



Liberal European economic sanctions against Russia: The European Union as the (last) defender of liberal norms and values?

Master thesis

January 11, 2018

Olivier ter Meulen

S1361163

o.h.c.ter.meulen@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Leiden University

Political Science: International Organisation

Supervisor: Dr. R. van der Haer

Second reader: Dr. N. Blarel

Word count: 9,994

Table of Contents

Introduction 2

Theory..... 4

Methods 9

Liberal values 12

Analyses 14

 Rule of law 14

 Freedom..... 15

 Democracy 16

Conclusion..... 18

Reference list..... 21

'Ukraine's case is a test of Europe's fundamental values in the neighbourhood'
Donald Tusk, 2015 ¹

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, over 500 cases of economic sanctions imposed by one state on another can be identified (Cashen 2017). The official political goals behind these sanctions, ranging from nuclear non-proliferation to the promotion of human rights, are diverse and ambitious (Cashen 2017). A well-known example of an inter-state economic sanction is the United States' blockade of the Cuban economy (Weiner 2007). Another notorious case is the set of economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and allies that was eventually lifted in 2016 (Levs 2016).

Since the rise of international organisations in the foreign policy domain, they quickly became important actors in the imposition of economic sanctions. The United Nations (UN) was the first international organisation to authorize and establish procedures for economic sanctions in 1966 (Stremlau 1996) and has since then enforced economic sanctions on as much as 26 states and terrorist organisations (United Nations 2017). The European Union (EU) went even further and imposed, in a shorter period, economic sanctions on 38 states and organisations (European Commission 2017a).

Economic sanctions have been extensively discussed in the academic literature, often with contradicting opinions and findings (Jones 2015). Previous studies range from the effectiveness of economic sanctions (e.g., Cortright & Lopez 2002; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot 1985) to what the targets of these economic sanctions should be (e.g., Galtung 1959; Moret 2015). Limited research, however, has been conducted on economic sanctions imposed by the EU. The few studies that are conducted on EU economic sanctions are habitually not specified at one case of economic sanctions but focus onto the relation between EU bureaucracy and economic sanctions. Giumelli and Ivan (2013), for instance, state that EU sanctions have some effect but their official goals should be defined better. Biersteker and Portela (2015) claim that EU sanctions should be imposed in closer collaboration with the UN and non-EU states, such as Australia and the United States.

¹ Donald Tusk is President of the European Council. This quote is taken from his statement following the EU ambassadors meeting in 2015 (European Council, 2015a).

An ongoing case of economic sanctions that has not been researched is the set of economic sanctions that the EU has imposed on the Russian Federation in 2014 and is still in place. Early 2014, the EU has imposed a set of economic sanctions after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Russian intermingling in separation conflicts in Eastern Ukraine (European Council 2017a). Economic sanctions imposed by the EU need to be renewed every half a year by a unanimous vote of the heads of states of the member states in the European Council (European Council 2017a). To date the sanctions imposed on Russia have been renewed eight times. The most recent renewal took place on December 21, 2017 (European Council 2017a). However, the EU sanctions against Russia seem to suffer from several negative effects for the EU member states. The most significant negative effect for the EU member states is that Russia has decided to impose counter-sanctions on the EU, causing severe economic damage to all EU economies (Rapoza 2015). In addition to the economic damage, the EU member states are divided on the measures that should be taken against Russia and the effectiveness of the imposed sanctions is expected to be low. The EU economic sanctions imposed on Russia thus seem to suffer from several problems but are still renewed every half a year by a unanimous vote. In this thesis, I will therefore try to answer the question *'Why does the European Union continue to impose economic sanctions on the Russian Federation despite its negative side effects?'* In order to answer this question, I will perform a critical discourse analysis on official EU statements about the economic sanctions imposed on Russia.

In this thesis, I will examine whether the liberalist take on economic sanctions is able to provide an explanation for the imposition and renewal of the EU economic sanctions on Russia despite its negative effects. According to Koga (2015), the liberalist take on economic sanctions assumes that economic sanctions are imposed in response to a breach of liberal norms and values. The influence of the liberal theory on sanctions, however, has decreased during the last decades since liberal norms and values have become less important in international politics (Koga 2015: 23). In my research, I will examine whether the reason behind the continuation of the EU sanctions imposed on Russia can be found in the EU's emphasis on their role as protector of liberal norms and values. By researching whether the liberal theory can explain the EU sanctions imposed on Russia, I will be able to determine if the liberal theory on sanctions, even though it lost most of its academic influence, is still able to provide an explanation for the imposition of recent cases of economic sanctions.

Besides the critique on the importance of the liberalist view on economic sanctions, it is argued that liberal norms and values itself are nowadays not of importance anymore. Waltz (2016) for example, argues that liberal values have become less important over the last years and that there can be observed a shift towards illiberal directions in international politics. It is, according to Waltz (2016), currently not a good time for supporters of liberal ideas. By examining whether the sanctions imposed by the EU are based on the idea of protecting liberal norms and values, this research will also contribute to the debate around the question whether liberal norms and values and the liberal theory on sanctions are still of importance.

Answering my research question will not only give an answer to the question why the EU has imposed and renews its sanctions on Russia, but will also show whether the liberal theory on sanctions, and liberal values itself, are still of importance nowadays. Since economic sanctions are still a very commonly used foreign policy tool by both states and international organisations, research on the reasons why they are imposed is also of interest to policy advisors and politicians. Examining why states and international organisations impose economic sanctions will help policy advisors and politicians to come up with well-founded advises on future economic sanctions. In addition, answering this question will give new insights in the complex reasoning and language behind the EU's common foreign policy.

This thesis will be built up in the following way: First, I give an overview of previous academic work conducted on economic sanctions, I present the liberal theory on economic sanctions and give my hypothesis. Thereafter, I further elaborate on my case selection, I present the discourse analysis method I use to research EU statements and I argue which statements I have decided to examine. In the next chapter, I elaborate on which liberal values I have decided to examine and I present the results of my research. In the conclusion, I briefly summarize my findings and give an answer to the main question and hypothesis.

Theory

Economic sanctions are far from a new phenomenon (Jones 2015). One of the first texts about economic sanctions is written by the Greek statesman Pericles, who wrote in 432 BC that the Megarians were banned from the Greek markets until they complied with his demands (Pericles as cited in Fornara 1975). Despite the long history of imposing economic sanctions, they only became an influential foreign policy tool and subject of academic interest after World War I (Hufbauer et al. 1985). Wallensteen (1968: 248) describes economic sanctions as 'general trade bans between nations, through which most of the trade between the parties is

affected. It purposes no use of military measures'. Hufbauer et al. (1985: 3) argue that the threat of imposing sanctions should already be seen as a use of force and define economic sanctions as 'the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations'. Miyagawa (1992: 7) uses an even broader classification of economic sanctions and argues that 'they may be defined as the use of economic capacity by one international actor, be it a state or international organisation, or by a group of such actors, against another international actor, or group of actors'.

