

# Enduring Tensions: Explaining Conflict Occurrence between India and Pakistan beyond Deterrence Theory

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Steven Kroon

S1019651

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Supervisor: Dr. R. van der Haer

Second Reader: Dr. H. Pellikaan

## 1. Introduction

When in 1947, the Indian subcontinent was partitioned into the Hindu-majority Republic of India (India) and the Muslim-majority Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Pakistan), communities that had coexisted for centuries attacked one another (Dalrymple 2015; Sagan and Waltz 2015, 136). In this gruesome outbreak of sectarian violence between 200.000 and 500.000 people lost their lives (Ibid.). The Indo-Pakistani conflict, which continues until today, has seen three declared wars, one undeclared war, many border skirmishes and military stand-offs (Paul 2005, 8). The conflict often erupted in the Himalayan region of Kashmir, which territory is claimed by both nations (Ibid. 9-10).

Several scholars (e.g. Ganguly and Kapur 2009; Kapur 2007; Sagan and Waltz 2015) attribute these conflicts to the effects of both nations' possession of nuclear weapons. Explanations for why such nuclear weapons states tend (not) to wage war against each other, often function as the basis of classical deterrence theory. This theory entails that when a threat to use nuclear weapons is credible, it will deter a threatening nation from attacking a threatened nation (Sagan and Waltz 2015). However, armed conflict between India and Pakistan has taken place both before and after both nations developed nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear weapons can thus not explain conflict occurrence.

Although often used to explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan, deterrence theory is then also unable to explain the enduring Indo-Pakistani conflict, which is problematic. By leaving out nuclear deterrence theory in explaining the Indo-Pakistani situation, and by identifying other factors to explain Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence, I aim to fill a scientific niche. A broader understanding of Indo-Pakistani circumstances – not just in light of nuclear deterrence – can provide policymakers both nationally and internationally with a solid basis for their responses. For years, Western policymakers and decisionmakers have focused on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in South Asia as a means of ameliorating the Indo-Pakistani conflict (e.g. Joshi, O'Donnell and Pant 2016). Showing that other factors are operating between India and Pakistan can drive refinements in policymakers' understanding of the Indian subcontinent. A better understanding amongst stakeholders about the nature of the South Asian situation could consequently create a more peaceful state of affairs. Such actors can then create other, perhaps even more effective measures, that are not rooted in nonproliferation, to counter the ever-persisting tensions between India and Pakistan.

In this thesis, I will answer the following research question: *Which factors explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan beyond deterrence theory?* In order to answer this question, I will first analyze classical deterrence theory and its use to explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan, including the limitations of this theory. Subsequently, I will investigate alternative, non-nuclear, general conflict occurrence factors/theories. I will conduct a controlled comparison to establish which of these non-nuclear factors can explain conflict occurrence between India and

Pakistan. I will analyze four selected instances of conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan, two in the pre-nuclear era and two in the post-nuclear era. After the analysis section, a discussion and summary of findings will follow, together with recommendations for future research.

## **2. Theoretical framework**

### 2.1 Classical deterrence theory

Rooted in the realist school of international relations, classical deterrence theory was developed to analyze the relationship between nuclear weapons and conflict occurrence (Zagare and Kilgour 2000, 7). In the anarchic world system without an overarching authority, states are driven by their nature to maximize power or by their environment to maximize security (Milner 1991; Morgenthau 1948; and, Waltz 1979). Here, a balance of power is the most efficient mechanism for maintaining order (e.g. Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1993). Classical deterrence theorists see the key to international stability in a balance of (nuclear) power, especially in bipolar structures (Zagare and Kilgour 2000, 8).

In classical deterrence theory, nuclear deterrence can generally be defined as a threat of using nuclear force to coerce a potential attacking nation not to undertake aggressive action (Gerson 2009, 34). This is achieved by making the costs of such an aggressive action unacceptably high or the probability of success extremely low (Ibid.). The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is linked to the conviction of potential attackers that their military aggression will be met with retaliation (Ibid.). Crucially, deterrence contains both ability and credibility (Huth, Gelpi and Bennett 1993, 612). This is because a deterring state must have nuclear weapons capabilities to substantiate its threat, but also have the will to execute the nuclear threat when needed (Ibid.)

When applying classical deterrence theory to the Indo-Pakistani situation, two different schools of thought can be distinguished: (1) those scholars who posit that India and Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons has by and large prevented conflict; and, (2) those scholars who indicate that it has increased conflict in the past and that it will make conflict more probable in the future (Sagan and Waltz 2015). These contrasting views are best illustrated by Sagan and Waltz' (2015) debate on the effects of the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia.

On the one hand (1), in line with classical deterrence theory, Waltz has been a proponent of the school arguing that the spread of nuclear weapons would prevent conflict (Sagan and Waltz 2015, 1-46). In his reasoning, because India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, the risk of preemptive war and interstate conflict between the two is reduced (Ibid.). In Waltz' argument, India has rightly developed nuclear weapons to secure itself against its nuclear-armed neighbor, the People's Republic of China (China) (Ibid. 159-61). After this development, Pakistan needed to acquire nuclear weapons of its own (Ibid.). He also argues that nuclear weapons empirically show to make conventionally

dangerous and unstable situations to be safer and more stable (Ibid. 162-3). This is shown, he reasons, in the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan, where nuclear weapons prevented major interstate war from breaking out (Ibid.). Importantly, nuclear weapons make crises more stable, which is the reason to believe that India and Pakistan are better off with nuclear weapons than without them (Ibid. 170).

At the other hand (2), however, Sagan is pessimistic (Sagan and Waltz 2015, 47-93). He argues that India and Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons will not inhibit war and conflict (Ibid. 138-56). As the mindsets of the Pakistani militarized regime vis-à-vis India's civilian controlled state are different, preventive war between the two nations over the years has been a serious possibility (Ibid. 140-6). At the same time, the Kashmir conflict has kept tensions high between India and Pakistan (Ibid.). This makes future nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan likely (Ibid.). According to Sagan, the 1999 Kargil War is disturbing, as it shows that nuclear-armed states can fight wars – disproving Waltz' (1981) conception that they do not – making future conflict in South Asia more likely (Ibid. 144-5).

When trying to explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan with classical deterrence theory, opposing interpretations of the situation are found as shown above. This urges the need to investigate conflict occurrence beyond deterrence theory, also since armed conflict has been present between India and Pakistan both before and after they developed nuclear weapons. Therefore this thesis will proceed by taking out nuclear weapons as a factor in explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. Henceforth, I will be looking into other, non-nuclear, explanations of conflict occurrence.

## 2.2 Theoretical argument: non-nuclear conflict occurrence factors and theories

When describing non-nuclear explanations of conflict occurrence, Ganguly (2001, 4-8) and Paul (2005, 21) have used both international relations paradigms (e.g. Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann 2004), that draw on systemic level explanations, and area specialist approaches (e.g. Bose 1999), that offer idiosyncratic variables (Paul 2005, 251). Although often seen as distinct fields of research, a combination between these could form a good basis to explain multifaceted conflicts like the Indo-Pakistani conflict (Ibid.). Therefore, I have combined Ganguly's (2001, 4-8) aggregate level analysis with Paul's (2005, 21) more exhaustive, fine-grained, list of conflict occurrence factors, to establish which factors could be relevant in explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. Where Paul (2005, 21) lists a number of factors without describing the mechanism of their interaction, Ganguly (2001, 4-8) outlines the mechanism between them without explicitly listing the singular factors at play. To bridge both authors' arguments, I have modified these factors into: (I) incompatible national identities; (II) irredentism; (III) particular power asymmetry; (IV) domestic power structures; and (V) great power involvement. With these factors, I hope to cover the most important causes at play. These five factors are elaborated below and

will be used as a hypothesis in this thesis for explaining conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan over time.

