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**The Dutch East India Company in Fuzhou
and
the Dutch merchant's image of China, (c.1660 – c.1690)**



Master of Arts in History - "European Expansion and Globalisation", thesis paper,
under supervision by Prof. Dr. J.J.L. Gommans,

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*“Op de Stadt Hoeksieuw:
Swicht Amstel aen het Y; hier's meer dan uws gekijck
In grootte, en meer Volck als gras al op u velden,
Een brugh roemt van haer lof, die dyusent voet beleeft is, welck in geen twintigh jaer oyt sonder mensch geweest is.”¹*

I. Introduction

I. a. Basic outline

The second half of the Seventeenth century was without question a difficult time for the Dutch state and its commercial lighthouse, the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Wars with England and France, fierce competition and mercantilism placed a heavy burden upon the young republic, which so depended on international free trade. Historians today widely agree that the years around 1680 were a turning point in the East. The renowned historian Om Prakash defined 1680 as the year of “the end of the first phase of the European companies’ trading activities in Asia”.² A very few people would have believed such a statement by that time because of the promising prospects. The Portuguese had successfully been driven out of almost all of their possessions and the spice monopoly seemed secure, with a few exceptions. The market and trading conditions changed though. Customers in Europe became fond of the Far East style - something that is referred to as *Chinoiserie*, a European vision and imagination of the Far East.³ This phenomenon led to the markets’ increasing demand of silk and cotton fashion, called the *Indian craze*⁴ and made all sorts of silk and cotton cloth from the Far East the most wanted items of the trade. There were three ways to obtain silk: Either from Persia, from Bengal or from China. Italian silk was suffering from crop failures, produced in insufficient quantities and quality and was not really competitive.

In the second half of the Seventeenth century the VOC thus intensified its efforts to expand its activities to China. Three embassies were sent to the Manchu court in Beijing in 1655, 1666 and 1686. The loss of Taiwan in 1662, first felt as a prestigious rather than an economical blow to the Company, had destroyed the Dutch plans for their China trade. The Company focussed for a brief time on establishing another fortified post at Keelung on Northern Taiwan from 1664 to 1668 (see further down below), before it redirected its efforts on establishing a foothold directly on the coast either near Canton, Amoy or Fuzhou [called *Hoeksieuw* by the Dutch, author’s note], because it was just impossible to attract any traders to Keelung. Indeed the Dutch were reluctant to set a foot on the mainland. Two possible reasons might have been that they feared a loss of control and the unstable political situation

¹ Cramer, Matthijs: *Borts voyage naar de kuste van China en Formosa, 1662-1664*, Amsterdam, 1670, p. 120.

² Prakash, Om: *The New Cambridge History of India*, Vol. 2: European commercial enterprise in pre-colonial India, Cambridge, 2008, p. 209.

³ Honour, Hugh: *Chinoiserie - The Vision of Cathay*, London, 1961, pp. 7f.

⁴ Gastra, Femme: *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, Zutphen, 2002, pp. 134 and 138.

during the period. Thus in the beginning they always insisted on selling their goods on board of their ships, a demand they quickly had to give up.

Fuzhou became the focus of attention from around 1663 to 1687, shortly before the High Government in Batavia decided to suspend sending own ships to China but to rely on Chinese junk trade to Batavia instead in 1690. To answer the question “Why?” will be the main purpose of this paper. What seems like a logical and rather petty decision given the small gains and insignificance of the trade at Fuzhou in the general balance of East Asia actually touches on the very core of the VOC’s trading policy and the future economical development of the Company as a whole. That is, the significance of intra-Asian trade in financing the Asian purchases and expenditures and the role this trade was to play in the future.⁵

The aim of this paper is twofold. In the first place I want to shed some light on the problems which the VOC was facing by conducting a case study on the trade attempts in Fuzhou: its conceptions, its difficulties and problems and finally the reasons for the suspension and the consequences resulting from this temporal decision in 1690. This will mainly be an economical study, but it will have to pay attention to political changes in China and influences from Europe. Necessarily I am also going to expand the geographical scope beyond Fuzhou and include Canton, Macao, Amoy and Quanzhou [Dutch *Chincheeuw*, author’s note] as far as they relate to the shipping traffic between circa 1660 and 1690. The focus of this study will be on the last decade, the 1680s and the year 1690.

The second part of the study covers the Dutch merchants’ image of China. During my archival research I noticed a remarkable shift in the perception of the other culture, away from the ostentatious and proud idolaters, heathens and betrayers in Matthijs Cramer’s *Borts Voyagie* (1670)⁶ to a more acculturated image, albeit Cramer of course was a soldier and not a merchant. I wondered how far an image was created by the merchant’s interaction and in what way it might differ from the image transmitted by other groups of writers: travellers, diplomats and missionaries, i.e. mostly the Jesuits. Merchants are known for their sober and analytical style. That is why I was particularly interested in their view. Sometimes their image even seemed somehow familiar to me in a historical perspective, in relation to the image of the Chinese in later centuries as well, what made me want to question if it manifested itself in a sort of stereotype. This second part will mainly consist of socio-cultural observations. The core of my study will be formed by the analysis of readings in the Nationaal Archief in The Hague of the *Overgekomen brieven and papieren* of the VOC merchants who were sent to Fuzhou.

Methodologically this is a case study, covering only a predefined and limited geographical area and a brief period of thirty years in a chronological approach, because this seemed the best way to me to illustrate the changes. Although the focus is on the late 1680s and 1690, I deemed it necessary to

⁵ Cf. Glamann, Kristof: *Dutch-Asiatic trade, 1620-1740*, 's Gravenhage, 1981, p. 17.

⁶ Cramer, *Borts voyagie*, pp. A2, 10, 69, 80, 97 and 123.

extend this time frame. That is why I am going to briefly touch on the developments after 1690 and up to 1730 before phrasing my conclusions.

The thesis I am going to propose is that what seems like a planned reorientation towards the Western quarters (*Westerkwartieren*) of the Indian Ocean, to Persia and Surat⁷, to Bengal for silk, textiles and nitre and to Ceylon and the Middle East mostly for coffee, actually was a forced development rather than a deliberate act of the Batavian High Government of India. In this way the VOC mainly reacted to a shortness of money, a lack of suitable shipping capacities and to increased competition from European and Asian merchants and especially the administrative, mercantile and protectionist economic measures of the Eastern governments of China and Japan, supplemented by a shift in European demands and facilitated by a regression of the important Japanese market for the VOC. A cutback of the VOC's share in the intra-Asian trade and a drop in the sale prices of spices also contributed to that outcome. The VOC could not foresee the unbelievable success of tea. In my point of view, it could at least have been anticipated because of growing demands and exports to Europe. What made all worse was that the VOC did not actively change its trading policies or adapt to new market situations, options and economic operational measures like the new English models, but seemed to hold firm to old-fashioned customs of monopoly trade and reduced their participation in the intra-Asian trade.⁸ Speaking of intra-Asian trade I speak of the exchange of textiles from India in the archipel against spices and precious wood. The VOC used these items for exchange into Chinese and Persian silk and the silk then for precious metals from Japan which were again used for purchases in India.⁹ But I cannot strictly limit intra-Asian trade in this way for the whole period because it just as any other trade was subject to fluctuations and changes (see Table V c.), e.g., in demand of Malaysian tin, Siamese and Timorese sandal wood or linen and woollen cloth. Another problem was that VOC merchants were rarely empowered to make their own decisions but were strictly forced to obey their orders and stick to the prices prefixed at Batavia.

Because Joannes Leeuwenson was the Dutch merchant who had the longest term of employment in China I use his conclusions on China trade as one of my main sources. Leeuwenson had been sent by the VOC to China as *opperkoopman* from 1679 to 1682 and as *opperhoofd* of the comptoir at Fuzhou from 1684 to 1687. Thus he had experienced the trade shortly before the emperor permitted his citizens the foreign trade and introduced a new tax system and shortly before the VOC decided to suspend its own activities in China. Vincent Paets' conclusions after his embassy to Beijing in 1686 in my opinion also were influential on the High Government's decision in 1690.

⁷ Blussé, Leonard: *No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690*. In: *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30(1), 1996, p. 74.

⁸ Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, p. 123: Exceptions were spices, Japanese copper trade and Javanese sugar trade, e.g.; He also states that the share from trade in the total income declined from 90% in the 17th century to 60% in the 18th century.

⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 109 and 124. It is important though, that Gaastra also clarifies that the two pre-conditions for this trade: enough money and ships.

There were two other influential factors which need to be addressed. They might not be as important as the economic factors mentioned above, but they repeatedly reappear in the sources, in the writings of Vincent Paets or of the Governor-General Johannes Camphuys whose final decision it was to suspend the trade in 1690. Both addressed the political sphere and endless changes in China and a certain dislike of Chinese habits and mentality, openly expressed in the restrictive legislation at Batavia starting in April 1690. The following Governors-General have been deeply involved in the decision of 1690. Willem van Outhoorn and Joan van Hoorn as part of the High Government's council probably shared Camphuys' policy and attitude towards China and very likely carried it on. There had been an uprising in Spanish Manila, almost foreshadowing the massacre at Batavia in 1740. Thereafter all non-Christian Chinese were expelled from Manila in 1688 and the remaining Chinese inhabitants moved to residential areas outside the walls.¹⁰ Perhaps the High Government, despite the economic benefits for Batavia from Chinese enterprise, feared similar things to happen at Batavia resulting from uncontrolled immigration. The second factor was the discussion between the Heren XVII and the High Government of India about the Company's Euro-centric trade policy. To make Ceylon a second *rendezvous* in 1665 and direct shipping were ideas that were not welcomed by the High Government of India.¹¹

I. b. Source criticism

Little has been written on the VOC's presence in Fuzhou so far. What also leads me to a regrettable disadvantage of this study which I do not want to conceal: Unfortunately I have no knowledge of the Chinese language and so I was confined to rely exclusively on Dutch, English and German primary and secondary sources. I am aware that this might lead to a one-sided view and that it left me also unable to double check the Dutch merchant's accounts for their correctness. I might use in my defence that I was precisely interested in the Dutch view. I am aware that there are the so called *di fang zhi*, local chronicles or gazettes, but I am not sure how important the Dutch presence was to the Chinese at all considering the parallel developments and wars in China.

With regard to my secondary sources I relied as the backbone of my work on John E. Wills' fine book *Pepper, guns and parleys* (1974) and Leonard Blussé's excellent articles *Chinese trade to Batavia during the days of the VOC* (1979) and *No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690* (1996). John Wills focused on diplomatic and cultural interaction. He saw the reasons for the Dutch withdrawal mainly in the tributary trade system and in the monopolisation of trade by the provincial governors and their factors or client merchants. In his latest work *China and Maritime Europe* (2010) John Wills added official extortion and unreliable

¹⁰ Ptak, Roderich; Rothermund, Dietmar: *Emporia, commodities and entrepreneurs in Asian maritime trade, ca. 1400-1750*, Stuttgart, 1991, p. 71.

¹¹ Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, p. 114.

mercantile practises as reasons.¹² Leonard Blussé reasoned that the more convenient Chinese junk trade to Batavia was responsible for the decision to stop sending own ships to China, but he also takes into account the competition with other European powers, especially with the British and the monetary problems of the VOC. Both theses fall a bit short in my opinion, although I can agree to both. It is just that I think that the issue is more complex. John Wills' thesis of problems with officials and monopolisation of trade does not fully convince me because the VOC had to deal with high-ranking and monopolising groups or officials almost everywhere in India, Persia, Asia and the East Indies and rarely decided to end any trade because of this. Concerning the tributary trade its negative ramifications had been acknowledged by the Imperial court before 1690 because of the high costs it incurred and was abolished. Leonard Blussé's argumentation, albeit very appealing, did not fully convince me either. I was unable to find conclusive evidence for an advantage in nautical techniques or economical advantages of the junk trade.¹³ Among the ships coming from China to Batavia during the time under consideration only a few were specifically classified as *wangkang*¹⁴ and the VOC employees in China only referred to the small junks of the Coxins sailing between Taiwan and Macao as *wangkang*.¹⁵ The rest were termed *junks*. There exists a description by the harbourmaster of Makassar, J. Van Schinne, admiring the effectiveness of a *wangkang*, but it is from a later date.¹⁶ To quote from Anup Mukherjee's entry *Indian Ocean Trade* in the *Encyclopedia of World Trade*: "*The industry gradually adopted Western methods of building ships. However, technologically the Indo-Arab boom and the Chinese junk were on a par with European ships. European ships would attain superiority only by the mid-nineteenth century when they started to use the steam engine.*"¹⁷ Arguable as this might be at least I doubt that a Chinese trader would offer better prices to the Dutch at Batavia than in China, even more so considering that they had to pay heavy duties at both places as well. And why should any Chinese merchant forego a higher profit margin from lower transport costs and pass it on to his Dutch customer? Besides, the junk trade had long been established before 1690, so it would have been easy to rely on it far earlier. This is to say that I see it rather as a consequence than as a reason. I would have expected to find complaints in the primary sources, but they never mentioned transport costs being a decisive factor. It might very well be

¹² Wills, John E. (ed.): *China and Maritime Europe, 1500-1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy and Mission*, Cambridge, 2010, p. 201.

¹³ Blussé, Leonard: *No Boats to China*, p. 62: *Wangkangs* were smaller, faster and outmaneuvered the Dutch.

¹⁴ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, The Netherlands, archive no. 1.04.02, inventory no. 1432, p. 475 (henceforth NA- only): Among 13 ships from China to Batavia Dec 13th 1687 – Feb 17th 1688 were" 5 *wangkangs* from Amoy, the rest were classified as *jonken* (3), *jagten* (3) and *chaloupjes* (2).; Cf. Generale Missiven, Dl. 2, p. 89: 1 *wangkang* in 1676, and Dl. 3, p. 615: 1 *wangkang* in 1689.

¹⁵ NA-1.04.02, 8680, pp. 126v., 139v. (two '*tayowanse wangkangs*' with salt) and 149. (anno 1682)

¹⁶ Sutherland, Heather: *Trepang and wangkang - The China trade of eighteenth-century Makassar, c. 1720s-1840s*. In: *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, vol. 156/3 (2000), p. 453f.; Cf. Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic trade*, pp. 239f.: An inability to compete with Chinese freight rates was stated in the '*Versamelingh van de Verkoopingen*' of Zeeland 1724-36 in the Nationaal Archief, NA 8335. But it is from a later period.

¹⁷ Entry *Indian Ocean Trade* (2005). In: *Encyclopedia of World Trade - From Ancient Times to the Present*. Retrieved from http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy.library.uwa.edu.au/entry/sharpewt/indian_ocean_trade; last viewed 2012 Nov 27th, 9.35am.

that a more attentive bookkeeping after 1700 made the disadvantage visible, but I am not convinced that it played a role in the decision in 1690. In my opinion Chinese carriers just filled the gap which the Dutch trading ships left and the disappearance of junk trade in the 1730s, when the Dutch themselves sailed to China from Batavia again, would support this assumption.

The official reason given by the Governor-General in Batavia was that it was more effective to send the ships to Bengal than to China. This reason seems quite illogical given the fact of sinking silk prices in China, increasing demands in Europe and an even fiercer competition on the Bengal market with the other European nations than at this time there was in China, but can be explained by a lack of smaller vessels with smaller shipping capacity and crews, while China was not the priority destination for available ships and the newly built huge East Indiamen were better suited for voyages to Europe. The decision to withdraw from China was decisive and to a large extent forced on the High Government in India by capital shortness. The Heren XVII ordered to send money to Bengal and India first instead of using it in the intra-Asian trade.

II. The VOC and China: Political and economical setting, aims, mentalities

II. a. The VOC

In 1641 the Dutch had conquered Malacca from the Portuguese. Negapatnam at Coromandel followed in 1659, Makassar in 1667 and the sultanates of Ternate and Bantam in 1677 and 1682 respectively. The VOC's policy aimed at securing a spice monopoly, though from the beginning silk trade from China had been a goal of the Company. After an attack under Cornelis Reijersen on Macao had been repelled in April 1622, the Dutch first established a post on the *Pescadores* [Penghu] and in 1624 on Taiwan. By 1635¹⁸ they had accomplished a stable trade route via Taiwan to Japan with the help of the influential trade network of the Zheng family under Zheng Zhilong [Iquan, d.1661] and his son Zheng Chenggong [Coxinga, d.1662]. In 1655 the Dutch had sent an embassy to the Qing court from Canton to enquire about trade rights. After Coxinga's attack on Nanking in 1659 had failed and tensions in the trade relation with the Dutch increased and were enforced by his suspicions about the Dutch negotiations with the Qing, Coxinga laid siege to Fort Zeelandia on Taiwan in 1661. The fortress fell in February 1662 and the Dutch concept for China trade had to be revised. The Dutch, after two naval wars with Britain (1st: 1652-1654 and 2nd: 1665-1667), faced the terrible *Rampjaar* of 1672 and the start of a third war, this time against the combined French and English power. While peace could be concluded at Westminster with the British in 1674 and the Dutch and British even became allies after the Glorious Revolution in 1688, the Franco-Dutch War went on to 1678 to be followed by the Nine Years War in

¹⁸ Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC*, p. 56.

