

War-bands on Java

Military labour markets described
in VOC sources



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Acknowledgments: Never mind, always wonder.

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by

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British English

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Ein Javan.

Ich liebe Tapferkeit und bin von starcken kräften,
Mein Hollandt braucht mich wohl, in allerley geschäften
Ich fechte für sein heil mit schwerden kries und schild
Biß Java ruhig steht und füs sein Zulist [list] gestillt.

-

Casper Schmalkalden¹



¹ Casper Schmalkalden was a German VOC soldier, during his second voyage for the Company (1646-1652), he travelled to Java. See C. Schmalkalden, *Die wundersamen Reisen des Caspar Schmalkalden nach West- und Ostindien 1642-1652: Nach einer bisher unveröffentlichten Handschrift bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Wolfgang Joost Weinheim* (Michigan: Veb F.A. Brockhaus Verlag, 1987): 105.



Picture 1 Seventeenth century VOC map of Java and Madura. While drawn in 1695, the East Javanese hinterland data suggests it to be derived from sketches made in the late 1670s.²

² Maps prior to Hurd's campaign tend to only give details on the Pasisir; Hurd was the first to march inlands. Isaac de Graaff, "Kaart van het Eiland Java en Madura, met de verdeeling in districten en bezette posten in de Mataram." In *Atlas Amsterdam*, ed. Isaac de Graaff (Amsterdam: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, circa 1695, completed in 1705). Nationaal Archief, VEL1157 (accessed via <http://proxy.handle.net/10648/af9922d2-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84>, on 24-03-2014).



Picture 2 Map of coastal Central- and Eastern Java, including the tip of Madura: from Semarang to Surabaya. Made around 1695, but likely based on the campaigns in the late 1670s.³

³ Isaac de Graaff, "Landkaart van Cheribon tot Golongong en de negory Madoera, van Samarang tot Grouda Langs de Kust, en van Mataram tot Blietar." In *Atlas Amsterdam*, ed. Isaac de Graaff (Amsterdam: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, circa 1695, completed in 1705). Nationaal Archief, VEL1163 (accessed via <http://proxy.handle.net/10648/af992610-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84>, on 24-04-2014).

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1. Introduction: Walis, warrior charismas, and mandalas

This thesis concerns hallowed men like Trunajaya. To introduce him, I will narrate his death. After bringing the great Javanese realm of Mataram to its knees and enmeshing the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in a bloody four-year conflict, he perished on the mountaintop now bearing his name.⁴ A witch-hunt of many months preceded his capture, during which most former allies abandoned him. His demise in 1679 was almost as rapid as his rise in 1675. After chasing him from stronghold to stronghold, the VOC had finally left the warrior on his last legs.⁵

But while stepping out of his hiding place on the mountain's crown, the persona that had attracted so many to fight along his side still stood tall and proud. Like "the holiest of priests", he appeared in his "Portuguese garment of black satin, a black turban with golden rings on his head and a long black staff in his hand".⁶ Dressed in black, the warlord embodied the mythical "young conqueror" that he proclaimed to be five years earlier. Yet, all he conquered was lost and soon merely his legacy would remain. He could only point the finger at himself: "itu betah punya salah"; it was his own fault.⁷

Indeed he built the hierarchy of insurgents, and he led it crumble. The remnant of his power was the very personality that he still portrayed, or lived for that matter. An amalgam of Walisanga legends, Majapahit roots, Madurese nobility and multiple conquests, his myth had propelled people of many backgrounds to join the uprising against the ruler or Sunan of Mataram. Now, the Sunan had his opponent on his kris' end; caught between him and the VOC as shown on the cover. But even while he tore Trunajaya's body apart and fed it to his servants, the man's mystical impact would not perish.⁸

Above and beyond all else, this impact was one of a socio-religious identification among martial gangs. My aim is to examine how the VOC sources described and comprehended these fraternizations. Men can fight for glory, gain and nation. But often they are chiefly stirred by

⁴ This is the mountain now known as the Gunung Trunajaya by locals and located at Limbangan, Kendal, Central Java. See J.J. Briel, "Letter LXV (28 December, 1679)." In *De Opkomst van het Nederlansch Gezag in Oost-Indië: Verzameling van Onuitgegeven Stukken uit het Oud-Koloniaal Archief Deel Zeven*, eds. J.K.J. De Jonge (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1873): 289.; and H.J. De Graaf, "Gevangenneming en dood van raden Truna-Djaja, 26 Dec. 1679- 2 Jan. 1680." *Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* 85, no. 2 (1952): 308.

⁵ J.J. Briel and J. Couper, "Letter LXII-LXVI (28 December, 1679-12 January, 1680)." In *De Opkomst van*: 279-296.

⁶ The quotes are translated from "allerheyligsten priester" and "Portugees gewaait van swart sattyn, een swarte tulbant om zyn hooft met goude bantjes en een swarte lange stock in zyn handt." See Briel, "Letter LXV": 289-293 and De Graaf, "Gevangenneming": 299-300

⁷ As will be clarified later, Trunajaya means "young conqueror"; the name of birth of Trunajaya was likely Nila Prawata. His statement was made in Malay: "Itoe beta ponja sala, dat bet syn eygen schult was", literary 'this stand [capture], [I] have fault'. Trunajaya does explain he sought agreement with the Sunan before, and wanted to return the stolen regalia. See Briel, "Letter LXV": 291.

⁸ This depiction of Trunajaya's death relies on the Babad Tanah Jawi and the Serat Kanda. He was first stabbed by the Sunan, after which bupatis (local governors) and servants cut him further. Then, subordinates ate Trunajaya's liver and the Surabayan brothers Jangrana and Angga-Jaja were forced to smear the blood over their faces. The body's head was cut off and all female servants wiped their feet on it before going to sleep. Bruised and battered, the head was pulverized on a rice-block the day after. De Graaf, "Gevangenneming": 304. Notice that Walisanga is written without a space between; as is done in Indonesian too and Susuhunan is shortened to Sunan for convenience.

something different. Groups of warriors tend to constitute a cult centring around leading figures, usually of a saintly character. Fighters huddled along chieftains, appealed by both their worldly and mythical allure.

The symbolic unity this brings to bands of warfare commonly forms the backbone of any larger institution of martial power; be it armies or realms. As such, the socio-religious identification within war-bands is not only key to understanding war itself, but the society in which it is fought too. Fighting men do not merely seek social glories; they equally shape and define them through the most fundamental martial ties. Even up to the point that preserving the war-band itself becomes the reason to fight. The warlord stood on top of these fraternizations and can be defined as ‘a territorial ruler, aristocrat or town representative raising troops he can allocate to military enterprisers’.⁹ On their turn, war-bands can be seen as groups of warriors abiding to such lords, however partially it may be.

The war-bands investigated here roamed Central and East Java between 1677 and 1679. Those two years were chaotic and bloody; stirred up by contested successions and insurgence. A mixed group of warriors were involved; originating from Makassar, Madura, Ambon, Java itself, and varying regions of Western Europe. Even though I draw a heuristic line between the indigenous warriors (*pejuang*) and the European ones, there never existed two clearly defined opposite camps during these tumultuous times.¹⁰ Smaller war-bands could easily shift from one side to the other. Attempts to muster these itinerant troops resulted in a complicated military labour market. To win a war, attracting most soldiers was crucial.

Earlier work has stressed the difficulties of doing so within the divided Javanese society. Courtly intrigues limited the degree to which the kraton’s war force could be counted on.¹¹ Charney claims these *prajurits* or court soldiers were even less reliable than mercenaries from outside Java.¹² Some limited means were available to demand obedience from local war forces. Anderson, Moertono and Wolters, for instance, describe a spiritual and material ‘Cult of Glory’ surrounding

⁹ This definition is inspired by Redlich’s and Parrott’s one of European warlords. The ‘businesses of war’ on Java and in Europe were of course not the same, especially after the latter’s military boom in the 1670s. Yet, the abstract definition of a warlord does suffice for both contexts, certainly when taking into account that local rulers could operate largely independently in both parts of the world. Parrott designates the warlord “as the party contracting with the military enterpriser for the raising of troops”. Since Javanese warfare was characterized by warlords avoiding contracts, I shaped a slightly different connotation to the description. Parrott’s notion of ‘military enterpriser’ and ‘general contractor’ were left on the shelf since no Javanese equivalents of them could be found in the period under investigation (1677-1679). See D. Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 22-23.

¹⁰ *Pejuang* is an Indonesian word for ‘warrior’ or ‘combative’. It is used to distinguish the indigenous alliances from the Asian legion in Batavia. It also avoids the connotation of ‘indigenous’ fighters, soldiers or warriors; which implies sedentary domestic forces rather than itinerant ones. Being of Malay origin, the term ‘*pejuang*’ was not used within the Javanese language and should thus be taken as a heuristic device. A Javanese equivalent is avoided since the term is not restricted to Javanese troops.

¹¹ The kraton is the Javanese court.

¹² Notice that *prajurit* were usually those soldiers without distinction, as Bertrand tells about the ‘nobles of the sword’: “Un fonctionnaire royal de haut rang ne pouvait faire carrier sans prouver régulièrement sa valeur militaire. Inversement, un simple soldat (*prajurit*) qui avait démontré son courage au combat pouvait se voir offrir un apanage et un titre par le souverain.” See R. Bertrand, *État colonial, noblesse et nationalisme à Java: la Tradition parfaite (XVII^e -XX^e siècles)*. (Paris, Karthala, 2005): 73.

warlords and Sunans. Yet, monopolies on sacred power did not exist and cults could easily fall apart.¹³ Mustering men was a dynamic process with constant shifts in demand and supply.

Although Charney and Moertono touch on some issues of military exchange, there is much more to tell about the Javanese war business.¹⁴ Fraternizations, myths and warrior charismas are marginalized within Charney's account and simplified as a 'theatre state' in Moertono's one.¹⁵ The notion of a 'military labour market' can be extended to tackle these topics more convincingly. For Java this has never been fully attempted, but for the Indian subcontinent it has. Therefore, I like to draw a parallel across the Indian Ocean, taking the historiography on Mughal warfare as a starting point. State-formation in both areas has been described in strikingly similar terms, so setting their way of warring side by side is only called for.¹⁶

On the Indian subcontinent, Mughal emperors could achieve dominance over large spans of land by gradually controlling the warriors in outer regions.¹⁷ Dirk Kolff's work has been seminal in explaining this process; showing how this type of market generated socio-religious identities on its own terms. A gap persisted between identification within the aristocratic lineage hierarchies of the court and the heterogeneous, meritocratic order on the battle lines. The open distribution of loot and agrarian profits of the latter went beyond ethnic and religious boundaries; enabling the

¹³ B. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture." In *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, eds C. Holt et al. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972): 1-69; S. Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century* (Sheffield: Equinox Publishing, 2009): 72, 79, 89; and O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1999): 18-19, 93-95.

¹⁴ Charney describes these Southeast Asian -not Javanese specifically- courtly intrigues as part of "complex organizations in which labor and land, the bases of power, were internally divided among competing elites, and among whom the ruler was often simply the *primus inter pares*. (...) It was for this reason that the great warrior kings of the region emerged during interregnums, when governing or social institutions had broken down or weakened sufficiently to release large supplies of manpower now available to be harnessed by a warrior-cum-king". Calling for mercenaries could thus avoid such fleeting supplies of manpower. Yet, mercenary practices were intervened by the naval power of the VOC that limited the ability of the Sunan to ship in warriors from other islands. Despite these statements, Charney never made the attempt to investigate "many of the inner workings of political and social institutions and their organization of manpower". This will be done in this thesis. Moertono also noticed how "the base characteristic of the army lay (...) in the closely knit cores of trusted followers of the commander". A 'Cult of Glory' was abided to that both had a material and a spiritual side. Most rebels seemed to have aimed for solidifying these close ties as "the purpose of an uprising seemed almost always to set up an independent government, complete with all ceremonial paraphernalia and a full set of dignitaries". See M. Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare 1300-1900* (Michigan: The University of Michigan, 2004): 130, 213, and 224; Moertono, *State and Statecraft*: 72, 79, 89; O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture*: 18-19, 93-95; and L. Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch Tiger: The Dutch East Indies Company and the Northeast Coast of Java, 1680-1743* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996): 36-37.

¹⁵ These academics proposed a ritual or theatre state based on the work of C. Geertz. One implication of their view is that the intervention of European powers is described as unnatural to the indigenous traditions and hierarchies. However, the close interaction and integration of VOC soldiers into Javanese political and martial struggles undermines this assumption. See Anderson, "The Idea of Power": 1-69; C. Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980); S. Kartodirdjo, *Protest movements in rural Java: A study of agrarian unrest in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973): 64-79; and B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke, vol II* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1957): 9, 76, 79, 88, 97-99

¹⁶ This is not to claim an encompassing history of 'Indian' or 'Indianized' civilizations. Rather, it is to propose a more flexible outlook on the manner in which the armed events laid the foundation of the larger Javanese kingdoms or mandalas, as that of Mataram or Majapahit. The history of these realms has paralleled that of 'Indian' ones. As Subrahmanyam observed: "historiographically at least, state formation in Southeast Asia and India appears to be portrayed in startlingly similar terms. In the Southeast Asian case, the static and cyclical notions of the state are to be encountered as much as in pre-colonial India ...". He mainly refers to the stress put on charismas rather than institutions. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "State Formation and Transformation in Early Modern India and Southeast Asia," In *India and Indonesia during the Ancient Regime*, eds. P.J. Marshall, R. Van Niel et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1989): 91-109.

¹⁷ Be it *ghazis*, *Naukar*, *Raiputs* or *Sepoys*.

attraction of a mingled and diverse crowd.¹⁸ When successful, warlords assembled a large amount of soldiers, thereby threatening the power-base of the official state.¹⁹

Both conscription and ascription were resorted to; troops could be forced into military service for a longer time or mustered for temporary projects. Unlike expected, the temporary troops still attributed statuses to their group. Even when jumping from one fight to another, a strong socio-religious group identity persisted.²⁰ Market competition was at the core of identification. The constant attempt to attract the most warriors and thereby establish political dominance created a 'tussle' in which religion could become a central tool for military rivals.²¹

Perhaps the most dominant notion in this regard is the ideal of the frontier-warrior: the *Ghazi*. The legend of the *Ghazis* is one describing warriors of faith offering their services for the holy war. Yet, in many pre-modern contexts, *ghazis* are commonly referred to as charismatic chiefs of war-bands wandering in search of booty rather than sanctity. What is more, the concept of the *ghazi* warrior often subscribes to "an eclectic image" feared by the more "orthodox strands" of religion.²²

The intricacies of the image varied, however. Linda Darling conducted an encompassing survey on the *Ghazi* throughout the Muslim world and discovered that the definition of the term differed among the communities of the frontier societies. The notion comprised anything from tribal looters, orthodox theorists to antinomian Sufis.²³ Conflicting contents were thus given to a single term, allowing opposite ideologies to apply the same name. From this viewpoint, the *ghazi* frontier-warriors were many, not one.

¹⁸ As is shown by authors as D. Kolff and J. Gommans, South Asian war-bands could attract warriors of different backgrounds and hurdle them together under the martial banner. Even when warring was only a seasonal activity by peasants after having harvested their crops, regional affinities could easily submerge in the heat of battle and while roaming the lands. J. Gommans, *Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire 1500-1700* (London: Routledge, 2002); and Dirk Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy: The Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market of Hindustan, 1450-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 42-56, especially 44 and 47. On the Raiputs it is said that "the act of leaving their fields and families behind was also a religious expression of social dissociation, coming very near to the Hindu ideal of the world-renouncing sannyasi". On the *ghazis* it is stated how "their camaraderie stemmed from a togetherness of deeds sealed in various plundering expeditions and raids".

¹⁹ Kolff aims "to place the market for peasant soldiers itself at the centre of my enquiry" can be said to show the genealogy of several communities. Notice that the demand and supply effect could go in both ways. The demand from the court was determined by the total amount ('supply') of active war-bands. Among other reasons, war-bands started roaming because of unfulfilled demands for (agricultural) sustenance which in some cases could be due to misguided state politics. Kolff's indications of such processes can be found in Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput*: 169 and 191. See also *idem.*: 58, 127, and 195.

²⁰ It should be remembered, however, that "[n]o single identity covered all aspects of a man's life. (...) As no identity covered all fields of action or all spheres of life, it had to be complemented by others." Moreover, "these identities were chosen, not acquired by birth or ascribed". See *ibid.*: 58, 65, 67, 121, 132, 148, 153, 182, 194-195.

²¹ Everything depended on the shifts in the balance of power between the parties and the unending negotiating process that from time to time reformulated 'the terms of the alliance'. Frequent were the frictions between the landholding and service parties and the crown prince versus the 'rebel son'. See *ibid.*: 123 and 126.

²² Notice the use of capitals to distinguish the Ghazi myth from the ghazi warrior. Within the Mughal Empire, they can be contrasted with the *mirza* or *Rajput* who were settled and tied to the palaces. Still, the empire also needed "to accommodate as many as possible of these migratory, armed bands". They had wide-ranging connections through extensive business relations, potentiating them as effective stooges. These relations could, however, also be employed by the Mughal's opponents. This made it vital to attract them to one's side, yet this was troubled by the ascetic *Ghazi* faith stressing renunciation. See Gommans, *Mughal Warfare*: 40, 43, 49-51, 67 and 88.

²³ She also stresses finding a balance between the agency of the historical figure studied and the legacies dedicated to him or her. Anooshar himself states that "those who are interested in how Darling's 'tribal looters, orthodox theorist and antinomian Sufis' became *ghazis* may wish to apply the findings and methodology of this [my] book if they find it appropriate or useful". See A. Anooshar, *The Ghazi Sultans and the Frontiers of Islam: The Ghazi Sultans and the Frontiers of Islam: A Comparative Study of the Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008): 10; and L. Darling, "Contested Territories: Ottoman Holy War in Comparative Context." *Studia Islamica* 91 (2000): 133-163.

On the other hand, imitation of legends did tie these mystical warriors together. Normally, art and literature were intrinsic to the self-conception and identification of the fighters. A 'cosmopolis' of a preferred warrior charisma existed. Discourses of sacred kingship and charismatic sainthood were abundant in it, be it produced contemporary or in hindsight. For instance, the myth of the millennial sovereign –relying on astrology, divine intercession and magic- marked the rule of both Safavid Iran and Mughal India. Similar warrior charismas endured on large stretches of land.²⁴

They built on rites and were rooted in cults. Rituals and myths have been portrayed as temporary means to prepare for battle. Yet, cults were much more long-lasting than that. They crafted a mystical world of mingled religions and magnificent magic. The warlords heading the cults conducted such spiritual powers into an itinerant force desired by Mughal rulers. Bearing titles referring to saints and legends, they led ascetic lifestyles centred on mercenarism as much as praying. Their world renunciation went hand in hand with armed expertise.²⁵

Colonialism and institutionalization gradually turned warrior ascetics into ascetic soldiers, a process recalling Weber's contrast between personality and 'institutionalized life orders'. The mystic warrior was a child of its time; essential to a world filled with religious sects and lacking the regulatory impact of structured hierarchies.²⁶ But areas counted as much as eras. To use charisma effectively entailed an appropriation to local circumstances. It demanded an eclectic mix of religion and locality.²⁷ Those mixtures also occurred on Java.

²⁴ Sacred kingship could be constructed by subsequent generations and could equally substantiate spiritual power despite lacking physical one. Context thus matters a lot, for "sacred authority must be understood by paying close attention to its social dimension". The concept of cosmopolis can be used to see how different contexts overlapped. The concept is based on Pollock's work; it can be taken as constituted through a discourse of *Ghazis* and sacred kingship spread by the widely-used languages of Arabic and Persian. Both leave a uniformising impression on the societies they pass through and are adapted in; they implement similar narratives in different vernaculars. Thereby a linguistic pattern causes social parallels; for the ideal warrior will at some point shape the battles of real wars. Anooshar, *The Ghazi Sultans: 3-4, 9-11, and 165*; and A. Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam* (New York: Columbia UP, 2012): 8, 14, 24, and 225.

²⁵ R. Gerard, *Violence and the Sacred* (London: Athlone Press, 1988); L. Harlan, *The Goddesses' Henchmen: Gender in Indian Hero Worship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); A. Hildebeitel, *Draupadi among Rajputs, Muslims and Dalits: Rethinking India's Oral and Classical Epics* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); and William R. Pinch, *Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

²⁶ Turner perceives "important parallels between Max Weber's account of the routinization of charisma in military bureaucracies and Elias's analysis of the decline of militarized feudalism". He criticizes Elias' Civilizing Process to ignore "the historical and comparative importance of religious cultures and institutions" in military conflicts and social violence. Rather, he opts that warrior charisma "is conceptually part of an analytical framework that understands the dynamics of large-scale changes in religious institutions and the foundations of authority as outcomes of the violent impact of the sacred on the profane". See Pinch, *Warrior Ascetics*; and Bryan S. Turner, "Weber and Elias on religion and violence: warrior charisma and the civilizing process." In *The Sociology of Norbert Elias*, eds S. Loyal and S. Quilley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2004) 257 – 276.

²⁷ Take, for instance, Bayly who writes on "recently sedentarized ex-pastoralists and martial predator groups" in the South Indian hinterlands who crafted a "mixed and volatile cultural order in which traditions that would now be identified as those of formal Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity were all being formed, received and transmitted at the same time". Moin equally debates the ideas of a "vernacular Islam" and "syncretism", a hibernation of religion and locality, when treating Timur's influence in the Safavid Empire. S. Bayly, "Cult saints, heroes, and warrior kings: South Asian Islam in the making", in *Religion and Public Culture*, eds. K. E. Yandell & J. J. Paul (London: Routledge/Curzon, 2000): 194-196, 200, 201-202 and 206; and Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign*: 26, 56-60, and 90.

On the island, the most salient legend is that of the Walisanga or nine saints. Continuous adaptation of the myth was crucial in applying it to construct martial cults. As such, Javanese authors over time and space have persistently altered the composition of the holy men. Each new polity, dynasty or warlord could thereby underline the saints with whom they associated genealogically, geographically or historically. Three walis have been particularly popular in the late seventeenth century: Sunan Giri, Sunan Kudus and Sunan Kalijaga. Two others played a central role in the court chronicle of Mataram, the Babad Tanah Jawi: Sunan Bayat and Sunan Ampel Denta.²⁸

In general, the Walisanga are perceived as Islamic harbingers, the ones who converted the island. But some hints are given on their actual lives too. Sunan Giri set up an Islamic school, the Giri Kedaton, that would turn into a centre of resistance over the next two centuries. Sunan Kudus was known for attacking Majapahit, conquering a Hindu state in Pajang and was supposedly related to Jaka Tingkir; the progenitor of Mataram. Sunan Kalijaga influenced Jaka Tingkir directly and is remembered for the two mosques he built.²⁹ Yet, their true significance comes from their legacies and the authority their descendants could achieve.

Even the esteemed titles of Pangéran and Susuhunan were first coined for these holy men. It took decades before a secular connotation became attached to the designations. But when it did, nobles immediately erased the religious sides of them. The power it casted over the titleholder was to be reserved for the royals. Wali descendants who still dared to call themselves Pangéran were ridiculed; showing how the new generation of political actors had replaced the religious harbingers. But outside of the court, the Wali legend was still beloved and honoured. The Giri saints thwarted Mataram, and Sunan Bayat's grave site in Tembayat remained a locus of insurgency.³⁰ At the same time, the kraton resorted to the Wali lore to stabilize their authority in the periphery of their realm.

²⁸ It should be realized that the Sunans did in general not write themselves. In fact, illiteracy gradually became a status symbol showing that nobles did not have waste their time to administrative pickles. Of course the court did command chronicles to be written by courtiers to show their genealogical links to previous rulers and respected figures. See J. Fox, "Sunan Kalijaga and the Rise of Mataram: A Reading of the Babad Tanah Jawi as a Genealogical Narrative," in *Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought & Society*, ed. P. Riddell and A. Street (Leiden: Brill, 1997): 187–218. Shifts within dynasties occurred too, just consider how Sultan Agung's admiration of certain walis turned into Amangkurat I's antipathy towards them and in particular towards Sunan Giri. See H.J. De Graaf, *De Expeditie van Anthonio Hurdt, Raad van Indië, als Admiraal en Superintendent naar de Binnenlanden van Java. Werken van de Linschoten Vereeniging deel 72* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971): 3 and 49; and D.A. Rinkes, *Nine Saints of Java* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1996).

²⁹ The last powerful Panembahan of Giri was killed in April 1680. Sunan Kalijaga is still influential today, Sukarno for instance referred to him within his ideologies. How sensitive the topic is today, became clear when Suharto banned Muljana's book on the initial Islamization of the archipelago. Muljana stresses the Chinese descent of the Wali Sanga, relying on alternative sources to the Babad Tanah Jawi. This undermined Suharto's ill treatment of the Chinese community. See H.J. De Graaf and T.G. Pigeaud, *Islamic states in Java 1500-1700. Eight Dutch Books and Articles by Dr H.J. de Graaf* (Leiden: KITLV, 1976): 7-8; N. Florida, *Writing the Past, Inscribing the Future: History as Prophecy in Colonial Java* (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1995); S. Muljana, *Runtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu-Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara-negara Islam di Nusantara* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005/1968); S. Al Qurtuby, *Bongkar Sejarah atas Peranan Tionghoa dalam Penyebaran Agama Islam di Nusantara Abad XV & XVI* (Yogyakarta: Inspeal Press, 2003); and M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001): 45, 46 55, 96, 97, and 99.

³⁰ As Moedjanto has stressed, entitlements were an essential feature of constituting royal rule and geneology. The use of the saintly titles was hence a way to construct a powerful mandala though increasing the statuses of central rulers. As De Graaf writes: "Het ligt daarom voor de hand, dat na de islamisering de pas omhoog gekomen vorsten, die aanvankelijk allen pati genoemd werden, hun aanzien hebben trachten te verhogen door de verwerving van geestelijke titels". These titles never constituted a separate warrior caste, however, as Houben and Kolff observed. The label of Sênapati Ingalaga or 'honourable commander in battle' does come closest to a martial class. It was carried by multiple warlords among whom Sultan Agung prior to getting his Sultan title. See H.J. De Graaf, "Titels en namen van Javaanse

In the seventeenth century, courtly interests and Wali legends thus both clashed and complemented each other. Evident parallels can thus be drawn to the *Ghazis* on the Indian subcontinent.³¹ This stresses once more that the era under concern was primarily one of Late “Islamization”, rather than Early Modernity.³² All around the Indian Ocean, religious motivations to escape the grudge of central capitals persisted. Adopting these Islamic convictions at the court, could transform potential enemies into partners. Sultan Agung –the most renowned ruler of Mataram (r. 1613-1645)- succeeded in doing so when visiting the holy graveyard Tembayat and Amangkurat II assigned a descendant of the Walisanga to bless his inauguration and edit the court chronicles. Both sought to turn religious rebellion in support and thereby increase their status as divine lords or *wahyu kaprabon*.³³

That rulers turned to Islam to bring their subjects to obedience is almost natural in the realms they governed. Both in Java and northern India, hierarchies were limited and fragile. Wolter’s mandalas can be both applied to the Mughal Empire and Mataram.³⁴ Unlike states, mandalas are not defined by their rigid borders, but rather by their strong centres. The periphery was instead ambiguous and could consist out of numerous tributary polities with relative autonomous local leaders. The ties between these leaders and the overlord were personal not administrative, and

vorsten en groten uit de 16^{de} en 17^{de} eeuw.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 109, no. 1 (1953): 62-82, 67-69, and 74-78; V.J.H. Houben and D.H.A. Kolff, “Between Empire Building and State Formation; Official Elites in Java and Mughal India.” In *India and Indonesia during the Ancien Regime; Comparative History of India and Indonesia vol. III*, eds. P.J. Marschall et al. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1989): 185; G. Moedjanto, *Konsep Kekuasaan Jawa: Penerapannya oleh Raja-raja Mataram* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1987): 17-24; and Ricklefs, *A History*: 53, 55, 96, 97, and 99.

³¹ Gommans, *Mughal Warfare*: 46.

³² From this perspective, one could consider Java as part of the Late Al-Hind. Al-Hind is that region east of the Middle East; the stretches beyond Mesopotamia still largely inhabited by *kāfirs* around the tenth century. Wink applied it as a heuristic concept indicating a greater ‘Indian realm’ or cosmopolis. This is a usage based on the work of Ronald Inden and deemed controversial due to the neglect of the distinction between Hind and Sind. Yet, as a heuristic tool ‘Late al-Hind’ does function. While his use of the term has met criticism, it can be broadened to emphasize a movement of ‘Islamization’ that rings more bells than the movement towards modernity stressed by the more conventional periodization. Accordingly, the Malay world might be taken as the most eastern span of Al-Hind. Notice that Ricci and Pollock dismiss this term “Islamization” as vague and misleading. Their proposed concept of cosmopolis would highlight the more complicated dynamics of Islam as a spreading religion. Although, agreeing with their viewpoints. I would also argue that an expanding Islamic cosmopolis could be described as a form of Islamization in itself. Sunil Kumar, “Review Andre Wink, al-Hind.” *Studies in History* 10 (1994): 147.

³³ Amangkurat II’s scribe and holy man was known as Panembahan Natapraja or ‘Pangéran Adilangu I from Demak’ and was a direct descent of Sunan Kalijaga. His task was to supplement Amangkurat II’s martial victories, boosting his *kadigdayan* or invincibility, with the godly gift of sovereignty or *wahyu kaprabon*. J. Ras, “Geschiedschrijving en de legitimiteit van het koningschap op Java.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde* 150, no. 3 (1994): 531-532.

³⁴ Notice that I prefer the term ‘mandala’ over ‘negara’ to stress the comparison with the Indian subcontinent. Mandala is a term describing political realms defined primarily by their centre rather than their periphery. In other words, borders were not rigid and regions removed from the capital could easily shift alliances. Hereby, a power dynamic emerged quite different from the current nation-states. As Houben and Kolff showed, this dynamic can be found in both a patrimonial and prebendalist form in respectively Mataram and the Mughal Empire. They naturally refrain from the term mandala (which only gained its current meaning in 1999) but do notice how the Javanese *priyayi* and the Mughal *umara* both combined aspects of the ideal warrior-administrator” and were used to keep the divergent realm together while at the same time completely subjecting to the monarch. In Java, the patrimonial ties between the monarch and his rulers strongly favoured personal relationships that could easily break apart when individual rulers passed away or deserted. See R. Bertrand, *L'Histoire à Parts Égales: Récits d'une Rencontre Orient-Occident (XVIe-XVIIe siècle)* (Paris: Seuil, 2011): 323-346; Houben and Kolff “Between Empire Building”: 165-194; and Wolters. *History, Culture*.

hence likely to shift. Wink stresses how the governmental relations were weakened by *fitna*; a drive to secession and upheaval.³⁵

The continuous courtly incorporation of local elites usually led to many compromises. Over time, “regional élites grew excessively powerful economically, and asserted themselves *vis-à-vis* the central power”. A process of *fitna* would then easily break the realm apart. For men like Ibn Khaldun or Emperor Jahangir, *fitna* forced alliances opposing the leaders of polities; as to prevent all-dominating rulers and realms.³⁶ Besides testing the faith of individual believers, *fitna* was thus also perceived as a check on authoritarianism. Still, central rulers could resort to nepotism, warfare and myth to prolong their rule and quiet down the secessionist urges of their subordinate courtiers and elites.

Gaining the upper hand in the military labour market was crucial to reach this aim; for control was not only lacking over the outer areas, but also over the warriors residing or roaming there. A complicated ‘war business’ developed in which political networks, geographical frontiers and warrior charismas could tip the scales. For this reason, it is worth investigating to what degree the *zamindari* landlords can be juxtaposed to the Pangérans, how the Central Javanese-East Javanese-Pasisir relations were similar to those of arid and monsoon India, and how both *Ghazis* and Walisanga were able to mould ethnic and religious identities.³⁷ With this purpose in mind, some particularities of Java need to be mentioned.

In comparison with South Asia, Houben and Kolff have stressed the limited immigrant élite on Java.³⁸ Nonetheless, mobility certainly impacted the island and the warfare on it. Two factors were of specific influence on the Javanese military labour network: the infrastructure and the

³⁵ Like Wink has stressed, *fitna* functioned as a “normal political mechanism of state-formation or annexation and, as it were, the negative basis of universal dominion”. The last clause refers to the Hindu belief in an ideal dharma crossing over ethnic identities and establishing universal dominion. The dharma realm was considered unachievable, however. In its counter-world of the here and now, such homogenizations were to be upset by successions and ethnic divisions to oppose monopolies of power. Alliances in and outside the mandala kept political balance, preventing certain polities to gain the upper hand. In fact; “objectively, *fitna* implies no more than the forging of alliances, it is thus (...) not primarily determined by the use of military power”. Even though, Wink can be easily criticized for asserting a constant vision on insurgence throughout many ages- a common sin of Orientalism- his effort to limelight the religious motives of political resistance is very informative. See A. Wink, “Sovereignty and universal dominion in South Asia.” *Indian Economic Social History Review* 21 (1984): 270, 274, 279, and 282.

³⁶ Jahangirnama, for instance, carefully avoids using the term *fitna* with the aim to “downplay the threat to imperial order posed by princely rebellions”. See M. D. Faruqi, *The Princes of the Mughal Empire, 1504-1719* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 189; S. Subrahmanyam, “State Formation and Transformation in Early Modern India and Southeast Asia.” in *India and Indonesia during the Ancien Regime; Comparative History of India and Indonesia vol. III*, eds. P.J. Marschall et al. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1989): 95-96; and Wink, “Sovereignty and universal”: 277 and 283.

³⁷ Careful attention needs to be paid here to the role of heredity, however. The Central Javanese-Pasisir relations reveal crucial aspects of the influence rebellious turmoil had on the religious ideology created at the court. Carey indicated the cultural (ranging from architecture to music) and political ties between the centre and periphery of the empire. His survey shows large progressive influences of the latter on the former, which brings to question how the shifting relations between these regions changed the cultural and religious expressions of the ‘Asabiyyah’ sought for by the Sunan. See P. Carey, “Civilization on Loan: The Making of an Upstart Polity: Mataram and Its Successors, 1600-1830.” *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1997): 711-734; idem., “Core and Periphery, 1600-1830: The Pasisir Origins of Central Javanese “High Court” Culture.” in *Regions and Regional Developments in the Malay-Indonesian World*, ed. Bernhard Dahm (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992); and Gommans, *Mughal Warfare*: 68-69, 90-91, and 96-97.

³⁸ They claim: “[w]hereas in Java the ruling élite, though from different parts of the island, was almost exclusively Javanese, in most of India the aristocracy was made up of various religious and ethnic elements.” Houben and Kolff, “*Between Empire Building*”: 171-183.

demographic spread.³⁹ The first was largely limited to the larger rivers, roads and northern coastal waters. Inland mobility was restricted by volcanoes, mountains, jungles and flooding. At the same time, villages tended to be rather isolated. The three to four million Javanese were “clustered in pockets of population” across hundreds of kilometres.⁴⁰ Moving from one place to another would often be an adventurous pursuit. Still, many did move.

The motivations for migration contrasted. Inhabitants could be attracted to pilgrimage, assisting a rebel leader, or could be imposed to attend a kraton gathering. Quite often, however, the decisions were stirred by the dynamics of the military market. Determining where to move usually involved an acceptance of either the state hierarchy or the forces fighting against it. Individuals travelled in different directions, and war-bands marched to the beat of different drummers and gamelan sets. The reasons of lesser notables to “endorse or reject royal authority” thus explain more than just the “political history” of Java.⁴¹ The trends in mobility were equally shaped by it. A martial history of Java should therefore attend to marches as much as battles and courtly intrigues.

In this light, the movements from the coast or deep woods to the royal hinterlands were particularly important. Compared to Demak and even Prajat, Mataram was located far inland. Although secure from hostile maritime forces, the control of the Pasisir and Eastern Java was equally limited. Amangkurat I made several attempts to subdue the coastal areas through disposal of bupati and the introduction of new taxes. But the Sunan was never the “natural” ruler of the north coast. Nor was he of the thick forest east of the Brantas. Rivalries between these areas never faded out. As a consequence, particular cultural and political interactions developed between the core and periphery of Mataram, or -to use the Javanese division- the *nagaragung* (core-regions), the *mancanagara* (outer-regions) and the *pasisir* (coastal regions).⁴²

Beyond the *nagaragung*, local rulers or *bupati* needed to be employed. Nepotism was involved, since many of them tended to be ex-courtiers and thus affiliated with the kraton. But even when friends and family were sent to the periphery, autocracy was in vain. The wide-spread belief in

³⁹ Some readers might be reminded of Schrieke’s “primary factors” of the “Javanese people” and the “Javanese landscape”. Notice, however, that Schrieke emphasizes immobility rather than mobility. My statement should, moreover, not be taken to assert a changeless society, these characteristics instead were two main axes through which change occurred. Mobility and infrastructure, often propelled by military events, made Java very dynamic indeed. For Schrieke’s division see Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. 2*: 99-101.

⁴⁰ One major difference between the Mughal mandala and the Mataramese one is the sheer population size. For the Mughal mandala this could be estimated at 150 million in 1700. Indications for Java are harder to get, but Reid has estimated that the total population of the entire island must have been around four million in 1600 and five million two centuries later. Ricklefs even suggests these numbers to be too high. It can hence be deduced that Mataram had about two percent of the Mughal population. See J. F. Richards, “The Mughals and their Contemporaries.” In *The New Cambridge history of India: The Mughal Empire*, Gordon Johnson, ed. C. A. Bayly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 1, 190; Ricklefs, *A History*: 19, idem., *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Norwalk : East Bridge Signature Books, 2006): 3, 36; idem., *War, Culture, and Economy in Java, 1677-1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura Period* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993): 5 and 7; and Schrieke, *Studies vol II*: 139.

⁴¹ The most noticeable kraton gatherings were the Garebegs. See Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 9.

⁴² Anderson, “The Idea of Power”: 1-69; Carey, “Civilization on Loan”: 711-734; Houben and Kolff, “Between Empire Building”: 179; Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch Tiger*: 16, 26-33, 36-39 and 25; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 7 and 9.

sacred power did not entail acceptance of the Sunan's authority. The Sunan was not the supreme leader the VOC men sometimes assumed he was. In fact, "the mobilisation of economic or manpower resources" could only be achieved through persuading, pressuring or threatening local rulers "with more direct control of resources". Albeit several means were available to the Sunan, one was specifically resorted to; military power. Military marches to and fro the periphery at times resembled religious processions in an aggressive search for supporters.⁴³

In the vein of Ricklefs; "at bottom, what held this state together was force or the threat of force". The Javanese army consisted of both professional soldiers and peasants. The former were closely tied to the court and well equipped. The latter wandered around, changing from one side to another and drafted temporarily by different warlords. What is more, they heavily outnumbered the soldiers. The Sunan's force can be expected to have been around 300.000 in normal times.⁴⁴ But underneath this number hides a motley crew. Conscripting these men required tactics that had to take account of the dominant trends in martial supply and demand. Active persuasion and local presence were needed to compete with other armed forces.

All in all, the most salient characteristics of this labour market did remain the same in the seventeenth century. Ricklefs and De Graaf, for instance, noticed central locations repetitively used for rebellions as well as a consistent courtly inability to control border areas. The frictions between the coast and the inlands kept returning. And so did the reliance upon religiously tinted identifications, which in this century were largely steered by Islam. Most importantly, the hierarchical social structures propelling the martial demand were essentially left unchanged. It is rather the social mobility within them that was facilitated by continuous insurgence.⁴⁵ That very mobility became a feature of the hierarchy and accomplished opportunities within the military labour market. New fights entailed desertions but also fresh vacancies.

⁴³ Houben and Kolff noticed a stronger tendency for local control in Java: "in Java the local power base of the *priyayi* was essential to the functioning of the realm, whereas in Mughal India the *umara* lacked such a power base." But what they conclude from this is less convincing: "[t]he military corollary of these structural differences was that in Java feudal levies and native armies were of primary importance, while in India the central phenomena were mercenaries and a relatively open military labour market". As this thesis shows, migrating war-bands certainly played a key role in Javanese military affairs. See Anderson, "*The Idea of Power*": 19, 25; Bertrand, *État Colonial*: 86-90; Houben and Kolff, "*Between Empire Building*": 179-180, and 183; Nagtegaal, *Ridging the Dutch*: 36-39; W. Remmelink, "De Worsteling om Java." In *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie*, eds. Gerrit Knaap en Ger Teitler (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002): 342; idem., *The Chinese War and the collapse of the Javanese state, 1725-1743* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994): 12-31; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 8.

⁴⁴ That is about a third of what the VOC delegate Van Goens suggested. See Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 8 and 13-14.

⁴⁵ The social structures propelling the martial demand were characterized by rebelling peripheries. As Ricklefs states on regional rulers: "outside of the capital city, regional families were often powerful". Specific locations were especially prone to counteract central power; chiefly at the Central-Eastern coast (*Pasisir*) and in East Java (*Blambangan*, contemporary Banyuwangi, formally this is part of the Pasisir too). Not coincidentally, these regions also harboured many migrant communities. What is more, *Blambangan* was the place Islam and Hinduism clashed most violently after the sixteenth century. Margana and Kwee found similar patterns among the migrant communities found in this area during the first half of the eighteenth century. Schrieke underlines a similar potential for mobility throughout the early modern times. This explains continuity in infrastructure and demarcations of provincial borders. See Houben and Kolff, "*Between Empire Building*": 181; K. H. Kian, *The Political Economy of Java's Northeast Coast, c. 1740-1800: Elite Synergy* (Leiden: Brill, 2006); S. Margana, *Java's last frontier; the struggle for hegemony of Blambangan c.1763-1813* (Leiden; Leiden University, 2007); Ricklefs, *War, culture*: 3, 6, 7, 226; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 102-120.

Insurgences, in this sense, were indirectly fuelling a motor that kept the mandala running. A look at the organization of the Amangkurat II's war-bands evidences the market's durability. The Sunan was constantly in search for supporters. He seemed to have used a clear strategy to gather them. This particularly comes forward when he adjusted the VOC war plans for attacking Kediri. During negotiations on 29 October 1677 between the Sunan and the lower lords, Speelman laid out his strategy for a direct attack from Surabaya. The Sunan urged to start the campaign inland instead, leaving more opportunities for achieving new coalitions.⁴⁶

The VOC's interference thus did not alter the fundamental scheme of campaigning. It mainly exerted influence on minor tactical concerns. Not only were European clothes and drilling methods partly adapted; technologies equally transmitted.⁴⁷ Conversely, the close operations with Asian war-bands and the pre-eminence of these soldiers certainly did shape Dutch warfare as well. In fact, one cannot escape the relevance of the "Javanese military labour market" for the Dutch inland offensives.

The Company and the Sunan shared aims. From Ricklefs' viewpoint, both parties had a similar "culture of war" and a comparable quest to instil a "stable new order in Java".⁴⁸ Even though the notion of this order differed, the means used to fight for it could overlap. An overarching question emerges on the mutual understanding between the two parties on conducting war and attracting alliances. Were similar tactics used to gather mobile warriors to one's side and was the appreciation of fraternization akin?

Since the VOC entered a labour market unlike European ones, misinterpretations were commonplace. At times, the Company men were left whistling in the dark. In this thesis, I consider what their sources still reveal about war-bands and the mandala plus military labour markets in which they operated. I discuss how they framed the martial activities of warlords like Trunajaya or Amangkurat II and, indirectly, the Company itself. For this purpose, I take a closer look at the VOC sources written in the midst of conflict.

When it comes down to it, the conflict of the late 1670's was also one between two martial cultures. Therefore, I set off my inquiry by contrasting the Javanese and VOC ways of warring (chapter 2). Secondly, I describe how those contrasts were highlighted within different historiographical strands (chapter 3). Thirdly, I reflect on the elaborate reports of two VOC admirals to consider how they bridged the gap between their conscribed and controlled Batavian troops and the spontaneous alliances with 'indigenous' warriors or pejuang. Questions will be asked on their

⁴⁶ De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 18 and 41.

⁴⁷ To what extent they did is a much more controversial issue that led to debates on technological development *avant la lettre*; before the so-called first-, second and third world nations were categorized in a developmentalist sense. Although it is useful to map out military technologies to gain an impression of military potential, entering in discussions on innovation levels and development stages will be as deceiving as developmentalism was halfway the twentieth century. See Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 223-228.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 226.

background, concerns and preconceptions (chapter 4). Subsequently, the epistemic character of their writings is judged upon in the conclusion. Having found the limits of the VOC's scope, I analyse the clues of a larger Javanese military endeavour that was not fully understood by the Dutch, yet indicated in their writings.

2. Ways to War: The chaos between 1677 and 1679

a. War on Java

The Javanese calendar took the start of the seventeenth century to spell disaster. A centurial downfall would bring an overhaul of hierarchies, a turn of power. Volcano eruptions, famines and a lunar eclipse increased anxieties about a looming destruction and made hay for prophets of doom. That Trunajaya was ravishing East Java can only have brought expectations from bad to worse. And indeed the Mataram kraton did fall that very year. For the Javanese year 1600 is the Gregorian 1677.⁴⁹

The disaster striking Central Java was rooted in the disputes over Madura. This island is separated from Java by a small strait, small enough to allow continuous Javanese influences from at least the 10th century on. Mataram got its grip on it when Sultan Agung conquered the island around 1624. He ousted the only remaining Madurese lord and confined him to the kraton with the title Cakraningrat I. After years in exile, his grandchild was born: Nila Prawata, as Trunajaya originally was called. When Nila Prawata reached his twenties he returned to his homeland; not to rule but to rebel.⁵⁰

And so it happened that five decades after Agung' victorious march to Madura, a just as devastating one was charging at the Mataramese capital from the other direction. Trunajaya employed tactics similar to those bringing triumph to the Javanese subordinator of his family. While traversing the lands he attracted warlords and troops. They were aroused by oaths and rituals, armed with spears, shields, krisses and guns and helped him block provision lines, fight skirmishes and siege towns. A military pattern lays bare that can be judged characteristic for the area. Partly, this is one of warrior charismas: where Agung craved his lineage, so did Trunajaya combine the Islamic influence of his warlord Raden Kajoran with more secular appraisals of personality.

As Andaya proved for the Bugis and the Makassarese, a "holistic conception of warfare" tended to prevail in the Indonesian archipelago. Concepts of state, solidarity and honour intertwined with those of war tactics and weaponry. Sulawesi documents stressed how martial conflicts served "the maintainance of proper relationships within the human community and between states". The VOC, on the other hand, "were principally concerned with demonstrating the effectiveness of their


⁴⁹ More precisely, the AJ 1600 started in March of AD 1677. Schrieke observes "messianic expectations" at work here. Ricklefs even claims the "populace at large almost certainly expected major changes". Yet, only hints can be found of this. In the light of Moin's observations on Millennial Sovereignty on the Indian subcontinent, large-scale influences of cosmological prophecies can certainly be expected. As for the cosmological court traditions, see M.C. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: a history of the division of Java* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974): 420-1 and 176. Similar predictions occurred for other Sunans too in different times: Bertrand, *État Colonial*: 98-100. Next to these, see Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*: 33, 41; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 94-95.

⁵⁰ This royal family turned out much less faithful than the Sultan might have expected. Notice that no absolute certainty remains about Trunajaya's original name; but Nila Prawata is the most likely one. See K. Van Dijk, H. de Jonge, and E. Touwen-Bouwsmas, "Introduction." In *Across Madura Strait: the dynamics of an insular society*, eds. van Dijk et al. (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995): 1-6; and H.J. De Graaf, "De opkomst van raden Truna-Djaja." *Djawa XX*, no. 1 (1940): 56-87.

military campaigns against local kingdoms”. Their way of war centred on “cost and effectiveness”; the efficient operations, the profitable contract signed and “light losses among the European soldiers” due to the “native allies” backing up the army.⁵¹ It nearly appears these allies were cannon fodder.

To show that “native allies” or pejuang troops did come to serve similar purposes in both archipelagic and European armies, this chapter will study how both armies engaged in battles. A thread connecting the ‘Asian and European’ textual traditions can be found in the manner wars were fought in the late 1670s. Both documented similar military actions. Therefore, I will start by unravelling the conventional side of warfare; that of ‘blood and iron’. Adaptations to local war tactics indirectly exposed the broader connotations warfare had in the Indonesian archipelago. This will show how the Company’s interest in “native allies” went beyond mere concerns of cost efficiency.

Demand and supply, be it the Sunan asking for the VOC or the VOC asking for warlords, created intricate networks of martial associations. Armies overlapped; leaving the Company to enter the holistic world of which the pejuang forces were part. Hence, an overview is required to see how Trunajaya fought and was fought against, as well as how those battles were organized and prepared for. At first sight, a clear pattern of engagement is visible. Certain conventional ideas on fixed battle formations were seemingly abided to. They were based on Indian models that had spread around the Indian Ocean. Mataram, for instance, was stated to use the Makara array at the start of battles.⁵²



Picture 3 Makara Vyuha, a battle formation used in Java and recorded by Raffles in 1817. The numbers inside the battle formation refer to the type of elite warriors and units of troops used.⁵³

⁵¹ L. Andaya, “Nature of War and Peace Among the Bugis-Makassar People.” *South East Asia Research* 12, no.1 (2004): 53-54.

⁵² T. S. Raffles, *The History of Java* (London: Black, Parbury, and Allen, 1817).

⁵³ Ibid.

Nonetheless, despite the mention of Makara in Javanese chronicles and European accounts alike, the military activities appeared chiefly characterized by improvisation and chaos rather than order and organization. Warriors sooner ran amuck than charge in array.⁵⁴ These very battle formations served more as ideals than applied practices. Military command consisted out of noblemen appointed ad hoc during times of distress. Favoured courtiers and royals thus took charge on an arbitrary basis and sometimes without any relevant tactical knowledge. Moreover, distrust usually led to a constant shuffling of positions to avoid subordinates from accumulating power.⁵⁵

And in certain cases shuffling meant death. Potentially hostile warlords were eliminated. Trunajaya murdered Makassarese traitors and Sultan Agung appears to have assassinated his failing commanders during the first siege of Batavia in 1628.⁵⁶ At some points, Mataram ran in trouble because few competent and trusted Javanese commanders remained. Hence, Amangkurat II also approached non-Javanese warlords as the Makassarese; who had shipped to Java after the fall of Makassar a few years earlier. After contacting Karaëng Galesong -the most powerful Makassarese warlord on Java- in writing, the latter suddenly gained the royal title of Prabu Jayalelana. The Sunan had high hopes for Galesong conquering Kediri.⁵⁷

Amangkurat II's preferences even mattered for the selection of VOC officers. During the initial negotiations in the late 1677's, the Sunan made clear he only wanted the Company's support when their Ambonese captain Jonker would join. He equally sought Speelman to enlist, but the latter could not. Subsequently, Tumënggung Suranata and others were called on to gather troops for an offence that would not start till the next Northeast monsoon. Dissatisfaction on the available commanders seemingly delayed Amangkurat's campaigns. For insurgents as Trunajaya, the inconsistent supply of warlords led to even more uncertainty. No regular officer class thus existed; only local armies brought together by temporary figureheads. This left Speelman to lament even the "most experienced of the inexperienced Javanese commanders".⁵⁸

⁵⁴ In itself, running amuck was a very effective tactic. Yet, by its very nature, it was not one conducted in an organized matter. It's power is shown by the attack Panembahan Mas of Giri launched in 1680 against the VOC and Mataram forces: "(...) they did not bother with shooting or wounding in the struggle but, at the constant cry *amokan* (stab them to death) of the aged *Panembahan*, who personally gave out his commands on every side, they fell upon our men from all sides at once, with such violence that after the loss of six Europeans and ten Javanese of the Susuhunan fell into so much confusion that they grew panicky and took flight, thereby at the same time completely disorganizing two of our white companies and putting a third to flight (...)". See Supreme Government of Batavia, "2 June 1680." *Dagh-register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlands-India Anno 1680*, ed F. De Haan (The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1912): 321-332.

⁵⁵ Nagtegaal makes a similar observation, stating: "[t]he fluid nature of the Javanese state promoted social mobility. Wartime in particular was a period in which existing rulers would vanish and others would seize their opportunity. When regents were being appointed, aristocratic origins would appear to have been less important than being on good terms with the new Susuhunan. Again, we see the key role played in the Javanese state by personal relations." See Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 44; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol.II*: 132-133.

⁵⁶ Bertrand, *L'Histoire à Parts*: 426-428; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 55.

⁵⁷ The Sunan sent the letter after possibly being advised to do so by Tumënggung Martalaja. This title was worn by a Balinese commander too: Tumënggung Djaja-Lelana. Amangkurat II instructed the lords of Madiun and Wira-Saba (Madja-Agung) to join the Makassarese. See De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 22 and 68.

⁵⁸ See C. Speelman, "Letter XXIII (10 July, 1677)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 123 and De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 18-19.



Picture 4 Sultan Agung's army attacking Batavia in 1628. Notice the murders within the Mataramese camp in the bottom right corner as well as the tent encampments. Sieges were organized, but troubled by inefficient provision lines and limited tactics for attacking the cities.⁵⁹

Consequently, elaborate plans for the battle grounds were rare. Similarly, the armies on Java seemed more like clustered groups of war-bands rather than uniform companies of troops. Each commander could call his own shots and pick his own routes; with his followers trailing behind. Consequently, massive field battles were rare compared to the skirmishes of one warlord versus another. In rage, small groups faced each other. Nagtegaal goes as far as claiming the leaders and nobles were the only ones motivated to fight: “when the leader died or surrendered the battle was almost always over, and everyone went home”.⁶⁰ Besides some scarce references to Hurdt's campaign, however, his conclusion seems without foundation. And even if command could quickly evaporate in battle, intricate unions and hierarchies did exist during its prologue. The extensive exercise of mustering and moving troops evidence this.