### 2.2.1 Incompatible national identities

Scholars (e.g. Anderson 1983; Hutchinson 2017; Van Evera 1994; Wimmer 2012) note that incompatible national identities can be significant factors in explaining conflict occurrence between states. Anderson (1983), for instance, argues that national identities are a way of imagining and creating communities. Nevertheless, these identities are fictional and invoked by political leaders in order to precipitate a desired political response (Ibid.). The links between states with strong such national identities and war are noteworthy (Van Evera 1994, 5). Hutchinson (2017, 2-3) attests that nationalism can be a threat to a stable world order because nationalist irredentist claims remain a problem to international stability (Ibid.). Besides, Wimmer (2012, 4) states that new nations, that just have shifted to nationalism to legitimize political power, are a major cause of war in modern times. Nationalist identities can ideologically too be driven by religion, where it provides the identity that makes a community cohere and links it with a particular territory (Juergensmeyer 1996, 4-5). In such cases, nationalism can also be targeting other religions as a means of unifying a people (Ibid. 13-5).

Generally, the more divergent the national identities of two nations, with different perceptions about their mutual history and their current conduct and character, the greater the risk of war (Van Evera 1994, 9). This happens as divergent national identities often result in chauvinist mythmaking, which is the creation of myths by decisionmakers that often serve purposes as self-glorifying, self-whitewashing, and other-maligning (Kapur 1991, 16-7; Van Evera 1994, 26-33). Chauvinist mythmaking can create conflict-spirals leading to war (Ibid.). In such conflict-spirals, a nation responds hostile towards others' legitimate claims, hoping that the claimant will back down (Ibid.). In turn, the targeted nation will take this as further evidence of the other nation's inherent cruelty and injustice, creating a vicious circle leading to conflict (Ibid.). The purpose of chauvinist mythmaking is to create group or national cohesiveness, to bind governmental institutions with the people, and to serve as a basis for policy and social action (Kapur 1991, 16-7). Nationalist mythmaking can be clearly present in textbooks of such nations (Shin and Sneider 2011, 6-10).

### 2.2.2 Irredentism

Saideman and Ayres (2000, 1126) indicate that irredentism has been an important cause of international conflict. Irredentism is a political movement, often advocated by nationalists, that aims to unite the territory of an ethnic group with the territories of other segments (Ibid). Irredentism is inherently risky compared to other foreign policies because making territorial demands upon a neighbor is tantamount to inviting war (Saideman 2005, 208-11). However, although irredentist

behavior can have harmful consequences for nations, domestic policies can induce irredentism (Ibid.). Politicians that are competing for support of a population that has kin in the territory to be redeemed, are more likely to support irredentist policies; even if it will hurt the country on whole (Ibid.). Similarly, Van Evera (1994, 20) argues that situations in which the rescue of diasporas by homelands is difficult but possible, have a greater risk of war. In such scenarios, homelands will seize any windows of opportunity that arise – often resulting in conflict – to reunite its foreign kin (Ibid.).

### 2.2.3 Particular power asymmetry

A number of scholars (e.g. Zinnes 1961; Mack 1975; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; and, Arreguín-Toft 2001) have written on asymmetric conflicts. Asymmetric conflicts involve states that have unequal power capabilities (Paul 2005, 5). Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 182-3) argues that weaker states can initiate conflict in their pursuit of maximizing expected utility. In other words, when weaker states have a reasonable expectation of success against a more powerful foe, they can initiate wars (Ibid.). Elaborating on this, Paul (1994) states that conflict occurrence can be explained by particular power asymmetry between nations. He contends that weaker states can initiate conflict if its key decision-makers believe they can achieve their political and military objectives (Ibid. 16-35). According to him, this belief can ensue when (a combination of) four conditions are in place: (1) when a limited aims strategy could award the weaker state with gains to the status quo; (2) when short-term capabilities cause windows of opportunity to be exploited; (3) when great power ally support is favorable; and, (4) when domestic power structures are changing (Ibid. 20).

### 2.2.4 Domestic power structures

Tremblay and Schofield (2005, 227) indicate that military and hybrid regimes behave more aggressively and war-prone than more democratic ones. Here, hybrid regimes are regimes that combine democratic and autocratic traits, consisting of civilian and military interest groups (Ibid. 229). Tremblay and Schofield (2005, 225) delineate the following mechanism. Military regimes create structural and normative distortions in decision-making (Ibid. 226). This causes that military regimes become involved in strategic disputes more often than civilian ones; while they also escalate disputes more rapidly (Ibid.). Hybrid regimes have an even greater tendency than military ones to pursue confrontational policies (Ibid.). This is because – contrary to military regimes – they are not insulated from volatile popular issues (Ibid.). Hybrid regimes even seek popular legitimacy through disputes, while they rely on the generation of regime-legitimizing myths for their survival (Ibid.). This explains military and hybrid regimes' increased propensity to conflict.

Conversely, Tremblay and Schofield (2005, 237) argue that democratic states are less war-prone due to domestic crosscutting cleavages that make aggressive unilateral policy difficult to

implement. In a democracy, foreign policy decisionmaking is affected by its institutional constraints, causing that normative biases are not that easily created (Ibid.). This has a mitigating effect on foreign policy. Moreover, civilian control over the military in democratic states means that defense policy receives lower priority (Ibid.).

Complementary, Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 1-19) attest that contrary to fully established democracies, new democracies are often more unstable and more war-prone. This happens because such states go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where democratization suffers reversal (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 5). Without democracy's mitigating institutions strongly in place, politicians resort to bellicose nationalism to empower the people (Ibid. 2005, 2).

#### 2.2.5 Great power involvement

Lastly, Kober (2006, 21) has linked conflict occurrence with great power involvement in two ways. First, great powers get involved in regional disputes to balance power (Levy 2004, 30-5). Balance-of-power theory entails that on the international stage states act to regulate disputes by forming a coalition against any state that threatens to gain a position of (regional) hegemony (Ibid. 35-6). In bipolar systems, great-power competitive balancing is extended to peripheral regions (Kober 2006, 20). Second, the patron-client theory focuses on the vertical great power–local actor relationship, considering the informal relations between unequal partners (Ibid. 22). At the onset of war between local actors, great powers might try to influence their adversaries' capabilities in war (Ibid. 22). For military action poses risks and costs for patrons, they normally prefer to support a client through arms and logistical support (Ibid. 23). Therefore, when great powers get involved in a regional conflict, military capabilities of (one of) the warring factions are often enhanced, increasing the risk of conflict (Ibid.).

### **3. Case Selection:**

I will conduct a qualitative controlled comparison to establish which above-described factors might explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan. According to Slater and Ziblatt (2013), a controlled comparison design combines multiple methods to tests hypotheses in cases that are similar or identical except for the independent variable(s). In doing so, it can clarify empirical convergences and divergences (Ibid. 1301). Sharing this goal, I will use this design for this research.