There are, broadly speaking, three strands observable in the academic literature about economic sanctions. These three strands sometimes overlap in expectations, theoretical frameworks and results but focus on different questions around economic sanctions (Jones 2015). I will briefly highlight the main arguments of the three strands before presenting my theoretical framework.

The effectiveness of economic sanctions

Hufbauer et al. (1985) were the first authors that have conducted research on the effectiveness of economic sanctions. They have conducted a large-N study on 115 cases of economic sanctions since 1914 and have examined if these sanctions were effective in reaching the official goals that were set beforehand. Hufbauer et al. (1985) conclude that at least 33% of economic sanctions is actually effective in reaching its official goal (Hufbauer et al. 1985; 79). This 33% success-rate of economic sanctions has quickly become the rule of thumb in the literature on economic sanctions (Jones 2015) and is later confirmed by research from Cortright and Lopez (2000).

At the same time, other scholars argue that economic sanctions have no, or only marginal, effects. Pape (1997) opposes the work done by Hufbauer et al. by claiming that most of their successful cases were not effective because of the economic pressure but because of military pressure. The effectiveness of economic sanctions, after leaving out the cases with military pressure, is far below 5% (Pape 1997; Pape 1998). Other authors (e.g., Early 2015; Lacy & Niou 2004) that also criticize the effectiveness of economic sanctions have diverging reasons why economic sanctions are not effective. Some (e.g., Haass 1997; Early 2015) claim that economic sanctions are ineffective because they are not state's preferred policies but are promoted by pressure groups and rent-seeking businesses within the imposing states. Others (e.g., Lacy & Niou 2004; Davidson & Shambaugh 2000) argue that economic

sanctions are ineffective because they mainly serve as a symbolic political tool that is used for domestic political reasons.

Should economic sanctions be targeted?

The second debate centres around the question whether economic sanctions should be targeted against a complete state or against a small decision-making elite within a state. In the first decades of research on economic sanctions, economic sanctions were seen as tools to target a complete state's economy to force it to change its behaviour (Jones 2015). The principal idea was that when the population of a country faces enough misery, they would revolt against the ruling elites, resulting in the desired change (Dodge 2010; Geddes 1999; Escriba-Folch 2007).

Supporters of targeted sanctions, however, claim that broad economic sanctions often fail to pressure authoritarian leaders to change their behaviour, since they are not dependent on popular vote (Oechslin 2014; Haass 1997). Moreover, they argue that the broad sanctions cause the suffering of people who have no influence in changing the regime's policy (Cortright & Lopez 2002). Furthermore, broad economic sanctions are seen as inhumane and cruel (Moret 2015). Following from their critique on the broad economic sanctions, supporters of targeted sanctions have come up with sanctions that are meant to inflict harm on the responsible leaders while sparing the population from suffering (Portela 2016).

Motivations for the imposition of economic sanctions

The most relevant strand of literature for this thesis' question is the debate around the motivations for states to impose economic sanctions. Two principal stands within this debate can be observed: realism and liberalism (Koga 2005).

The realist view on economic sanctions is based on the assumption that actors are focused on gaining as much power as possible (Mearsheimer 2001: 32). Following from this, realists argue that economic sanctions can best be seen as a state's foreign-policy instrument with the goal of pursuing national interests (Koga 2005). Barber (1979: 367) for instance, states that economic sanctions should be seen as "economic measures directed to political objectives". Other realist scholars (e.g., Forland 1993; Drezner 1999) have claimed that states impose economic sanctions to gain a relative economic and political profit. It is important to note that realists have problems with defining economic sanctions. Contrary to Pape (1997), most realists (e.g., Rennack 2000; O'Sullivan 2003) claim that using military pressure is also a

form of imposing economic sanctions. Since realists use diverging definitions of economic sanctions, realist researches often give contradicting findings (Koga 2005). The realist approach of economic sanctions is frequently criticized to be suffering from several shortcomings ranging from the flawed conceptualizations with different views of economic sanctions (Koga 2005: 47; Kat 2015), to their inability to grasp the importance of international organisations in current international politics (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2017).

Another perspective on examining economic sanctions is to look at it from a liberalist point of view. The core assumption of this standpoint is that actors should be equal and free (Owen 1994). Contrary to the realist view, actors are according to the liberalist view not focused on gaining as much power as possible for themselves but are focused on the possibilities of cooperation (Powel 1991). In the liberalist view, cooperation between states is possible since states are focused on obtaining absolute gains (Powel 1991). Absolute gains mean that two (or more) states can profit from cooperation (Powel 1991). This cooperation between states will cause interdependence between them (Moravcsik 2010). Interdependence, according to Moravcsik (2010), influences a state's policy and preferences since states realize that all actions will affect their own economy. Since states are interdependent and understand that they will both suffer from war, war is less likely for liberalists (Dunne 2008: 112). Therefore, economic sanctions are historically seen as connected with liberalism since economic sanctions are perceived as a way of waging war without the actual costly war (Jones 2015; Cox & Drury 2006: 719). Pape (1997), for instance, describes economic sanctions as the liberal alternative to war. Moore (2000) builds on this and argues that liberalism sees sanctions as the middle ground between diplomacy (persuasion) and force (coercion).

Whereas realists argue that economic sanctions are merely an instrument to pursue national interests, liberalists claim that economic sanctions are imposed as punishments to a violator of international norms and/or laws (Koga 2005: 44). Ostrom (2014) and Rasmussen and Posner (2000), for example, state that actors can be pushed to follow a set of norms and values that are important to a group of actors if they are pressured by means of using guilt, shame or monetary pressure. Miyagawa (1992) states that by imposing economic sanctions and explaining why they are imposed, the imposer can let the world know what the important norms are and that the imposer is willing to punish actors that act against these norms. According to Miyagawa (1992), economic sanctions are therefore a way to make a distinction between the good (imposing) state(s) and the bad (sanctioned) state(s). The existence of liberal values is a prerequisite for the use of economic sanctions according to Koga (2005: 44);

without norms or values, there is no sanctioning act. From this follows the liberal standpoint that coercive acts stripped from normative and legal contents are illegitimate or illegal acts that should not be called sanctions (Koga 2005: 14). Liberalists do not consider self-interested acts or military pressure to be a form of economic sanctions (Jones 2015: 16). The problems with contested definitions of economic sanctions that occurred in several realist works on the topic are thus eliminated in the liberalist approach of economic sanctions. Consequently, liberalists argue that economic sanctions should not only be seen as changing a state's behaviour but also as punishing it for breaking the rules (Koga 2005).