1688-1697. The British and French mercantilism and protectionism, most of all the British Navigation Act of 1651¹⁹, successfully hampered the Dutch sales in Europe.

The Dutch High Government in Batavia was disunited, following no coherent policy and furthermore was in a constant debate with the Heren XVII about their general policy of monopoly trade and the preference of the European market over the intra-Asian market and a trade policy that was preferred by the High Government in India which better served the prosperity and well-being of Batavia.²⁰ Especially the amount of spices available for the intra-Asian market was constantly becoming smaller due to the exports to Europe.

The Company according to Charles R. Boxer had three main principles which dominated its proceedings in Asia in the Seventeenth century: the acquisition of safe havens or naval bases under a general policy of security, a general rendezvous and the pursuit of the spice monopoly.²¹ To some extent its actions regarding China were also determined by these principles. If successful the attack on Macao in 1622 by C. Reijersen would have not only eliminated a European competitor but also brought the VOC an established trade node with an excellent fortified harbour. The establishments of Fort Zeelandia and Keelung on Taiwan also followed these principles, albeit Zeelandia only succeeded because of the trade cooperation with Coxinga's network and Keelung thus was a complete failure. There was hardly any considerable and valuable trade option left beside the Coxins and the regents due to the needed shipping and money and the risks from piracy and detection.

The Dutch never were extensive fortification builders like the Portuguese and tried to avoid unnecessary expenses.²² Keelung certainly was an exemption as was Negapatnam later, but in my opinion the increasing costs for security and control severely reduced the available monetary resources in Asia. The Dutch were also unable to enforce the spice monopoly. Even the control of the street of Malacca was rather pro forma. The pass system was no tool to fight clandestine trade, which was becoming an increasing problem for the VOC, and while the EIC legalized the private trade the VOC only for a short time allowed participation and opened the trade very late only by 1743.²³ The clinging of the Dutch to strict monopoly policy is one reason for their failure to me.

The main aim of the Heren XVII was to maximize profits in Europe and to reduce the export of bullion to the East to a minimum by obtaining Japanese silver, gold and copper. To maximize profits from this trade they tried various impracticable plans to secure a silk monopoly as well.²⁴ Governor-General Speelman tried with a policy of 'frightfulness' to disturb junk trade to Manila and deployed

¹⁹ Ormrod, David: *The rise of commercial empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650-1770*, Cambridge, 2003, p. 32.

²⁰ Cf. Gaastra, Femme: *Bewind en Beleid bij de VOC, 1672-1702*, Zutphen, 1989, pp. 123ff., 126, 129 and 130.

²¹ Boxer, C.R.: *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800*, ed. by J.H. Plumb, London, 1977, p.188f.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 233f.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

cruisers near Bantam and Palembang to hunt down unconventional pepper traders. Silk junks from China to Japan were also hunted occasionally, but the policy was given up for fear of a Japanese reaction. To uphold the spice monopoly, the Heren XVII tried to adjust prices to a level where it would be impossible for competitors to buy spices outside the Indonesian archipel, e.g., in India and sell them in Europe. At the same time they wanted to prevent prices from falling too low and so becoming unprofitable. Nevertheless the Dutch often used a dumping strategy to force competitors out of the market, which is the typical behaviour of a monopolist.²⁵

The intra-Asian trade did not materialize the hope to fully compensate for the expenses in Asia in which the spice monopoly and the exclusivity of the Japan trade played key roles.²⁶ Spices were mostly needed in India to obtain textiles and Japan was needed to obtain gold in exchange for silk. Here China comes in because Persian silk was of inferior quality. Persia was too far away and too expensive. The Bengal market was highly competitive and the production and exports only by 1680 considerably increased.²⁷ China also offered gold which was needed at Coromandel at an advantageous rate of exchange against silver and other valuable goods like tea, porcelain, radix China or spelter and had a high demand for precious woods and pepper.

Four Governors-General determined the VOC's actions in the East during the period from 1660 to 1690: Joan Maetsuycker (g.1653-1678), Rijckloff van Goens (g.1678-1681), Cornelis Janszoon Speelman (g.1681-1684) and Joannes Camphuys (g.1684-1691). Maetsuycker had been governor on Ceylon beforehand and was interested in a strong position of the VOC on Ceylon and in India. During his time as Governor-General a contract with Palembang was concluded and Makassar brought under VOC control in 1667. Rijckloff van Goens had also been governor on Ceylon and would have preferred to make it the major rendezvous in the East. But the Heren XVII objected. Both, Goens and Maetsuycker, were troubled by war on Java. Cornelis Speelman had been governor on Coromandel and during his governorship Ternate and Bantam were subdued. Joannes Camphuys had been *opperhoofd* of the VOC's comptoir at Deshima in Japan. Because some of the others felt bypassed in his election Camphuys faced some opposition within the council at Batavia. He had the support of the Heren XVII, but he also depended on them because of this.²⁸ Camphuys, who had been on Deshima almost continuously between 1670 and 1675, certainly had a good knowledge and understanding of the condition and development of the Japanese market following the *pancado* system (1672) and Chinese competition. When the chiefs of the Deshima factory were men who took an intelligent interest in their surroundings and made an effort to understand the Japanese viewpoint, they were usually treated respectfully and

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 188f.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 96 and 100.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

²⁸ <http://www.vocsite.nl/geschiedenis/personalia/camphuys.html>, last viewed 2012 Dec 15th, 1.15pm. (Please see the respective site for the other Governors-General.)

considerately by the officials and daimyo with whom they came into contact.²⁹ Ill-timed contradiction and contemptuous behaviour was not tolerated in Japan. The same code of behaviour was valid in China.

Negative Dutch comments on Chinese mentality were exclusively connected with the trade negotiations and may not be misinterpreted as a general verdict. The Chinese, just as the Dutch, were cunning, but also very gifted and clever merchants. They were characterized as greedy, untrustworthy and hardheaded, but somehow even admired for their ability to cooperate with each other and to organize.³⁰ The groups which were despised by the Dutch were the client merchants of the regents and the Chinese defectors from the Coxins. The Dutch early on had decided to ally with the Manchu, though they also were ready to change sides if it would be save and a reroll of the Manchu conquest was seen as possible up to 1683. A trait of character which was hard for the Dutch to deal with was the slow, opaque, ill-tempered and hotheaded manner of the Manchu.³¹ This made them appear unpredictable, although they were also respected because of their discipline and honour. Their uncertainty in regard of the Manchu and the fact that the supply of the important trade goods was controlled by and depended on Chinese viceroys (lieutenant generals) made the Dutch to seek cooperation with the latter.

The Dutch comments on Chinese traits and mercantile practises in the letters might have become stereotypical but certainly did not play a role in the suspension of the trade. In which way these were picked up in Batavia from the letters is another question. What indeed played a role was the apparent inconsistency of the Manchu and their retardatory political style. Although it is never openly mentioned I see as well as the Dutch and the Manchu mentality as one, but not the most important, reason to leave China.

Batavian Dutch and Chinese freeburgers were also active in the China trade, but only traded small amounts clandestinely in the vicinity of Macao and were not much of a real competition. The main competition came from other European and native Chinese merchants. The advantage of the Southern Chinese regents' merchants and Coxins was their huge network, which was long established all over Southeast Asia ('trade diaspora').³² Sumatra, Patani, Malacca and other places had large Chinese communities, as of course had Batavia. And the first Chinese which the Dutch met in Bantam in 1598 were not without reason Fujianese.³³ Palembang, Cambodia, Ayutthaya and North-Java had early

²⁹ Boxer, *Dutch Seaborn Empire*, p. 238.

³⁰ NA-1.04.02, 1241, pp. 405r and 410r.; 1257, p. 1379.

³¹ NA-1.04.02, 1253, pp. 1853 and 1857; 1257, pp. 879 and 1122f.

³² Lockard, Craig A.: *The Sea Common to All: Maritime Frontiers, Port Cities, and Chinese Traders in the Southeast Asian Age of Commerce, ca. 1400-1750*. In: *Journal of World History*, Vol. 21(2), 2010, p. 223.

³³ Herport, Albrecht: *Eine kurtze Ost-Indianische Reisz-Beschreibung*, Bern, 1669, p. 25.

Chinese settlements. Bantam and Banjarmasin were important pepper trade centres for the Chinese merchants and frustrated the VOC's monopoly policy in China to a great deal.³⁴

II. b. Imperial China and the Manchu conquest

The second half of the Seventeenth century was a period of economic depression in China³⁵, of internal migration movements (increasing emigration to Batavia as well around 1680) caused by the destructive civil war and of tensions between the new Manchu and old Chinese officials.³⁶ The Manchu had succeeded in subduing the Southern Ming loyalists in 1662. But only after the end of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories in 1681 they had eliminated the remaining domestic resistance and after the conquest of Taiwan in 1683 from Coxinga's son Zheng Jing [Kimsia in Dutch sources] they finally exterminated the last external threat. The second Manchu emperor, Kangxi (r.1661-1722), had already earlier begun to consolidate Manchu rule over China through administrative changes. By 1666 the Oboi regency, who reigned in Kangxi's name, had established a centralized system of 18 provinces, each governed by a governor, a lieutenant-governor [called viceroy by the Dutch] and a provincial judge. Three provinces formed the jurisdiction of a governor-general. Fuzhou had got a governor and lieutenant-governor in 1647.³⁷ It had already served under the Ming as the seat of a Grand Coordinator³⁸ and was one of the four provinces in 1665 which, because of their importance for the war in the South, had a governor-general for itself.³⁹ Important governors-general in the period were Li Shuaitai [called Taising Lipovi by the Dutch], followed by a Tsiang Povi in January 1667 and an uncle of Kangxi named Yao Ch'i-sheng [called Senong] in 1677. "Povi" or Pu-i was the title of the imperial powerholders and councillors who had seats in the Imperial councils. The *Pim-pu* [council of war] was one of the councils beside the *Li-pu* [council of politics] which decided on the Dutch matters. Governors and governors-general were almost exclusively Manchu bannermen. Mighty Chinese lineages and bannermen in the South were allowed to hold the position of viceroys or lieutenants general. Each major city was furthermore the seat of a Combon [a stadtholder], who was a Chinese in the case of Fuzhou. From the Dutch sources we only know the names of a certain Combon Khouw, Zuy-tsit-sian, who established friendly relations with the Dutch in the 1660s and a Combon Houw, who complained about Joannes Leeuwenson, the Dutch merchant in the 1680s. The second major problem Kangxi had to

³⁴ Lockard, *The Sea Common to All*, pp. 231 and 242: A report in late 1600s noted that nearly half of the ships in the harbour of Ayutthaya's harbour were of Chinese origin.; Dahm, Bernhard; Ptak, Roderich: *Südostasien-Handbuch: Geschichte, Gesellschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur*, München, 1999, pp. 120, 124 and 131.

³⁵ Twitchett; Fairbank: *The Cambridge history of China*, p. 173.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 173 and 176. Cf. also Spence; Wills, *From Ming to Ch'ing*, p. 207: "Chinese officials did have extensive private financial interests which [...] led them to ignore anticommercial laws and ideologies."

³⁷ Guy, R. Kent: *Qing Governors and their provinces: the evolution of territorial administration in China, 1644-1796*, Seattle, 2010, p. 51.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

³⁹ Onam, *Ruling from horseback*, p. 215.

solve was to reduce the influence and power of those mighty Southern lineages. In Fujian this was the Keng clan and in Canton the Shang. Keng Chimao [called Singlamong by the Dutch] was viceroy in Canton in 1655, where he probably also had extensive mercantile influence because the spelter he was selling to the Dutch was delivered from Canton and viceroy in Fuzhou until his death in 1676. He was followed by his son, Keng Ching-chung. Shang Kexi [called Pinglamong by the Dutch] was viceroy in Canton until his death in 1671, after which his son Shang Chih-hsin took over. The main interest of those mighty lineages was to secure their inheritance in the South and to get enough money to fulfil the enormous provincial tax quotas from Beijing. This related to the third major problem the emperor had to solve, namely to break or at least to hold these mighty lineages at bay and to stabilize the disastrous financial situation after the conquest.

It was said that the total income of the court was only 8.750.000 *tael* while the expenses of the province of Yunan under the important military commander Wu San-kuei, a Ming defector who subdued the West and Southwest for the Qing, alone summed up to 9.000.000 *tael*.⁴⁰ China and Japan were forced to develop distinct measures and economic ideas which remarkably resembled European mercantilism by introducing taxation schemes, limiting the exports of precious metals and imports with the help of quotas, fixed prices, licenses or prohibitions, in the case of China perhaps to protect its own growing cotton industry around the lower Yangtse River ('*Nankeen*' linen, e.g.) from European imports. The *Hubu* [ministry of finance] published an edict in 1686 to amend the custom system, which was established in 1684: "*Custom duties should only be levied on sea-going ships and not on boats and carts used in the local business, so as to conform to the emperor's desire to protect commerce*".⁴¹ Probably the Qing focussed first on the expansion of domestic production and markets.⁴² Kangxi was forced to reform the taxation scheme and even to introduce a whole range of new petty taxes (farmland, head and other petty local taxes), thereby increasing the tax burden by around 50% on a population that only by 1680's started to recover.⁴³

While the Dutch complained about the Chinese "*coopmansstiel*"⁴⁴ they shared the Chinese principles of industriousness and frugality. But the Chinese principle of confidence in each others honesty⁴⁵ certainly was disappointed by the Dutch both in political and economical negotiations. That there was fair price thought⁴⁶ is very well documented by Li Shuaitai gruffly answering to the Dutch

⁴⁰ Oxnam, *Ruling from horseback*, p. 218f.: A 1664 statement showed a deficit of 27.000.000 *tael* in silver for the period 1644-1660. The quoted tax balance was drafted 'a few years earlier' by a censor, thus some time around the year 1660. The maintenance of the Wu San-kuei regime in the Southwest costed the Qing a rough 20.000.000 *tael* annually by 1670.

⁴¹ Collis, Maurice S.: *The great within*, London, 1941, pp. 9 and 14.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁴³ Vermeer, *Development and decline of Fukien province*, pp. 159f.

⁴⁴ NA-1.04.02, 1253, p. 1936: Letter C. Nobel an J. Maetsuycker, 16.11.1665: "[...]; *ende dat noch tegen dien hoogen prijs, ende vermiets het coopmansstiel is, niet altijd te vast houdende te wesen, maer sich te voegen (soo veel moogelijk is) na den gemeenen martganck; [...]*"

⁴⁵ Ptak, *Maritime Asia*, p. 63.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

when Nobel complained about the low prices that he would very well know that they were not making a loss.⁴⁷ The Qing concept of economy was following a policy of paternalist tradition with limited state capacity. The market prices of grain and rice were stabilized by controlled sales and thus social stability was achieved. The concept was controversially discussed in Beijing, whether to follow an interventionist or self-regulating market mechanism policy. In the end it was decided in favour of a profit-earning state officialdom against local magnates and gross merchants, which in practice often led to accommodation between administrators and local power holders.⁴⁸ The most common of the four types of organization among the private merchants identified by Lin Renchuan were probably the 'adopted sons' and 'client merchants', trading with borrowed money from rich and powerful families at high interest rate (c. 1.3% monthly, i.e. compound interest).⁴⁹ The situation was even more difficult in the South, where officials and powerful lineages owned around 90% of grain, land and ships, according to Hsieh Chao-Chih in the *Wu-tsa-tsu*.⁵⁰ Monetary and administrative policies were critically discussed in Beijing, as can be seen in Tang Zhen's (1630-1704, from Suzhou) essays "*On authority*" and "*On enriching people*" about avarice and the use of silver⁵¹, and Li Yesi's (1622-1680) works on higher taxation. The whole concept nevertheless aimed at the common wheel (*minsheng*). It was highly idealistic, alone considered the size of the country and available lines of communications, but was solved by two regimes or guiding principles: 'negotiation/cooperation' and 'competition of interests'.⁵² Another pillar of the Chinese political and economic thought was the concept called *pao*, meaning basically a 'contractual relation', but also carries the notions of 'to guarantee' and 'to recompense', and it was used to define the relation between state and merchants.⁵³

The brunt of the monetary tax income had to be borne by the viceroys, because the population paid their taxes in victuals or goods. To control the provinces, the Manchu relied upon a system of overlapping hierarchies and multiple appointments.⁵⁴ Together with the pressure from taxation it led to fierce competition among the regents in a province. Kangxi strengthened another group and pillar of Manchu reign: the mandarins. The most important measures were a remodification of the chin-shi quotas in the provinces, thus increasing the administrative personnel, and the *po-hsüeh hung-ju* examination in 1678/9.⁵⁵ The aim was to integrate the Han Chinese into the networks of official service

⁴⁷ NA-1.04.02, 1264, 174.