India and Pakistan have been selected as they harbor one of the longest enduring conflicts of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries (Paul 2005, 3). Conflicts have occurred both before and after India and

Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons<sup>1</sup>. Relating Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence to their possession of nuclear weapons cannot convincingly be corroborated by empirical evidence, as opposing interpretations of the situation by Sagan and Waltz (2015) in paragraph 2.1 show. Two conflicts have been selected as cases in the pre-nuclear era ( $t_1$  = independence until the late 1980s), and two conflicts as cases in the nuclear era ( $t_2$  = the late 1980 until the present) (Khan 2005, 160; Leng 2005, 121-2; Paul 2005, 8). These conflicts can be seen as diverse cases spanning the pre-nuclear and the nuclear era with the objective of achieving maximum variance along relevant dimensions (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 300-1). These cases are intended to represent the full range of values characterizing the relationship between the various factors and Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence with the aim to test the hypothesis (Ibid. 300). The cases that I will look into are:

- Conflict 1: the 1947-8 Indo-Pakistani armed conflict ( $t_1$ );
- Conflict 2: the 1965 Indo-Pakistani armed conflict ( $t_1$ );
- Conflict 3: the 1999 Indo-Pakistani armed conflict ( $t_2$ );
- Conflict 4: the 2001-2 Indo-Pakistani armed conflict ( $t_2$ ) (Paul 2005, 8);

My research design is summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1: Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence**

	T <sub>1</sub> (1947 – late 1980s)		T <sub>2</sub> (late 1980s – present)	
	Conflict 1 (1947-8)	Conflict 2 (1965)	Conflict 3 (1999)	Conflict 4 (2001-2)
<b>X<sub>1</sub>: Incompatible national identities</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>X<sub>2</sub>: Irredentism</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>X<sub>3</sub>: Particular power asymmetry</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>X<sub>4</sub>: Domestic power structures</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>X<sub>5</sub>: Great power involvement</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>Y<sub>dependent</sub>: Conflict occurrence</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Conflict characteristics (initiator; type)</b>	-	-	-	-

Moreover, this controlled comparison uses an explaining outcome process-tracing research method, aiming to sufficiently explain conflict occurrence (Beach and Pederson 2013, 11). In order to reach this goal, a deductive path will be followed in which first a theory has been conceptualized into

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<sup>1</sup> Both nations are regarded to have gained the capability to test and deploy nuclear arms by the late 1980s (Khan 2005, 160).

a causal mechanism (Ibid. 19). This causal mechanism will be evaluated against the empirical record, where after an assessment will be made whether or not a sufficient explanation has been crafted (Ibid.).

## **4. Analysis**

This chapter analyzes the contribution of chosen conflict occurrence factors in explaining the selected conflicts. Under header 'Overall state of hostility', the factors (I) incompatible national identities, and (II) irredentism are covered. I ascertain that these factors are drivers for Indo-Pakistani conflict, as they are root causes explaining the overall state of hostility between India and Pakistan. I should note that factor (II) irredentism is an extreme expression of factor (I) incompatible national identities. However, it is such an important materialization, comprising a core element in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, I will discuss it separately. Furthermore, under the header 'False optimism', the factors (III) particular power asymmetry, (IV) domestic power structures, and, (V) great power involvement are included. I posit that these factors are enablers of Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. So, when (a combination of) these enabling factors changes, Indo-Pakistani conflict is induced. I should mention that factor (III) partly overlaps with the factors (IV) and (V), in the sense that factor (IV) overlaps with condition (4) of factor (III), and that factor (V) overlaps with condition (3) of factor (III). Nevertheless, as they have distinctly been listed by Paul (2005, 21), I have chosen to review them separately.

### **4.1 1947-8 conflict**

#### 4.1.1 Conflict explanation

After the Indian subcontinent was divided on the basis of demographics into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan in 1947, conflict broke out between both nations on the territory of the independent State of Kashmir (Ganguly 2001, 15). Trying to add Muslim-majority Kashmir into its nation, aiding a tribal Kashmiri rebellion, Pakistan invaded the area (Ibid. 16-7). In response, Kashmir's Hindu-ruler decided to accede to India and to appeal for its military assistance (Ibid.). Indian military forces managed to halt the Pakistani attack and a subsequent ceasefire line, called the Line of Control (LoC), was created, dividing Kashmir into two (Ibid.). Next, India transferred the resolution of the Kashmir issue to the United Nations (UN) Security Council, where a new battlefield opened up (Korbel 1954, 165-98).

#### 4.1.2 Which factors caused the 1947-8 conflict?

Regarding the disarray of Pakistan's political and military structures after partition, at first glance, it is hard to understand why Pakistan could have believed that war with India over Kashmir could lead to a

Pakistani victory (Jalal 1990, 25-48; Ganguly 2001, 19). In trying to answer what caused this conflict, I will analyze whether the five hypothesized factors can explain the 1947-8 conflict between India and Pakistan.

### Overall state of hostility

*Incompatible national identities.* At the onset of the 1947-8 conflict, the overall state of hostility between India and Pakistan can be explained by the incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities. Foremost, the Partition of India, preceding the 1947-8 conflict, was caused by fundamentally different views on the future of the Indian subcontinent (Ganguly 2001, 4-5; Khan 2017). The founding principle of secular India declares that Hindus and Muslims are two intertwined communities which should live in one country (Zakaria 2004). In contrast, the founding principle of religious Pakistan claims that Muslims are different from Hindus, and thus comprise two nations (Khan 1950). Because of these contrasting views, the two emerging states were already locked into a potential collision course after the demise of British rule (Ganguly 2001, 10). This resulted in the fact that Pakistan, seeing itself as the homeland for Muslims on the Indian subcontinent, sought to incorporate the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir (Ibid. 5). At the same time, as it wanted to demonstrate that all communities could thrive in its secular state, India sought to thwart Pakistan's claim to Kashmir (Ibid.).


At the time of the 1947-8 conflict, Pakistani leaders were inexperienced, weak and lacked a vision for the future (Kapur 1991, 11). Therefore, they were unable to develop a Pakistani nationalism or identity other than one based on negative anti-Indianism (Ibid.). Although in 1947, Pakistan's founder, Governor-General Jinnah, acknowledged that domestic issues were the primary problems for Pakistan, he chose instead to concentrate on anti-Indianism to minimize internal political pressures (Ibid. 17; Jalal 1985, 50). This is reflected in the use of images of 'us versus them' by the Pakistani leadership (Kapur 1991, 17). These images portray the Hindu-Muslim religious divide to be the basis of the India-Pakistan rivalry (Ibid.). One of such self-glorifying sentiments has been captured by Pakistani Major-General Khan's account of the war: 'In the remotest of our villages, the humblest of our people possess a self-confidence and ready willingness to march forward into India – a spirit the equivalent of which cannot be found on the other side. It may take many generations to create such a spirit' (Khan 1970, 191). While another, anti-Indian image was uttered by Governor-General Jinnah in 1946, commenting on the dangers of an Indian empire: 'If a Hindu empire is achieved, it will mean the end of Islam in India, and even in other Muslim countries' (Biswas 2009).