In fact, battlegrounds were not all that important to begin with. Sieging towns was what really mattered. Once a larger settlement was captured, the surrounding region could often be claimed too. Aiming to conquer the enclosing fields would be a task burdened by “an evaporating rural population” -fleeing to the forest before the first shots were fired- and requiring more manpower than warlords could grant. When victorious, aggressors seized and subjected a town by capturing or resettling some of the inhabitants, installing new leaders and even tearing down its

⁵⁹ Aart Dircksz Oosaaan, Sander Wybrants and anonymous (after 1680), “Belegering van Batavia door de sultan van Mataram.” The Hague: Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 511 K 23: 358 (accessed via <http://www.atlasofmutualheritage.nl/nl/object/?id=6775>, on 24-03-2014)

⁶⁰ Rimmelink gives an analysis on these arbitrary assignments in his account on chaos leading to the Chinese War. See Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 59 and 63; and Rimmelink, *Chinese War*: 20-21.

walls. Fortification was crucial to avoid this or achieve a stronger position to negotiate terms of surrender.⁶¹

The Javanese had a long tradition of constructing defences, one that Ricklefs would not judge inferior to that of the Europeans. Towns with brick walls, wooden fortifications, temporary stockades, trench works, moats and stakes existed for a long time on the island. The forts (*benteng*) generally had palisades or mud walls and several outworks; usually palisaded areas (*pagar*). The stronger European firearms did urge adaptations of course, but minor alterations in the defence works usually sufficed.⁶² Constructing fortifications was demanding, however, and needed to be schemed out by leaders.

The attack on strongholds had its methods too. Charney recognizes two common ways of assaulting a besieged fortification: a noisy and a quiet one. If confidence grew high, the army “would announce their impending assault with cannonades, yelling, the beating of drums, gongs” as to “terrorize the enemy into submission or weaken their resolve in their defence”. The quiet one instead attested fear and involved careful approaches usually mantled by night or thunderstorms.⁶³ But for truly understanding the assault, you need to look beyond the siege itself.

There is a preamble that greatly affected the anticipations of any army. That is, the transport and march towards the enemy. In bad times, half of the army could perish before any offence occurred. Keeping up provision lines was thus crucial. Carriers made up a large part of the warforce, and soldiers could not do without carts, oxen and buffalos.⁶⁴ Both helped carry food, cannons and ammunition; a task requiring no particular training as it was similar to agricultural work. Only the heavy artillery could be tricky to transport; demanding robust carts and healthy draught animals.

The speed of carts pulled by buffalos, or *pedati*, can be judged around 3.22 kilometres an hour and sixteen kilometres a day. Lagging carriers were thus a common issue, exposing them to attacks. To stay safe, moving as part of a caravan was critical. Without any shared protection, the baggage train would turn into a sauntering target for bandits and hostile warriors.⁶⁵ The restricted amount of routes made ambushes easy to arrange. Warlords thus needed to give careful thought on the arrangements of transportation.

⁶¹ When strong fortifications would prolong a siege for a long time, chances were that the monsoon and sickness would scatter the enemy. Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 73 and 78.

⁶² Such alterations also included the protected positions for firing the muskets of the besieged themselves. See Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 65-67; and Ricklefs, *War, Economy*: 131.

⁶³ I do not argue for a common Southeast Asian way of warfare here, but these observations were largely based on Javanese cases. Charney stresses how “the Javanese launched [the noisy] kind of assault against Batavia in 1628 and 1629, as well as at Kediri in 1678 and against the Makassarese in 1679”. See Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 101; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies* vol II: 135-139.

⁶⁴ Sultan Agung, for instance, used eight thousand carts for his 1624 campaign. The carts tended to be slow wheeled and entirely made out of organic materials. See Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 207-210; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies* vol. II, 131 and 139

⁶⁵ Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 207 and 211; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies* vol II: 128 and 130.

On Java, certain roads and waterways were used time after time and became the main arteries of military mobility. The lack of bridges and the limited mountain passages restricted the itineraries. Blocking these routes by felling trees was an effective way to obstruct the opponent's baggage train. Cutting crops and damming rivers were tactics too. Sultan Agung, for instance, ordered thousands of men to "to destroy the crops and produce in the fields and to despoil the land" of Surabaya.⁶⁶ But the despoilers needed to be careful not to cut their own resources as well. In dire straits, wasted fields could have served their own needs. For both sides were often vulnerable to famines, particularly during the rainy season.

Avoiding the monsoon was hence crucial to keep the supplies running and the army marching. The rain season was capable of bringing the most persistent troops to a standstill. Mobility and communication were hardly possible in the mud, floods and erosion that heavy downfalls would bring. Not to mention the inevitable desertion when farmers felt the urge to plough and sow rather than kill and conquer. War campaigns were therefore planned in the dry months, usually from March till June, and September till December. In addition, larger armies favoured camping during the night to avoid nocturnal dangers like wild animals and obscure trails. Military advances were thus equally a fight against time and for nutrition. Trunajaya only truly caved in when scarcity obligated him to request food from his enemy.⁶⁷

At first sight, Mataram had a more efficient distribution system offered basic food and apparel supplies. But even the Sunan's provisions frequently ran out.⁶⁸ In those cases, soldiers were to live off the land. Both food and women were hunted for; foreign auxiliaries were especially notorious for their raids. During the 1670s, fear spread among Javanese peasants for the Balinese, Bugis, Madurese and Makassarese warriors serving either the VOC and the Sunan or Trunajaya. Robbing and burning down villages almost became a habit for them. Naturally, this tendency spelled disaster for many villagers. Houses were demolished, fields pilfered and families torn apart. The destruction in the shadow of marching armies was in itself an important component of drafting new forces. Desperate farmers and peasants could opt for the military as a final resort.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ In fact, setting out the routes traveled by certain war-bands will offer an important understanding of regional associations and abilities to attract troops from different places. As Schrieke understands it, the Javanese landscape offered similar geographical obstacles for most centuries before the technological revolutions of the modern age. Bridges, for example, were seemingly absent; ferries being likely used to cross rivers. In his perspective, this contributed to a "repetitive history" which does not "of course imply uniformity, as influences from outside have varied in both intensity and nature". Roads could be "specially prepared beforehand" if the occasion called for it, making it easier to convey carriers. See Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 100, 102-120, 132, 134-135, 146-147 and 153-229.

⁶⁷ Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 210; De Graaf, "Gevangenneming"; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 129.

⁶⁸ Notice that during the eighteenth century, Mataram was no longer paying its indigenous warriors directly. See Rummelink, *The Chinese War*: 19.

⁶⁹ Schrieke asserted that "war on any appreciable scale was for the Javanese an economic catastrophe". See Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 190, 214, and 216-221; Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 60; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 129-130 and 143.

Local leaders could incite them to do so. Indeed, rousing ones people to war would usually establish the community leader as a warlord.⁷⁰ But only few warlords had access to skilled soldiers; most subjects were porters instead. For Mataram, the military workforce can divided between the service, free and royal service populations. The first tended to be subjected to local rulers, the second less so and the latter were primarily accountable to the court and often provided restricted knowledge on weaponry and tactics.⁷¹ To bring such men under a single martial banner did require leadership skills that Nagtegaal overlooks when merely considering events on the battleground.

The most valued warriors could be found among the royal service populations. Due to the high court demand for them, they were enabled to get thoroughly involved with politics. To fight was their most striking task, nonetheless. In fact, success on the battlefield usually was a chief requirement for achieving titles and courtly positions.⁷² Amidst the royal servicemen were the true *prajurit* or soldiers; disciplined, trained and experienced. The elite guards consisted out of these men. Not only did they protect the Sunan or central warlord, they equally were the core fighting force during battles; the ones engaging first and often exclusively.⁷³

Yet, nobles outside the capital were able to retract such skilled royal servicemen, decreasing the court's revenue base and disturbing the balance of power. The same went for peasant levies; most of whom belonged "to noble-men or rich merchants" prior to Sultan Agung's conquest. But even during the rule of Agung's son and grandson, peasants still needed to be forcefully pulled from the farming fields onto those of battles. Thereby, the personal resources of local rulers were tapped into and seriously damaged in case of heavy losses. Hence, resistance against conscription as well as sudden desertion was common.⁷⁴

To hinder the nobles from detracting forces, rudimentary censuses and service lists were introduced to conscribe peasant levies. Amangkurat I composed one in 1651, for instance. Large parts of the population were drafted in this matter, even when the chaos of war disrupted the administration. Sultan Agung is stated to have armed ninety percent of his subjects against Batavia in 1621. Halfway the century, Mataram's army levelled between 150.000 and 300.000 men, and was claimed by Van Goens to potentially assemble 920.000.⁷⁵ Such exaggerations illustrate how European

⁷⁰ This of course depended on whether the leader himself would take soldiers to battle.

⁷¹ Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 214-216.

⁷² Bertrand, *État Colonial*: 73.

⁷³ Given their leading role in engagements the elite guards were the only soldiers that did wear a uniform. Military parades in modern Yogyakarta and Surakarta still give an impression of how these clothes looked like. See J. Groneman, *De Garebeg's te Ngajogyakarta* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1895). See further Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch Tiger*: 61; and Rimmelink, *The Chinese War*: 20.

⁷⁴ Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 214-216, 220, and 20; Rimmelink, *The Chinese War*: 19; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 128 and 147.

⁷⁵ See Ricklefs for a background on Amangkurat I's census, which has now unfortunately been lost. These surveys were also conducted for gathering taxes; hence taxation units of *cacahs*, consisting out of a certain number of household, were used. See M.C. Ricklefs, "Some Statistical Evidence on Javanese. Social, Economic and Demographic. History in the Later Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." *Modern Asia Studies* 20, no.1 (1986): 1-32; Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 46-50, and 59-64; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 129 and 138-139.

observers tended to overestimate the size of Asian armies. As Charney shows, however, Southeast Asian leaders themselves equally spread hyperboles to increase their status or decrease the one of a competitor.⁷⁶ The fact remains that the Javanese peasant warriors far outnumbered the VOC soldiers.

Charney calls the high amount of these “low value” peasant warriors “a major problem facing early modern Southeast Asian courts”. In his mind, they would suffice best as porters, and indeed that was their chief function on Java. Moreover, they boosted military power by their mere presence, for the “rule of the thumb” was: “the larger the size of the army, as opposed to training or other factors, the greater the likelihood of a successful outcome of a military campaign”. But when relying on peasant conscripts, sizes could easily fluctuate. Desertion and looting notoriously hindered Javanese armies and the arms and training provided to peasants by a ruler could easily turn against him when alliances shifted.⁷⁷

Mercenaries tended to be more trustworthy, and better trained plus equipped at that. Dutch, British, Portuguese, Turkish, Malabari, Acehnese, Bugis, Balinese, Madurese, and Makassarese soldiers or captives were all made use of. As uniforms were not worn in this era, the ethnic markers of these groups functioned as the means to distinguish them. Being foreigners, they were not entangled in court politics, and thus no direct competitors to Javanese rule. At the same time, a rebel leader would have fewer fears for them claiming the lands he tried to conquer. In most cases, looting appeared more important than dominating to these outsiders. At the same time, they had no compulsion to pay due respects to leaders other than receiving their payment. Conversely, the ruler could get financially indebted since the expenses of mercenaries far outweighed those of peasant levies.⁷⁸

No matter the wages, all warriors were exposed to elaborate oaths and rituals used to ensure their loyalty. As Raffles tells, even the summoning of ancestor spirits was resorted to.⁷⁹ Equally important was boosting bravery. Especially the elite warriors were expected to fight till death follows. To make sure they would, banners, spells of invulnerability or –equally effective– opium were of great use. Attacking with ‘iron’ to spill ‘blood’ involved mystical instigation; and battle tactics thus had a spiritual coating. All these stimulants were noticed and described by the Dutch.

⁷⁶ He also claims that “from the 1630s, however, as Europeans became more knowledgeable about Southeast Asia and its demographic resources and as the intense warfare of the sixteenth century gave way to a more docile period, estimates of Southeast Asian armies became more modest” (p.217). Naturally, he refers mainly to the Iberian forces here. See M. Charney, “A Reassessment of Hyperbolic Military Statistics in Some Early Modern Burmese Texts.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 46, no. 2 (2003): 193-214; and idem., *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 217.

⁷⁷ Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 218-220; Rummelink, *The Chinese War*: 19 and 118; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 128.

⁷⁸ Rummelink, *The Chinese War*: 20; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 124.

⁷⁹ Charney claims: “[p]rior to the rise of nationalism in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asians generally fought either in the interests of their village or for their patron, either a local lord or the king. The oath was a means of emphasizing these bonds before entering battle.” See Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*, 9; and Raffles, *The History of Java vol. II*: clxxxv and 817.

Trunajaya was said to have a banner depicting “a strange figure regarding whom he had misled his people with many fabulous stories”. It contained “an ancient flag, on which (...) was depicted a strange human form with strange limbs, standing with an uprooted tree in his hand, the which is explained by some experienced natives as representing the first conqueror of this island of Java. According to information procured, Trunajaya has some time since audaciously claimed this honour for himself, hence his adaptation of such a flag”.⁸⁰

But these flags not only boosted the ego of the warlord; they equally uplifted his followers. Almost all troops the VOC encountered -Makassarese, Mataramese, Madurese- carried them. Spells served a similar purpose. Sultan Agung was even said to have seven thousand men “impervious to shot or thrust” among the army of thirty thousand he gathered in 1624.⁸¹ Chants like these made sure warriors would stick to the fight despite the absence of strict battle orders. In the heat of the encounter, command appeared given by the senses as much as overseers; running amok was desired over standing in line.

Vicious bloodshed was aroused among the elite soldiers; a fact not always recognized by the European observers. Foreigners “frequently underestimated” the violent nature of the ‘indigenous warfare’. In contrast to the “labour-scarcity” argument of Reid -supposing limited casualties due to a general anxiety on the lack of population- Charney poses “killing and death” stood at the core of all Southeast Asian warfare.⁸² The term ‘Southeast Asian warfare’ is controversial, but the the degree to which bloodletting occurred on Java needs to be considered. The weapons and tactics –implicit as they might be- used tell much about the ways in which warlords could put their men and preparations to mortal use, or conversely avoid fatal encounters.

Two sorts of weaponry can be distinguished; that belonging to individual soldiers, and that monopolized by the state. The former often consisted out of tools equally used in times of peace. Most non-gunpowder weaponry was accessible to a larger audience. Spears, pikes and lances were most common. Pires already observed in 1515 that “every man in Java, rich or poor” had a lance in his house.⁸³ They were primarily used in hand-to-hand fighting rather than throwing. The javelin did serve that purpose. For protection, light leather shields seemed to be popular, although elite soldiers often wore chainmail or bronze armour. Trunajaya’s cavalry at Kediri was, for instance, armoured in these meshes of small metal rings.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ C. Speelman, “Letter XXI (14 June 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 120; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 125-127.

⁸¹ The quote is from Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 125-127 and 131-133. See also Raffles, *History of Java vol. II*: 298.

⁸² Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 18 and 21.

⁸³ Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires: An Account of the East, From the Red Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515 vol. I* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944): 179.

⁸⁴ There is unclearity about the armour, since they appeared to be used fighting neighbours more than European companies, hence accounts on them are scarce. Bows and arrows were not used in the seventeenth century Java. For an impression of these weapons consult Raffles, who made illustrations of them from the early nineteenth century: Raffles, *History of Java*. See L. Andaya, *The Heritage of*

Most famous is of course the kris, which was an object of honour. All Javanese were expected to carry one. Pires wrote “every man in Java, whether he is rich or poor, must have a kris in his house, (...) and no man between the ages of twelve and eighty may go out of doors without a kris in his belt”. A married man was even required to wear three of them: as tokens of kinship, ancestry, and family-in-law. Nobles, moreover, limited elaborate decorations of sheath and weapon to their class. Even though widely spread, the kris thus still indicated status differences.⁸⁵

Firearms were most exclusive, however. China being the birth ground of gunpowder, merchants had already introduced guns long before the seventeenth century. Cannons had become the symbol of mystical power, often being constructed -not even casted- with impractical large sizes. But the blasts or mere appearance of these enormous cannons could shiver the enemy to retreat. Small arms equally served claims to rule; gunfire marking special religious celebrations, ascendancy to the throne, or salutes to honoured visitors. Sometimes they were even considered *lingam*: a phallic symbol of manly capabilities.⁸⁶

The distribution of guns among Trunajaya’s troops seems to have been arranged by every warlord separately. But within Mataram, firearms were centrally circulated. They were stored in the royal arsenals, to be taken out in times of war. The size of the armouries must have been extensive. In 1624, Mataram armed more than four thousand musketeers. Halfway the century, about thirteen percent of the army operated guns. Limiting the availability of firearms to soldiers on campaign did discourage the training of marksmanship. In times of peace, no shots could be practiced. This led some staff members of the VOC to doubt their “dexterity in the use of Muskets”.⁸⁷

Dexterity was certainly not lacking when it came to using animals. The handling of elephants and horses left outsiders impressed. Yet, the former was gradually abandoned in the seventeenth century; wild elephant herds apparently becoming rarer and rarer on the island. The associations with royal power did remain; Amangkurat II even appeared to have considered his lost elephant as some kind of regalia. Horses enjoyed an elevated status too. War, hunting and tournaments were their domain, not agriculture.⁸⁸

Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981):387-8; Anderson, “The Idea of Power”; Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 23-42 Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 13-4; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 122, 125, 127, 213; and 405.

⁸⁵ G. B. Gardner, *Keris and Other Malay Weapons* (Singapore: Progressive Publishing Co., 1936): 121; F. Noor, “From Majapahit to Putrajaya: the Kris as a Symptom of Civilizational Development and Decline.” *South East Asia Research* 8, no. 3 (2006): 239–279 and Pires, *The Suma Oriental*: 179.

⁸⁶ The European matchlock technology was quickly adapted in local foundries, although accustomation slowed down in the course of the seventeenth century. European captives were also used to gather instructions on artillery. See Charney, *Southeast Asia*: 42, 51-56; C.A. Gibson-Hill “Notes on the Old Cannon found in Malaya, and Known to be of Dutch Origin.” *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 26.1 (1953): 152-153; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 124.

⁸⁷ This quote derives from Willem Lodewycksz. See Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 123-124, 127, 129, and 131.

⁸⁸ Unlike tigers, leopards and buffalos, the elephant was no longer used in the tournaments at the kraton either. The few remaining boars were more or less turned into curiosities, heavily decorated and valued. Amangkurat II requested his brother Puger to give back his elephant. Peter Boomgaard, *Frontiers of Fear: Tigers and People in the Malay World, 1600-1950* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001): 3, 111,115, 146-147, 151, 152, and 162; and J.J. Briel, *De Expeditie van Anthonio Hurdt, Raad van Indië, als Admiraal en Superintendent*

Horsemanship was a noble trait and reserved for elite guards. Etiquettes existed; allowing skills and bravery to shine through and determine victory. Such unwritten rules led to a great deception when facing the VOC, who could not care less about them. But the Europeans were left in awe from time to time. One VOC man convinced himself the Javanese only fought on horseback. Others were just overwhelmed by the sheer number of them. During the campaign of the late 1670s, large units of cavalry were often encountered. Trunajaya used hundreds of riders during the siege of Kediri.⁸⁹

The horses available in the archipelago were not ideal for war. The prime stocks of them were of Tibetan, Mongol and similar breeds; resulting in short ponies rather than combative stallions. Other types of horses were highly requested. Van Goens experienced the pronounced demand for Persian stocks first-hand when the Sunan suggested sending some of his courtiers to pick out ‘proper’ ones.⁹⁰ The indigenous ponies were put to good use too, however. First, they were valuable for communication and intelligence gathering. But most importantly, they were skilfully put to fight.

When it came down to it, Javanese horses could be just as lethal as Persian ones. An eyewitness tells us how these “fine horsemen (...) have both hands at their disposal, as they guide the horse with their knees and body. Around their waists they wear a girdle on the front part which is fixed a copper hook, in which they fasten the rein, so that they keep both hands free, manipulating the long pike ... so cleverly that anyone who had never seen it before would be astonished”. When put to charge, great damage could be done by these riders. If fortunate, a deadly strike of confusion, velocity and mobility bashed through infantry, tearing soldiers and porters apart and chasing the men in retreat.⁹¹

Naval warfare was conducted as well. And halfway the 1670s, Mataram did order one large warship for every one-thousand coastal residents. These ships could be used to transport armies or block ports. Nonetheless, the realm’s rule over the waves was insignificant. Mataram was an insular power not an archipelagic one. Even in 1615, Mataram was claimed to have “no power at sea. [The ruler] is very mighty on land and has excellent means and materials for constructing fine galleys, but he lacks seamen”. Sultan Agung’s bloody campaigns in the Pasisir would only have decreased the


naar de Binnenlanden van Java. Sept.-dec. 1678 volgens het journaal van Johan Jurgen Briel, secretaris, ed. De Graaf (Amsterdam: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971): 128.

⁸⁹ Schrieke, *Sociological Studies* vol. II: 122 and 131.

⁹⁰ R. Van Goens, *De Vijf Gezantschappen van Rijklof van Goens naar het Hof van Mataram 1648-1654*, ed. H.J. de Graaf (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1956): 57. Notice that the supply of Arabian and Persian horses appears to have declined halfway the seventeenth century. The reasons for this are not yet clear. See Charney, *Southeast Asian Warfare*: 182-183.

⁹¹ The characteristics of the horses mentioned make it highly likely these horses were Javanese. See Schrieke, *Sociological Studies* vol. II: 132.

amount of competent sailors further by its heavy tolls on sailors. Large scale naval actions halted completely after 1676, leaving the deep waters to European hegemony.⁹²



Picture 5 Imaginative engraving from Wouter Schouten's *'Oost-Indische voyagie'* depicting a battle between the Sunan of Mataram and 'his enemies'. Interestingly, it was made near Haarlem in 1676, just before the inland campaigns of Hurdt started. The close cooperation between the Mataramese and VOC army would soon demonstrate elephants, bows and arrows were no longer used in the late seventeenth century and, most importantly, that the 'Javanese' sooner fought in small war-bands than massive phalanxes as shown here.⁹³

⁹² The quote derives from Coen. See *ibid.*: 139-141.

⁹³ Notice that archery came back after the seventeenth century, as is evident from Raffles's drawings. "Gevecht tussen de sousouhouan van Mataram en zijn vijanden" In *Oost-Indische Voyagie: Vervattende voornamelyc voorvallen en bloedige zee- en landt gevechten tegen de*

b. VOC warfare

While the VOC was mighty on the waves, it could not dominate the Javanese hinterland. Therefore, it needed to adapt to the patterns of warfare discussed above. It partly had to become an “Asian Company”, depending on the “brawn and loyalty of men and women with an Asian descent”. Similar to the Asian warlords, huddling manpower proved important for the VOC. But, it took a while before a firm base of alliances was built up. First, the VOC systemized its own pool of warriors under contract. Secondly, a reputation needed to be established to access a stable flow of allies and mercenaries. Only the former warforce was truly impelled by conscription and resembled the privatized armies in early modern Europe.⁹⁴

These conscribed warriors inclined to be non-Javanese. Common monikers included Ambonese, Balinese, Buginese plus the ambiguous ‘Mardijkers’ and ‘Malayans’.⁹⁵ Raben suggests they tended to be lured from enemy troops around the archipelago. Everyone was welcome, although at times certain groups like the ‘Buginese’ were refused entry.⁹⁶ The divergent body of warriors became settled in Batavia and formed a single Asian legion of the VOC army; a pattern no different from other “Asian cities”. No strict segregation between these groups existed. Formally, the kampongs or quarters near Batavia were assigned to residents with homogenous backgrounds, but they soon became ethnically mixed. It appears personal attraction of commanders motivated individual soldiers to assemble in their quarters. The administrative ethnic classifiers used for these troops and their commanders were hiding their hybrid nature. The Bugis mingled with the Ambonese, the Makassarese with the Balinese and so on.⁹⁷

Portugeezen en Makassaren 1658-1665 Derde Boeck, Wouter Schouten (Amsterdam: Jacob Meurs, 1676): 142. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, RP-P-OB-47-479.

⁹⁴ Anthony van Diemen was influential in constituting this Asian legion. Raben “roughly” categorizes three types of Asian troops: the regular VOC soldiers (i.e. The Asian legion), the warriors of allies, and the gangs that joined during the campaigns. The difference between the second and third is very ambiguous, however. Raben claims the allies to mingle more with VOC troops than the gangs. But this overlooks that the troops of the allies were often constituted out of these gangs; some of them simply entered later during the campaign. Moreover, his statements suggest a growing administrative control over the alliances: “Geheel eigen aan het rationele doel van haar expansie, poogde de Compagnie na verloop van tijd om het aanbod van reservetroepen te systematiseren”. He overlooks, however, the increasing dependence on rather autonomous troops outside Batavia. See D. De longh, *Het Krijgswezen onder de Oostindische Compagnie* (The Hague: W.P. van Stockum, 1950): 53- 56 and 61-78; and R. Raben, “Het Aziatisch legioen Huurlingen, bondgenoten en reservisten in het geweer voor de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie.” In *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie*, eds. Gerrit Knaap en Ger Teitler (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002): 181, 185, and 197. For the “public-private partnerships” shaping early modern European armies, see Parrott, *The Business of War*.

⁹⁵ ‘Papangers’ or papanggo was also used to refer to Mardijkers, a group that might only have existed in an administrative sense. It is to be questioned whether a community of Mardijkers was ever formed at all. Instead, it could have been fragmented in groups like the papanggo. De longh claims the Malayans to primarily come from Gedong and Panjang. See De longh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 77; and Parakriti Tahi Simbolon, *Menjadi Indonesia* (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2007): 462.

⁹⁶ Raben writes: “Na een overwinning trachtte zij de krijgsheren van de voormalige vijand aan zich te verbinden. Aangezien in vele delen van Azië relaties tussen mensen en gemeenschappen in een hiërarchisch verband worden gebracht, betekende onderwerping ook het aangaan van een nieuwe loyaliteit.” De longh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 76-77; and Raben, *Het Aziatisch*: 189 and 191.

⁹⁷ Raben underlines the organization needed to operate the Asian legion : “[h]oe eenvoudig het ook lijkt, het vergde een aanzienlijke organisatie om duizenden reservesoldaten paraat te houden om op ieder gewenst ogenblik naar het strijdtoneel op welke plaats in Azië dan ook te zenden. De VOC liet ook hier zien dat zij de heersende omstandigheden naar haar hand kon zetten”. A decree was made in 1688 to pen down the system; the simplified ethnic classification was strongly present in it. De longh had a different view on the homogenizing effect of VOC policies. See De longh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 65-68; and Raben, *Het Aziatisch legioen*: 184-185 and 192-196.

During campaigns, the Supreme Government of Batavia purposefully mixed troops abiding to different warlords and with different ethnicities. This was to avoid dominant single-minded army sections that could resist European rule. Furthermore, combining warriors with different skills under separate warlords increased the overall military strength. In due time, the VOC relied more on the Asian martial power than that of their European soldiers. While essential to the Company's troops, the Asian legion still held an inferior position. They usually got lower wages and were put under temporary contracts. Therefore, they needed to work the Batavian lands in times of peace. However victorious a campaign might have been, on return the soldiers were left plowing to put bread on their tables and a shelter over their head.⁹⁸

This increased the tension within a community that was already upset by war traumas. In fact, Raben is not surprised by the amount of thugs, gangs and *jagos* springing from the legion.⁹⁹ Besides wages, training was also lacking. The VOC hardly provided firearms to its Asian troops, let alone gunpowder to practice with. Moreover, Maurice of Nassau's famous armament and drill were not applied to these warriors. The Asian and European troops therefore remained in "separate worlds" and kept operating differently. The former were storm-troops used for "hit and run" attacks, usually operating from the flanks. Their tactical use was mainly due to their "manoeuvrability and fanatical effort".¹⁰⁰

It was only halfway the eighteenth century that modernization of the military management occurred. At that point, the Company finally made efforts to integrate its Asian army section and thereby increase its efficiency and discipline. However, the European soldiers also needed fixing. In the previous one and a half century their low quality had often been stressed by VOC officials. Their clothing, obedience and skills were all complained about. Military clothes -not uniforms- had to be brought along, or bought in the expensive VOC store. Under such conditions, soldiers marching shoeless were not uncommon. Provision was very scarce too; consisting of rice and *kanjang*. Order did not always prevail and desertion occurred frequently.¹⁰¹

Worst of all, however, the European soldiers were not known as good marksmen either and at times lacked up to date equipment. What is more, their battle tactics were not adapted to dense

⁹⁸ Raben, *Het Aziatisch*: 184-186 and 192-198.

⁹⁹ Raben states: "[h]et voortdurende komen en gaan van de soldaten, de psychische en sociale effecten van voortdurende ranseling en oorlogsvoering leidden tot ontregelmg van de sociale cohesie. Het is niet verwonderlijk dat zich uit de militaire kringen allerlei boeven en boefjes, bendeleiders en jago (vechtersbazen) ontwikkelden, die een gevaar vormden voor de rust en orde in de landen rondom Batavia." See *ibid.*: 184-186, 192-198.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*: 183, and 197-199; and Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 67-68.

¹⁰¹ Desertion did seem to be much rarer among European company troops. Nagtegaal asserts their chances of survival would have been very low; unlike the Javanese they did not enjoy any family protection. See De Jongh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 80-88; Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 68; and Raben, *Het Aziatisch*: 183-184 and 202-204.

forests, but open fields.¹⁰² Still, their ability to form lines and deliver volley fire did make them much more efficient spearheads. The interlocking shots produced by two rows of soldiers swapping place after every salvo -from sitting and loading, to standing and shooting- broke through many Javanese frontlines.¹⁰³ European soldiers were even judged invincible by the Javanese at some points. Rummelink seemingly agrees with this, pointing at a superior European tradition of soldiery based on fighting oneself to death. The 'primitive warfare' of Javanese 'warriors' was instead centred on fleeing and therefore deemed to suffer defeat.¹⁰⁴ Be this as it may, the Company's military service came into high demand by the Sunans, his subordinates and his opponents.

While signing alliance with the VOC, Amangkurat I addresses them as "those who have many weapons, that are feared by their enemies".¹⁰⁵ Those weapons went beyond guns, cannons and swords; it was a style of warring adapted to local circumstances. Not only were the Europeans drilled better, they were equally familiar with crucial tactics in Javanese warfare as sieges.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, after the 1650s they increasingly tried to regulate their Asian alliances through control over indigenous troops outside the Asian legion; to incorporate sections of pejuang effectively. Their reputation allowed access to a 'stable flow' of war-bands in Java, Timor, Sulawesi and the Moluccas.¹⁰⁷ Due to these factors, the VOC-servants have been depicted as "ultimate arbiters of insoluble disputes".¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² See for instance the complaints on the Makassarese hit and run techniques in and out of forests, while the VOC could not leave their turf. Concerning the equipment: flintlocks were introduced relatively late for instance. See Speelman, "Letter XXI": 121; and De Jongh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 88-96.

¹⁰³ Volley fire developed in the Dutch Republic in the early seventeenth century and replaced the tercio lines; a square formation using both pike men and musketeers. Gustavus Adolphus used it brilliantly during the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631 by letting his lines fire together; rousing a lot of fear among his opponent. This tactic slowly found its way to Java, where it was more difficult to apply due to the limited amount of open field battles and lacking availability of flintlocks. See De Jongh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 15, 22, and 114; and G. Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984).

¹⁰⁴ Rummelink not only distinguishes the European soldiers from the Javanese peasants, but equally from the Asian mercenaries and the skilled royal prajurit warriors. Soldiers and warriors are essentially different, he states. He suggests soldiery to be a European tradition going back to the "Greek phalanx and the Roman legion" and based on "hand-to-hand combat, the final battle, and fighting till the last man stands". The prajurit instead derives from what Keegan calls "primitive warfare" centring on natural barriers or fortifications which left plenty of room for escape. Fighting oneself to death was not expected. The only tradition I can recognize here is one of Orientalism affecting the Dutch historian, not one of European or Javanese soldiery. See De Jongh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 114; Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 67; Raben, *Het Aziatisch*: 183-184, and 202-204; Rummelink, *De Worsteling om Java*: 339; and M.C. Ricklefs, "De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de Gewelddadige Wereld van het Vroegmoderne Azië." In *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* In *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie*, eds. Gerrit Knaap en Ger Teitler (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002): 370-373.

¹⁰⁵ The quote is translated from: "die veel wapenen hebben, die door haar vyanden ge vreest werden". See Amangkurat II, "Letter XVI (25 March, 1677); Translaat van den brieft' door den Sousouhouan Mataram aen d'h' admiraal Cornelis Speelman Geschreven." In *De Opkomst Van*: 114-115.

¹⁰⁶ As De Jongh claims: "[n]og steeds culmineerde het krijgsgebeuren dier dagen in het al of niet bezit van en den strijd om versterkte steden en plaatsen. Zoo was het in Europa en zoo zien wij het dan ook in Oost-Azië." The inclination to caravans appears similar to the Javanese one too: the Babad Tanah Jawi describes how the Company's troops marched in step (sapangkat-pangkat). In other words; they had a snail's pace likely due to pulling many carts with them. See De Jongh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 12; and W.L. Olthof, *Babad Tanah Jawi vol. II* (Leiden: KITLV, 1941): 191.

¹⁰⁷ Andaya, *The Heritage of Palakka*; H. Hägerdal, *Lords of the Land, Lords of the Sea* (Leiden: KITLV, 2012); and S. Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-making in Maluku, C.1780-1810* (Leiden: Brill, 2008): 1-46.

¹⁰⁸ The controversial underlying assertion being that the Javanese were stuck in endemic violence to be resolved by an outside force. See D. Henley, "Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-king: Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere." *Modern Asian Studies* 39, no. 1 (2004): 85-144; and M. Ricklefs *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749- 1792: a History of the Division of Java* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974): 420-421.

The Javanese, however, sooner perceived them as mercenaries than arbiters. Mataram remained the sovereign seat of power, be it one crumbling apart. For the Sunan, relying on Europeans proved a double-edged sword; the dependence on foreign troops to settle inland issues raised questions on the legitimacy of the Sunan. It equally undermined his divide and rule politics; including the bestowal of office or local ruling positions. Indirectly, calling in the VOC summoned new conflicts in itself.¹⁰⁹

Yet, the Company was blind to the catalysing effects of their own interventions. In Nagtegaal's opinion, the eventual failure to reap benefits from these campaigns had to do with the unreasonable expectation that the Sunan could easily step back to power. The Oriental stereotype of a "powerful Eastern despot" fed the misperception of a temporary chaos. Trunajaya was taken as just an unruly vassal to be put to check. This mind-set changed when the Madurese managed to muster many forces a month after the VOC interference started. The Mataramese periphery gave way much easier than the Company expected. In consequence, the extensive authority of the Sunan was put to doubt and neutrality became aimed for.¹¹⁰

According to Nagtegaal, this simply resulted in a denunciation of the Susuhunan's personality rather than recognition of the decentralized nature of the realm. He goes even further, however. The patih or bupati, i.e. the central administrators and regents, of the king supposedly came to be considered as the cunning and dangerous stooges of the Sunan. Unlike their leader they were capable of hindering the Company. All in all, this made the court a despised place; "an attitude that stemmed from the widespread distaste for monarchies in the Republic".¹¹¹

Nagtegaal overlooks the varying perceptions on courtiers and regents. They both differed from one VOC servant to the other and while considering distinct Javanese rulers. The author makes the routine mistake of assuming an all-prevalent Orientalism among the European outsiders, thereby stereotyping the 'stereotypers'. Based on a handful of letters he draws conclusions that do not seem granted for. The Batavian governors viewed matters differently from their men in the field. As will be shown in chapter four, careful analysis of individual VOC-servants shows opinions to be not so much settled a priori as to develop during interactions with the Javanese.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ K. H. Kian, "How Strangers became King." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 36, no.105 (2008): 293-307; Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 69; W. Rimmelinck, "Expansion Without Design; The Snare of Javanese Politics." In *India and Indonesia during the Ancien Regime; Comparative History of India and Indonesia vol. III*, eds. P.J. Marshall et al. (Leiden; Brill, 1989): 111-128; and Ricklefs, *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*: 369.

¹¹⁰ Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 22 and 28-30.

¹¹¹ Note that Nagtegaal starts his book with a discussion on the period directly after Trunajaya's revolt and only later turns to the eighteenth century. His statements do thus certainly concern the period treated here, he writes: "[t]he VOC saw the Susuhunan as surrounded by bad counselors, minions, Moorish 'priests' and other disreputable characters. In such company the sovereign could not possibly arrive at the measured decisions that were needed" (p.22). The resulting vision is claimed to affect the current historiographical view on the Javanese state. See *ibid.*: 22 and 28-30.

¹¹² A similar error is made when stating that "[t]he Dutch were only too aware of the impossibility of gaining any military victories on their own. Without sufficient Javanese allies they would not even venture into inland regions." It remains to be wondered who 'the Dutch' and 'Javanese' referred to are in this case. See *ibid.*: 67.

But even the Batavian Supreme Government did not hold a single perspective. Larger shifts in policy determined how the Sunan and his mandala would be framed. Clashes with the Company abounded. The treaties signed between these different parties were a source of misunderstanding. The VOC approached them as contracts; rigid and binding. For the Javanese, Madurese or Sulawesians, the interpretation differed. Ricklefs suggest it was perceived as “a means to reach agreement in martial matters, so the battles could be ended, but the details of the text were in themselves of less importance”.¹¹³ The degree to which treaties could still be rectified, led the VOC to separate its trading area into three categories.

The three cut divide was made in the Generale Instructie of 1650. First, were the areas of “own conquest”, like the Banda islands. Secondly, were those regions where exclusive contracts had been reached, as happened in Ternate and Amboina. Thirdly, those lands where the Company was on equal footing with the Asian lords, and needed to deal “as made possible by signed contacts”. Mataram clearly belonged to this category, and constant negotiations were required to settle business.¹¹⁴ At stake were not only profits, but basic stuffs of survival like wood and rice.

Still, to the Lords XVII -who defined the general VOC policy from the Dutch Republic- lingering talks appeared a less costly option than warfare and colonization. In the early seventeenth century, only men like Jan Pietersoon Coen and Anthony van Diemen would opt otherwise. Coen expressed himself clearly: “trade cannot be maintained without war nor war without trade”.¹¹⁵ Under Maetsuycker’s governor-generalship (1653-1678) almost the opposite motto was abided to. Costly wars were to be avoided as much as possible to maximize profits. “No desire” existed “to gain possession of any more towns or estates in the kingdom of Mataram”. They would demand upkeep and only destabilize the region. This policy certainly reflected on the embassies and campaigns of Speelman and Van Goens.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ The original quote, albeit translated to Dutch by the editor, is: “weliswaar een middel waren om overeenstemming te bereiken inzake strijdige belangen, zodat er een einde kon worden gemaakt aan de gevechten, maar dat de details van de tekst er op zich minder toe deden”. See Ricklefs, *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*: 374. For the Sulawesians see Andaya, *The Heritage of Palakka*: 100-116.

¹¹⁴ As Bertrand notices: “Pour se prémunir contre le danger d’une éviction commerciale hors de eaux asiatiques, les administrateurs de la VOC prirent de plus en plus part aux intrigues des aristocraties indigènes”. See Bertrand, *État Colonial*: 50; C.R Boxer, *Zeevarend Nederland en zijn wereldrijk 1600-1800* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff: 1965). For the official VOC policy lines see *Generale missiven van gouverneurs-generaal en raden aan heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. Historici.nl (accessed via <http://www.historici.nl/retroboeken/generalemissiven/#page=0&size=800&accessor=toc&source=1>, on 25-12-2013): 76. For an earlier and similar division, see M.E. van Opstall, “Laurens Reael in de Staten-Generaal. Verslag van Laurens Reael over de toestand in Oost-Indië, uitgebracht in de Staten-Generaal op 30 maart 1620.” In *Nederlandse historische bronnen uitgegeven door het Nederlands Historisch Genootschap I*, ed. M.E. van Opstall (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1979): 175-213.

¹¹⁵ Coen wrote this on the 27th of September 1614 to the Lords XVII: “per experientie behoorden de Heeren wel bekend te wesen, dat in Indië de handel gedreven ende gemainteneert moet worden onder beschuttinge ende faveur van U eigen wapenen ende dat de wapenen gevoert moeten worden van de profijt die met den handel sijn genietende, in voege dat de handel sonder d' oorloge noch d' oorloge sonder den handel nyet gemainteneert connen werden”. See De Longh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 38.

¹¹⁶ So speaks Maetsuycker in the *daghregister*. Note that Hurd’s campaign was initiated under the governance of Van Goens, so after the passing of Maetsuycker. See Supreme Government of Batavia. “13 August 1677.” *Dagh-register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India Anno 1676-1677*, ed J.A. van der Chijs (The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1903): 192.

Maetsuycker's instruction for the campaign against Trunajaya was to achieve armistice or break his movement through minor military interference. This was partly because of costs, and partly due to a looming attack from Banten. Quick solutions as the installation of new local chiefs or a partition between Amangkurat II and his brother Pangéran Puger were searched for.¹¹⁷ Some interference was unavoidable, however, with the lingering inland chaos and the threat of Makassarese pirates.

After the havoc of Trunajaya's uprising started, the Dutch meddled in several times. 1776 saw the commission of three expeditions: Jan Franszen Holsteyn, Christiaan Poleman and Cornelis Speelman were sent one after another to re-establish the central power of the kraton. Yet, Holsteyn and Poleman thought they only had to wipe the Makassarese from the coast and Speelman was strictly prohibited to march inland by the Batavian Supreme Government.¹¹⁸ After Maetsuycker expired, his successor Van Goens decided the opposite and allowed hinterlands campaigns. Expectations were that Mataram would pay back the military expenses.

In hindsight, this proved to be an idle wish. Only a small proportion of the war debts were returned by the Mataram rulers. But the damage done had been great. Both sides lost much manpower and material resources.¹¹⁹ This did not keep the Company from intervening, however. After the hectic years of Trunajaya's upsurge and downfall, the VOC appeared a much more attractive partner to many regional Javanese leaders, certainly those of the Pasisir. The military victory demonstrated competence, and the increased taxes to pay the war debts raised hostility towards Mataram.

After 1680, numerous requests were made by the Javanese elites to become vassals of the Company rather than Mataram. Batavia was very careful with such approaches, however; not wishing to destabilize the Sunan's hierarchy. New chaos would merely bring more financial losses. Only over East Madura, Cirebon and Semarang did the Supreme Government take suzerainty.¹²⁰ Even with men as Van Goens and Speelman calling the tune, the colonizing tendencies of the Company would thus still be restrained.

Beliefs in 'powerful Eastern despots' do not explain their self-limitation. Van Goens did write two distorted accounts of an absolutist rule after returning to the Republic. Yet, these appear political ammunition in internal Company debates. Both Van Goens and Speelman noticed plenty of factions in the Mataram realm during their embassies and campaigns. What is more, they actively used them

¹¹⁷ Gaastra has even called the VOC a "reluctant imperialist" dragged into the hinterland conflicts against its own wish. F. Gaastra, *The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003): 60; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies vol. II*: 18-19, and 141-142.

¹¹⁸ The Supreme Government did not want to continue the intervention in 1677 due to threat of the Bantenese and the Malays of Johor. Palakka was called to Batavia and not Kediri for that reason. See De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 6; Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch Tiger*: 8 and 19-25; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 40.

¹¹⁹ Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 223.

¹²⁰ Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 41-43 and 46.

to their own benefit. Not so much a fear for weak Asian tyrants, but an awareness of the dependence on local alliances must have kept them from accepting the notion of obedient vassal states ruled by Mataram.

At first sight, the failing tyrant and the autonomous local rulers might seem two sides of the same coin. Still, the realization of needing local and regional assistance is clearly different from betting on the favoured royal horse, i.e. the Sunan, for a return of the war debts. Two contrasting kinds of intelligence lay behind both views. The latter is based on the formal reporting guidelines, the former on experiences of negotiation and fighting with and against a fragmented Javanese society. The formal guidelines were certainly not all-prevailing in the accounts of admirals like Hurdt and Speelman.

These guidelines were imposed since 1619, when the VOC gained an exclusive right on publishing and revealing all information gathered by its servants. The clearest request was made in the 'Memorie voor de coopluysden en andere officieren' as put on paper by Maetsuycker in 1670. Main themes of interest were: the locations visited by the delegates, the state system, trade and other means of survival, agriculture, hostile military forces, and the power and potential of the VOC within the area. Other common concerns were the sex distribution, households, possible alliances with the central leader, availability of arms, munitions and soldiers, location of forts, fighting of crime, 'churches' and religious figures.¹²¹

Although these themes are certainly treated, reports were not limited to them. What is more, the 'Memorie voor de coopluysden' was hardly applicable to military operations; after all, no separate directions were given specifically for admirals. Their descriptions appear largely shaped by the immediate issues they faced; most of all keeping their army together. The empiric impression of indigenous affairs and organizations unfolded the fractions stirring politics on Java. Fighting Trunajaya confronted the authors with mandalas and military labour markets. This deluged them with intelligence of a different kind. The immersion into the chaotic warfare around 1677, made the contracts between military cultures more evident than ever. The aspects of warrior charisma and shifting war-bands diverged most clearly.

¹²¹ The 1670 Memorie revised several parts of the instructions written in 1643, still overall they make similar demands. Note that Maetsuycker followed the requests made by the Lords XVII when writing down the Memorie. J.A. van der Chijs, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811 deel II* (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1885-1900): 52-72 and 527-534. (accessed via <http://archive.org/stream/nederlandschind00unkngoog#page/n6/mode/2up/search/In+de+Memorie+voor+de+coopluysden+en+andere+of+ficieren>, on 04-06-2013) and D. De Wever, *Javaense Reyse: de bezoeken van een VOC-gezant aan het hof van Mataram, 1648-1654* by Rijklof van Goens. (Amsterdam: Terra Incognita, 1995): 115; and A. Zuiderweg, "Batavia in reisverhalen uit de VOC-tijd" *Indische Letteren* 21 (2006): 151-166 and 154.

3. Describing Warfare: Between events and actors

a. Historiography

War surprises. Right before the VOC attacked Trunajaya's stronghold Kediri, their Makassarese allies suddenly vanished in the air. Hurdt, the admiral in charge, was counting on these hundreds of men. He requested their return, asking their warlord Galesong to "fulfil his promises" so he can "welcome them as good friends". The "sudden change of retreating ones dispatched people" -Hurdt wrote to Galesong- must have been caused by "the malicious inductions of several vile men". Likely, Hurdt knew the latter was not true. The Makassarese were reputed to jump from one army to another. Yet, the VOC admiral appeared baffled, uncertain why this pact was suddenly broken.¹²²

The VOC was often at a loss to find out how alliances formed among the pejuang. A scramble for intelligence came about to discover what was motivating warlords, who could be trusted and what could be done to end the costly war as soon as possible. However, being thrown into a conflict on foreign islands, the VOC men were frequently left grasping in the dark. Their acumen was hindered by the limited understanding of both royal and religious hierarchies and cults.¹²³ As mentioned, I attend to these gaps of knowledge and reflect on what the Dutch can still tell us about the war-bands under concern.

It might surprise the reader that merely Dutch material is analysed. What remains of the Javanese perspective if their very sources are not given thorough attention? One practical reason for leaving them out of the main analysis is the sheer lack of time for writing a MA thesis. Moreover, only babads translated in English or Dutch could be consulted, since I cannot read Javanese. Yet, I am also convinced a careful evaluation of the VOC material yields new understandings of both their message and nature. Accordingly, it enables a more careful assessment of the information the sources contain on Javanese alliances, be it in times of peace or distress.

My hope for increasing awareness on the potential of the VOC materials will come across best through reflecting on the existing historiography. For that purpose, I will start by reviewing the work that has already been written using the same kind of sources for the same period. Especially worth describing are the larger tendencies and presumptions central in De Graaf's and Ricklefs' oeuvre. Looking at their works specifically will show how the writings of European traders functioned as building stones for a Javanese history.

¹²² The quote derives from: "Daeruijt soo schielijke veranderinge en het aftrekken uwer medegesondene volkeren voortgecomen zij, dan eenelijck dat ghij door quade inductien van eenige boose menschen daartoe misleijd zijt" (p.216). See Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 135, 138, 188-190, 191-193, 196 and 214-217.

¹²³ Bertrand discusses this as a clash between two cultural perspectives. More will be said about this a few pages down. See Bertrand, *L'Histoire à Parts*.

The upsurge of Trunajaya has been treated many times before. Receiving the title of ‘national hero’, Trunajaya has found his place in the curriculum of Indonesian history courses. In this chauvinistic niche he figures as the good guy fighting the deceptive Amangkurats and their *kāfir* allies.¹²⁴ Luckily, more scholarly work has been available for decades already to counter this simplistic view. Yet, even within the academic literature certain discursive choices have been made that characterize the work and the stories told. In this chapter, I will trace these tendencies to see how they can be expanded upon. Naturally, a central issue is the use of Dutch sources.

Halfway the twentieth century, debates raged over the significance of Dutch sources for writing a history of Java. Scholars like De Graaf and Pigeaud very much liked to pick descriptions from both Javanese and Dutch writings to know the ‘true historical events’ the best. Berg instead stressed how Javanese sources were a league on their own, and could only be interpreted through recognition of their mythical character. This debate on reconstructing events and interpreting the actor who described them has steamed ahead since then; with well-known historians as Ricklefs or Kumar tending to one side or the other.

To understand the current scholarly discords, awareness of the academic debates halfway the twentieth century seems all but vital. And there is a good reason for this. After all, it was in these times that the foundation was laid for a post-colonial history of Indonesia. Different questions came to be posed, and different research methods were sanctioned. This is not to claim that comparable scholarly approaches did not bud before. Authors like De Graaf and Berg were, after all, active in the 1920s already.¹²⁵ Yet, a new disciplinary discourse emerged that directed the research to come. No book demonstrates this better than Soedjatmoko’s *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*.

Published in 1965, the work reflects the debates bustling since the 1950s. It was the awaited response against the “overly nationalistic” history writing that simply embellished on “the existing often Europe-centric body of Indonesian history”. Thereby, it pointed towards a route not stuck with “European narratives, chronologies, and categories of analysis”.¹²⁶ Be it about the earliest Hindu empires or the high colonialism of the nineteenth century, a new style of research was called for.

Multiple contributing authors -young and old, Asian and European- expound their ideas to take the ‘Indonesian Historiography’ one step ahead. Practical concerns are expressed on archival materials, research facilities and seminars. More interesting to us, however, is the theoretical layer

¹²⁴ Kāfirs are unbelievers. See, for instance, R. S. Hadiwidjojo, *Raden Trunodjojo, Panembahan Maduratna pahlawan Indonesia* (Pamekasan: s.n., 1956).

¹²⁵ G. Nagelkerke, Bibliography H.J. de Graaf. *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 141, no.2/3 (1985 Leiden): 201-214; and J. J. Ras: *In memoriam Professor C.C. Berg, 18-12-1900 tot 25-6-1990. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 147, nr. 1 (1990): 1-11.

¹²⁶ G. Kahin and M.L. Barnett, "In Memoriam: Soedjatmoko, 1922 – 1989". *Indonesia* 49 (1990): 135.

supporting the preferred course of enquiry. As acknowledged by Soedjatmoko, theoretical perceptions on sources and methods determined the research questions posed.¹²⁷

Let me demonstrate the consequences of these assumptions for those contributors interested in applying Dutch materials to write a Javanese history; Hoesein Djajadiningrat, H.J. de Graaf, J. Noorduyt, C.R. Boxer, and Graham Irwin. A dominant topic in their essays is the epistemic concern for connecting European sources to 'indigenous' views and reasoning. The preceding generations of historians are refuted for having failed to do so.

Most of the authors agree with Soedjatmoko's statements that the "*histoire réalité*" needs to be distilled from the "*histoire-récité*". Putting it differently; the 'subjective' Asian material is to be framed in factual 'Western' history as to provide an opportunity to truly perceive the real actions and motivations of the historical subjects. Hereby scholars can evade "inaccurate" mythological stories and use "relational objectivity". Scholars can procure the objectivity of Asian sources through relating them to Western ones. This is done by contextualizing the deeds and thoughts of Asian actors through events described in objective, mainly Western, sources.¹²⁸

In this manner, a "universal history" can be written; contrasting and thereby transcending different regional historical traditions.¹²⁹ The philosophical justification of this method is the notion of interpretationism propounded by Collingwood. As he stated: "the historian's work may begin by discovering the outside of the event, but it can never end there; he must always remember that the event was an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action, to discern the thought of its agent." Thinking oneself into an action requires a truthful understanding of events. Basing interpretations on obscure myths will merely result in distorted depictions of the action underneath.¹³⁰

Interpretationist epistemological concerns are clearly addressed in the aforementioned essays. De Graaf argues European sources offer "a check on the historical references in the Babad" and Jayadiningrat finds comparisons with "regular history books" crucial for making any sense out of the Javanese chronicles.¹³¹ Irwin stresses how the "high degree of cultural and economic integration" between colony and metropolis makes Dutch sources "expert and exact". Hence, they offer "checks

¹²⁷ Soedjatmoko, "Introduction" In *An Introduction To Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): xv.

