The sustainability of negotiated settlements:
The exclusion of provisions on women as an impediment to peace.

Jessy Hendriks
Leiden University
s2332035
jessy.hendriks.7@umail.leidenuniv.nl

First reader/supervisor
Dr. R. van der Haer
r.van.der.haer@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

Second reader
Dr. C. Jentzsch
c.jentzsch@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

Universiteit
Leiden

Abstract - Many conflicts that end in a peace agreement recur as a result of the agreement breaking down. Most of the literature on how we can increase the likelihood of an agreement to be sustained has emphasized the resolution of security concerns between warring parties, causing it to overlook the importance of the social requisites to peacebuilding such as including civil society and addressing its needs post-conflict. An especially important part of civil society that is essential to improving the social requisites of peacebuilding but has been long overlooked, is women. In this thesis, I thus established a link between addressing women, their rights, and inclusion in peace agreements and the likelihood that a peace agreement will be sustained. Even though I was not able to find support for this link in my thesis, I argue that the mechanisms by which women influence the likelihood of a peace agreement to be sustained still stand, but that they are hard to measure due to failure of implementation. Through safeguarding women's physical security, employing them as a source of domestic capacity and creating a more gender equal post-conflict society, the prospects for peace still have a chance of improving. However, more research is needed to confirm this.

Introduction

Roughly a third of all armed conflicts after 1989 have ended through a peace agreement[1] at some point (Kreutz, 2010). However, approximately half of these agreements break down after some time, and opposing sides return to violence (Kreutz, 2010). Fortunately, the issue of how to prevent states from relapsing into conflict is a high priority in policymaking and academics alike (Elbadawi et al., 2008). Many scholars have focussed their research on determining factors that could improve the likelihood of negotiated settlements to be sustained[2] and conflict recurrence to be prevented (e.g. Walter, 1997; Fortna, 2003; 2004; DeRouen et al., 2009; Nilsson, 2012). We generally identify two strands of research which are taken into account when conducting such research: literature on conflict recurrence in general (i.e. regardless of whether or not a negotiated settlement was signed) and

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[1] As Bell & O'Rourke (2010) state, there is no clear definition of peace agreements. Rather, it is a term that signals a certain agreement, or settlement, between parties to an armed conflict (Bell & O'Rourke, 2010). In line with Bell & O'Rourke (2010), I here broadly define a peace agreement as a document that is produced as a result of the negotiations between at least two parties to an armed conflict with the intention of ending it. Like Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) I will use the term interchangeably with the term negotiated settlement.
[2] As will be explained later in my method section, I define peace agreement sustainability as the remaining absence of conflict.

literature on conflict recurrence after a negotiated settlement is signed (i.e. agreement sustainability) (e.g. Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell et al., 2001; Fortna, 2003). Existing literature on the former already identifies several external factors[3] such as the pre-conflict regime type of a state, the nature of the conflict or the length of the conflict to be influential in predicting whether or not peace is likely to last [4] (e.g. Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell et al., 2001). Research on the latter has focused more on how including certain provisions in a settlement could improve the likelihood of it being sustained (e.g. Fortna, 2003; Nilsson, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Joshi & Mason, 2011).

However, much of this literature has emphasized the resolution of security concerns between warring parties, causing it to overlook the importance of the social requisites to peacebuilding[5] such as including civil society and addressing its needs post-conflict (McKeon, 2004; Belloni, 2001; Gizelis, 2009). To this end, scholars increasingly argue that civil society is essential in legitimizing peace processes, successful democratization and increasing levels of economic development (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Bell & O'Rourke, 2007; Gizelis, 2009). All of which are crucial to sustaining negotiated settlements as well (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007). Moreover, scholars argue for the importance of a focus on social requisites of peacebuilding such as supporting health and education initiatives, as this would increase the likelihood that a peace agreement is sustainable (Gizelis, 2009; 2011). Even so, there remains a body of actors within civil society which is known to facilitate the post-conflict peacebuilding process through their many grassroots organizations and initiatives that focus on the social requisites of peacebuilding, but are still often overlooked: women (Gizelis, 2009). Women, as a part of civil society, are generally believed to lay high emphasis on these social requisites and scholars increasingly point towards their importance both during peace negotiations and after a peace agreement is signed (Nakaya, 2003; Porter, 2003; Gizelis, 2009; 2011; Bell, 2018). Previous research suggests several ways in which addressing women, their inclusions and their rights in peace

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[3] I define external factors as the conditions that surround the signing of a peace agreement.