*Irredentism.* Pakistan's nationalist identity based on religion, encouraged by its anti-Indian images, urged it to try to add Muslim-majority Kashmir into its nation (Ganguly 2001, 5). For this reason, Pakistan initiated armed conflict (Ibid.). This shows irredentist Pakistani desires, increasing the overall state of hostility between the two nations. Crucially, during UN negotiations after the war,

Pakistan explained that it had intervened in Kashmir to protect ‘its own population’ from Indian aggression, questioning the legality of Kashmir’s accession to India (Ganguly 2001, 20). Pakistan’s irredentist desire is further substantiated by a statement of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Khan, commenting on the need for war with India on Kashmir in 1947: ‘If, God forbid, the Pakistan Government or the Muslim League do not act [to gain Kashmir], Kashmir might be lost to them’ (Raghavan 2010, 103). After the 1947-8 Kashmir conflict, showing irredentist yearnings, Governor-General Jinnah was stated to have said: ‘Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or country would tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword of the enemy’ (Kashmir Information and Research Center 2017). As a result, since this war, Pakistan has provided its full support to irredentist and secessionist movements in Kashmir, ranging from verbal encouragement to all-out war (Saideman 2005, 218).

False optimism

*Particular power asymmetry.* Next to the two above-mentioned driving causes, Pakistan’s decision to use an opportunistic event – the tribal Kashmiri rebellion – to start war on Kashmir, was augmented by Pakistani false optimism. Particular power asymmetry between India and Pakistan has influenced this false optimism (Ganguly 2001, 7; Paul 1994; Paul 2005). In the 1947-8 conflict, although India enjoyed a military advantage of approximately 4:1 over Pakistan (see Figure 1), Pakistan nevertheless initiated war on Kashmir. Here, most conditions of Paul’s (1994, 20) theory of asymmetric conflicts were present.



**Figure 1** India to Pakistan capability ratios. Source: Diehl, Goertz and Sweedi (2005, 37). Note:

Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Ratio here is a measure of national power, representing represent demographic, economic, and military strength (Ibid.). Ind/Pak Military Ratio

here is the size of Indian military capabilities versus Pakistani military capabilities, measured in yearly military expenditure and number of military personnel in each state (Ibid.).

First, Pakistan used a limited aims strategy by supporting Kashmiri rebels and initially acting covertly, hoping they would be able to deny their role in the events (Kiss 2013, 10). The aim of Pakistan's limited aims strategy was to create an irreversible *fait accompli* before India could react, to change the status quo over Kashmir in their favor (Ibid.). Second, at that time, India's military policy was to a great extent influenced by Gandhi and Nehru's notion of nonviolence, that among other things propagated that India had no need for strategic defense plans or intelligence organizations (Ibid.). This resulted in a lack of sufficient investment in the military and intelligence organizations (Ibid.). Pakistan wanted to take advantage of this window of opportunity, that bridged the India-Pakistan power asymmetry, to change the state of affairs in Kashmir (Ibid.). Third, linking with factor (V) great power involvement, the 1947-8 conflict marks the beginning of the attempt by Pakistan's Governor-General Jinnah to develop a Pakistan-United States (US) alliance against alleged India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Kapur 1991, 24). The nascent Cold War offered Jinnah the chance to explore this alliance structure (Root 2008, 153). Thus far, it did not yet yield any favorable support, therefore this condition was not present (Kapur 1991, 24). Fourth, linking with factor (IV) domestic power structures, the Pakistani leadership hoped that a war on Kashmir would unite their new country against India, while at the same time it would increase regime legitimacy and popularity (Ibid.) This would unite the country domestically through foreign and military intervention (Ibid.).

*Domestic power structures.* Domestic power structures can significantly explain the occurrence of the 1947-8 armed conflict. At that time, India and Pakistan's political systems were similar, as both countries enjoyed civilian rule exempt from military pressures (Tremblay and Schofield 2005, 231). Nevertheless, Pakistan's early democracy can be associated with war-proneness as described by Mansfield and Snyder (2005). After partition, Pakistan had neither a firm institutional democratic base nor a clear national identity (Ibid. 241-3). As these institutions proved inadequate to bind together Pakistan's splintered society, its leaders resorted to using anti-Indian nationalism to establish a base of popular legitimacy (Ibid. 241-3). This caused Pakistan false optimism, and commence the war of 1947 (Ibid.).

*Great power involvement.* Additionally, great power involvement did not shape Pakistan's decision to instigate the 1947-8 Indo-Pakistani conflict. Although Pakistan sought to correct the Indo-Pakistani imbalance by searching for military assistance and support from the US, these efforts did not yet yield support (Thomas 2004, 311). Although the US started giving financial aid to Pakistan shortly after the country's creation in 1947, not until 1955 did it start military assistance (Center for Global Development 2017). In the 1940s, the India-Pakistan conflict had low priority for the US, as it was not

yet interested in pushing the USSR from the region (Kapur 2005, 134). Therefore, the US used an evenhanded approach of mediation in the Kashmir dispute (Kapur 2005, 136). The USSR too was not yet interested in South Asia, neither supporting India and Pakistan in any significant way (Gupta 1981, 219). Besides, China and Pakistan did not have a strong alliance relationship at that time yet (Paul 1994, 118). Lastly, inspired by Nehru's policies of nonviolence, India remained non-aligned to any major great powers at that time (Thomas 2004, 312).

#### 4.1.3 Conclusion

Two driving factors indeed explain the root cause of the overall hostility between India and Pakistan at the onset of the 1947-8 conflict, which are (I) incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities and (II) Pakistani irredentist nationalism on Kashmir. Next to the two driving causes, Pakistan's decision to wage war on Kashmir in 1947-8 was augmented by its false optimism. This false optimism was mainly fueled by the enabling factor (IV) domestic power structure, as Pakistan's early democracy's nationalist tendencies instigated Pakistan's decisionmakers to go to war on Kashmir. Next to this, as most of Paul's (1994) conditions were present, the enabling factor (III) particular power asymmetry between India and Pakistan, has also been of influence. This all led Pakistan to believe that war on Kashmir could be won. Lastly, the factor (V) great power involvement did not shape Pakistan's false optimism.

## **4.2 1965 conflict**

### 4.2.1 Conflict explanation

Since the 1947-8 conflict, the question of Kashmir remained deadlocked in the UN, while Indo-Pakistani talks on resolving the issue failed (Korbel 1954, 165-97; Ganguly 2001, 32-5). In order to change the status quo on Kashmir, in 1965, Pakistan embarked on Operation Gibraltar (Ibid. 43-6). Initially, Operation Gibraltar was designed to entail covert infiltration of Pakistani regular and irregular forces into Kashmir in order to provoke a Kashmiri rebellion (Ibid.). However, Indian forces quickly became aware of the intruders, and various major battles ensued around the LoC and in the Punjab. By mid-September, the war was reaching a stalemate, and a UN-brokered ceasefire resolution entered into force, ending this outbreak of hostilities (Ibid.).

### 4.2.2 Which factors caused the 1965 conflict?

Similar to the 1947-8 conflict, as the Pakistani leadership was aware of their disadvantaged position vis-à-vis India, its decision to resort to war against India in 1965 is an interesting puzzle (Ganguly 2001, 40). In trying to answer what caused this conflict, I will analyze whether the five hypothesized factors can explain this conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan.