¹²⁸ Ali expresses this perspective very clearly. See M. Ali, "Historiographical Problems." In *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 13; and Soedjatmoko, "The Indonesian Historian and his Time." In *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 406.

¹²⁹ The stress on a 'universal' history reveals the notion of a singular truth in which all human beings, at all places and times, must have acted. See Soedjatmoko, "*The Indonesian Historian*." In *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 407.

¹³⁰ R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History: With Lectures 1926-1928* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and M. Day, *The Philosophy of History* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008): 115-129.

¹³¹ Notice that the VOC sources equally allow tracing the "political calculations" of men like Speelman. See De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 16; and also idem., "Aspects of Dutch historical writings on colonial activities in South East Asia with special reference to the indigenous peoples during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." *Historians of South East Asia*, ed. D.G.E. Hall (London: Oxford University Press, 1961): 213-224.

on indigenous Indonesian chronicles".¹³² In short, a proper VOC-orientated contextualization of historic actors functions as a wand to bring them to life and read their thoughts.

The relational objectivity within De Graaf's work stimulates a portrayal of warlords' rationales rather than their organizational ties. Well-founded assumptions on and interpretations of personal decision-making flourish in his texts. But neglect of the martial networks and associations of the warriors conceal their attitudes inside the military system they were part of. Only his article on Kajoran -the religious patron of Trunajaya- truly takes such interests.¹³³ In the case of Trunajaya, De Graaf puts much weight on his desire for recognition by Amangkurat II. He, for instance, describes Trunajaya's "pleasure" at receiving the Sunan's letter in December 1679, which again addressed him as a subordinate rather than a rebel.¹³⁴

The long-term efforts of setting up a large war-band are thereby slighted. De Graaf is occupied with square inch circumstantial analyses -direct responses to current events- on the one hand, and very general narratives -winning the war, personal feuds and the like- on the other. This grants a contextualization of individual behaviour, but neglects perceptions actors themselves had on their conduct. That De Graaf wrote three separate articles on the Trunajaya's deeds -concerning his rise, main alliance, and death- reflects the absence of an account fully dedicated to the man.¹³⁵ By contrast, Berg did advocate thorough enquiries on personal motivations and thereby approached sources in a different way.

It should not be forgotten that the theoretical debates supervised by Soedjatmoko defined both the possible connections between the sources as well as their intrinsic character. Not surprisingly, the single author that did reject 'relational objectivity' conceptualized Javanese chronicles in a very different manner. Berg considered the past as "a specific complex of myths" construed as "part of the speech habits of a community". Over time, new generations would add new layers to the myths. Accordingly, a "continuous narrative evolution" added new and possibly contradictory aspects into a single "picture of the past".¹³⁶

¹³² H. Djajadiningrat, "Local Traditions and the study of Indonesian History." In *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 77; H.J. De Graaf, "Later Javanese Sources and Historiography." In *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 126; and G. Irwin, "Dutch Historical Sources." In *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 235-238.

¹³³ In this article, De Graaf ponders on the reasons Kajoran's forces accepted him as a warlord and the causes of the war-bands slowly falling apart after the sacking of the Mataramese kraton. See H.J. de Graaf, "Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk." *Djawa* XX, no. 4-5 (1940).

¹³⁴ De Graaf states: "De brief zal intussen Raden Truna-Djaja mede genoeg gedaan hebben, omdat dit het eerste teken van vertouwelijheid was, dat hij sedert ruim drie jaren van de Susuhunan mocht vernemen". See De Graaf, "Gevangenneming": 289.

¹³⁵ Notice that De Graaf did write single and complete narratives for Sultan Agung, Amangkurat I and other royal figures. Even within these works, the description of events stirs most reflections on the historical subjects under concern. See De Graaf "Gevangenneming."; idem, "De Opkomst"; and idem., "Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk".

¹³⁶ C.C. Berg, "De Evolutie der Javaanse Geschiedschrijving." *Medelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen* 14, no.2 (1950): 122; idem., "Herkomst, Vorm en Functie der Middelljavaanse Rijksdelingstheorie. Amsterdam: Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1951: 10; and idem., "The Javanese Picture of the Past." In *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965): 87.

For this reason, Berg suggests a “syntypical” method to evaluate the Javanese sources. This involves perceiving them as “products” of the “Indonesian culture” and “spirit”. Doing so requires attending to the intrinsic value of Asian mythical texts, not contrasting them with Western ones.¹³⁷ Zoetmulder applauds Berg and urges to read with the grain and view the sources as “special cultural manifestations and as a component parts of that culture”. To avoid a vicious circle merely based on the historical literature itself, ‘local knowledge’ should be used for theories and conclusions.¹³⁸

Friction between the two research approaches is evident. Soedjatmoko manages to express it clearly when stating: “Berg’s basic assumption cannot be ignored, and his provocative theory stands as a challenge to those historians who, on the basis of Javanese historical writing, are working towards the ‘re-enactment of past thoughts’- to borrow R.G. Collingwood’s phrase”.¹³⁹ Berg hence offers a different analytical platform, and allowed scholars to write a Javanese history contrasting clearly with that disseminated by researchers like De Graaf. Still, Berg never attempted to apply his methods to Dutch sources.

Interestingly, the scholarly schism of the 1950s tended to propel the historical research for the subsequent decades. With it, the neglect of an actor-centred take on VOC material continued too. This can not only be seen in the historiography on Java as a whole, but also for the sub-discipline of Javanese seventeenth century warfare. The major work in this field –Ricklefs’ ‘War, Culture and Economy’- demonstrates this most clearly. It is mainly concerned with the Kartasura period, 1677-1726, and how the Mataram dynasty re-established itself through strong dependence on the VOC. Ricklefs portrays a Dutch dilemma. Every subsequent upcountry conflict required a choice whether to continue intervention.¹⁴⁰

The VOC could either prolong their interference in hopes of returns when peace was established or it could retract its forces and thereby lose their chance to gain more hinterland influence. The book pushes forwards an image of the Dutch Company as a ‘consortio economicus’; a purely rational actor opting the most profitable way out of every subsequent troublesome event. Even though the work offers many valuable insights on distinct circumstances, its scope is too large to refine on them extensively. The broad periodization draws attention away from small-scale

¹³⁷ F. Bosch, “C.C. Berg and ancient Javanese history.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 112, no.1 (1956): 2.

¹³⁸ Zoetmulder wrote on the adaptation of Indian epics in Old Javanese; such epics were conformed to the standards of Old Javanese poetry. He struggles with the limited ability to interpret Javanese sources and discusses a “vicious circle”: “we should read the sources using our knowledge of the cultural pattern, yet how can we comprehend that pattern if not from the sources?” Despite these limits in ‘reliving the past’, local knowledge can serve as an alternative to century-old European knowledge. See P.J. Zoetmulder, “The Significance of the Study of Culture and Religion for Indonesian Historiography.” In *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, ed. Soedjatmoko (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1965): 326, 329, 335, 338 and 341.

¹³⁹ Soedjatmoko, *An Introduction to Indonesian*: xix

¹⁴⁰ Ricklefs, *War, Culture*.

decision-making by specific authors, and consequently the less 'rationalized' choices made in engaging men like Trunajaya.¹⁴¹

Ricklefs does give general reasons for the Company to involve itself with the inland struggles, yet further exploration of individual motives falls short. The biographical account he gives of Van Goens and Speelman stretches no further than one paragraph in total, afterwards Speelman's motives are rarely referred to. Instead, much of the book is dedicated to technological exchanges and the contracts signed between Mataram and the VOC, especially the way in which debts were demanded.¹⁴² For the Javanese, a similar bias is found.

Mataram is depicted as a social structure with a hereditary hierarchy struggling to retain its dominance. Still, unlike the VOC it is seen as stirred by dominant personas, namely the lineage of Sunans. Here then, individual actors do shine in the limelight, be it in such a way that it suggests "a highly personal rule". The shadow of De Graaf -Ricklefs' former supervisor- casts over the "dynastic approach to history" directing Ricklefs' focus on rulers. Hoadley admires the "truly Asian-centric view on history" portraying "Javanese perspectives". Still, the strict abidance to the primary material disregards "any evaluation of the voluminous data's veracity, or even their significance".¹⁴³

Much of this disregard can be explained through the remnants of 'relational objectivity' in Ricklefs' analysis. Throughout his work, both Javanese and Dutch sources are used to create a factual stage on which his actors of main interest operated. His Asian-centric view on history becomes one of interpreting the actions or motivations of the Sunans.¹⁴⁴ These rulers are situated in a "world of brutal power struggles" in which they needed to "persuade, cajole, threaten or compel other powerful men with more direct control of resources until he achieved a consensus of notables in his favour."¹⁴⁵

Hence, the bulk of attention goes to the figure of the Sunan himself and his attempt to sustain power. Further institutional and societal aspects as court alliances and war-banding thereby end up in the background. Theoretically they are stated to have been of significance, but the use of sources eliminates a thorough consideration for these facets.¹⁴⁶ Like De Graaf, sources from both the

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² A chief reason being the Company's dependence on Central and Eastern Java for food and timber reserves in the headquarter of Batavia. See *ibid.*: and 33. *Ibid.*: 14-21, 33-35, 38 and 47-48.

¹⁴³ As Ricklefs himself introduces: "Dr. H.J. de Graaf and Dr. Th. G Th. Pigeaud, have left their mark on all that I write". See M.C. Hoadley, "Review of Ricklefs, War, Culture and Economy." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no.3 (1994): 1019; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: x.

¹⁴⁴ In this way, Collingwood's influence seems to linger ahead, even without being explicitly recognized.

¹⁴⁵ Stated differently, the Sunans needed to operate in world where violence was the "social fact". Amangkurat I, for example, is seen to have "tried to centralize his kingdom to serve his interest alone. He achieved thereby the alienation of many of those upon whose consensus the Javanese state depended: princes, officials, regional notables and religious leaders." (Ricklefs, *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*: 357). See *idem.*, *War, Culture*: 8, 10, 12 and 31.

¹⁴⁶ In the introduction Ricklefs writes: "[a] central function of the administrative arrangements of the state was the levying of men and wealth for war. Military power was the basis of imperial politics. Java's poor communications and barely institutionalized administrative network may indeed have encouraged war. Regions were emboldened to resist central authority while the centre, if personal ties, threats, cajolery and murder failed, could in the end only attempt conquest and retribution." See Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 13.

VOC and indigenous side are combined to reconstruct historical circumstances, not so much historical associations. Actors follow cues to an end, but are not clearly situated in the community they were part of.

Ricklefs carefully considers the lacking mutual understanding of both Europeans and Javanese about each other. And he thereby certainly abandons any notion of VOC material being exclusively objective.¹⁴⁷ Nonetheless, in bridging the gap between his varied historical materials, he searches for a straight-forward overarching narrative of the Kartasura period. The wonderful effort to create a plain oversight of what exactly happened in these times does, however, leave out more mystical or personal motivations of the actors involved.¹⁴⁸

Ricklefs' description of both the VOC and Mataram shapes his conclusion on the influence of warfare. As he sees it, cross-cultural exchanges defined the martial activities and the institutional changes surrounding it. Both players were required to respond to each other's innovations. Mataram is suggested to have lost the war not because of limited military capacities, but due to corruption within the Javanese court. Court intrigues hindered the successful adaptation to changing political, cultural and economic circumstances. Yet, Ricklefs fails to connect these issues of alliance to the intrinsic character of the Javanese military apparatus.¹⁴⁹

In his work, cross-cultural influences are largely limited to transference of military technology and intensification of "cultural (and) political identities". The latter aspect gave war a perpetual character "exacerbating" the conflict which led to further schisms of identity. Unfortunately, however, the last point is only substantiated through discussing different dress codes and slight changes in behaviour. As Hoadley already observed, an important question is hence left out; how intensified identities can "explain the growing tensions within Javanese culture in the institutional sense".¹⁵⁰

The strands of VOC-embracing 'modernizers' and hostile 'conservatives' at the court is a case in point. Their stance was not merely affected by affinity; the benefits they could gain from increased trade equally drew them closer or further from foreigners. Applying the notion of military labour markets reveals even more of these schisms. It expounds on the conflicting interior and coastal

¹⁴⁷ "For Javanese society one must rely in part upon European documents which are contemporary, but which also reflect misunderstanding and misinformation." (p.1-2). See *ibid.*: 1-2, 22 and 23.

¹⁴⁸ Even though it is only perceived as volume one of a proposed project on Kartasura. For a theoretical discussion on the difference between mystical and personal motivations for Javanese actors to conduct violence see R. Bertrand, "Un subject en souffrance? Récit de soi, violence et magie à Java." *Social Anthropology* 11, no.3 (2003) : 285-302.

¹⁴⁹ Ricklefs stresses three aspects of 'military affairs' that contrast between the VOC and the 'indigenous forces'. These are the quantity of warriors, discipline and strategy plus tactics. It is the failure to discipline the troops and, at times, the lack of shared strategies that left the Javanese in disadvantage. See Hoadley, "Review of Ricklefs", 46; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 38 and 234.

¹⁵⁰ Hoadley, "Review of Ricklefs", 46; and Ricklefs, "De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie", 234 and 375-376.

interests, the mingling of non-Javanese forces and the dynamic collaborations that Ricklefs already touches upon, but does not flesh out.¹⁵¹

Just as individual decisions of VOC men and the intricacies of Mataram are overlooked, the bridge between the Company and the Javanese is interpreted using contemporary concepts (*'histoire réalité'*) in a matter that largely ignores the notions applied in the *'histoire-récité'* of either the European or Asian authors. Ricklefs almost got to discussing it thoroughly, apparently intending to write on the religious sides of Javanese warfare. But his publisher declined the project.¹⁵² Therefore, shadows still linger. Others did tempt to surpass them, however. Bertrand has been able to shine his own light over the sources and take up the issue of *'L'histoire à parts égales'*; the history beheld by two different societies in two unique ways.¹⁵³

Implicitly, he continues in line with Berg's work; seeking "special cultural manifestations" and reading along the grain. Unlike Berg, however, the VOC men are now counted as cultural actors too. He describes they "sont issus, non des milieu lettrés ou nobiliaires, mais du monde du port et du négoce".¹⁵⁴ Care is given to De Houtman's 1596 arrival in Banten, the rivalries between the British and Dutch trade company and the defence of Batavia. Though multiple "tableaux" he is able to address various themes of intercultural exchanges made by both Asian and European participants. Contrasting backgrounds brought separate prejudices and posed merchants next to nobles. The VOC servants were shaped by the events and debates in the Dutch Republic, the Javanese by the new understanding of both state and religion hovering over the archipelago.¹⁵⁵

In framing the latter perspective, Bertrand still leans a lot on an assumed rise of the priyayi. His earlier works described how the priyayi constructed an identity as noble administrators. They took the lead from the older aristocratic class of warlords; the courtiers by blood. In the wake of Sultan Agung's conquests, the need arrived to control the extensive realm of Mataram. Slowly a mandala was instituted, in which control over outer regions was facilitated through the command of the courtized priyayi, including the bupati exercising local rule. According to Bertrand, the discourse

¹⁵¹ Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 42-43.

¹⁵² This was conveyed to me by Dr. David Kloos; I have yet to gain confirmation from Prof. Ricklefs himself. Likely the correspondence between H.J. De Graaf and M.C. Ricklefs will reveal similar intentions; see the personal documents of De Graaf (KITLV-inventaris 125).

¹⁵³ Bertrand argues: "Écrire une histoire "à parts égales" des commencements de la rencontre, pas encore tout à fait inégale, entre les Provinces-Unies de la Grande Révolte et les sociétés des mondes malaise et javanais, ce n'est pas tenter de recomposer arbitrairement un monde commun. ...d'une part de prendre acte du fait qu'elles ne constituaient que l'un des plans de pensée et d'action des parties en présence, de l'autre d'admettre qu'elles n'étaient pas *initialement* dotées des mêmes coordonnées spatiales et temporelles." Bertrand, *L'Histoire à Parts* : 15-16.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*: 19.

¹⁵⁵ Bertrand's treatment of the intrinsic mysticism of political power, for instance, stresses the expanding "*negara*" or governed realm ideally under control of the "souverain-ascète". Looming over this discussion are the "noblesse de robe" *priyayi*, qui assurait l'administration de la maison royale" halfway the seventeenth century. Thereby they constituted the newly conquered *negara* of Sultan Agung and allowed his ideal kingship to blossom. See *ibid.* : 19, 21-22, 25-58, 99-120, 189-214, 231-260, 293-322, 323-346, 375-444 and 445-449.

of these 'nobles of the robe' -'la tradition parfait'- dominated the Javanese state system since then.¹⁵⁶ This, however, makes it appear as if warfare lost its identifying potential.

The discourse surrounding Islamization has shown otherwise, but only of late. For a long time warfare remained disconnected from the spread of Islam. Anthony Johns proclaimed the scholarly and mercantile Sufi conversion as the chief propagator of Islam.¹⁵⁷ The Southeast Asian trade ports came to the fore as transformative hubs from which the surrounding lands were converted.¹⁵⁸ In a like manner, Azyumardi Azra describes "penetration" was first caused by Muslim merchants and then by "wandering Sufis and scholars who came in increasingly large numbers to the area from the thirteenth century onwards". The scholars achieved a mix "between *shari'ah* (Islamic legal doctrine) and *tasawwuf* (Islamic mysticism)".¹⁵⁹

Azra and Johns do not only chase the aggressive face of proselytization, they equally depict it as externally imposed. In his recent trilogy on Indonesian Islam, Ricklefs shifts this narrative around. The Islamic waves do not come from the shore but the court inlands. There, Islamic and Javanese cultures and beliefs were mingled into a "mystic synthesis". "The cultural and social choices of the elite of this hierarchical society" were "crucial" in "developing cultural synthesis". Simultaneously, Ricklefs still expects a surge in "Islamic sensibilities as a cementing force of resistance against the king and his new Christian allies".¹⁶⁰

The trilogy, then, recognizes the violence underneath Javanese Islam. It acknowledges both war and religion as 'social identifiers'.¹⁶¹ But it does not allow the 'courtier' and the 'rebel' to speak up with the same volume. This has to do with a dichotomy underlying the mystic synthesis and that derives back to his earlier work.¹⁶² In courtly circles, Islam did not so much guide "personal faith and

¹⁵⁶ The new identification also altered education, as Bertrand notices: "Jusqu' au milieu du 17e siècle, l'apprentissage des arts de la guerre faisait partie de l'éducation du gentilhomme *priyayi*, qui était exercé dès la prime enfance au manègement de la lance et au tir à l'arc" (p.69). See Bertrand, *État colonial*: 68-81, 86-90, and 100-103.

¹⁵⁷ As he states: "[I]n other words the history of Islam in Southeast Asia cannot be understood apart from the history of the generation of trading centers at focal points in the archipelago." A. Johns, "Islam in Southeast Asia: Reflections and New Directions." *Indonesia* 19 (1975): 37.

¹⁵⁸ Unlike his predecessors, Johns went beyond discussion on the "provenance of Southeast Asian Islam" and instead gave prime attention to the "modality of its spread" as well as "the social and political effects of the new religion, and the subsequent character of the centres of political power where it developed". In this manner, hard-core 'Islamization' theories were avoided and the Southeast Asian trade ports came to the fore as transformative hubs. However, the streams of conversion still flowed as rudimentary forces of trans-cultural adaptation. As he sees it, the "Muslim city-states" emerging at the coast around the fifteenth century were "gradually to diffuse waves of Islamic influence into the hinterland, (...) which was to lead to the Islamization of broad swathes of the indigenous population" (p. 34 and 39). Even though a direct implementation of Arabic or Indo-Persian Islam is thereby doubted, it still asserts a religion prescribed from the coastal plains. See Johns, "Islam in Southeast Asia": 33-55.

¹⁵⁹ He refers to a "cosmopolitan scholarly community linked together in a relatively solid fashion by way of their studies, particularly of *hadith*, and their involvement in the *sufi tariqahs*." Crisscrossing theological networks and religious "processes of transmission" shaped the community. Pilgrimages subsequently furthered the connections with Mecca and *hajj* hubs. Through the effort of the roaming scholars, a "harmony" was achieved "between *shari'ah* (Islamic legal doctrine) and *tasawwuf* (Islamic mysticism)". In effect, a "socio-moral reconstruction of Muslim societies" occurred, creating a "renewalist drive" touching "the outlook and daily lives of many Malay-Indonesians". Azra opens new windows by considering the bridges laid down by Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian theology. See A. Azra, *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004): 2-4.

¹⁶⁰ Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 29 and 40. Ricklefs refers to Azra too, See *ibid.*: 50-1.

¹⁶¹ It thereby elaborates the social identification set out in *ibid.*: 11. That is, it now includes markers of cultural identity.

¹⁶² Ricklefs' notion of identity stirs a lot on assumptions of 'Islamization': the mystic synthesis assumes a binary collide and assimilation between forces of Islam and Javanese 'culture'. Think of sentences as: "[I]t is possible that the idea of Javanese identity came to be

behaviour” as it shaped cultural identities. Within the pockets of conservative religion, matters were different; theology and personal belief did surface there.¹⁶³ But in the seventeenth century, Islamic religious communities were not yet part of the regular hierarchy.¹⁶⁴ Java held internal islands of religion; the frequent ethnic and sectarian hostilities between regional groups evidence this.¹⁶⁵

From Ricklefs’ perspective, a cleavage existed between the pious Muslims and the mundane or politicized one. A parallel to Geertz’s division between the *abangan*, *priyayi* and *santri* -the followers of ‘Javanese Islam’, the royals, and the dogmatic believers- comes to mind. Yet, different identities were eminent before the 1850s.¹⁶⁶ Dogmatism was less important to the synthesis than how the ‘Javanese’ thought about converting to Islam, being a Muslim or living next to one. Accordingly, the juxtaposition of an Islamic and Javanese identity features prominently.¹⁶⁷ The question looming in courts, mosques and villages was whether ‘Javanese Muslims’ existed, not whether they were proper believers.¹⁶⁸ For Ricklefs, however, the question tends to become whether ‘courtly Javanese Muslims’ prevailed.¹⁶⁹

The mystic synthesis juxtaposes the creation of an Islamic identity with that of ‘unified’ Javanese one.¹⁷⁰ Even though no actual homogenous society was achieved, the synthesis did bring people together during the initial decades of the seventeenth century. Sultan Agung (r. 1613-1645) initiated it in 1633, under pressure to consent the rebelling Islamic groups. He both abided to rooted

approximately coterminous with an Islamic identity as one of the fruits of the success of Islamization.” The reader only needs to recall the work of Pollock and Ricci to perceive the danger of such a scheme. In their view, the power of “grammar” or religious concepts tempted a “cultural process of imitation and borrowing” leading to the gradual emergence of a realm-like cosmopolis with a similar “cultural-political style”. Instead of a collision and synthesis, Islam seems to have entered the archipelago by circulation and regeneration. See S. Pollock, *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in Premodern India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006): 133.

¹⁶³ M.C. Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 11.

¹⁶⁴ Villages of the pious usually gained an independent (*pradikan*) status. Central to their functioning were the *pesantrens* that soon spread throughout the island, although uncertainty remains over their existence in the seventeenth century. The founders of the schools often chose to locate near holy graves, particularly those of the *walis*. Believers expected such places to hold extraordinary powers or *kramat*. This made them attractive for both worship and refuge. Especially the graves of Kajoran and Giri consistently allured wanderers at odds with the central state hierarchy. Not surprisingly, these places eventually turned into hotbeds of ‘rebellion’. See *Ibid*: 4 and 11.

¹⁶⁵ In this manner, Ricklefs takes the continuing violence to indicate prominent local and religious identities rather than a dominating and all-encompassing Javanese one. Moreover, Ricklefs conceives a ‘degree of fluidity’ of ‘ethnic and cultural categories’ which allowed shifting identities. See *ibid*.: 22 and 225.

¹⁶⁶ Or the *abangan-putihan* distinction as it was called within the Javanese society itself. See Robert W. Hefner, “Islamization and the Changing Ethical Imagination in Java: Review of M.C. Ricklefs’ Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: c. 1930 to the Present.” *Indonesia*, no. 96 (October 2013): 187-202; M.C. Ricklefs, “The Birth of Abangan.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 162, No. 1 (2006): 35-55; and *idem*, *Mystic Synthesis*: 6-7.

¹⁶⁷ Notice how such a dichotomy suggests a still limited amount of separate branches among the Islamic believers. Different interpretations of beliefs and rituals certainly proliferated, but a split as that between Islamic modernism and the ‘spiritual’ Javanese Islam was not in place. This surely was to change in the modern age, at which point the mystic synthesis came to be deconstructed. Ricklefs defines identity as “the perception of membership within distinguishing boundaries that a group regards as defining itself, as expressing significant shared characteristics. All of us have multiple identities at any moment, but in some circumstances one or another of these memberships is the most salient”. Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis*: 4 and 12.

¹⁶⁸ Notice that such debates of dogmatism have been described as occurring prior to Sultan Agung. Bertrand even states that “[a]u fil de ce processus [of Islamization], Java connut, à l’instar de toutes les sociétés du pourtout insilindien, une islamisation ‘en dents de scie’, productrice d’identités distinctes, en parfois contradictoires”. See Bertrand, *L’Histoire À Parts*: 261- 291.

¹⁶⁹ In posing this question, Ricklefs refers to the courts of the likes like Sultan Iskandar Muda in Aceh or Sultan Abdul Kadir in Banten. See M.C. Ricklefs, “Islamising Java: The Long Shadow of Sultan Agung.” *Archipel* 56 (1998): 479-480.

¹⁷⁰ Notice how “particular practices” are used “as markers of Islamic identity”. See N. J. Kaptein, “Review of: (2006) *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the early Nineteenth Centuries*.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 164 (2008): 320.

courtly traditions and pious Islamic ones; visiting Tembayat, marrying the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul), creating a new calendar (Anno Javanico), financing extensive Islamic literature, and accepting the title of sultan.¹⁷¹ A new, normative culture was cropping up. Yet, after Sultan Agung expired in 1645, his successors would tear it apart again.

Amangkurat I and II managed to increase internal hostilities rather than resolve them. In this sense, the wars in and after the 1670s resulted from an accumulation of discords within a realm lacking courtly synthesis. Fighting the Sunan became a fight for a proper Islam; a jihad to expel the *kāfir* influences at the centre of the mandala. For the insurgents, the kraton was tarnished through its ties with the Christian VOC and the lacking Islamic affections of the king. Underlying the schism were networks of different kinds. Firstly, the ‘colonial’ one focused on commerce, mercenary and profits. Secondly, the ‘Islamic’ one with its teachers, holy men and scriptures. Both clashed violently and derailed a proper mystic synthesis for the years to come.¹⁷²

Ricklefs thus certainly sketches an intricate and thoughtful account on the expansion of Islam. Nonetheless, the Islamic motives of warring forces can be delved out much further. Several sides of religious ‘social identification’ are not yet disclosed. Trunajaya’s ties to Majapahit, his marital links with the Makassarese and appreciation for Islamic honorary titles become side-matters.¹⁷³ One reason for neglecting such aspects is the very abidance to a conceptual ‘mystic synthesis’. This pushes forwards an image of Islam directed by monarchs. But so much occurred beyond the capital.

Local actors were vital for adapting and taking on the religion, while redistributing it at the same time. All kinds of means were available for this; from pesantrens to infantries. Such continuing reproductions of, for instance, the Walisanga legend is partly omitted from Ricklefs’ study. Relational objectivity rears its head again. The era is defined by a fluctuating mystic synthesis that during certain events was active and others, as the early Kartasura wars, was not. Ricklefs’ findings on identities thus derive from event-based reconstructions of the past. The hybrid beliefs of Trunajaya’s forces are not counted as a mystic synthesis or are merely depicted as a continuation of “the themes of Javanese identity as shaped by Sultan Agung”.¹⁷⁴

Since they were expressed while fighting the Javanese overlord, they do not fit the narrative of a dynastic fusion of Javanese and Islamic identities. The circumstances conclude full recognition of

¹⁷¹ Tembayat is the grave site of Sunan Bayat, one of the Walisanga who is depicted as a last ruler of Majapahit. He supposedly was converted to Islam by Sunan Kalijaga. The legends tell Sultans Agungs met Sunan Bayat’s soul during the grave visit. The main pieces of sponsored literature were the *Carita Iskandar*, *Serat Yusuf*, and *Kitab Usulbiyah*. This synthesis contrasted with earlier manuscripts that often contradicted the Javanese and Islamic identity, although judgements are difficult to make for the times prior to Sultan Agung’s rule. See Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis*: 21-25, 34-36, 39 and 43-44; and *idem.*: *War, Culture*: 39..

¹⁷² Ricklefs continues with self-conscious Muslim identity established by the efforts of on Ratu Pakubuwana in the early 18th century. But this is beyond the scope of the thesis. See Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 58. For a view similar to Ricklefs, see Rimmelink, “De Worsteling om Java”: 348.

¹⁷³ Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis*: 62-63.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*: 63.

Trunajaya's own mystic motivations, for they were only relevant as far as they countered the courtly ones. The diverging voices of warriors become melted into a single scream for insurgence. Yet, Islamic motives on the battlefield were uttered in different terms by the diverse amount of actors and war-bands involved. Even the VOC material manages to demonstrate the dissenting views of their warrior correspondents and addressees.

The rebels' constant regeneration of warrior cults calls for attention. By suggesting a rather uniform Islamization to underlay the mystic synthesis, Ricklefs does not give this attention yet. The different groups of believers are assumed to have been subjected to an overarching religious process that speeded up or impeded in subsequent historical periods, usually defined by the successions of Mataram rulers. Their thoughts are a reaction to the religious processes encapsulating them; to be framed in an abounding Islamic dispersion.

Again a stage is set for interpreting the reasoning of historic actors. Their thoughts are approached through the supposed wave of Islamization the subjects happen to be caught into. The actors are hurled together as pawns on the chessboard, moved from one square to another. A master play follows, in which the long term adaptation of Islam is reframed. What is left unexplained, however, is the manner in which every pawn piece is held together, or whether they form a unity at all. That is, what grouped the rebel forces specifically?

I will reconsider these pawn pieces through taking the observations of individual actors as a starting point. In this case, these actors are the VOC men rather than the Javanese. Bertrand has demonstrated that the nature and authors of sources need to be respected; looking at Dutch material thus begs for a consideration of VOC actors. Surely, these were not the ones exposed to Islamization, mystic syntheses or Javanese identification. But great parts of their military subjects and opponents were. It is the way in which the VOC commanders considered these, that new insights on martial Islamization can be reached.

b. Methodology

In the Dutch Republic, friendships ensured survival.¹⁷⁵ So they did on Java. Bertrand's emphasis on limited contacts between the "Hollandais et Javanais" does not go for the era of encounters starting around 1650.¹⁷⁶ The new series of embassies and interventions greatly widened the connections across the cultural divide. With it came personal relations that ran the gamut from amiable to hostile.

¹⁷⁵ L. Kooijmans, *Vriendschap en de Kunst van het Overleven in de Zeventiende en Achttiende Eeuw* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1997).

¹⁷⁶ On the initial contacts, Bertrand states: "[t]el est les secret bien gardé de la rencontre imperial entre Hollandais et Javanais: elle n'a pas eu lieu." He means no great civilizational exchange occurred, but only ones "entre des fragments instables de celles-ci". The interaction between Mataram and Batavia became significant enough after the passing of Sultan Agung to claim the two societies were tied together later on, which is left ignored by Bertrand. See Bertrand, *L'Histoire À Parts*: 445.

Salvaging the former turned out crucial to attain success. I research how the new Asian networks were put to paper by the VOC commanders.

Unbarring intercultural networks is the main reason individual authors are spotlighted. Archival ‘pulses’ are useful for describing the greater scheme of things. They can be researched to perceive the broader shifts of narrative. Yet, micro-level enquiries on actors as well as meso-level analyses of their associations enable a wholly different approach. Questions on mutual understanding, socio-religious motivation, self-perception and fraternization can only be addressed properly from those levels.

Bridging cultural gaps required a cosmopolitan attitude. One could, however, have been cosmopolitan in many ways. The concept needs to be historicized to understand the past act of “conviviality and tolerance”.¹⁷⁷ On one extreme, authors might sustain an intrinsic interest in the culture and people he or she encounters abroad. On the other, purely pragmatic motives abound. Usually the first attitude is taken as true cosmopolitanism. Yet, for those Europeans wandering in early modern Asia, empiric impressions tended to be shaped by ‘banal’ interests; as Bertrand calls them.¹⁷⁸ Indeed, this was an “age of improvisation” in which contacts were to be sustained with newly contrived behaviour faceted by both commercial and cultural interests.¹⁷⁹

The earliest European visits to Asian courts were both intrinsically exploratory and utilitarian; seeking out how the hierarchy operated as well as how to reach profitable agreements. No manual was yet in place, so different approaches were tried out until trial and error led to consensus. Exploring the culture and rationality of the ‘Other’ and acting in accordance to it could open doors to new treaties.¹⁸⁰ Subrahmanyam calls this the “negotiated ways of understanding one another”.¹⁸¹

He describes a ‘produced incommensurability’ that attends to the decisions of actor rather than any intrinsic semiotic divides. Diplomacy hence becomes a core interest. Despite the distortion through mistranslated treaties and false promises, diplomats had the power to negotiate and

¹⁷⁷ J. Gommans, *Asian Cosmopolitanism and the Dutch Microcosmos in Cochin* (article to be published) (Leiden: Leiden University, 2013).

¹⁷⁸ Jacob had uttered an overarching definition spinning around “curiosity, interest, acceptance” and the absence of “suspicion, disdain and disinterest”. While the emphasis on “praxis” or “experientia” rather than ideology is useful, it is doubtful that the cosmopolitan attitude or behaviour can be simplified in this manner. Her exploration of the multiple social spheres in which cosmopolitanism can occur is illuminating. As is the way in which these varying communities are chronologically discussed in one narrative. Still, a distinction between personal and societal ‘acceptance’ is not drawn and the pragmatic drive of especially the initial encounters is overlooked. See Bertrand, *L’Histoire à Parts*: 22; and M. C. Jacob, *Strangers Nowhere in the World; The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early Modern Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2006): 11.

¹⁷⁹ T. Brook, *Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008): 19 and 21. See also Steenbrink’s view on the acceptance of Islam in the initial encounters between the ‘Dutch’ and the inhabitants of the archipelago. He claims “the trader or military official could hardly find any space for [describing religious customs] among the figures and surveys of cargoes and contracts in their ‘matter-of-fact’ reports”. K. Steenbrink, *Dutch colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993): 25.

¹⁸⁰ Emmanuel Levinas inspired this formulation. See E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969).

¹⁸¹ S. Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia* (Cambridge: Mass, Harvard University Press, 2012). Bertrand made a similar argument for Western Java, see Bertrand, *L’Histoire à parts Égales*.

mediate ways in and out of cultural conflict.¹⁸² Their impact thus ranged from cultural exchanges of paintings and the like to erupting warfare due to exaggerating or summoning mutual agitations.

The commensurability of war cultures is yet another issue. Geoffrey Parker has prompted it through his overarching thesis on ‘the military revolution’. He uttered contrasting cultural notions of warfare to have determined most conflicts between Europeans and non-Europeans from 1500 to 1700. Three differing extra-European spheres are perceived as exposed to three different types of clashes. ‘Indonesia’ belongs to those regions where Europeans had triumphed by the 1650s. European modes of war and technologies had supposedly ruled superior, leaving the indigenous without any chances. Hence, the VOC had won through exploiting a gaping incommensurability.¹⁸³

Like Subrahmanyam, I will not adhere to such theories. They suffer from structuralist assertions that take historical continuities for granted. In other words, intercultural dynamics are dimmed down, local deviations ignored and colonial dominations asserted. On Java, the West did not simply clash with the East; military cooperation stretched beyond such dichotomies. Even the acceptance of firearms demonstrates this complicity; as is ironically proven by a joined article of Parker and Subrahmanyam. Having said that, ideas of acculturation and trans-culturalism can be just as misleading. Teleological assertions on ethnicity and integration condemn the theories to oblivion.¹⁸⁴

Instead, “shifting vocabularies and changes wrought over time by improvisations” directed the early contact.¹⁸⁵ This had little to do with fundamental incomprehension or gradual incorporation, but was charged by a rational aim of reaching consensus and striking deals. A triangle of understanding, alliances and intelligence evolves. The awareness of cultural networks and etiquette enabled a clever selection of contacts resulting in the intelligence needed to negotiate ones objectives. Ergo, circumstances demanded careful consideration, spontaneity in approaching the right persons, and disclosing insights and information to reach a resolution. How this was to be done differed from one situation to another.

¹⁸² Subrahmanyam notices “there is a tendency to think of cultural incommensurability as particularly acute at moments of encounter, when two disparate (and perhaps historically separated) politico-cultural entities come into contact.” Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters*: 4-5, 8-9, 32 and 209. Similar processes can be perceived in early modern Europe, see W. Roosen. “Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: a Systematic Approach.” *The Journal of Modern History* 52, no.3 (1980): 452-476.

¹⁸³ G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Note that the ‘military revolution’ was coined by Michael Roberts and expanded by Parker. For similar books see C. M. Cipolla, *Guns, Sails and Empire* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965); and Jeremy Black, ed. *War in the early modern world, 1450-1815* (London: Routledge, 1999).

¹⁸⁴ Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters*: 24-26 and 29; and S. Subrahmanyam and G. Parker, “Arms and the Asian: Revisiting European Firearms and their Place in Early Modern Asia.” *Revista de Cultura* 26 (2008): 12-42. Ricklefs comments on ethnicity: “[d]e Europeanen en Javanen waarover wij het hebben, hadden nog niet het idee dat mensen, evenals alle overige levende wezens, bestonden uit ‘raciale’ groepen, die deel uitmaakten van een proces van competitieve en natuurlijke selectie”. Merle Ricklefs, *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*: 362; and Steenbrink, *Dutch colonialism*, 25.

¹⁸⁵ Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters*: 24-26 and 29.

The context of the encounters is thus key to comprehending the underlying motives. The meetings were not between societies at large, but rather between “particular subcultures or segments of societies”.¹⁸⁶ Whereas Subrahmanyam’s segment of choice is the court, most of my attention is on interactions during military marches (Hurdt) or the preparations for them (Speelman). However, his observation on the heuristics applied by the foreign visitors is applicable to both situations. The Portuguese rephrased the Asian court systems in their own vocabulary, automatically crafting a biased impression through translation.¹⁸⁷ A search for parallels and recognizable hierarchies equally defines the Dutch intelligence on the Javanese war-bands.

Consequently, the VOC agents framed warrior groups in much more rigid terms than seems suitable. Designations as ‘Javanese’, ‘Makassarese’, ‘Balinese’ and even the obscure ‘Malayans’ are thrown around; suggesting clearer groupings than might have existed.¹⁸⁸ Along with the categorization came rejection of the Asian “subservience and willingness to please, poor vitality and absence of wilfulness, a mixture of indifference and courtesy”.¹⁸⁹ What is more, the leaders of these subservient and indifferent men -warlords or not- tend to be portrayed as greater arbiters than they appear to have been. However unguided such identifications may strike us now, they did fit the state-centred warfare of Europe.¹⁹⁰

A rationale in search for European army structures easily evoked such biases. Of course, a complete parallel was never drawn between Dutch and Javanese armies. European vocabulary could not encompass all new phenomena; hence the authors sometimes resorted to foreign words. Still, the convention of *esquadres*, infantry companies, and battalions as made famous by the Dutch States Army lingered in the descriptions. And a tendency remained to speak of Adipatis, Radens, Tumenggungs, Pangérans, Karaëngs as if they were captains, lieutenants, corporals, or sergeants.¹⁹¹

All in all, ‘the Asians’ had exactly the same inclinations. Like the VOC, the Javanese elite saw many opportunities in military cooperation and “hoped to profit from it”. Similarly, they encapsulated Dutch victories, histories and even alcoholism into their own stories. The *wayang* clown servant *panakawan* -comical and victorious- became associated with the Europeans, the independence from Spain was retold in a Javanese context and Speelman was portrayed in chronicles

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.: xiv, 212.

¹⁸⁷ For Subrahmanyam, religion was not dominant in the courtly encounters. In his mind, they occurred in a “potentially secular sphere, where the religious identities of participants were at times somewhat attenuated or rendered irrelevant”. Subrahmanyam frames translation as “a positive intercultural hermeneutics based on deploying concepts such as prejudices”. See *ibid.*: xiv, 29, 62, 173 and 213

¹⁸⁸ Malayans seemingly often refers to men from Minangkabau.

¹⁸⁹ J. Van Doorn, *A Divided Society: Segmentation and Mediation in Late- Colonial Indonesia* (Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1983): 95.

¹⁹⁰ Note that state-centred warfare did involve many private investors who often benefitted from bloodshed. See Parrott, *The Business of War*.

¹⁹¹ Notice that while the reforms of Willem III after the ‘Rampjaar’ 1672 changed the military organization, its contrasts with the Javanese warriors groups remained about as large. See O. Van Nimwegen, “*Deser landen krijchsvolck*” *Het Staatse leger en de militaire revoluties (1588–1688)* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2006); and K. Roberts, *Pike and Shot Tactics, 1590–1660* (Botley, Osprey Publishing, 2010).

as the drunk Dutch general. Asian alliances of the Dutch were characterized as part of this VOC cosmopolis as well.¹⁹² Still, the Javanese heuristics are usually neglected due to a “deeply asymmetrical knowledge of the source materials of the period”.¹⁹³

Subrahmanyam even warns for the “impoverished history” which only perceives European agents as ‘cosmopolitan’, active translators and bridge-builders.¹⁹⁴ The reader might want to blame me for falling into the trap. But, even though the analysis sticks to Europeans, I certainly do not see them as the sole actors crossing cultural borders. Rather, they offer one of the several perspectives available on the abundant social, cultural and religious interactions during the wars on Java. For that very reason, a ‘Bergian’ analysis of their motivations is more than welcome.

c. Asian Associations

Capturing the diverge networks VOC men were part of, is the first leap to contextualizing their insights. To put it bluntly; their Asian associations determined the way in which they associated Asian concepts and institutions. Since the military campaigns were “intricate processes of treat, diplomacy and battle”, negotiations were as significant as fights.¹⁹⁵ For both pursuits, victory and loss shaped the idea of an inferior or superior opponent. Face-to-face talks thus led to impressions on the society as a whole. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the inter-personal from the inter-cultural exposures. The first are characterized by feuds and friendships, the latter by generalizations.

In Mataram, friendships were always tainted by the larger political parties opposing each other. In this manner, any personal contact would yield a particular angle for looking at society. The importance of associations is not surprising in a “network state” lacking elaborate institutions. To achieve aims, personal ties and strong personality counted much. The realm was a flexible and adaptive one, finding its way like a meandering river. Only the destruction of war could really tear the social-political network down. Fractions characterized the kraton. In different times, contrasting groups of courtiers gained the Sunan’s approval and dominated Mataram politics.¹⁹⁶

Ordinarily led by a prince or powerful patih, these fractions could stir policies to trade or isolation, war or peace and fellow believers or *kāfirs* like the VOC. Consequently, “the regents’ sense of commitment to Mataram” was very much shaped by “the extent to which they could help determine the policy pursued by the court”. The Garebeg Mulud was the best occasion to

¹⁹² On the Asian alliances, Ricklefs writes: “Ongeacht hoe ‘Nederlands’ deze strijdkrachten naar onze huidige normen betreffende identiteit en nationaliteit zouden zijn, voor tijdgenoten ging het wel degelijk om troepen van de Nederlandse Compagnie.” See Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 16; and Ricklefs, *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*: 361-369.

¹⁹³ Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters*: 30.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*: 30.

¹⁹⁵ Raben, *Het Aziatisch legioen*: 184.

¹⁹⁶ As Nagtegaal states: “it was only in the extremities of war, when social life itself was thrown out of joint, that the network collapsed altogether”. See Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch Tiger*: 45-46 and 51-55; and Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters*: 215.

demonstrate ones loyalty. Not attending this annual ceremony more or less paralleled rebellion and the seats and roles given during the celebrations exposed ones standing at the court.¹⁹⁷

Outside the court, leaders were suppressed as much as possible. But the arms of Mataram were not strong and its grip not tight. The local power networks were still largely intact despite the conquest of Sultan Agung in the first half of the seventeenth century. When Trunajaya stormed the island, the peripheral cities and communities were governed by individual rulers with local roots. Therefore, they were very capable of disobeying courtly orders in case their interests were not served. The Sunan's frustration with this power balance is illustrated by his attempt to turn things around in 1680. Multiple local leaders were replaced for one single, non-native, bupati per region (*kabupaten*). But still centralized control remained limited and conflicts stayed on the horizon.¹⁹⁸

The VOC men discussed here, found themselves at the heart of these conflicts: Cornelis Speelman and Antonio Hurdt landed in the middle of military affairs splitting the Javanese.¹⁹⁹ They both had to direct and mobilize the combined army of the Company and Mataram by drawing in warlords. However, they were unable to control or fully understand the army under their guidance. There were large fractions of local allies with high independence and on the verges of Dutch administration. The VOC men could only partly recognize the organization of such war-bands, including their shifting alliances. Equally limited were the attempts to survey Trunajaya's legions through correspondence, negotiations and embassies. And in some cases, the main impression on his warforce was derived from the warriors switching from one army to another.

Still, enough was perceived to formulate personal heuristics on both royal and martial matters. To appreciate those interpretations, analyses based on 'relational objectivity' will not suffice. Reflection on the epistemic value of the consulted sources is required to go beyond event-based interpretations of what historical subjects were supposedly thinking. A focus on chronological events and actors can be combined to suggest the presence of military fraternization perceived by certain historical subjects and occurring in a specific time frame. Those fragmented observations are small beams of light revealing larger military tendencies, markets and group formations. For between events and actors, one can find the war-band.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷ Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 45-46.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*: 43-45.

¹⁹⁹ That is, to the degree that the Javanese were one people to begin with.

²⁰⁰ That is to say, by considering the perspectives and associations of the VOC authors, the epistemic value of descriptions of Javanese martial organizations can be judged upon. Based on such a survey, the particular military labour market in which war-bands functioned as well as, in extension, the nature of war-bands can be more carefully interpreted from the VOC's standpoint.

d. Case study: Van Goens

To fathom the consequences of the preceding methodological assertions, I will offer a test case: Rijckloff Van Goens' five embassies between 1648 and 1654. The example will equally demonstrate the effect of shifting associations on the appreciation of Mataram as a whole. More so than Speelman and Hurdt, Van Goens witnessed the centre of the mandala and was thus strongly exposed to its political tides. In addition, the case offers a comparison between delegates and admirals; or that of ambassadorial and martial commensurability. The VOC man entered a world of court intrigues and needed to reach diplomatic consensus through availing the courtly divides. He had the option to either do so by force or consent.²⁰¹

Van Goens (1619- 1682) is a well-known character within VOC history. His conquest of and rule over Ceylon plus his position as governor-general between 1678 and 1681 have brought him fame. It equally established an image of a ruthless colonizer interested in bashing the autonomy of local Asian leaders to pieces.²⁰² As two authors have pointed out, however, Van Goens' colonizing tendencies seem to have entrenched in the early 1650s only.²⁰³ Most of his accounts of the Javanese court predated this 'turning point'.

He visited Mataram five times between 1648 and 1654. In the elaborate accounts on these embassies, there are only scarce hints to the colonizing agenda he would embrace afterwards. The court is not portrayed as a burdensome institution per se. Instead, his writing demonstrates a concern for delving deeply into the Javanese mandala. It is only when negotiations break down in the last two embassies that dismissal of the kraton comes through.²⁰⁴ Still, even at that point there remains an evident interest in the courtly alliances and the way to use them to reach his diplomatic aims.

His sudden aversion might indicate self-censorship while corresponding with Supreme Government or doubts about the feasibility of subduing Mataram. But these possibilities only partly explain the trends in his reports and letters.²⁰⁵ Not aversion but immersion defined his embassies.

²⁰¹ I say 'peaceful' because no massive wars occurred. The court itself was by no means serene: the Sunan in these days, Amangkurat I, was known for his violent and aggressive punishments. See R. Van Goens, *De Vijf Gezantschappen van Rijckloff van Goens naar het Hof van Mataram 1648-1654*, ed. H.J. de Graaf (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956): 74-75, 202-3, 221 and 254.

²⁰² K.W. Goonewardena, *The Foundation of Dutch power in Ceylon 1638-1658*. (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1958); H. s'Jacob, "Rijckloff Volckertsz van Goens, 1619-1682: Kind van de Compagnie, diplomat en krijgsman." In *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: tussen oorlog en diplomatie*, eds. : G. Knaap en G. Teitler (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2002): 131-151; A. Van der Kraan, "A Baptism of Fire: The Van Goens Mission to Ceylon and India, 1653-54." *Journal of the UNE Asia Centre* 2 (1999): 1-52; and M. De Wever, ed. *Javaense Reyse: de Bezoeken van een VOC-gezant aan het Hof van Mataram, 1648-1654* (Amsterdam: Terra Incognita, 1995).

²⁰³ s'Jacob, "Rijckloff Volckertsz": 140; and Van der Kraan, *A Baptism of Fire*: 1-52.

²⁰⁴ Van Goens expresses this very clearly in his 1655 Vertooch. See R. Van Goens, "Rapport van Van Goens; Vertooch wegens den presenten staet van de generale Nederlandtse geotroijeerde Oost-Indische Comp." *Bijdrage tot de taal-,land- en volkenkunde van Neerlands-Indië* 4 (1856): 180.

²⁰⁵ Van Goens might have purposely avoided direct critique on Maetsuycker's government. At the same time, he neither expressed his aversion under the more liberal regime of the preceding governor-generals Cornelis van der Lijn and Carel Reyniersz. The hierarchical context in which he functioned does thus not explain much of Van Goens' silence in this political debate. On the other hand, s'Jacob asserts that the very idea of an aggressive policy towards Asian rulers would only come to him during his voyage back to the United Provinces in 1655. Goonewardena, *The Foundation*: 162-165; s'Jacob, "Rijckloff Volckertsz": 140; W.M. Ottow, *Rijckloff Volckertsz Van Goens: De*

After serving as secretary to Sebalt Wonderer during the first visit, he took charge of the delegation and was thereby enabled to carefully examine court relations. Van Goens used the knowledge of translators like Michiel Zeeburch and Matthijs Pietersen -who spend years in Mataram as captives- to his own avail. He praised the latter to “get along with these people wonderfully” and “speak the Javanese language fluently”. Zeeburch even converted to Islam and appeared to have married a Javanese wife. Assistants like that could guide Van Goens over the cultural and linguistic gap to the core of the kraton.²⁰⁶

The VOC man’s framing of the reeling and dealing at the royal centre thereby tells a lot about the degree to which a European outsider could grasp the elaborate networks of Javanese court alliances. Confusion remained. The delegate, for instance, misinterpreted royal titles he encountered as representing the realms of subordinate kingdoms. As a consequence, he drew a faulty map of the mandala. For Schrieke, “this fact leads one to accept with some reservations what he has further to say regarding the administrative structure of Mataram”.²⁰⁷ Still, the VOC man was able to, if not touch, at least approach the essence of courtly functions of Pangéran, Tuměnggung, and that of the Sunan himself. Hence, Bertrand takes Van Goens as the sole eyewitness of the Mataramese state centralization; albeit one “légèrement plus tardif”.²⁰⁸

Such judgement can be substantiated with an analysis of the reports used to convey his insights. Delving into Van Goens’ mind-set requires a concern for the different mediums used to pen down his observations. Whereas these were *dagregisters* -daily journals- for the first three embassies, the fourth and fifth one have been conveyed in letters and general reports. S’Jacob stated how Rijckloff’s writing style loosened accordingly.²⁰⁹ Yet, such loosening does not seem to have greatly affected Van Goens’ literary devices for judging the Javanese.

Clearly, *dagregisters* do have a more formal and chronological structure. In fact, the first one was even written anonymously, which stresses the bureaucratic nature of these documents.²¹⁰

Carrière van een Diplomaat 1619-1655 (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 1954): 6 and 159-174; and L. P. van Putten. *Ambitie en Onvermogen: Gouverneurs-Generaal van Nederlands-Indië 1610-1796*. (Rotterdam: ILCO-Productions, 2002). Notice that although interesting for the primary material gathered, Ottow’s work also comes close to being a hagiography. He wrote a sequel too, equally admiring, which can be consulted in the Royal Library in The Hague.

²⁰⁶ Notice that Zeeburch did not follow Van Goens to the kraton. But he was used as a translator and spy on other occasions after returning to the VOC in 1651. Therefore, he would have likely influenced the information that reached Van Goens indirectly. Zeeburch left the Company in 1653 and moved to Djuwana under the protection of Tuměnggung Pati. The quotes are translated from Dutch: “wonderlicq met dat volck ... om te gaen”; and “in de Javaense tale prompt is, ende vryposticheyt heeft, om by de groote zyn woort redelyck te doen”. See Van Goens, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 80 and 466; and H.J. De Graaf, *De regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I Tegal-Wangi, vorst van Mataram 1646-1677 Deel I: De ontbinding van het rijk* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961): 86-87.

²⁰⁷ For instance, Schrieke writes: “Van Goens clearly constructed his subjugated kings of Purbaya, Blitar, and Silarong, and imagined his provinces of those names on the analogy of these examples.” See Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies vol. II*: 187- 189.