⁴⁸ Dunstan, Helen: *Conflicting counsels to confuse the age: a documentary study of political economy in Qing China, 1644-1840*, Ann Arbor, 1996, pp. 31, 63ff., 71 and 109f.

⁴⁹ Renchuan, *Fukien's Private Sea Trade*, p. 186ff.

⁵⁰ Vermeer, *Development and decline of Fukien province*, pp. 246f.: Hsieh Chao-Chih was a man from Ch'ang-le in Fujian.

⁵¹ Dunstan, pp. 106ff. and 123ff.

⁵² Kreuzer, Peter: *Staat und Wirtschaft in China*, p. 105.

⁵³ Twitchett; Fairbank, *The Cambridge history of China*, p. 578.

⁵⁴ Kreuzer, Peter: *Staat und Wirtschaft in China*, p. 29; *tu-fu*: arrangement of regular Chinese provinces with two officials with overlapping powers (most of them bannermen in the beginning, like Li Shuai-t'ai (Taising Lipovi)), see Oxnam, *Ruling from horseback*, p. 160.

⁵⁵ Twitchett; Fairbank: *The Cambridge history of China*, pp. 148f.

to the state.⁵⁶ These *chin-chi* degree holders operated very independently and were allowed to enrich themselves in offices also because the pay was little and the office term short. Thus they had little allegiance except to get the most out of it. There were both local and imperial mandarins or commissioners, who kept an envious eye on each other. The last important group was that of the merchants, which can be divided into agents, brokers or gross merchants and client merchants. The local regents held firm to the profitable silk trade with Japan and also controlled various other key goods such as gold, silver, spelter, iron, copper and *goutdraet*. Because the export was temporarily prohibited for some products like silk through imperial edicts and copper and iron export prohibited by the imperial military council because it could be used for military purposes, the regents always made sure that they were not openly related to any trade of these and used the help of client merchants, who worked with credits received from the regents at high rates of interest. Thus, these merchants were forced to maximize their profits. The regents were only in so far interested in the trade with the Dutch as it not endangered their profitable Japan trade. This changed after 1672 with the *pancado* system in Japan and in 1685 with the trade limitation. The Dutch by then were no longer interested because of the high taxation and mandarin extortion after 1684. The other group of merchants which I refer to as agents were men like the Chinese Lapora and Liulauja. These independent merchants were helpful to the Dutch but followed their own interest and one could never know whom they just worked for.

II. c. Fuzhou and the other ports: Canton, Amoy, Quanzhou and Taiwan

Fuzhou was everything but the first choice for the VOC in China. The choice fell on it more or less because of the fact that it was the political centre of Fujian. The condition of the port itself was inferior to that at Amoy and Chincheo, which for centuries had been centres of Fujian trade. The province itself had advantages and disadvantages. It was ideally situated for the trade with Japan and halfway between the important producing areas of Zhejiang (silk) to the North and Jiangxi (porcelain) to the West, and to the staple harbour of Canton (metals) to the South. The problem was that transport was extremely difficult, because the province mainly consists of mountains and hills. Although the Wuyi Mountains to the West were to become an important producing area of green tea, this was not yet a point of consideration. The harbour itself was unfit for the deepgoing Dutch ships.⁵⁷ In one of the first voyages the *Ankeveen* run on the cliffs called 'the pyramids' midst of the Min River. Goods had to be unloaded at Minjaceen [Mei-hua-zhen, the small fortress town at the entrance of the river Min, author's note] and transported by smaller vessels or river barks to the suburb of Lamthay, while to obtain passes from the regents for that was always required. Coolies and some additional small boats also had to be hired. This

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 136 and 148.

⁵⁷ The Pearl River at Canton also was only shipable up to Whampoa. Company servants also had to leave after the trading season and to rent a housing, see: Jacobs, Els M.: *Koopman in Azie: de handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18de eeuw*, Zutphen, 2000, pp. 142f.

was costly and a reappearing point of quarrels in the negotiations. At one time the tour from Lamthay to the Dutch ships at Tinghay⁵⁸ took three days because the boat had to wait a night at Minjaceen due to bad weather.⁵⁹ That the VOC did not have a trading post with a warehouse at the place was extremely uneconomic and inefficient. The ships had to stay for the whole monsoon period and sometimes additional storeroom space had to be rent in Lamthay.

Just like any trade in the East Indies, the trade with China was determined by the monsoon seasons (Oct-Mar from Northeast, remaining year Southwest monsoon). If the ships and merchants did not manage to get rid of their goods by March they ran into danger to have to leave with unsold goods. The Chinese merchants were aware of this fact and made the best use of it by playing out time and “*dilaj*” the Dutch “*in the Chinese manner*”.⁶⁰ The Dutch ships usually wanted to leave early in February to catch the spring return fleet at Batavia which left in March.

Last but not least it must not be forgotten that the sea around Fujian was very dangerous not just because of piracy but of the weather, too. Heavy summer storms and taifuns (reported in 1664, 1678 and autumn 1680⁶¹) were common and in the primary sources we far too often read about lost ship masts and other damages of ships caused by currents and reefs further north of Zhangzhou.⁶² Due to the coastal evacuation policy there were very few destinations and opportunities to trade as well. The Dutch first relied almost exclusively on Portuguese charts and knowledge. But they used their time on Taiwan and in China to gain a far better understanding of the Chinese culture and knowledge of the land and sea. Constantijn Nobel, the first merchant at Fuzhou, and Hermann de Bitter, the commander at Keelung, expressly ordered the ship captains to collect nautical data around Putuoshan. And the ambassadors Hoorn and Paets also used the possibility to examine river and harbour conditions.⁶³

Fukinese ports had almost no economic hinterland, except some sugar, indigo and shipbuilding industries⁶⁴ and little farmland. Only 40% around Zhangzhou, which was the main port since 1567 (the date of the opening of the port at Hai-ch’eng [Amoy] by the Grand Coordinator of Fujian, T’u Tse-min⁶⁵),

⁵⁸ Tinghay was about 12 miles distance from Fuzhou, see NA-1.04.02, 1362, p. 1057.

⁵⁹ Tappe, David: *Funffzehen jährige Ost-Indianische Reise-Beschreibung, 1667-1682*, Hannover, 1704, p. 122.

⁶⁰ NA-1.04.02, 1377, p. 620v.

⁶¹ Vermeer, Eduard B. (ed.): *Development and decline of Fukien province in the 17th and 18th centuries*, Leiden, 1990, p. 107.

⁶² Spence, Jonathan; Wills, John E.: *From Ming to Ch’ing: conquest, region and continuity in seventeenth-century China*, New Haven, 1979, p. 208.; Cf. Blussé, Leonard; Moor, Jaap de: *Nederlanders overzee: de eerste vijftig jaar, 1600-1650*, Franeker, 1983, p. 196.; Cf. Renchuan,: *Fukien’s Private Sea Trade*, pp. 169ff.; A description of one of these heavy storms at the end of the Southern monsoon can be found in C. Barthelsz. Marchier’s day register’s entry of 15th Sep, 1665. The ships then were usually brought into safety “*onder Tinghaj*” / “*voor Sjotea veilig geleegt*”, see NA-1.04.02, 1257, p. 957. For location please see the Bellin map in VII b..

⁶³ Demel, Walter: *Als Fremde in China: das Reich der Mitte im Spiegel frühneuzeitlicher europäischer Reiseberichte*, München, 1992, p.37.; In 1669 knowledge still relied on Portuguese see charts and knowledge and the same route was used, see VII a., Nobel wrote in 1669: “[...] niemandt der zee verstandighe op dit ship in dit vaerwater ervaren zijn”, see NA-1.04.02, 1272, pp. 1123ff. (There is also a detailed description given of the route as indicated on the map in VII a.)

⁶⁴ Renchuan, *Fukien’s Private Sea Trade*, pp. 202 and 204f.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

30% in the mountain valleys and 70% on the slopes were arable.⁶⁶ Zhangzhou also was, for the Ryūkyū Islands, one of the three 'tributary harbours' next to Ningbo for Japan and Canton for Southeast Asia since 1370, replaced by Fuzhou only in 1472.⁶⁷ Probably up to 80% of whole Fujian consisted of mountains with sparsely terrace farming, so the province relied from the beginning on food imports. Fuzhou fell to the Manchu in 1646.⁶⁸ Tappe estimated the population of the city at around 300.000 men, women and children by 1678.⁶⁹ According to the Dutch merchant ambassador Pieter van Hoorn, Fuzhou was one of the largest cities he passed next to Beijing and Hangzhou. It was said to be equal to Chincheo [Quanzhou] but larger the suburbs included. Fujian according to Hoorn produced paper around *Hempingh* and *Kieningh*. It traded in beer, Cantonese beer, timber and salt. Some iron was traded over the mountains to *Hempingh*, while *goutdraet*, *aluyn* and *radix China* came from *Kimsieuw* and from the area North of Fuzhou. In Fuzhou itself only victuals were sold.⁷⁰ Due to the maritime restriction the province then [said by Van Hoorn, thus in 1666/7] belonged to the poorest of China. Fujian had severely suffered under the repressive governmental policies, the trade ban in 1652 and the evacuation policy from 1661 on, not to mention war, famine, diseases and natural catastrophes.⁷¹

A Jesuit mission had been established in Fuzhou by 1660 under Antonio de Gouvea. Phillippe Couplet, when giving the Dutch admiral Balthasar Bort and a bit later Nobel a tour through the mission, openly expressed his disgust towards the viceroy Keng Chimao [Singlamong] and his personal sympathy for the Manchu governor Li-Shuaitai [Taising Lipovi].⁷² Lamthay, the suburb of Hoksieu, was also called the *Portuguese kwartier* because of the Jesuit mission and it was said that around thousand christianized Chinese belonged to the parish.⁷³ The Dutch were also surprised to find the 'black guard' of Keng Chimao consisting of Portuguese soldiers from Macao under the leadership of a Spanish captain from Manila named Carvaillo. But I could not find any traces that this presence was in any way related to the problems of the Dutch at Fuzhou. In 1625 Giulio Aleni, the 'Apostle of Fujian', wrote about the province Fujian in the Litteral Annual of the S.J.: "*For a long time the Fathers had pursued the idea of obtaining a residence in the province of Fokien, called Cinceo [Quanzhou, a mistake] by the Portuguese, not only because it borders upon Cantum [Guangdong], but even more [...], because the natives are*

⁶⁶ Vermeer, *Development and decline of Fukien province*, pp. 8 and 11.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁶⁸ Hang, Xing: *Between trade and legitimacy, maritime and continent: the Zheng organization in Seventeenth-Century East Asia*, Berkeley, 2010, pp. 32ff. and 62.

⁶⁹ Tappe, David: *Funffzehen jährige Ost-Indianische Reise-Beschreibung*, p. 152ff.: He gives a wonderful detailed description of the city, together with mentioning the graves of the Dutch merchants Gillis van Breen and Jacob Martensen Schagen, the Hungarian bookkeeper, Marcus Stroelius and some of the other Dutch commons who died there. He left Fuzhou on February 27th, 1679.

⁷⁰ NA-1.04.02, 1267, p. 610.

⁷¹ Antony, Robert J.: *Elusive pirates, pervasive smugglers: violence and clandestine trade in the Greater China Seas*, Hong Kong, 2010, pp. 85, 87f. and 89f.

⁷² Heyndrickx, Jerome (ed.): *Philippe Couplet, S.J. (1623-1693): the man who brought China to Europe*, Nettetal, 1990, pp. 98 and 100.

⁷³ Tappe, David: *Funffzehen jährige Ost-Indianische Reise-Beschreibung*, p. 145.

engaged in commerce with Japan, Manila, Malacca, Sumatra, and with the other Kingdoms of this Orient; for which reason they adapt more easily to foreigners."⁷⁴

A couple of other harbours were of interest for the Dutch. In the first place there is to mention Canton of course, where they had entered China in 1655 because it was the only harbour admitted for embassies from Southeast Asia. Although Canton was known to be a staple harbour for metals and silk, some facts spoke against Canton. Firstly there was the competition which was to be expected not only from the Portuguese at Macao, with whom the Dutch tried to avoid further atrocities, but also from the other merchants sent there from all over Southeast Asia. The rulers of Siam, Cambodia, Tonkin, Annam and Bantam regularly dispatched trading embassies to Canton. Furthermore the Dutch knew that it was a centre for the Coxin trade and piracy and that the Portuguese were forced to pay high amounts of money to the Shang family for their permission to trade. Secondly it was too far away from the silk producing areas and further away from Japan. The Dutch wanted a harbour further north also to become less dependent on the regents. And thirdly, albeit they seemed quiet, the Southern provinces were politically unstable. The city was also overcrowded with Manchu soldiers, ships and officials and there was a greater weight difference of 10 to 12% (202 Batavian *catties* = 224 Chinese *daets*). From 1669 on it was already habitual to have to pay fees in the harbour of Canton. Although the relations with Macao had eased after the wreck of the *Joncker* in December 1667, they began to deteriorate again after 1669 due to the clandestine Dutch freeburger trade around Macao. The Dutch High Government did not want to antagonize the Portuguese who were dispatching approximately one to two ships yearly to Batavia for trade. Between 1673 and 1681 Guandong was shaken by war because of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories. For these reasons the Dutch would always prefer and ask for a harbour further north. Among them were Quanzhou [Chincheo], Amoy and Quemoy. Amoy since old times has been the best and most important harbour of Fujian, but it was occupied by the Coxins almost during the whole period, who from there also threatened Quanzhou, where all Dutch trade attempts had been forbidden by the Fuzhou regents. Zhangzhou was all in all too negligible as a harbour. Further north of Fujian there was the area the Dutch were most keen on getting access to: Ningbo and Hangzhou. These harbours were the most important in the Japan trade, more important than Canton and Fujian⁷⁵ and the Dutch made attempts to ask for trade through the ambassadors Hoorn and Paats in 1666 and 1686, but were never successful. The raid on Putuoshan [*Papen eiland*] in 1665 had worsened the prospects and led to complaints by the governor of Chetkian in Fuzhou.

⁷⁴ Vermeer, *Development and decline of Fukien province*, p. 427.

⁷⁵ We know that 33 junks sailed in November 1664 from China to Japan. Among them were 9 from Canton. Another 3-4 sailed from Fuzhou and 6-7 from Quanzhou. This leaves another 13-15 from the area around Hangzhou and Ningbo. See Dagh-Register Batavia, 1664, p. 509 and NA-1.04.02, 1248, pp. 2610-2656.

III. Chronology

III. a. 1662 - 1669: The loss of Taiwan & the Oboi regency

The loss of Taiwan to Coxinga in 1662 was a severe blow to the VOC and its promising China trade. The subsequent three fleet under the command of Balthasar Bort had no chance without support by the Manchu and did only incur heavy costs. The Manchu on the other hand were taken by surprise and neither prepared nor able to conquer Taiwan in the early 1660s. Constantijn Nobel, the merchant who was assigned to the trade negotiation and was left by Bort in Fuzhou, first got the impression that their success in the trade depended on the sending of armed fleet.⁷⁶ But this was not the case. Only a small amount of silk at a high price could be obtained, because the regents did not want to increase the Dutch competition in China. Groups of the client merchants of Keng Chimao, the Combon and later in a few cases Li Shuaitai as well, monopolized the trade and threatened petty merchants under penalty of death to buy from the Dutch. The council of politics in Beijing was very likely bribed by Keng Chimao, whose brother [Timpinsiancon in Dutch sources, he later appears in Fuzhou as viceroy.] was in Beijing. They managed that the Dutch were only granted very adverse trade concessions, which was an easy thing to do because of the factionism during the Oboi regency. When the Dutch entered China in the 1660s, Kangxi the son and successor of the first Qing emperor Shunzhi was only a child thirteen years old when Pieter van Hoorn's embassy reached Beijing in 1667 and barely understanding the Chinese language. The Oboi regency [so called after the most important leader of the four Manchu clan leaders and bannermen: Oboi, Ebilun, Soni and Suksaha] governed on his behalf from 1661 to 1669, which was a time of increased factionism and competition between the clans and within the imperial councils.⁷⁷ This was the political set up and mess that the Dutch had to face when they entered China. It is understandable though that they were not keen on establishing themselves directly on the coast in this early period and probably why the Dutch treated China so differently compared with the unified Japan, where they seemed to get along with their confinement on Deshima (f. 1641⁷⁸).