### Overall state of hostility

*Incompatible national identities.* The 1965 conflict has its roots in the incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities. During the mid-1960s Pakistan's decision-makers remained fundamentally unsatisfied about the disputed status of Kashmir (Khan 1967, 122-8). They argued that Kashmir, as a predominantly Muslim territory, had to merge with Pakistan to complete Pakistan's distinctive identity (Ibid.). This is characterized by the post-war statement of the Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto: '[i]f a Muslim identity can remain a part of India, then the raison d'être of Pakistan collapses. [...] It would be fatal if [...] Pakistan were to abandon the struggle [on Kashmir]' (Bhutto 1969). Concurrently, India showed resolve on Kashmir in this conflict too, as Kashmir, being predominantly Muslim, was the shining example of India's secular qualifications (Kumar 2013, 70).

The 1965 conflict has also been characterized by Pakistani chauvinist mythmaking. In an anti-Indian fashion, Pakistani President Khan wrote on India's intentions before the 1965 conflict: 'Indian efforts in the field of foreign policy were all directed at one aim, the isolation of Pakistan and its disintegration' (Khan 1967, 117). At the same time, Pakistan created the self-glorifying myth that the 1965 conflict ended in a Pakistani victory, in order to counter Indian claims and shield the Khan-regime from criticism (Imtiaz 2015).

*Irredentism.* The 1965 conflict shows strong evidence for the role of irredentism. Aiming to instigate a Kashmiri rebellion with its incursions, Pakistan hoped that it would finally bring a favorable conclusion to the Kashmir issue (Ganguly 2001, 40). Again, one of the most distinct voices of this irredentist sentiment was Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto (Ibid. 32). During the 1964-5 Pakistani Presidential election campaign, he stated: 'Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically.' (Ibid.). Moreover, Bhutto promised 'retaliatory steps [in the near future] to counter the Indian attempt to merge the occupied parts of Kashmir with India' (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 243). To this, he added the clear irredentist claim that 'Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning' (Ibid.). President Khan, who would win reelection, followed Bhutto's lead in using the Kashmir issue to generate popular enthusiasm for his presidency, paving the way for the 1965 conflict (Ibid.).

### False optimism

*Particular power asymmetry.* The 1965 armed conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir can be explained by Indo-Pakistani power asymmetry (Paul 1994). On the eve of the 1965 armed conflict, India's military advantage against Pakistan was a staggering 8.5:1 (see Figure 1) (Paul 1994, 107-25). Nevertheless, Pakistan initiated this armed conflict (Ibid.). All four conditions of Paul's (1994, 20) theory of asymmetric conflicts were present. The Pakistani leadership planned this armed conflict as a limited aims strategy, believing that achieving territorial and political objectives in a short operation

would strengthen their negotiation position on Kashmir (Ibid. 110-4). Moreover, Pakistan had recently acquired sufficient offensive capabilities for a short war on Kashmir (Ibid. 115-7). Because of India's army modernization efforts after the 1962 Sino-Indian War, waiting would have been to Pakistan's disadvantage (Ibid. 115-7). Concurrently, related to factor (V), the alliance structure had shifted in Pakistan's favor (Ibid. 170-120). After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, China allied itself with Pakistan to counter Indian power in the region and to divert Indian military attention away from China (Curtis 2009). Likewise, Pakistan expected the US not to interfere, because of its focus on Indochina (Paul 1994, 117-20). Due to the Sino-Indian War of 1962, in which two Soviet allies had fought, the USSR took a neutralist position towards the Indo-Pakistani conflict, supporting India less than before (Gupta 1981, 223). Lastly, related to factor (IV), the arrival of Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Bhutto, who took a more hawkish attitude on Kashmir, into the decision-making structure, caused significant change (Ibid. 120-2). As mentioned above, his staunch bellicose rhetoric on Kashmir influenced President Khan's later decision to start the 1965 conflict (Aziz 2009, 39). This all culminated in Pakistan's 1965 false optimism leading to war over Kashmir.

*Domestic power structures.* Domestic power structures can explain the 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict as well. In 1960, a hybrid regime came to power in Pakistan under former-general, President Khan (Tremblay and Schofield 2005, 231-2). India's defeat against China in 1962 became an irresistible window of opportunity for Pakistan's militarized institutions (Ibid.). A territorial dispute in early 1965 on the Rann of Kutch, a remote desert border area, which was won by an India that showed little willingness to fight, inspired the hybrid Pakistani regime to set in motion plans to start the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War on Kashmir (Ibid.). It is unlikely that a democratic or military regime would have escalated a conflict on such remote and strategically marginal issues (Ibid.). Only for the domestic nationalist value of a confrontation with India, Pakistan's hybrid regime engaged in these hostilities (Ibid.). Likewise, Pakistan's domestic power structure enabled the 1965 conflict to be planned without the consultation of the army generals, who likely would have rejected the plan, causing this conflict to materialize (Ibid.).

*Great power involvement.* In contrast to the 1947-8 conflict, the 1965 conflict was shaped by great power involvement. After the 1947-8 conflict, a convergence of US and Pakistani interests produced a strategic alliance to contain India's potential economic and military hegemony of the South Asian region (Kapur 2005, 138). However, in the beginning of the 1960s, US interest began to wane as a result of its preoccupation in Indochina (Paul 1994, 119). Pakistani leaders, therefore, believed that the US would remain neutral if it launched an offensive on Kashmir (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the US did supply arms to Pakistan in these years as a result of their patron-client relation (US Department of State 2017).

Due to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Chinese and Pakistani relations strengthened significantly (Paul 1994, 118). Since partition, China tried to balance against India's potential rise in three ways: (I) it attacked India's prestige regionally and internationally through war, (II) it sought Indo-Pakistani arms balance, and, (III) it pursued an active anti-India policy (Kapur 2005, 134). Consequently, the Pakistani leadership believed that should Pakistan become involved in a war with India, China would fight along Pakistan (Ibid.). Yet, China merely supplied Pakistan with arms during the 1965 conflict (Alam 2012, 27).

Another great power that became increasingly interested in South Asia was the USSR. At that time, South Asia was geographically important to the Soviet Union because (a) India-China rapprochement against the USSR would harm Soviet interests; and (b) the spread of Chinese influence to the Middle East through Pakistan could affect the Soviet position in the area (Kapur 2005, 134). To that extent, the USSR supplied weapons to India (US Department of State 2017). As a result of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the USSR signaled that they would remain neutral in the event of an Indo-Pakistani conflict (Paul 1994, 119). Therefore, Pakistani decision-makers believed that the USSR would not get involved if war would break out (Ibid.). These favorable calculations on great power involvement contributed to Pakistan's false optimism that a limited war with India on Kashmir could be won, resulting in the 1965 armed conflict.

#### 4.2.3 Conclusion

Like in the 1947-8 conflict, again, two driving factors can explain the overall hostility between India and Pakistan at the onset of the 1965 conflict, which are (I) incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities and Pakistani (II) irredentism. Next to these driving causes, Pakistan's decision to start this conflict was augmented by false optimism. This false optimism was triggered by all three enabling factors: (III) particular power asymmetry, (IV) domestic power structures, and by (V) great power involvement. However, here, factors (IV) and (V) were most significant in enabling the Pakistani leadership to decide to wage war on Kashmir in 1965.