Furthermore, liberalists take the role of international organisations into account and argue that they are a useful place for states to cooperate in (Ozkan & Cem Cetin 2016). Within international organisations, states can work together to achieve absolute economic gains (Oneal & Russett 2015). From their respect for international organisations follows the liberalist view that international organisations are the rightful organisations to impose economic sanctions (Moravcsik 2010). Hurd (2005) gives the example of UN sanctions imposed on Libya in the early 1990s; these sanctions were seen as legitimate because they were not imposed unilaterally but by an international organisation.

In the following chapters, I will research whether the liberal theory on economic sanctions can provide an explanation for the EU sanctions imposed on Russia, even though the theory and liberal values itself have lost most of its importance. I expect that the liberal theory on economic sanctions is able to provide an explanation for the sanctions against Russia for two important reasons. The first, and most important, reason is that the liberal theory on sanctions argues that sanctions are based on liberal norms and values and that there can be no sanctioning act without them. Liberal values are also of central importance to the EU and the EU frequently presents itself as the defender of liberal norms and values such as democracy, freedom of speech and sovereignty (European Commission 2007). This is shown in the treaty on the creation of the EU that starts with stating that the EU is founded on the principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law (European Union 2012). This message is repeated on the official websites of the European Parliament, European Council and European Commission. Since liberal values are of main importance to the EU, I expect that the set of economic sanctions imposed on Russia is grounded on this idea. The hypothesis that I will test in this paper is that the economic sanctions imposed on Russia are based on the idea that the EU should protect and further promote their liberal norms and values. If my hypothesis is correct, the EU has been speaking in their statements on the sanctions (in which the words are

chosen with accuracy) about protecting and diffusing the liberal norms and values on which the EU is based.

A second reason why I expect that the liberal theory on sanctions is able to provide an explanation for the EU sanctions imposed on Russia is that the liberal theory on sanctions considers international organisations a legitimate platform for cooperation and sanctioning (Moravcsik 2010). This is of importance to this thesis since the EU sanctions imposed on Russia need to be renewed every half a year by a unanimous vote of the European Council (European Council 2017a). A theory that values the existence of this organisation seems therefore useful to explain the reasons why the sanctions are unanimously imposed.

Methods

Case selection

I have decided to research the extreme and unresearched case of EU sanctions imposed on Russia for numerous reasons. To start with, the EU sanctions imposed on Russia are a mixture of targeted sanctions and broad economic sanctions as travel bans imposed on high-ranking Russian officials accompany broad economic boycotts (European Commission 2017a). This is remarkable because in previous cases of EU sanctions, the EU has preferred to impose targeted sanctions and not the broad economic sanctions (Portela 2016). An illustrative example of previous EU sanctions is the set of economic sanctions imposed on Syria in 2011. In the Syrian case, the EU has decided to impose only targeted sanctions since the population would otherwise suffer too much (European Council 2017d). A second reason why this case is interesting is that Russia has decided to mirror the EU's sanctions and to impose counter-sanctions on the EU (RT 2014). By, especially, targeting food imports from the EU, Russia has been able to do severe economic harm to many European economies (Rapoza 2015; Gros & Di Salvo 2017). The damage from the Russian counter-sanctions is, however, not the same for every member state. Italy, for example, is to a large extent dependent on trade with Russia and claims that the Russian counter-sanctions have already costed them over 4 billion euro (Cavestri 2017). The Netherlands, on the other hand, is less dependent on trade with Russia and claims that the Russian counter-sanctions 'only' cost their economy 300 million euro annually (CBS 2014). The EU estimates that the costs of the Russian counter-sanctions for all EU member states combined are around 50 billion euro (European Parliament 2015: 4). Furthermore, the expected effectiveness of the sanctions is low since it is, according to many

observers (e.g., Ashford 2016; Duke 2016), highly unlikely that Russia will implement the official goals stated in the Minsk agreements², re-instating the sanctions seems therefore a nonsensical policy for the EU. A final reason why the set of EU sanctions imposed on Russia is an extreme case is that the EU member states are divided on the issue. Since the economic sanctions have to be renewed every half a year by a unanimous vote (European Council 2017a), it is noteworthy that the member states do not appear united on this important issue but still vote unanimously to extend the sanctions. Especially Eastern European heads of states are critical³ of the EU economic sanctions imposed on Russia since they are more dependent on trade with Russia and have closer diplomatic and cultural ties with Russia (Bechev 2017). These heads of state criticize the EU sanctions and claim that the sanctions imposed on Russia are illegitimate and should be lifted.

Costa and Jorgenson (2012) argue that the EU's foreign policy is often subject to path dependency: once sanctions are imposed, it is hard to get this policy reversed or changed and countries will continue renewing them. Contrary to this idea, the EU has decided to lift the sanctions imposed on Belarus in 2016. In the Belarusian case, the economic sanctions were lifted overnight without any sign that Belarus had given in to the EU's demands (Rankin 2016). The Belarusian case shows that assuming that EU policies are irreversible and path-dependent is not a right postulation since the EU often revises or adapts its sanctions (Lester 2017).

Critical discourse analysis

In order to answer this thesis' research question, I will perform a critical discourse analysis by, qualitatively, examining statements made by the European Council and the European Commission on the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. I have decided to research statements from these two bodies of the EU since they have the most important say in the EU's foreign policy (European Union 2017) and their statements are therefore a good reflection of the complete EU's foreign policy. By performing a critical discourse analysis, I will be able to examine the ideology behind the language used in official EU statements about the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. Furthermore, I will be capable of determining the argumentation strategies that are used by the EU when talking about the sanctions. Additionally, I will be able to distinguish who came up with the statements. Was it, for

² The Minsk agreements are agreements between Russia and the EU on a ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine. Among others, all heavy weaponry had to leave Eastern Ukraine within a month (European Council 2017a).

³ For examples of critique from Eastern European heads of states see European Values (2017) and Slobodchikoff (2014).

example, a statement made by a single commissioner or was it a statement endorsed by the complete European Council?

A critical discourse analysis is a research method that focuses on the study of language in practice (Fairclough 2010). In the literature about critical discourse analysis, discourse is described as “an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being. As discourse analysts, then, our task is to explore the relationship between discourse and reality” (Bryman 2012: 536).