The Dutch fell for Keng Chimao's feigns of friendship and a group of Cantonese merchants. Among them was a certain Lapora who lived in the house next to the Dutch lodge at Lamthay. The group of Canton merchants was associated with Keng Chimao who had been governor in Canton in 1655 and they tried to monopolize the trade. Keng Chimao was under enormous financial pressure because he was forced to pay 500.000 *tael* in silver to Beijing and the same amount in gold to Wu San-kuei in the West. Haytingcon, the viceroy [lieutenant-governor] of Quanzhou, who had offered the Dutch to trade with them, was held back by an order from the governor-general Li Shuaitai on behalf of Keng Chimao. It was said that Li Shuaitai had accused both Haytingcon and Keng Chimao in Beijing and even asked the

⁷⁶ NA-1.04.02, 1241, p. 403.

⁷⁷ Roberts, *A History of China*, p. 207.; Cf. Twitchett; Fairbank: *The Cambridge history of China*, pp. 147 and 160ff..

⁷⁸ Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, p. 53.

Dutch to hunt down their trading ships to Japan. But the Dutch were afraid to antagonize those wealthy persons and to risk a Japanese reaction. The competition between the regents severely hampered the trade. Because of Gruys', the branch manager on Deshima, information about the deteriorating market situation in Japan and the price difference between Cabessa and Lidlie silk, the VOC resolved in 1665 to buy silk in Bengal at a ratio of 55% *Cabessa* and 45% *Bariga*.

The Dutch made the mistake to bribe the local regents and officials, which was to no avail. Li Shuaitai told Nobel that it would be possible to get a trade concession and afterwards a lodge and warehouse on one of the small islands in the Min River with presents first to the emperor and then "*met matelijken vereeringen*" to the great imperial council "*Soetaisins*" [the most important council of eight princes and high officials and predecessor of the Grand Council, Junji chu], to the "*Li-pu*" [council of politics] and the "*Hem-pu*" [council of ceremony or rites].⁷⁹ But Hoorn did not succeed in this in 1666 because Keng Chimao made him to take a certain Gencko as a translator, who negated any attempts. The raid on Putuoshan and the sending of the ship *Mars* under Justus Six and the appearance of the Batavian Chinese headman Siqua's junk at Quanzhou [Chincheo] deteriorated the relations to the Manchu as did the Dutch attempt to establish at Keelung between 1664 and 1668. The Dutch ship traffic from and to Keelung raised Manchu suspicions about Dutch allegiance. Furthermore the Dutch did not obey the order that the *Caneelboom* was to be unloaded and unloaded the *Durgerdam* instead. The reason was that for every ship coming Li Shuaitai had to write to Beijing and ask for the allowance of trade. The whole travel of information took a lot of time and perhaps was delayed on some occasions on purpose, which was unacceptable by the Dutch. Up to 1666 when the death of Adam Schall van Bell in Beijing and the anti-Christian movement made an end to it the Dutch attempts were perhaps also hindered by Jesuits.

There even were minor economic reasons for the failure. The fixed prices from Batavia counting on a monopoly situation were inappropriate. The Dutch planned to sell in their typical manner small amounts at high prices. This policy clashed with the Chinese mass sale. A second reason was that the Dutch lacked sufficient money. Although most of the goods were exchanged for Chinese goods, Keng Chimao's merchants demanded immediate payment in silver for the silk. Thus the Dutch were forced to accept a loan of 10.000 *tael* at a high interest rate of 3% p.a.⁸⁰ Last but not least the Dutch complained about thefts, albeit some of these can be attributed to embezzlement and clandestine Dutch trade, a small weight difference of 2% between the Chinese *daats* and the Batavian *cattij* in Fuzhou and the compulsion to deliver the goods to the stone bridge at Lamthay also considerably lowered the trade profits, which overall probably did not exceed 25% (see table V d.).

⁷⁹ NA-1.04.02, 1257, p. 1168.

⁸⁰ *Dagh-Register, Batavia*, 1665, p. 77f.

III. b. 1672 - 1683: The decline of the Japanese market & the unification of China

In 1672 the Nagasaki chamber of commerce introduced a system of fixed prices for the purchase of goods named *shih shohai* which the Dutch translated as *taxatie-handel* or appraised trade.⁸¹ Up to 1676 no VOC ship was sent to China, either because of the disappointing experience in the 1660s or due to the cost of war in Europe (3rd Anglo-Dutch War, *Rampjaar* 1672 and Franco-Dutch War) and Asia (China, Ceylon, India, Java). Another reason could be that the sale of Bengal silk in Japan still was more lucrative. The profit margin advantage of Bengal silk versus Chinese silk in Japan turned around by 1681.⁸²

Freeburgers received passes to trade pepper and cloves to China and traded small amounts clandestinely near Macao. After the Portuguese who had rescued the crew of the *Joncker* were allowed to buy pepper in Batavia the relations deteriorated again and they switched to buy pepper in Bantam.

The second period was especially marked by the fact that the regents' monopoly was increasingly replaced by lower ranking officials' monopoly, i.e. mandarins, army and naval commanders, etc. The situation changed in 1673 when Keng Chimao was ordered to Beijing, probably to justify himself. Shang Kexi had already died in 1671. The sons of Keng Chimao and Shang Kexi, Keng Ching-chung and Shang Chih-hsin who feared for their inheritance joined Wu San-kuei in the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories. This changed situation prompted Joan Maetsuyker in 1675 to ask for a trading comptoir in Fuzhou. But by 1677 both Canton and Fuzhou were back in Manchu hands. Amoy, Quemoy and Quanzhou were temporarily seized by Coxins. During the Rebellion there was increased ship traffic. Many Chinese used the chance that the trade ban could not be enforced and sailed to trading centres mostly to Bantam and not to Batavia. Bantam became a major problem for the VOC. Not only Chinese traded there but also Portuguese and English. And the French were just about to open a lodge there. The English had established a trade link with the help of the Coxins on Southern Taiwan and Amoy. Soon thereafter English goods were to be found on Chinese junks at Fuzhou. The English were also busy at Aceh and Benkulen operating from Madras and Surat. First only cruisers were deployed off Bantam, but in 1682 it was eventually conquered by a Dutch-Javanese force.

After they had heard about successes of Chinese forces in 1676 in Southeastern China the High Government decided to dispatch own ships again and stopped issuing passes to the freeburgers, although these kept on for some time with their profitable clandestine trade which also led to sending two Portuguese emissaries to Batavia for complaining. In 1676 the VOC sent ships to Canton and Fuzhou. There was almost no trade at Canton because the Dutch were told that they had to wait for a

⁸¹ Prakash, *The New Cambridge History of India*, pp. 126f.

⁸² *Dagh-Register, Batavia*, 1681, p. 730. Letter by Hendrick Cansius from Deshima in December 1681, informing Batavia that Bengal silk, which had given the most profit in the previous year, gave smaller profits this year because it had been to be bought more expensive, while the Chinese silk had earned a higher profit.

trade concession by Wu San-kuei. In Fuzhou the new Manchu governor Senong [Yao Ch'i-sheng]⁸³ had intensified the administrative control and the VOC trade was damaged because of the drunkenness of its merchant Jacob Martensen Schagen. Following the disappointing news in 1679 from China the High Government sent Martin Caesar as "*commissaris en commandeur over Comp. zaken en handel in't rijk van China*" to Fuzhou. A new weighing method had been introduced which was manipulated by the regents on will and disadvantaged imports by using a lighter weight of only 85 *tael* silver. Martin Caesar criticized the trade set-up at Fuzhou, because first the wrong products were delivered (linen instead of woollen cloth and far too little pepper) and the lack of money became a serious problem because it took just too long to first have to acquire money by the sale of goods. Caesar estimated that there should be a reserve of money of about *f*100-200.000. He had found grave errors in the bookkeeping and embezzlement by the merchants Schagen and bookkeeper Melman and addressed the need to find a solution for the costly river transport up to Lamthay. The mere 38% net profit led to the decision by the High Government in July 1679 to end the trade in Fuzhou. The decision made little sense because the low profits were caused by Schagen's mismanagement and even Rijkloff van Goens admitted that the trade in China was "*vrij gunstig verlopen*", considering the circumstances. I think that it must be seen in regard to increasing financial pressure and a lack of ships. The Manchu were asking for naval support in 1679 for an attack on Taiwan. Keijser, who had taken over office in Fuzhou from the deceased Jacob Schagen, and Caesar apparently had put in prospect some naval support in return for a trade concession. In 1680 two Imperial mandarins were sent from Fuzhou to Batavia, Liulauja and Lilauja [Liu Zi and Lin Qifeng⁸⁴]. But they left after endless talks in spring 1681 because the High Government was neither able to send help nor even the requested few ships to make an impression. The Dutch also did not trust that it was an official embassy. Following the disappointing answer the contact to the regents in Fuzhou was severely cut back and only Lapora and the translators were available for talks. Lapora offered the Dutch a co-operation in the Japan trade on behalf of the Combon where the Dutch would have to provide the shipping and the regents the silk at an interest rate of 2-2½ % monthly. They had an equal co-operation with some Koreans. The deal was refused because the regents sent two additional junks and the profit would have been too low. Leuwenson calculated the costs per picul - including the interest - at about 180 *tael*, while the silk price in Japan stood at 300 *tael* only. The regents also co-operated with so-called "*carriers*", probably former Coxins, who even had an own comptoir at Fuzhou of about 40 persons. Leeuwenson just like Caesar complained about the "*gebrek van geld*". He was forced to melt down the silver cutlery of the Company when the little money reserves at Fuzhou ran out and were only saved by the arrival of the ships with Juriaen Adriesen Munnick and Adriaen de Man. The two

⁸³ Senong was sent to quell the rebellion of Keng Chimao's son. Keng Chimao himself was pardoned through the advocacy of his brother and died imprisoned in Beijing, 1676, see Tappe, *Funffzehen jährige Ost-Indianische Reise-Beschreibung*, pp. 122 and 129.; Twitchett; Fairbank: *The Cambridge history of China*, p. 146; Yao Ch'i-sheng.

⁸⁴ Knaap, Gerrit; Teitler, Ger (eds.): *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie*, Leiden, 2002, p. 250.

were sent to close down the factory. These two men and Leeuwenson had done a great job around Canton and Fuzhou and saved the trade balance, leading to Goens comment (see above). Goens decided, following Maetsuykers plan in 1678, to limit the personnel at the comptoir to a minimum to save money.

In June 1680 the ship captain Hendrick van den Eeden and the general secretary of Batavia Jan Jacob van Merwede were sent to China with letters by Governor-General Goens. They were expressly ordered to hand over the letters only in Beijing, because they contained complaints about trade conditions. The Fuzhou emissaries, who requested copies, received changed letters. The purpose was undone by the hayong [*waterfiscaal*] of Fuzhou, a newly created administrative post, who was sent to Beijing on behalf of the local regents. According to Leeuwenson the hayong did his job so well that he was “showered with presents” by the regents after his return. Leeuwenson got into a fierce argument with the hayong, what made trade still more difficult. Albeit Leeuwenson was no longer forced to trade with regents alone, he now was only able to trade with administrative officials and their merchants, mainly with Golauja, one of the Imperial mandarins, with the merchant of the *proviantmeester* Nioncto and he ran into debt with Silauja, the merchant of the army commander Jonthetock. Leeuwenson’s conclusion was that it was better to trade with the regents, so he could rely on their help in case of outstanding payments and because the regents themselves were more reliable and able to deliver the demanded silk. But also because they would take care of the bribes in Beijing, which according to the Combon summed up to approximately 10.000 *tael* a year. Leeuwenson estimated the possible trade volume in Fuzhou at *f*250-300.000.

According to Leeuwenson the major problems he had in Fuzhou were a lack of money (“*manqueren von contanten*”) and that he did not have enough pepper to sell. Many of the problems were caused because Van Goens had not answered the call for military assistance in 1680. In March 1683 Rijkloff van Goens informed the Heren XVII that he had got a letter from Senong in Fuzhou renewing the offer of a trade concession and a comptoir in Fuzhou in return for naval assistance by six or seven ships or to send an embassy and agree to totally submit to Chinese customs. The offer had already been made by the emissaries in 1679. Whatever the reason was maybe Goens found both conditions unacceptable. The letter with the offer remained unanswered. Instead it was resolved to send 3½ tons gold in goods, almost as much gold as was sent to Coromandel which was to receive 4 tons, supplemented by *f*100.000 in money to trade at Canton. Leeuwenson left Fuzhou in January 1682. The goodbye was cordial he said, but the governor Jauw and the Combon Houw bitterly complained about Leeuwenson with the commissioners Eeden and Merwede.

In 1680 the emperor had allowed the trade with foreigners in Canton against a payment of 200.000 *tael* and a ship tax according to the size of the vessel. As a consequence the client merchants of the regents of Fuzhou were sent to Canton. The Combon equipped his merchants with 100 *picul* silk,

100 *picul* pieces of silk and 10.000 *tael* each. The Combon and the governor were both accused by Senong for illegal trade in Beijing. The Combon also had embezzled money from the war budget. Lilauja also left Fuzhou to Canton. Kangxi finally decided to get rid of Shang Chih-hsin who after he had saved his head by changing sides and fighting Wu San-kuei was now taken captive and committed suicide in 1681 perhaps due to his extortion of the Portuguese. A sum of 1.300.000 *tael* was confiscated. Canton was furthermore placed under the Western Tartar or Gohon⁸⁵ with whom the Emperor had come to an understanding on a payment of 20.000 *tael* a day as Leeuwenson had heard.⁸⁶ Amoy and Quemoy were quickly reconquered in 1680 from the Coxins and in 1683, without any assistance by the VOC, the Manchu retook Taiwan. Kangxi finally could reform and consolidate the Manchu reign in China. One of the first measures of Kangxi was to introduce a taxation scheme for sea trade and the first *hai-kuan* [maritime customs administration office] was installed at Amoy in 1684.⁸⁷ The English who had given up their trade on Amoy and Taiwan afterwards concentrated on clandestine trade at Macao. The English *Formosa* was first reported around Maserican in 1681. With the help of trade between Goa, Macao, Timor, Banjarmasin, Malacca, Patani, Siam and up to 1682 especially Bantam, Portuguese Macao had seen an astonishing revival. The Portuguese worked hand in hand with local Canton officials, especially a Manchu admiral called Soupingh, to successfully hamper any trade attempts both by the English and Dutch at Canton, where the trade was controlled by the merchants of the Manchu admiral Thetock and his vice admirals, Haijto [also referred to as *zeevogt*] and Gamkauja. The Portuguese would have offered a trade concession, if the Dutch and English had paid the immense sum of 600.000 *tael* for it. But the latter refused and thus were forced to trade clandestinely. The Dutch furthermore refused many trade offers because these would violate their price instructions, although both the English and the Portuguese were accepting even higher prices from the Chinese and were trading considerable amounts of spelter to India. In 1682 a French pater was sent from Siam to Canton to enquire the possibilities for trade, so was assumed. In 1684, the new Pu-i of Canton, Gohinsock⁸⁸, started sending two junks to Manila and Japan with high profitability. Only two ships sailed from Batavia to China in 1683 which despite a sales tax of 2% at Canton made a profit of 95%. The encouraging result led to the sending of Leeuwenson to China again who was appointed as *opperhoofd* for three years in 1684. Four ships were dispatched in July 1684, one each to Amoy and Maserican and two to Fuzhou.

⁸⁵ I merely assume that here Wu Yingxiong is meant (The son of Wu San-kuei and father of Wu Shifan, who were both death by then.)

⁸⁶ Cf. Twitchett; Fairbank: *The Cambridge history of China*, p. 137: A brief summary on Wu San-kuei.

⁸⁷ Twitchett; : *The Cambridge history of China*, p. 587; A degree in Oct 1684 allowed oversea trade from Fujian and Guangdong, another one in Dec 1684 in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong and Zhili, see: Tsao, Kai-fu: *The rebellion of the three feudatories*, p. 163.

⁸⁸ Gouhincon Zontok Poui, Zontock or Samtock Poui, see *Dagh-Register Batavia*, 1688, pp. 271ff. (See above: I assume that Wu San-kuei's son was meant.)