²⁰⁸ As Houben notices: “The prince’s title (Pangéran) earlier belonged to the regional lords of Java (formerly: *mahamantri*), who were subjected by Mataram and incorporated into the realm. Thus the Dutch envoy Rijckloff van Goens was not wide of the mark when, during his visits to the Javanese courts, he defined all Pangéran as subordinate kings”. See Bertrand, *État Colonial*: 42; and Houben and Kolff, *Between Empire building*: 167-169.

²⁰⁹ s’Jacob wrote: “In de loop van zijn missies naar het hof van Mataram zien we Van Goens in zijn rol groeien. Tot de derde missie hield hij keurig een dagverhaal bij maar daarna werd de toon losser en gaf hij vaker zijn eigen mening.” See s’Jacob, “Rijcklof Volckertsz”: 140.

²¹⁰ Despites the unknown authorship of the first *dagregister*, there are clues suggesting Van Goens as the author.

Yet, when it comes down to it, they enabled a similar kind of reflection on the occurrences during the audiences as well as the events before, in-between and afterwards. Of course, letters did usually address a more particular topic and general reports could juxtapose events that occurred on different days. Still, expecting such differences to result in fundamentally different narratives by Van Goens is far-fetched. Rather, s'Jacob's implication that the changed medium reflects an increased comfort with the kraton politics is well taken.

Within all the sources, one can recognize a consistent approach towards the Javanese society. It is only in the overarching report addressed to the Lords XVII in 1655, *Javaense Reyse*, that the stories gain a fundamentally different character. Amangkurat I suddenly receives a more despotic personality and malpractices at the court are highlighted.²¹¹ The text seemingly caricaturizes Mataram and is therefore best perceived as part of a diptych with Van Goens' *Vertooch* pamphlet from 1655.²¹² This report, after all, sees the eyewitness turn into an orator.

The *Vertooch* pamphlet -addressing issues of concern to the Lord XVII and striving for more VOC dominance in Asia- forcefully rejected Asian politics and advocated increased independence from those corrupted trade partners. What is more, Christian sentiments pop up that had been marginal in his previous texts. *Javaense Reyse* picked up on this theme and appears to transform and embellish his embassy experiences to exaggerate the inefficient and lawless central Javanese court hierarchy. Even this document, nonetheless, shows through the court fraternization Van Goens was exposed to. Therefore, it is not to be entirely disdained. Rather, it demonstrates how the same court structure was described differently when viewed with distinguishable political motivations.

So, what did Van Goens tell us about the court coalitions? First, I will discuss his interpretations given in the direct reports; afterwards a short contrast is drawn with his *Javaense Reyse*. A key point is Van Goens' own functioning within the court. The man became trapped in royal games of affiliation. The elaborate attention for court relations and etiquette is a remnant of this. It indicates how courtly contacts shaped the information reaching Van Goens. Many of his observations could have only been derived from Javanese sources; treating circumstances that occurred more than a decade earlier, or that involved intricate details of the court system.²¹³

²¹¹ De Wever refers to Orientalist tendencies in the text; stereotyping the East as a place of unrestricted sensuality and intrinsic violence. See R. Van Goens, *Javaense Reyse: de bezoeken van een VOC-gezant aan het hof van Mataram, 1648-1654*, ed. M. De Wever (Amsterdam: Terra Incognita, 1995): 94, 99-101, and 118-119.

²¹² De Wever makes this point too, stating: "Van Goens schreef in *Javaense Reyse* niet als onafhankelijk waarnemer over Mataram, maar als werknemer in opdracht van zijn werkgever de VOC. Deze grote handelsonderneming manifesteerde zich in Azië slechts met een oogmerk: winst maken." See Leupe, "Rapport Van Goens": 180; and M. De Wever, "Ambassades aen den Sousouhouan Mattaram, machtigste coninck van 't eijlant Groot Java' De VOC-gezantschapsreizen van Rijklof van Goens en zijn voorgangers." *Indische Letteren* 11 (1996): 31-43; and idem., *Javaense Reyse*: 114 and 119.

²¹³ De Wever, *Javaense Reyse*: 116.



Picture 6 The map of the Mataramese kraton Plered (1646-1680), which was likely drawn by Van Goens with the assistance of his informant Pietersen. In the lower right corner the residences of different courtiers are numbered; the locations are indicated on the map. These numbers demonstrate efforts to unravel the court networks.²¹⁴

Fractions split the intelligence received. After decades of mutual avoidance under Sultan Agung, his successor Amangkurat I finally sought contact. His court was divided on these approaches; some welcomed the VOC, others quite the opposite. Even though we cannot expect binary opposites, the texts of Van Goens sometimes do suggest them. Already during the first embassy, complaints are made on the limited visits to courtiers due to “the jealousy between them”.²¹⁵ Wierra Patra, for instance, showed dismay at being visited later than the Tumenggung Mataram. Subsequently, the report dismisses the former as a distrusted stooge of the Sunan; calling him arrogant and feeble-minded.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Notice that the picture is twisted due to lack of space. “Vertooningh van de Provinciale Hofplaats van de Sourousounan Ingalaga, genaamt Mataram of de Hoofdstad syns Ryks.” Kaartcollectie Buitenland Leupe. Nationaal Archief, 126 (as accessed via <http://proxy.handle.net/10648/af992fa2-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84>, on 24-02-2014. See R.A. Kern, “Een Kaart van Mataram.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 113, no.2 (1957): 205.

²¹⁵ The report states: “sulcken gevalle meer grooten besocht souden hebben, tensij uit jalousie d'een tegen d'ander”. “Want wanneer op 't versoek van voorschreven Wierra patra bij hem verschenen, soo bespeurden terstond afgunstigheijt tegens den tommagon Mattaram, ons soetelijck reprocherende, hoe wij soo weijgerich waren geweest tot sijnent te comen, daer doch soo dickmael bij den tommagon gingen, daerbij voegende : seijde den Sousounangh tegens den tommagon vader , hij noemden hem outsten broeder”. Nebeij Wiera Patra was involved in another case of jealousy. Van Goens, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 60.

²¹⁶ Note that this man was also known as the assassin of Wiera Goena, whom is described as an enemy of the Dutch. From the account a Dutch prisoner, Wiera Goena is claimed to have been personally responsible for the murder of several Dutchmen after the request for their liberation during a previous embassy. *Ibid.*: 23, 60 and 62.

The arrival of the fourth embassy was judged gloomily because the deputy welcoming them was seen as “our biggest enemy, and would not prefer anything more than our downfall”. This Anga Prajia was a court translator that seemingly had troubled the delegates before. Tension was only relieved when the favoured Tumenggung Pati appeared a bit later to guide them further.²¹⁷ Evidently, the right connections mattered much for reaching success.

In fact, Van Goens’ attempt to disentangle the courtly ties and schisms went further than mere side-observations. He tried to stipulate the relations between the courtiers, saw the *Garebeg Muludan* court gatherings, the Sumatran embassies and noticed places at the kraton only accessible to favoured ‘nobles and friends’.²¹⁸ Most importantly, Javanese nobles informed him on courtly feuds during his stay inlands. Most reveal an aggressive search to centralize the realm. So he is told by some Kjais that “the chief reason for the Susuhunan to travel southwards was to eliminate certain old lords, like Tumenggung Arta Tales and Tumenggung Wiera Sastra”.²¹⁹ It is a confession leaving the delegate dazzled by the “odd manner of their government” to “kill the old, to make room for the young”.²²⁰

Javaense Reyse contains the bloodiest account of the Sunan’s aggression; telling about the large-scale murder of Islamic ‘priests’ whose bodies were still spread over the countryside. It appears these religious figures had favoured Allah over the monarch. The embassy reports describe executions too. During the third embassy, the courtier Ango Prajia conveys to Van Goens that the Sunan could not attend the VOC embassy for he was busy “killing 25 Javanese (...) whom against the Susuhunan’s order courted several Balinese women”. So, the delegates instead entertained themselves at Kjai Patra Mangala’s house.²²¹ Similar events happened during the other embassies.²²²

But punishments were not the Sunan’s only means to control. Van Goens is struck several times by the way in which warfare is applied as a power tool. In *Javaense Reyse*, he refers to the register of all “noteworthy lords” and their followers. The importance of martial power thus even led

²¹⁷ Ibid.: 96 and 118-119 .

²¹⁸ . Concerning the off-limit areas, it is mentioned that the “zuijderpleijn, alwaer wij audientie gehadt hebben, daer niemant mag binnencomen dan sijn beste vrinden ende heeren, daerop sich vertrouwt, ende uut deselve niemandt, dan die door hem daer geroepen wierden”. See *ibid.*: 46, 66, 79-80, 87-88 and 91-93.

²¹⁹ Van Goens received this information during the return travel of the embassy. The quote above is roughly translated from: “de principale saeck, daerom den Sousounangh sijn reijse om de zuijt hadde aengenomen, was om eenige van d' oude grooten, daar hij noch op gebeten was, om den hals te helpen, als den *Tommagon* Arta Tales en de den *Tommagon* Wiera Sastra”. Later on, he hears about the hostilities between “Wiera Sittia ende Soeta met Angapraja”. The former assist the Dutch in their hunt for Chinese defaulters. During the third embassy, Van Goens would come to know that Wiera Sittia and Anga Prajia had lost the Sunan's favour. Wiera Sittia was even degraded to a post in Kendal. Around the same time the news dripped that “den *Tommagon* Mattaram mede in ongenade des Coninck was ende alle sijn volck, zijnde 6000 mannen, hem affgenomen waeren, ende geordineert was, sich als een gemeen Edelman met weijnich swiete te erneren”. *Ibid.*: 67-70 and 79-80.

²²⁰ Translated from “t *Stondt noch te [ge]loven, dat het getal met geen 2 ofte 3 soude ophouden, daar door de vreemde maniere van hunne regeringe can bespeurt werden, die voor d' onse onbegrijpelijk is, mits d'oude vermoort werden, om de jonge plaetse in te ruijmen*”. *Ibid.*: 67.

²²¹ Van Goens, *Javaense Reyse*; and *idem.*, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 84.

²²² For the fourth Van Goens writes that there “was groote verslagentheijt onder de grooten om des Coninck grimmicheijt ende gestadige toorn, dat meest dag elijcx d'een ofte d'ander den hals coste”. *Ibid.*: 119.

to a bureaucracy surrounding it. Tellingly, Amangkurat I's first enquiry is on the Dutch contacts with his martial rivals. It is plausible the VOC appeared as another potential warlord on his list.²²³

Feigning war was effective too. The first embassy report concludes it is "certain" that the Sunan's call to attack Banten, served no other reason than "to keep his enemies under fear, or eliminate his distrusted subordinates".²²⁴ His analysis of the alliance between Mataram and Banten in 1652 equally typifies. Concerned with a potential pan-Islamic attack and a shrinking rice supply, he sets out the new marital links connecting the polities as well as the courtly oppositions towards them.²²⁵

Two political strands are described. On one side, the resistance of Pangéran Purbaja against the marriage. On the other, the plans of the "priests and other riff-raff" to attack Bali first and leave Banten in peace for now. Van Goens knows this plan is being advocated in the name of Sultan Agung who had assumingly claimed that "one should turn Mataram's arms to the East before taking them to the West, otherwise they will not be blessed". He had heard a near lethal accident with an exploding cannon had made Amangkurat I religious and abiding to the "priests".²²⁶

Besides confirming to the VOC delegate how "whimsical" these people are, the account above also shows how the delegates' ties could establish and break apart. Next to the punishments, and war treats plus peace agreements, a vital way of expressing political preferences was through the embassy itself. The VOC men indicated their subordinate visitor status by wearing a yellow band and carrying their letter above the head. The most explicit expression of Javanese dominance was, however, the distance at which one was seated from the Sunan.²²⁷

The VOC visits were comparatively rare next to the frequent commission of local leaders. The more dismissive nature of 'indigenous' embassies is recognized by the VOC men. The Pangéran from Jambi visiting the court in 1651 is said to be "in awe of the Susuhunan's power" and to undertake the journey "against [his] own wish".²²⁸ It became obvious to Van Goens that subjected

²²³ Ibid.: 45, and 54. See also De Wever, *Javaense Reyse*: 41.

²²⁴ This war never materialized Van Goens, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 67.

²²⁵ For the VOC, Mataram hostility towards either Banten or Blambangan was both equally obstructing. In both cases, it would likely mean an attempt by the Sunan to assure Dutch neutrality through putting the rice supply under pressure. Pan-Islamic alliances between Banten and Mataram would endanger Batavia for an attack from East and West. During the embassy these threats did not seem likely, however. Van Goens states: "Immers met Bantham is 't heel aff, ende tracht men des Coninx outste soon off den pangoran Maes (geseijt prince des Rijcx), met een dochter van Bantham te trouwen, nochtans met conditien, dat de Banthammer een van syn kinderen ofte naeste bloetverwanten, dependenten van 't Ryck synde, aldaer ten hove senden sal ende jaerlycx continueren, wanneer den Coninck ofte Sousouhouan aenneemt vrient ende bontgenoot van den Sultan te wesen". Ibid.: 103-104 and 153.


²²⁶ The quotes are translated from Dutch: "papen en ander gespuys" and "men soude de Matarams wapenen eerst naer 't Oosten ende dan naer 't Westen wenden, anders waeren se niet gesegent.". On the religious turn of the Sunan he states: "dit doet hem religieus werden, bid de papen voor hem te bidden, staet aff van syn hartneckigh voomenen, sweert den oorlogh tegen 't Oosten ende belooft hem met den Bantammer te bevredigen, behoudens de reputatie synes persoons". Ibid.: 122-123.

²²⁷ Ibid.: 53- 54, 102-103 and 122-125.

²²⁸ The quotes are roughly translated from Dutch: "de oorsaacke, waerom desen pangoran ten hove comt, geschiet nergens dan uijt ontsach van des Sousouhouanans macht, ende genoeg tegens den Jambijnees sijn sin, 't welck UEd. vrijelijck voor vast gelieven aen te nemen; ende 't gene de Jambijnesen van hun out hercoment maechschatp voorgeven (hoe wel 't seecker ende waer is) is niet dan omtrent ons hun cleijn heijt tegens den Coninck te bedecken." Ibid.: 94.

polities needed to be submitted to these rituals if the realm was to be kept together. Schism within the court were not all that mattered, those between the centre and the periphery were just as important.

Gradually, the independence enjoyed by local rulers was noted. That the fringes of Mataram were not easily commanded by the kraton came across when Van Goens needed to pay extra fees to locals while settling the trade post of Japara. Or when he needed to retrieve the promised rice himself when it turned out not to be delivered to Semarang by the local leaders.²²⁹ The Sunan expressed his concern for disloyal subjects multiple times. The Javanese migrating to Batavia were, for instance, dismissed as “bad and lazy no-goods, that flee from their masters” deserving to be punished.²³⁰



Picture 7 Tournament games in the court of Mataram. This is how the kraton is depicted in Schouten, *Oost-Indische Voyagie* (1676). Halfway the 1670s, Van Goens’ embassies, mainly as expressed in *Javaense Reyse*, still provided the main insight into the Central Javanese court. No surprise, then, that Schouten chose to visualize it as both violent and autocratic, with all princes watching their peers being stabbed of horses. Just like the earlier engraving from this book, the Sunan’ army is large and mighty, appearing to dominate his subordinate rulers.²³¹

²²⁹ As is stated in one of Van Goens’ reports: “hoewel den Coninck ons geschoncken had, 't gene wij begeerden, soo conden die luyden, die reede op dit eijlandt woonden, niet verdrijven ofte wij mosten den Gouverneur, die last had ons huijs op te maacken, de handt salven met 200 Ra., doch niet eer te leveren, voordat wij 't eijlandt aileen in possessie hadden”. Ibid.: 95, 112 and 116.

²³⁰ The quote is translated from Dutch: “quade luije schelmen, die haer meesters ontlopen”.Ibid.: 86.

²³¹ “Tournooispeel te Mataram in 1664” In Schouten, *Oost-Indische Voyagie Derde Boeck: 147*. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, RP-P-OB-47-468.

In fact, the way in which Amangkurat I was subordinating the coast during these times demonstrates his need to clamp to it as if it could break away every moment. Local rulers were put under strict legislative and taxative restraints to ensure their loyalty. Even the VOC post at Japara was perceived as submissive to the court, despite its clear service to the Europeans.²³² Yet, the centralization attempts witnessed by Van Goens were largely in vain. The possibilities to enact policies far from the kraton were limited, and governors strengthen their status through tertiary alliances.

The Company became a great allure to them. Throughout the embassies, multiple lords of the Sunan request the prolonged stay of the Dutch, usually for protection from their overlord.²³³ In this manner, the VOC offered local rulers a remedy to intensified central control by the court. When the VOC delegates wanted to sail off to end their third embassy, several Javanese governors came on board and delayed the depart so much that Van Goens reckoned they were "exceptionally attached to us, as if we were their guardians against the Susuhunan".²³⁴

In 1651, Anga Praija assumed even the mere arrival of the VOC delegates to bring him and other coastal governors "back in the king's favour". Three year later, Tumënggung Patty and Nebey Wangsaradja felt the opposite when the VOC delegates had not brought the cannons that the two courtiers had ensured the Sunan to arrive. Nonetheless, the bupati succeeded in convincing Van Goens not to mention these issues at court and delayed his arrival till after the jurisdiction day. In this way, the embassy was still employed as protection against the Sunan's wrath.²³⁵

On the other hand, the VOC delegates were frequently assisted themselves. Van Goens, for instance, called on two 'old ladies' functioning within the kraton to speed up his demission. At another time, he supported on Tumënggung Patinata-Airnawa and the governor of Patramenggala to get extra rice supplies.²³⁶ At the end of his final embassy, two bupati even assisted sacking Makassarese ships in Japara.²³⁷ Next to these aids, informal meetings were equally arranged without any apparent aim other than the consumption of wine.²³⁸

²³² This became clear while Van Goens was discussing permission for the VOC resident of Japara to immediately visit the Sunan whenever he is being obstructed in his dealing by the local leaders. Amangkurat I approved this, stating the residents were bound to listen to his call. Yet, a year later the Sunan would be offended when one of the head of the Japara trade post would leave to Batavia without a request to the Sunan. Van Goens, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 35, 84, 111-112 and 128. See also De Graaf, *De Regering vol. I.*: 83-85.

²³³ During the first embassy, 'Queij Soeta' asks the VOC delegates to remain at the Semarang harbour, for a few days longer, which is declined. Van Goens, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 68.

²³⁴ The quote is a rough translation from: "die hem sonderlinge veel aan ons laet gelegen syn, als die syn lyffbeschermers omtrent den Sousouhouan zyn". It concerns two nobles in particular. Ibid.: 96-97.

²³⁵ The quote is translated from Dutch: "met onse comste weder in de gunst des Conincks soude comen d'andere resterende Zee-Gouverneurs waren mede in decadentie, soodat naer apparentie binnen corten tijt pertije stonden over de klingh te dansen (...)". Ibid.: 79-80, 134, 142, and 158-163.

²³⁶ These old ladies were Ingneijns't Chila and Parangh. Ibid.: 86-87 and 94

²³⁷ He reasons: "daermede dan den roep genoch in Maccassar sal comen, om hun te doen gelooven, dat dese custen voor haeronveijl zijn (...)". The Batavian government was quite displeased with these actions and opted to not tell the Sunan about them, hoping the courtiers would not do so either. Ibid.: 150-152 and 165- 170.

²³⁸ Van Goens mentions how halfway the third embassy a lot of courtiers were visited "die alle sonderlingen smaack in onse Spaence wijn hadden, ende dickwils niet vertrocken, voordat thuys gedragen werden". Unfortunately no further information is given. Ibid.: 86.

The refined way of interacting with the elites largely limited the actual inter-personal contact to the kraton and regional centres. Yet, the latter's impact could define the image of the Javanese way of living beyond the courtly walls.²³⁹ Van Goens does draw some generalized conclusion about the "Javanese" based on his strictly courtly networks. He notices their "hospitable and polite attitude" and less obese body shape. When frustration rises, especially during his fifth embassy, derogatory comments intensify; the Javanese are condemned for their "slowness" and to be trusted "as much as flies".²⁴⁰

Clearly, the most important contact was with the Sunan himself. On occasion, cultural exchanges similar to the interchange of paintings at the Mughal court happened. Be it that the objects of interest were weapons and horses. This did not keep the parties from praising each other's cannons and stallions, which appeared to be among the Sunan's pastimes.²⁴¹ Acts like these strengthened a mutual hospitality. During the first three embassies, hardly any incommensurability was produced. The reception of the delegates symbolizes this. The magnificence of it even left some Pangérans amazed about "the extra honour the Susuhunan gave to them".²⁴²

A shift would occur halfway 1652, however. Amangkurat I started enacting restrictions on rice exports and logging. The underlying but ambiguous reason was the need for reserves due to a looming war with Banten. As it turned out, no such direct hostilities were planned by the Sunan. Rather, the restrictions functioned as a scheme to make Batavia more dependent on the court. This strategy was an old one: Javanese rulers used it back in the sixteenth century in an attempt to subdue Makassar.²⁴³

Van Goens was requested to deliver a fourth embassy to resolve the issue. Like previous years, the envoy consisted of fourteen men as not to expose the Company's anxiety. Yet, the fear was reflected by the higher value of gifts brought with them.²⁴⁴ Even though the issues could be temporarily resolved through signing a new contract, a new court visit was required within a few months. Van Gent delivered it reluctantly after failing to strike a deal with the Japara leaders directly.²⁴⁵ Effort was thus made to bypass the Sunan altogether and to build on connections with his subordinates.

²³⁹ Van Goens, *Javaense Reyse*: 107 and 108.

²⁴⁰ The quotes are translated from Dutch, e.g. "traecheijt deser menschen". See *ibid.*: 107; and Van Goens, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 12, 134, 150 and 158-164.

²⁴¹ On the horses Van Goens comments: "soo 't scheen wilde ons den coninck hier mede te kennen geven, of te wel berispen, dat hij zijn paerden [beter] dan wij wisten te voeden". Van Goens, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 57, 84-86 and 94.

²⁴² *Ibid.*: 94.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*: 95-99.

²⁴⁴ This was about f 58727; more than three times the amount given in each of the previous embassies. In 1654, the VOC spent f 27171, which was a noticeable figure too. *Ibid.*: 32.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*: 94., 126-127.

Not much was achieved through this tactic, however. A new embassy was set up in 1654 to gain further cooperation from the Sunan. Van Goens was again called upon to fix the lingering restrictions as well as provoke a war between Mataram and Makassar. The latter request had to appear a personal one, for the VOC wanted to conceal their limited capabilities for warring the south Sulawesi polity. Flattery was used to pull in the Sunan; Van Goens calling him the “biggest king in the world” and asserting the mere fact of him declaring war would scare away the opponents.²⁴⁶

A translation error during the request enabled the courtiers contentious about fighting the Makassarese to intervene. Tumenggung Paty and Nebey Wangsaradja, who were mentioned earlier as the courtiers anxious about the lack of cannon gifts, objected that the VOC put too much pressure on Mataram and that “one should not appeal to the king to war his fellow believers”.²⁴⁷ The fraction hostile towards the VOC had spoken.

Soon after, Amangkurat I politely refused the suggestion, supposedly stating Batavia and Mataram were like a single household: “Batavia was the husband due to his combativeness, and Mataram was the housewife due to her incapability and weakness”.²⁴⁸ To Van Goens, these “empty offers” meant minimal Mataramese assistance; leaving the hard work to the Company. From that moment on, the VOC man would fathom the infeasibility of his demands. As De Wever suggested, the European perception on the Asians was largely determined by their ‘usability’.²⁴⁹ Van Goens’ subsequent dismissal of the kraton is hence not unexpected.

His writing started to reflect his frustrations. The delegate criticizes the “special incapacibilities that excel in the nature of these people and the flightiness that is detectable within it”. He dismisses “barbarians” and their “windy offers” and expects any concession to change whenever “the king feels like it”.²⁵⁰ It is “as clear as the sun that the king never intended to fight Makassar or any of his

²⁴⁶ Van Goens’ statement to Amangkurat I reads as follows: “Dat den Coningh van Maccassar wel sagh, dat hy tegens soo grooten Coningh niet bestaen conden als den Sousouhouunan, ende daerom liever ons tegens d' Amboyneesen socht te becommeren, om door middel van onse oneenicheyt proffyt te doen, en dat wy vast stelden, soo de Sousouhouunan den oorlogh tegens hem aennam, dat hy wel in corten tyt mocht contributaris van den Sousouhouunan werden (...)by weleker goet succes hy een der grootste Coningen van de werelt syn zoude!” Ibid.: 138 and 156-162.

²⁴⁷ These courtiers thus understood Malay and dared to intervene between the Sunan and the delegates. The quote is translated from Dutch: “Anga Praija (...) wert op 't jongste belet door den *Tommagon* Paty ende meest door Wangsa-Radja, juyst daer den Coningh tot den oorlogh geanimeert wert, voorgevende, dit discours tehooch liep ende men den Coningh niet behoorde te *raden* tot oorlogh tegens haer gelooffsverwanten (...)”. Ibid.: 139 and 140.

²⁴⁸ The quote is translated from Dutch: “hy geen vyanden hadde, ende met niemant in oorloge waere, maer was seer belust syn volek onder d'onse ten stryde te conjugeren om te bethoonen dat wy een land besaeten, die als man en vrouw huys hielden; daerbij voegende: Batavia was de man, om haer strybaerheyt, ende de Mataram was de vrouw, om haer oncunde ende slapherticheyt; gevende genoch te kennen, dat hy veel meer genegen was, ons met volck te willen adsisteren, als wel een ander met de macht van syn vaertuygen te offeenceeren.” Ibid.: 145

²⁴⁹ Van Goens, *Javaense Reyse*: 108; and idem.: *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 94- 107.,

²⁵⁰ The quotes are translated from Dutch: “speciale incapaciteiten, die in denature deeser mensch[en] uijtmunten ende de variabelheijt, diedaerin bespeurt wert”; “winderige aanbiedingen”; and “den Coninck weder andere sinnen in 't hooft comen”. Van Goens, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 141-142 and 145-146.

subjects, countries or provinces”.²⁵¹ At the same time, he also loses trust in the capabilities of his courtly contacts, his “assumed Javanese friends”, to speak in his favour. This while the hostile courtiers deserve a tough treatment, for a soft one would only make them “braver and bolder”.²⁵²

Van Goens’ comments were not merely prompted by personal animosities but equally reflect a growing sense of incompatibilities between two societies. His ‘Javaense Reyse’ and ‘Vertooch’ exposes the disbelief in future cooperation. They suggest the Susuhunan brutally dominates and arbitrary rules abound. The people accepting such dictatorship are not to be trusted either. The VOC delegate “often wondered on the sovereign power of this ruler, that I even figured it a miracle rather than an ordinary course, to govern such numerous people in such a slavish matter”.²⁵³

A large section of ‘Javaense Reyse’ is dedicated to the intrigues between the young Amangkurat and Wira Guna; an important governor of Sultan Agung. Eventually this would result in the massive murder of priests, with whom Wira Guna had aligned. The lesson Van Goens draws from this gory episode is how a “gruesome, tough and unyielding wrathful nature” is rousing “this nation”, “yet how deceitfully these people hide their pretensions through skilful courtesy”.²⁵⁴ The centralizing urges were now seen as autocratic suppressions. No wonder, then, that refuge was sought among the local governors to at least make some impact. As a desperate final attempt to draw in the Sunan to war Makassar, he sacked two Makassarese ships in Japara with the help of local rulers.²⁵⁵ This was the only wedge to be driven between the overlord and his ‘subservient’ subjects.

Whereas the Central Javanese landscape is admired for its transparent beauty, its denizens are condemned for their inconceivable behaviour. No emotions are shown, it is impossible to even see “whether they are good or bad, happy or sad”. While this can make them worthy warriors, it equally makes them deceitful, jealous, and thievish. These were “evil and ungrateful humans” comparable to “Chams’ children” from the story of Noah.²⁵⁶ The fruitless inter-personal relations at the court resulted in a castigating view of the society as a whole, leaving no hope for inter-cultural compatibility. The depiction of the Oriental despot sucking the blood of his apathetic subjects did not

²⁵¹ The quote is translated from Dutch: “zijnde soo claer als de zon, dat den Coninck noijt gedachten heeft gehad, Maccassar ofte ymant zijner onderdaenen, landen, ofte plaetsen te bevechten, als in 't verhael van deesen UEd. nader gelieven te zien, insgelijcx 't principaelste op dese reijse voorgevallen”. Ibid.: 153.

²⁵² Namely Tumenggung Patij and Tumenggung Suranata. The quote is translated from Dutch: “gepretendeerde Javaense vrunden”. Ibid.: 134, 143, 154-156 and 165-170.

²⁵³ The quote derives from: “my dickmael soodanigh verwondert over de souveryne macht van desen vorst, dat ick 't selve eer een mirakel dan een ordinaer maniere genaemt heb, om suleken grooten volec soo slaefs te regeren”. Van Goens, *Javaense Reyse*: 47.

²⁵⁴ The quote derives from: “Uyt dit lange verhael mach men oordeelen van wat wreede, harde, ende onversetelikehaet-dragende nature dese natie gedreven wert” and “mitsgaders hoe verradersch dese menschen haer voornemens door konstig veynsen weten te verbergen.” Ibid.: 74.

²⁵⁵ He reasons: “daermede dan den roep genoch in Maccassar sal comen, om hun te doen gelooven, dat dese custen voor haeronveijl zijn (...)”. The Batavian government was quite displeased with these actions and opted to not tell the Sunan about them, hoping the courtiers would not do so either. Van Goens, *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 150-152 and 165-170.

²⁵⁶ The quotes derive from: “Of se goet of quaet zijn” and “die ick om haer ongelooffelijcke boosheit voor eenige Chams kinderen houden.” Van Goens, *Javaense Reyse*: 85 and idem., *Vijf Gezantschappen*: 184.

derive from a priori biases towards Asians, but growing dissatisfaction in seeking cooperation with them.²⁵⁷

A triangle of empirical description can be discerned. While picking up the sources, one will first notice the frameworks used to understand the phenomena surrounding the VOC man. Then the associations with indigenous informants are detected. Interestingly enough, the intelligence granted by these contacts evoked a whole new set of descriptive tendencies. Van Goens' dismissal of the Javanese polity rooted in his suspicion towards certain courtiers and catalysed when he sensed the incapability of his kraton acquaintances to advocate his aims. The initial suspicion subsequently grew to new proportions and caused the VOC man to shift his attention to provincial rulers. By and by, involvement with the local networks again led to new reflections and raised fears for Javanese autocracy.

e. Expanding the case study: Trunajaya

The analysis of Van Goens' reports shows the discourse on violent Oriental despots ultimately derives from alliances and fractions faced at court. The account given on Trunajaya can be delved out in this manner too. The degree to which he is depicted as a terrorizing vicious warlord rather than a capable ruler seems largely determined by the kind of informants engaged with. To trace the research possibilities left, I will end with an overview of what has been written on the warlord by De Graaf and Ricklefs. Especially their selection and interpretation of sources will reveal the potential for further enquiry.

As told earlier, Trunajaya was born bearing the name of Nila Prawata. He descended from Cakraningrat I; the Madurese leader that was exiled to the Mataramese kraton by Sultan Agung. Nila Prawata was soon orphaned. Both his grandfather and father passed away, the latter being murdered at Amangkurat I's court. Apparently the family was perceived too powerful as formal vassal rulers of West Madura. Instead Trunajaya's uncle, Cakranigrat II, was given the office.²⁵⁸ From then on, Trunajaya's struggle grew.²⁵⁹

Van Goens has described the previously mentioned courtly contests in his reports; framing them in his understanding of the kraton. Both De Graaf and Ricklefs have made ample use of these sources to recover courtly affairs. Treachery was very dominant at the court, and after some time Trunajaya himself fell into disfavour with the very man that had both raised him as an orphan and

²⁵⁷ De Wever expected the former, see De Wever, *Javaense Reyse*: 118-119.

²⁵⁸ Pangéran Alit murdered Trunajaya's father. De Graaf, "De Opkomst": 2-3; and idem., *De regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I Tegal-Wangi, vorst van Mataram 1646-1677 Deel II: Opstand en Ondergang* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962):, 49.

²⁵⁹ This royal family turned out much less faithful than the Sultan might have expected. Notice that no absolute certainty remains about Trunajaya's original name; but Nila Prawata is the most likely one. See K. Van Dijk, H. de Jonge, and E. Touwen-Bouwsmas, "Introduction", In *Across Madura Strait: the dynamics of an insular society*, eds. van Dijk et al. (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995): 1-6; and De Graaf, "De Opkomst": 2 and 28.

taken the position of his parents: his uncle.²⁶⁰ At first, he sought protection from the crown prince, but to no avail. Trunajaya chose to flee to the town Kajoran where he married the daughter of Raden Kajoran; an Islamic holy-man competent in *shakti* (cosmic power) and *tapa* (asceticism).²⁶¹

De Graaf perceives both the alliances with Kajoran and the Makassarese to have constituted Trunajaya's power.²⁶² Attention to this cooperation is certainly called for; not only because of the soldiers they mustered, but also because of the identifications they evoked. Trunajaya's relation with his stepfather Kajoran is described similarly in the varying Javanese chronicles, although the Dutch sources contain little about it. Usually, it is narrated how Kajoran considered him destined to become 'a great hero' and to bring Mataram to its downfall. According to the legends, the Mataramese crown prince asked the Raden to subdue the Sunan, after which he naturally chose Trunajaya to do so. For this purpose, he was trained and sent to Sampang, Madura, to gather supporters.²⁶³

Speelman wrote about Trunajaya on multiple occasions. He takes his efforts in southern Madura to have been the basis for his further rebellion. From there, he managed to increase his control over the rest of the island, which was eased by the unpopularity of his uncle.²⁶⁴ Yet, his army truly took form after the Makassarese exiles reached East Java, where they started plundering towns and harbours as Gerongan. Large groups of Makassarese left Sulawesi in the years after their 1669 defeat against Buginese and VOC forces. Their reason for doing has not been determined yet, but they were clearly as outlandish to Java as cockatoos would have been.²⁶⁵ Violence, however, allowed them to settle or at least survive. In due time, the Makassarese moved from unknown to notorious. They thereby proved a competitor to state rule. Gradually, attacks were no longer necessary to win the support of Pasisir rulers; envoys would already do the job. Many coastal Javanese joined the insurgency of their own accord.²⁶⁶

Mataram sent out instructions to the bupati; demanding they submitted the Makassarese to their power and thus make them subjects of the empire. These calls turned out inefficient, nonetheless. Indications can be found of a closer cooperation between Trunajaya and Galesong's Makassarese warriors, which was soon sealed by a marital bond in 1674. Trunajaya offered his

²⁶⁰ De Graaf, "De Opkomst": 2-4.

²⁶¹ This happened under the threat of his uncle. See De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 2-4; idem., "De Opkomst": 3; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 31.

²⁶² De Graaf suggests both the Makassarese and Kajoran to have served as field warlords fighting in the interest of Trunajaya, but acting rather independently. De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 5 and 7; idem., "Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk"; and idem., *De Regering vol. I*.

²⁶³ De Graaf, "De Opkomst": 5; idem.: *De Regering vol. I*: 46-47; and idem., *De Regering vol. II*: 46 and 51.

²⁶⁴ Speelman specifically referred to his activities in Pamekasan. The Makassarese arrived in two main groups: a western one led by Karaëng Bonto-Marannu and an eastern one commanded by Karaëng Galesong. See De Graaf, "De Opkomst", 14; and idem., *De Regering vol. I*: 56 and 62-92.

²⁶⁵ The habitat of Cockatoo stretches from the Australia to all Indonesian islands east of Java, including Sulawesi.

²⁶⁶ Even the bastard son of the Sunan, Notobroto, betrayed him. He was claimed to have gathered the unlikely number of 100.000 men and ambiguously claimed neutrality. Only when local leaders would support his father, would he fight for the Madurese; a policy detrimental to Mataram. The Bupati equally had a dubious role in these sieges. C. Speelman "Letter X (9 January 1677)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 73-75. See also Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch Tiger*: 19; and De Graaf, *De Regering vol. I*: 81-82.

daughter in return for “the conquest of Surabaya and Gresik”.²⁶⁷ Around this time, the Madurese warlord started to use the royal title ‘Raden Trunajaya’; the youthful conqueror. Two years later, he married one of Amangkurat I’s daughters and praised himself Raja or Panembahan Maduretna; the true king of Java.²⁶⁸ Likewise, Karaëng Galesong changed his to Adipati or Adipati Anom; the young ruler.²⁶⁹ To Speelman, these entitlements demonstrate a boisterous arrogance and relentless desire to conquer all.²⁷⁰

But the labels were as much directed to allied warriors as opposing ones. Throughout his struggle, Trunajaya strived for a cult status. Religion was one of the ways and means to do so; as Ricklefs observed: “an Islamic sense of identity had long been evident among the rebel forces”.²⁷¹ Raden Kajoran stood central in this.²⁷² But when Trunajaya decked himself with laurel, most attention indeed became focused on his personality; as was symbolized by the use of sacred standards, banners, and genealogies to Majapahit.²⁷³ This might be one reason for him to neglect his ties with the Sunan’s son. The *kāfir* enemy symbolized by the VOC only enforced such identifications. Mataram was rejected; his followers in Kediri praised Trunajaya as Sultan Intra Prista not Susuhunan.²⁷⁴

The numerous appellations of Trunajaya evoked legacies too.²⁷⁵ All boosted the warlord’s charisma further. The status constructed in this period appears vital for the onslaught that followed. Looking at conquests, De Graaf underlines the warlord’s rise in the preceding years without intending to constitute a new realm.²⁷⁶ Looking at his entitlements, his ascendance takes a different shape. It enabled a close cooperation with distinctive groups as the Makassarese. This new alignment soon led to the acquirement of Javanese beaches and ports proximate to Madura. In command was a capable overlord, whose pretensions were less imaginative than Speelman would recognize. Fear rose among

²⁶⁷ Trunajaya himself stated this trade-off to the VOC delegate Moor Piero: “hy syn dochter aan Crain Glisson ten huwelyck gegeven hadde, op voorwaarde dat hy, Glisson, Surabaya en Grisee voor hem overwinnen zoude...”. Moor Piero, “Letter XIV (24/25th February 1677): Rapport door den Moor Piero, wegens syne verrichtinge geduerende het bestellen van syn brieff aen den Panembahan Maduratna, ten overstaan van de gecommiteerden M. Isaack de S. Martin, Jacobus Couper, Everard van der Schuur en Johan Leeuwenson, tusschen den 24^e en 25^e February ’s nachts, gedaan.” In *De Opkomst Van*: 83-93. See also De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 14; idem., *De Regering vol. I*: 84 and 86; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 32.

²⁶⁸ C. Speelman, “Letter XXIX (7 August, 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 135. See also De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 28.

²⁶⁹ This title mimicked the one carried by Amangkurat II as a prince. Around this time, a priest associated with the Makassarese started to foretell the doom of Mataram in the mountains behind Gresik. See De Graaf, *De Regering vol. I*: 110.

²⁷⁰ C. Speelman “Letter XII (10 March 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 77-78.

²⁷¹ Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 40.

²⁷² The influence of Sunan Giri appears to be limited. De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 13.

²⁷³ Galesong’s Makassarese used different banners. Trunajaya also asserted the title Susuhunan to belong to him based on his own genealogical arguments and aimed to reconstitute the court of Majapahit. After Trunajaya settled in Kediri, he kissed the former head of the town; Katawengan. Having done so, Trunajaya divides Katawengan’s wives among his followers and titles himself panembahan Ratu Pamenang or “Coning van Groot Java ...onder den titel van Ratou Cadirij”. Round the same time rumours spread on his illicit acts, which Speelman initially plays down. See De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 21; and Schrieke, *Sociological Studies Vol. II*: 125, 275 and 278

²⁷⁴ J. Couper, “Letter LXIII (12 January, 1680) and LXVI (13 March, 1680).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 282 and 295; and Briel: “Letter LXV”: 295. For Trunajaya’s entitlements see De Graaf, “De Opkomst”: 28-29. For the neglect of these ties see Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 40.

²⁷⁵ Many myths spread that conflict with the Trunajaya’s own story of his predecessors gathered for the VOC by Moor Piero in direct negotiations in 1677. De Graaf, *De Regering vol. I*: 49-53.

²⁷⁶ Consider, for instance, his comment on the Moor Piero embassy. De Graaf, “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”: 286.

the local rulers that Mataram would not be able to beat the forces by itself, which indeed turned out to be the case.²⁷⁷

In 1776, Amangkurat I attempted to pursue Trunajaya's forces by sending, of all people, the crown prince to hunt him down. This is the very prince plotting a coup against the Sunan and the one eventually succeeding his father as Amangkurat II. The Sunan thus had plenty of reasons to be on guard. His army, however, largely consisted out of *tanis*, i.e. farmers; not noblemen that could keep their eyes on him. Chances were ripe for desertion. But instead of betraying his father, the crown prince was betrayed by Trunajaya. The two appeared to have agreed on a feigned battle at Gegodog to fool the Sunan. Yet, the prince's forces instead faced a bloody and decisive defeat in October. With it, the amicable relation between the prince and the warlord was equally shattered.²⁷⁸ After Gegodog, the crown prince's brothers Pangéran Martasana and Puger took over instead, to lead a campaign that was now chiefly defensive.

The Madurese victory at Gegodog was followed by more success. On the fifth of January 1677, the forces reached up to Cirebon, although the inlands advance was naturally slower. New Javanese forces were attracted.²⁷⁹ In the meantime, however, the Madurese and Makassarese started to drift apart; Trunajaya claimed to have been offended by the way Galesong "damaged and redistributed merchant ships without his order or any need".²⁸⁰ Within the latter group a further split occurred.²⁸¹ Concurrently, the kraton also fell to pieces now the Sunan proved incapable of stopping the Madurese. Naturally, De Graaf and Ricklefs underline the impact this had on the Mataramese dynasty, and the ego of Trunajaya. The personal betrayal of Amangkurat II by Trunajaya is eminent in their narratives; the Madurese dwarf had tricked the giant causing him to stumble and fall.²⁸² Yet, how the warlord's followers shifted sides in the wake of these events has not been touched upon much.

Many changed camps, nonetheless. And the VOC sources give plenty of clues why they did. The Company got involved in 1676; Poleman took charge over multiple battles. In the beginning, unawareness of who was in league with whom hindered the campaign. Poleman was even ignorant

²⁷⁷ The acquirement occurred when Javanese regents deserted from Mataram. Adipati Anom stirred this up to increase his power. In fact, the crown prince was assisting Trunajaya too, and the Makassarese were making much use of this second alliance. The alliance between the Madurese and the Makassarese was sealed through the marriage of Trunajaya's daughter with Karaëng Galesong in 1675. See De Graaf, "De Opkomst": 16, 17, 18; and idem. *De Regering vol.I*: 87-91.

²⁷⁸ C. Speelman, "Letter XV (30 March 1677)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 94; and De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 4 and 7.

²⁷⁹ Trunajaya was still abusing the earlier support he gained from Adipati Anom, which had broken apart after Gegodog. Making such fictional claims of alliance made it easier to attract Javanese rulers. See Briel, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 53 and 119-128; De Graaf, "De Opkomst": 26; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 33.

²⁸⁰ The quote comes from: "de vaartuygen der cooplyuden buyten ordre off last aentastende en verdistruerende, was hy daardoor tot toorn verweckt". Moor Piero, "Letter XIV": 83-93.

²⁸¹ Namely that between Karaëng Galesong's Makassarese and those abiding to Karaëng Tellolo. Speelman, "Letter X": 75. See also De Graaf, *De Regering vol I*: 53 and 134-137; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 34.

²⁸² De Graaf, *De Regering vol.I*: 139.

of Trunajaya's involvement with the 'insurgence'.²⁸³ But interests in alliances grew and the increased description of them allows an analysis of martial associations. Where Van Goens probed the court fractions, VOC admirals were now exploring the ties between different war-bands. Friendly and hostile forces were distinguished. Attempts were made, for instance, to survey the ties between the Madurese and the Makassarese through elaborate correspondence.²⁸⁴

Even allegiance with Trunajaya was contemplated. Speelman's campaign in Japara, and later on Madura, started with attempts to mediate with the warlord. During these negotiations, the warrior once exclaimed that all Javanese were already paying tribute to him, excepting the Sunan, so that within a month he would rule supreme. Nevertheless, he completely undermined the talks through unreliable promises, seemingly stirred by alcoholism, and war was declared by Speelman on the 27th of April, 1677. The warlord's name would be blackened since. By that time, the Makassarese had equally abandoned Trunajaya.²⁸⁵

Speelman now made the "master move" -in De Graaf's words- and joined the 'incapable' Sunan.²⁸⁶ After attacks on Surabaya, the VOC hoped to create a path to Kediri; Trunajaya's headquarter. Cooperation with his former allies, among whom the Makassarese, was sought to achieve this. Yet, the news that Kajoran had captured the kraton -the heart of Mataram- arrived in the meantime.²⁸⁷ Speelman appeared to have been at a loss.²⁸⁸ The intervention had only brought more instability; the admiral had cornered the cat, but now it jumped in rage. De Graaf and Ricklefs' stress how Trunajaya and his followers were driven further inlands and attached to a religious resistance "against the king and his new Christian allies". The capture of the court would only strengthen them.²⁸⁹

²⁸³ The same goes for Jan Fransz. Initially the mission was only aimed at stopping the Makassarese. It was only after Poleman's first campaign that he started to notice the coalition between the Makassarese and Trunajaya. Ironically enough his campaign contributed to this alliance by forcing the Makassarese to abandon their ships and roam inlands. See De Graaf, "De Opkomst": 18-19, 21 and 23; and idem., *De Regering vol. I*: 95-99 and 114.

²⁸⁴ Here one should mind the fact that Trunajaya only exposed himself in October 1676, which might have been due to the troubles of controlling the Makassarese as a force. De Graaf, "De Opkomst": 16. The Makassarese had their own warrior background. Several sources can be used to trace it back. European literature grants some valuable descriptions of the society. The Makassarese court chronicles do mention acts of war, yet have a strong focus on the central ruler. See W. Cummings, *A chain of kings: the Makassarese chronicles of Gowa and Talloq* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

²⁸⁵ Already on the 28th of February did Speelman sign a contract with Ngabéhi Wangsdipa, the Sunan's regent of Japara. Later on, Amangkurat II would state he was misinformed about the contents of these contracts. Galesong also abandoned Trunajaya after the latter kidnapped his family. See De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 8-9; idem., "De Opkomst": 27; and idem., *De Regering vol. I*: 146 and 165-166.

²⁸⁶ The contract of alliance was first signed by the governor of Japara in March 1677. Amangkurat I indirectly rectified it. Since he was too sick to put his signature himself, the soon-to-be Amangkurat II did it for him. After the fall of the kraton the alliance extended to Amangkurat II. Cooperation with the other princes was sought to, but with few results. None of them wanted to submit to their brother Amangkurat II.

See Speelman, "Letter XII": 77; and De Graaf, "Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk": 324.

²⁸⁷ While Trunajaya himself was kept at bay in Eastern Java, two of his warlords, Raden Wiramenggala and Tumënggung Mangkujuda, fought their way to the kraton. The Madurese were not trusted in Central Java. But Raden Kajoran certainly was. He could hence hurdle enough men to attack the kraton twice. They managed to subdue the court at the end of June 1677, turning Speelman's campaign on its head. See also De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 8-9; and idem., "Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk"; and idem.: *De Regering vol. I*: 170-180.

²⁸⁸ C. Speelman, "Letter XXIV (17 July, 1677)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 125-126.

²⁸⁹ Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 40.

Increased Islamic sensibilities go a long way in explaining the troops gathered by Kajoran to conquer the kraton on account of Trunajaya. The Madurese warlord himself was unable to constitute a power base in Central Java. He remained too much of an outsider, settled far eastwards. Only his father in law was recognized as a justified ruler by the population. After all, he was both Javanese and an established religious figure, unlike his stepson whose alleged sanctity was recent. Under these circumstances, a diarchy was set up to control the region. Kajoran was the authority in Central-, and Trunajaya in East-Java. Still, it remained clear who was in charge; Trunajaya swallowed all power. The court treasuries of Mataram were brought to Kediri; Kajoran would not see any of them. The nobleman would lose the capital he vanquished too; soon Pangéran Puger would take the royal city, and leave the warlord empty-handed.²⁹⁰

In the other military camp, new forms of cooperation were sought for as well. This alliance between Amangkurat II and the VOC, headed by Hurdt, would eventually lead to the end of Trunajaya. Hurdt's campaign turned the tide and even caused men as Kajoran to desert Trunajaya and ally the Makassarese. This central Javanese holy man was not spared however, and got captured in September 1679. No Javanese lord wanted to kill him, so the VOC ordered a Buginese soldier to do it. Karaëng Galesong was still to return to Trunajaya, but was seemingly murdered by him after the Madurese warlord found out about his earlier deceit.²⁹¹

Previous historians acknowledged the downfall of the warlord looking at these facts, yet did not thoroughly delve into the reasons 'the insurgents' fell apart. Only De Graaf's article on Kajoran extends on this issue. First, De Graaf perceives a split of the Kajorans and their allies the Purbayas (centred in Madiun) from the kraton in early 1677.²⁹² Secondly, unlike Trunajaya's followers, Kajoran chiefly used Javanese warriors and lords; appealing to a shared ethnic background. Thirdly, he suggests Trunajaya tried to manipulate this appeal by summoning him to Kediri after the conquest of Mataram. Finally, this "honourable detention" as well as the absence of a suited heir destroyed his prestige in Central Java; from a charismatic warlord he turned into a stooge of the Madurese.²⁹³ Obedience among his subjects waned afterwards.

²⁹⁰ The Islamic sensibilities are for instance revealed when the Sultan of Banten offered Kajoran two "holy shirts from Mecca". Notice that most of the regalia were still in the hands of Amangkurat I. Puger's servant Raden Wira-Truna misled Kajoran's warlord to leave the kraton early, so Puger could claim supremacy over it. See De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 12; idem. "Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk": 323; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 40-42.

²⁹¹ For the capture and murder of Kajoran see J. A. Sloot and W. Taalbeecq, "Letter LVIII (20 September, 1679)." In *De Opkomst Van*, 271-274; and C.B. Marchier, "Letter LVIX (26 September, 1679)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 274-276. For the death of Karaëng Galesong see J. Couper, "Letter LXII (7 January, 1680)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 279-282. See also De Graaf, "Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk": 323; and Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 55.

²⁹² The Kajorans are the denizens of Kajoran; the town and region ruled by Raden Kajoran.

²⁹³ Purbaya II was important for initiating the rebellion, but died soon after it started, explaining the minimal attention for this man in the VOC sources. Islamization is perceived by De Graaf as a way to legitimize power, especially when lacking heirs or ethnic ties, his comment on Islam is very brief, however, and does not do justice to the role in had in these uprisings. See De Graaf, "Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk": 279, 285-286, and 290-297.

The VOC campaign appears to have brought about a similar character assassination of Trunajaya. In these last months of fleeing about, Trunajaya sustained correspondence with both the VOC and Amangkurat II. In it, he exclaimed the injustice done to him as well as the motivations for his rebellion. To the VOC, he explained his revenge over not inheriting Madura as well as the hostility of his uncle towards him.²⁹⁴ He was a just prince; a 'Ratu Adil' who by nature was to muster many and constitute new hierarchies in replacement of the old corrupted ones. But it was not to be, due to the European 'deus ex machina'.

Clearly, Trunajaya's dream of becoming 'the true king of Java' had flown out of the window. His appeal as a mighty warlord with powerful allies was no more. After making his way to the Limbangan mountain ranges, Trunajaya surrendered to Captain Jonker on the 26th of December 1679. The opening scene of this thesis was to follow. The history of his resistance clearly reveals shifting alliances whenever victory occurred or losses prevailed. Moreover, his legacy remained inspiring for subsequent warriors. Wasengrana would, for example, pretend to be Trunajaya risen from the dead in August 1680.²⁹⁵

Even though work has been made of clarifying the all too shuffling fraternizations, lore stimulating such resurrections directs us to new unexplored arguments of cult and faith. Most importantly, the manner in which such lore impacted the intelligence received on Trunajaya by the VOC is left ignored. Chapter four and the conclusion indicate how this determined his image as a rebel instead of a sovereign, how Amangkurat II became defined as a justified successor and how men like Galesong were neither fish nor fowl. Conceptions on the warlords subsequently established the vision on their war-bands.

²⁹⁴ This is a statement that seems to be tied in current affairs; he even claimed his uncle wanted to kill him. See De Graaf, "De Opkomst": 3-4.

²⁹⁵ Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 57 and 77.

4. The Eye of the Beholder: Associations during martial encounters

In 1678, Speelman warned the VOC for the “devilishly hymned false prophecies” used by the opponents to distract the “general people” from “their required obedience”.²⁹⁶ Ironically, many similar ‘wicked’ temptations appear to have pulled in troops of Amangkurat II. The religious glue sticking the Company’s allies together was looked at less suspiciously, however. Observations on favoured men, ‘Islamic temples’ or graveyards “deemed very holy” by “the Javanese” and “their priests”, do not carry a diabolical undertone.²⁹⁷ The commensurability of heuristics has already been demonstrated in the last chapter, in the following pages it is asked how devils and saints fitted into a larger discourse on Javanese armies expressed by writers like Speelman.