[4] It is generally accepted that factors that influence the likelihood of conflict recurrence (i.e. when peace does not last) in general will also affect the likelihood that a negotiated settlement will be sustained. Therefore these factors are discussed in this thesis as well (DeRouen et al., 2010).

[5] By peacebuilding, peacebuilding activities and the peacebuilding process I mean all efforts, by any actor, that are made to facilitate post-conflict peace.

agreements could increase the likelihood that the agreement will be sustained (Bell, 2006; Gizelis, 2009; 2011; Arostegui, 2013). Ní Aoláin et al. (2011), for example, argue that including women and women's issues in peace agreements is not only beneficial to the women themselves, but also to the entire peacebuilding process. The opposite is also true: A lack of attention to women in constitutional texts such as peace agreements is of great influence on what happens in practice and thus endangers women's status and equality in society (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011; Demeritt et al., 2014). This is detrimental to sustaining a peace agreement (Melander, 2005a; 2005b).

In spite of all this, women are still often excluded from the peace process in practice and have been overlooked for a long time in research as well (Krause et al., 2018). Over the past two decades, however, scholars have increasingly started to focus their attention to this topic, arguing that women actively participate in the post-conflict peace and reconciliation processes (Porter, 2003; Melander, 2005a; 2005b; Gizelis, 2009; 2011). Yet, their studies generally do not focus on the actual peace agreements and their contents (Ellerby, 2013). Rather, they lay emphasis on topics such as the influence of women's grassroots organizations on the likelihood that peacekeeping operations will succeed (e.g. Gizelis, 2009) or the negative effects of excluding women from the negotiating table on peace (e.g. Porter, 2003). As Bell & O'Rourke (2010) state: "Even where strong gender provisions are conceded, the relationship between peace agreement text, implementation of its provisions and durable peace, remains largely unknown" (Bell & O'Rourke, 2010: 948-949). To this date, the influence of addressing women's rights and their inclusion in a peace agreement on the likelihood that such an agreement is sustainable, has not been tested nor has it received any empirical backing (Nakaya, 2003; Bell & O'Rourke, 2010; Krause et al., 2018). Without knowledge about how women influence an agreement's sustainability after it is signed, their legitimacy and relevance as actors in post-conflict societies will remain questioned and their access to resources in peacebuilding activities will be unnecessarily limited (Ellerby, 2013). This lack of systematic evidence thus poses real consequences for women in post-conflict situations and not studying provisions on women in negotiated settlements affects their position and security post-conflict (Ellerby, 2013). Improving their

position and security is therefore important as existing literature seems to point toward the notion that women are essential in sustaining peace agreements[6].

In this thesis, I will therefore carry out the first large-N quantitative analysis of the influence of provisions on women on the sustainability of negotiated settlements. I hereby ask the question *'How does including provisions on women in peace agreements affect the likelihood that this agreement will be sustained?'*. In line with several scholars, I will argue that peace agreements form 'road maps' for subsequent peacebuilding activities; determining priorities, violations and resource allocation for the entire peace process that follows (Bell, 2006; Bell & O'Rourke, 2010; Ellerby, 2013). I further argue that including provisions on women therefore has an impact on the sustainability of a peace agreement because it improves women's physical security, enhances domestic capacity and increases gender equality in a post-conflict society.

I will structure this thesis as follows: In the first section, I will review the existing literature on the sustainability of negotiated settlements and which factors affect it. After that, I will identify and outline several mechanisms by which including provisions on women in an agreement affects its sustainability. Subsequently, I will explain my methods, analyse the data and describe the results that they produce. Finally, I will end with a discussion of the found results.