Gee & Handford (2012: 1) argue that “a critical discourse analysis is the study of language in use. It is the study of meanings we give language and the actions we carry out when we use language”. Critical discourse analyses emphasize the role of language as a power resource that is related to ideology and socio-cultural change (Bryman 2012: 536). It does not just provides an account of what goes on in society: it is also a process whereby meaning is created (Van Dijk 1997: 2). This involves asking who uses language, how, why and when. Ideologies are a topic of considerable importance in critical discourse analyses (Blommaert 2005: 26). According to Wodak and Meyer (2001) and Van Dijk (1995), ideologies in texts are not shown directly but critical discourse analyses are able to expose them. Wodak and Meyer (2001: 28) argue that a critical discourse analysis not just cherry-picks words from a text but that it is a useful tool to analyse four aspects of a text. To start with, it is a useful tool to analyse the kind and form of argumentation that is used. Furthermore, a critical discourse analysis is able to show certain argumentation strategies that are used. A third strength is that critical discourse analyses are able to show the intrinsic logic and composition of texts. Finally, a critical discourse analysis is a useful tool to define who the speech actors are and what their position is. Both their official position and their position in relation to the text is important. Moreover, Bryman (2012: 537) highlights the role of actors in critical discourse analysis and argues that it is a method that is able to define “how particular actors draw on the discourse to legitimate their actions”.

Since 2014, when the first sanctions were imposed, the EU has come up with over 200 official statements about the sanctions imposed on Russia. These official statements were made

available by the EU in the databases of the EU websites⁴. The statements were all published and corrected by the secretariat of the European Commission and the secretariat of the European Council and the words in the statements were chosen with accuracy. In the following chapters, I will assume that the EU's statements are part of a broader EU policy on handling Russia's annexation of Crimea and intermingling in Eastern Ukraine. From the 200 statements, I have selected 87 statements in which the European Commission or the European Council speak comprehensively about the sanctions. The 120 statements that I have disregarded were merely technical statements about the targets of the sanctions or practical statements that the sanctions were prolonged⁵. I will examine the language being used in the 87 statements and analyse whether the EU has been speaking (and if so, how?) about three liberal values that are marked as important by the EU. By performing a critical discourse analysis, I will be able to research the ideology behind the statements on the sanctions. When looking at the statements by the European Commission and the European Council, I will focus on three liberal values that are marked as the EU's most important values in the treaty on the creation of the EU (European Union 2012) and in a speech by the EU Commissioner Stefan Füle (2014). These three liberal values are the rule of law, freedom and democracy (European Union 2012; Füle 2014). Before presenting my results, I will go deeper into these three liberal values, argue how they are defined and why the EU denotes them as its key values.

Liberal values

Rule of law

The rule of law is one of the EU's founding principles stemming from the common constitutional traditions of all member states and is one of the fundamental liberal values upon which the European Union is based (European Commission, n.d.). Vice-President of the European Commission, Timmermans, has labelled the rule of law in 2015 the 'cornerstone of the EU's liberal policies'. 'When laws are not respected, democracy and freedom are almost not possible' (European Commission 2015c). Carothers (1998) has described the rule of law as a system in which laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning and apply equally to everyone. The rule of law is further described by Barnett (2014) as the principle that all

⁴ For statements made by the European Commission I have used the database on <http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm> and for statements made by the European Council I have used <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/>

⁵ For an example of a statement I neglected, see the European Council (2016b) statement in which only a list is presented of sanctioned actors.

people and institutions are subject, and accountable, to law that is justly applied and enforced. In the statements about the economic sanctions on Russia, the rule of law will be treated as the principle that states are subject to international law and treaties and have to comply with them.

Freedom

Freedom is seen as one of the most important values of liberalism (Joyce 2003). Christman (1991) claims that actors are free when they can formulate their own desires, values and goals. Arendt (1990) argues that in politics, sovereignty is the equivalent of freedom as sovereignty means that political actors can govern themselves without external or internal interference. Freedom and sovereignty are, according to Krause (2015: 4), fundamental preconditions for liberal democracies that never should be abandoned. Krause (2015) describes sovereignty as the possibility for states to make intentional choices, rather than acting from deference. The EU has often condemned non-members (for example, China) when they breached the sovereignty of other states by invading or pressuring them (Hill, Smith & Vanhoonacker 2017). Sovereignty is therefore seen as an important pillar of the EU's foreign policy (Hill et al. 2017). Freedom will be treated in this research as a state's sovereignty against another state's aggression or pressure through the threat of aggression.

Democracy

The third liberal value I will try to trace back in the EU statements is democracy, and in particular liberal democracy. Plattner (1998: 1) argues that liberal democracies "are home not only to free and competitive multiparty elections but also to the rule of law and the protection of individual liberties". The European Commission (2017b) builds upon this argumentation and claims that liberal democracies do not only consist of transparent elections, but also contain liberal institutions, a political and civil society and selected human rights such as freedom of speech. Liberal democratization is an important part of the EU's foreign policy and is seen by the EU as the most important prerequisite for a possible EU membership (European Commission 2017b). The importance of democracy for the EU is further elaborated in the treaty on the creation of the EU that states that the promotion of liberal democracy is the EU's most important foreign policy goal (Bosse 2012). In this research on the EU statements on sanctions imposed on Russia, democracy will be treated as a system of free elections combined with the rule of law and protection of individual liberties.

Analyses

The European Council is the most important organisation within the EU regarding the imposition of economic sanctions (European Council 2017f). Whereas one would expect that they would have come up with the largest amount of joint statements about the economic sanctions, this is not the case. From the 87 collected statements on the sanctions by the European Commission and the European Council, only 20 came from the European Council. From these 20 statements, over half were merely statements that the sanctions would be prolonged for another six months without the reasoning behind it. Statements by the European Commission, on the other hand, were much more focused on the reasons behind the sanctions than on the technical details. As one would arguably expect, almost every researched statement was a joint statement in name of the complete European Commission or European Council and not from one head of state or commissioner.