Those ‘devils and saints’ were not necessarily religious figures; court fractions, ethnic warrior groups, and peasants were equally fashioned in similar terms. Such framing clearly reflects a broader interpretation of the Javanese society. The way in which writers approached the people, politics and myths around them thus deserves notice. I therefore offer a closer look at the actors or authors behind the Dutch sources. To begin, their manner of reporting on war-bands, shifting alliances and even religious legends is investigated. I describe their work and observations by looking at their occupations in Southeast and South Asia, the context in which they wrote and the retrievable impression of their personalities. Most of all, however, I consider the ‘Asian’ networks in which they operated.

Hurdt, Speelman and the previously mentioned Van Goens can all be taken as early colonizers. They strove to diminish the autonomy of indigenous rule and sought to bring the Javanese lands to fuller exploitation. The support of the Sunan was just a mean to win his obedience. Yet, they were equally some of the best informed VOC agents when it came to hinterland affairs. This apparent irony does not have to be taken as an oddity. The aims of these men could, after all, only be reached through a proper understanding of inland hierarchies, local issues, diplomacy and warfare. And, consequently, of social ties too. Mustering warriors required it.

Besides the ‘author’, the ‘document’ is worthy of concern too. All selected authors produced intelligence for an extensive trade company. But, the headquarters in Batavia and Amsterdam only partially directed the documented observations of the actors under concern. Their writings were largely derived from experiences on the field. The eye of the beholder justified a personal narrative

²⁹⁶ The quote refers to Kajoran’ efforts to tempt warriors around Mataram to join his side. C. Speelman, “Inscriptie door Edele Admiraal Corn. Speelman op sijn Edele vertrek van Japara aen d’Edele commandeur Isaac Saint martin tot naeright gelaten” (23 March 1678). Nationaal Archief, 1.04.02, 1332: 746.

²⁹⁷ Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 82, 109, 245 and 251.

of issues, chronologies and causation.²⁹⁸ Yet, the beholder was not a scholar. He gazed on practical matters that, in the end, did serve the Company's interest. The men in the field might not be strongly restrained in their writing, they were still expected to deliver certain intelligence.

In the end, all documents served as input to the Supreme Government in Batavia, or even the Lord XVII in the Dutch Republic. Different kinds of documentation took different aims. Daily journals sought to clarify the progress of operations, letters replied to specific queries, and mission reports granted overviews of key affairs. Therefore, all discussions on the authors will start by reviewing the type of records they made and how this influenced their writing. From the sources up, I then trace their articulated view on society, war and religion.

Some VOC servants contemplated more on indigenous affairs than others. I selected two lengthy reports that delved into martial alliances most thoroughly; Speelman's instruction to De Saint-Martin's and Briel's daily report on Hurdt's 1678 campaign.²⁹⁹ These sources were cornerstones for earlier research. But no one dedicated separate analyses to them or compared them explicitly; here they stand at the centre of attention. A progression exists from the previously discussed court focus of Van Goens, to the mixed interests in royal hierarchies and warring of Speelman, and the description of Hurdt's hinterland military marches.³⁰⁰ All accounts, in their own terms, grant a unique perspective on mandalas and military labour markets.

It will be scrutinized how Speelman and Hurdt operated and understood the struggle against Trunajaya's 'insurgence'. The former campaigned on the Javanese coasts between December 1676 and late 1677. Hurdt took over afterwards and, unlike his predecessor, was allowed to go inlands. They themselves formally controlled troops of Mataram. But many of those went their one way still. The only means for directing these pejuangs was through constant examination of their fraternizations, leaders and political ties. VOC men needed to carefully note their assistance and the information they disclosed. Warlords were to be watched. Hence, intelligence provided by central informants like Jacob Couper, Moor Priero and Willem Bastinck is consulted too.³⁰¹

²⁹⁸ These personal historical narratives spread since the 1560s and reflected a growing scholarly sense of causally linked events and a chronological history. Woolf has demonstrated how this conception impacted the perception of the English population at large. Bertrand stresses, however, that this new discourse also "se nourrissent en effet de plus en plus des façons de dire des voyageurs". The empirical arguments of the travellers could then serve a strongly personalized historical narrative on exotic destinations. See Bertrand, *L'Histoire à Parts*: 51-57; and D. Woolf, "From Hystories to History: Five Transitions in Thinking about the past." *The Huntington Library Quarterly* 68, no. 1-2 (2005): 33-70.

²⁹⁹ Some readers might be surprised by the absence of François Valentijn's "Old and New East-India". This elaborate text possibly allows the most in-depth insights into Javanese warring and religion from a Dutch perspective. Still, I wanted to stick to agents reporting within the VOC apparatus and thus contributing directly to the Company's intelligence gathering and cooperating with local rulers out of a professional interest. Valentijn's work, although based on his VOC service, were published as a separate travel report. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*; and Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*.

³⁰⁰ As Schrieke noted, the impression gained in the hinterland differed much from the kraton: "[w]hen, thanks to Hurdt's expedition from Japara to Kadir in 1678, the Dutch East India Company first came to know the interior of Java, it proved to consist of various regions, some governed by court dignitaries (including members of the ruling family), others by officials, still others by the descendants of the original local nobility." See Schrieke, *Sociological Studies* Vol.II: 153. See also Ricklefs, "Some Statistical Evidence": 2-3.

³⁰¹ De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 49.

In the conclusion, I address the degree to which the VOC men could recognize the organization of war-bands, including their shifting alliances. The epistemic range of the VOC sources can then be tested. In general, much information can be obtained on the group formations, be it coloured by ethnic categorization, misspellings of names, and ignorance about the specific reasons for deserting or allying. But before sifting for such knowledge, I address how these different types of literature reflect the social associations of the authors as well as their produced incommensurabilities. Through reflecting on their authors, the qualities, narratives and oversights of the material are to be judged upon. And the devils and saints are to be appraised in context.

a. Cornelis Speelman

Like Van Goens, Speelman is one of the major figures in VOC history. Born in a higher middle class family in Rotterdam on the third of March 1628, he joined the Company as a mere sixteen year-old. His first functions were that of assistant and *boekhouder-generaal*.³⁰² Both positions required skills in accounting that Speelman would prove to master in his subsequent military career too. While his fame might have been largely obtained through martial success, it is his proficient writing that makes his legend highly suited for scrutiny.

Mataram was certainly not the first polity he would interact with. Speelman's report on the Joan Cunnaeus embassy to Shah Abbas II of Persia is still published today and reveals a high curiosity on unknown cultures.³⁰³ He had a nose for unfamiliar commerce networks too, as he was able to influence the trade relations on the Indian subcontinent during his three-year directorship over the Coromandel trade post. He fought privateering, but equally sought to establish a stronger influence on the indigenous polities. The latter aim tied him to intricate rivalries between local lords; leaving him caught in a web of local politics.³⁰⁴

But conspiracies also hunted him in Batavia. False accusations of privateering blemished his reputation and led him to lose office. Speelman made up his mind to leave the Indies and return to the Republic at once after having cleared his name. His decision to abandon Asia would never materialize, however. Makassar would come in its way. Tension between the VOC and this Sulawesi polity had risen over the years. Signed contracts and VOC monopolies were ignored. When the Makassarese killed some VOC men while sacking wracked ships, this proved to be the final straw. On the 23th of November 1666, Speelman was instructed to sail the VOC naval force to Sulawesi to impress the enemy by using cannon fire and thereby tempting them to negotiate.³⁰⁵

³⁰² F.W.Stapel, *Cornelis Janszoon Speelman* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1936): 2.

³⁰³ C. Speelman, *Journal Der Reis Van Den Gezant Der O.T. Compagnie Joan Cunaeus Naar Perzië in 1651-1652* (Charleston, South Carolina: Nabu Press, 2010).

³⁰⁴ He received this position in 1663. Stapel, *Speelman*: 11.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*; 25-28 and 34-35.

Were this to fail, Speelman was requested to plunder parts of the Sulawesi coast and visit Buton to win over its leader. Afterwards, sails were set to be to Ternate and Tidore for bridging the discrepancies between these realms. A final means was to block Makassar's harbour and lead a destructive artillery attack. Yet, invasion of the city was prohibited. In case negotiations were possible, Speelman was to enact specific conditions of surrender predetermined by the Supreme Government.³⁰⁶

Matters turned out differently, however. Speelman was bold enough to stride inlands and commit to direct combat. The shores of Makassar were reached on the 19th of December; a Makassarese pirogue tried to pay off the murders through offering some silver and gold. Speelman refused to accept the gift, however, and demanded the death of those responsible for the bloodshed. So war began. A long struggle ensued testing the ties between the European and Asian army sections.³⁰⁷

The campaign was one of the first to intensively rely on pejuangs; local alliances were more decisive than the Asian legion or even European soldiers. The twenty-one ships for this mission contained six-hundred VOC soldiers and several Buginese and Ambonese assisting forces. The bulk of troops were, however, gathered at the spot. Speelman's most crucial native intermediaries were Arung Palakka -the Sultan of Bone who had fled from the Makassarese- and Captain Jonker; the chief of the Ambonese.³⁰⁸ Both assisted in controlling a warforce far greater than the initial handful of Europeans.

Attracting those crowds demanded traversing a long and winding road of diplomacy. Even though the martial instructions of Batavia were cast aside, the diplomatic plan of the Supreme government was partly enacted. The Batavian directions again positioned Speelman in the midst of Asian tact. Buton signed a treaty of alliance on the 31st of January 1667. Ternate, Tidore and Bacan were drawn in too. The VOC army equally attracted extra Buginese forces that deserted the Makassarese as soon as they learned about Arung Palakka's presence.³⁰⁹

Speelman promptly requested for more freedom in contriving Makassar's submission, which was granted by Batavia. During his visit to the Moluccas, he also took the liberty of shipping in additional troops that were officially assigned to their post in the eastern archipelago. At the same time, he managed to attract about 10.000 pejuangs through use of Sulawesi rivalries, promises of power shifts, the charisma of Palakka and the distribution of the spoils of war; especially ships and

³⁰⁶ Ibid.: 35-36.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.: 36

³⁰⁸ De Jongh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 68-69; De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 6; and Stapel, *Speelman*; 35.

³⁰⁹ Other troops deserting to Palakka's side were from Luwu, Mandar and Buma. See Raben, "Het Aziatisch Legioen.": 191; and Stapel, *Speelman*: 38-41.

weapons. Despite these numbers, the war soon became one of attrition and unrest among the Buginese did need to be calmed down.³¹⁰

A lot became at stake for settling the fights; for sickness, desertion and plain weariness started tearing the army apart. Speelman kept up pretence towards the Makassarese, as to fake military strength that was no longer there. Sultan Hassanudin went for the bait, but his initiation of negotiations was torpedoed by the Makassarese court. After resolving some internal disagreements, a peace treaty was finally signed in Bongaja on the 18th of November 1667. Among other things, it contained Sultan Hassanudin's promise to retreat from Sumbawa, Buton and surrounding polities. Large celebrations on the Buginese and VOC side ensued, but Speelman retained his scepticism and kept the navy on guard for an extra month.³¹¹

And indeed another two years of fighting followed prior to a definitive peace settlement in 1669.³¹² The persistent resistance of the Makassarese and attritious warring against them likely evoked Speelman's adage in the following years: "[the enemy] flees if one comes and returns if one retreats, so nothing is achieved. To strike at the heart of the matter, the enemy should not only be chased, but also pursued and crushed".³¹³ But these words stretch beyond Sulawesi; his efforts on Java are equally captured by these two phrases. 1677 saw the start of a campaign that would soon manifest the adage.



Picture 8 "Victory of the VOC over the kingdom of Macassar": this well-known print is noticeable for its depiction of heroic Buginese fighting alongside the European soldiers. Both Speelman, on the top left, and Palakka, on the top right, are praised for their command.³¹⁴

³¹⁰ These pejuangs were not just Buginese. See Stapel, *Speelman*: 37-38, 40, 42 and 44.

³¹¹ Sultan Hassanudin tried to appease the Boni and Palakka. See *ibid.*: 40-41 and 44-48.

³¹² De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 5.

³¹³ The quote is translated from Dutch: "[de vijanden] vlughten, als men komt en retourneeren als men terughkeert, sulcx op die wijze nooyt gedaan wercq. De saeck moet in 't herte aengetast en de vijandt niet alleen verdreven, maer vervolgt en ontsenuwt werden." De longh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 123.

³¹⁴ R. de Hooge, "Victorien der Nederl. Ge O Compagnie in het Koninkryck van Macassar" (circa 1669). Nationaal Archief, VELH0619.68 (accessed via <http://www.atlasofmutualheritage.nl/nl/object/?id=6157>, on 24-03-2014).

Again Speelman brought along a mixed arm force. Besides the 310 Europeans, he assigned four companies of Ambonese, Malays, Balinese and Mardijkers plus 600 sailors and the like to join the 400 troops already stationed in Japara.³¹⁵ In the beginning, negotiations were led with both Amangkurat II and Trunajaya. The admiral hoped to meet Trunajaya “with good intentions”, but those turned sore soon enough. In April, the Sunan gained Speelman’s favour, war was declared on Trunajaya and all his followers were urged to again obey Amangkurat who will “forgive their sins”.³¹⁶ Nagtegaal takes the agreement with the Mataram as a “personal initiative” of the VOC man, who looked for an “autonomous yet subservient ruler”. Trunajaya, in contrast, was suspected to easily take matters in his own hands.³¹⁷

In the admiral’s final report, mention is made of the failed attempt to draw Trunajaya to Japara for negotiations. Speelman was willing to give an “honourable pardon” plus rank and recognition. Yet, it soon “turned out, that all our efforts were to no avail and to confidence in him could be stabilized, [him] being like all criminals, full suspicion, disbelief and distrust, so that were finally forced to draw the sword from the sheath”. God immediately “blessed” this decision through the conquest of Surabaya.³¹⁸ To which Trunajaya responded that the true favour of God could only manifest without the arbitrary intervention of the Company. He rebelled because of internal issues: dissatisfaction among the Mataram courtiers, inheritance of Madura, and courtly assassinations.³¹⁹

No matter whether the ties to Amangkurat were a personal initiative or not, Speelman certainly grew strongly disfavoured towards Trunajaya due to failed diplomacy. The reliability of Amangkurat II was doubted too, however. The VOC officer distrusted the degree to which the Sunan and his ‘minister’ Mandaraka were seriously involved with the war. Their lacking persistence led to a warning. The admiral would retreat his VOC forces if Amangkurat’s men “would show to have been born to serve Trunajaya as slaves” rather than fight against him. Military support was minimal. When the Dutchman sought to set up a campaign only the “the old, honourable” Martapura and Martalaja volunteered.³²⁰

³¹⁵ Ricklefs, *War, Culture*: 35.

³¹⁶ Amangkurat I’s sickness inhibited him to meet with Speelman, so his son led the negotiations which eventually would concern his rule as overlord. In the other camp, Moor Piero met with Trunajaya to negotiate agreements. Speelman, “Letter X”: 7, idem., “Letter XII”: 77-78; idem., “Letter XVII (16 April, 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 115-116; idem., “Letter XVIII (30 April, 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 116-117; and idem., “Letter XIX (23 May 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 117-119.

³¹⁷ Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch*: 23 and 25.

³¹⁸ The quote is translated from: “een honorabel pardon , en daar en boven nog zoo veel meer eere staad, en aanzien, zonden verzongen, als hij eeniger maten met rede konde desidireeren, dan het is gebleeken, dat alle onze moeijten te vergeefs en in hem geen confidentie te stabileeren was, zijnde gelijk al tijd de misdadigers, vol argwaen, agterdagt en wantrouwen, zoo dat wij ten laatsten genootdrukt zijn gewerdig het swaart uijt de scheede te trekken, en onze proceduren op die wijze aan te leggen, die hoewel door God de Heere genadelijk gesegent met de veroveringe van Sourabaija”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 745.

³¹⁹ This was stated years later on the second of December 1679; shortly before Trunajaya met his end. Couper, “Letter LXII”: 280-282.

³²⁰ The quote is translated from: “aandien zy lieten blyken, als geboren te wesen om Troenadjaja als slaven te dienen”. See C. Speelman, “Letter XLI (30 November 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 175-178.

Martapura was a stout supporter of the Sunan; the mere request to join Trunajaya's forces led him to behead the harbingers. But even his commanders needed to be urged by Speelman not to return without putting up a fight for "he would shoot a bullet through their head" if they did.³²¹ Tumenggung Martapura reconquered Kudus, Pati and Djuwana with 1500 men, but the lords were eventually led to a retreat. Having arrived back, more hostilities followed as Tumenggung Martapura was killed in courtly affairs.³²² Mobilizing the Sunan's forces thus required having an eye for courtly friendships; for the ones that truly cooperated could be rare.

Speelman's campaign again immersed deeply into local strifes. Much of this is due to his efforts to find stable political support from Javanese leaders. Selecting a leader for Surabaya, for instance, involved quite some considerations. Since the governor Wangsaprana had just passed away, the *priestervorst* of Giri, named Panembahan Agong, was next in line. Since he too was old and weak, contact was made with his representative; Dipati Mas Tumapel.³²³ Tumapel, subsequently, gained de facto power over the city. Unlike the Panembahan, he did not pursue high autonomy and accepted the Sunan's wishes. Speelman's political manoeuvres ensured a vassal state, not a competitor.³²⁴ Similar negotiations were conducted in Semarang, Demak and Pati.³²⁵

An elaborate documentation was needed to choose proper representatives. Speelman asked Amangkurat II to pen down a "Nader Verclaringe" on the fall of the kraton and the court 'historian' Surawikrama to record his insights on the war and Javanese society.³²⁶ Even more perceptive is the account of the alliances by the admiral himself at the end of his mission; written in Japara and Semarang and completed on the 23th of March, 1678. Speelman was promoted to First Counsellor and Director-General of the Indies and had to leave Central Java with the onset of the monsoon. Since the war was still in full swing he wrote an elaborate *Memorie* to his assumed successor De Saint-Martin. In this manner, the new Dutch admiral would be able to approach the right men, keep hold of the needed resources and steer the war-machine that was as much Javanese as it was Dutch.³²⁷

At the time of writing the *Memorie*, Speelman was suffering from grits in his kidney and bladder for about ten days.³²⁸ His illness made it difficult to abide to the exact wishes made for the

³²¹ The quote is translated from: "hij hun een kogel door den kop zou doen jagen." Speelman, "Letter XLI.": 175-179.

³²² C. Speelman, "Letter XLII (10 December, 1677)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 182-183.

³²³ C. Speelman, "Letter XXVII (4/5 August, 1677)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 134; idem., "Letter XXX (3 September, 1677)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 139-143; and idem., "Letter XXXV (2 November, 1677)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 169-170.

³²⁴ Couper, "Letter LXIII": 284.

³²⁵ Notice that Tumapel needed to flee Surabaya in July 1678. See I. De Saint-Martin, "Letter XLIX (8 July, 1678)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 215.

³²⁶ De Graaf, *Titels en Namen*: 64.

³²⁷ Speelman gained the position of "*Eerste Raad en Directeur-Generaal van Indië*". As will be read in the next section, not De Saint-Martin but Hurdts became the new admiral. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 739- 742.

³²⁸ Ibid.: 739, 742, 801. Speelman refers to "pijnlijke graveelpijne", which is a "[b]enaming voor het kalkachtig gruis dat zich bij sommige personen in de nieren en de blaas vormt en met het water geloosd wordt." See De Geïntegreerde Taalbank, "Graveel", *Historische woordenboeken op internet De Geïntegreerde Taalbank* (accessed via <http://gtb.inl.nl/iWDB/search?actie=article&wdb=WNT&id=M021643>, on 14-02-2014).

Missive. Instead, he “was forced to use whatever was still in my memory and how I considered the matters at present”. And -as he stresses- if some of those matters are not described truthfully at least they are addressed as issues of concern. To his own surprise, the text “has become much larger and elaborate, than I had expected in the beginning”. But he does believe it to reflect “the most important current affairs”.³²⁹

Of all these affairs, starting the inland campaign is deemed most essential.³³⁰ The piece addresses De Saint-Martin as well as the Supreme Government. Both are offered a summary of the VOC’s potential for winning the war. Elaborations are sometimes avoided, however. He promises to give additional oral explanation on certain issues treated in his text.³³¹ At other points, he refers to previously send letters containing details on events, problems and allies.³³² Still, the *Memorie* remains a coherent overview of Speelman’s perception on the current circumstances and military potentials.

The writing style exposes an interest in foreign terms and expressions. Not only does he resort to French words and terms, he equally layers his texts with Javanese titles and concepts.³³³ Only at rare occasions are Dutch translations of noble titles attempted. This demonstrates recognition of the unique nature of Javanese entitlement, including the confusing name-changing for every new status. Speelman even tends to give both the venerable and common name for lords. And whenever he is unaware of the original name, he careful avoids mentioning it by referring to ethnicity or other personal features.³³⁴ His grasp of Javanese designations must have been enabled by his assistants.

Speelman relied much on servants assembling news on the road. As mentioned, he tends to direct his reader to their reports and letters for more elaborate information. The dependence on them is not surprising, for the admiral was stuck at the coast himself. They could thus operate as back land envoys. Especially translators were of much value. His Malaysian scribe Alem and Javanese writers Pousparaga and Pouradria are rewarded for their services. The “most highly regarded” Sergeant Couper is praised for his “Javanese language capabilities”. These men were rare, and would a similar interpreter be found, “he will be wisely employed and used”.³³⁵ Dealing with Javanese and

³²⁹ The quote derives from: “van ’t geene mij de geheugennisse suppediteerde en zoodanig, als mij de zake present voor ooge stinden”; and “veel grooter en wijtlopiger is gevallen, als ik inden beginnen gedagt hadde”; and “de zaken ten principalen voorgevallen”. Ibid.: 902-903.

³³⁰ Ibid.: 903.

³³¹ Ibid.: 739, 769 and 786-787.

³³² Ibid.: 741-744, 747, 760, 785, 790-791, 819, 839, 870, 872-873 and 892.

³³³ These terms are often bastardised to Dutch, as was common in the Dutch Republic.

³³⁴ Tumenggung Jalalana is, for instance, referred to as the “Balinese” prior to achieving his noble title from the Susuhunan. See *ibid.*: 796-797

³³⁵ The quotes are translated from: “Javaanse taalkunde” and “die zal wel mogen aangenomen en gebruikt werden.”. The Scotsman Couper was the resident of Japara between 1671 and 1676, and led embassies to the Sunan. He has been stated to speak Javanese fluently and also appears to have been a crucial intermediary for the admirals. At the end of the war he even took command of the VOC force in East Java. See *ibid.*: 862-863. Also see De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 49.

Malaysian was crucial in his opinion; to gather the desired knowledge required crossing linguistic borders with care.

Such care is exhibited when choosing informants too. These agents came in all colours and shapes: Dutch, Scots, Javanese, Muslims, royals, and merchants. The reports range from Jagapati's account of the Madurese occupation of the kraton and the genealogy of the Sunans, meetings between Trunajaya and Moor Priero, to the assassination attempt on the Madurese warlord as observed by Captain Couper.³³⁶ All these conveyed important insights, but others failed doing so. Few issues led to condemnation as much as corrupted or partial intelligence. If VOC officers or merchants neglect to inform, the admiral tends to request their discharge.³³⁷ The comments on Javanese informants can be equally sceptical: "one can in general not trust Javanese messages, as our experience has taught us redundantly and dreadfully".³³⁸

This does not change the fact that two of his most knowledgeable contacts were Javanese: Tuměnggung Surawikrama and Tuměnggung Ingawanga. The first is described as a "secretary of state of the old and the new Susuhunan, who was famous among the Javanese as one of the major shrewd and specialized experts of their antiquity".³³⁹ De Graaf suggests he might have been an editor for the famed Mataram court chronicle: the Babad Tanah Jawi. Ingawanga was a grand-Mantri and confidante of the Sunan, and served as a delegate to both Pangéran Puger and the Supreme Government.³⁴⁰ More Javanese agents offered valuable insights, however. In fact, several Javanese lords were invited to attend the VOC meetings in Japara, which demonstrates appreciation for their accounts.³⁴¹

Deputies of warlords or rulers were welcomed as well. The admiral confirms to the Supreme Government that he does keep a watchful eye to whatever delegate asks for his attention, but reveals the best salutes were reserved for those negotiating a submission or alliance.³⁴² Most eager was the admiral about a possible abasement of Amangkurat II's brother, Pangéran Puger. Both princes held legitimacy to the Sunan title. Favouring Amangkurat over Trunajaya still left the former's siblings the possibility to claim sovereignty. The mandala, after all, allowed multiple monarchs to

³³⁶ De Graaf, "Titels en Namen": 64; and Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 782.

³³⁷ Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 800-806, 848-853, 864-865, 872-873, 889-892 and 894.

³³⁸ The quote is translated from: "gelijk men int geheel op geene Javaense tijdinge doen mag, zoo als ons d'ervaren theijd overvloedig en tot vervelens toe, geleert heeft". Ibid.: 756

³³⁹ The quote comes from François Valentijn, it is roughly translated from: "Sura-Wikrama, secretaris van staat van de oude en nieuwe Susuhunan, welke, onder de Javanen beroemd was voor een der voornaamste vernuftelingen en kenners hunner oudheden". De Graaf, "Titels en Namen": 64.

³⁴⁰ Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 91.

³⁴¹ Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 862 and 890.

³⁴² Ibid.: 844.

gather a significant backing. The admiral draws parallels with the Indian and “European kingdoms, where the kings have many brothers” and fears fraternal fights.³⁴³

To avoid secession struggles, Amangkurat II's inheritance is elaborated to show why he suffices better than his brothers. It is told how he arrived in Japara on the 15th of September bearing the title Susuhunan Amangkurat Sinnepattij Ingalaga; which he claimed to have obtained from his dying father. The new Sunan arrived with a mission, for his father had equally recommended him to search VOC support, because “there was no hope for restoration”.³⁴⁴ Trunajaya had to be put to death. But, the new Sunan said he was powerless because “I cannot bring the people of Mataram to warring or fighting”; he asked VOC's help to reconquer territory “so many may follow me” again. The Javanese lords no longer sent delegations “out of fear for Puger” and Trunajaya; leaving Speelman the only one to turn to.³⁴⁵

Speelman was, however, aware of the rumours among “the people” that this prince had killed his own father. Since this would invalidate any claim to the throne, the admiral enquired further on these hearsays. Amangkurat II was asked to report on the fall of the Kraton via a *Nadere Verclaringe* or additional declaration. The resulting report shows knotty courtly ties to have slowly dislodged Amangkurat I. Only the crown prince stayed at his side; a self-proclaimed and uncontested loyalty.³⁴⁶ Speelman takes this for granted and rejects the gossip as plotted by the “deceased untrustworthy Marta Saaija”.³⁴⁷

The deceit and defeat at Gegodog is excused too. Amangkurat II is relatively open about it and his courtiers convey his father never gave hay to the accusations of the prince commencing rebellion.³⁴⁸ But curbing the rebellion he can; Speelman hopes to control the uprising through establishing Amangkurat as recognized overlord. A captured warlord from Semarang, Astrajuda, provides Speelman with a detailed account of the kraton's fall and stresses that many of the Mataramese courtiers brought to Kediri desired for “one of their legitimate rulers” descending from

³⁴³ The quote derives from: “andersuijt te verwagten, als nog het dempen van 't eene vier, het weder ontfonken van een ander, gelijk d'ervarentheid in de Euopische Coninkrijken, daar de coningen veel broeders hadden, en nog bij onze geheugenisse in het Hindostanse gebied, ten overvloede geleert, en aangewezen heeft”. See Ibid.: 877-878. Notice that Speelman was aware of the Aria Martalaja's attempt to refrain the Sunan from contacting the Dutch. See Speelman, “Letter XXX”: 136-137.

³⁴⁴ Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek* : 746-747.

³⁴⁵ The quotes are translated from “opdat velen my volgen mogen en in der haaste, de Mattaram weder verwinnen dat ick het volck van de Mattaram tot het oorlogen noch vechten, niet crygen conde”; “opdat velen my volgen mogen”; and “uit vreeze voor Poeger”. Amangkurat II, “Letter XVII (16 April, 1677): Translaet van een verzegelden brief, door den Adipati Anoem, nu genaamd Ngalaga Amankoeat aan den Ed. Hr. Gouverneur Generaal, uit Tegal geschreven.” In *De Opkomst Van*: 130-132; idem., “Letter XL (around November, 1677): Translaet van een versegeit versoekeschrift soo in de Javaanse als Maleijtsse tale door den Soudouhouan Aman Conrat Sinnepatty Ingalaga, op den ... aen d'Ed. H.. Admiraal Cornelis Speelman.” In *De Opkomst Van*: 171; C. Speelman, “Letter XXXIV (14 October, 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 157-158; and idem., “Letter XLI”: 175.

³⁴⁶ Amangkurat II, “Letter XXXIII (10 October, 1677): Nader verclaringe door den Soudouhouan selffs ... op de instantie van den admiraal Cornelis Speelman op den 19de en 20de September opgegeven.” In *De Opkomst van*: 147-155.

³⁴⁷ The quote is translated from “den overleden trouwlooze Marta Saaija”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 747.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.: 758-759.

Sultan Agung.³⁴⁹ Amangkurat II might well be it. To prove so, further attention is paid to the mothers and the background of the brothers.³⁵⁰

Just two of the six princes are judged “lawful and legitimate” heirs; Amangkurat II and Pangéran Puger.³⁵¹ In the end, Speelman claims the former to be the true successor. Nine courtiers witnessed Amangkurat I’s decree: it “is my oldest son on which I rely, and [to him] Mataram belongs; Niety Nagara, hand to him my precious gong Sibietsia, and my krits Belatar” as “to recognize this truthful, and legitimate successor of his father, in spite of Pangéran Puger”. In contrast, Puger is said to only have only one important Mantri following him.³⁵² One cannot avoid noticing the opportunistic reasoning behind this; Speelman himself suggests the choice of Sunan is not as relevant as “the Company’s interests” of retrieving “tranquillity” and “eradicating” Kajoran and Trunajaya. Counting Mantris eases the choice of ruler, so attention can be quickly turned to chief concerns.³⁵³

The intricacies of legitimacy to rule are side-issues. Speelman even wishes the fight between the brothers would cease “so to exterminate their shared enemy easier with the Company’s help.” Thereby they would sooner become independent, and the VOC would be able to halt its costly intervention much faster.³⁵⁴ The intrinsic difficulty of having two heirs fight alongside is hence disregarded and Puger’s suggestion to divide the realm into a two rejected. The false promises of Puger to attend Amangkurat II’s court are instead blamed on “mistrust and suspicion”, self-interest, “false hearsays” and ignorance on the VOC’s aim “to make them rule the realm themselves.”³⁵⁵ Even cooperation with Kajoran and Trunajaya is suspected.³⁵⁶ Nonetheless, “as much honour and respect

³⁴⁹ Speelman, “Letter XXX”: 136.

³⁵⁰ The degree to which the brothers are willing to submit to Amangkurat II is treated too. Most of Amangkurat I’s daughters ended up in Puger’s or Trunajaya’s camp, still Speelman does not take this as important (“die ons ter zake weijnig importeeren”) while summarizing their stories. Thereby he neglects the genealogical legitimation of these warlords; binding in the late Sunan’s wives could after all bring recognition from others. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 747-750 and 777- 779.

³⁵¹ Even the successor of Amangkurat II is debated; the Sunan points at his son Raden Mas, who is so young that Speelman suggests might better resort to one of his brother instead in case of succession. Notice that Amangkurat II is the Sunan title, as a boy his name was Raden Mas Rahmat and as a prince Pangéran Adipati Anom. Ibid.: 750 and 776-777.

³⁵² The quotes derive from: “is mijn oudste zoon daar op ik mij verlate, en hoort de Mataram toe, Nietij Nagara, geeft hem over mijn rijke gong Sibietsia, en mijn krids Belatar, ’t welk zoodanig naargevolgt en door dezen Mandaraka voor ende van wegenz zijnen heer aanvaart wierde, zulke men allenthalven ten belange van de wittigheid zig niet en schijnt te komen abuseeren met den dezen voor waargti, en ligitieme opvolger van zijn vader aan te nemen ende te erkennen, niet tegenstaande den Pangéran Pougar ...” Puger’s pretensions and the rumour that Amangkurat I divided the realm – expressed in letters to the VOC- are wholly dismissed as “deceitful”. See idem.: 750-751. The Mantri staying with Puger was “Tommagon Sjougulimouda, welke bij hem tot nu toe continueert, en gehouden werd, voor een quaad instrument ontrent den zelven”. See further idem.: 756-757.

³⁵³ Ibid.: 751-752 and 874.

³⁵⁴ The quote is translated from: “om alzoo gesamentlijk haren algemeenen vijand te gemakkelijker mets Compagnies hulpe te verdelgen.” Ibid.: 752, 768.

³⁵⁵ The quote derives from: “haar door haren agterdogtigen aart niet konnende imagineeren dat de Compagnie al deze moeijsje, en kosten doet, puer en alleen to hare adsistentie maar nergens anders om, als om hun selfs meester van het rijk te maken”. Speelman laments teh self-interest in this phrase: “dat zij daar van mij anders wisten te denken, nog te zeggen als dat een ijder van hun alle, even garig zelfs konink in des vadersplaatse willen zoude, want hunnes wetens, en had Adepattij Anmon, hun noijt in hare perzonen, eenige redenen tot misgenoegen gegeven”. Ibid.: 754 and 758-760. See also Speelman, “Letter XLI”: 179.

³⁵⁶ C. Speelman, “Letter XLIII (2 January 1678).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 184-185; and idem., *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 752-755, 759 and 874-875.

should be given [to him] as is convenient for princes of such royal birth"; for that will prove the Company's good intentions.³⁵⁷

Puger himself claims to face famine and epidemics and can only send delegates to Japara. Speelman agrees to support such an embassy and selects a commander to guide it; the "most adroit and capable" Mandaraka. Mandaraka is assigned a hidden agenda, however. He is to gather an sizeable army as "to march towards Mataram with awe, so in case Pangéran Puger would submit to his brother, they can meet him with all due respects."³⁵⁸ Although the embassy was never assembled, the intention of Speelman to draw an alliance between the two brothers shines through once more. The reported weak position and popularity of Amangkurat at the kraton would supposedly ease this aim.³⁵⁹

Conversely, Pangéran Puger is "generally perceived" as a "just as competent ruler" that "was by far not as guided by his lust that much".³⁶⁰ Amangkurat II instead managed to offend "the bulk of the large and small people" by taking "wives and daughters for his own pleasure". Speelman even needed to publically reproach him for this behaviour to satisfy his subjects; stating it would be a sin to God empowering a man acting like that. The Sunan was urged to change his ways.³⁶¹ Javanese courtiers had similar objections. Indeed, at one point Amangkurat confessed having too few followers to "do anything significant".³⁶²

According to Speelman, Amangkurat II subsequently swore "with very touching oaths, and tears in his eyes, that he would no longer disgrace himself with this [behaviour], and that he would even punish his commanders by death or other heavy penalties, in case they would act alike".³⁶³ Rather than an actual confession, this anecdote appears a flight of fancy; serving to increase the Batavian support for Amangkurat II. The Sunan had persisted in pursuing romantic affairs and insisted "that the previous wars among the Javanese were generally fought for women or daughters,

³⁵⁷ The quote derives from: zoo veel eere en respect te bewijzen als princen van zoo hooge geboorte convenieert ...te tonen dat wij haar welstand betragten zonder ander opzigt als om ons contract met haar en haar vader gemaakt, als trouwe bontgenoten naar te komen, en in een onverbreekelijke vrede en aliantie tot afweeringe van alle vijande met haar te continueren, indien zij luijden van hare kant insgelijks alle pligten van een eerlijk bontgenootschap komen te presteeren en met haar broeder den Sousouhoenan in vrede blijven leven ..."
Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 871-872.

³⁵⁸ The quote is roughly translated from: "om met ontzag voort naar de Mattaram te trekken, behouden dat ingevalle den Pangéran Pugar zijnen broeder quam te erkennen, zij hem als dan met alle respect rencontreeren". In reverse, when Puger would not show any intentions to abasement, they could claim to have arranged an army for the purpose of showing respect not causing bloodshed. See *ibid.*: 766-767.

³⁵⁹ Speelman, "Letter XLI": 174-175; *idem.*, "Letter XXXV": 161-163; and *idem.*, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 767-768.

³⁶⁰ Raden Tappa, for instance, gives Puger his preference. See Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 763-764 and 777.

³⁶¹ The quotes derives from: "is nogal het gemeen gevoelen ... dat Pangéran Pugar door het geheele land, bij groot en klein, aangenamer, en veel meer getrokken zij, als den dezen dat hij ook ruijm zoo bequaam tot de regeeringe is ... maar op verre na zoo veel niet aan zijn wellust, als den dezen, zeer was overgegeven, zonder nogtans ijmants vrouwen off kinderen tot zijn vermaak naar hem te nemen, 't welk de grootste en voorneemste oorzaak gezegt wert, te wezen, waarom deze zijn hoogheids successive, het meeste gros van groote, en klein volk, tegens de borst zoude stooten". *Ibid.*: 763-764. Earlier agitations arrived over Amangkurat II desire for retrieving a certain princess. See C. Speelman, "Letter XXXII" (6 October, 1677)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 145-147; and *idem.*, "Letter XXXIV": 157-158.

³⁶² The quotes is translated from: "ijets van belang te komen uijtregten". Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 827.

³⁶³ The quote is translated from: "sweerende indien tijd met zeer diere eeden, en de tranen in zijn ooggen, dat hij niet nader zig daar met niet bezoetelen, maar dat hij ook zelfs zijne bevelhebbers, met de dood, off ander swaerlijk straffen zoude, indien zij het hun onder wonden te doen." *Ibid.*: 764.

and that [these desires] were hence not strange to this country, but familiar".³⁶⁴ Speelman appears to cover up the Sunan's convictions to the Supreme Government. Amangkurat's 'oaths and tears' suggests the reputed decency of Puger should not lead to preference for him, for in the future the same can be expected of Amangkurat.³⁶⁵

Couper seems to have laid the seeds for favouring Amangkurat II. His embassy in March 1677 centred on Amangkurat II; then still titled Pangéran Adipati Anom. He was the one recommending the visit to his brother Pangéran Martasana to open doors to the kraton. Martasana, however, warns Couper for the possible difficulties in getting his three brothers to sign for cooperation with the VOC. "One wants to become Susuhunan [i.e. Puger], the other is a womanizer [i.e. Amangkurat II], the third just slacking about [i.e. Singasari]; leaving the realm's matters to decay. For if they had acted like sons of the Susuhunan, Raden Kajoran would, without doubt, not have turned his back" to Mataram.³⁶⁶

Their "distrust towards each other" precluded efficient rule; as the ill and aging Sunan had given authority to them. Yet, having arrived at Pangéran Adipati Anom's court, Couper is assured full support by the prince. The crown prince calls himself "the admiral's own son" and stresses how his brothers are jealous on the recognition he gains from the Dutch. It is he who receives the diplomatic letter and contract; "opening it with his own hands", asking the royal secretary to read it out and "calling loudly: silentium, thee Mataramese lords listen with attention!" When the Sunan turns out too sick to sign the contract, his son Adipati Anom does it for him; as such rectifying a contract that would soon position himself as the 'just prince' and Sunan, at least as far as Speelman was concerned.³⁶⁷

All these arguments for supporting a single legitimate leader, point into one direction: the need to quickly initiate a hinterland march to constitute the Sunan's power. Throughout the *Memorie*, the campaign to Kediri keeps looming. All kinds of preparations are made; from strengthening fortifications and depots, accumulating arms and cannons, to gathering intelligence

³⁶⁴ The quote is translated from: "dat de voorgaande meeste oorlogen onder de Javanen al doorgaans om vrouwen of dochters was toegecomen, en dat het mitsdien hier te lande niets vreemts; maar familjaer was". Speelman, "Letter XXXIV": 157-158; idem., "Letter XXXV": 159-160; idem., "Letter XLI": 179-180; and I. De Saint-Martin "Letter XLV (9 May, 1678)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 208-209.

³⁶⁵ Notice that Speelman expresses his doubts on the confession, but subsequently demonstrates how his behavior has improved. Hence, concluding that the oaths were legitimate. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 764-765.

³⁶⁶ The quotes derive from: "d'een wil Sousouhounan wesen, d'andere hout het met moye vrouwen ende den derde met een toebackjen, latende de saacken van 't ryck verlooren gaan. Want indien se haar als des Sonsonhounans soons gethoont hadden, boyten twytfel was Radingh Cadjohoran niet wegh geraackt, en dat ontstaat uyt bet misvertrouwen, dat sy op den anderen hebben, waarmede het soodanich hebben laten liggen". J. Couper, "Letter XVI (25 March, 1677): Schriftelyck rapport door den coopman Jacobus Couper over syne commissie aan 't Mataramse hof aen d'EdH. Comelis Speelman." In *De Opkomst Van*: 98.

³⁶⁷ The quotes derive from: "want ick ben des admiraals eygen soon, hy mach van my in alles verseeckert wesen, ick sal Pangoranh Pongar beweegen om met my syn stemme tot des admiraals versoek te geven"; "want myn broeders zyn jaloers, dat ick bij de Hollanders in meerder aansien zoude wesen als syluyden"; "Pangeranh Adypatty, die den brieft en contract oock overnam, doende de brieft' met eygener handen open"; and "overluydt geroepen zynde. silentium, ghy Mattaramse grooten hoort toe met aandacht!". Couper is the one ending up reading out the contract, as he could speak Javanese. See *ibid.*: 98-113.

and tempting warriors.³⁶⁸ As Speelman stresses in the first pages, the opponents were slowly forced into retreat. The enemy was “pushed back to the land of Djepan” by “the might of some of our army men” and the assistance of Javanese troops charged by Adipati Martapura and Martalaja. Thanks to “the help of God” it is evident how “mighty the Company’s weapon has become on this island”.³⁶⁹

The situation was “favourable for the upcoming campaign”, and no further time should be wasted “lying still”.³⁷⁰ While putting these words on paper, Speelman must have realized the power shifts in Batavia would make such hinterland campaign very feasible indeed. Up till that point, he had received autonomy of the Susuhunan to act as he wished within Mataram.³⁷¹ No similar sovereignty was granted by the governor-general. The new leadership of Van Goens would do justice to his agreements with the Sunan; granting access inlands. In his own words, the Mataramese contracts were signed with “the intention to safe his majesty from the disorder striking his realm ... to the fullest extremity”. To blame were “Trunajaya... and his followers under Raden Kajoran” and the “roaming Makassarrese under Karaëng Galesong”.³⁷² Freedom to enter the back lands would finally bring back order.

He had already brought the Pasisir “to again obey the Susuhunan”; capturing the coastal towns “under the Company’s protection” or planting VOC flags to deter opponents.³⁷³ Thereby they “would have contributed to whatever made the recovery of calmness practicable and applicable”. Yet, stabilizing peace further required stepping foot on the back land.³⁷⁴ Trunajaya hid in Kediri, where Speelman had been unable “to visit” him due to “the strict prohibition of the Supreme Government”, causing the admiral “very sincere discontent”. In the meantime, Trunajaya’s “deceitful father in law, masked under priestly sanctity, played his part and distracted the common population from their required obedience though devilishly hymned false prophecies”. Mataram had been

³⁶⁸ For the enforcement of forts see: Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 794, 827-832, 837-839, 843, 863-864, 871, 879-880, 882-883, 893, and 902. New depots were built too.

³⁶⁹ The quote derives from: “dat alles met Godes hulpe naar alle apparentie zig naar wensche vlijen, en schikken, zoude, hebbende de ervarenheid ons tot nu toe overvloedig geseert hoe onsagelijk ’s Compagnies wapen op dit eijland geworden zijn”. Inid.: 742. Speelman had been stressing this since the conquest of Surabaya, see Speelman, “Letter XIX”: 117-119.

³⁷⁰ The quotes are derived from: “dog dat ook sedert de veranderinge op Sourabaija en hier om herre met de hulpe Godes met alleene weder geredresseert, maar dat ook zelfs den vijand hier bij, en ontrent doorgebroken, door t’ontsag van weijnige onze militeijren, zonder eenige bijzondere resistentie te derven bieden, of ergens stant te houden, zoo verre zijn gedreven geworden tot in t’land van Dsjepan toe, t’gunt zij al meede verliesen en aan d’onze ten besten gaven zulke de Javaanse troepen van zijn hoogste onder Adepattijs Marta Poura en Marta Lajja geadsisteert”; “die brave gedesidereerde situatie, zoo favorabel voor t’ aanstaande companje door de Javaanse tropen”; and “in plaats van stilleggen”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 738, 742, 763, 790 and 837-839.

³⁷¹ Two contracts determining a taxative payback as well as increased autonomy of Batavia show an unusual recognition of autonomy that might not have been granted to other neighbouring realms. The VOC was even allowed to control the foreign Asian groups within their territories. See De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 16-17.

³⁷² Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 744.

³⁷³ Speelman, “Letter X”; and idem., “Letter XI (10 January, 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 76.

³⁷⁴ The quote is derived from “den Sousouhouan weder hebben doen erkennen, verklarende met verzegelde actens en het uijt deelen van prince vlaggens, dat wij die plaats en namen onder Compagnies bescherminge, ten minsten , tot zoo lange wij vanwege de Compagnie alles zouden hebben bijgebracht wat tot herstellinge van de ruste particabel en applicabel konde wezen”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 744-745.

sacked and “the old lord, with his four feminized sons” had cowardly fled. A stitch in time had to be made before disorder would rule all.³⁷⁵

The fastest and easiest way to reap the benefits of these contracts would be a submission of Trunajaya and Kajoran. Kajoran could “be brought back to friendship and taken as a noted minister of the state”. Trunajaya could become a governor of Madura, if he acts properly. Speelman hopes for this, but at the same time envisions the inevitability of conquest.³⁷⁶ To muster the required manpower, the admiral evaluates the pejuang troops that are likely to participate or are already under command. The teaming of Puger and Amangkurat II is one aspect of this query. But local leaders and war-bands gain equal attention.³⁷⁷

In the overview he gives of the current army, four categories are applied: European (566 soldiers), Ambonese (138 soldiers), *Mardijkers* (81 soldiers), and Makassarese (67 soldiers). Smaller war-bands are found among them: the Makassarese are commanded by three and the Ambonese by two lords. All these sections are stationed separately and appear to have formed rather independent war-bands. Hardly any details are given on these groups, however.³⁷⁸ It almost appears the particularities of the warriors no longer matter when they are already drawn into the warforce. This is different for the potential allies.

Other than his successor Hurdt, Speelman fully relied on pejuang troops for hinterland battles; for only they could enter the back lands with large groups and for an extended period.³⁷⁹ The concern with Sulawesians and Javanese warriors is thus not unexpected. Several reports were written on them. Couper’s account, for example, unveiled the fraternization within Galesong’s army and demonstrated the need to make the Makassarese submit to the Company. It suggests different war-bands started to drift apart. The group “is about 2.000 men strong, but divided by so many leaders of equal quality, nobility and origin, that they as such assert to be alike [and] that Karaëng Galesong ... do[es] not hold much authority over them, and the internal discords are not small”. Speelman plans to cause a split between these troops by sending two- to four-hundred of Raja

³⁷⁵ The quote is derived from “en al waar wij hem hem tot mijn bijzonder, en zeer hartelijk leetweezen, door hey expres en stricte verbod van de Hooge Regeeringe niet hebben mogen gaan bezoeken, en heeft hij derhalven binnen ’s lands de handen ruim gehouden, om ten principalen door toe doen van zijnen listigen schoonvader, onder schijn van een priesterterlijke heiligheid, zijn personagie te spelen en het gemeene volk door een parthije duijvelsche gesingen valsche prophecijen van hare schuldige gehoorsaamheid af te leijden, zoo verre dat den ouden laten vorst, en zijne vier verwijfde zoonen, eijnteling haar niet langer in de Mataram dervende vertrouwen.” Ibid.: 746.

³⁷⁶ The quote derives from: “weder in vrintschap en een aansienelijk minister in het rijk aan te neemen”. Ibid.: 844-845. See also earlier letters: Speelman, “Letter XII”: 77-79.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.: 769-770.

³⁷⁸ On Semarang are stationed: Karra Pappas leading 12 Makassarese soldiers and one sergeant, two Ambonese Sergeants leading 40 Ambonese and Kambral heading a group of 19 mixed indigenous men. The latter mixed groups were also described as *Mardijkers*; but it is not clear whether they had anything to do with Batavia. ‘*Mardijkers*’ was after all a very ambiguous moniker. In the fields: the Makassarese lieutenant Karremou Toulj charging three sergeants and 41 soldiers, 96 Ambonese under Captain Abraham Tiekio, eight Makassarese soldiers of Care Montoulijs. See *ibid.*: 834 and 836-837.

³⁷⁹ Hence Speelman’s request to the Sunan for men after the fall of Surabaya. See E. van der Schuer, “Letter XX (4 June, 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 119.

Palakka's "best men" which ought to be done "with care", because "no opportunity should be given for one part of [Palakka's] group to desert to Trunajaya".³⁸⁰

A comparable plan was made for convincing the Madurese to submit to Amangkurat. This time the Buginese themselves proposed going to Madura "to deprive Trunajaya of all support that he could still aspire from those lands". The admiral had to admit that "the project is in fact not ill conceived". But care needed to be taken to select a trustworthy warlord to avoid one that "will act to his own benefits, and would attempt to make himself master, which is not an unlikely event, and which will grant them more prosperous and arable lands than can be found on the entire Javanese island". Yet, with the proper warlords and VOC surveillance -he reckons- this plot might convince locals to join the marching army.³⁸¹

Next to attracting new masses, local rulers were also expected to hold on to their current ones. Speelman recommends local leaders to "firmly win over the favour of the villages, at least those approximate [to their power centres], so rebels won't dare to invade or oppose them".³⁸² The population surrounding the cities was to be used for guarding duties too; the Chinese and Javanese living near Semarang were, for example, insisted to flee inside the city and not the forests whenever enemy forces approached. In that matter, they could be equipped with arms if the need arrived. Local protection was thus relied on; both in and outside city walls. Several Javanese nobles were assigned to guard the fields with their own followers and minimal European backing.³⁸³ At the same time, Speelman realizes that for some villages "our help might be as small as anything, [but it] seems to be their only salvage".³⁸⁴

Just as was the case for winning over new warriors, protecting villages was done better by some leaders than others. If successful, Javanese warlords and rulers are highly praised and usually earn royal designations in consequence.³⁸⁵ Aria Urawan stands out particularly; both Couper and

³⁸⁰ The quotes derive from: "bestaan de hare presente sterkte naar dat Glissons broeder Dain Memang met de zijne van 't eijland Cagginjan bij den hoop gekomen was, volgens de laatste tijdinge, door Sergeant Couper daar van gerapporteert zoo men zegt in ontrent twee duijzent koppen, dog verdeelt onder zoo veel hoofden van gelijke qualiteit, geslagt en afkomst, en die der halven, mejnen d'een zoo wel als d'ander te wezen, dat Craijn Glisson en zijne naaste Dain Masserrij, neve van Niontemorano, daar over zoo groot gezag nog autoriteit niet zeer geschikt, en de onderlinge disordre niet kleen is"; and "want U Edele zelfs genoegsaam weeten dat daar door geen oorzaake zoude mogen gegeven warden, om een parthije van de zelve tot Troenadjaaija te doen overgaan". Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 790-791. Speelman first expressed this plan on the 10th of March, 1677. See Speelman, "Letter XII": 78.

³⁸¹ The quotes are translated from: "om Troenadjaaija te ontzetten alle hulpe die hij zig van die kant nog mogte imagineren, 't project en is in effect van zoo quaden aanzien niet"; and "daar in naar eijgen voordeel zoeken, en tragten zouden, voor haar zelve meester daarvan te werden, 't welk voor hun gansche geen onmoogelijke zaak is, en waar met zij dan nog gelukkiger en vrugtbaarder akker zouden bezitten als op 't geheele eijland Java te vinden zij...". Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 791-793. Another reason is to free VOC prisoners kept by the Madurese after a shipwreck, see *ibid.*: 793.

³⁸² Descriptions of trade posts or villages often have the tendency to urge proper defences against roaming rebels. The quote is translated from: "de dorpen met een sterke hand, ten minsten de gene die naast bij gelegen zijn, onder haar devotie te stellen, omdat wij geloofden dat de Maccassaren hun evenwel opentlijk daar tegen niet en zouden durven stellen, nogte in oppositie komen". *Ibid.*: 794, 800 and 806-807.

³⁸³ Only the most basic information on the troops is given: leaderships, number and provincial origin. However, mention is made of slight competition between the units. *Ibid.*: 873-874, 878- 879, and 896-897.

³⁸⁴ The quote is translated from: "dat onze hulpe zoo kleen alsoe ook wezen mag, haren eenigsten toeverlaat schijnt te wezen". *Ibid.*: 809.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*: 795-797, 806-807, 814, 861-862, 873, 876, 881-882 and 899.