### **4.3 1999 conflict**

#### 4.3.1 Conflict explanation

Since Bangladeshi independence from Pakistan in 1971, for many years, South Asia saw a period of relative peace (Syed 1992; Ganguly 2001, 79). Nevertheless, in 1999, India and Pakistan almost plunged into another full-scale war on Kashmir again (Ibid. 114). On routine patrol in the Kargil sector of the LoC, the Indian army discovered that hundreds of Pakistani troops had intruded into Indian Kashmir, occupying a number of strategic positions (Ibid. 115-6). Eventually, assisted by Indian Air Force bombardments, Indian forces managed to recapture the lost territory (Ibid. 117-8). Facing

escalating losses and little international diplomatic support, the Pakistani leadership was forced to reconsider continuing its military operations (Ibid. 120). Finally, after a couple of weeks, the conflict came to a close (Ibid. 120).

#### 4.3.2 Which factors caused the 1999 conflict?

Parallel to the 1947-8 and 1965 conflicts, answering which factors explain the Pakistani decision to go to war with India in the 1999 conflict is complex. Nonetheless, I will try to analyze whether the five hypothesized factors can explain this conflict between India and Pakistan.

##### Overall state of hostility

*Incompatible national identities.* The 1999 conflict is rooted in incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities. Since Bangladeshi independence, Pakistan's Islamic communalist discourse of forming one union had failed (Nasr 2005, 183). This development caused Pakistan to begin to draw on a more fundamentalist kind of Islamism to define its national identity (Ibid.). From envisioning itself as the homeland of Muslims on the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan increasingly tried to become the embodiment of the Islamic ideal as defined by Islamism (Ibid.). Islamism in Pakistan is anti-Indian in rejecting India's secularism and Hindu domination (Ibid. 184). Islamism has also been used by the Pakistani military to legitimize military rule in Pakistan, resulting in prolonging the Kashmir issue and highlighting the Indian threat (Kumar 2013, 70; Nasr 2005, 191). Since the 1980s, Islamist and anti-Indian images also found its way in the Pakistani textbooks and curricula, which, according to Jalal (1995, 78) are the best examples of Pakistani mythmaking. A 1995 primary education textbook notes: '[r]egard Pakistan as an Islamic state, and acquire deep love for it' (Nayyar and Salim 2005, 11). From an Urdu textbook from the same time, a clear example of an anti-Indian myth can be found, stating: '[the] Hindu has always been an enemy of Islam' (Ibid. 20). These textbooks also aim to promote militarism in Pakistani society, containing myths glorifying war and the military, while introducing courses like 'Fundamentals of War' in intermediate classes (Ibid. 77-8).

*Irredentism.* The 1999 conflict shows signs of irredentism. Irredentist feelings had subsided in India and Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s, after, with Bangladeshi independence, it was demonstrated that Pakistan could not keep its nation united on the basis of religion alone (Ganguly 2001, 5-7). By the same token, India's normative claim to Kashmir began to erode too, as its secularism declined. At the same time, Indian efforts to alleviate the living conditions in Indian Kashmir paid off, resulting in diminished violence and a relaxation of intra-Kashmir tensions (Saideman 2005, 217). Nevertheless, Pakistan instigated the 1999 armed conflict to derail India's accomplishments in the area (Ibid.). Clearly, Pakistan started these efforts in order to thwart the solidifying India-favoring status quo on Kashmir (Ibid.). Yet, without having officially declared war against India on Kashmir, as it had done

before, Pakistan seemed to lack as strong irredentist feelings and unwavering resolve to change the status quo on Kashmir (Ibid.). Nonetheless, addressing the 1999 Kargil conflict, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, spoke out with the irredentist notion: 'I want to declare that the Kashmiri urge for freedom cannot be stifled by force. The Kashmiri people's struggle will continue. [...] [Pakistan] will never abandon the Kashmiris' (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2017).

### False optimism

*Particular power asymmetry.* Pakistani false optimism in the 1999 conflict can be explained by Paul's (1994) theory of asymmetric conflicts. While India held a 6:1 military advantage (see Figure 1), the Kargil incursions by Pakistani forces can be characterized as a limited aims strategy: using covert forces to test India's will to fight (Ganguly 2001, 121). This limited attack, with the ability to still be able to reverse course, made the risks for Pakistan both calculable and controllable, while it could also challenge the status quo on Kashmir (Ibid.). Before the onset of the Kargil War, the international community pressured India and Pakistan to improve their relationship and a successful dialogue on reducing tensions started (Ibid. 114). However, the Pakistani military, fearing that the Kashmir issue would be resolved in the ongoing talks, felt the need to use this chance to plan a military operation that would revive the Kashmir issue on the international agenda (Ibid. 115). At the same time, tied to factor (V), Pakistan's decision-makers assumed that the international community would find it difficult to accurately pin responsibility of the attack on Pakistan, because of the covert nature of the Pakistani incursions of the LoC (Ibid.). Likewise, Pakistan also assumed that the US would not support the Indian position, due to its longtime alliance with Pakistan (Ibid.). These assumptions turned out to be false as the US ended up actively denouncing Pakistani aggression, while China, Pakistan's other main ally, remained neutral (Ibid. 115; Mahapatra 1999; Singh 1999). Furthermore, tied to factor (IV), Mr. Musharraf's October 1998 appointment as Pakistani Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee enabled the Kargil War to materialize (Chitkara 2001, 135-6). Since the beginning of the 1990s, Musharraf, in his role as Director General of Military operations of Pakistan, had been refining the Kargil plan, and proposing it to the Pakistani leadership (Kapur 2007, 117-8). Nevertheless, these plans for a Kargil incursion were rebuffed by the Pakistani leadership time after time (Ibid.). Finally, with Musharraf's promotion, preparations for the Kargil incursion were able to commence (Chitkara 2001, 135-6; Kapur 2007, 117-8).

*Domestic power structures.* This conflict also was largely the result of Pakistan's hybrid regime. After the late 1980s, Islamist state ideology came to influence Pakistan's interventionist foreign policy on Kashmir under the Prime Ministers Bhutto (1993-6) and Sharif (1997-9) (Tremblay and Schofield 2005, 233). The persistent threat of a coup, which finally occurred after the 1999 conflict with India, provided the Pakistani military with enough autonomy to plan and execute military operation without

civilian control (Ibid.). Therefore, the 1999 conflict over Kashmir was largely the result of a Pakistani hybrid government composed of Prime Minister Sharif, Islamists, and military interests, all focused on Kashmir (Ibid.). Just before the outbreak of the 1999 conflict, Prime Minister Sharif attempted to put the president's and military's power under civilian control and oversight (Banerjee and Hosur 2015, 69). In order to counter these developments, the Pakistani army used the 1999 conflict as a policy instrument to outmaneuver civilian leaders to regain its lost power (Ibid.).

*Great power involvement.* Pakistan's false optimism at the start of the 1999 conflict was only partly shaped by great power involvement. The Pakistani military devised the Kargil plan to revive the Kashmir issue on the international agenda (Ganguly 2001, 115). The Pakistani leadership believed that the US would remain neutral and that China would publicly support Pakistan in the event of war breaking out in Kashmir (Ibid.). This belief stemmed from Pakistan's assessment of past behavior of great powers in the Indo-Pakistani conflicts (Ibid.). However, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1980s, the strategic importance of Pakistan for the US began to wane; therefore, the US actively denounced Pakistani aggression in the 1999 conflict (Ibid. 115; Ganguly 2016, 41; Mahapatra 1999; Singh 1999). Concurrently, China remained neutral, although it did supply Pakistan with military aid (Curtis 2009).