Rule of law

In the statements about the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, there is a great deal of attention for the rule of law. The European Council and European Commission emphasize the rule of law in three different ways. The first and most frequently used way that this concept is applied is by arguing that Russia should be punished with economic sanctions because of its illegal actions in Ukraine. An example of this is a statement by the European Commission that claims that ‘Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and actions to de-stabilize Eastern Ukraine are illegal and must stop’ (European Commission 2014d). In many other statements (e.g., European Commission 2014g; European Council 2015c) it is not further specified why the EU perceives Russia’s actions to be illegal. However, by constantly repeating that the Russia’s actions are illegal, the EU creates a feeling that Russia is culpable and should be punished by the EU. The second way that the rule of law is applied is by placing emphasis on international treaties and conventions. The European Commission states on March 12, 2014 that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is ‘a clear violation of the United Nations Charter; Russia’s commitments under the Helsinki Final Act; its obligations to Ukraine under its 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership; the Russia-Ukraine basing agreement; and its commitments in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994’ (European Commission 2014a). The European Commissioner for Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood policy, Stephan Füle, declared in the European Commission that the EU should act against Russia since it violates the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Paris Chapter, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and agreements made in 2008 between Russia and Ukraine (Füle 2014).

Furthermore, the European Commission (e.g., 2014h; 2015b) has repeatedly mentioned the importance of compliance with international humanitarian laws and has stated that, contrary to Russia, the EU has a firm trust in the principles of humanitarian law. Additionally, the European Council has constantly stated (e.g., 2014; 2017a) that sanctions are imposed because of a breach of international law (without further specifying what laws they refer to). By repeatedly emphasizing the importance of international treaties, conventions and international laws, the EU is able to present itself as the defender of the rule of (international) law. The last way the EU mentions the rule of law is by referring specifically to the Minsk agreements. Both the European Commission (e.g., 2015a; 2015b) and the European Council (e.g., 2015a; 2015b) repetitively argue that Russia should comply with the agreements made in Minsk in 2015, since these agreements are binding to Ukraine, Russia and the EU. The EU is capable of portraying Russia as a breaker of international treaties by constantly arguing that Russia should start implementing the agreements made in Minsk. Moreover, the EU has been able to portray itself as a supporter of liberal values by repeatedly endorsing the importance of international treaties and claiming that the EU is living up to the Minsk agreements.

The EU's emphasis on the rule of law seems to comply with this work's expectation. The EU is in its statements speaking about the protection of the rule of law by claiming that it imposed economic sanctions as a reaction to Russia's disrespect for the rule of law. Furthermore, the EU is promoting liberal values by repeatedly emphasizing its own respect for the rule of law.

Freedom

Freedom, perceived as a state's sovereignty, is another important aspect in the EU statements on the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. The European Commission and the European Council address sovereignty in two ways in their statements about the economic sanctions. The first way sovereignty is mentioned is by arguing that sanctions are imposed since Russia has violated Ukraine's sovereignty. Examples of this can be found in numerous declarations of the European Commission (e.g., 2014c; 2015b). In these statements, the European Commission argues that Russia should respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. An example of this is a declaration that is published in March 2014 in which the European Commission states that 'we reiterate the strong condemnation of the unprovoked violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity' (European Commission 2014b). The European Council follows this argumentation and argues that sanctions will not be lifted until Russia respects Ukraine's independence and sovereignty

(European Council 2016a). Another way the EU speaks about Russia's lack of respect for Ukrainian freedom is when the EU criticizes Russia's military pressure on Ukraine. An example of this is when in March 2014, the European Commission states that Russia's support for a referendum in Crimea is unacceptable because Russia is threatening to use military force if the referendum will be cancelled (European Commission 2014a). Following Christman's (1991) take on freedom, actors should be able to formulate their own decisions. According to the European Commission, Ukraine was then also not free to formulate its own decisions and eventually held the (in the EU's opinion illegal) referendum, forced by Russia's military pressure (European Commission 2014a). By repeatedly stating that sanctions are imposed since Russia is breaching Ukraine's sovereignty and by claiming that Russia's military pressure is making Ukraine do things that go against their interests, the EU is able to create a feeling that the wrongdoing Russia should be punished by the EU. This feeling of the good EU versus the bad Russia is further strengthened by the EU's emphasis on its own respect for sovereignty. In a speech on September 11 2014, the European Commission states that the EU has always respected Ukraine's sovereignty and that the EU would never use force to pressure Ukraine (or other states) to do something against their will. According to the European Commission (2014h), an important reason to impose sanctions on Russia is that Russia was pressuring Ukraine to do things against their will. The European Commission's view that the EU was respecting Ukraine's sovereignty comes back in more statements from the EU (e.g., European Commission 2014h; European Council 2017c) and is another sign of EU's emphasis on their respect for liberal values and Russia's disrespect for them.

As was the case with the rule of law, the EU statements on the sanctions also repeatedly mention the protection and diffusion of the liberal value freedom. The EU argues that the economic sanctions are imposed because the EU needs to defend Ukraine's sovereignty. Moreover, the EU has been promoting liberal values by repeatedly emphasizing its own respect for Ukraine's sovereignty.

Democracy

In the statements about the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, the European Commission and European Council have also referred to liberal democracy. In only a handful of statements (e.g., European Commission 2014d; European Council 2015c) liberal democracy is mentioned. When the EU speaks about liberal democracy, it is used as a way to present Ukraine as a part of Europe that is being attacked by Russia. A first example of this is a statement by the

European Commission on April 4, 2014 in which is claimed that the EU has an inspiring influence on Ukraine; it is the EU's democratic values that the Ukrainians want. In a statement by the European Commission on April 26, 2014, the European Commission applauds Ukraine's liberal democracy, free elections, constitutional reforms and amnesty laws. A third example of the EU praising Ukraine's liberal democracy is a statement by the European Commission in September, 2014 when the European Commission appreciates Ukraine's liberal democracy by claiming that 'Ukraine stood up for its democratic accountability and human rights' (European Commission 2014i). In these examples, after praising Ukraine's liberal democracies and liberal reforms, the European Commission states that Russia's interference in Ukraine is a danger for Ukraine's democracy. According to the EU, economic sanctions are imposed on Russia because of their aggression against a liberal democratic state. By stating that Ukraine is a democratic state that is inspired by the EU, the EU highlights the idea that the EU and Ukraine are both supporters of liberal values whereas Russia is not. It is interesting and unexpected to see that even though liberal democracy is one of the most important pillars of the EU (European Council 2017e), it is by far the least mentioned in the statements on the economic sanctions.

In the handful of EU statements about the economic sanctions that mention liberal democracy, it is mostly used as a way to promote liberal values by emphasizing its importance and admiring Ukraine's efforts to reform. When the EU points to Russia's disrespect for Ukraine's democracy as a reason for the sanctions, the EU is also using democracy as a way to show that the sanctions are imposed to protect liberal values. The fact that the EU speaks about the diffusion and protection of democracy is another sign that my hypothesis seems to be correct.