Speelman acclaim his dedication. This “modest” and “brave” Surabayan governor offered to conquer Kediri, if about two-hundred VOC soldiers or the Ambonese/Ternaten legion would assist him for two weeks. Furthermore, he would be able to maintain the city and its surroundings “with the followers he was convinced to gain there”. He took this as a safe bet for the Kedirians were still angry about the murder of their former lord and the assignation of his wives to others. But his brother had escaped to Giri and could attract “his followers in Kediri ... that he surely still had”.³⁸⁶

Urawan requested governorship over the area in return. The Surabayan Ombols (county regents) similarly recommended installing him as city administrator. The Sunan equally tried to “pull him in”. Urawan’s popularity thus stretched beyond the VOC. The potential of the fervent warlord was recognized by all. His initiative never lifted off, however, since -as Speelman stresses- no VOC soldiers could enter the backcountry due to Batavian policy. Instead, he is offered governorship over Sidaijo “where he is much better regarded and appreciated by the population” as the current ruler.³⁸⁷

Comparable endeavours were suggested by other local rulers. But these were not always as reliable. The governor of Wiera Saba, for example, claimed he only needed about 30 men support to retake his land. But Speelman notices that he had “joined the Makassarese” immediately after Trunajaya has conquered his territory. Even though Wiera Saba assumed Galesong to be warring under the Sunan’s banner, the admiral still thinks him a traitor. Other rulers do formally abide to the Sunan but do not mobilize their population.³⁸⁸ When Kjai Derma Souda and Aria Blater -lords ‘eastwards of Surabaya’- are asked to “appear from their mountains and hiding places and arm and marshal their people”, none such efforts are made; “so that their loyalty cannot be honoured”.³⁸⁹

The lords residing in Mataram with Pangéran Puger claim similar recognition without living up to it.³⁹⁰ And the Javanese lord that deserted the post Siepan, Martalaja, simply refuses to collect men to retake it; rather requesting to be assigned a new territory. Similarly, the ruler of Balora quietly fled his town while pretending he had defended it well. Prince Martasana even faked alliance, while he “detracted the loyalty to the Susuhunan from the people on Wates with evil intentions”; making it necessary to reconquer the post.³⁹¹

³⁸⁶ The quote is translated from: “maar ook met den aanhang, die hij vast stelde te zullen krijgen”. Ibid.: 795.

³⁸⁷ The quotes are translated from: “weder bij sig te trekken” and “waar in hij bij het volk veel beter gezien en bemint is”. Ibid.: 795-796. See also Speelman, “Letter XXXIV”: 156.

³⁸⁸ This happens even when traditions of handing out men exist; see for instance the complaints on Limbraauwa. See Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 756, 776 and 883-884.

³⁸⁹ The quotes are translated from: “uijt hare bergen en schuijloeken te voorschijn te doen komen en haar volk in wapens op de been te brengen” and “zoo dat ook van hare getrouwheid niet te roemen valt”. Ibid.: 798-799.

³⁹⁰ This is demonstrated to Speelman by Pugers’ ‘deceipful’ occupation of the kraton and informants stating the insincerity of the rulers in the old court. See *ibid.*: 760-763, 768.

³⁹¹ The Sunan forgave him these pretensions, possibly showing an expected confession of bravery even when it did not occur, or otherwise a form of nepotism. See *ibid.*: 807-808 and 865-870.

All of them appeared to be playing a diplomatic game in deceit of the VOC. For each and every case, Speelman expresses his frustration. That his doubts were justified is proven by the two-day showdown with which Martalaja sealed his disobedience. After his wishes were not fulfilled, he hid in a removed *kampung* as an act of resistance and needed to be hunted down. In the battle that followed, not only he himself, but equally the well-respected Martapura and Wangsa Diepa lost their lives. The lament over the latter offers a shining contrast to the condemnation of Laja for whose cut-off head a “high price was paid”.³⁹²

More forgiveness is shown to the Surabayan Ombols that had temporarily associated with Trunajaya or the Makassarese but later travelled to Japara to submit to the Sunan.³⁹³ They gained new noble titles as a reward. All their backgrounds and personalities are described to showcase their alliance. Speelman recommends gratifying them “so them all ..., as well as their community, will be indebted and tied to the Company through well-doings and riches and unable to persist without those and her fatherly care”. The admiral even accepted Amangkurat selecting rulers that were known “as very disfavoured towards the Company”. None of them, after all, could bite the hand that feeds; a hand ultimately belonging to the VOC.³⁹⁴

For the campaign lying ahead, Speelman had plans to ensure comparable compliance from new allies. Traversing the right roads was one of them. It was necessary to find out how the land lies to gain support. The Supreme Government is alerted on the lacking geographical knowledge on “provinces, cities, villages etc.” The hinterlands and coastal peripheries thus need to be mapped out. Few Javanese have acquired the knowledge to do so; therefore Speelman suggests their first mate Cornelis Coops to expand an earlier map of the shipper Corter.³⁹⁵

Routes for the campaign were picked; three trails are suggested for three different army sections consisting out of men with varied ethnic backgrounds. Unlike the broad categorizations of Hurdt’s armed force, Speelman refers to certain regions where warriors can be obtained.³⁹⁶ The routes of the campaign seem tailored to collect these specific regional forces. The admiral is

³⁹² This ‘traitor’ did appear to enjoy Amangkurat’s protection, to the chagrin of Speelman. Yet, the admiral already believed him to “desert” whenever he will be capable to before his rebellion. Later on, the VOC man would regret would come to regret the initial trust he had gave to him. See *ibid.*: 800-805.

³⁹³ For the letter accounting on them see C. Speelman, “Letter XXV (1 August, 1677).”: 126-130.

³⁹⁴ The quote is taken from: ““want dezelve alle zonder onderscheijt, zoo wel als de heele gemeente, door weldaden ten overvloede aan de Compagnie verpligt, ende verbonden zijn, en ook nog eerst zonder dezelve, en haar vaderlijke voorzorge, niet en zouden komen bestaan.” Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 797-798 and 860-861.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*: 846-847.

³⁹⁶ Speelman mentions how “ zoude uijt het volk van Coudoes Damacq, Pattij, Jawana, Rimbang , Lasseem en de plaats en daar om her, het derde esquadre zoude bestaan, uijt het volk van Sourabaija, Griesik, Gierij, Zidaayo, en eenige uijt het Kindanse gebergte om daar mede over Wiera Saba, of een ander bequamer weg, naar de generale rendezvous, daar men dezelve komt vast te stellen, te avanceeren.” *Ibid.*: 769 and 882-883. The list of villages controlled in Banjukunung on folio 882-883 might be noted down with similar intentions. For earlier planned routes see Speelman, “Letter XXI”: 121-122; and *idem.*, “Letter XXIII”: 123-125. Here again, submission or scaring away Madurese support in towns and regions was aimed for.

therefore very displeased when one of the posts that was part of his scheduled march, Siepan, is suddenly abandoned without any permission of him or the Sunan.³⁹⁷

Seasonal scheduling is also addressed; for monsoons can change paths into swamps. “His highness as well as his principal ministers” declare to Speelman that they cannot muster their forces before the end of May or the start of June due to heavy rainfall and the harvest season. Still, the admiral urges that “the Company and the Susuhunan are determined to have the bulk of our troops moved beyond Kudus ... before the end of April, as to submit those areas, stop the invasion of thugs and poachers, and ensure the [acquisition] of the harvest.”³⁹⁸ Those troops, be it European or pejuang, required training and provision

Speelman makes several requests to the Supreme Government to ensure the army is well prepared.³⁹⁹ Special care is taken to ready the “foreigners” -Chinese, Balinese, Arabians etc.- in Javanese port towns, since they will require much “guidance”. The Javanese do “not have the power, nor the skills to bring those people to proper obedience and under discipline”. Without such control, they will bother everyone -“friend or enemy”- with “robbing, stealing, burning and plunder”.⁴⁰⁰ Were there to develop difficulties between the Javanese and the foreigners, the Sunan was to settle those. Amangkurat was equally held responsible for delivering carriers and grooms, who were demanded separately from the warriors.⁴⁰¹

Indigenous manpower thus served two purposes to the VOC: fighting and transporting. Amassing the former kind tended to involve much more diplomacy and consequently takes up much more attention within Speelman’s report. The Javanese commander Mandaraka suggests 20.000 armed forces and between 600 till 1.800 horses can be mustered at the coastal towns between Tegal and Surabaya. Speelman, however, trusts his own judgement better, and instead counts on 2.000 to 2.500 men, to be collected by Adipati Martumappel. To the admiral’s opinion, destruction of the region between Tuban and Demak makes it impossible to collect manpower there. Simultaneously,

³⁹⁷ This appears so because the suggested routes tend to take a detour towards these regions. Notice that the Madurese reconquest of Surabaya initially led to a planned campaign through Mataram (Couper would retake it before this Missive was written, but after the first ideas for a campaign were discussed), but that this campaign was adjusted to gathering troops in that area. See Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 769-770, 773, and 800-806; and idem., “Letter XLII”: 184.

³⁹⁸ Quote derives from: “de Compagnie ende dde Sousouhouunan ernst gaat werden het gros van onze troepen met het eijnde van April naar buijten tot in Coedoes, en naar gelegentheid ook verder tot in Grobagan te voeren, om die landstreeken voor eerste tot beter devotie te verpligten, d’invasie der loopers en stroopers te doen ophouden en ‘t gezaj op ‘t veld dat dan rijc en ontrent rijc zal zijn, allent halven te verzeekeren”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 770-771

³⁹⁹ This included a recommendation to make “our armed forces” capable of “using the horses of this land”. Mandaraka was to collect six to seven hundred of them. Bans on the private consumption of arak were also suggested to avoid disorder; instead the army could provide them with a daily small amount of it. See *ibid.*: 771-772, 825-826 and 840-841.

⁴⁰⁰ The quotes are translated from: “vreemdelingen”; “begeleijdinge”; “de Javanen, nog de magt, nog de bequaamheit hebben, om dat volk onder behoorlijke devitue en discipline te houden”; “‘t zij vrunt of vijand”; and “met roven, steelen, branden, en plunderen”. *Ibid.*: 820.

⁴⁰¹ The seal of the Sunan was referred to when asking obedience from Javanese warriors, in combination with the threat of death when defying orders. *Ibid.*: 773, 809 and 841.

the VOC had “lost many benefits” in the last few months due to “the risen rebellion that has been so successful”.⁴⁰²

Interestingly, the admiral refers to the march to Kudus conducted some months earlier to showcase how alliances could be attracted and lost. Within the “short period” of one week, their “Javanese force grew to no fewer than 6.000 heads”. Similarly the march of “the aged Martapura and other chiefs, who were assisted by so few of our men” “multiplied” in force too. This convinces him “that the assistance of Javanese will not disappoint”. Yet, one “requisite” is the presence of the Sunan, so “the suspicious and superstitious people see, and as such believe ..., that the Company is not making such great costs and efforts for themselves but for his resumption”.⁴⁰³

Most of these men were not ready for combat. Speelman reckons Javanese war-bands consist out of few actual warriors; less than twenty percent usually. The fighters, who initiate the battles, wear “one or two krisses and a pike... the rest, and the bulk, are carriers, some equipped with a kris or a knife, or often a parrying dagger”.⁴⁰⁴ While “the provinces tax one on every one [to eight] thousand men, to serve the lord when the need arrives ... from that number no more than 100 out of 1.000 men are counted as armed soldiers”. Sometimes, warlords will even “provide them with more guns, to feign larger numbers”. This tendency can be catastrophic, as the admiral point out by recalling Amangkurat II’s defeat at Grobogan.⁴⁰⁵

The “disastrous” army of 150.000 had no more than 15.000 armed warriors. “At the first rumour of approaching enemies”, they were all “brought into confusion and put to flight” because “of the large number of carriers and attachments” and “the lacking experience of the commanders”. The “long lasting peace in this realm [made] all military discipline unusual”. “In the previous old times” -Speelman must have been told by the court-historian Surawikrama- “the cluster of carriers were put two miles back whenever a fight or encounter lay ahead, to avoid such confusion”. Luckily, neither allies nor enemies manage to bring such order to their forces today; to the competitive advantage of VOC interventions.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰² The quote are translated from “veel advantage verloren” and “de opperese rebellie die zoo voorspoedig is geweest”. Ibid.: 774-775.

⁴⁰³ The quotes derive from: “zijn U Edele zoo wel als ik van gevoelens dat het aanden bijval van Javanen niet gebreken zal, en dat de Compagnie met het voorselijke vermogen al hier, magt genoeg op de been zal hebben”; and “op dat wantrouwende , en bijgelovige volk te sien, en soo doende te beter geloven tegen, dat de Compagnie niet voor haar zelve maar tot zijn herstellinge zoo groote kosten, en arbeid doet.” Ibid.: 775.

⁴⁰⁴ The ‘parrying dagger’ probably refers to less luxerious krisses

⁴⁰⁵ The quotes are translated from: “in een of twee cridssen en een pieck”; “de resterenden hoop, die dat gros uijt maken, zijn dragers, eenige met een crids of een mes, maar wel meest met een parring verzien”; “want of schoon de gouvernementen d’eene op duijssent, 2,3, tot, 5, 6, 8000 man toe, getaxeert staan, om des noots ten dienste van den heer, te moeten imploijeeren etcra, zoo werd uijt dat getal in effect niet meer, als 100 uijt 1000 man voor gewapende soldaten gerekent”; and “haar zelfs van meer geweeren versagen, om grooter getal te komen monteeren”. Ibid.: 876-877.

⁴⁰⁶ The quotes are translated from: “het rampsalige leger”; “op het eerste gerugt, van vijanden zonder datze nog ijemant sagen”; “in confusie en aan’t vlugten gebragt wierden”; “door het groote getal dragers en bijloopers”; “door puer gebrek van ervarentheid der bevelhebbers”; “door de lang beleefde ruste in dit rijk, alle oorlogs discipline ongewoon”; and “in de oude voorgaande tijden, te practiseeren dat tros dragers, wanneer eenig gevegt en rencontre voorhanden was, ten minsten een of twee mijl agteruijt gelaten wierden, om dergelijke confucie te voorkomen”. Ibid.: 876-877.

Even though some assumptions on the preserved discipline are made, the ways in which Trunajaya and Kajoran gather their men remains obscure to Speelman. Yet, he reports how the half-brother of Kajoran, Kabaijang, suddenly appeared in Japara and gave several insights into the hostile war-bands. From him came to “most certain and probable” account on the enemy received thus far. Besides information on fortifications and armouries, it contains the number, origin, and leadership of the warriors in Kediri.⁴⁰⁷

On Trunajaya, Kabaijang states that “he was beloved among the general people, because he was inspiring to them” and was able to keep prices low.⁴⁰⁸ The charm of the Madurese warlord equally pulled in several courtiers from Mataram, who were seen walking around in Kediri. Marriage and entitlements tended to be used to tie in these nobles. As Speelman concludes: the warlords “credit and status will improve over time” while, at the same time, he is enjoying life and alcohol in his new headquarter.⁴⁰⁹ Earlier accounts on the warlord were exaggerated here.

The VOC delegate Moor Piero visited Trunajaya in a Surabayan “little bamboo house” half a year earlier. He reported on the warlord’s inability to bring tribute to the Sunan and his clash with the Makassarese. Both clues of stubbornness and cruelty prevail. Trunajaya kept the embassy waiting for many days, and is offended by the demanding VOC letter that does not pay due respect to ‘a ruler descending from Majapahit kings’. The warlords explains how he cannot leave “since I have no-one to whom I can trust my realm to, at which moment ... two cut-off Makassarese heads were brought in, which [Trunajaya] beheld, saying: these heads belong to folk, whom I provided and cared for, because they are people of my brother, still since they resisted and dishonoured my aids, I was forced to treat them in this manner”.⁴¹⁰ One of Trunajaya’s former lords illustrates his vicious nature further. Trunajaya had murdered his stepson and molested his grandchild. His daughter -wife and mother of both victims- speaks to Speelman for revenge. The Admiral is struck by the ‘salient hatred’ reflected in “her eyes when his name is mentioned”.⁴¹¹

Religious fervour was added to the list when Couper met the warlord near Surabaya two months later. The VOC man ensured the admiral “would offer him so many benefits as justice and capability could allow” in case he would recognize the Sunan as “his just lord and sovereign” and return to Madura. Trunajaya would consider leaving Java, but refuses to recognize a lord who is not

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.: 779-780.

⁴⁰⁸ The quote is roughly translated from: ““bij dat geheele volk niet onbemint te wezen, omdat hij over deselve wildadig was”. Ibid.: 780

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.: 781- 782.

⁴¹⁰ The quotes are translated from : “bamboes huysje”; and “mynen broeder onbietet my by hem te comen, en hoe kan ick by myn broeder gaan, daar ick niemant hebbe aen wie ick myne negryen toevertrouwen kan; onder welcke samenspraack aldaar in hunne tegenwoordicheyt twee affgekaptte Macassaerse hoofden gebracht wierden, welke de Panembaban aenschouwende, seyde by: dit syn hoofden van volckeren, die ick onderhout gegeven en goet gedaen hebbe, omdat sy volckeren van mynen broeder zyn, doch zy solcx verwerpene en myne weldaden met de voeten tredende, ben ick genootsaackt geworden haar soo te laeten onthaelen.” Moor Piero, “Letter XIV”: 83-93.

⁴¹¹ The quote derives from: “men dien haat uit hare oogen, wanneer se synen naem noemt, merckelyk kan sien”. Speelman, “Letter XXI”: 122.

entitled Sultan by Mecca. With a touch of irony, Couper pens down “similar discourses” followed “while three to four glasses of brandy were consumed”. The warlord’s religious claims were demeaned.⁴¹² No surprise then, that both his title of Panembahan and Sultan are ridiculed and the prophecies of praise objected. He might have been foretold to found a wealthy empire in Kediri, but has no personal control over Mataram, did not attract a lot of people to Kediri and cannot keep the Makassarese in check.⁴¹³

In his final report, Speelman collects bad impressions of his delegates to denounce Trunajaya’s trustworthiness in support of a hinterland campaign instead of lingering negotiations. Regret is expressed on the failed assassination attempts conducted thusfar by insiders, for the death of the warlord would have made the campaign “very easy”.⁴¹⁴ With the leader alive, Amangkurat II fears the people on Madura and in Kediri would “without doubts” allow him “to be an independent lord, without giving [the Sunan] recognition.”⁴¹⁵ The very attempts on his life brought out the worst of Trunajaya. The admiral’s tells how he kried three of his concubines and all his six till twenty-three servants and exiled his family near the Southern Sea of Java.⁴¹⁶

Luckily, an attack on Kediri will most likely result in the capture of the warlord and his treasures. The Sunan promises to use these spoils of war to pay off his war-debts to the VOC. Speelman figures this will encourage his troops “with the hope of bringing the loot home.”⁴¹⁷ Even if Trunajaya manages to flee again, benefits will be gained. He will never be able to take the bulk of the treasury and, more importantly, will have to leave his esteem behind too. Speelman predicts that due to such cowardness “his primary power will lose its appeal, nor [will he] retain any noticeable group of followers”. Either way, “bravery” and ‘God’s blessing’ will thus surely ‘crown’ the campaign with a “successful end”.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹² The quotes derive from: “hem zooveel gunst zou betoonen, als de regtmaticgheid en billykheid kon toelaten”; and “diergelyke discoursen meer, onder welken een glaasje brandewyn drie a vier weder gedronken werd”. His drunken talk is suggested to lead to a false promise to meet Speelman that afternoon. But the warlord does not show up; keeping the admiral standing in the cold. See Speelman, “Letter XIX”: 118-119.

⁴¹³ Speelman, “Letter XXIX”: 135-136.

⁴¹⁴ On the execution he states: “Een groot jammer; en waarlijk te beklagen zijnde dat de aanslagen door zijn Compangeran Sampan, tegens zijn leven gemaakt telkens of het tipje van de executie mislukt waren”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 782-783.

⁴¹⁵ The quote is derived from: “indien gevalle het gantsche eijland Madura , en al het volk dat van het zelve of Caderij waren zonder twijffel, hun bij hem zouden hebben gevoegt, en schijnt zijn hoogheijd onfeijlbaar vast, en zeker te stellen, dat hij hem al te getrouw is om zig van hem ’t ontrekken, en een heer op zijn zelve te wezen, zonder hem te willen erkennen”. Ibid.: 782-783

⁴¹⁶ The death of his son and the concubinage of his daughter is mentioned too. Ibid.: 782.

⁴¹⁷ Speelman is slightly skeptical about the offer of the Sunan: “’t gunt wel schijnt de huijt te willen verkoopen, eer de beer gevangen is”. The quote is translated from: “op hope van goede buijt te maken”. Ibid.: 783-784.

⁴¹⁸ The quotes derives from: “dat hij zig door deze tweede vlugt van zijn voorneemste kragt zoude komen t’ ontzenuwen, nog eenige bijzonderen aanhank blijven behouwden, vermits buijten twijffel dan inzonderheijd het gemeene volk alle ontzag en vreesse zouden verliesen, zullende dan onzes eragten zijn retraicte naar Madoura zoeken te maken, alwaar hij ook niet buijten de werelt, en wel te vinden zal zijn”; and “men verkrijgt geen groote dingen zonder dapperheijd en arbeid, en mag men vrijelijk gelooven, zoo God de Heere s’Compagnies wapenen genadelijk belieft te zeegenen, en zulke dit onderhandse werk, met een voorspoedig victorieus eijnde te kronen, dat de Compagnie daar bij niet weijnig zal komen te gewinnen”. Ibid.: 784-785.

The Makassarese war-bands are a second concern. Although Speelman does not want to elaborate too much on them, regret is expressed on the failed attempt to work together.⁴¹⁹ The Makassarese “acknowledge to be the Company’s subjects, and happily want to abide to its orders”, but “requested not to be persuaded to leave from Java to Makassar... before taking revenge on Trunajaya.” Speelman found the Sulawesians in the middle of a major conflict with the Madurese. Trunajaya had even kidnapped and likely poisoned Galesong’s wife and child, who were his own daughter and grandchild.⁴²⁰

But to the admiral these conditions are just excuses. Their promises of good behaviour “are not sincere”; even though they ceased bothering the VOC, plunder follows wherever “they reach or travel to” and inconsiderate on whether their victims belong to the Madurese or Amangkurat.⁴²¹ The warlord Galesong corresponded that “this happens without his awareness” and promises to punish the perpetrators.⁴²² Moreover, surveillance is very difficult due to his “small troop units ... who are always ready to drive off on their horses” and “who do not only need to take care of themselves, but also of their wives and children who were there with them”.⁴²³

These confessions, however, strike Speelman as “untruthful”. Reports of Sergeant Couper, the translator Annaihoda Subu and the informant Moor Hussein all demonstrate “that there is no other aim among this people, as to settle on this island...”. The admiral prefers to see the Makassarese as unwanted conquerors instead of a decentralized warforce, thereby disregarding the contrasting army structures of both parties.⁴²⁴ Speelman was certainly aware of the divergent warlords commanding the Makassarese, but he nonetheless insisted on their unity.⁴²⁵ It appears Speelman still treats them as the single army of Sultan Hassanudin faced a decade earlier. He complains about their half-

⁴¹⁹ He does discuss the informant send out to enquire on them. Ibid.: 785.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.: 786-787; and Speelman, “Letter XXX”: 143-144.

⁴²¹ The quote is taken from: “het geheele land dat zij maar bereiken en bereijns konden, te berooven , en ’t volk te schatten en te scheeren, zonder onderscheijt te maken of se onder Troenadjaaija nog sorteerden dan of ze haar weder aan de zijde des Sousouhoenans gevolgt hadden”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 786. Similar complaints would later be made by Couper on the Buginese fighting on Java. This time, ironically, the VOC themselves had brought them there, but their warlord Raja Boni appears to have lost control over them. See J. Couper, “Letter LXI (13 November, 1679).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 278-279.

⁴²² The quote derives from: “hoewel Glisson, en d’andere bevelhebbers altijt verklaart hebben dat dit buiten haar voorweten door het gemeene volk quam te geschieden”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 786. Similar statements were made in De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLV”: 208-209.

⁴²³ The quote derives from: “dat het zoo wel volkomen in haar vermogen niet was, hun onderhorig volk onder behoorlijke tugt en disciplune te houden nadien dezelve niet alleen haar eijgen onderhoud mosten verzorgen, maar ook mede vrouwen en kinderen die zij bij haar hadden.” Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 786. He made a similar comment in a letter in August 1677, see C. Speelman, “Letter XXVIII (4/5 August, 1677).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 135.

⁴²⁴ It is only during the previously mentioned attempt to exploit their internal discords that the military structure of the Makassarese is underlined. The quote is translated from: “datter bij dit volk in effecte geen andere opzigt is, als om haar zelven op dit eijland ... te vestigen”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 786.

⁴²⁵ Moor Piero reports, for instance, the sum up of Makassarese warlords given by Trunajaya. These were Karaëng Galesong, Bongon, Rupa, Lumu, Intje Hassan, Mupu, Tellolo and Datu Louadin. Further warlords of Malayan or Makassarese origin are: Dain Mainu, Aru Sium, Hadjie Bulubaulu and Intje Ladin. Some warlords are said not to cooperate with the other, as Intje Ladin whose only ally is Intje Soleman and his 60 followers. De Saint-Martin was aware of these schisms too. See Moor Piero, “Letter XIV”: 83-93; and I. De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLVII (12 June, 1678).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 211-212.

hearted attempts to fight the Madurese and their suppression of local lords. At the same time, he discovers how the Sunan bestows the Sulawesians with “grand titles” and promises of land lease.⁴²⁶

Apparently, Amangkurat did appreciate the promises of cooperation. The vision of alliance evidently contrasts between the VOC and many Mataram royals and courtiers. The *Memorie* exposes incommensurability between European expectations of definitive submission and Javanese acceptance of fragile and partial military support. Even Trunajaya was formally accepted as governor over half of Madura after his surrender and a few days before his death. The entitlement is not meaningless, for the warlord might have been murdered in rage not with aim. The intention to position him as local ruler fits the tradition of picking vassals and allies among the defeated enemy.⁴²⁷

Traditions of the VOC differed, and confused the Javanese. One of the Mataramese princes was, for instance, amazed at the VOC’s command to send all Makassarese back to Sulawesi; doubting whether such itinerant troops could be controlled. The admiral, however, had all intention to submit them: “the roving and robbing, of these enemies, that is but a packed together tractable and intractable people, divided into multiple parties, [that will] not cease nor stop... before we take our power to commit to a campaign, because even if we will chase them today, and not pursue them further than that, or guard our position, they will return the day after”.⁴²⁸

One warlord that keeps returning time and time again is Trunajaya’s right hand: Kajoran. Kabaijang reveals that he resides in the mountains of Totombo; “two days travelling from Kediri, where he has about 200 men with him, without involving or being concerned with anything but agriculture”.⁴²⁹ Kabaijang also heard Trunajaya and Kajoran divided the realm between the two, but this he judges unlikely since “Trunajaya obtained the entire treasury of Mataram for himself”; having brought the regalia to Kediri. This possibly made Speelman more willing to seek alliance with Kajoran. In support of this pursuit, he stressed the interest Amangkurat I had in taking Kajoran into his court,

⁴²⁶ Correspondance between Japara and Galesong was taken hold of, In it, the Makassarese warlord was allowed “tot permanente ingezetenen van zijn land ..., jaa ook daar en boven keuze van land strecken tot zijne bezittinge”. In other letters, requests were made to please to not attack villages belonging to the Sunan. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*, 787-789 and 794

⁴²⁷ Think of Sultan Agung sending submitted local lords to the court. See H. J. de Graaf, *De regering van Sultan Agung, vorst van Mataram 1613-1645, en die van zijn voorganger Panembahan Seda-ing-Krapjak 1601-1613* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1958). Couper, “Letter LXVI”: 295-296.

⁴²⁸ The quote is roughly translated from: “het loopen en stroopen, van dees genoemde vijanden, dat maar een t’saamgeraapt willig en onwillig volk is, in verscheijde parthijen verdeelt, niet en zal cesserebig ophouden, gelijk hier voren ter materie al geallegeert is, voor en aleer wij met onze magt ten principalen in campagne komen, want of wij schoon haar van daag weg jagen, en niet voort vervolgen, of posthouden, zoo keerense morgen wederom”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 810. Notice that Speelman’s reference to “multiple parties” does not preclude his presumption of facing a single minded force. See also Couper, “Letter XVI”: 106; and Speelman, “Letter XLI”: 180-182. Couper, “Letter XVI”: 106.

⁴²⁹ The quote is translated from: “twee dag reijzen van Cadierij, daar hij ontrent 200 man bij hem hadden, sonder zig ergens met te moeijen, of met te bekommeren, als met de landbouw”. Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 780.

which he declined back then due to “suspicion” and “fear [that] it was not [a] sincere [offer]”. This misunderstanding led to his rebellion, but could surely be rectified.⁴³⁰

In other parts of the text, however, the admiral is hypothesizing how Kajoran is ordering his troops from afar and seeks to empower his younger brother, not himself, though conquering the Pasisir so the rest of Java “will follow”. Religious deception is used to reach this aim. The admiral writes that they believe “God and his Prophet will never bless the Javanese land again, as long as the kaffers or unbelievers, the ... Company’s power and servants, will be accepted there”. It is a message “which can be easily taught to this foolish people, especially when it is told by a person that is ... renowned throughout the land as being so much holy as this Raden Kajoran” and his “creatures and temple priests, that continuously roam through the entire country”.⁴³¹

Still, the people “already start to see and recognize that [Kajoran’s] promise of invincibility does not suffice for the Dutch guns” and that his stooges are “immediately abusing the women and the daughters”. This shows they are all “the biggest thugs of the world”, no matter whether Kajoran falsely rejects the rapists as rotten apples that lacked “rigid trust in their prophet”.⁴³² All in all, Speelman can thus not make his mind up about the man, but moves from tempting forgiveness to full rejection and back again. As an opponent, Kajoran remains depicted as a devilish figure; usually purely evil but at the same time hard to grasp hold of.

The reader gets the impression Speelman thought similarly about the Javanese in general. He complains “how great his care has continuously been, to, wherever possible, take away the distrust of these suspicious people ... but this has not been as fruitful inlands as I had wished”.⁴³³ No wonder, given the “enormous greed and avarice, which is a perfectly familiar Javanese deficit”.⁴³⁴ Tasks are not completed due to “lollygagging in the Javanese fashion”, showing “how little one can or may expect of the execution by these Javanese, for no presumptions can be made on it.”⁴³⁵ Nor can their

⁴³⁰ The quote is translated from: “Troenadjaaja, den gantschen Mattaramsen buijt alleen genooten”. Ibid.: 780. See also Speelman’s skepticism on this deviation on folio 874 and 845.

⁴³¹ Notice how Speelman uses the word kaffers not *kāfirs*. The quotes are translated from: “Godt en haren propheet, het Javaanse land nooit weder zeegenen zal, zoo lang de caffers of ongeloovige, de nooteerende s’Compagnies magt en dienaren, daar in gedooft komen te werden”; “dit slegte volk zeer ligt is wijs te maken, bijzonderlijk als het afkomt van een persoon die door dit gantsche land, nu nog meer als voor heenen gereputeert wert voor zoo grooten heijlig, als dezen Radeen Cadjoran of Panambahan Rama”; and “creaturen en tempelpriesters, die continueel het gantsche land door, en weer doorloopen”. Ibid.: 874-876.

⁴³² The quotes are translated from: “dog zij beginnen nu al te zien en te bevinden dat zijn verzeekeringe van de kragteloosheid der Nederlantse geweeren zoo vast niet gaan”; “misbruijkende al meteen de vrouwen en de dogters”; “de grootste fielden van de werelt zijn”; and “dat zij geen vast vertrouwen op hare propheet gehad hebben”. Ibid.: 875-876.

⁴³³ The quote derives from: “zijnde u Edelen alle andere officieren, die kennisse van zaken hebben volkomen bekent, hoe grootelijke het van mijne zorge continueel geweest is, om waar ’t mogelijk uijt dit wantrouwige volk alles diffidentie weg te nemen, en inplaatse, een goed vertouwen te stabileeren, maar het en is egter binnen s’lands nog van zoo veel vrugt niet geweest, als ik wel hadde gewenscht, en zulke moet nog al door u Edele met alle kragt gearbeijd werden, om naar uijterste vermogen daar in te avanceren, als zijnde een zake van groote consideratie, en importantie...”. Ibid.: 754.

⁴³⁴ The quote is translated from: “grootte gierigheid, en hebzugt, ’t gunt genoegsaam een familiaar Javaanse gebrek is” . Ibid.: 765.

⁴³⁵ The quotes are translated from: “lanterfant en na de Javaanse wijze”; and “hoe weijnig men zig van ’t onderigt deze Javanen kan, en mag dienen, want daar op gantsche weijnig staat te maken zij”. The latter complaint was made after ambiguous Javanese promises on supplying horses turned out of little value. Ibid.: 774-775.

rulers be trusted: for good leadership “is not regarded” and “ministers” constantly challenge the sovereign.⁴³⁶

All in all, the narratives in the *Memorie* focus much on alliances, legitimacies and the preparations for campaigning. The stress authors as Ricklefs put on contracts and profit motives takes up only a small part of the content. Contracts do certainly feature within the *Memorie* and interest in their long-term benefits is uttered. After the war is settled, a bustling trade and reimbursing taxes are believed to lie ahead. Whole sections of the text are reserved for the trade potential of the island. The delivery of money, rice and wood all spring to attention, as does the recognition of state borders, trade posts and Batavian subjects; especially the non-Javanese traders.⁴³⁷ Protest against growing autonomy of VOC commerce by certain courtiers and regional leaders is not overlooked, but the Sunan is just expected to settle such matters.⁴³⁸

The attention for contracts is only natural; it was one of the most basic developments that needed to be conveyed to Batavia. Any march to Kediri was expected to eventually yield treasuries, taxes and higher commerce. Still, Speelman is not left daydreaming about such bright futures. He cares about the military operation itself too. For that very reason, most of the document is reserved for the ways and means to muster the required troops, keep them under surveillance and make them submit to Amangkurat. These enquiries go much further into unravelling the Javanese military labour market than the efforts to resolve the ‘Dutch dilemma’ described by Ricklefs.

b. Anthonio Hurdt

On the second May of 1678, Hurdt was asked to lead the VOC army in East Java. Two months later, two resolutions were accepted. One added 1.400 men to the total force of 1.100. The other selected Hurdt as the new admiral, backed up by Tack, Muller and Wesdorp as chief military officers. Initially a short march from Surabaya was planned, yet the Sunan wanted a long one to reconquer Mataram’s hinterland and thereby bolster his forces. This strategy of winning back former subordinates indeed worked.⁴³⁹

After a tumultuous advance filled with desertions, alignments and battles, Kediri fell on the 25th of November. In the aftermath, the motley troops immediately ransacked the town. As Kediri lay pillaged, so did the army fall to pieces. A dreadful return was to await the remaining forces, hindered by disease, swamps and bad weather. Hurdt’s campaign certainly was a tough one. Surprisingly, his

⁴³⁶ The quote is derived from: “maar daar op en wert bij deze vorsten, int minst geen agt geslagen”. Ibid.: 777 and 805

⁴³⁷ Ibid.: 799, 808. 810-814, 814- 825, 827, 842-843, 852-860, 880-881, 884-889 and 892-902.

⁴³⁸ All other issues are naturally left to the VOC to resolve. See *ibid.*: 816-817.

⁴³⁹ Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 34, 40, 41; and A. Hurdt, “Letter LII (2 September, 1678).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 217-218. At arrival Hurdt requested additional troops from Batavia, see I. De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLVIII (25 June 1678).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 214; and A. Hurdt, “Letter LI (11 August, 1678).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 216.

previous career did hardly tie in with the difficulties faced here. In fact, he neither operated on Java or with warriors.⁴⁴⁰ Why, then, was he selected for hunting down Trunajaya?

A significant reason is the rejection of this post by De Saint-Martin. Speelman had already penned down the 'Memorie' for this officer when it turned out leading the campaign did not fit his agenda. Other high officials like Willem van Outhoorn, Facob Camphuys and Jacob Pits, equally refused the offer. Hurdt thus was the last resort for a mission aimed to "increase the Company's honourable reputation, recover the Susuhunan, tranquillity of the unrest and troubled lands, [and the] silencing and eradication of the insurgent rebels".⁴⁴¹ He was granted autonomy in dealing with the Sunan and obtained command over all "chief merchants, captains, merchants, ship captains, lieutenants, lower merchants, fenriks, postmen, lesser officers, soldiers, sailors, Javanese, Malayans, Balinese and all other indigenous servants and subjects of the Company".⁴⁴²

A collection of sources on Hurdt's campaign is available. Central is the 240 page account written by his secretary Johan Jurgen Briel. Other material consists out of letters and resolutions. Even though merely an assistant, Briel himself was an interesting figure too. He, in fact, served the subsequent two admirals as well, and even took over when admiral Couper fell ill and could no longer supervise the capture of Trunajaya. In the next two years, he participated in the campaigns against Pangéran Puger and the 'bandit' Namrud, during which he himself diseased.⁴⁴³

Despite Briel's activities afterwards, he appeared to be unknown while penning down Hurdt's offensive. No record of him can be found preceding 1678 and he left few personal marks in the campaign narration. His texts hence seem to reflect Hurdt's view on the war, while Briel remains the silent scribe. Sometimes Hurdt is quoted directly; at others his impressions are paraphrased. But the general perspective on troop alliances and events seems his most of the time. Other important assistants were taken over from Speelman -like Couper or several translators- and again mainly provided information rather than explicitly shaping the admiral's reports.⁴⁴⁴

Hurdt himself is first mentioned when arriving in Batavia on the 22th of July 1652. Soon after, he was send to Ambon to work as a secretary. From 1657 till 1661, the man functioned as the head of Lontor.⁴⁴⁵ In subsequent years, he would take position in Ambon, Banjarmasin, Timor and Banda.

⁴⁴⁰After receiving the position of 'admiral', complaints were heard about his civil background and him "equally being not so strategic". Notice, however, that Speelman and Van Goens equally lacked these experiences during their first campaigns. The quotes are translated from "en ook zoo krygskundig niet". See De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 37.

⁴⁴¹ The quote derives from the VOC authorisation presented on the ship 'Zilversteyn' that would take Hurdt to East Java. It is translated from Dutch: "tot vermeerderingh van Comps. loffelycke reputatie, herstellingh van den Sousouhouanangh, tranquilliteyt van d' ontruste ende getroubleerde landen, demping ende uytroeyinge van de ruutinerende rebellen". See Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 36 and 93-96.

⁴⁴² The quote derives from Van Goens mission statement and is translated from Dutch: "oppercoopliden, Capitajns, coopliden, schippers,lieutts., ondercoopliden, vaendrighs, stierlieden, mindere officieren, zoldaten, matroosen, Ja vanen, Maleijers, Baliyers en alleandere Inlandse onderdanen en subjecten van de Compe." Ibid.: 95.

⁴⁴³ De Graaf, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: VIII; and idem., "Gevangenneming".

⁴⁴⁴ Some commanders were also known as "fluent among the Javanese"; Willem van Buitengem was one of them. See Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 51 and 148.

⁴⁴⁵ And the end of his service, Hurdt's wife passed away, but he remarried sometime after.

Hurdt was thus attached to the Eastern archipelago, not the western one. De Graaf stresses how he managed to overcome his limited knowledge on Java through “a cautious, controlled and wise generalship”.⁴⁴⁶

Earlier negotiations with the Moluccan lords and residents might have prepared him more than De Graaf expects, however. Judged from the cover, his regent accounts are mainly about agriculture, commerce and construction. But underneath lay deeper interest in local hierarchies or the remains of them. He discusses the surveillance of *orang kaya* (‘rich men’) to avoid them doing damage wandering around.⁴⁴⁷ Or he stresses to his sergeant to find “experienced natives” to occupy a forest of “large and ripe” bael or *maja* trees.⁴⁴⁸ These comments illustrate more extended associations with the Moluccan denizens aimed to use their brawn and control potential rebels.

Similar associations were apparent during his campaign in Central and East Java. Not the least, they occurred among the fractions of the VOC army itself. Four branches of infantry marched: those of Captain Tack, Van Renesse and Mulder, Bastinck and Hurdt himself. Their routes are shown on picture nine. The first started with 385 men, amongst whom 147 Europeans, 70 Mardijkers, 116 Balinese and 52 special troops with no ethnic moniker. Van Renesse and Mulder operated 308 soldiers: 103 Europeans, 24 Mardijkers, 97 Balinese, and 48 Batavian Javanese.⁴⁴⁹

Hurdt headed 158 Europeans, 58 Mardijkers, 105 Balinese, 28 “Ambonese and Makassarese”, 288 Batavian Javanese, 45 Makassarese⁴⁵⁰, 12 “indigenous soldiers” and 12 additional staff members. Under his command, several European subordinate officers led the European VOC legion and a small part of the Asian one: Isaac De Saint-Martin, Aernout Wesdorp, Martinus van Ingen, Andries Hartman and Pieter Craan.⁴⁵¹ The other columns depended more on Asian lords.

The indigenous commanders stood shoulder to shoulder with the European officers. During the reorganization of the army the following lieutenants were counted: van Zeelst (58 Mardijkers), Marcus Mendonza (107 Mardijkers), Bagus (47 Ambonese), Alexander Maquelij (54 Ambonese), Care Montoelij⁴⁵² (73 Makassarese). Next to them were the captains: Captain Tiben (105 Balinese), Captain Kago Mataram (118 Batavian Javanese), Captain Wisa Praija (87 Javanese), Captain Naija

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.: 52.

⁴⁴⁷ As Hurdt says: “om voor geen quade treck van die landt laten bedugt te wesen”. A. Hurdt, “Memorie door den gouverneur Hurdt van Banda op sijn afscheid aen sijner vervanger de heer gouverneur Willem Maetsuijker ter handen gestalt, in dato 16 April 1672.” Nationaal Archief; 1.04.02; 1287: 909-910. As Hurdt says: “om voor geen quade treck van die landt laten bedugt te wesen”.

⁴⁴⁸ In this case only two natives were needed, but the request is exemplary. A. Hurdt, “Ordre en Instructie voor Cornelis van Dijk sergeant in de redout overburgh op Loeloe militerende omme hen in de administratie van sagou bosch aldaerna te reguleren dato 15 Julij 1672.” Nationaal Archief 1.04.02 1286: 592.


⁴⁴⁹ Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt: 76-77*. Van Renesse and Mulder army grew over time, as can be seen by the figures collected halfway the campaign; see *ibid.*: 170. For the difficulties see *ibid.*: 176.

⁴⁵⁰ Who are seen as part of the “Christian militia”. *Ibid.*: 115.

⁴⁵¹ Wesdorp would be killed in battle on the 15th of October. *Ibid.*: 115; and J.J. Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister gehouden in den optogt na Cadiety met Comps. Uijtgesette krijgsmagt, onder d'E. Heer Antonio Hurdt*: “Hebbendeden Commandeur oogq na gedane monsteringe de volgende compen. geformeerd en opgebracht.” National Archive, 1.04.02, 1351: 30-36.

⁴⁵² Also written as Corramansoelij.

Gattij (83 Batavian Javanese).⁴⁵³ All these Ambonese, Balinese, Mardijkers, Makassarese and Javanese warriors were part of the Asian legion, commanded by warlords settled in Batavia.



Picture 9 the marches of the four columns during Hurdt's campaign. See Ricklefs, *War, Culture and Economy*, 51.

Similar to the Batavian *kampungs* in which these troops resided, the ethnic composition of the military units was much more diverse than suggested in the Company's tables. A similar homogenizing description was given of the warriors joining the army later on or led by the Sunan. The latter, in fact, constituted the bulk of the fighting force. The VOC merely conscripted 683 soldiers, whereas Amangkurat II brought 4.000 men of whom 3.000 were armed with pikes. For those he selected four commanders: Tumënggung Narapaxa, Tumënggung Zitsianapura, Tumënggung Madura and Kjai Ranga. Together they were taken as the commanders of 'the Javanese'.⁴⁵⁴

In due time, the number of 'Javanese' would surge and implode. Only 1.000 "armed heads" were counted in the first week of campaigning, this rose to 13.220 just before invading Kediri. Round harvest, it would drop to 1.000 again. For the VOC, high aggregates appeared to fully determine the Javanese military potential. The depiction of the Mataram army often stresses their lack of weaponry or lacklustre involvement. Tumënggung Suranata's "Javanese army" from Demak is, for example, described as standing "orderly arranged with their pikes. Many guns were not to be found amongst

⁴⁵³ Notice that the troops were divided by their military titles; the 47 Ambonese of Lieutenant Bagus consisted out of 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 38 soldiers and the lieutenant himself. See Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*: "Hebbenden Commandeur ooc na gedane monsteringe de volgende compen. geformeerd en opgebracht, als." and "Vrijdag 25e November 1678.": 30-36 and 186-187.

⁴⁵⁴ Notice that the numbers Of VOC troops mentioned earlier do include unarmed troops too, hence the amount of soldiers being under 706. See Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 78-80 and 98-101.

them, but all the more standards, pennons, and flags of all kinds of colours".⁴⁵⁵ Keeping up sizeable numbers was thus judged important, for Hurdt mainly defined his or the hostile armed force by its quantity not its quality. Dutch soldiers lacked short, so numbers should be boosted with local allies and care should be taken to remain successful to ensure these allies will hold by.⁴⁵⁶

More than with the Asian legion, the uncertainties on the pejuang support riveted attention in the *daghregisters*. The texts describe how their alignment was offered, how Hurdt's column formation was changed due to their presence and how the warriors behaved during the campaign. New alliances of the other columns are equally reported whenever the separate convoys meet again. Usually numbers and leaders are listed to show how the army was reorganized.⁴⁵⁷ The anxiety on fluctuating and divergent troop compositions, however, comes across most clearly in the accounts of the fourth column. This army section was only called to action at the end of the campaign and needed to be gathered together by Bastinck.

Bastinck was asked to prepare an attack from the East. Unlike the other columns he had to muster his troops in the midst of war. What is more, he was assembling them in eastern Java and not in the safe haven of Batavia. Since he already was "in commission to the Makassarrese in Képer", Hurdt requested him to join the campaign on the 26th of September. Several orders were given "to make the [Javanese] regents of Surabaya, Giri and Grisik bring together a separate army, as to tear down the enemy as much as possible".⁴⁵⁸

Bastinck, moreover, was to "animate the Makassarrese to live up to their promises, to do their best against Trunajaya (...)".⁴⁵⁹ The 1667 contract of Bongaja was re-enacted, but uncertainties of support remained. At the last minute, unison was reached when Mas Tumapel -governor of Surabaya and stepson of the Giri priest- joined the column in front of Kediri. The appeal of this Walisanga descendant must have been notable. Multiple groups combined forces, including several Makassarrese lords led by Karaëng Galesong plus the 'Malayan' Entjik Subu, and Buginese and Towadjos ones under 'Aru Tsióng'. In total they numbered: 380 armed Javanese, 200 'Surabayan'

⁴⁵⁵ The quote is translated from Dutch: "Het Javaanse leger van Souranata stond mede in ordre gerangeerd met pijken gewapent. Veel schietgeweer sag men onder haar niet, maar des te meer standaerden, wimpels, en vaendels van alderhande coleuren." Ibid.: 87, 120 and 235-26.

⁴⁵⁶ Supreme Government, "25 November 1678." In *Dagh-register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India Anno 1678*, ed F. De Haan (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907): 681-682.

⁴⁵⁷ Throughout the campaign, the officers would alter the formation of their troops. Tack reunited with Hurdt on the 21st of September in Grompol and Van Renesse and Mulder and Bastinck would join near Kediri on the 31 of October. Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 91, 120 and 191.

⁴⁵⁸ This scheme also involved Jan d'Harde; "chief of Surabaya". The original quotes are: "sijn twee missiven afgesonden, d'een aan den coopman Jan d'Harde, opperhoofd tot Sourabaija, en d'ander aan den coopman Willem Basting in commissie aan de Makkassaren tot Cappar wesende" and "eenige ordres, ten eijnde de regenten tot Surobaija Gierij en Grisse, een apart leger op de been zouden brengen, om de vijand daermede soo veel afbreuk te doen, als eenigsints geschieden konde, en bijsondedijk in de districten van Zidajoe en Toeban." In addition, it was stated how "Item rakende de Makkassaren en Boegijs, in cas deselve op Surobaija magten verschijnen". Willem Bastinck was known to speak Malay well. Ibid.: 57, 129 and 169.

⁴⁵⁹ The quote is taken from: "dat voornd. Bastink de Makkassaren tot volbrenging van haare beloften animeeren moeste, om van gindse kant tegens Troenadjaja hun best te doen." Ibid.: 143.

carriers, 390 Makassarese and Buginese, 14 Dutch, 38 unidentified servants and Subu with his three guards.⁴⁶⁰

The army was not too stable, however. As I mentioned in chapter two, the Makassarese were soon to desert “without goodbyes”. Hurdt still made a final attempt to retrieve their support by sending a letter. Emphasis was put on the unfairness of breaking deals. Such a “sudden change of retreating ones dispatched people” must have been caused by “the malicious inductions of several vile men”; that is, the Bantenese and their peers. Hurdt asked Galesong to come back and “fulfil his promises”, so he can “welcome them as good friends”.⁴⁶¹

The futility of this request might have been inherent to Hurdt’s misunderstanding on the ‘Makassarese’ attaching mainly to contracts rather than leadership. Karaëng Galesong even appears to have realized this himself. After Trunajaya fled from Kediri to Malang, he made all kinds of false promises to deceive the VOC in assuming him to operate on their behalf. On paper he pledged to hunt down Trunajaya and return to Sulawesi, but in reality he was realigning with the Madurese warlord. Robberies and attacks secretly continued. Hurdt had learned his lesson and saw through the ‘deceptive’ letters.⁴⁶² Yet, his earlier surprise at the sudden Makassarese desertion shows this to have been a change of mind-set. Initially, the admiral was more inclined to take allies for granted and depend to them as ‘conscripted’ sections of his warforce.

The admiral’s flawed notion of supervising conscripted army units reflected on the nominators used to identify the pejuang troops. The administration of clearly demarked groups allowed a sense of control over them. Yet, the ethnic categories distinguishing sections of the army could be arbitrary. Tack’s men changed from Europeans, Mardijkers, Balinese and some unidentified servants mentioned above to 232 Europeans, 59 Mardijkers, 114 Malaysians, and 84 Ambonese and Makassarese during the regrouping with Hurdt. The difference in numbers is due to temporary backings, desertion and disease. The transformation of the moniker “Balinese” into “Malaysians” raises some questions, however. More of these conflicting descriptions are found in the reports.⁴⁶³ In such cases, the labels used might tell more about the bureaucracy behind them rather than the war-bands they mark. It appears Hurdt was satisfied as long as supposed homogenous units of pejuang

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.: 69-70, 135, 138, 188-190, 191-193 and 196.

⁴⁶¹ The quote derives from “Daeruijt soo schielijke veranderinge en het aftrekken uwer medegesondene volkeren voortgecomen zij, dan eenelijk dat ghij door quade inductien van eenige boose menschen daartoe misleijd zijt”. Ibid.: 135, 138, 188-190, 191-193, 196 and 214-217. For the attempts of the Bantenese to blacken the image of the VOC, see De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLVIII”: 214.

⁴⁶² After failing to notice the intentions of eight Bantenese ships” himself, Hurdt was informed on the attempt of the Sultan of Banten to reunite Galesong with Trunajaya. Yet, he was equally told that Galesong “de Sulthans begeeren buijten kennisse van de Edele Compagnie en zijn broeder der Craijn Bitteij niet accepteeren, nog eenigsints daerin consenderen conde, dewijl het sijne heeren waren, want hij deze maaninge van sijn broeder om de Compagnie getrouwe te blijven, beloofd had, neerhalven geen leugenaar woude wesen”. Hurdt responded: “zoodat uijt allen desen wij zouden mogen besluijten, dat ghij lieden de compagnie slegts met goede beloften soekt te stillen, en in de slaep te wiegen tot ter tijd toe ghij uw wagtig hoopt te vinden, om deselvete wederstaan, en een eijgen Conickrijke in Java op te regten”. Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*: 261-262, 282-287 and 289-304.

⁴⁶³ The sudden “Ambonese and Makassarese” presence was likely a new alliance. Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 76- 81, 91, 98-101, 120, and 191.

troops could be emplaced in his military strategy. A classification of leaders and broad ethnic designations suited that purpose best.

Leaders and warlords are accentuated throughout the text. Be it to appellate specific war-bands or show esteem. When Suradikara perishes he is remembered for “his good services on Rembang”. Similarly the passing of Adipati Mandaraka -Amangkurat II’s right hand- is considered a ‘great loss’ for the Sunan. Even the Babad chronicles mention how the “admiral... was deeply impressed” by his death.⁴⁶⁴ Respected names as these are generally used to distinguish the “Javanese” aids. Examples are “Mangononang’s people” or “Tumenggung Mankojuda with his Javanese cavalry”.⁴⁶⁵ Names of warlords serve as adjectives to sections of troops and thereby imply certain origins of warrior units.