III. c. 1684 - 1690: The reorientation to Bengal & the consolidation under Kangxi

The introduction of the maritime taxes, albeit it was a very sophisticated system (see V e.), disadvantaged foreigners and especially the *meetgelden* (ship taxes) were extremely high. The system offered a lot of possibilities for the administrative personnel to enrich themselves. In this period the further decline of the Japanese market through the introduction of a limited trade in 1685, albeit it increased the quantity of available silk which could not be sold in Japan and the introduction of this taxation scheme in China in 1684, brought the VOC almost to the point of ending its activities there. High tax quotas from Beijing forced the officials to adjust the income from taxation and not to pay in silver but only silk to the Dutch with which they were “*overcropt*”, because of the lower sales in Japan, as Leeuwenson noticed in 1686. The Dutch on the other hand were by then hardly interested in silk, because the production in Bengal had increased and preferred money. The lack of money by now severely disadvantaged the Dutch against the English competition at Amoy and Canton. Joannes Camphuys, the new Governor-General, wrote on January 8th 1686 to the Heren XVII that there was still no free trade but monopoly trade in China and “*best en sekerst met factoren der regenten, nog veel ongemaklijcker te coopen en vercoopen aen haer gemene lieden [...] quellingen der veele thollenaren, fiscaels en al sulcken sort die alomme in China van grooten getalle zijn*”. The High Government decided to send Vincent Paets as ambassador to Beijing in 1686 to ask for permanent entry into the harbours of Canton, Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Ningbo and Hangzhou, a trading lodge wherever they wanted, freedom of trade and that no goods should be prohibited for export [Iron and copper exports were prohibited, the spelter export was limited.]. Paets perhaps was a bad choice as ambassador, since he embezzled the bribe intended for the Beijing officials. He was later accused for that by Alexander Gravenbroek, the translator who accompanied him.

Alexander Gravenbroek, who had learned Chinese during his imprisonment on Taiwan by the Coxins, established a friendly contact with the local governor called Swansinfoe Chinchiancon by the Dutch, with his brother and a certain trader named Peampeu on Amoy, who all offered the Dutch a trading lodge. But the fact that Peampeu served “*Engelse water*” on the table and the fact that the English were with twenty people on the island and that they would have to pay Peampeu for the lodge, made the Dutch reluctant to accept and Gravenbroek anyway was not entitled to make such decisions.

Gijsbert van der Heijden who was at Canton found trade difficult because of the high taxation. Including the 2.2 *tael* custom the Dutch were forced to offer the pepper for 7.6 to 7.7 *tael* while it was sold by Chinese traders for 6.8 to 7 *tael* per *picul*. The regents were telling him that they had been allowed to offer the Dutch a piece of land, but said that Heijden’s departure would be a disadvantage. Heijden, who like Gravenbroek did have no power to decide, left Canton according to the orders to meet Leeuwenson at Fuzhou. The reason why all regents suddenly offered a trade lodge was because they were forced to attract as much shipping as possible to their harbour to fulfil the Imperial tax quotas and

the Cantonese regents already noticed that traders switched to other ports. The height of the ship taxes and other duties depended on the number of ships arriving. Then the share or tax that fell on every single ship simply could be lower, in other words the hayhong was then enabled to offer better conditions. Thus the tax paid at Amoy and Fuzhou could differ up to 50% and by 1686 the Canton regents were already planning to reduce the tolls. At Fuzhou, although the initial request to land the goods and weapons at Minjaceen was withdrawn, the refusal by Leeuwenson to hand over parts of the sailing as it was customary and his refusal to buy a trade permit led to a series of trade hindrances. An extra fee of 15 *tael* was placed on every picul silk bought, later even increased to 20 *tael*, and only very low quality *Bariga* silk at a high price of 170 *tael* was offered and which Leeuwenson offered only 103 *tael* for. The price at Canton was only 150 *tael* by the time. The Chinese only bid on very few goods, offering even higher prices than demanded by the Dutch for some, but a very low 4.8 *tael* for pepper, the product they were most interested in. According to the lately granted freedom of taxes for 3 ships accompanying the trade embassy every 5 years and after bribing the toll commissioner, Leeuwenson got the *Westbroek* granted duty free instead of the *Montfoort*, which together with the *Moercappel* had been freed from duties by the commissioner as the largest ships. The reason according to Leeuwenson was that he did not want the duties to be added to the price of goods from Holland and India loaded on the *Montfoort*. Because he had refused to pay the unavoidable *meetgelden*, Paets had Leeuwenson removed from office immediately after his return from Beijing in November 1686, because he had delayed the trade and departure unnecessarily. Again, the Chinese requested that the goods were delivered to the large stone bridge at Lamthay, what Paets refused to do, threatening to depart without trade. The regents on the other hand justified their actions with their duty to protect their subjects from having to buy the Company goods above their actual value. The high tax quotas from Beijing furthermore forced the regents to demand at least 10% of payment in silver money. Leeuwenson in return asked the Chinese to pay 20% in silver for the Dutch goods, but the regents equally wanted to save their silver. The issue was finally resolved as always by an 'inofficial understanding': Poutchinsij, the *general rentmeester* who was of imperial blood and had lent the Dutch 700 *tael*, simply bought goods clandestinely. This he did together with some other mandarins. When Poutchinsij published a placard at the Dutch lodge only allowing the sale for merchants who could show a paper having his seal, the other officials reacted by increasing the silk duty from 15 to 20 *tael per picul*. Thereby Poutchinsij was forced to remove his placard from the Dutch lodge. It can be seen how the newly imposed imperial administrative system worked and outbalanced itself. Personal enrichment was acceptable to a certain degree. The *waterfiscaal* or hayong of Hoksieu, who was at the same time the governor of Minjaceen, demanded additionally to the 13 *maas* of the toll commissioner's 2 *maas per picul*. Worst of all the demanded goods for Holland and India could not be purchased because of the serious lack of money. From the whole cargo of f358.546 despite all odds f304.467 were sold and goods purchased for

f446.395. The profit had been very low 46½ % and only 39 % on the goods which had been additionally brought there that year. It was considered much too little in regard of an investment of four ships and this long time. In addition to the *meetgelden*, the costs incurred amounted to f43.929, without including even costs for guards, clerks, translators, etc. The purchase was judged to be faster and easier, but still accompanied by much theft. It is impossible though to find out how much actually was embezzled. But it can be assumed from the examples which were discovered (see above) that there was quite a considerable personal enrichment. A very appealing issue too was that obviously the English were buying up Dutch goods from the Chinese, which was for example the case with cloves. *Perpetuanas*, camphor, woollen cloth, *groff greynen*, *bloedcorael* and *fijne lywaten* could not be sold at all because of the high duties. Interestingly, also the English *perpetuanas* from Madraspatnam and other goods did not find customers. They had sold 200 *picul lywaten* [linen cloth] at 1.6 *tael* per *picul* with a great loss. Hence you cannot draw the conclusion that competition alone was responsible for the Dutch failure.

On February 15th 1687 Leeuwenson had written to Camphuys that the trade in China could not be placed on a solid basis and that the hopes raised by the opening of harbours by the emperor had not come true due to high customs and ship taxes [*meetgelden*].⁸⁹

It was said by Gijsbert van der Heijden from Macao that the Portuguese had to pay 15.000 *tael* for their ships, of which two were sailing to Manila, two to Banjarmasin for pepper and two to Timor for sandal wood. That's why Heijden could not make any profit on pepper or sandal wood at Canton. He pledged some goods to a Joseph Piniero, an inhabitant of Macao. In Van der Heijden's opinion the Portuguese were so plagued by their mandarins that they would have to give up Macao swiftly, if this was to continue. Two English ships were at Macao which according to Van der Heijden had made more a loss than a profit by selling sandal wood, lead, tin and manufactures [probably 'manufactures' here meant cloth, it was not specified nearer]. But they had the advantage of 50.000 Spanish *real* in money, for which they bought tutenague at 5.7 *tael*, some coarse porcelain, some tea of bad quality (some 12 or 10 *picul* only) and a small amount of silk. He also was reporting that five English privateers were operating near Manila, capturing Portuguese vessels as well. According to English information, two Siamese junks and two English ships were at Amoy, selling pepper from Banjarmasin at just 5 *tael*. They were not able to sell *lywaten*, but *lakenen* at 2 *tael*, *croonrassen* at 18.15 and lead for 3.3 *tael*. The Dutch at Amoy estimated that the English capital ran up to 100.000 Spanish *real* in money both from sales and in bullion. The English were buying up musc and gold, only buying 80 *picul* inferior *Bariga* silk for 150 *tael* and some spelter. In Canton the English merchant from Madras named Baron was staying with eight English ships, where he co-operated and negotiated with the governor Sichiancong, but was asked to leave by other Manchu officials, after which he set sail for Amoy. The French Pater Philibert Leblanc

⁸⁹ NA-1.04.02, 1429, pp. 819f.

[the one from Siam, see above] had been offered to send an embassy, but it was uncertain if the French were going to comply. According to the imperial toll commissioner Pimpoe they were eager to establish themselves in Canton. The VOC instead assumed an impoverishment of the southern provinces following the imperial extortion. The province Guandong had already contributed 200.000 *tael*. The governor or Pu-i it was said to have paid 400.000 *tael* and the Combon 300.000 *tael* for their offices, which were expected they would want to regain by all means. Poutchinchij in Hoksieu also had paid 300.000 *tael* for an additional Combon office in the province of Huquan. The office was granted for only three years, but the term could be prolonged. That silver export from the southern provinces remained forbidden, together with Japan's trade limitations and the small expectations at that time from Manila, added to a frustrating situation. This was further supplemented by the fact that sellers in Canton insisted on payment in money because this made it possible for them to pay the export tolls. Interestingly, Van der Heijden did not see the VOC's position in China so negatively. In his opinion the Company was not on a worse level than the English but was still competitive. Heijden urged the Company not to cede the ground to the English, but instead to sell small amounts and wait for an improvement of the situation which he expected to come in the form of a tax reduction. He also pressed the Company to make use of the advantage of the granted five year's duty freedom with an embassy.

Paets, after returning to Fuzhou in November, wrote a report about the embassy on February 24th 1687. He had met with the Hangzhou regents, but a trade concession was denied because of an imperial order. According to the *anachoda* [Chinese ship captain] from Zootzieuw [Suzhou, near modern Shanghai] Paets was told that this captain had been able to sell iron at 8 *tael*. This seemed a very low price to Paets considering all the taxes and duties. Albeit he could not find out other prices and referring to Hoorn's report of 1667, he said that there was no trade possible or to be expected. The reason was that because of the inland tolls and transport costs prices would not differ from these further down south and that was according to Paets valid both for Company goods and Chinese goods. The Chinese would rather transport their goods to the southern ports themselves than sell it cheaper locally. Paets' conclusion was that first the Dutch did not want to trade because of the monopolizing regents and now they wanted but could not because of the taxes and duties, with which the officials were given even more effective tools to monopolize the trade. He concluded that either the Company ends its trade or must become acquainted with very low profit margins. His hope was to gain duty freedom, perhaps against offering a participation in the profits or a yearly "*tantiem*" [thus an immediate or yearly participation in profits]. If he was not to achieve this in Beijing, Paets proposed to end the trade and wait for better days or to send only a very few predetermined goods to China on Company ships or to rely on the China traders, meaning the freeburgers. A last proposal of a trading lodge at Fuzhou in Beijing against a one-time payment of 6.000 *tael* was refused by Paets as ridiculous. Although the emperor was troubled with the Russians and was not very fond of European nations at the moment he

had granted the Dutch quite favourable conditions: a yearly trade in Canton and Fuzhou, while having to send an embassy to Beijing every five years. The Dutch were allowed to trade at Canton or Hoksieu as from the beginning under supervision of mandarins, but a request for a permanent trading lodge was by then totally refused. Furthermore, the request for a written concession from the emperor was turned down as “*onbehoorlijk*” [unseemly]. The fact that the Dutch had not sent an embassy for eighteen years instead of the negotiated eight years turn was seen as a great disregard. Kimong, the stadthouder (i.e. governor-general here) of Hockien [Fujian], Kianxi and Chekiang, wrote to the Governor-General in Batavia that he was unable to change any of these conditions without imperial consent.⁹⁰ No further attempt to trade at Fuzhou took place after 1688.

Between December 13th 1687 and February 17th 1688, five *wangkans*, three junks from Amoy, two sloops from Canton and three yachts from Macao brought a total of 10.943 coarse porcelain cups, 25.000 pieces tutenague, 16.524 porcelain dining plates, 3.879 porcelain dining plates with ornaments, ‘white’, green and ‘red’ tea, tobacco, silk, *radix China*, alum, anise, *goutdraet*, *soethout* and much more to Batavia.⁹¹ The Company could already have stopped sending ships to China, if it wanted to rely on this trade.

Camphuys consequently wrote in his letter to the Heren XVII in March 1688: “[...] *die gestadige gewone veranderingen onder de Tartarische monarchie in dat rijk hebben wij doorgaans bevonden de meeste moeyelijkheden in Comp.s saken te resideren. [...] beslissing van Heren XVII gevraagd; de vraag is, of het beter is dese U Ed.ls verarmde hoofstad aan te queken en Comp.s soowel verminderde incomsten als vertier van koopmanschappen wederom wat doen restaureren dan wel de lang benijde diversie onser welstant door onse competeurs meer en meer in vreemde rijken te sien overbrengen en daardoor in vermogen toenemen.*” Camphuys also wrote to the Heren about a lower demand of spelter in India, rendering another possible export item from China less profitable.⁹²

In May 1688 two ships, the *Eemland* and the *St. Martensdijk*, sailed to Canton and Amoy with letters to the Combon and mandarin Tampou Talauja at Amoy, to Silongh, the governor-admiral en *veltoverste* of Amoy and Chincheo and to Tsianongh, the head of the Amoy militia. The ships also carried letters addressed to the *tholmeester* Houpoulaja at Canton, the governor-general of Guandong Gouhincon and the emperor Kangxi. In those letters Camphuys informed these persons that because of wars the trade at Batavia was currently in a bad state and offered a contract for a yearly delivery of 3-4.000 *picul* Japanese copper. The merchant at Canton, Pieter Godschalck, complained about the high tolls, which the imperial commissioners paid the personnel and guard junks from. The emperor had demanded from the city of Canton solely a contribution of 90.000 *tael* from the ship taxes [*meetgelden*]

⁹⁰ *Dagh-Register, Batavia*, 1687, pp. 319 and 331.

⁹¹ NA-1.04.02, 1452, p. 475.

⁹² *Generale Missiven*, Dl. 3, pp. 173ff. and 176.; At Canton the regents furthermore were forced by an imperial edict to stockpile tutenague and it was only available for a price not under 5.1 *tael* per picul. See: NA-1.04.02, 1438, pp. 730ff.

and demanded 120.000 *tael* from the whole province of Fujian. Lilauja had complained to the Dutch that the Chinese had not been able to sell the Company's camphor and that he saw himself not bound to buy the woollen cloth from them, saying that he could obtain it cheaper from the English.⁹³ Lilauja, who had been in Canton by this time, had been involved in the copper contract negotiations, what perhaps was one reason for refusing it. He also had offered the Company large quantities of spelter which was much over the amount ordered by the High Government. Godschalck pointed out that the woollen cloth were in high demand, but in this product the English were simply better off. Godschalck wrote that the English came from Madras and that their responsible merchant Mr. Yale stayed with the Combon for about three months. The English had been offered a trading lodge at Canton for a payment of 33.000 *tael* to 'the great' in Beijing. Yale refused the offer. Godschalck made other curious observations about the English at Canton. They had opened the trade at Canton to everyone and were acting as a mere carrier against a 20% charge for freight ("*vrachtpennigen*") and 2% for a place in the Company warehouse. The order was then placed via Madras and a ship sent from there to Canton which directly sailed back to London. The East India Company even hired freelancers in case they did not have enough ships. The procedure was not new though, but Godschalck seemed surprised. The English started in 1654 to rent privately owned ships and introduced a freight rate or 'shipping interest' system.⁹⁴ The Portuguese on the other hand displayed envy about the copper contract, for which the Dutch would depend on the Japanese copper deliveries to fulfil it. The French Pater had been able to get approval of Canton for the French ships, but under the condition that the French first must send an embassy to Beijing. In total, Godschalck had sold goods for f104.969 and bought goods for f158.782, mainly consisting of the famous 'Songloe'-tea, damask, gold, *pelangs*, wheat and some spelter. The profit made in ten months ran up to 51½ % including the costs of f9.501.

The *Eemland* returned in January 1689 with f172.461 in silk, silk pieces and tea, the merchants telling that the Dutch were more welcomed than the English, but hampered by the "*conductors der Lepous*" or "*tol commissarissen*", who sold licenses to merchants and partly demanded taxes twice, once from the buyers and once from sellers, so that "*niemand sonder haer maynen handeln mogt*". Gravenbroek had followed the official orders to stay away from the roadstead of Amoy, after he had been forced to surrender parts of the sailing the last time and had been strictly rebuked in Batavia for this. He found three English ships there, the *Caesar* from Surat and the *Loyal Marchiant* and *Molfvoort* from Madraspatnam. He had to rent a lodge for 30 *tael* [total sum for his stay] and found the tolls and duties too high. According to Gravenbroek the profit accounted for 67%. His conclusion was that the situation was better in harbours with more incoming ships because then the ship taxes [*meetgelden*] would not rise so exuberantly. As long as the toll commissioners ("*hopoes*") and the regents were not on

⁹³ NA-1.04.02, 1453, pp. 261-294.