By investigating, through a critical discourse analysis, the language that has been used by the EU in the statements about the sanctions imposed on Russia, I have been able to explore the ideology behind them. In my research, I have focused on the question whether the EU has been speaking about liberal values that they marked as ideological important. Additionally, I have focused on the argumentation strategies that the EU has been using. In every one of the 87 analysed statements, the European Commission and the European Council speak about at least one of the three values that are marked as important to the EU. All examined statements repeatedly emphasize these values in two ways. On the one hand, the EU speaks about the rule of law, freedom and democracy as a way to portray Russia as a wrongdoing state that needs to be punished through the EU's economic sanctions. On the other hand, the EU is able

to present itself as a defender of the same values by repeatedly stating that the EU is respecting and cherishing them.

Conclusion

In this research, I sought to answer the question ‘*Why does the European Union continue to impose economic sanctions on the Russian Federation despite its negative side effects?*’ By performing a critical discourse analysis, I have tested the liberalist assumption that economic sanctions are imposed following a breach of norms and values. Since the EU sanctions imposed on Russia face negative side effects, ranging from costly counter-sanctions to members states that are divided on this issue, I have examined whether the imposed economic are put in place (and renewed) because liberal norms and values were broken by Russia. In my research, I have found that the European Commission, and to a lesser extent the European Council in every researched statement speak about three liberal values that are marked as important to the EU: the rule of law, freedom and democracy. The rule of law comes back in almost every statement concerning the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. The EU refers to the rule of law by constantly marking Russia’s behaviour as illegal. Furthermore, the EU is emphasizing international law and treaties; presenting itself as a supporter and Russia as a violator of them. Additionally, the EU repeatedly states that Russia should implement the Minsk agreements. Freedom (perceived as a state’s sovereignty) is also frequently being referred to in the EU statements. The EU argues that sanctions are imposed following Russia’s disrespect for Ukraine’s sovereignty. Additionally, the EU repeatedly claims that it is a defender of sovereignty and respects the sovereignty of Ukraine. The third examined liberal value, democracy, has not come back as frequent as the other two examined values. In a handful of statements, the EU compliments Ukraine’s liberal democracy and reforms. In these statements, the EU immediately continues with stating that sanctions were imposed because Russia has threatened Ukraine’s liberal democracy and reforms. These results prove my expectation, that the economic sanctions imposed on Russia are based on the idea that the EU should protect and further promote their liberal norms and values, to be correct. In every statement on the economic sanctions (short and technical statements neglected) the EU claims that sanctions were imposed on Russia because of a breach of the liberal norms rule of law, freedom and sovereignty.

As stated in the analyses section, the fact that the European Commission has far more significant statements on the sanctions imposed on Russian than the European Council is

unexpected since the European Council is ultimately responsible for renewing the sanctions. A possible reason for this might be that the European Commission has more official meetings to formulate an opinion about the issue. Examining why the European Commission was more vocal on the issue than the European Council is an example of a possible follow-up study on my thesis. A less surprising outcome, when looking at who made the statements, was that almost all statements were joint statements that spoke on behalf of the complete European Commission or European Council. That commissioners and heads of states do not prefer to speak on behalf of their own, can be explained by arguing that it is easier for them to follow the official EU line than to go against their colleagues. Moreover, there can be argued that these heads of states and commissioners do not want to provoke Russia by coming up with individual statements but prefer to speak on behalf of the much stronger EU. A follow-up research could try to locate statements or speeches from separate actors and try to find if these statements differ from the joint statements.

The assumption that economic sanctions are imposed following a breach of liberal norms and values seems to be accurate in this case. Contrary to the Koga's (2005) view that the liberal approach of economic sanctions has lost its significance, this thesis finds that the EU sanctions imposed on Russia can be explained well from a liberalist perspective. Furthermore, this thesis also challenges the assumption that liberal values have become less important nowadays. The EU repeatedly emphasizes the importance of liberal values in its statements about the economic imposed on Russia and perceives itself as a defender of them. Whether this liberalist assumption is also correct in other contemporary cases of economic sanctions can be a topic of further research. Future research on this subject should also focus on the language of, for example, separate EU member states on the economic sanctions or the language that Russia has used in statements about the counter-sanctions. Other additions to this research could look at the statements from a more chronological or statistical angle of approach. Possible subjects can be how much the EU spoke about liberal values at what time and if this is the same in other recent cases of economic sanctions.

The finding that the researched assumption of the liberalist theory on economic sanctions seems to be accurate is also of importance for policy makers. This finding can be of importance to states or organisations who impose economic sanctions. These states or organisations can make better-informed choices about a possible imposition of economic sanctions when they have additional knowledge about the reasons why economic sanctions were imposed previously. The findings in this research are also of importance for states who

are being sanctioned. Generally, sanctioned states want the sanctions to be lifted as soon as possible. By knowing why economic sanctions are imposed, sanctioned states will be able to get the sanctions lifted more rapidly.

Reference list

- Arendt, H. (1990). Philosophy and Politics. *Social Research*, 71(3), 427-454.
- Ashford, E. (2016). Not-So-Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions against Russia. *Foreign Affairs*, 95(1), 114-123.
- Barber, J. (1979). Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument. *International Affairs*, 55(3), 367-384.
- Barnett, R. (2014). *The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baylis, J., Smith, S. & Owens, P. (2017). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bechev, D. (2017, October 11). *Central and Eastern Europe's Pushback Against Sanctions on Russia*. Retrieved November 23, 2017 from <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/central-and-eastern-europe-s-pushback-against-sanctions-on-russia>.
- Biersteker, T. & Portela, C. (2015). EU Sanctions in Context: Three Types. *Research Collection School of Social Sciences*. Paper 1688. Retrieved from http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sooss_research/1688.
- Blommaert, J. (2005). *Discourse: A critical introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bosse, G. (2012). A Partnership with Dictatorship: Explaining the Paradigm Shift in European Union Policy towards Belarus. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(3), 367-384.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carothers, T. (1995). The rule of law revival. *Foreign Affairs*, 77(2), 95-106.
- Cashen, E. (2017, April 20). *The Impact of economic sanctions*. Retrieved from <https://www.worldfinance.com/special-reports/the-impact-of-economic-sanctions>.
- Cavestri, L. (2017, February 8). *Russian sanctions have cost Italy €4 billion*. Retrieved November 20, 2017 from <http://www.italy24.ilsole24ore.com/art/business-and-economy/2017-02-07/russian-sanctions-have-cost-italy-4-billion-135157.php?uuid=AEjvD4P>.
- CBS. (2014). *Russian boycott will cost Dutch economy 300 million euros*. Retrieved November 21, 2017 from <https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2014/34/russian-boycott-will-cost-dutch-economy-300-million-euros>.
- Christman, J. (1991). Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom. *Ethics*, 101(2), 343-359.
- Cortright, D. & Lopez, G. (2000). *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN strategies in the 1990s*. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. (2002). *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft*. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Costa, O. & Jorgensen, K. (2012). The Influence of International Institutions on the EU: A Framework for Analysis. In O. Costa & Jorgensen, K. (Eds.), *The Influence of International Institutions on the EU*, (pp. 1-12). London: Palgrave MacMillan.