Similar categories can be found when opposing warriors are described.⁴⁶⁶ The elaborate story of Patrajuda illustrates the attention for the trajectories of warlords rather than war-bands. Biographical information functions to explain the troops mustered and attacks delivered. The journal refers to his birth in Grobogan, the former obedience of his father to Amangkurat I, how Patrajuda joined Trunajaya after the fall of the kraton, his “friendships” with other war lords, his flight to the mountains and his capture. In this narrative, the warlord’s troops are merely stated to be assigned to him, and to consist out of a certain amount of ‘men’. Apparently, Hurdt had no interest in questioning the captured Patrajuda on where his men came from or for what reason they were following him.⁴⁶⁷

Usually, most attention is paid to the names of the warlords and their origins. The retelling of the fall of Mataram is, for instance, filled with names of nobles. The information on the troops is vaguer. The forces of the Madurese commanders Wassingattij and Wiramenggala are described differently over time: be it “mixed people”, “1.000 men” or simply “hostile troops”.⁴⁶⁸ In his own words, Wiramenggala claimed: “we only have 1.000 men that can fight, 300 from Pangurit, 300 from Wira Baajja, and 400 from Raxa Baajja, all ready to run amok. The remaining force consists out of varying *negori* people [villagers] that do not know how to fight.”⁴⁶⁹ Even though the data might be

⁴⁶⁴ As is written down by the VOC: “waeraan sijn Hooghd. nae de presente gelegentheijd veel verliest, als zijnde geweest een goede raadsman, en van tamelijk ontsag”. Ibid.: 177, 195 and *Babad Tanah Jawi in proza*, ed. J.H. Meinsma and W.L. Olthof (The Hague: KITLV, 1874/1941): 197. This contradicts Speelman’s earlier complaints about his cowardness; but a change of heart might have occurred. See Speelman, “Letter XL”: 176.

⁴⁶⁵ Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 65 and 175-176.

⁴⁶⁶ These descriptions were partly based on informants but chiefly shaped by Hurdt’s discourse. Ibid.: 90- 91 and 109; Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*: 309-310.

⁴⁶⁷ Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*: “Relaas van een gevangen mantri van Troenadjaya gen(aam)d Patra Joeda”: 87-90.

⁴⁶⁸ The quoted words were translated from: “gedeelte volk”. Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 91, 112 and 194.

⁴⁶⁹ The quote derives from the following letter written by Wira-Menggala and translated by the VOC: “Desen brief comt van Wiera Mangala, en alle andere Madurese hoofden alhier aan Mangononaug en verdere Javaanse bevelhebbers met twee gevangens, die wij niet hebben willen dooden, maer met dese brief terugsenden. Soo ghijlieden lust hebt met mij twee à 3 dagen te speelen, 't is goed, wij sullen bij u comen. Wij hebben maar 1000 man, die vegten kunnen, 300 van Pangoerit, 300 van Wira Baaija, en 400 van Raxa Baaija, alle amokspeelders. De verdere magt is divers negorijsvolk, dat niet weet te vegten. Komt maar ooc met een gelijk getal van 1000 koppen aan! Wij willen met de geheele magt nu niet vegten, want al ons ander volk verlopen soude, maar wij sullen ons best doen, om al 't volq onder

skewed since the warlord was challenging the VOC, it does show an internal heterogeneity only hinted at by the Company's informants.

In the *daghregisters*, lesser known war-bands are simply distinguished as "Madurese enemies", "roaming gangs" or 'Javanese forces' be it with or without alliances with some "Makassarese".⁴⁷⁰ Contrasting to them are the "Kajorans". To all likelihood these forces were more 'Javanese' than those of the Madurese commanders. But the usage of the term for mystical warriors fifteen years after Kajoran's death, suggests an association with religiously motivated 'rebels' rather than ethnicities.⁴⁷¹ In either case, the labels carry wider expectations on the behaviour of the warriors.

When it comes to numbering these troops, similar broad strokes are drawn. The numerical indications are rounded off suspiciously for information usually based on rough guesses. Data on other phenomena -demographical, agricultural- suffer the same fate. The quantitative errors are thus not that particular. Yet, as far as war-bands are concerned, the figures do suggest a strong homogeneity due to single adjectives attached to them. References to a "Javanese force" of "6.000 heads", implies a uniform body of troops.⁴⁷² The VOC appears to consider them much more kindred than was the case. The 6.000 Javanese referred to above, for instance, likely belonged to Tuměnggung Mankojuda from Kegu who commanded miscellaneous forces from Semarang, Wates, Kegu and Pajang.

A similar bias is found in the description of Trunajaya's troops. It is only after the fall of Kediri, that Hurdt lays his hands on an extensive list of Trunajaya's forces. These were given to him by the defected Madurese Pangéran Sampang, and contain the surveyed size of the total army shortly before the attack on Kediri. No simplified division along the lines of 'Javanese' and 'Madurese' was present; instead ten kinds of Javanese and seven kinds of non-Javanese troops are distinguished.⁴⁷³ This list discloses a strict grouping of regional fractions: the Javanese are therefore not one, but many. Up till that point, the VOC intelligence had not truly grasped this diversity.

Beyond numbers, central characteristics of military units are discussed too. Certain attributes are usually ascribed to distinguished warrior groups. Pastimes and traits particular to certain 'ethnic' groups are mentioned every so often. The "free Makassarese [i.e. those without a Karaëng warlord]

Troenadjaja's gehoorzaamheid te doen houden. Wanneer d'Hollanders met hun schietgeweer op ons aankomen, soo doen se geen groote schade; of se schoon nu en dan een quetsen of dooden, daar en is niet veel aan gelegen. Ratou Troenadjaja sal evenwel d'overhand houden, en die tegens hem veegt, sal tegenspoed en ongeluk te verwagten hebben". Ibid.: 153.

⁴⁷⁰ Ethnicity is thus taken as a binding force. Ibid.: 115, 116, 121 and 203.

⁴⁷¹ The quote is translated from: "Cadjorangers". Ibid.: 101.

⁴⁷² Ibid.: 116.

⁴⁷³ 14.547 heads were counted: 7.600 Madurese, 2.000 Panaraga Javanese, 1.000 Kertasana Javanese, 200 Ngandjuk Javanese, 100 Patjeh Javanese, 250 Berbek Javanese, 1.000 Blitar Javanese, 500 Kalangbret Javanese, 1000 Rawa Javanese, 500 Nirmala Javanese associated with Kajoran. The additional troops were even more diverse: 200 men of Wira Saba, 40 Malayans, 50 Makassarese under Galesong, 70 Balinese delegates from Buleleng, 30 Bantene and 7 European "deserters". Ibid.: 252-253.

did not rarely hunt for deer and animals while sitting on their horses with their assegais".⁴⁷⁴ The "Demak people" are called for building boats.⁴⁷⁵ And "our Javanese" are observed to "gain entertainment" from "burning emptied villages".⁴⁷⁶ Specified characterizations like these contrasted with the condemnation of gambling done by "Europeans or natives" alike or the drinking of arak by the 'Asians'.⁴⁷⁷ But such general references are never as abundant as those to 'ethnic' traits. It can be wondered whether these behaviours were chiefly shaped by ethnicity, rather than military fraternization.

Despite the prejudices behind VOC characterizations, 'ethnic' ties were certainly present; even across frontiers. A warning of one of Trunajaya's Malayan soldier to his peers illustrates this. He was calling two acquainted Malaysians serving the VOC "that they should be beware, as there will be an attempt to raid [the VOC camp], with amok games and fires".⁴⁷⁸ In this case, concerns for the safety of associates hindered tactical ones; Hurdt came to know about the assault and could take the appropriate measures. Both the strength and weakness of ethnic ties is demonstrated here. Trunajaya's Malaysians cared more about their ethnic peers than their warlord, Hurdt's Malaysians the opposite. Ethnic rivalries were observed too: Hurdt had to keep the Makassarese and the Buginese apart.⁴⁷⁹ What, in the end, mattered most to the Company was performance not ethnicity.

Besides the ethnic labels, the Company also categorized their troops according to reliability. Two kind of allies existed: the "engaged" and the "non-engaged" ones. A distinctive treatment of these groups applied. Whereas the first were free to roam, the latter were kept under strict surveillance. It was a contrast between respect and suspect that determined both trust and tactical treatment.⁴⁸⁰ Sometimes the Asian soldiers could evade wary eyes. When the "free Makassarese" were caught looting Javanese horses, for instance, their leaders promised "to carry responsibility like all the [other troops]".⁴⁸¹ Repercussions and close observation was thereby avoided through confirming recognition of the VOC rules.

Later during the campaign, similar agitations did lead to action. A ban was emplaced due to "the multiple complaints, uttered by Mandaraka and others about the Balinese, Makassarese etc.

⁴⁷⁴ The quote is translated from "De vrije Macassaren maakten niet weijnig jagt op de hertebeesten en varkens met hunne hassegaijen te paerd sittende." See also Hurdt, 232. Hassagaijen is an unusual spelling of Assagaijen or assegais in English. This word usually refers to slim hardwood spears or javelins with an iron tip. Ibid.: 134.

⁴⁷⁵ The quote is translated from "Damackse volk". Ibid.: 206.

⁴⁷⁶ The quote is derived from "hebbende I onse Ja vanen ondertusschen met het verbranden van de ledige dorpen hun vermaek genomen." Ibid.: 214.

⁴⁷⁷ The quote is translated from "Europaiaen ofte Inlander". Ibid.: 264; and Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*: 263.

⁴⁷⁸ The quote derives from: "Den treijnmeester van Vliet, mede present zijnde, verhaald dat een Maleijer van d'oversijde der rivier aan twee van onse Maleijse zoldaten, die van sijne kennis waren, toegeroepen hadde: dat wel op hoede mogten wesen, alsoo onderstaan zoude werden, ons bij nagt te overvallen, met amock speel en en branden." Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 177.

⁴⁷⁹ Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*: 268-271.

⁴⁸⁰ The trusted Mardijkers were, for instance, applied as a direct back up for Dutch soldiers, where the Batavian Javanese were kept at bay. See Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 210.

⁴⁸¹ The quote is translated from Dutch: "zoo wel als andere gehoorsamlijk te dragen." Ibid.: 83-84.

“because of stealing Javanese horses by day and night, which led to several disputes”. All groups were demanded to stick to their section, be it on march or in camp; and their chiefs were to prohibit their warriors to pass further than a musket shot from their respective flag standard.⁴⁸² From the 22nd of September on, more care was thus taken to segregate the army in subsections, as to avoid bad blood between the motley gangs of fighters with different loyalties.

The distinction between dedicated and less dedicated soldiers comes to the fore in the descriptions of battle scenes. Troops standing firm are praised as “magnanimous” and “brave” whereas defeat is often associated with chaotic battle formations and lacking discipline. Warriors in retreat are similarly depicted as unreliable. And carriers are bemoaned for throwing off their baggage and shiftily disappearing. In contrast, the indigenous themselves explain how chaos sprang from wounded or even killed commanders.⁴⁸³

Most fight were skirmishes, only the traverse over the river Brantas and the attack on Kediri involved large amounts of troops and artillery.⁴⁸⁴ Still, similar narratives are used for small and big battles. They usually start with a description of the opposite troops, the men hurt or fled during battle and the pursuit of withdrawing enemies. At times, particularities of the opposing forces are noticed. The colourful banners waving in the air, the gongs rang to commence the encounters and the crescent shape of the battle lines all illustrate the attacks. Leadership and tactics are also commented upon. Yet, they are not scrutinized. When it comes down to it, the depiction of battles concerned what was won and who was brave.⁴⁸⁵

The appearance of enemy warlords caught the eye too. Once, Trunajaya himself was seen on the battlefield wearing his ‘priestly’ black clothes and a white *pajong*.⁴⁸⁶ Particular offensive tricks are equally noticed. Madurese assailants on horseback could be recognized by the “way they wore their long hair” while storming through the rear guards like “wild people, the hair hanging in their face, and protecting the heads with a lance carried by hand”. A captured Madurese even identified one of the assailants as Antadersana of Arosbaja, simply by recognizing his kris.⁴⁸⁷

Religion could be just as characteristic and cutting as krisses, but that was hardly recognized by the VOC. Admiral Poolman’s warning on the Makassarese attempt to win over the Buginese

⁴⁸² The quote is translated from: “Op de veelvuldige klagten, die door Mandaraka als andere gedaan wierden over de Baliërs, Maccassaren &a., wegens het steelen van der Javanen paerden bij dag ende nagt, waeruijt eenige onlusten stonden te rijsen”. Ibid.: 122-124.

⁴⁸³ The quotes are taken from the account of the battle near Tukum on page 166-167 referring to the “standvastigheid” and “dapper” repel of the “Captain of the Balinese” and the carriers who were attacked on the 10th of November “en ‘t hasenpad gekoosen hebben” (philologically this could also mean just fleeing in itself but since Briel stresses their complete disappearance it appears to mean fleeing cowardly). Brave conduct is even awarded with medals and promotions in the case if the Mardijker and soldier whi measured the water level of the Brantas under heavy fire. See *ibid.*: 161, 166-168, 176, 184-185, 198-199, 204, 211-212, 223-226, and 237-239.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*: 223-226 and 237-239.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*: 212.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*: 232

⁴⁸⁷ The quotes are translated from: „dragt van haar lange hajir” and “als dolle menschen, 't hair in 't aangesigt hangende, en d'hoofden schuttende.” *Ibid.*: 160-161.

warriors comes closest. They prayed that “He will strengthen your and our hearts, so we will stand together with all out power that derives from our religion; for God’s words in the book of our prophets [tell] the pagans (Kāfirs) should be rejected [and killed] by us”.⁴⁸⁸ To Hurdt, the religion of the Makassarese is insignificant. He limits himself to observing certain troops having ties with Kudus and Giri, without giving further comment.

The most explicit remark on spiritual devotion of these war-bands merely stresses how they would flee to Panembahan Giri in dire straits. Panembahan Giri’s role as an arbiter is stressed, however: it is mentioned how Arua Cartasan wanted to subject to the lord for refuge and how Trunajaya send money to him to march through his lands.⁴⁸⁹ Hurdt and his colleagues seemingly found more ease in identifying troops by their origins than their creed. Whereas only the secular actions of the Islamic lords are discussed.

The accounted correspondence between Amangkurat II and the Bantenese forms the exception. The letter of Sultan Ageng reminds “his young brother” the Sunan “that God grants you life and made you; strength derives from one’s own God, as does weakness”. Sultan Ageng saw a Sunan ‘obedient’ to the VOC, who did not follow the path of his ancestors “because your life and religion as well as your realm contradict each other”.⁴⁹⁰ The Sultan can only pray he would realign with his Muslim brothers so “God will bless and support you and retrieve your thrown”.

Although this letter was left uncommented in the VOC’s administration, the personal religious struggle of Amangkurat II did surface later on. At first, the Sunan appears to reject Ageng’s appeals as attempts to vassalize him and raise hostility towards him among the Makassarese and Madurese.⁴⁹¹ Yet, soon after, he suddenly “loses trust and says, among other things, that after restoring his realms, he wants to hand over governance to his son, to end his life in Mecca”.⁴⁹² The image of a secular overlord shattered. But only for a moment, for the VOC forced his way back to power; their ideal leader was anything but a Hajji, nor were the desired warriors *ghazis*.

Having treated the identification of warriors, it is time to consider how the Hurdt perceived their alliances and desertions. After all, the temporality of Asian alliances comes through most clearly while these topics are treated. One returning theme in Briel’s reports is the abasement of local

⁴⁸⁸ C. Poolman, “Letter LIV (27 March, 1679).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 265-266.

⁴⁸⁹ The quote derives from: “Seggen was, dat de vijandelijke troepen, indien se quamen onder te leggen, van sin waren hun onder den panambahan Gierij te begeven.” Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 150 and 193-194.

⁴⁹⁰ The quotes derive from: “gy gedenkt dat Godt u in de weerelt het leeven verleent en u heeft laten voorteomen; de sterckte komt van dien eygen Godt zo ook de zwackheyt” “omdat uw leeven en geloof als ook uw staat nu tusschen beyde sehynt te staan”; and “Soo sal Godt u ook zeegegen en bytaan en uw troon bestendigh”. Sultan Ageng, “Letter XLVI (22 April, 1678): Translaat van den brief, dien de Banthamse Sultban Agon, geschreven heeft aan den Sousouhounangh Amancourat Siunepatty Ingalaga.” In *De Opkomst Van*: 209-211. Ageng’s son Haji avoided this religious language, as can be expected from his support of the VOC, see Sultan Haji, “Letter XXXIX (around November, 1677): Translaatbrief van den Sulthan Abou Nazar tot Bantam aan den Zousouhounan Amangh Courat Senopatti Ingalaga.” In *De Opkomst Van*: 170-171 and 173.

⁴⁹¹ J.J. Briel, “Letter LIII (3 April, 1679).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 263-264.

⁴⁹² The editor quote is translated from: “geheel ontmoedigd en zegt o. a. dat na de herstelling van zijn rijk, hij afstand wil doen van de regering ten behoeve van zijn zoon, om zelf zijn leven te Mocha te eindigen.” Couper, “Letter LXI”: 278-279.

leaders to the Susuhunan, sometimes after battles or breakthroughs.⁴⁹³ Two hundred seventy village heads (*patinggis*) would, for example, submit after the successful traverse over the Brantas river. Many more followed when Kediri fell.⁴⁹⁴ One can find these submissions throughout the campaign, however.

Local allies assisted in multiple ways; from clearing roads to laying sieges.⁴⁹⁵ From time to time, Hurdt makes explicit requests for pejuang forces to join his column.⁴⁹⁶ Most often, however, the approaches came from the warlords or rulers themselves; be it to offer warriors or show gratitude. Already at the third day of the campaign, Hurdt is told how Jagaputra, “a subaltern leader of Kudus”, desires to again swear “faithfulness to his nobleness” Amangkurat II and his “great governor” Martapura. A year earlier, he had submitted to Speelman after a short desertion to the Madurese side.⁴⁹⁷ The presence of the new Sunan, however, urged a reaffirmation. Subjection to the marching king had a character of its own. But affiliations were not only reached at his appearance.⁴⁹⁸

Striking is the letter received from Ngabéhi Dipanegara, who swore loyalty to the Sunan, but could not escape Kediri. It “was impossible, that I would get out of Kediri, because the Madurese guards are all around me”.⁴⁹⁹ Dipanegara conveys details on the hostilities between the Makassarese and the Madurese as to show he does not have “two lords, but one, the Susuhunan”.⁵⁰⁰ Still it is to be doubted whether his dedication was all-conveying. The higher nobility often bet on two horses. Even Trunajaya’s own uncle did so.

Exiled to a forest of predators and evil spirits (Lodaja), he was hoping to “get out of his banishment”. Since the Sunan was not yet able to bridge the river Brantas, he would wait for him to “cross over” before “joining his Majesty”. The occasion was there since “the Madurese, that were otherwise around him all the time, are now roaming here and there.” In the meantime, he planned to send his 200 men to plunder and loot “to the detriment of Trunajaya’s followers”.⁵⁰¹ But his proposal only bore fruit after the fall of Kediri. Again, the conditional abasement was a very

⁴⁹³ At the end of the campaign the soldiers of different backgrounds shortly abuse several abasing villagers or victims of gambling as their slaves. Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 85-86, 127, 129, 143-145, 153, 155, 164, 187, 193, 213-214, 218, 226-227, 230, 247-251, 265-268 and 273; and idem., *Vervolgh Dagregister*: 304-305..

⁴⁹⁴ Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 230, 242.

⁴⁹⁵ Arja Sindu-Redja, the governor of Keçlu, was assisting Tack to clear roads. Aroe Palakka -Speelman’s main ally during the attack on Makassar- jumped in as a back up after the fall of Kediri. His Buginese raised their krisses on the alun-alun of Japara as “oath of trust”. See *Ibid.*: 113, 117, 257 and 271-272..

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*: 156.

⁴⁹⁷ The quote is translated from Dutch: “hebbende sig doenmaels voor gem. zijn Edle. en den groot gouvr. Martapoera verootmoedigt, van dewelke ooc wegens zijne begane faute gepardonneerd was, weshalven nu bij zijn E. sig liet aandienen, om niet onbekend te wesen, presenterende, indien sulx begeerd wierde, den Eed van getrouwigheid noghmalen voor zijn E. af te leggen.” *Ibid.*: 85-86.

⁴⁹⁸ Due to the word ‘nobleness’ (in two abbreviations: Edle and E.) instead of Sunan this quote might refer to both Hurdt and Amangkurat II; it is quite plausible both were addressed by Jagaputra. *Ibid.*: 85-86.

⁴⁹⁹ The quote is translated from: “Het is onmogel[ijk], dat ik buiten Cadierij can geraeken, want de Madurese wagten sijn rondom mij .” *Ibid.*: 175.

⁵⁰⁰ The quote is translated from “Ik heb geen twee heeren, maar één, den Soesoehoenan. Het is onmogel[ijk], dat ik buiten Cadierij”. *Ibid.*: 175.

⁵⁰¹ The quote is derived from: “nu hoopte eens uijt sijn bannissement te sullen konnen geraeken”; “over de rivier soude comen”; “bij sijn Hooghd. Vervoegen”; “mitsgaders Troenadjaja allen afbreuk toe te brengen”; and “to the detriment of Troenajaya’s followers”. *Ibid.*: 178.

ambiguous one, leaving Hurdt to call the exiled royal a “good man” yet deceiving any expectation of direct assistance.⁵⁰²

Even whole communities opted for equivocal alliances. The Tubanese were well-known for it, having pulled the same trick with Sultan Agung. Before Hurdt crossed the river Brantas, the “residents of Tuban and its surroundings did not yet pick a side, not knowing, what kind of lord they will choose; it is not possible to rely on their reasoning”. It is only after traversing Brantas, that Hurdt obtained their support.⁵⁰³ This illustrates that local leaders expected achievements and advances before tying their people to an army.

If possible, spiritual agents could serve to negotiate requirements of alliance. Mas Wargadalem sent four “Javanese popes” after the Sunan failed to travel over the river Brantas. They stated “that they had 1.000 men under their guidance, with whom they were inclined to be with the Susuhunan, but that as long as the river was not crossed, it could not be expected to happen”.⁵⁰⁴ Such flexible pragmatism could be troublesome for the VOC. Still, Company sources were much less suspicious about the alignment of noblemen than those of their messengers: the “devil worshippers” and “priests”; the devils and saints.

Holy men would equally submit themselves. Five delegates from the sacred place Wanasalam announced their priest’s compliance which Amangkurat II accepted. The tomb guards of Kjai Ageng Séla -the proclaimed godfather of Majapahit- acted similarly.⁵⁰⁵ Briel’s descriptions of political and spirited concords differ slightly. The former are looked at pragmatically, the latter rather curiously. The chief of Wanasalam is, for instance, “deemed very holy [like most of his peers], which was shown by [the five delegates’] appearance, as the merely wore old patches on the body, the hair on the head was washed by each other, living so the Javanese say, a strict life”.⁵⁰⁶ Having said this, the arrival of “two sons of the Panembahan Giri with 400 armed Javanese and 100 carriers” was connected to the surrender of two major opponents. With a religious man so powerful as Panembahan Giri, recognition for political influences was much more pronounced.⁵⁰⁷

Another man respected for his political capabilities was Amangkurat II’s brother: Pangéran Puger. As mentioned earlier, Speelman even believed the union of both brothers’ forces would entail

⁵⁰² Ibid.: 178 and 198.

⁵⁰³ The quote is translated from: “De inwoonders van Toeban en daaromtrent staan nog tussen bejide, niet wetende, wat voor een heer dat se kiezen sullen, konnende op hare redenen geen de minste staat gemaakt werden”. Ibid.: 190.

⁵⁰⁴ The quote is derived from a lontor to “Dat 1000 man onder hem hadde, met dewelke seer inclineerdebij den Zoeseoehonan te wesen, maer dat soo lang niet over de rivier en waren, het beswaarlijk konde geschieden.” Ibid.: 213.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.: 112.

⁵⁰⁶ The quote is roughly translated from: “Tuan Ban bang die voor seer heijlig gehouden werd, gelijk meest alle deselve inwoonders de naem soadanig voeren, zulx aan dese lieden wel uijterlijk bleek, alsoo maar oude lappen om 't lijff dragen, 't hair op haar hoofd was door malcanderen gewassen, voerende volgens 't seggen der Javanen, een streng leven.” Ibid.: 109.

⁵⁰⁷ The quote is translated from: “twee soonen van den panambahan Gierij met 400 gewapende Javanen en 100 dragers aangekomen waren”. Ibid.: 232-233.

a rapid victory.⁵⁰⁸ Puger was reported as wanting to assist his disliked brother with 10.000 men. What is more, in a letter to Hurdt he expressed: “I shall humble myself and greet my brother like a poor beggar from Mataram” when “the Susuhunan Amangkurat would arrive in Logendèr”. Yet, he likely knew his sibling would not be able to reach the town.⁵⁰⁹

In reverse, Amangkurat II would request Puger for “500 horses, which are required for this army” and “his elephant” that had likely belonged to his father. Never would he get them.⁵¹⁰ Ironically enough, the only time Puger would send forces in the direction of the VOC army, was when he mistook his brother to have died and feared the Company would head to his capital.⁵¹¹ This makes it all too clear that his courtesy towards Amangkurat II was a mask of mere self-interest.

Puger’s correspondence with Hurdt shows he himself was equally tempting warriors. He explains how his Dipati Mangkuburni was heading to Bagelèn “to bring several rebels to devotion”.⁵¹² Likely, these belonged to the Makassarrese warlord Namrud, who posed a threat to his capital. Puger’s mask of self-interest was discerned over time. Captain Tack would later tell Hurdt “that Pangéran Puger was not sincere towards his brother the Susuhunan; in case he wanted to he was powerful enough to ruin Kajoran’s forces”. Hurdt even started fearing an alliance between the two.⁵¹³

Whenever alliances occurred, so did desertions. Even warlords needed to be replaced at times due to their betrayal.⁵¹⁴ Soldiers deserted most frequently, however.⁵¹⁵ After one week, six Europeans, four Balinese and one Javanese were already found absent. Around the same time, De Saint-Martin reports six deserters present in Trunajaya’s court, one of whom receiving the title Captain Agrajuda.⁵¹⁶ Not long after, Hurdt would express his concern on “the collapse of our militia, (...), which lacks people”.⁵¹⁷ Even the carriers appear to have regularly abandoned their position.⁵¹⁸

⁵⁰⁸ Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*: 752.

⁵⁰⁹ The quote is translated from: “Soo den Zoesoehoenan Amancoerat tot Lagoudeer aankomt, om na Cadierij te trekken, soo sal ik als een arm bedelaar van Mataram mij comen vernederen en mijn broeder begroeten.” The letter on its turn was translated from Javanese to Dutch by a VOC servant. Puger equally underlines his trust in Hurdt stating: “Heer Admiraal en sal de belooft van mijn overleden vader aan sijn Edele gedaan naekomen, soo waer als son en maen staan.” The coming decades would show shifting relations between the two, ranging from war to induction as the new Sunan. Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 102 and 106.

⁵¹⁰ Quote is translated from “500 paerden, waeromme dit leger benodigt was. Vorderende daerbeneffens zijnen oliphant”. Ibid.: 128.

⁵¹¹ Pangéran Panular spread this rumour, after which Puger decided to protect his border against a possible VOC invasion: “Poegar hadde 1000 gewapende Bagaleenders nevens 3500 Mataramse volkeren bij hem, waarmede hij de Hollanders, zoo se in de Mataram wouden komen, en die plaats innemen, dewijl sijn broeder niet meer in 't leven was, woude tegengaan, en verslaan. Sij hadden weijnig schietgeweer.” See Ibid.: 138.

⁵¹² The quote is translated from: “naer 't land van Bagaleen was vertrokken, om eenige rebellen tot devotie te brengen.” Ibid.: 105.

⁵¹³ The quote is translated from: “Capn. Tack was van sentiment, "dat pangeran Poegar geen opregt hart tegens zijnen broeder den Zoesoehoenan droege; indien hij wilde, was magtig genoeg de Cadjoranse vijanden te ruïneeren”. Ibid.: 118-119, 184.

⁵¹⁴ Leadership over separate companies were changed too. Vacancy was often the reason; officers were missing, had died or could even have betrayed the VOC army. See *ibid.*: 96, 98-101, 177.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.: 98, 115, 122, 127, 141, 144, 201-202, 206, 213-215, 219, 222, 229, 256 and 262-263.

⁵¹⁶ Captain Agrajuda is said to have resided in Batavia, have French origins and carried the name Lesage. See also Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 98 and 115. De Saint-Martin, “Letter XLIX”: 215.

⁵¹⁷ The quote is translated from: “het invallen van onse militie, die bij 't voortmarcheeren moesten gedragen werden, waertoe volck ontbrack”. Ibid.: 122.

⁵¹⁸ This is indicated by Adipati Manda-Raka being asked by Hurdt to find “genoegsame dragers” where there were sufficient earlier on. Ibid.: 127, 141 and 144.

Amangkurat II shared the admiral's worries, especially when the campaign halted in front of the river Brantas.⁵¹⁹ Deep and wide, the waterway posed difficult to traverse; certainly under heavy enemy fire from the eastern bank. Due to lack of food, casualties and the mere impasse; the Sunan feared "that his people would desert and abandon him".⁵²⁰ Indeed they did, but matters did not run out of hand. The campaign had not yet foundered so much as to cause massive abandonment. The VOC Sergeant De Saint-Martin warns for inactivity, however, for it will embolden the enemy and enable him "to draw in the general people".⁵²¹

A raft bridge would hopefully break the distrust. Yet, until it was constructed, temptation from the opposite shore easily undermined the Sunan's authority, although only for a small number of soldiers.⁵²² Europeans were seen walking in the hostile camp, probably the fugitives mentioned at the beginning of the campaign. Switching army could be a dangerous move, as the soldier Christiaan Muller experienced when he reached the opposite bank and was "beaten and stabbed off his horse with a pike, that [horse] fell on its back, and [he] was carried away by the stream".⁵²³

Still, other deserters did survive and tried pulling their peers along while fooling with the VOC officers. So soldiers were tempted by their 'comrades' to swim across and switch sides. "There is enough money and food, and no lack of womenfolk"; it was cried out.⁵²⁴ One VOC sergeant screamed to a deserter that he would pay for his deeds. The reply ran: "come over, I shall pay you double (...) Do you also want to go to Kediri? You first have to face this"; at which point another deserter grabbed a gun to shoot at the sergeant.⁵²⁵ The fact that such stories are frequently discussed in Briel's journal proves the VOC's anxiety about being cast aside by its service men.

Another fear was losing contact with the other columns. Not surprisingly, a large part of the reports is dedicated to the correspondence between the army fractions. A constant notification of hostile advances was crucial for setting up proper tactics.⁵²⁶ Not even a week after the campaign started, Hurdt already grew nervous over the columns of Renesse and Muller, requesting them to "send daily expresses on the enemies' activities, where they hide, how strong and all the other

⁵¹⁹ Notice that the name 'Palabaan' is used which can either refer to the Majapahit Tjangu or Kediri. Both, however, are located near the Brantas. See *ibid.*: 155.

⁵²⁰ *ibid.*: 173.

⁵²¹ This is a general statement on the campaign, not referring to the Brantas episode specifically. De Saint-Martin, "Letter XLIX": 215.

⁵²² Hurdt writes: "Nu waren er vijf van die schelmen aan de overzijde". Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 187,

⁵²³ The quote is translated from: "van de vijand aangeranst en met een piek van 't paerd gestoaten was, dat agterover vallende, in de stroom wegdreef". *Ibid.*: 187 and 218.

⁵²⁴ The quotes are translated from "Camerrath" and "Geld en kost isser genoeg, en geen gebrek aan vrouwlieden." *Ibid.*: 183.

⁵²⁵ The quote is derived from: "Kom over, ik sal U dobbel betalen", en verders: 'Gij wild ook mede na Cadierij? Ghij moet eerst dit hagje hebben, en dan sien hoe ghij in Cadierij comt'." *Ibid.*: 174.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*: 80, 101-102, 104-105, 108, 113, 117, 130, 136-137, 142, 144-146, 148, 150-151, 152, 154, 156-157, 162-166, 168-170, 194-198, 233-234, 255-256 and 270.

occurrences, so our measures concerning our subsequent march can be adapted to it, and especially whenever it is necessary for us to travel thither with our troops".⁵²⁷

To travel and find directions, communication with the Javanese colleagues was crucial.⁵²⁸ Initially, misunderstandings arrived on both the routes and travel time.⁵²⁹ Already during the first day after departure, Hurdt was annoyed by the Sunan advancing so much that no track was left for them to follow. The admiral hence requested some Javanese guides for the VOC army to keep them from losing their way. Two Mantris were assigned to "stay near the Lord Admiral at all times, and point at the straight paths".⁵³⁰ But more was asked from the indigenous troops and residents.

Surveillance demands similar to those of Renesse and Muller were made on the Javanese and Makassarese. The former tended to be used as spies that could equally serve to recruit villagers.⁵³¹ The Sunan, for instance, sent four "distinctive Javanese" together with "some followers" to eye the enemy and gather men for Renesse's column in Grobogan. The Madurese did the same, judged from the caught spy Sutagati. While conversing with the free Makassarese of the VOC he accidentally admitted his Madurese origins. The troops immediately arrested him. He confessed being sent together with five others by his namesake Sutagati; an Ombol from Surabaya. More information could not be gotten from him, since he claimed to just be a "simple person" that "never went to Kediri".⁵³²

Local rulers usually had better connections and would inform Hurdt about matters as the realignment between Trunajaya and Galesong.⁵³³ Captured bupatis that had escaped Trunajaya were also called upon. Tjiptaradja, for one, describes the impression he got from Kediri while detained there: only "16 to 1.800 Madurese" could be found in the city; "the rest are Javanese". The emphasis, however, was on how to conquer the town, causing a focus on defensive works and the amount of cannons.⁵³⁴

A more intricate story was received from a submitted Javanese that had just returned from Kediri. He has counted "7.000 armed men, among whom effectively 3.000 Madurese. He only saw

⁵²⁷ The quote is a rough translation from: "dagelijcx pr. expresse boden berigt moesten toesenden van des vijands gedoente, waer sig onthoud, hoe sterq en van 't geene anders meer passeerd, opdat men de messures aangaande onsen verderen optogt daerna aanstellen mogte, en specialijk of het de nood sal vereijschen, dat wij selfs met onse magt derwaerts comen". These expresses are sent using *suruhans*. Ibid.: 89.

⁵²⁸ At times, warning on dangerous routes would also be ignored, for instance Manda-Raka insistence on the tricky passage to Grompol. Ibid.: 82-83, 107 and 113.

⁵²⁹ Hurdt's Kalangan assistants, for example, would tell him the journey from Grompol to Kediri would last 26 rather than 16 days. Ibid.: 124 and 148.

⁵³⁰ The Mantris were Nitijprajja and Cartanagara. The quote is translated from Dutch: "om altijd bij d'heer Admiraal te blijven en de regte wegen aan te wijzen." Ibid.: 82-83.

⁵³¹ Ibid.: 97, 109-110, 114, 121, 128-129, 131, 142, 149, 170-171, 180, 183-184, 187, 195-196, 201, 228, 231, 249 and 264; and Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister* "Recommendatie aan Capitein van Vliet aangaande de messagie van d'provisie": 268-269. Apparently, even a recruitment tradition of human branding existed; see idem., *De Expeditie Van*: 142.

⁵³² Another spy was caught on the 21st of October. See ibid.: 114, 149-150 and 180-181.

⁵³³ Ibid.: 213; and Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*: 269, 301 and 305-306.

⁵³⁴ Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 116.

one Dutch, and one Ternaten inside". This is confirmed by Dipanegara -a nobleman loyal to Amangkurat II but stuck in Kediri- who saw "about 4.000 Madurese".⁵³⁵ A captured Madurese, who claimed "he was send, to fracture our power", has something else to tell: "only 1.000 Madurese and 100 Makassarrese as well as Malayans, but no Javanese were inside Kediri". The Madurese defector Walliingattij accounted the troops roaming outside the city walls.⁵³⁶

Even more interesting than these numbers, was the message by Najatjitra received while camped at the Brantas. After abandoning his governorship of Semarang, he joined the Madurese in December 1676. Now, he decided to return to the Sunan, which eventually would bring him back his old post. Najatjitra advises Hurdt to attack Kediri soon. "All the Javanese heads currently led by Trunajaya, and whose wives are in Kediri, longed for our arrival, hoping that success would deliver them from Trunajaya. They were planning to change sides, but saw no occasion to do so with their children and wives, and needed therefore to wait for a better opportunity. In Kediri, there were many qualms, so we would conquer it quickly during an assault, since varying Javanese heads that were inside would favour us."⁵³⁷

When Hurdt and the Sunan did make it to the eastern riverside, Najatjitra again contacted the admiral on the "great tumult" in Kediri; "Trunajaya being shaken and having lost his tongue, at one moment wanting to live and die in Kediri, and at another wanting to flee when the Dutch come; however, being asked where, he is astonished, and does not know".⁵³⁸ It almost appears as if Trunajaya himself was becoming the target of rebellions.

That Trunajaya was not betrayed during the attack on Kediri, shows that Najatjitra was either overly optimistic or deceptive. The latter did not appear to be the case given the additional entrusted information send by this lord. He offered a complete list of "both Madurese and Javanese heads" that were stationed "down or at the river".⁵³⁹ The amounts of troops was very high and Trunajaya

⁵³⁵ Ibid.: 155 and 176.

⁵³⁶ The quote derives from: "Den gevangen Madurees beleed, 'dat hij was uijtgesonden, om onse magt te verspieden, seggende dat maar 1000 Maduresen en 100 soo Maccassaren als Maleijers, maer geene Javanen in Cadierij waren. Aan dese kant sworven 50 Madurese ruijters', dog welk relaes voor absolute leugens en flatterije gehouden wierd, doordien 't contrarie reeds hier bevonden hebben". The VOC men hence show scepticism towards his latter claim, yet do not judge upon the first. See *ibid.*: 161; and Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister* "Walliingattij verschijnd aan boord en doet 't volgende relaas": 272-280.

⁵³⁷ The quote is derived from: "Hij relateerd, 'hoe alle de Javaanse hoofden jegenwoordig onder Troenadjaja, en welckers wijven in Cadierij waren, verlangden na onse overkomste, in hoope bij goed succes van Troenadjaja verlost te sullen werden. Zij waren wel van sins om over te komen, maar en sagen met haare vrouwen en kinderen geen kans, en moesten dierhalven beter gelegentheijd verwagten. In Cadierij was veel murmuratie, twijffelden niet, off wij zouden bij een assaut in korten meester daervan wesen, want diverse Javaanse hoofden, die binnen waren, hun in ons faveur aanstellen soudent'." Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 219-220

⁵³⁸ The quote is derived from: "Daar was groote murmuratie, zijnde Troenadjaja in sijn gemoet kennelijk geturbeert, en in sijne concepten vacillant, willende dan in Cadierij leven en sterven, en dan eens weder, soo haest d'Hollanders quamen, vlugten, dogh gevraegd werdende, waarheen, staat hij versteld, en weet het niet". *Ibid.*: 227.

⁵³⁹ The quotes is translated from "nederwaarts of aan de rivier". The soldiers are described as 200 largely Madurese ones near Tukum, 500 Madurese in front of Tukum, 100 Makassarrese and Malayans opposite the *pagar*, and 40 Madurese, 50 Javanese (Madr.), 60 Madurese collection of Javanese", 50 Madurese and 30 Madurese in front of it. Additionally there were "about 1200" "forced Javanese" who were under surveillance. *Ibid.*: 220-221

appeared to have gathered many forces along the river, although not as much as he kept in Kediri. Through disclosures as these, an impression of enemy war-bands near and far could be formed.

Intelligence on the enemy at close quarters was gathered frequently.⁵⁴⁰ The same Madurese prisoner mentioned above named all leaders of his camp. Albeit he could not provide numbers, he did stress that “the enemy consisted out of Madurese, a small amount of Javanese, Makassarese and Malaysans”.⁵⁴¹ Others captives equally conveyed internal disagreements between Trunajaya and various warlords. So the VOC came to hear about Trunajaya repelling the warriors of Tumënggung Dermajuda, whom the Babad Tanah Jawi describes as a supporter of the Madurese.⁵⁴² Likely, the trust between the two had been broken. Loyalty for other fallen commanders was more long-lasting and stronger.

Two Javanese boys even mentioned Trunajaya approached the frontier in search for revenge over the death of his two main field officers; Arja Singasari and Suradipa. He “wanted to run amok, still was retained from doing so by much prayer, screaming and begging of his mother and wives”. So much noise was produced by them that Mardijkers on guard at the other side of river Brantas could hear it.⁵⁴³ After losing Kediri, Trunajaya’s search for refuge was again traced by the VOC. Now the loyalty was offered to not by the fallen overlord. Three-thousand Sampanese, likely an exaggeration, were claimed to follow him. Escaping from Blitar to Malang, the warlord was assumed to seek consolidation with the Makassarese there.⁵⁴⁴

Locals are equally questioned on the movements of the enemy, although such informants tend to be briefed on fleeing opponents rather than offensive ones.⁵⁴⁵ Only in rare circumstances do the hostile troops attack the VOC army.⁵⁴⁶ More frequent are the raids on surrounding villages to scare the provincial communities; a likely means to avoid them aiding the advancing Sunan.⁵⁴⁷ In fact, letters of pardon were spread along the villages by harbingers of the Sunan’s army to gain back their trust.⁵⁴⁸ Other traces indicated a large-scale provisioning of Kediri: wheel tracks became abundant while closing in to the city.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.: 162, 181, 184, 219, 249-250, 263.

⁵⁴¹ The quote is translated from: “De vijand bestond meest uijt Maduresen, weijnige Javanen, Maccassaren en Maleijers”. Ibid.: 162.

⁵⁴² Derma-Juda used to be the governor of Pasuruhan and was ordered by Amangkurat I to fight the Makassarese. After a military defeat, he would however retreat to the Tengger mountains to suppose a neutral stand. Ibid.: 181; and *Babad Tanah Jawa*, ed. Meinsma: 163 and 191.

⁵⁴³ The quotes derives from the confession of the boys: “Item dat Troenadjaja twee etmael hier tegenover sig hadde opgehouden, en ons leger besigtigt en, om de dood van de twee bovengenoemde Reeren te vreeken, had selfs amock willen speelen, dog was daarin door veel bidden, schreuwen en smeeken van sijn moeder en wijven verhinderd geworden”. Briel, *De Expeditie Hurd*: 191.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.: 253-255.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.: 90- 91, 109, 112, 136, 151, 195 and 270.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.: 112.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.: 233-234

⁵⁴⁸ It is mentioned how “Sij hadden diverse pardonbriefjes uijt de naam van sijn Hooghd. ende hr. Admiraal aan de inwoonders, die hun mede in de bossen waaren onthoudende, verleent; en wanneer den Zoesoehoenan die streke quam op te trekken, zouden zig al d’inwoonders komen vernederen, hadden nog allerwegen kost genoeg gevonden.” Ibid.: 102 and 228.

⁵⁴⁹ Already on the second of October, Briel notices that the “de weg was goed en bequam, en van karrens sterk gefrequeeteerd, die gepresumeerd wierden na Cadierij gegaan te sijn.” Ibid.: 139.

Clearly, provision was crucial for the VOC too. Baggage train leaders as Jeremias van Vliet continuously notified Hurdt on food supplies and resting places.⁵⁵⁰ Friction could emerge on the division of foodstuffs. Hurdt expected the Javanese to hurdle together supplies, and could be angered when this did not happen. So he demurs Adipati Mandaraka “that more rice for the people would be delivered, as there isn’t half enough, and that even needs to be eaten without any extras”.⁵⁵¹ The Sunan suggests drastic measures to improve delivery. He recommends to “stante pede kris” his servants that were supposed to supply the army, but did not.⁵⁵² On other days, brief mentions are made of deliveries that did succeed.⁵⁵³

Gradually, sickness would spread fervently and wagons for food were rolling next those transporting the ill and deceased.⁵⁵⁴ These transportation tasks were again assigned to indigenous troops, as were additional ones like building bridges and shelters or carrying loot. At times, this led to frustration among the VOC men, certainly during the Brantas river episode. The requested raft bridge took days to finish, by which time it lost its purpose since the river already ebbed.⁵⁵⁵ At other moments, encampments needed to be constructed. In cities and villages, shelter appears to have been built or restored on the spot “in Javanese fashion” and lofty when possible. On the field, *pondoks* or huts were constructed.⁵⁵⁶ Abandoned houses offered protection too. Villages, towns, and even temples are often deserted: a common tactic on Java when fearing upcoming forces.⁵⁵⁷ The surrounding forests served as refuge.⁵⁵⁸ So the Sunan was brought to “an old Javanese house” by one of his Mantris in Godong.⁵⁵⁹

Houses like those in Godong were both sites of accommodation and negotiation. The mutual visits between Hurdt and Amangkurat II in these camps are described frequently; Briel states they occurred “habitually”.⁵⁶⁰ Ceremonies surrounded them, like the “3 charges and several cannon shots” that accompanied the Sunan’s entry of Hurdt’s house.⁵⁶¹ The meetings usually served to discuss

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.: 86-87, 91, 110-111, 119 and 135; and Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*: 310.

⁵⁵¹ This is directly said by Hurdt and put between quotes in the text, in Dutch it reads: "dat meerder rijs voor het volq zoude doen aanbrengen, alsoo niet d'helft genoeg hadden, en die se nogh sonder eenige toesprijsemooeten nuttigen &a." Briel, *De Expeditie Van*: 87. See also *ibid.*: 133, 134, 147 and 276.

⁵⁵² The quote is a translation from: “stante pede krissen”. *Ibid.*: 107.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*: 88, 91, 97, 107-108, 110, 114, 116, 119, 127, 130, 142, 182, 218 and 231; and Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister*., 260. Examples are: “Tumënggung Zoeranata liet eenige koebeesten brengen, die aan 't volk verdeeld wierden”. A hint is given on ties with Giri, when salt from that region is expected to be delivered. See Briel, *De Expeditie Van*: 173.

⁵⁵⁴ The request for medical transits already grew noticeably two weeks after the start of the campaign. *Ibid.*: 117-118, 124-126, 165, 172, 229, 252, 257-258, 268, and 273 .

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*: 186.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*: 88-89, 121, 131-132, 158, 168, 202, 241 and 276.

⁵⁵⁷ Even though Reid’s theory on military labour scarcity is contested, his reference to fleeing villagers appeared less controversial. See A. Reid, “Low Population Growth and Its Causes in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia.” in *Death Disease in Southeast Asia: Exploration in Social, Medical and Demographic History*, ed. N. G. Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

⁵⁵⁸ Near Kalang, mention is made of a temple “the priests have abandoned” (“een tempel, waeruijt de papen verlaopen waren”). Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 83, 87, 114, 119 and 139-141..

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*: 82-83.

⁵⁶⁰ The quote is translated from “volgens gewoonte”. *Ibid.*: 110.

⁵⁶¹ The quote is translated from: “3 chargies en eenige canonschoten”. This is the only time this particular ceremony is mentioned. *Ibid.*: 88.

tactics. Be it to support the other columns, occupy cities, choose routes, arrange provision and troops, avoid overlooking enemy troops, send letters to local rulers, or even build bridges.⁵⁶² Amangkurat's reliance on Hurdt shines through in his constant abidance to negotiations and VOC tactics.

The Sunan equally makes his efforts to please Hurdt. He sends his "gandex", or servants, to bring fresh fish and fruits, and gives water deriving from a source used by "Susuhunans of old times on".⁵⁶³ Respect was mutual. When the princess Ratu Woh expires in Japara, Hurdt shows his sympathy through camping down "because [the Sunan] will call together all his Mantris, to conduct the customary mourning". The wait did happen to suit his military scheme too, revealing how utilitarian and compassionate reasoning were often two sides of the same coin. When anger about Ratu Who's death reared up again two years later, it was not the Company but the Javanese caretakers that were blamed and even hunted down. It appears the VOC remained understood as a protector of Mataram.⁵⁶⁴

Nonetheless, shortly after victory distrust lingered. When Kediri fell, the Sunan attempted to shed off his dependence. Correspondence between the parties declined. Hurdt complained to the Sunan about the lack of "decent communication (...) even though that was very necessary". The transport of sick soldiers was thereby delayed. Amangkurat claimed he "did not want to bother his father, the admiral, with nonsense". Moreover, he was not to be blamed for the slow process since he did "order his Mantris to do their best". Yet, now the delay had become evident, he would "immediately bring things in order".⁵⁶⁵

That was a promise hard to keep, however. The Sunan might have been able to obey, but could not always command to live up to it. Amangkurat held a fragile authority and bewailed his own lack of control. Most bothersome was "the slowness of the Mantris in diligently following his commands, contrary to the old habit of his ancestors' times, that made women conduct most of [the Sunan's] orders, so they would be done well and accurately. But now he was calling the shots, [they] were not listened to".⁵⁶⁶ Hurdt did not fall for this and remained dissatisfied over the lacking organization of the Sunan and his Mantris, accusing them on several points.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶² Ibid.: 88, 92, 102-103, 107-108, 122, 125-126, 128, 130, 170, 172-174, 202, 207, 212-213, 228-229 and 266-267. Mantris were usually present too. The heads of the army are generally shortly referred to, mentioning their names and negotiations –not the topics of negotiation- with them. See *ibid.*: 96, 120 and 133.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*: 86, and 131.

⁵⁶⁴ The quote is translated from: "stilleggen, want hij alle zijne mantri's soude bij malcanderen laten roepen, om de gewoonlijke rouw te bedrijven". It derives from a letter sent by Marchier halfway 1680. *Ibid.*: 113 and 186.

⁵⁶⁵ The quotes are translated from: "had hij zijn vader, den Admiraal, met beuselingen niet lastig willen vallen"; "want hij zijn mantri's gelast hadde haar best te doen"; and "Hij soude aanstonds ordre daerin stellen". *Ibid.*: 214.

⁵⁶⁶ The quote is translated from: "Soesoehoenan klaegt "over de traegheijd van de mantri's in 't vlijtig naekomen van sijne bevelen, contrarie d'oude gewoonte sijner voorouders tijden, die haar meeste bevelen door wijven lieten doen, en egter wel en accuraat geobserveerd wierden. Maar nu hij self alles gelaste, wierde niet verrigt." Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 214.

⁵⁶⁷ De Saint-Martin did spread a similar message earlier, however; emphasizing the hostility towards the Sunan amongst his courtiers. I. De Saint-Martin, "Letter L (29 July, 1678)." In *De Opkomst Van*: 215.



Picture 10 Illustration of the attack on Kediri from a nineteenth century children's novel: only European soldiers can be seen, chanting "hurray, long live the Company!" The authors based their story on the Briel reports and took the denunciations in it to depict the 'Javanese soldiers' as lazy-no goods of no significance to the VOC's victory.⁵⁶⁸

Prior discussions were not as heated. Amangkurat II often expresses his anxieties towards Hurdt.⁵⁶⁹ The admiral certainly considers these, apparently taking the Sunan's insights as valuable. The whole strategy of the campaign was, after all, shaped by Amangkurat II's preference for a 'long march'. The 'listening ear' is detectable in more passages. At the start of the campaign, the Sunan, for instance, asks "whether it will not be necessary to keep the post of Selimbi and Logendèr occupied as to make sure no hostile invasion will occur there, because he does not trust his brother Pangéran Puger". Hurdt promises to keep this in mind, even though this would impede his plan to bring all forces together.⁵⁷⁰

The day after, the Sunan's call is partly discarded due to concerns that "our general army will thus be weakened too much by it."⁵⁷¹ Even then, an attempt is made to expound the motivations

⁵⁶⁸ H. van Balen, *De kroon van Mataram. Historisch verhaal van den eersten krijgstoct der Nederlanders in de binnenlanden van Java met illustraties van Willem Steelink* (Amsterdam: Jan Leendertz & Zoon, 1890): 169.

⁵⁶⁹ Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 89-90, 144, 163 and 172-174.

⁵⁷⁰ The quote, which might be citing Amangkurat II directly, is translated from Dutch: "of het niet noodig zoude wesen dat de post op Chelimbij ofte Lagondeer beset bleef ten eijnde daar ontrent geen vijandige invasie quame te geschieden, want hij sijnen broeder pangeran Poegar niet betrouwde; 't welk d'heer Admiraal zijde in opmerkinge te sullen houden, om verder daervan te spreken." Ibid.: 89.

⁵⁷¹ The quote is translated from "dat men onse generaele magt daarmede al te veel verswacken zoude." Ibid.: 90. Notice that Couper did urge earlier to only send commanders eastwards that were popular in those lands, which stirred up the courtiers and led to other to insist

behind the Javanese demands. So the feuds between Amangkurat II and his brother Puger are elaborated upon. Interestingly, Puger's mythical claims on kingship are set out specifically. The Sunan apparently told Hurdt and his colleagues about the Sunan Kudus or possibly the Raden Patah, the 'conqueror from Demak', and his fears for his brother re-enacting this story. The description of the Sunan's angst does not show any scepticism, besides the nominator of "pagan" for the pre-Islamic Javanese.⁵⁷²

Puger is residing "in a desolated place southwards of Mataram named Gambauwa while praying and doing *sembahyang* [conducting salat], living ascetically, to obtain from heaven, that he may retain the rule over Java, like in old times, when the Javanese were still pagans, a certain Sultan of Demak [who was] very much longing to take control and aspiring to take over the government of Majapahit, abstaining himself in a hole not far from this pager, for forty days with regular fasting and *sembahyang*, to, as stated, thereby obtain the region of Java, which he succeeded to do, becoming a master over Majapahit and conquering the land through violence. This the Susuhunan feared, his brother would also attempt to do."⁵⁷³

This statement shows us Hurdt certainly had some concern for the intricacies of Javanese kingship, including its mystic sides. But the degree to which this influenced his tactics is hard to tell. The next day, Hurdt and Amangkurat II would inspect this famed 'hole' of asceticism; likely the Watu Bethek at Kayangan where the first Mataramese king retreated to meditate.⁵⁷⁴ Hurdt's account of it is very descriptive, attending to the material shape rather than spiritual significances.⁵⁷⁵ At other moments, the Sunan's advice on his brother's spiritual capacities makes a more concrete mark on Hurdt's operational plans.

on their East Javanese followers too. This to the dismay of the princes. The kraton thus was careful not sending commander that could be too powerful. See Couper, "Letter XVI": 112.