#### 4.3.3 Conclusion

Like the previous conflicts, two driving factors explain the overall hostility between India and Pakistan at the onset of the 1999 conflict, which are (I) incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities and (II) Pakistani irredentist nationalism on Kashmir. Next to these driving causes, Pakistan's decision to start war with India on Kashmir was increased by its false optimism. The most significant enabling factor in explaining the 1999 conflict was a change in Pakistan's (IV) domestic power structure, which led Pakistan to believe that it could win a limited war with India. The enabling factors (III) particular power asymmetry between India and Pakistan, and partly (V) great power involvement contributed to Pakistan's false optimism.

### **4.4 2001-2 conflict**

#### 4.4.1 Conflict explanation

Late 2001, armed terrorists, with links to Pakistan-based terrorist organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), attacked the Indian parliament (Ganguly 2016, 64-5). As a result of this attack, the Hindu-nationalist BJP-led Indian government mobilized its armed forces against Pakistan (Ibid. 65-6; Singh 2006, 266). As Indian mobilization took some three weeks, Pakistan had ample opportunity to reinforce its own defenses (Ganguly 2016, 66-7). During India's mobilization,

Pakistan also banned a number of terrorist organizations, denouncing their actions and their use of Pakistani territory (Ibid. 67-8). The ensuing Indo-Pakistani standoff, which culminated along the LoC in Kashmir and saw a number of casualties, heightened tensions significantly (Ibid.). As a consequence of US diplomatic intervention, the crisis slowly wound down (Ibid. 71-2).

#### 4.4.2 Which factors caused the 2001-2 conflict?

After all these years, without ever having changed the status quo with India, it is interesting that Pakistan still had not abandoned its intransigence in fighting war against India. Nevertheless, for the 2001-2 Indo-Pakistani conflict, I will analyze whether the five hypothesized factors can explain this conflict between India and Pakistan.

##### Overall state of hostility

*Incompatible national identities.* The enduring overall hostility between India and Pakistan at the onset of the 2001-2 conflict stems from incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities. During the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan's identity has become increasingly Islamist (Nasr 2005, 199). In order to keep the Kashmir issue flared up and to find a new preoccupation for growing Pakistani radicalism, the Pakistani military encouraged jihadi terrorists to become active in India and Kashmir (Ibid.). Pakistan's support for jihadi Pakistani and Kashmiri groups led to the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, which was the prelude to the 2001-2 armed conflict (Ibid.). The support of Pakistan's military and intelligence services to the terrorist organizations perpetrating the Indian parliamentary attack was so significant, that one can speak of state-sponsored terrorism (Wolf 2017, 117-20). There is credible evidence that the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, was at least involved in training and arming the terrorists (Ibid. 136). This is supported by the fact that the perpetrators were fighters from LeT and JeM, two organizations who maintain close links with the ISI (Ibid.).

Textbooks from around the time of the 2001-2 conflict again show clear Islamist and anti-Indian images (Nayyar and Salim 2005). Since the 1980s, Pakistani textbooks of compulsory subjects openly praised jihad and urged students to become mujahideen and martyrs (Ibid. 87). At the same time, in a textbook on social studies from 2002, one can read about the 'the social evils of the Hindus' – a clear anti-Indian myth (Ibid. 20). This indicates that Pakistan at that time defined itself through staunch Islamism and anti-Indianism.

*Irredentism.* The 2001-2 Indo-Pakistani conflict can also be explained by irredentism. After the 1999 conflict, Pakistani decision-makers remained reluctant to abandon their claims to Kashmir or part with their strategy of asymmetric war against India (Ganguly 2016, 53). This is illustrated by Pakistani President Musharraf's 2002 claim that: 'Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. [...] We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to

Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principle stand on Kashmir' (New York Times 2002). The stated intent of the terrorist forces supported by Pakistan was to attack India and to reclaim Kashmir, this was too the reason why Pakistan supported these groups so elaborately (Wolf 2017, 136). This indicates that this conflict is influenced by irredentism.

#### False optimism

*Particular power asymmetry.* At the onset of the 2001-2 conflict, Pakistani false optimism in supporting terrorist groups to keep the Kashmir issue alive, can to some degree be explained by Paul's (1994) theory of asymmetric conflicts. While India held an 8:1 military advantage (see Figure 1), Pakistan envisioned the use of a limited aims strategy to test Indian military resolve by using terrorist forces (Ganguly 2016, 53). In that way, it hoped to be able to deny its involvement (Ganguly 2016, 53). Pakistan intended to make use of a window of opportunity, as there is a correlation between this terrorist attack and Indo-Pakistani peace talks of mid-2001 (Wolf 2017, 136; Pande 2016). Because the Pakistani army did not support this development, it engaged with Pakistan-based terrorist groups in keeping pressure on Kashmir (Ibid. 53-4). At first glance, the timing seemed peculiar (Pande 2004). At this time, just a couple of months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City, the US and other major great powers were poised to battle terrorism (Ibid.). Nevertheless, parallel to factor (V), Pakistani decision-makers rightfully predicted that having terrorist groups on their soil would gain them military, economic and political support from the US to combat terrorism (Ibid.). Furthermore, in line with factor (IV), Musharraf became the Chief-Executive of Pakistan after the 1999 military coup (Raman 2001). From this moment onwards, he covertly started supporting terrorists to achieve Pakistan's strategic objective in destabilizing India and to keep the Kashmir issue alive (Ibid.).

*Domestic power structures.* The 2001-2 Indo-Pakistani conflict has been influenced by domestic power structures. Although this attack was not perpetrated by regular Pakistani forces, the terrorists that committed the attack were supported and facilitated by the Pakistani regime (Ganguly 2016, 64-6). Although Pakistan has long been accused of sponsoring terrorism, the 1999 Pakistani military coup, which led the Pakistani military to govern the country again, accelerated this development (Wolf 2017, 120-48). As mentioned above, after the 1999 conflict, Pakistan's militarism made it unresponsive to external pressures to abandon its enmity towards India (Ganguly 2016, 63-4). The Pakistani army showed little willingness to scale down its strategy of using asymmetric, terrorist, forces to destabilize India and Indian Kashmir (Ibid.). In fact, Pakistan's military accession to power, influenced by Islamist and irredentist forces, motivated it to increase the use of such forces (Ibid.). This formed the groundworks of the 2001-2 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament culminating eventually in the border crisis (Ibid.).

*Great power involvement.* Pakistan’s false optimism in supporting anti-Indian terrorist groups was only marginally shaped by great power involvement. As a result of the 1999 conflict, Pakistan did not enjoy a warm relationship with the US, thus receiving no arms supplies (Alam 2012, 51). Nevertheless, as mentioned above, having terrorist forces on their soil, eventually would gain Pakistan military, economic and political support from the US (Pande 2004). Indeed, after 2001, the US-Pakistan relationship improved, boosting US arms supplies to Pakistan to battle terrorism (Alam 2012, 51).