- Cox, D. & Drury, A. (2006). Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(6), 709-722.
- Davidson, J., & Shambaugh, G. (2000). Who's Afraid of Economic Incentives? The Efficacy-Externality Tradeoff. In S. Chan, & A. Drury (Eds.), *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice*, (pp. 37-64). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dodge, T. (2010). The Failure of Sanctions and the Evolution of International Policy Towards Iraq, 1990-2003. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 3(1), 83-91.
- Drezner, W. (1999). *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Duke, S. (2017). The Return of Geopolitics and Relations to the East. In S. Duke (Ed.), *Europe as a Stronger Global Actor*, (pp. 85-113). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dunne, T. (2008) 'Liberalism', in Baylis, J., Smith, S., and Owens, P. (2008) (Eds) '*The Globalization of World Politics. An introduction to international relations*' (pp. 100-113). New York, Oxford University Press.
- Early, B. (2015). *Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Escriba-Folch, A. (2007). Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and Survival of Authoritarian Rulers. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(2), 335-359.
- European Commission (n.d.). *Effective Justice: Rule of law*. Retrieved October 30, 2017 from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/rule-of-law/index_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2007). *European Cultural values: Fieldwork February-March 2007*. Retrieved September 26, 2017 from http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_278_en.pdf.
- European Commission. (2014a). *G-7 Leaders Statement*, March 12, 2014. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-65_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2014b). *Joint statement by President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy and the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso on Crimea*. March 16, 2014. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-71_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2014c). *Joint statement on Crimea by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso*, March 18, 2014. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-74_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2014d). *EU-US Summit – Joint Statement*, March 26, 2014. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-84_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2014e). *Speech by President Barroso: The European Union's Choices and Challenges*, April 4, 2014. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-289_en.htm.

- European Commission. (2014f). *G-7 Leaders Statement on Ukraine*, April 26, 2014. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-318_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2014g). *Remarks by President Barroso following the meeting between the European Commission and the Ukrainian government*, May 13, 2014. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-372_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2014h). *President Barroso: phone calls with President Poroshenko and President Putin on the situation in Ukraine*, August 11, 2014. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-921_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2014i). *What does Maidan mean?* September 11, 2014. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-591_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2015a). *EU assistance for the most vulnerable victims of the Ukrainian crisis: Statement by the Commissioner Christos Stylianides after his meeting with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko*, January 26, 2015. Retrieved October 27, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-3701_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2015b). *The G7 Summit in Germany on 7-8 June 2015: The European Union's role and actions*, June 5, 2015. Retrieved October 27, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5127_en.htm.
- European Commission. (2015c). *The European Union and the Rule of Law*. Keynote speech at Conference on the Rule of Law, Tilburg University, August 31, 2015. Retrieved October 22, 2017 from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/timmermans/announcements/european-union-and-rule-law-keynote-speech-conference-rule-law-tilburg-university-31-august-2015_en.
- European Commission. (2017a). *Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force*, 4 August, 2017. Retrieved September 20, 2017 from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/restrictive_measures-2017-08-04.pdf.
- European Commission. (2017b). *Human Rights and Democratic Governance: Democracy*. Retrieved November 1, 2017 from https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/human-rights-and-democratic-governance/democracy_en.
- European Council. (2014). *Statement by the President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy and the President of the European Commission in the name of the European Union on the agreed additional restrictive measures against Russia*, July 29, 2014. Retrieved October 27, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/?p=118>.
- European Council. (2015a). *Address by President Donald Tusk at the annual EU Ambassadors' conference*, September 3, 2015. Retrieved October 27, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/press-releases/2015/09/03/tusk-conference-eu-ambassadors/>.
- European Council. (2015b). *Joint Statement by President Donald Tusk, President Jean-Claude Juncker and Prime Minister of Australia Malcom Turnbull*, November 15, 2015. Retrieved October 27, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/da/press/press-releases/2015/11/15/pec-tusk-joint-statement-australia/>.

- European Council. (2015c). *Statement by President Donald Tusk before the meeting with President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine*, December 16, 2015. Retrieved October 27, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/press/press-releases/2015/12/16/tusk-joint-meeting-president-poroshenko-ukraine/>.
- European Council. (2016a). *EU-Ukraine Association Council - Joint press release*, December 19, 2016. Retrieved October 27, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/19/eu-ukraine-association-joint-press-release/>.
- European Council. (2016b). *Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions by six months*. Retrieved December 22, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/19/sanctions-russia/>.
- European Council. (2017a). *Timeline - EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine*. Retrieved September 5, 2017, from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/>.
- European Council. (2017b). *Europe's values are its best defence*, January 13, 2017. Retrieved October 28, 2017 from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2017/1/47244663380_en.pdf.
- European Council. (2017c). *Declaration by the High Representative Federica Mogherini on behalf of the EU on Crimea*, March 17, 2017. Retrieved October 28, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/17/hr-declaration-crimea/>.
- European Council. (2017d). *Syria: EU extends sanctions against the regime by one year*, May 29, 2017. Retrieved November 11, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/05/29/syria-sanctions/>.
- European Council. (2017e). *Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv*, July 13, 2017. Retrieved October 28, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/press/press-releases/2017/07/13/tusk-remarks-summit-ukraine-kyiv/>.
- European Council. (2017f). *Sanctions: how and when the EU adopts restrictive measures*, November 22, 2017. Retrieved December 31, 2017 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/>.
- European Parliament. (2015). *Economic impact on the EU of sanctions over Ukraine conflict*. Retrieved November 20, 2017 from [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI\(2015\)569020_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_EN.pdf).
- European Union. (2012). *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union* (Official Journal of the European Union). Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
- European Union. (2017). *Foreign & Security Policy*. Retrieved October 27, 2017 from https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/foreign-security-policy_en.