⁹⁴ Rothermund, Dietmar: *Europa und Asien im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus*, Darmstadt, 1978, p. 42.

good terms with each other each party was unable to monopolize the trade. Unfortunately this had not been the case at Amoy.⁹⁵ Nevertheless the Dutch had made f83.717 with the total in taxes and costs amounting to f15.130, so that there remained only f68.587. The English came a little later with the ships *Roijael Marchant* [*Loyal Marchiant* according s' Gravenbroek] which had sailed in nine months via England and *Bancoulon* [Benkulen], where it took in 4.200 *picul* of pepper and from where they also shipped considerable quantities of pepper to England. According to Gravenbroek they had bought the pepper at Sillebar [unidentified, either a bay or small settlement near Padang on Sumatra or at the westcoast of Java and belonging to Bantam⁹⁶], which had been conquered by a pirate named Jan Pattewan with English support. They had a huge sum in money and around nine tons of gold, buying lots of silk and silk pieces for England and were still staying and buying up more gold, bribing mandarins, planning to expand their lodge and send a ship further north to *Nimfou* [probably Ningbo], when the *Eemland* was leaving.

After the return of the ships the merchants informed Camphuys that Gouhintock in Canton had accepted the offered copper contract but refused to sign it. This resulted in Camphuys' rejection of the copper delivery. The reason was probably rather a lack of money to buy the copper than Camphuys' claimed reason that the governor had not signed the contract and therefore did not vouch for the truth of it. Camphuys ignored that the Pu-i would never sign it by himself out of fear of the Beijing reaction. Camphuys also complained about the amount of unwanted goods sold to the Company, especially the spelter, which led to an argument with the Portuguese about the falling price at Batavia. The import to Batavia in 1689 from Canton and Macao had been 3.048 *picul* Chinese tobacco, 297 *picul* tea, 51.598 *stroipen* coarse porcelain and 678 *baleys* fine porcelain, 204 pieces of silk, 213 *casjes goudtraet*, 6.295 *potjes 'songloe'* and 9.600 stones [as ballast] and some iron pans.⁹⁷ It is important to note that no bales of raw silk at all and only 204 pieces of silk were brought to Batavia. Silk remained a good that could only be purchased from a few officials and the regents. The VOC could not hope and wait for silk deliveries to Batavia. The Heren XVII sent a letter to Batavia in 1687, informing the High Government of India that silk and porcelain especially with Chinese motifs were in high demand in Holland.⁹⁸

The last shipment to China took place in 1690 by the yacht *Eemland* to Amoy. It sold goods worth f199.957, bought goods worth f221.223, and took back unsold goods worth f37.000. The profit was lowered though because of the high costs of f8.298 plus f5.000 *meetgelden*. The latter were much higher than the combined *meetgelden* of f1.500 for the three English ships present at the same time. The English told them that they had paid 700 *tael* for their large ship, 500 and 300 *tael* respectively for the two smaller ships in *meetgelden*, but also about their current problems at Bengal, Surat and Bombay

⁹⁵ NA-1.04.02, 1453, pp. 290ff.

⁹⁶ <http://www.nedindexicon.nl/trefwoord/19380?q=%22Padang%22>; last viewed 2012 Nov 23rd, 12.15am. (locations, Sillebar)

⁹⁷ NA-1.04.02, 1444, pp. 1945f.; cf. 1432, p. 475: list of goods delivered betw. Dec 13th 1687 and Feb 17th 1688, no silk.

⁹⁸ Blussé, Leonard: *Tribuut aan China: vier eeuwen Nederlands-Chinese betrekkingen*, Amsterdam, 1989, p. 90.

because of Mughal wars and sieges [Maratha War of Independence, 1681-1701]. The 'English friends' also told the Dutch that the success at Amoy depended on the toll commissioner, who was exchanged yearly. The Chinese traders complained about the prohibition of pepper sales to Chinese at Batavia and were working together at Amoy to lower the prices offered by the Dutch. But actually some prices achieved by the Dutch were quite good. The Dutch were for example able to sell 2.000 *picul* pepper at 8.3 to 8.5 *tael* and sandal wood at 21 *tael*, while other prices were less good due to the time pressure, for example the 80 *tael* for the cloves. The English too were planning to abandon their trade on Amoy. Only eight English ships had been in East Asian waters the previous year. Four of these had been at Amoy, three near Macao and one at Malacca, as they informed the Dutch. Foreign traders had been invited to come to trade at Ningbo by the local governor. On February 28th 1691 Sontock Pu-i [Gouhintock] wrote to Camphuys inquiring about why there had been no delivery of copper according to the contract and ensuring him of his friendship.⁹⁹

At the end of April 1690 a placard had been published in Batavia forbidding "*t overblijven van veele vreemde ondeugende Chinesen*" and on June 6th the High Government decided to send no ships to China that year: "*Om het manquement van een bequaem schip, de laetheyd der tydts ende omdat men van gewilde coomansz.: 't eenemaal ontbloomt was wiert goet gevonden dit jaer geen besending naar China te doen*"¹⁰⁰. Two days later, on June 8th, eight Chinese junks set sail for China.¹⁰¹ Three things become evident from Camphuys' letter. Firstly, the High Government was not finally ending the trade but only suspended it that year. Secondly, a 'bequaem' ship was missing, rather meaning a suitable smaller ship instead of a general lack. Thirdly, that there was nothing available to sell in China, probably because simply everything was to be delivered to Europe, a policy that Camphuys already had addressed in 1687 in his letter to the Heren XVII (see above).

In the following year, in March 1691, Camphuys again informed the Heren XVII that: "[...]; *bij gebrek aan schepen, zilver, peper en sandelhout werd geen bezending naar China gedaan, maar handelaren uit Macao zijn te Batavia welkom; het van hen inkopen komt mogelijk voordeliger uit dan het zenden van schepen naar China, verkopen kan men hier aan Chinezen evengoed als in hun land; door kruisen werd er voor gezorgd, dat zij geen peper konden sluiken uit Palembang, enz.; [...]*". Apart from the reasons Camphuys listed for not sending ships it seems revealing to me that he does not talk about buying from the Chinese at Batavia, only to sell to them and that only traders from Macao were welcome, albeit this might be a bit too close reading. In my view there were definitely tensions between the Dutch and Chinese at Batavia, but I cannot identify them more clearly. It is hard to say why Camphuys placed his hopes on the Portuguese but the issues might be correlated in that way that he

⁹⁹ NA-1.04.02, 8361, pp. 2ff.

¹⁰⁰ *Dagh-Register Batavia*, 1690, p. 256.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 1690, p. 260.

would want to use the Portuguese for handling his own smaller shipping problems and avoiding a further increase of Chinese economical power and influence at Batavia. The decision to despatch no ships and no copper to China certainly was a bad one as Camphuys' statement shows: "[...]; *recentlijk kwam er ook een brief van den poui, vnl. aandringende op voldoening van het de V.O.C. opgedrongen koopcontract en op afname van de in 1689 bestelde, maar veel te laat aangeboden pelings, men zal die er inmiddels wel aan de Engelsen verkocht hebben; [...]*"¹⁰² Why should the Chinese anyway bring their goods to Batavia and pay duties if they could sell them to the English in China? Why should they buy pepper in Batavia, where it was only sold to the Chinese junks at 10 *rd.* per *picul* and not in Banjarmasin or elsewhere? A noteworthy order was placed by the Heren over 15-20.000 *picul* tea.

In February 1695 the new Governor-General Outhoorn informed the Heren XVII that the English ship *Sara* had been stopped at Fuzhou and was not allowed to trade. And in January 1697, that "[...] *van een handelsreis naar Ningbo wardt niets verwacht [...] hoewel de landaert van dat gewest van een redelijker humeur geseget werdt te wesen, als die van Hoccieuw, Canton en andere sijn, dat evenwel best kan ondervonden werden, wanneer men met deselve in haar eygen territoir te doen heeft*".¹⁰³

In 1701, on January 20th, the Dutch questioned a Chinese trader, who probably originated from Ningbo, how many ships would sail to Ningbo as far as he knew. He answered that he knew that eight were sailing from Batavia to Ningbo, while two sailed from Johor and two from Banjarmasin, but none from Cambodia or Siam. He had knowledge of four English ships with various manufactures from England, supplemented by some tin and *poetsiok*. They had bought gold, damask, silk and alum in considerable quantities, not directly at Ningbo but at Putuoshan. He also said that one was sailing then to Surat and one directly back to England. Five junks from Batavia had been at Amoy, five English ships and one Arab trader. One of the English ships had mostly traded with military equipment like guns and muskets and bought spelter, gold, damask, some porcelain and silk. One toll official was there, named Houphou [probably not the name but one of the *hopoes*]. Seven junks were supposed to sail again to Batavia and probably two to Banjarmasin and one to Johor. Only two were sailing between Canton and Batavia and only one from the Portuguese at Macao. The *anachoda* knew of three English ships currently in Canton, but no French ones. The English had traded almost the same goods as at Ningbo and Amoy but in addition also silver bars, linen, grain and amber. While buying the same goods like in Ningbo and on Amoy they also bought sugar, *radix China*, *southout*, Japanese copper and porcelain in Canton. The Chinese were buying pepper at 5 *tael* as the Chinese trader reported. The English did not yet have a permanent lodge at Canton but anchored between the islands nearby.¹⁰⁴ Especially

¹⁰² Generale Missiven, Dl. 3, p. 407.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 735 and 815.

¹⁰⁴ NA-1.04.02, 1630, pp. 1718ff.

interesting from this report was that only two junks from Canton were sailing to Batavia and the English had just started to trade near Ningbo.

Again in 1701, this time on October 27th, they questioned another *anachoda* to check the answers of the trader from January for correctness. Only one junk had come from Ningbo and one from Canton. Four were supposed still to come from Ningbo. Two English ships were at Ningbo, but the captain did not know where from, only saying the English had earned a bad reputation there for their frauds. Four junks from Ningbo had sailed to Japan. One Canton junk could be expected in Batavia, while five English ships currently anchored at Canton with products from England, lead, tin and lots of Spanish *reals*. They were buying gold, copper, spelter, silk, pieces of silk, tea and porcelain. No French ships or Portuguese ones were sighted. Only one junk had sailed from Canton to Banjarmasin.¹⁰⁵

It becomes absolutely clear from this, that the Dutch were not only losing ground, but even did nothing to enter the trade. Obviously the English were trading large numbers of goods to which the Company also had access and one can only guess that it was a serious lack of appropriate ships and enough money what inhibited them.

On February 13th 1720 the *sabandar* Arnoldus Abeleven wrote a letter to the Governor-General Hendrick Zwaardecroon in Batavia, that two Portuguese captains from Macao, Louis Sanche de Cacero and Francisco d'Abreo, had been questioned about the number of ships at Canton in 1719. According to them there had been at Macao: Three French, six English from Bombay, Madras and Bengal and four Ostender's, the *Wurtemberg*, *St. Joseph*, *Brussel* and *Huys te Austria*, all under English command. Abeleven informed the High Government that they were "*in seer goede hermonie en ommegank*" [i.e., they got along very well with each other] and had even concluded a contract with the regents about a fixed price for tea and other goods.¹⁰⁶

Certainly Camphuys' letter to the Heren XVII in 1691 was revealing: He had no ships, no money and no goods. Although the voyage of 1690 to Amoy had been quite successful the High Government simply lacked the means to send another one in 1691. But it seems to me that it would have liked to. The following assessment of Camphuys on the other hand was very unrealistic. The consequences were serious, as the following years showed. One could name it an irony of history that 1690 was also the year in which the English founded what should become the centre of their empire in the East within the next approximately 25 years: Calcutta, in Bengal.¹⁰⁷ But up to 1700 the English were far from dominating the Chinese market. They made heavy losses in the 1690s caused by the war with France and managed

¹⁰⁵ NA-1.04.02, 1642, pp. 1165f.

¹⁰⁶ NA-1.04.02, 7546, pp. 519-523.

¹⁰⁷ Prakash, Om (ed.): *Precious metals and commerce: The Dutch East India Company in the Indian Ocean trade*, Aldershot, 1994, p. 176.

only a close-run survival up to the recoinage in 1696 and the Peace of Rijswijk in 1697.¹⁰⁸

IV. Conclusion

I am not going to argue about the fact that the VOC transferred its economic focus towards Bengal where they had long established a factory at Cossimbazar since the 1650s. Nor would I want to argue with the profitability of the factory. The export figures speak for themselves. From 80.000 pounds in 1669/70 they rose to 121.096 pounds in 1690/1 and reached its peak in 1701/2 with 263.589 pounds.¹⁰⁹ The English corresponding figures seem little at first, only 20.000 pound in 1669 and 45.960 pounds in 1689, but reached a considerable 155.842 pounds in 1701/2. By 1752 the English imported 82.774 pounds from Bengal but, more important, they were able to supplement it with 184.560 pounds from China, thus reaching a total of 267.334 pounds.¹¹⁰ The question I wanted to look at was how much the Dutch reorientation to Bengal was a controlled and deliberate act instead of a more or less forced consequence due to lack of alternatives within a given changed economic and political setting. Jonathan Israel also suggested that the Dutch were more or less forced into counter the French and English advances in Bengal and Malabar.¹¹¹

Economically it was not the best decision, because the English over the long run profited from their advantage in China. As can be seen in the work of Kristof Glamann, Chinese silk achieved, with a very few exceptions, higher prices than Bengal silk at the Amsterdam auctions until late in the 1690s and 1700s.¹¹² And that despite a price rise of 150% between the late Seventeenth century and mid-Eighteenth century.¹¹³ Furthermore he also points out the change in the export from the East: The spices exports dropped to 23 % at the end of the 17th century, while textiles and silk rose to 55% share of the total exports.¹¹⁴ This furthermore underlines the significance of the China trade and makes the decision to withdraw from a supplier of silk and silk goods like China even more puzzling. In March 1690 the retour fleet from Batavia still, beside 5.302 pounds *Cabessa*, had a load of 12.093 "*gebloemde en offene pelings*", 16.021 "*witte en rode gielams*", 6.899 "*grote en kleene pausjes*", 45.449 "*verscheide porceleyen*" and 12.000 Tonkinese pelings, while the retour fleet in March 1700 exclusively consisted in 24.257,5 pounds Bengal *tanny* silk.¹¹⁵ I also would like to draw attention to the often cited statement of Dutch factors in Bengal which further illustrates the difficulties there. These were caused by increasing

¹⁰⁸ Israel, Jonathan I. (ed.): *The Anglo-Dutch Moment - Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact*, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 398f.

¹⁰⁹ Mukherjee, Rila: *Merchants and Companies in Bengal: Kasimbazar and Jugdia in the Eighteenth Century*, New Delhi, 2006, p. 9.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 10f.

¹¹¹ Israel, *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, pp. 422ff.

¹¹² Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic trade*, pp. 282f.

¹¹³ Shih, Min-hsiung; Sun, E-tu Zen: *The silk industry in Ch'ing China*, Ann Arbor, 1976, p. 4

¹¹⁴ Prakash, *Precious metals and commerce*, p. V. (Quoted after Glamann, *Dutch Asiatic Trade*, 1958, p. 13, Table 1)

¹¹⁵ *Dagh-Register Batavia*, 1690, p. 126ff. and 1700, p. 159ff.

influence of middlemen against the companies and why the Company could not comply with the orders from Holland: “The middlemen inform us (and on investigation we find that they are speaking the truth) that because of the large number of buyers in the weaving centres and the large sale of textiles, the weavers can no longer be coerced. They weave what is most profitable for them. If one does not accommodate oneself to this situation, then one is not able to procure very much and the supplies go to one’s competitors”¹¹⁶.

I would also like to recall some problems considering the trade in silk that have been discovered by other historians. In Bengal the VOC had to pay duties too, albeit only between 2½ and 4% and only at the seaports (Hugli), while it was exempted from transit taxes from inland comptoirs.¹¹⁷ But often the imperial *firman* concession of duty freedom existed only on paper and the Dutch needed considerable amounts of gold and silver in Bengal. As Om Prakash had found, the Company’s estimation in 1671 showed that it paid 14%, sometimes even 50%, above the toll that was actually due to or was forced to other obligations: a ‘loan’ of 100.000 *rs.* to Shah Shuja in 1658 or gifts and bribes to local authorities at various levels, for example to the Nawab in 1716 of probably 50.000 *rs.*¹¹⁸ It is also important to know that the value of silver continuously sank over time, which would be logical considering the bullion inflow into a pre-modern economy without any financial institutions. From 1661 to 1719, as K.N. Chaudhuri had researched, one unit of gold was worth 16.161, later only 12.759 units of silver, or in other words the value of silver sank by 21.05 %.¹¹⁹ I am aware that the *rupia* in Bengal was a silver coin. But I am saying that in my opinion the English bought huge amounts of gold in China in the late 1680s to get an advantage in India and Bengal.