**4.4.3 Conclusion**

Again, two driving factors can explain the overall hostility between India and Pakistan at the onset of the 1999 conflict, which are (I) incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities and (II) Pakistani irredentist nationalism on Kashmir. Next to these driving causes, Pakistan’s decision to support terrorist forces was augmented by Pakistani false optimism. This false optimism was mainly caused by the enabling factor (IV) domestic power structures, although factor (III) particular power asymmetry, also had some influence. Factor (V) great power involvement only marginally enabled this false optimism.

**4.5 Discussion**

In analyzing non-nuclear factors explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence, I found that all five hypothesized factors – to a greater or lesser extent – have influenced Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence over time. Here, I have discerned between driving and enabling factors, and found the following mechanism. Two driving causes explain the overall state of hostility between India and Pakistan, namely (I) incompatible national identities and (II) irredentism. However, as both driving factors have been present at a comparable level over time, by themselves they cannot satisfyingly explain when conflict will break out. Explanations for specific occurrences have been different levels of enabling factors, augmenting false optimism in starting the various conflicts. In this analysis on the Indo-Pakistani conflict three enabling factors have been defined: (III) particular power asymmetry, (IV) domestic power structures, and, (V) great power involvement. I argue that, if the driving factors remain at a comparable level, it is not only the presence of enabling factors, but also a significant change in one of these enabling factors that cause Indo-Pakistani conflict. Most often, this has been change in Pakistan’s domestic power structure. The results per conflict are shown in Table 2.

**Table 2: Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence.**

Factors that show significant change just prior to conflict occurring are both bold and underscored.

<b><u>T<sub>1</sub> (1947 – late 1980s)</u></b>	<b><u>T<sub>2</sub> (late 1980s – present)</u></b>
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	<b>Conflict 1 (1947-8)</b>	<b>Conflict 2 (1965)</b>	<b>Conflict 3 (1999)</b>	<b>Conflict 4 (2001-2)</b>
<b>X<sub>1</sub>: Incompatible national identities</b>	Yes, driving factor	Yes, driving factor	Yes, driving factor	Yes, driving factor
<b>X<sub>2</sub>: Irredentism</b>	Yes, driving factor	Yes, driving factor	Yes, driving factor	Yes, driving factor
<b>X<sub>3</sub>: Particular power asymmetry</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, influenced
<b>X<sub>4</sub>: Domestic power structures</b>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Yes</u>
<b>X<sub>5</sub>: Great power involvement</b>	No	<u>Yes</u>	Yes, partly	No, only marginally
<b>Y<sub>dependent</sub>: Conflict occurrence</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Conflict characteristics (initiator; type)</b>	Pakistan; open invasion of Kashmir	Pakistan; covert invasion of Kashmir	Pakistan; covert invasion of Kashmir	Pakistan; covert support of terrorist attack on India

Consequently, this approach could pose a tool to assess the risk of future Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence by carefully analyzing the state of affairs and interplay of the three enabling factors. Nonetheless, a number of limitations have shown during the analysis. Although derived from reputable literature (Paul 2005), the chosen set of factors partially overlaps, thereby complicating the analysis. As mentioned earlier, driving factor (II) can be seen as an extreme materialization of driving factor (I). In the analysis, enabling factor (III) has been assessed based on the four conditions from earlier work of Paul (1994). These conditions are (1) a limited aims strategy, (2) a window of opportunity, (3) great power support, and, (4) changing domestic power structures (see also paragraph 2.2.3). This creates partial overlap when assessing the enabling factors (IV) and (V). I propose future analysis to counter this overlap in the following manner. Condition 4 of factor (III) could be defined as a change in domestic power structures, while factor (IV) would entail different domestic power structures. Moreover, condition 3 of factor (III) could cover a shift in alliance structures, while condition (V) could be defined as great power verbal and material involvement. These shifted definitions of the enabling factors will pose a clearer and less overlapping framework for explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict, while addressing the change related aspects of the enabling factors more explicitly under (III) particular power asymmetry.

As the five hypothesized factors have caused Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence in the above-described manner, little evidence has been found of the influence of nuclear weapons on Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence in the nuclear era. Conflicts have occurred both before and after nuclear weapons were present, while, when looking to conflict characteristics (see Table 2), no clear shift in how conflicts occur has been observed. This supports my starting assumption on the limitations of deterrence theory to the Indo-Pakistani situation. Before and during the nuclear era, Pakistan has been the initiator of conflict, initiation both covert and open military operations against India. This supports my starting assumption on the limitations of deterrence theory to the Indo-Pakistani situation. Nevertheless, as a result of my research design, I have not been able to analyze the influence of nuclear weapons on the enabling factors. Here, especially impact on the (perception of) (III) particular power asymmetry could be expected.

## 5. Conclusion

In this thesis, I have answered the following research question: *'Which factors explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan beyond deterrence theory?'* In order to do so, general theories on conflict occurrence have been looked into, which have been projected on four selected Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrences, two in the pre-nuclear era and two in the nuclear era. This has been to ascertain whether or not deterrence theory is able to explain Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. The following hypothesis has been formulated: due to factors as (I) incompatible national identities; (II) irredentism; (III) particular power asymmetry; (IV) domestic power structures; and (V) great power involvement, conflict has occurred between India and Pakistan over time.

To get to these five factors, I have combined Ganguly's (2001, 4-8) and Paul's (2005, 21) arguments. This is done in order to bridge Ganguly's mechanism of driving and enabling factors with Paul's more comprehensive list of factors explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. Here, my results refine existing theories on Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence.

In my analysis, I have found that the hypothesized five factors, when linked, are able to explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan. Two driving causes, namely (I) incompatible national identities and (II) Pakistani irredentism, explain the overall state of hostility between India and Pakistan. However, as they have stayed at a comparable level over time, by themselves they cannot satisfyingly explain when conflict will break out. Explanations for specific occurrences have been changes in enabling factors, that augmented Pakistani false optimism in starting the various conflicts. In the Indo-Pakistani conflict three enabling factors have been discussed: (III) particular power asymmetry, (IV) domestic power structures, and, (V) great power involvement. So, I argue that it is not just the presence of enabling factors, but also a significant change in one of these that will cause Indo-Pakistani conflict to occur. Mainly, this has been change in Pakistan's domestic power structure. This

is a clear indication that there is no reason to believe that nuclear weapons have had an explanatory role in Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. No obvious shift in conflict characteristics has been observed after entering the nuclear era either.

### Recommendations

In the discussion, I have identified the following arguments that could improve future analysis of Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. First, reduce the existing overlap in the analysis between the enabling factors by improving their definitions, starting from Paul's (1994) four conditions of factor (III) particular power asymmetry (as described in paragraph 4.5). This will especially improve the analysis of change related aspects of the enabling factors. Second, further investigate the possible impact of nuclear weapons on the enabling factors, especially on (III) particular power asymmetry, as nuclear weapons could bridge power asymmetry. Third, further examine to what extent the presence of nuclear weapons has changed the character of the conflicts as listed in Table 2, thereby identifying whether the type of the conflicts has changed. Four, within this thesis and based on empirical evidence, the levels of the driving factors are assessed to be comparable over time. It would be valuable to confirm this by a further detailed study on the driving factors. Implementing these recommendations would bring refinements into my analysis of Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence, which, in turn, might provide stakeholders with some instruments to prevent conflict from re-occurring between India and Pakistan in the future.

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