- European Values. (2017). *How do European democracies react to Russian aggression? Review of shifts in strategic & policy documents of EU28 following Russian aggression against Ukraine*. Retrieved September 30, 2017 from <http://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/How-do-European-democracies-react-to-Russian-aggression.pdf>.
- Fairclough, N. (2010). *Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language*, 3rd edn. New York: Routledge.
- Forland, T. (1993). The History of Economic warfare: International Law, Effectiveness, Strategies. *Journal of Peace Research*, 30(2), 151-162.
- Fornara, C. (1975). Plutarch and the Megarian decree. *Yale Classical Studies*, 24. 213-228.
- Füle, S. (2014). *EU-Ukraine: There is no time to rest*. Retrieved October 10, 2017 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-601_en.htm.
- Galtung, J. (1959). Pacifism from a Sociological Point of View. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3(1), 67-84.
- Geddes, B. (1999). What do we Know about Democratization after Twenty Years? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 115-144.
- Gee, J., & Handford, M. (2012). *The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. New York: Routledge.
- Giumelli, F. & Ivan, P. (2013). The effectiveness of EU sanctions: An analysis of Iran, Belarus, Syria and Myanmar (Burma). *European Policy Centre Papers*, 76.
- Gros, D. & Di Salvo, M. (2017). Revisiting Sanctions on Russia and Counter-Sanctions on the EU: The economic impact three years later. *CEPS Commentaries*, July 2017. Retrieved from https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS%20Commentary_Sanctions%20on%20Russia%20_Gross_Di%20Salvo.pdf.
- Haass, R. (1997). Sanctioning Madness. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), 74-85.
- Hill, C., Smith, M. & Vanhoonacker, S. (2017). *International Relations and the European Union*, 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hufbauer, G., Schott, J. & Elliot, K. (1985). *Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, 1st edn. Washington: Institute for International Economics.
- Hurd, I. (2005). The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992–2003. *International Organization*, 59(3), 495-526.
- Jones, L. (2015). *Societies under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do Not) Work*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Joyce, P. (2003). *The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City*. London: Verso.
- Kat, M. (2016). *A Conceptual Analysis of Realism in International Political Economy*. Retrieved December 27, 2017 from <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/16/a-conceptual-analysis-of-realism-in-international-political-economy/>.

- Koga, Y. (2005). *Constructivist Approach of International Sanctions: Realism, Liberalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Hegemonism*. Retrieved from <http://www.sanctio.jp/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Constructivist-Approach-of-International-Sanctions-by-Yoshifumi-KOGA1.pdf>.
- Krause, S. (2015). *Freedom Beyond Sovereignty: Reconstructing Liberal Individualism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lacy, D. & Niou, E. (2004). A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats. *The Journal of Politics*, 66(1), 25-42.
- Lester, M. (2017). *Category Archives: European Court Cases*. Retrieved December 1, 2017 from <https://europeansanctions.com/category/european-court-cases/>.
- Levs, J. (2012, January 23). *A summary of sanctions against Iran*. Retrieved November 3, 2017 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/meast/iran-sanctions-facts/index.html>.
- Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Miyagawa, M. (1992). *Do Economic Sanctions Work?* London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Moore, R. (2000). The paradox of sanctions as a tool of statecraft. *National Defence University National War College Report Documentations*. Retrieved from <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA430993>.
- Moravcsik, A. (2010). The New Liberalism. In C. Reus-Smit & D. Snidal (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, (pp. 234-251). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moret, E. (2015). Humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Iran and Syria. *European Security*, 24(1), 120-140.
- Oechslin, M. (2014). Targeting Autocrats: Economic Sanctions and Regime Change. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 36, 24-40.
- Oneal J. & Russett B. (2015). The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992. In: B. Russett & H. Starr (Eds), *Pioneer in the Scientific and Normative Study of War, Peace, and Policy*, (pp. 74-108). Cham: Springer.
- Ostrom, E. (2014). Collective Actions and the Evolution of Social Norms. *Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research*, 6(4), 235-252.
- O'Sullivan, M. (2003). *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Owen, J. (1994). How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. *International Security*, 19(2), 87-125.
- Ozkan, E. & Cem Cetin H. (2016). The Realist and Liberal Positions on the Role of International Organizations in Maintaining World Order. *European Scientific Journal*, 12(17), 85-96.
- Pape, R. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. *International Security*, 22(2), 90-136.

- Pape, R. (1998). Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work. *International Security*, 23(1), 66-77.
- Plattner, M. (1998). Liberalism and Democracy: Can't Have One Without the Other. *Foreign Affairs*, 77(2), 171-180.
- Portela, C. (2016). Are European Sanctions "Targeted"? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29(3), 912-929.
- Powel, R. (1991). Absolute and Relative Gains in International Political Theory. *The American Political Science Review*, 85(4), 1303-1320.
- Rankin, J. (2016, February 15). *EU lifts most sanctions against Belarus despite human rights concerns*. Retrieved December 1, 2017 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/15/eu-lifts-most-sanctions-against-belarus-despite-human-rights-concerns>.
- Rapoza, K. (2015, April 17). *Here's What Putin's Counter-Sanctions Did To E.U. Exporters*. Retrieved September 10, 2017, from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/04/17/heres-what-putins-counter-sanctions-did-to-e-u-exporters/#2dcb09ff59da>.
- Rasmussen, E. & Posner, R. (2000). Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions. *John M. Olin Program in Law and Economic Working Paper*, 96, 369-382.
- Rennack, D. (2000). *Economic Sanctions: Legislation in the 106th Congress*. Retrieved from, <http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/international/inter21.cfm?&CFID=3378804&CFTOKEN=48114672>.
- RT. (2014, August 6). *Russia to ban all US agricultural products, EU fruit & vegetable imports - watchdog*. Retrieved October 7, 2017, from <https://www.rt.com/business/178540-russia-ban-us-poultry/>.
- Slobodchikoff, M. (2014, November 26). *Eastern Europe faces a tough choice on Russian sanctions*. Retrieved September 27, 2017, from <http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/eastern-europe-faces-tough-choice-russian-sanctions>.
- Stremlau, J. (1996). *Sharpening International Sanctions*. New York: The Carnegie Corporation of New York.
- United Nations. (2017). *Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List*. Retrieved September 20, 2017 from <https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/consolidated.xsl>.
- Van Dijk, T. (1995). *Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing.
- Van Dijk, T. (1997). *Discourse as Social Interaction. A Multidisciplinary Introduction*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Wallensteen, P. (1968). Characteristics of Economic Sanctions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 5(3), 248-267.
- Waltz, S. (2016, June 26). *The Collapse of the Liberal World Order*. Retrieved December 27, 2017 from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/26/the-collapse-of-the-liberal-world-order-european-union-brexit-donald-trump/>.

- Weiner, E. (2007, October 25). *Officially sanctioned: A guide to the U.S. blacklist*. Retrieved October 24, 2017 from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15634914>.
- Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (2001) Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, (pp. 1-33). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.