The annual price increase of Bengal silk mounted up to 0.89% between 1683-1717.¹²⁰ 97% of exports in 1720/1 from Holland consisted of precious metals, mainly silver. In 1687 it had been only 47.16%.¹²¹ If there was no inflation on most goods in Bengal caused by the huge inflow of bullion it remained on the other hand an uneven balance for the Dutch trade, because most of the money must be seen rather as an investment in the development of the economy than in the trade. The Dutch were putting more money into Bengal than they actually got back in goods. And Bengal was not only the area where the ‘largest profits’ were made but where corruption had reached the highest level, as the investigation by Baron van Rheede tot Drakensteyn at the end of the 17th century revealed.¹²²

¹¹⁶ Prakash, *Precious metals and commerce*, p. 177. (Quoted from NA-1.04.02, 1530, p. 17.)

¹¹⁷ Prakash, Om: *Dutch in India*, New Delhi, 2002, p. 273: 1663 1st *firman* granted by Aurangzeb, 2 ½%.

¹¹⁸ Prakash, Om: *The Dutch East India Company in Bengal: Trade Privileges and Problems, 1633- 1712*. In: *Indian Economic & Social History Review* Vol. 9 (1972), pp. 271ff. (esp. p. 276: In 1690 the V.O.C was forced to agree to 3½ % at Patna and Kasimbazar and export limits of 1.000 bales raw silk tried to put in force. And esp. pp. 279f.)

¹¹⁹ Prakash, *Precious metals and commerce*, p. X.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 168f.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 20ff. (Export figures: 1660 f1.28, 1690 f2.00, 1710 f2.87, 1720 f4.6 mill.)

¹²² Prakash, *Dutch in India*, p. 279.

Of course one has to admit, as F. Gaastra, O. Prakash and R. Ptak point out, the decline of the Japanese market due to the introduction of *pancado* [called “*taxatie handel*” by the Dutch] in 1672 and the revival of the *bakufu itowappu* or a limited annual import sum system in 1685¹²³ in a market which had been responsible for nearly one third of the VOC’s profits between 1670 and 1680¹²⁴ had a severe impact on the availability of precious metals in the East. But this could have been overcome by the availability of gold from China after 1683. From the 1680s onwards the English bought gold in China (see above), what had also been one of the initial conceptions of the Dutch China trade. China had another enormous advantage: It could have supplied the VOC with another possibility of earning an ‘extra-profit’ from intra-Asian trade. Bengal cloth also was sold from all over Southeast Asia to Africa and Bihar opium and Bengal nitre accounted for an export share of 7 and 12 % respectively¹²⁵, but despite that it remained dependent on bullion imports because of the cutback in intra-Asian trade. Already in the 1680s silver and gold transports from Holland to Batavia increased remarkably.¹²⁶ Another serious issue was the 20% devaluation¹²⁷ of goods and bullion brought to Batavia from Holland from 1683 on, because it was inconsequently taken into account by the comptoirs.¹²⁸ And if the Dutch had hoped for a revision of the Navigation Acts and the silk duties of 1660 and 1685 after the Glorious Revolution in 1688, their hopes were bitterly disappointed by William III.¹²⁹ Instead the companies instructed their merchants “to hinder and disturb the activity of the other company by all available means as long as these were compatible with an outward show of friendliness”.¹³⁰

The Nine Year’s War, starting in 1688, certainly had a far smaller impact on the Dutch in Asia than the Anglo-Dutch and the Franco-Dutch Wars up to 1678.¹³¹ The French establishments at Hugli, Ballasore and Cossimbazar in Bengal were destroyed in 1689.¹³² I was unable to find any signs of fear of a French attack on Batavia as a reason to send no ships to China, as John Wills presumed.¹³³ But what perhaps played a role were the increased costs for securing the VOC’s possessions. The VOC for example in 1687 started extensive fortification works at the fortress *De Vijf Zinnen* at Negapatnam. That might have been a good idea from the geostrategic point of view because of its geographical situation and excellent harbour, but was completely useless in economic terms. Still worse, the Dutch had to hand back Pondicherry to the French after the Peace of Rijswijk with its fortifications intact.¹³⁴ What also hurt

¹²³ Ptak; Roderich, *Emporia*, p. 74 and Prakash, *Precious Metals*, chapter IX, p. 91f.

¹²⁴ Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid*, p. 81.

¹²⁵ Prakash, *The New Cambridge History of India*, pp.195f.

¹²⁶ Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade*, p. 61.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 54f. and 72.

¹²⁸ Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid*, p. 88.

¹²⁹ Clark, George N.: *The Dutch alliance and the war against French trade, 1688-1697*, Manchester, 1923, p. 12ff. and 26; Ormrod, *The rise of commercial empires*, p. 46.

¹³⁰ Israel, *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, p. 420.

¹³¹ Clark, *The Dutch alliance and the war against French trade*, pp. 133f.

¹³² Israel, *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, p. 424.

¹³³ Meilink-Roelofs., Marie A.P.; Voss, Vivian B.: *De V.O.C. in Azië*, Bussum, 1976, p. 179.

¹³⁴ Israel, *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, pp. 422ff.

the VOC was England's remodelling of its financial system after 1688, which even intertwined Dutch and English financial operations and commercial interests so closely that it was nearly impossible to compete in the East. The foundation of the Bank of England in 1694 increased the gap on and on.¹³⁵ But as J. Israel pointed out the restructuring of the EIC first resulted in a drastic drop in profits and the creation of a second EIC in 1693, a problem that was only solved by the merging in 1709.¹³⁶ It is therefore hard to understand why the VOC would deliberately engage in competition in Bengal instead of focussing on China, assumed the High Government in India would have been able and allowed to send ships thereto. Maybe the Dutch intended to overcome the English competition in Bengal while the English were focussing on China and only had to face losses there.

Femme Gaastra quoted in his book *De geschiedenis van de VOC* (2002) the example of Pieter Overtwater in Japan in 1645, sending back Persian silk to Batavia on the reason that he was unable to sell it with a profit at his market, but completely ignoring that the overall trading balance, i.e. after the Japanese silver was brought to Coromandel, would have been indeed positive.¹³⁷ In my opinion, this 'thinking locally only' appears to me that it is characteristic for the Dutch. Maybe it was a sort of conservatism, which also can be applied to the behaviour of the Dutch in China. They seemed to care more about the profits of the actual trade than the initial purpose to obtain goods in exchange only. And in China they did not even make a loss but a small profit.

As mentioned before, there was more than one reason for the Dutch to 'end' or better to suspend the trade with China. Leonard Blussé, referring to the letter of the Heren XVII of September 30th 1689, names high tolls, extortion by local mandarins and that protection and shipping was needed in the Indian Ocean, the focus on Bengal silk, the disadvantage against traditional Chinese networks and competition by Asian traders as reasons for ending the trade.¹³⁸ With reference to the high tolls and unprofitability I would like to draw the reader's attention to Table V d. which shows that the VOC not only managed to get return goods worth f5 million. Albeit the f1.3 million return goods in 1660 were almost completely unsold products, with an input of f4 million from the trade, but also a steadily growing gross profit of nearly 69% in the 1680s despite the introduced tax system. It can also be seen that this was accomplished with very little money [see notes, in 1682 there were sent f200.000 in bullion, thus perhaps a total of some f250-300.000] and that indeed 2/3rd of the trade consisted in exchange of goods for goods (see columns sales and profit). This underlines in my point of view what could have been achieved if the High Government had sent monetary supplements to China instead of Bengal. And if it had been able to reduce transaction costs from the slow return of long distance trade

¹³⁵ Jardine, Lisa: *Going Dutch - How England plundered Holland's Glory*, London, 2008, pp. 338, 345 and 349.

¹³⁶ Israel, *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, p. 437f.

¹³⁷ Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, p. 109.

¹³⁸ Blussé, Leonard: *No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690*. In: *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30(1), 1996, pp. 74ff.

with Holland.¹³⁹ Instead of being forced to invest their capital in London, as Ormrod claims¹⁴⁰, the Dutch had an option to do that in my opinion. A low profit for the VOC in China and a lower requirement of bullion from Holland would always have been better or at least very helpful to supplement the finances of Batavia. As said beforehand I do not doubt that Bengal was highly profitable for the VOC in Europe, but for Batavia it was probably not. Maybe it was indeed a mistake of the Heren XVII's to stick too long to an antiquated bullionist theory, while meanwhile in England Thomas Mun (1571-1641) and Josia Child (1630-1699, *Discourse on Trade* (1690)) were already developing theories on money as a good¹⁴¹ and on mercantilism versus free trade (Charles Davenant, 1656-1714). What eventually saved the Dutch was the English government's ban on calico imports from India by the bill of 1697 and the act of 1700¹⁴² and the Treaty of Rijswijk with France (1697).

As far as I can say from what I read in the primary sources there was a crucial shortness of money and ships, there was the high taxation in China, supplemented by a general misunderstanding of the Chinese mentality and the permanent changes in the administrative set-up¹⁴³ what made it extremely hard for the VOC to come to an understanding with local individuals like in Bengal, for example, where it was much easier for the Company to act. I would not necessarily put that much emphasis on competition, since the English 'suffered' equally from the extortion as did the Dutch or even the native Chinese traders. And the small scale trade of Chinese traders and *freeburgers* was not that much of a competition either. The regents and client merchants kept strict control over the key products trade until 1684, when it was replaced by the mandarins' and other administratives' influences on the trade. One could add a certain anti-Chinese feeling among the government in Batavia around 1690 as well, although I do not want to go too far with such a conclusion. That Camphuys eventually decided to dispatch no ships to China - and in the end the distribution of ship capacity resided with him - proved a fatal decision in my view on the long run¹⁴⁴, but was understandable from his temporary situation. The reason Camphuys gave, was that the ships would be better deployed to trade to Bengal. That only makes sense with regard to a serious shipping capacity problem, provided that this means that only too large ships were available. As can be seen in the table in Femme Gaastra's *De Geschiedenis van de VOC* (2002) on shipbuilding the problem was not that no new ships were built but that only larger ships of class I and II (> 400 last) were built after 1690 and less smaller ones, which were better suited

¹³⁹ Ormrod, David: *The rise of commercial empires*, p. 65.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 42: Dutch merchants but little choice than to actively take part in London. And p. 73: 70% of £13 million exports 1699-1719 supplemented on Dutch bullion market by EIC agents.

¹⁴¹ Ormrod, *The rise of commercial empires*, p. 163.

¹⁴² Thomas, P.J.: *Mercantilism and the East India Trade*, London, 1926, pp. 79f., 86 and 105.

¹⁴³ For example the installation of a new Pu-i in Canton 1669 at the side of the Chinese Pinglamong was feared to cause the most problems in the coming trade negotiations, see NA-1.04.02, 1272, p. 1130v.: "*Dese veranderingh van den Pouij, dat den Toutanghi vreesse wij den ons de meeste moeilijkheeden veroorsaecken, often minsten onse saecke zeer vertragen zal, gelijk wij in Hocksieuw mede we hebbe ondervonden, [...]*"

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic trade*, p. 249: The reason for the decline was the failing inter-Asiatic trade.

for inner-Asian transports.¹⁴⁵ For example the last ship sent to Amoy with Gravenbroek in 1688/9, the *Eemland*, was one of the medium sized ships (b. 1680) with a capacity of 398 tons (~200 last) and 120 ft. long (~36.5 m).¹⁴⁶

There was little money to be made in Bengal neither in reference to intra-Asian nor trade from European goods thereto. Although Dutch shipping between Europe and Asia increased heavily, the fleet in Asia was reduced from 101 ships in the 1660s to a mere 37 in the 1720s.¹⁴⁷ As Femme Gaastra has shown, the Company's fleet in the East was extremely over-aged by the 1680s. In 1680 out of 91 ships enlisted 18 were in patria or in retour fleets and 5 were category C, meaning 'over-aged' or inappropriate for use on long voyages. In 1687 out of 102 ships listed 48 were in or on their way to Holland and 13 of them were categorized as C.¹⁴⁸ This left a net shipping of 68 in 1680 and 41 by 1687 in whole East Asia. Ship losses during the 2nd and 3rd Anglo-Dutch War might have played some minor role as well.¹⁴⁹ This underlines the problem of lack of ships that Camphuys in 1691 obviously referred to. Van Beuningen's recommendation in 1687 to use smaller ships in Asian waters might have been indeed a possible solution for the acute problems.¹⁵⁰

It is not understandable why the Heren XVII still distributed a dividend of more than 33%, compared to an average 7% of the EIC¹⁵¹, while already making a loss in the East after 1673.¹⁵² It is very telling that the first ship to Canton actually was not sent by the VOC but by the Imperial Ostend Company through an unsuccessful direct voyage of the *Coxhorn* from Amsterdam in December 1728¹⁵³, while the first under the direction of the VOC from Batavia followed only in 1734.¹⁵⁴ The reason was that goods delivered by the Chinese to Batavia were of inferior quality partly due to modes of transport in bamboo cases and even because of higher prices.¹⁵⁵ The transport of tea from the Wuyi Mountains in Fujian to Canton took about two months.¹⁵⁶ And to bring silk from Zhejiang to Canton probably took even longer. This makes John Wills' argument that Fujian was too far away from the silk producing area¹⁵⁷ less convincing.

The total Fujian trade probably measured about only 2/3rd that of Canton solely in 1750.¹⁵⁸ In

¹⁴⁵ Gaastra, Femme: *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, p. 161. (Quoted from J.R. Bruijn et.al. (eds.) *Dutch Asiatic Shipping I* (p. 52))

¹⁴⁶ See <http://www.vocsite.nl/schepen/detail.html?id=10294>, last viewed on Nov 19th, 9.30am.

¹⁴⁷ Veer; Blussé, *Rivalry and conflict*, p. 278.

¹⁴⁸ Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid*, p. 166.; Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, pp. 116 and 118: over-capacity in shipping in Asia, 20 out of 83 ships in Asia in 1659 were unfit for long travels, in 1670 44 out of 107 ships, in 1680 35 out of 88 ships.

¹⁴⁹ Ormrod, David: *The rise of commercial empires*, p. 276.

¹⁵⁰ Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid*, p. 174.

¹⁵¹ Rothermund, *Europa und Asien*, p. 52.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 203, 207 and 240f.

¹⁵³ Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic trade*, p. 230.

¹⁵⁴ Blussé, Leonard: *Chinese Trade to Batavia during the days of the V.O.C.* In: *Archipel* Vol. 18, 1979, p. 209.

¹⁵⁵ Jacobs, *Koopman in Azie*, p. 138.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹⁵⁷ Wills, *China and Maritime Europe*, p. 201.

¹⁵⁸ Vermeer, Eduard B. (ed.): *Development and decline of Fukien province in the 17th and 18th centuries*, Leiden, 1990, p. 11.

1749 we have the example of a certain Ch'en I-lao, who was trading on a Fujianese junk pepper, *poetsiok*, cloves and other goods from Batavia, Johor and Banjarmasin.¹⁵⁹ Trade only after 1757 was restricted to Canton.¹⁶⁰ The reason for that was the Qing policy of consolidation.¹⁶¹ A Chinese 'isolation policy'¹⁶² or 'continentaal stelsel'¹⁶³ at any time can in my point of view be dismissed into the sphere of myth. The tributary system, if one could anyway refer to it as such after 1644, was certainly no reason for the Dutch to give up that trade. The Qing policy was not directed against external threats as Demel wrote¹⁶⁴ but against internal threats. It brought a long time of peace for China. Considering the advantages of a trading post¹⁶⁵ it is not in every case understandable why the Dutch did not accept any of the offers for such a post.

The result was a lost chance for the VOC and the British dominance in China.¹⁶⁶ And I would argue that this was not the consequence of a deliberate acting by the Batavian High Government, but that it was forced on it by decisions of the Heren XVII. Concluding my thesis I would like to add that I can absolutely agree with both Leonard Blussé's and John Wills' latest publications regarding the Dutch withdrawal from China and do not to criticize or argue their conclusions, but I want to add some interesting facts which did not appear in their works and which I found in the letters of the employees of the VOC in China, like for example the Manchu tax system in 1684 or the different conditions in the Chinese ports.

¹⁵⁹ Ptak; Rothermund, *Emporia*, p. 374f.

¹⁶⁰ Vermeer, *Development and decline of Fukien province*, p. 301.

¹⁶¹ Demel, *Als Fremde in China*, p. 74.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 5 and 74, about an isolation policy up to 1684/5, and on p. 151, that the mandarins had no interest in foreign trade and that the Manchu prevented trade. This is absolutely wrong. Equally on p. 101, that there was always a lack of qualified personnel to communicate and write formal letters to officials. This is wrong.