⁵⁷² Although the Sunan apparently used that very same word for describing other practices preceding Islam. See Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 144.

⁵⁷³ The quote is a rough translation from: "Den Zoesoehoenan heeft een quaad gevoelen van zijn broeder Poegar, niettegenstaande denselven alle vriendschap scheen te willen doen blijken en sustinerende, dat Pougars voorgeven op een quade moer lag, tot confirmatie van dat zijn gevoelen alleguerende, hoe denselven present in een afgelegene plaats zijddwaard van de Mataram gend. Gambauwa met bidden en sombaijen sig was onthoudende, omme van den Hemel te verkrijgen, dat de heerschappij van Java bij hem mogte blijven, gelijk in oude tijden, wanneer de Javaanen nog heijdenen waren, zekeren Sultan van Damak seer regeersugtig en na de regeringe van Madjapajid aspererende, gepractiseerd had, onthoudende sig in een kuuil niet ver van dese pagger gesitueerd, veertig dagen met vasten en sombaijen, om, als gesegt, daardoor 't gebied van Java te verkrijgen, 't welk hem oock soadanig geluckt was, dat in korten tijt meester van Madjapajid wierd, en alsoo dit land onder zijn geweld bequam. Zulx was den Zoesoehoenan van gevoelen, dat zijn broeder Poegar van gelijken soude voor hebben &a." *Ibid.*: 90.

⁵⁷⁴ The area was named Kahyangan or heaven by Panembahan Senopati, who founded Mataram. It is located at Daleph. J. Miksic, ed. *Karaton Surakarta* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pawiyatan Kabudayan Karaton Surakarta, 2004): 230-231.

⁵⁷⁵ Briel writes: "d'Heer Admiraal bevond de voorm. kuuil te bestaan uijt twee hooien in steenrotsen, die van binnen tot malcanderen komen, zijnde tamelijk ruijm en wijd, hebbende van buiten een nauwen ingang ; beneden in de groote revier vloeyde uijt deselve een spruijt seer schoonfonteynwater, daar den Zoesoehoenan en onse officieren uijt dronken, omdat dito revier al meede moderagtig was, egter wat hooger op hier en daar een santplaatsjen hebbende, daar men aan de oevers klaar water uijt kuuilen konde scheppen." Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 91.



Picture 11 Watu Bethek at Kayangan⁵⁷⁶

On the 23th of September, Hurdt asked him whether the rising sickness and decreasing provision should not prompt them “to advance to Mataram, as to place his Excellency on the throne, as to clean the lands of Bagelèn, Wates, Kedu and others of enemies etc.” To which he responded: “no, and that one should pursue the path straight to Kediri, assuming, that the conquest of that place or city Mataram could not profit him; because his brother would flee to Bagelèn, and establish new followers there, to keep him in worries and rupture”. What is more, “when Kediri will be conquered, everything on this side [i.e. Central Java] will work out”.⁵⁷⁷

Amangkurat’s advice comprises insights into the manner his brother rallied men, the fleeting significance of the Mataramese kraton and the absolute need to smother the voice of the rebels’ warlord before emplacing a new hierarchy in Central Java. Hurdt took notice of them and carried on the march to East Java. Clues of sincere trust in Amangkurat’s judgements are hence clearly present. Nonetheless, the suspicion rising after Kediri’s fall could be distinguished during the march too.

Especially the authority of the Sunan among his own people was occasionally doubted by Hurdt. At the public reading of the contract with the VOC, one Javanese regent jumped up and screamed “with much fervour” “that the Susuhunan was mad, that he simply gave away his country,” indebted his people and turned them into slaves. Punishment ensued.⁵⁷⁸ Military initiative was

⁵⁷⁶ Miksic, *Karaton Surakarta*: 230.

⁵⁷⁷ The quotes are translated from: “na de Mataram te trekken, om zijn Hooghd. aldaar op den thron te stellen, mitsgaders de landen van Bagaleen, Wattas, Kadoe en andere van de vijanden te suiijveren &a”; “Van neen, en dat men moest de cours regt op Cadirij aansen, sustineerende, dat souder die veroveringe van die plaatse ofte stadt de Mataram hem niet voordeelig wesen konde; want zijn broeder de vlugt na Bagalen soude neemen, ende daar een nieuwen aanhang maeken, om hem steeds in bekommeringe en rupture te houden”; and “dat wanneer Cadirij vermeesterd was, alles aen dese cant wel gaan soude”. Ibid.: 125.

⁵⁷⁸ The quote derives from: “dat de Sousouhounangh krankzinnig was, dat hy zyn land maar weg gaf en daerenboven aan de Compagnie beloofd hadde 300,000 realen en nogh 2000 eoyangh rys jaarl. en daerenboven wilde men se hier nog tot slaaveu maeeken en diegelycke praatjes meer.” De Saint-Martin, “Letter L”: 215-216.

supported, however, even when undermining royal power. The Mantris sometimes simply went their own way, as it evident from the request for VOC officers to join their military expeditions or the Buginese offer to attack Madura.⁵⁷⁹

Amangkurat II lacked control over his own army. The failure to cross the river Brantas with rafts made this painfully clear. Even when Amangkurat II had urged his Mantris to “do their utter best, and assist in a truthful matter, because it concerned the Susuhunan and themselves”, the operation was hindered by Javanese truancy.⁵⁸⁰ Hurdt was deeply angered, exclaiming to the Sunan “that his highness can now see himself, how no claim can be made on his people, as their slowness and cowardness was the principal cause, for the fruitless results of our attack”. He now took it to himself, to warn the Mantris not to make the same mistake again, to which they obediently answered “that it would not fail due to their fault, and if it will [they] preferred to lose their lives”.⁵⁸¹

A week later, a new attempt was made. But luck struck. The water level turned out to have decreased dramatically overnight, and a passage on horseback was doable. The Babad Tanah Jawa took this as feat of the Sunan’s supernatural power, claiming two-thirds of the water level dropped when Amangkurat II drove his horse into the river. Hurdt instead names it a grace of God. In fact, the minister Manteau was called in “to conduct a prayer for all our people, and asking the Lord God for a blessing and victory” while the “Javanese force” was waiting by.⁵⁸² This time, the Javanese did fight fervently; chasing the enemy and being praised for it.

For the next days, obedience was all present. Yet, at the very moment Kediri was conquered, ransacking urges destroyed the indigenous compliance. As the *daghregister* states: “the plundering spread through Kediri, at which the Javanese showed to be brave masters, thereby missing the occasion to continue chasing the fleeing Trunajaya, like they had promised in advance”.⁵⁸³ The

⁵⁷⁹ “De Boegijse groote comt aan boord”. Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 185; and idem., *Vervolgh Dagregister*: 271-272. A possible reason for Amangkurat II’s lacking authority might be his limited bravery. Renesse en Muller complained about the Sunan not being heroic: “Het was te wenschen den Soesoehoenan veel van diergelijke stof hadde”. See Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 112.

⁵⁸⁰ The quote is derived from: “zijnde, heeft zijn E. den Zoesoehoenan en desselfs mantries ofte rijxraden wel serieuselijk geëxhorteerd, "dat se haare hulp en uijterste best nu moesten contribueeren, en de zake trouwelijk helpen bevorderen, want het den Zoesoehoenan en baarselven aanging. Anders, indien se soodaanig wilden doen, als meermalen geschied was, dat wij dan ooc 't werk op zijn beloop zouden laten, wanneer dan sien mogten, hoe sij het stelden &a". While needed the Javanese were not to be found: “dat niet ééne onser Javanen daar ontrent was te sien geweest, om bij de vaertuijgen te konnen gebruijckt werden, want se door het schieten in 't afdrijven alle daarvan verlopen waren”. Ibid.: 133-134, 173, 207 and 210 .

⁵⁸¹ The quotes derive from “dat sijn Hooghd.nu selfs genoegsam konde sien, hoe geen de minste staad op sijn volk te naeken was, alsoo hunne tragheijd en lafhertigheijd ten principalen oorsaek was, dat onsen aanslag nu weder vrugteloos uijtgevallen zij, ende dat wij dus doende zoude bedwongen werden, 't werk op sijn beloop te laten”; and “Waerop zij te samen zeer hoge beloften deden, "dat het aan haar niet haperen soude, ofte anderssints gaarne de dood wilden sterven &a". Ibid.: 212, 218 and 222. They stated their devotion again on the day after and the Susuhunan was asked "om zijn volq bijeen te roepen" mitsgaders tot het werk en hare pligt aan te seggen, opdat men niet weder, gelijk dickwijls geschiet is, van hare hulpe." "mogte verstoken blijven". Hurdt would make a similar warning before sieging Kediri. See ibid.: 235.

⁵⁸² The quote is derived from: “De Javaanse magt stondt doen mede gereed, ende wierd door den predikant Manteau onder den bloten hemel voor al ons volk een gebed gedaen en God de Heere om zegen en goed succes aangeropen”. Ibid.: 223. While this was a common initiation of an attack in Dutch warfare, Hurdt has not applied it earlier in the campaign. A pastor travelled along and conducted some services for time to time. See ibid.: 92, 128. See also *Babad Tanah Jawi*, ed. Meinsma: 198.

⁵⁸³ The quotes derives from: “'t Plunderen ging door heel Cadierij, waerin de Ja vanen bethoonden dappere meesters te sijn, versnijmende hierdoor d'occasie aan den vlugtenden Troenadjaja te vervolgen na te jagen, gelijk zij te vooren beloofd hadden.” Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 240-241.

Sunan's initial concern was with the regalia: hearing about "the Majapahit crown and other Mataramese court goods, like gongs, costly clothing and the like" he requested that those "will be returned, as they belonged to his ancestors, and [he would] prefer keeping them as a memory for his offspring." Possibly realizing the royal authority gained by these objects, Hurdt promised to return everything that could be retrieved and even issued a notice on it.⁵⁸⁴

When the admiral as well criticized Amangkurat II's lack of control over his forces, he replied: "it was difficult to tell who had hidden or taken [the treasures] away, suspecting our indigenous militia as much as his" and stressing "that a great part of his force had advanced, to hunt down the enemy".⁵⁸⁵ Indeed some men seemed to have continued the chase.⁵⁸⁶ It is likely, however, that a large part of these were running to their fields instead; as the farmland called now the martial aim had been reached. Yet, the VOC sources do not consider this.

What the Company men do notice is money. One of Amangkurat II's main means to control his servants was cash. He seems anxious to tell Hurdt not much of it had remained after paying his subordinate leaders and losing some Spanish reals through theft. The admiral appeases him, however, by stating that "he had not come for money, but to reclaim the charges of his Highness in time and according to capability".⁵⁸⁷ Similarly, the fleeing Trunajaya was reported to have taken 10.000 Spanish reals with him, of which he offered 1.000 as an honorary gift to Karaëng Galesong while requesting his assistance. He likely made a similar appeal to Kajoran, who however refused.⁵⁸⁸

Holy matters were also used to claim abidance. De Graaf already briefly consulted Hurdt's report in search of holy centres. Blitar, Kaluwang, Kalang, Prawata, Singkal and the mountains of Tegal plus Lawu are mentioned.⁵⁸⁹ Some of the sites abased to the Sunan, other denounced him. Mandaraka, for instance, informs how he has captured the insurgent Tédjalaku, the likely ascetic from the Babad Tanah Jawi that hid on the volcano Kelud together with forty students. Similar hostile ascetics were encountered throughout the campaign, getting rid of them proved Mataram's power.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁴ The quote derives from: "Sijn Hooghd., van de Madjapajitse croon en andere Mataramse hofgoederen, als gommen, kostel kleederen &a. gehoord hebbende, versogt, 'dat hem die mogten gerestitueerd werden, alsoo van sijne voorouders herquamen, en gaern tot een memorie op sijne naekomelingen bewaren wilde'". Ibid.: 242 and 247-248.

⁵⁸⁵ The quote is derived from: "Waerop sijn Hooghd. diende, 'dat hij mede wel wiste, dat er meer ligt geschut van bassen &a. alomme zij geweest, ooc konden qualijk raden, wie 't selve verscholen ofte weggevoerd hadde, suspecterende onse Inlandse militie soo wel als de zijne; ende wierd aangenomen, hierop bij den aftogt te letten'. Zijde voorts, 'dat een goed gedeelte van sijne magt was uitgetogen, om den vijand na te jagen, verhopende van deselve wat goeds'". Ibid.: 223-224.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.: 250.

⁵⁸⁷ The quote serives from: "dat niet gecomen was, om geld [tehaelen, maer de zaeken van sijn Hooghd. na tijds gelegentheijd en vermogen te redresseren". Ibid.: 246.

⁵⁸⁸ The old governor of Trunajaya, Suta Pattij of Rawa, told this to Hurdt. Ibid.: 253.

⁵⁸⁹ Singkal is merely refered to in the Javanese chronicle, but was encountered during Hurdt's campaign. De Graaf, "Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk": 320-321.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.: 109, 132, 133 and 134.

Just as effective was paying respect to holy sites. The old centres of the Walisanga are passed by; however the accounts on the visits differ between the Babads and VOC sources. While in Kudus, Briel only pens down the destruction of the city and the beauty of its mosque, or “Temple”. The Babad Tanah Jawa tells how the Sunan prays at Sunan Kudus’ grave and how his personal scribe and Wali descendant Panembahan Natapraja is called from Demak to “pray for him”.⁵⁹¹

Briel’s description of Kediri merely refers to an “Islamic temple” with “some old royal graves” standing on the west side of the alun-alun “that is not as graceful as Gunonsari [the residential quarters]”. It was used as ammunition storage and almost blew up as a consequence.⁵⁹² Judging from the Sunan’s visit to the Kudus graveyard and his interest in the Kediri regalia, he must have brought tribute to this site. Yet, such visits are not discussed by Briel. But towns were not the only localities of spiritual importance; shrines figure more clearly in the sources. For instance, gravesides that are “considered very holy by their priests” were visited by soldiers to offer tjempaka flowers.⁵⁹³

Eventually, Hurdt started to grasp the influence of religious authority. After Kediri fell, he makes an effort to resurrect the Sunan as an emblematic figure venerated by the realm at large. In a scene of cultural misunderstanding, Hurdt hands the Susuhunan a royal crown while he is sitting underneath a tree surrounded by “all his lords”. Briel happily writes how it “was received with great pleasure and soon many people came to submit to the Susuhunan”. Even the esteemed Madurese Pangéran Sampang fell “in front of his feet, and congratulated his majesty with tears in his eyes”.⁵⁹⁴

Yet, the significance of the ornamental head covering was not all that great.⁵⁹⁵ A more important step to dominance was taken by selecting the right men to govern Kediri, dismantling the city’s defences, and redeeming the abidance of the local population. At least, this was first on the Sunan’s agenda. Possibly he felt his spiritual status had already been established on march and did not need any newly imposed regalia. Care was taken to choose kin of the old Kediri dynasty, send men to Wates and even Madura to becharm its residents, and to retreat the European soldiers to the nearby Zinkal as to relief the fears of the Kediri city dwellers. Still, all this did not prevent Amangkurat’s great difficulties in mobilizing his Mantris and troops.⁵⁹⁶

The pillaging, gambling and even enslaving warriors could hardly be maintained. The Sunan asked Hurdt to post an edict against the misbehaviours and organized a tournament as a seeming

⁵⁹¹ As explained in footnote 33, Panembahan Natapraja was a direct descent of Sunan Kalijaga. Ibid.: 84; and *Babad Tanah Jawi*, ed. Meinsma: 196.

⁵⁹² The quote is derived from “Aan de westzijde van ’t pleijn staat den tempel, die niet soo cierlijk is als die van Goenonsarij bovengenoemd, waernevens eenige oude koninglijke graven gesien worden”. Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 245, 251

⁵⁹³ The quote refers to the first graveside visited by Hurdt’s column: “Hier was ter zijden een oude grafstede, op een verheven plaats, die de Javanen zeijden van hare papen voor seer heijlig gehouden wierde, Alle morgen wierden offerhanden op dit graf gedaan van seker kruijt, ’t welk de Javanen om te offeren op alle graven gebruijken.” Ibid.: 82. Still today, Tjempaka flowers are used for this purpose. See E. M. Beekman, *Fugitive Dreams: An Anthology of Dutch Colonial Literature* (University of Massachusetts Press, 1988): 304.

⁵⁹⁴ The quote derives from: “desselfs voeten nedervallende, en met wenendeoogen sijn Hooghd. gratulerende.” Ibid.: 247.

⁵⁹⁵ H.J. De Graaf, “Over de kroon van Madja-Pait.” *Bijdragen tot Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* 104 (1948): 573-603.

⁵⁹⁶ Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 249, 251, 253-256 and 261.

attempt to restrain and appease the crowds.⁵⁹⁷ Although he succeeded to some degree, disorder still reigned. So the Sunan decided to isolate himself on the return voyage; to not sleep “in his prepared resting-place, but rest in the forest out of disfavour against his Mantris.” Concurrently, food shares delivered by the king to the soldiers decreased. Hurdt had no time for these affairs. In the wake of the next day, his patience ended. After “waiting a long time for the Susuhunan and the carriers of ammunition... we marched on without his presence and followers”. The campaign had lasted two months.⁵⁹⁸

Trunajaya was defeated yet still alive. Soon after settling in Madura he informed the VOC he “would be inclined to visit the Susuhunan, but the general people refuse help, because Madura was given to Pangéran Sampang”. The latter prince had sought to oust Trunajaya from Madura for a long time already, and was now dominating the island with his followers.⁵⁹⁹ Trunajaya apparently felt stuck in the shadow of his competitor were he to submit to Mataram. An anxiety bolstered by receiving no replies from the Sunan to his letters requesting “that I would supervise Madura according to the right of my ancestors”. Therefore he “could not appear” “out of fear for the Susuhunan”. Instead, he promised “that I and all my people will abase” to Amangkurat if they were left in peace to grow rice around Malang.⁶⁰⁰

Ambiguous as this message might be, it did show Hurdt how the status of Amangkurat II had become of much significance after the fall of Kediri. No matter the recalcitrant troops and massive looting, the Sunan was referred to as a landowner by the biggest enemy he had faced. Still, by now the admiral had learned that all that glitters is not gold. The ‘feudal’ relationship suggested by Trunajaya would be emplaced in a fragile state system. While his people might not have been “more than a 1.000 souls strong”, Malang could soon become a second Kediri. Hence, Trunajaya was not left in peace.⁶⁰¹

Nor was a massive campaign against Madura set up. The limited control over pejuang as well as the threat from Banten brought too many risks. Amangkurat’s appeal to send new forces to Madura was rejected and the Javanese were asked to just convince the Madurese to subject. Sending “one or two trusted Madurese” to “peacefully dispose” the “leaders and elites” to “accept” the rule

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid.: 264-266 and 274.

⁵⁹⁸ The quotes are derived from: “ging niet in zijn geprepareerde rustplaats, maar in 't bosch logieren uijt misnoegen tegen sijne mantri's”; “naar langen tijd op den Soesoehoenau en de dragers tot d'amunitie van oorlog gewagt hadden, zijn wij sonder sijn persoon ende gevolg met Comps. dienaars voortgemarcheerd”. Ibid.: 275-276.

⁵⁹⁹ Pangéran Sampang had been requesting to return from the kraton to Madura for many months already; “versoeckende mede naar d'oost, beneffens Keay Wangsa Diepa mocht vertrecken, als wanneer hy sich verseeckerde, dat er veel van de Maduresen Troenajaja verlaeten, en by hem over comen zouden”. For a brief moment after the fall of the Mataramese kraton, he did serve Trunajaya: “Pangeran Sampan had by Troenadjaja, na 5 dagen wachters, weder zitplaats en aanspraak gekregen.” He soon abandoned Trunajaya, however, giving classified information to the Sunan and joining his side. Most Madurese did not favour him, but after the fall of Kediri, Mataram again dictated local rule. See Couper, “Letter XVI”: 112; and Speelman, “Letter XXX”: 139.

⁶⁰⁰ Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister* “Brief van Troenadjaja, aanTumënggung Suranata gesonden”: 264-265.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.: 265.

of the Susuhunan would supposedly suffice. Thereby, no war of attrition would have to be fought against the “stubborn people”. Only immediate threats as, for example, the Makassarese in Kakappar were to be dealt with.⁶⁰²

The campaign to Kediri had seemingly worn down the VOC forces. Judging from the reports, Hurdt’s weariness appears mostly rooted in administrative hurdles instead of combat. The sources on his campaign are not so much about battles as the gathering of intelligence. Since Javanese contacts were crucial for collecting it, the associations with allies, prisoners, enemies, villagers and warlords gain more attention than bloodshed and tactical concerns. The campaign reports become a looking-glass for cross-cultural networks, cosmopolitan awareness and contrasting acumens. Kediri fell due to pejuangs. The pejuangs fought since Hurdt could draw them in his VOC army.

Intelligence was necessary to bridge pejuang warfare with that of the Company. The reports show the incommensurability between two different ways of warring. The Sulawesi plan to attack Madura typifies this divergence. Whereas they wanted to “ravage” the island and make its residents and lords “oppose Trunajaya more out of remorse”, the VOC men warned them that ‘catching birds’ should not be done by ‘throwing stones at them’.⁶⁰³ Pillage mismatched ploy. As is shown in the conclusion, the manner in which this incommensurability is framed tells a lot about the extent to which VOC men could comprehend the mandala and military market in which they operated.

⁶⁰² Notice that the VOC was also stained by possible attacks of Banten and Hurdt wanted to wait for the response of the Supreme Government before persuading further. Still his main argument remains: “onse Europische en Boegijse magt niet derwaarts oversonden maar verwagten dat de opperhoofden van selfs haar gemoedelijk den Soesoehoenan komen submitteeren”. The quotes in the running text are derived from Dutch: “Madurees of twee derwaarts moeste senden”; “met sagtsinnigheijd daar toe te disponeren” and “sij vermits het een hartneckig volk is”. Briel, *Vervolgh Dagregister* “Voornoemde Pangeran moet self zijn best doen, om de inwoonders van Madura aan hem te verbinden”: 259; and idem, *Vervolgh Dagregister* “Voorstel hoe men best Madura zoude tot redelijkhejd brengen”: 280-281. On the negotiations with the Makassarese as well as the plans to attack them, see: J. Couper, “Letter LVII (6 September, 1679).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 270-271; idem., “Letter LX (15 October, 1679)” In *De Opkomst Van*: 276-278, idem., “Letter LXI”: 278-279; and J. van Vliet, “Letter LVI (3 August, 1679).” In *De Opkomst Van*: 269- 270. For the capture and murder of Kajoran see Marchier, “Letter LVIX”: 274-276; and Sloot and Taalbeecq, “Letter LVIII”: 271-274.

⁶⁰³ I am paraphrasing here, hence the single quotes. Briel, *De Expeditie Hurdt*: 185; and idem., *Vervolgh Dagregister* “De Boegijse groote comt aan boord”: 271-272.

5. Conclusion: Traces of the military labour market

Can Trunajaya's mystical impact be revived? The debate on historiography has shown us the tendencies of De Graaf's 'relational objectivity' and Berg's 'syntypical method'. The former produced chronological narratives stretching over long periods and interpreting the thoughts of actors based on the events surrounding them. Less appealing were explanations centred on the community or organizations of which the actor was part. The syntypical methods did take such factors into account and tried to dissect 'specific complexes of myths' by analysing the intrinsic interests of authors or societies. Yet, neither research approach did justice to Trunajaya.

Relational objectivity ignored how he amassed his men through cults and charisma. And the syntypical method trapped itself in a reciprocal circle in search of the real meaning of myths; were they described explicitly or rather hidden under figurative speech? The central book on seventeenth and eighteenth century Javanese warfare adopted the discursive choices of 'relational objectivity'. Ricklefs' *War, Culture and Economy* treats the impacts of half a century of violence. The kraton collapsed, rebellions were suppressed, and exploitative contracts were signed with the VOC. In the heat of these events, both the desperate cling to royal power and the increasing Company debts come to the fore as the central concerns of the historic actors. Again, the particular perspectives of the contemporaries end up as side-matters.

Both De Graaf and Ricklefs sifted through the VOC sources to find information on contracts, battles and warlords. That these sources constitute windows from which VOC officers beheld the Javanese warfare was no direct concern. 'Dates, 'names' and 'regions' are valuable facts, but the context in which they were scribed down proves 'interests' too. Those very interests -expressed in the selection of issues, layout, remarks and writing style- are yet to be fully appreciated. While these historians conducted seminal research on the materials, the personal perspectives within them were left tangled. Bertrand would not stand for this, and sought to retrieve motives and interests embedded into the cultures of both the Asian and European authors. The influence of warfare on the late seventeenth court is slighted by him, however. Only Ricklefs' recent work has given full due to the martial influence on long-term Islamization.

In the end, the conflicting strands of historians reveal the difficulties in describing the mystical impact of warlords. Such an aim begs a specific inquiry. What war is to whom is the question. Cultures of conflict contrast and can be concealed across the breach of communities. What is obvious to the Javanese is often odd to the VOC, lest they cooperate so intensely that commensurability among the parties is produced. This is exactly what happened during the chaos of the late 1670s. Times of disarray called for new alliances. Soon the Europeans and Javanese would no longer quarrel

at court, but march shoulder to shoulder. A continuum of sorts was achieved between a world of privatised state armies and one of fragmented fraternizations that segmented mandalas.

'Strange' parallels exist between the military enterprises of seventeenth century Europe and Java. On the one hand, the use of an Asian legion by the VOC and the use of the VOC by the Mataram Sunans, mirror the "public-private partnerships" shaping Swiss, German and Dutch armies in the same era. Warlords were to enact the wars intended by their governors; signing agreements and gathering provisions, arms and men for profit or benefits.⁶⁰⁴ On the other hand, the elaborate alliance system intrinsic to mandalas required a military approach different from the one uniting, for instance, the Dutch States Army. Not so strangely, the VOC had to adapt its intelligence to capture the dynamics of Javanese warfare fraternization. Most warlords in the archipelago could not be contracted and their war-bands were united ad hoc.

Yet, the continuity of upheaval, rebellion and war evoked the need for local warriors to settle lingering inland issues. Speelman's adage of eradicating the enemy, inclined towards gathering as many troops as possible to bring resistance to a close. Next to the Batavian 'Asian legion' arose a new much more improvised form of Asian alliance.⁶⁰⁵ The military reputation established in the last few decades, allowed the VOC to access a 'stable flow' of itinerant war-bands in Java, Timor, Sulawesi and the Moluccas.⁶⁰⁶ The ways of war bended before the breeze. The Asian legion composed of strictly administrated groups like the *Mardijkers*, were complemented by the temporary assistance of *pejuangs* charged by autonomous war lords.⁶⁰⁷ Warrior charisma slowly became one of the pillars of the VOC's army. The Company field reports reflect these changes.

The Company men had to craft agility in a military labour market that was unconventional to European standards. Commensurating Javanese notions of hierarchy and struggle proved a crucial step to do so. Mataram and the VOC were each situated in their own 'cosmopolis' or understanding of government and warfare; of hierarchies and their dissolution. The case study on Van Goens demonstrated how the impression of Oriental despotism derived from incomprehension of the court hierarchies and diplomacy. The frustration of dealing with capricious court fractions drafted the rejection of the polity or mandala at large. In consequence, Amangkurat I was spurned as an oppressor.

⁶⁰⁴ The military enterpriser was less visible in Java, although that might be a natural outcome of the more restricted monetary economy. In some ways, the 'fiscal-military' state was never founded there, and the military boom after the 1670s in Europe did not find a direct parallel along the likes of Mataram, even if the Sunan tried to achieve it. Of course, the VOC itself equally "represented a huge level of delegated military authority by European states". Still, that is not of interest if one restricts the analysis to how VOC men *on Java* dealt with Javanese warfare (p.321). See Parrott, *The Business of War*: 13, 19-23, and 307-317.

⁶⁰⁵ De longh, *Het Krijgswezen*: 53- 56 and 61-78; and Raben, "Het Aziatisch legioen": 181, 185 and 197.

⁶⁰⁶ Hägerdal, *Lords of the Land*; Andaya, *The Heritage of Palakka*; and Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku*: 1-46.

⁶⁰⁷ Notice that the *Mardijkers* also appeared to be a strictly administrative group; only existing in unity on paper.

The description of warlords and war-bands followed patterns similar to that of the autocrat. In the reports of Speelman and Hurdt, four warlords stand in the limelight: Raden Trunajaya, Raden Kajoran, Karaëng Galesong and Sunan Amangkurat II. Each gained labels and all were judged on their leading capabilities. What is more, their followers were scrutinized to see how compliant and alike they were. Just as Van Goens rejected the “slavish” court subjects, so did Speelman dismiss the stubborn Madurese, ‘deceptive’ Makassarese and Kajoran’s “creatures and temple priests”.⁶⁰⁸

To examine how the VOC sources described and comprehended fraternizations of these war-bands demands recognizing the biases reflected on them. Hence before continuing on mystical impacts, it is to be wondered what image was produced of men like Trunajaya. How was his charisma demeaned to that of a culprit? In one way, failed diplomacy was at the root of rejection. Speelman’s attempt to find a docile heir urged elimination of the rousing Madurese warlord for the sake of tranquillity and profits. Yet, the peaceful submission of Trunajaya was still strived for. It was realized that his adherents were numerable, and his ‘credit and status’ rising.⁶⁰⁹

Securing Amangkurat II’s power required breaking the esteem held by his opponent, be it in fight or consent. Even after war was declared. Showing off brawn while marching to Kediri turned out a good way of winning regard and reducing that of the enemy. But brawn went with brains; new alliances were not only fought for in physical encounters, but also through the appeal of ones warlords. Troops were attracted to their charismas. Demands of subordination were easier to make with their presence. Hence, the enemies remained partners of negotiation. Their charismas could not be denied, no matter whether they were used for hostile means or not. Kajoran, Galesong and Trunajaya might have been despised, but they were equally urged to lay down their arms and join the new Mataram. All would add strength to the mixed army the VOC had gathered and stabilize the mandala for which it was fighting.

The comments on Kajoran and Galesong illustrate this best. Kajoran’s ‘devilish prophecies’ and religious deception “distracted the common population from their required obedience”.⁶¹⁰ The admiral is wary of his schemes to subject the Pasisir and strike deals with elites and royals. Yet, informants conveyed that Trunajaya was the real overlord. Even through a diarchy was planned, Trunajaya draws all regalia and Kajoran himself to his headquarter. Speelman smells the opportunity to offer Kajoran a better alternative. He stresses how the warlord deserted Mataram due to misgivings, and could be “be brought back to friendship” as a state minister.⁶¹¹ The devil was loathed and craved for.

⁶⁰⁸ Speelman, *Inscriptie Edele Vertrek*: 875-876.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*: 781- 782.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*: 746.

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*: 845.

The Makassarese are approached in the same way, especially because their rupture with Trunajaya was more evident. From the start on, Speelman notices their internal fractures and attempts to split them apart. At the same time, he is unreceptive towards Galesong's difficulties on keeping his "small troop units" in order. Whenever the VOC admirals complains to Galesong for not respecting treaties between them, the warlord's lacking control over his roaming war-bands is dismissed as an excuse. The VOC men accuse him of either seeking to establish his own Javanese realm or join hands with Trunajaya.

As a potential threat, the Makassarese are rejected as a deceptive group of unwanted conquerors. As a potential partner, Hurdt seemed to keep faith of 'conscripting' them as units of his army. Deception taught him, however, not to expect too much. But the Sunan teaches a different lesson. He keeps addressing Galesong and other Makassarese lords as potential warlords and governors in his service. Despite his dismay, Hurdt finds himself in need to keep approaching the Makassarese for cooperation.

Like his subordinates, the overlord was not strictly an adversary. Alliance was sought with Trunajaya. The reports of Miero and Couper prepared ground for maligning the warlord as stubborn, vicious and Islamic; however devout. The rumours on dissent within Kediri and assassination attempts confirmed his malicious intentions. Yet, the ultimate aim remains incorporation, not to bring defeat. Trunajaya keeps being asked to acknowledge the Sunan as "his just lord and sovereign" and return to Madura.⁶¹² Disappointments followed disappointment for Trunajaya had no intention to do so. He wanted a Sultan not a Sunan; he wanted a natural war, not one involving the VOC; he wanted to cultivate East Java in peace, but not send an embassy to Amangkurat.

Throughout the insurgence, the warlord cherished his autonomy. Naturally, all his bids for the throne were ridiculed by the admirals. Any pretention for becoming a Ratu Adil or just prince needed to be nipped in the bud. Panembahan or Sultan; he remained a scoundrel till he was either dead or a vassal. Preference went to the latter, however. Not only would costs of conquest be avoided, capable warlords would equally increase the might of the Company or Mataram. His Madurese followers, however diverse they actually were, would provide a valuable addition to any realm or mandala. That is probably why Amangkurat II offered him half of Madura after his capture, despites the personal hatred between the two. His death likely followed in deny of his requested service.

The previous warlords were both 'devils and saints' depending on the situation, the military fractions exposed to and the kind of informants providing intelligence. While Kajoran, Galesong and Trunajaya were never purely treated as enemies, Amangkurat II's pretensions to sovereignty were

⁶¹² Speelman, "Letter XXIX": 135-136.

supported through thick and thin. And thin it could get. Coastal towns were lost, the kraton fell, Brantas could not be crossed, sickness struck; these were all events troubling his resumption. But the biggest issue was often he himself. The admirals are bothered by his womanizing, neglect of the campaign and his inability to control his own lords and manpower. And while Speelman considered him the legitimate heir, the Sunan's allure appeared to fall short next to that of the insurgents.

But an interesting dynamic arose between the VOC and the Sunan. The latter asked the Company's assistance in reconquering territory "so many may follow me" again.⁶¹³ The former insisted that Amangkurat joined on march to win over from local rulers. The king sought to derive power from the mercenary, and the mercenary sought to achieve power through the king. Warlord and warrior alike were requested to join, either out of respect for the sovereign or out of awe for the European military. To Amangkurat, Speelman and Hurdt were powerful warlords capable of turning the tide. When the tide did turn, they could be dismissed. Not only because of having retrieved the Sunan's followers, but also because the newly acquired cult would be strongest without the continued interference of outsiders. As the Bantenese Sultan Ageng had warned Amangkurat II; life, religion and realm were to be on one line.

The sources discussed here prove they were not for both Amangkurats. Van Goens describes a Sunan on its throne, Speelman one in exile, and Hurdt one on rampage. These are scenes of diplomacy, despair and combat; all starring a monarch that showed more sympathy towards women than holy men. The 'long march' to Kediri can be taken as a desperate effort to change the royal image. This thesis is really about marches rather than battles. Javanese politics centred on soft power not hard one, and as the Javanese adage goes: "soft power always prevails over hard power". The walk of warriors is altogether different from their assaults. Their function was to impress as much as fight. At times, military advances even resembled ritual processions.

The VOC men wilfully participated in them for the sake of bringing inland stability and thus money to their pockets. However, intricacies of fraternizations, submissions, and legitimacy could not be ignored by them. More than spilling blood, the campaign revolved around these issues. Hence, the Company needed to recognize martial networks. Like any procession, symbolic values became expressed in social ties. One is reminded of the *Garebeg Muludan* -the celebration of the Birth of the Prophet- where rice-mountains (*gunungan*) are carried around the kraton under the protection of "royal soldiers in battle dress". The *gunungan* came to stand for the wealth of the realm, eaten by the people and courtiers at the end of the procession.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹³ Amangkurat II, "Letter XVII": 130-132.

⁶¹⁴ This is, at least, how it developed nowadays; during the seventeenth century different traditions were likely in use. L.F. Brakel, "Islam and local traditions: syncretic ideas and practices." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 32, No. 92 (2004): 13.

The masses of men gathered during campaigns symbolize power and wealth as well. They tempted onlookers to submit to its commander; to be provided by his leadership as a bowl of rice to the hungry. Even if large parts of the army consisted out of porters, their mere presence still demonstrated abasement to the warlords. Marches turned into analogies of the network a ruler had expanded; quite alike the kraton rituals. Not soldiers, but their lords formed the hubs of it. The VOC men were part of these networks, and were delving out their own connections through correspondence with certain fractions within it.

During those interactions and through those associations, the Europeans found their 'devils and saints'. As mentioned, the support given or refused strongly determined the portrayal of courtiers, rulers and warlords. Troops were of less interest. After all, most of the VOC commanders used to be diplomats; and politic negotiations are made with rulers and their delegates, not subordinates. The diplomatic system of the VOC naturally zoomed in on the leaders not the warriors. They were the ones addressed in diplomatic letters, and the ones replying. This gave a platform for expounding their concerns and motivations whereas those of the common warriors remained unheard.

Scarcely do the leaders mention lineages, Walis or Islam. Their statements were hardly ever spiritual. Yet, when considered as part of a military labour market, the implicit religious sides of them are revealed. 'Intensified identities' -coined by Ricklefs- can be distinguished in the manner recognition is given to Amangkurat II and different war-bands are joining the march to Kediri. Speelman's fears derive from the rising Islamic appeal of men like Kajoran, and Hurdt's weariness is caused by fundamental disagreements on commanding troops with distinct ethnic and religious backgrounds. Yet, all these groups hurdled under the Sunan's banner; showing his allure was finally matching those of insurgents like Kajoran.

The VOC men did notice this. The socio-religious identification among martial gangs became most evident during the campaign. Surely, Hurdt does account fragmentation among the pejuang; all war-bands appear to have a mind-set shaped by specific localities and particular beliefs not shared with the indigenous army at large. But they affiliated with each other too. Hence the distribution of Mataramese offices among the warlords after the fall of Kediri; they were positioned in a new common hierarchy. Next to such state power existed a religious one. Both united the Sunan's subordinates. Hurdt's attempt to crown the Sunan, reveals he too grasped the potential of spiritual authority. Clues on it were given whenever pilgrimage sites like Watu Bethék -the 'hole' of asceticism- were passed by. Religion is never addressed directly; not a single author mentions the Walisanga. Nonetheless, traces persist of the warrior charismas and even some of the myths that seem to underpin these martial groups.

The realm we wandered through in this thesis was one of mandalas, warlords and Sunans but above all else Walis, asceticism, and Islam. Traces in babads and VOC sources show Trunajaya relied on these factors to construct his warrior charisma. Hurdt and Speelman never explicitly realized this, but their endeavour to win him over underlines how they did grasp part of his reputation. His refusal to comply immediately made clear Trunajaya was not just one of the warlords but held pretensions to the 'Majapahit crown'. The competition between the two overlords -Amangkurat II and Trunajaya- resembles the contest for warriors on the Indian subcontinent. The two opponents mirrored the millennial sovereigns and ascetic warriors overseas. A military labour market spanned between the two leaders. The VOC was caught in the middle.

The manner in which the Company arranged alliances demonstrates how similar the Indonesian archipelago and the Indian subcontinent were when it came to reaching alliances. The martial continuum is as evident as the other 'strange' parallels drawn over the Indian Ocean or in Southeast Asia.⁶¹⁵ Military demand and supply fluctuated strongly in both cases, and both areas were characterized by itinerant troops shortly sticking to overlords whenever the opportunity arrived. Hence, the ease of 'Afghan' warriors to settle in the Mughal Empire, and the opportunity for the Makassarese fighters to roam around Java for a long time. Both troops suddenly supplied skilful warriors in great demand. This allowed a convenient position; negotiating with multiple lords plus states and making requests proportional to the degree to which their brawn was desired.

Those impulses of warriors shaped the reports looked at here. The dynamics discussed above thereby determined the epistemic value of these sources. The endeavours of the authors did not resound '*veni, vidi, vici*', but rather the Arabic 'keep your friends close; hold your enemies closer'. Complicated alliances were reported, not simple victory marches. In other words, the knowledge sought for was different from that expected by De Graaf and Ricklefs. Their chronologies describing opposing dichotomous forces tend to deceive the many links connecting the armies. These links were the warriors themselves; war-bands and pejuang moving from one overlord to another.

Next to contracts and commerce, all VOC eyes were on the mobility patterns, fraternizations and leaderships of allies and potential partners in war. Clues of a larger Javanese military market thus scattered over the pages written to the Supreme Government in Batavia. The aggressive nature of the Javanese realm was hence underlined, and an image of the Javanese was constructed that contradicted with the serene romantics of the *Tempo Doeloe* (i.e. Good Old Times) two hundred

⁶¹⁵ A. Azra, *Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2004); K.N. Chaudhuri, *Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); V. Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Volume 2, Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800-1830* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); D. Lombard, *Le Carrefour Javanais: Essai d'histoire globale*, vol. I, II, and III (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociale, 1990); and A. Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680*, vol. I and II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

years later. The way in which the seventeenth century image of warrior charismas contrasts with that of the colonial times, enables a claim of reviving Trunajaya's mystical impact.⁶¹⁶ It is simply a matter of denying the stereotypes of indifferent and immobile natives that developed afterwards.

The portrayal of Javanese warriors became a shadow of its former self in the nineteenth century. Under the *Pax Neerlandica*, the Bupati clung to their image of warlords or *satriya* (refined knight) and celebrated their own Mataramese *Tempo Doeloe* by maintaining *jagos* ('fighting cock') and henchmen.⁶¹⁷ That those *jagos* turned from respected warriors to thugs only underlines the words of the VOC soldier Schmalkalden used in the motto: "[b]ið Java ruhig steht und füs sein Zulist [list] gestillt." During war, men as Speelman might have sought close cooperation, but their ideologies founded the colonial state and its complete suppression. While depending on charismatic warriors, the VOC equally ushered in their decline. Of this, the death of Trunajaya was just a token.

Nineteenth century literature illustrates the demise. The 1890 children's novel 'The Crown of Mataram' figures brave Dutch soldiers fighting thievish foes on quest for the lost regalia of their unfaithful ally the Sunan. Camped in Japara, a telling depiction is given on the European conquerors and their Asian dupes. The "sturdy [VOC] fellows ... with tanned faces, iron fists, and sparkling eyes ... stood in great contrast with the dreamy and apathetic Javanese ... who showed no sign of the zeal that gleamed in the eyes of the Dutch soldiers".⁶¹⁸

No surprise; whatever the outcome they will "win nothing" for all the "mean and inhumane" Javanese leaders would mistreat them alike. In the VOC sources consulted, these warriors certainly were not dull and apathetic, nor were their lords disinterested in their faith. Two-hundred years before the *Tempo Doeloe*, those very troops were the lifeblood of a campaign struggling to muster an army of all shapes and sizes. The only reason the 'brave Dutch' managed to do so was through the help of local warlords. But decades of colonization made the Europeans forget. Warriors once hallowed were now shallowed to obscurity.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁶ The colonial times are here taken as the period after the Giyanti treaty of 1755.

⁶¹⁷ Nordholt mentions the "colonial ideology" of "closed, more or less harmonious communities of farmers and non-agrarian specialists within which internal conflicts were controlled by the village councils". This caused ignorance on the aggressive role of village heads and *jagos*, leaving the latter to live "in the shadow of the colonial state". The legacy of warlords might still have led to some attention for the *jagos*, however. But this is to be further investigated. H.S. Nordholt, "The Jago in the Shadow: Crime and 'Order' in the Colonial State in Java." *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 25, no.1 (1991): 77-78; and Houben and Kolff, "Between Empire Building": 186.

⁶¹⁸ The quote derives from: "Het waren kloeke knapen, die soldaten van de Compagnie. Stevige kerels met gebruide gezichten, ijzeren vuisten en fonkeldende oogden, dier er niet naar uitzagen, alsof zij voor een troepje Javanen bevreesd zouden zijn. Zij vormden dan ook eene groote tegenstelling met de droomerig en lusteloos uitzijende Javanen, die voor het meerendeel met lanssen gewapend en, op den heupdoek en den hoofddoek na, naakt, geen zier van de geestdrift vertoonden, welke uit de oogden der Hollandsche soldaten schitterde". Van Balen, *De kroon van Mataram*: 6.

⁶¹⁹ The quote derives from: "wonnen er niets bij" and "leelijck en onmenscheelijck". *Ibid.*: 6.

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Notes on the foot- and endnotes

- I. In the cases of edited primary sources, the writing of the editor and the original author are distinguished through separate references: one credited to the former, the other to the latter. Hence these book appearing in both the primary and secondary literature list. The editors usually add essays at the beginning or end of their books hence the need for this measure.
- II. Repeated footnotes and endnotes referring to De Jonge et al., *De Opkomst van het Nederlansch gezag in Oost-Indie* abbreviate the title to *De Opkomst Van* without the authors for the sake of saving space. Reference to letters in 'De Opkomst Van' do not include the addressed institution or person for this is almost always the Supreme Government in Batavia. In exceptional cases, alternative addressees are indicated through quoting the heading of the letter. For the other letters the heading is left out since they are identical and do not convey important information other than the author and date.
- III. KITLV : Uitgeverij van het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde.

Appendix I: Index of royal titles and other terms ⁶²⁰

Arja	(Madurese) High nobility
Adipati/dipati	Lord
Bupati	Regent
Kjai	Saint (usage does not appear restricted to holy men)
Karaëng	Makassarese prince by blood
Mantri	Royal servant/ dignitaries
Mas	Nobleman
Nebey	Lord
Ngabéhi	Public servant of intermediate rank
Ombol	County Regent
Panembahan	Very high nobility, saint
Pangéran	Javanese prince by blood
Patih	Royal Minister
Prabu	King
Priyayi	Nobles of the robe/ royal administrators
Radèn	Intermediate nobility
Sunan	Honoured person ⁶²¹
Susuhunan (abbr. Sunan)	Lord of lords; the central king
Tumënggung	Public servant of high rank or warlord ⁶²²

Further Definitions:

Daghregisters	Daily journals of the VOC
Fitna	Drive to secession and upheaval
Ghazi	Honorific and mythical title for warlords; or the myth of such lords (Middle East and India)
ghazi	Warriors who fought for Islam but were not devout per se (Middle East and India)
Kraton	Javanese royal palace
Kris	Asymmetrical dagger associated with the Indonesian archipelago
Mandala	Realms with diffuse political power defined by their centre
Military labour market	The total demand and supply of warriors; often shaped by itinerant war-bands
(Military) march	This term usually refers to regular, ordered and synchronized walking of military formations. Here, however, it has the looser connotation of army sections moving to a particular locations led by a warlord
Pasisir	Northern coastal region of Java
Pejuang	Itinerant warriors following warlords
Prajurit	Soldiers; or more specifically royal soldiers
Walisanga	The nine saints or literally the nine representatives; the revered saints of Islam in Indonesia
Warlord	A territorial ruler, aristocrat or town representative raising troops he can allocate to military enterprisers
War-band	Groups of warriors following warlords

⁶²⁰ These definitions are partly based on Van Goens, *De Expeditie Hurd*: xii.

⁶²¹ The meaning changed over time; see the introduction.

⁶²² Other royals and public servants could function as warlords too, hence the preference for the term warlord rather than Tumënggung in this thesis.

Appendix II: Chronology of Trunajaya's uprising⁶²³

1624	Sultan Agung takes Prasena of Madura to Mataram and grants him the title Cakraningrat (I).
1647	Raden Demang Mlaja, son of Cakraningrat I, dies on the alun-alun of the Mataramese kraton while fighting Pangéran Alit.
1656	Apparent death of Cakraningrat I. Raden Trunajaya, son of Demang Mlaja, is now raised by his uncle Pangéran Ad Sampang, or Cakraningrat II.
1667	Death of Amangkurat I's wife Ratu Mtilang.
1668	Capture of Raden Oji, the lover of Pangéran Adipati Anom.
1669	Pangéran Adipati Anom (Amangkurat II as prince)'s dalam takes fire in July.
1670	Death of Pangéran Wiramenggala. Temporary exile of Pangéran Adipati Anom to Lipury, shortly after he is positioned as the leader of Surabaya.
1672	The Merapi volcano explodes at the 4 th of August; resulting into thousands of deaths. Dhobras accident caused by Ratu Singasari.
1673	Apparent treaty signed between Pangéran Adipati Anom and Raden Trunajaya, as mediated by Raden Kajoran. Trunajaya conquers Madura.
1674	De Makassarese are welcomed at Madura (before 2th of December).
1674 /1675	Turn of the year: attack of the Makassarese. They plunder harbours in East Java with the assistance of some Mataramese regents and Pangéran Adipati Anom. The latter is send back to the court.
1675-1677	Large famines on Java caused by drought.
1675	Shortly before December the alliance between Raden Trunajaya and Karaëng Galesong is secured through the marriage of Galesong with Trunajaya's daughter Suretna. In December, a second Makassarese attack on the East Javanese harbours initiates. Surabaya is burned through the help of Pangéran Adipati Anom.
1676	<i>In April and September:</i> Dutch-Javanese expeditions against the Makassarese take place <i>On the 24th of May:</i> Raden Prawiratarun passes away near Demung. <i>On or just after the 25th of May:</i> defeat of Kjai Pandji Karfula on land. <i>Early June:</i> Galesong flees back to Madura. <i>19th of June:</i> Destruction of Mataramese fleet near Sidapaksa. <i>In August:</i> All of East Java again occupied by the insurgents <i>In September:</i> VOC admiral Poolman destroys part of the Makassarese fleet and subsequently visits Trunajaya on Madura. After his departure, the Makassarese and Madurese traverse the Madurese Strait to Java. <i>On 13th of October:</i> Battle at Gegodog. Lords like Pangéran Purbaja get killed. Pangéran Adipati Anom is betrayed; he expected a feigned battle. <i>On the 20th of November:</i> The Madurese forces reach the alun-alun of Japara, where they are countered by Javanese and Dutch troops. <i>On the 29th of December:</i> Speelman leaves Batavia to start a new Campaign in Central and East Java.
1677	<i>In January:</i> Trunajaya moves to Surabaya to make it his stronghold <i>Between the 27th of January and the 10th of February:</i> VOC delegate Moor Piero visits Trunajaya in Surabaya. At the same time, Kajoran makes his first attempt to conquer the Mataramese kraton. In retaliation, his town Kajoran is burned.
	<i>On the 26th of March:</i> Council of war between Kajoran and Trunajaya. It is decided to attack

⁶²³ Largely based on the overview provided by De Graaf, "Het Kadjoran-Vraagstuk": 324-325.

the Mataramese kraton from two directions

In *early March*: Pangéran Martasana reconquers Semarang, allowing VOC delegates to be sent to the Mataramese kraton

Between *the 12th and 20th of March*: the VOC delegate Couper signs a treaty in Mataram with the Sunan and his four most important sons.

Between *April and June*: Double offence of the rebels against the Mataramese kraton

Halfway April: Semarang retaken by rebels: the connection with the Mataramese kraton is broken

End of June: Kajoran takes the Mataramese kraton.

On the *2nd of June*: Amangkurat I flees from the kraton

In *July*: Amangkurat I dies of disease. His son Pangéran Adipati Anom succeeds him as Amangkurat II, while his brother Pangéran Puger crowns himself Sunan Ingalaga. The succession struggle starts.

Between *27th of March and 29th of August*: Expedition of Speelman to reconquer Surabaya.

On the *13th of May*: Speelman reconquers Surabaya; Trunajaya flees to Kediri.

On the *19th of September*: Amangkurat II reaches Japara, in search for support of the VOC.

In *September*: The rebels abandon the Mataramese kraton and Trunajaya temporarily flees Kediri due to the Madurese.

In *October*: Puger moves into the Mataramese kraton. Trunajaya reconquers Kediri.

On the *19th and 20th of October*: Amangkurat II signs several contracts with the VOC.

In *November*: Offensive of Kajoran's followers at the Pasisir.

1678 On the *17th of January*: Death of Martapura and Martalaja

On the *23th of March*: Speelman completes his *Missive* to his successor.

Between *June and July*: Second offensive of Kajoran's followers at the Pasisir.

Between the *5th of September and 25th of November*: Hurdt's campaign against Trunajaya in Kediri.

On the *17th of November*: Hurdt's forces cross over the Brantas.

On the *25th of November*: Kediri is taken, Trunajaya flees to Malang; Hurdt's forces occupy the area and return to Surabaya.

Around the *1st of November*: Kajoran moves back to Central Java.

1679 Between *April and August*: The Makassarese warlord Namrud has several victories in Central Java under the supervision of Kajoran

On the *14th of September*: Captain Sloom captures Kajoran's stronghold Melambang, captures the warlords and orders his assassination. Some of his followers -Kartapada, Kartanadi and Kartanagara- continue his struggle.

On the *13th of November*: The headquarter of the Makassarese, Kakappar, is taken by captain Poleman.

On the *25th of December*: Captain Jonker captures Trunajaya and his few remaining followers

1680 On the *2th of January*: Amangkurat II gives the order to assassinate Trunajaya.

Appendix III: Map of Couper's march



Picture 12 Map showing the Southeast Javanese regions Couper marched through while seeking to capture or kill Trunajaya. Names of places and rivers are written down. Drawn around 1695, but likely based on expeditions drafts from 1679.⁶²⁴

⁶²⁴ I. de Graaf, "Aftekeningh van de Mars van den Commandeur Couper, met het leger van de Ed. Comp. door de Provincien Mataram, Bagil, Leer en Loeretenga, in het Zuidoostelyke gedeelte van Java." In *Atlas Amsterdam*, ed. Isaac de Graaff (Amsterdam: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, circa 1695, completed in 1705). Nationaal Archief, VEL1164. (accessed via <http://proxy.handle.net/10648/af9926d8-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84>, on 23-03-2014).