¹⁶³ Knaap, Gerrit; Teitler, Ger (eds.): *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie*, Leiden, 2002, p. 213.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

¹⁶⁵ Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC*, p. 70: purchase, sale, stockpiling, sampling, etc.

¹⁶⁶ Blussé, *No Boats to China*, p. 76.

V. a. Map 1. Southeast Asia and Southern China



Source: http://wiki.alternatehistory.com/doku.php/blank_map_directory/southeast_asia; last viewed Nov 19th, 9.45am. (blank map, own editing)

V. a. Map 2. Physical features of China



Source: Twitchett, Denis; Fairbank, John K.: *The Cambridge history of China*, Vol. 9, Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800, Cambridge 2002, p. xii (Map 1).

V. b. Map of the Fuzhou area (including the bay of Tinghay and the Min River)



Source: Bellin, Jacques Nicolas: *Carte de la Baye d'Hocsieu et des Entrées de la Riviere de Chang* (1750). In: Antoine-François Prevost's *L'Histoire Generale des Voyages*, published by Pierre de Hondt, The Hague, 1747-1780.

V. c. Table of product prices and development, 1664-1690

Sales Prices (<i>tael / picul</i>)	1663 ¹⁶⁷	1664 ¹⁶⁸	1665 ¹⁶⁹	1666 ¹⁷⁰	1667 ¹⁷¹	1669 ¹⁷²	1677 ¹⁷³	1679 ¹⁷⁴	1682 ¹⁷⁵	1683 ¹⁷⁶	1685 ¹⁷⁷	1686 ¹⁷⁸	1687 ¹⁷⁹	1688/9 ¹⁸⁰
Peper	14	7, 9, 11	11, 12	16-18, 11 (7.5-10)		13 (8½-10.3)	6	6	7.5, 8 at Canton	7.3-8		5.4	5.5; 5-10 (4.8-6.8) at Hoksieu	6.5-7
Rompen (broken kernels of nutmeg)	22		n/a	32-35 (16-17)	21 (13½), 18, 19	30 (14-18)	17	18.5	17.5				100	
Nagelen (cloves)	170-180	170 (63)	140	250-300 (120-130), 140	160 (105), 140, 120	180 (90-130)	100		85 at Canton				81; 85-120 (192) at Hoksieu	75; 175 at Amoy
Sandelhout	29	30 (21)	25, 28	32-35, 25 (20-23)	27 (21), 24 (22), 23	35 (19-26)	15		16, 12 at Canton	10		15-16	14.5; 15-22 (37.4) at Hoksieu	16
Loot (lead)	7	7 (5)			6.2 (4.7), 5.5, 5.4	12 (5-7.2)	5.5	3.5	7.5				2.8; 3-5 (3.4-10.8) at Hoksieu	
Tin					22 (14.3), 15								12-20 (27.4) at Hoksieu	
Nooten (whole nutmeg kernels)		24 (12)												
Rassemale		165 (-)	120	120					70					
Poetsiock (a digestive root, also used for incense)		35 (22)	32 (25-30)	45-50, 32 (25-28)		40 (22-30)	19		15					
Quicksilver		160 (-)												

Continued on next page.

¹⁶⁷ Dagh-Register, Batvaia, 1664, p. 88.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 519 and 582, 584.

¹⁶⁹ Dagh-Register, Batvaia, 1665, p. 77f.; NA-1.04.02, 1253, p. 1849ff.

¹⁷⁰ Dagh-Register, Batvaia, 1666, pp. 16, and 1667, 241 and 230f.; NA-1.04.02, 1257, p. 1137.

¹⁷¹ NA-1.04.02, 1264, pp. 135, 144 and 147f.

¹⁷² NA-1.04.02, 1272, pp. 1106v. and 1198.

¹⁷³ NA-1.04.02, 1330, 709f.

¹⁷⁴ NA-1.04.02, 1348, pp. 757 and 770.

¹⁷⁵ NA-1.04.02, 1377, pp. 568v and 569v.f.

¹⁷⁶ NA-1.04.02, 8680, pp. 137v. and 140ff.

¹⁷⁷ NA-1.04.02, 1438, p. 700.

¹⁷⁸ NA-1.04.02, 1438, p. 733v.f.

¹⁷⁹ NA-1.04.02, 1429, pp. 819f.

¹⁸⁰ NA-1.04.02, 1453, pp. 261ff.

Sales Prices (continued)	1663	1664	1665	1666	1667	1669	1677	1679	1682	1683	1685	1686	1687	1688/9
Caliatourhout		5 (4)	4.5	5.5-6, 4½ (4)	4.8 (3.6), 4, 4.4	6.5-7.6		3	2.5	3.6		4		
Sappanhout							3	3	2.5			0.8		
Rottang		6 (4 ½)	5-5.3	8.5-10, 5.3 (4-4.5)										
Wierook (frankincense)			33, 25 (20)	55-65, 33 (28-30)				7						
Gommelack			30	30					7.5					
Lakenen			4 ½-5					3.5	3.5-4 at Canton		2.5		2.1-2.8; 2.1-4 (-) at Hoksieu	
Croonrassen			35						23 at Canton		22-26		16; 20-25 (-) at Hoksieu	16-20
Perpetuana			22										12; 18 (-) at Hoksieu	11-12
Iron					10, 12 (9.6), 10.9									
Copper										16.5				
Arrack					6 (4.6), 4.6, 5									
Oliphant teeth						80 (25-28)								
Amber								6.7-9						
Camphor														5-5.2
Wheat														1.4

(x) = Chinese or Dutch price offered

Additional notes on some of the goods (see Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic trade*, pp. 16ff.):

Rompen = unripe nutmegs

Nagelen = whole cloves

Sappan wood; Caliatour wood = dye-stuffs

Camphor = drug

Spiauter = tutenague = spelter = alloy of zinc

Lijwaten/Lijnwaten = general "fabrics"

Gingans = coarse cotton, chequered and a little stiff

Salempouris = kind of chintz

Rottingen = "rattan", bamboo cane

Silk goods:

Gilams = Persian silk cloth, named after the province Gilan at the Caspian Sea

Cabessa, Bariga, Pee = 1st, 2nd and 3rd rate Bengali silk types, named after Portuguese words for "head", "stomach" and "foot".

Purchase Prices	1665 ¹⁸¹	1666 ¹⁸²	1667 ¹⁸³	1669 ¹⁸⁴	1678 ¹⁸⁵	1679 ¹⁸⁶	1682 ¹⁸⁷	1683 ¹⁸⁸	1686 ¹⁸⁹	1687 ¹⁹⁰	1688/9 ¹⁹¹
Gold	110-120 tael / 21-22 carat										105 tael / 22 carat
Silk <i>Cabessa</i>	180/190-240	190-220 tael / picul (160-187)	200-220 (170), 185	190	175	160	160	145-165	150-160	190; 150-175 (150-160) at Hoksieu	140; 129 at Amoy
Goutdraet	20, 15-16 / 100 pce		15								
Radix China	9		9							2.5	
Galliga	8									3.5	
Thee (grove)	3, 12		12								
Thee (fijn)	35	37		35				40			
Spialter (tutenague)	16.5, 13	20, 14 ½	16	7			5	4-5.5	5.5	5.5	
Anys	15-16										
Alluyn (alum)	3		6								
Silk art	1-1.5 / pce										
Maestpaer	2-3										
Muscus	25										

(x) = Chinese or Dutch price offered

Tutenague = a lead-zinc alloy, mainly from Guangdong, used for making brass (see Wills, *China & Maritime Europe*, p. 206.)

¹⁸¹ Dagh-Register, Batvaia, 1665, p. 77, 387 and 411.

¹⁸² Dagh-Register, Batvaia, 1666, pp. 16, and 1667, 241 and 230f. NA-1.04.02, 1257, p. 1137.

¹⁸³ NA-1.04.02, 1264, pp. 135, 144 and 147f.

¹⁸⁴ NA-1.04.02, 1272, pp. 1106v. and 1198.

¹⁸⁵ NA-1.04.02, 1339, 482.

¹⁸⁶ NA-1.04.02, 1348, pp. 757 and 770.

¹⁸⁷ NA-1.04.02, 1377, pp. 568v and 569v.f.

¹⁸⁸ NA-1.04.02, 8680, pp. 137v. and 140ff.

¹⁸⁹ NA-1.04.02, 1438, p. 733v.f.

¹⁹⁰ NA-1.04.02, 1429, pp. 819f.

¹⁹¹ NA-1.04.02, 1453, pp. 261ff.

V. d. Table of profits, 1664-1690

Year	Goods f	Sales f	Profit f	Return goods f	Japan f	Notes
1664	300626		53433			
1665	109479		179050	60927	127110	
	57498					
	122187					
1666	577419		17978	354190		- 23000 tael to Malacca
				327530		- 17000 tael to Quelang
				132114		
1667	328773		169391	361914		
				90304		
1668	221033	9392				+ 2000 real, 300 tael
Subtotal 1660's	1.717.015	9.392	419.852 (25%)	1.326.979	127.110	
1676	108495		121155			- 15569 f missing
	9002					
	256937					
1678	106590		93335	209978		150000 saldo in comptoir
				291184		
				248078		
1679	114162		151550	154883		
Subtotal 1670's	595.186		366.040 (61.5%)	904.123		
1680			61534	142657		
			90016	165485		
1681	61534	152635	65113	336935		
	205811		143640	98253		
			90155	82426		
				251921		
1682	370691					
1683			123753	398609		
1684	278367			139591		
				189293		
1685	334721			158798		+ 15000 kroonen, 5000 real
	180097			198391		
				108391		
				230954		
1686	299907	304467	77542	446395		+ 4000 real
	358546			149794		
				171917		
1688/9	105201	104969	95970	158782		+ 7000 ducats, 7000 real
	107165		68587	135559		+ 7000 ducats, 3000 real
	70899		53812	101682		
				172461		
1690		199957		221223		
				37000		
Subtotal 1680's	2.372.939	762.028	870.122 (68.78 %)	4.096.517		
Total f	3.968.433	771.420	1.656.014 (61.17%)	6.327.619	127.110	

V. e. The Chinese custom and ship tax system at Fuzhou, 1687¹⁹²

Ship tax in *tael*:

For a ship: Basis fee:

100-120 *feet* 1.250 *tael*

120-140 *feet* 1.500 *tael*

140-160 *feet* 1.750 *tael*

For example for the Dutch ships *Moercappel* and *Westbroek* in 1687 at Hoksieu:

Moercappel 1750 + 385 (22% difference from basis) +7% currency difference = 2295:7 *tael*

Westbroek 1250 + 50 (4% difference from basis) +7% currency difference = 1397:9:6 *tael*

Total = 3693:6:6 *tael* or f14.774:12:13

Customs in *tael*:

Import goods

Pepper 0.8 / picul (1.5)

Gloves 2.0 / picul (3)

Sandal wood 1.0 / picul (2)

Lead 0.2 / picul (0.3)

Camphor 0.6 / catty (1)

Amber 0.25 / catty (0.4)

Tin 0.7 / picul (1.1)

Lakenen 5.0 / pce of 50 length (7.5)

Lakenras 4.0 / pce (3)

Croonras 1.6 / pce (2.5)

Perpetuana 1.0 / pce (1.5)

Groff Greijn 0.3 / catty (0.5)

Lywaten 0.4 / picul (0.6)

Export goods

Silk 3.0 / picul (5-6)**

Pelings 5.0 / 100 (8)

Pausjes 3.0 / 100 (5)

Gielams 3.0 / 100 (5)

Tutenague 0.2 / picul (0.3)

Tea *Songloe* 1.0 / picul (1.8)

Ginger 0.2 / picul (0.3)

* The Dutch taxes were modified as in (x.x).

** "Depended on the mood of the Hopoes"

¹⁹² NA-1.04.02, 1438, pp. 718ff.

V. f. Tables of ship data and ship traffic between Batavia and China, c.1660-c.1690

Ship data¹⁹³

Name	Built	Length ft.	Width ft.	Capacity tons	Crew
Domburg	1654	?	?	320	?
Ankeveen	1660	120	25.5	283	?
Loenen	1656	?	?	?	?
Vlaardingen	1661	?	?	400	210
Meerman	1663	126	28	440	147-153
Caneelboom	1662	116	26	300	?
Nieuwenhove	1660	126	29	438	?
Overveen	1660	126	29	448	?
Rammekeens	1661	126	29	438	?
Bleijswijk	1661	100	24	240	?
Pegu	?	?	?	340	?
Zandlooper	?	?	?	120	?
Poelsnip	?	?	?	80	13
Mars	1653	?	?	400	?
Durgerdam	1662	126	28.75	452	?
Bunschoten	1660	103	23	219	?
Alphen	1662	142	33	700	
Constantia	leased	?	?	?	?
Vergulde Tijger	leased	?	?	520	?
Victoria	1666	140	34	666	?
Oyevaer (Ooievaar)	1656	140	32	627	?
Pimpel	1664	?	?	80	14
Batavia	1666	?	?	756	125
Joncker	1662	?	?	200	?
Wapen van Vlissingen	1667	145	34.5	725	130
Bock	1667	87.5	19.5	160	?
Zijp	1672	130	31	488	175
Brantgans	1673	80	20	90	19
Marcken	1671	100	23	230	50
Huis te Kleef	1674	130	32	564	200
Flaman	?	?	?	?	?
Betuwe	1672	145	34	704	270
Odyck	1674	130	32	551	200
Alexander	1674	130	32	524	180-200
Jamby	1679	110	26	336	80
Hellevoetsluis	1671	140	34	714	200-250
Woud	1680	85	21.5	90	25
Sillida	1680	115	27	324	100-125
Zeist	1679	110	27.5	338	80
Naaldwijk	1679	110	26.5	332	80
Naardermeer	1677	115	23	314	30
Gideon	1683	?	?	404	175
Huis te Merwede	1671	150	37.5	882	270
Montfoort	1682	?	?	540	40
Westbroek	1681	100	23	253	40-70
Maas	1683	143.5	35.5	790	200-250
Bovenhaspel	1683	130	29	490	130
Waalstroom	1684	150	27	648	240-275
Moerkappel	1684	135	35	685	170-225
Emmenes	1682	110	23.5	297	70-100
Eemland	1680	120	28.5	398	80-140
St. Maartensdijk	1681	110	28	352	70-125
Drakestein	1680	100	23	256	40

¹⁹³ <http://www.vocsite.nl/schepen/lijst.html?sn=A>, last viewed 2012 Nov 23rd, 12am.

Ship traffic between Batavia and China, c.1660-c.1690¹⁹⁴

Number of ships from - to / Year (as far as secured)	1664	1665	1666	1667	1668	1669	1670	1671	1672	1673	1674	1675	1676	1677	1678	1679	1680
Batavia to China (V.O.C.)	7	8	5	5	2								5		3	2	3
Batavia to China (freeburger and Chinese)	1						2	12	7	6	15	1	7	1	3		
Macao to Batavia (Portuguese)						1	1		2			3	1	1	1	1	1
Banten to China							2		1		5				1		1
English to China							1					1	1	2			
China to Batavia (Canton, Chincheo, Amoy, etc.)							3				2	2	1	3		11	6
Southeast Asia to Canton (Malaysia, Siam, Cambodia, Quinam, Johor)										1							

Number of ships from - to / Year (as far as secured)	1681	1682	1683	1684	1685	1686	1687	1688	1689	1690
Batavia to China (V.O.C.)	3	3	2	4	3	5		3		1
Batavia to China (freeburger and Chinese)	7			4	1	2				
Macao to Batavia (Portuguese)	1	1						2		
Banten to China										
English to China	1	1		5	2	2		7	7	3
China to Batavia (Canton, Chincheo, Amoy, etc.)	3	3						13-16	13	
Southeast Asia to Canton (Malaysia, Siam, Cambodia, Quinam, Johor)	6	1				5				

¹⁹⁴ Only as far as documented in the *Dagh-Register Batavia* and letters or day registers of VOC employees in China reported as being currently present in the harbour.

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VII. Declaration on Plagiarism

Name of Student: Jörg Moldenhauer
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Title of thesis: *om den vrijen handel in dit rijk - The Dutch East India Company in Fuzhou and the Dutch merchant's image of China, (c.1660-c.1690)*
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1st reader / supervisor: Prof. Dr. J. J. L. Gommans
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I have read and understood the rules on plagiarism.

I hereby declare that this written work is the result of my own independent scholarly work and that in all cases material from the work of others (ie books, articles, essays, dissertations and the internet) is acknowledged and indicated by quotations and paraphrases. No other material than that listed in the bibliography has been used. This written work has not been previously used as examination material at this or any other university. This written work has not yet been published.

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