Literature review

The very nature of war causes distrust between warring parties and makes it hard to keep parties to their agreements - as one side will always be afraid that the other side reneges (Walter, 1997). The likelihood that a peace agreement is sustainable is therefore greatly affected by problems of commitment between the opposing parties to the agreement (Walter, 1997; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; DeRouen et al., 2010; McBride et al., 2011; Joshi, 2013). The 'commitment problem', as Svensson (2007) elaborates, is a major obstacle to the negotiated settlement of conflict. He argues that there

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[6] As discussed in the previous paragraph and at the beginning of this paragraph, women are found to be active participants in post-conflict peace and reconciliation processes and seem to have great influence on whether or not a negotiated settlement will be sustained. These arguments will be more extensively discussed in the theory section of this thesis.

exists a time-inconsistency problem where future possibilities for exploitation of the agreement form an impediment to credibly commit to a mutually beneficial deal even if all warring parties prefer to settle the conflict rather than continue fighting. However, several scholars have identified mechanisms by which the effects of mutual distrust can be mitigated and thus peace agreements become more sustainable (Fortna, 2004; Richmond, 2004; Svensson, 2007; Walter, 2010). Generally, we identify two strands of literature that deal with peace agreement sustainability. The first includes research on the circumstances under which settlements are signed, which generally looks at external factors that influence peace agreement sustainability (Arnault, 2006; Svensson 2007; Ruggeri et al., 2016). The second strand of research focuses on the content of the agreement itself and looks at how certain provisions in it influence its likelihood to be sustained (Hartzell et al., 2001; Fortna, 2003).

External factors that influence agreement sustainability

The first of the external factors that can positively influence the likelihood that a negotiated settlement will be sustained, is third party mediation. Several scholars argue that having a credible third party guarantee that the agreement will be enforced, will increase the likelihood that this agreement is sustained (Walter, 1997; Arnault, 2006; Svensson, 2007). This is because the third-party guarantor can foster trust between parties, ensuring them that both sides stick to the agreement and implementing mechanisms that help reach a favorable outcome (Svensson, 2007). A third party can also ensure that the costs of reneging on the agreement outweigh the benefits as the side that reneges will not only face retaliation from their existing opponent, but now also faces sanctions from the third party guarantor (Walter, 1997). Therefore, it makes parties to the agreement less likely to abandon it and thus improves the likelihood of the agreement to be sustained (Walter, 1997). It is important to note, however, that all of this only works if the said third party is able and willing to put pressure on both of the fighting sides (Arnault, 2006).

Second, specifically employing peacekeeping operations (PKOs) as a third party to uphold an agreement post-conflict is found to increase the likelihood a negotiated settlement is sustained.

Scholars have found PKOs to promote democratic processes and institutions (Joshi, 2013), provide aid in implementing peace agreements (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000) and reduce violent encounters between former enemy factions (Ruggeri et al., 2016). Essentially, Ruggeri et al. (2016) argue, peacekeepers commit parties to the peace processes outlined in an agreement and force them to resolve their incompatibility. Thus, scholars find, the presence of international peacekeeping forces improves chances that a peace agreements will last (e.g. Fortna, 2004). However, Sambanis (2008) found that the positive effects of UN peacekeeping operations in the short-term may wane over time as peacekeepers leave.

Third, DeRouen et al. (2010) argue that state capacity plays an important role in sustaining a peace agreement. They argue it is likely that conflict recurs after a negotiated settlement due to the weakness of a state and its subsequent failure to implement agreement provisions. In line with Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), they link this to a state's capability to generate revenue streams to fund the implementation process and argue that higher rates of economic development within a state positively influences the likelihood that agreement provisions are implemented and thus that the agreement is sustained (DeRouen et al., 2010). Lastly, Hartzell et al. (2001) and Doyle & Sambanis (2000) have found that the stakes in conflict of identity are higher and more divisive, thus making it harder to sustain a settlement following such a conflict.

Agreement provisions and sustainability

Many scholars argue that negotiated settlements are more likely to be sustainable if certain provisions are included in it (Hartzell et al., 2001; Fortna, 2003; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Joshi & Mason, 2011). First of all, Hartzell et al. (2001) find that negotiated settlements are more likely to last if they include provisions on territorial autonomy. They argue that it suggests a compromise between parties as the group that fears for its security prefers independence or sovereignty whereas public officials prefer to strengthen political power at the center. However, it does not necessarily only work when negotiated settlements follow secessionist conflict (Hartzell et

al., 2001). Territorial autonomy provisions can also serve to reassure rebel parties as they limit political power at the center through giving some of that power to subunits of the state or a means of bringing about political stability by offering concessions to rebel movements (Hartzell et al., 2001; Cederman et al., 2013). Both of these are beneficial to the sustainability of a peace agreement (Hartzell et al., 2001; Cederman et al., 2013).

Second, several scholars argue that the likelihood of a settlement to be sustained increases when power-sharing provisions are included in it (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Nilsson, 2008). Mattes & Savun (2009) differentiate between political, territorial, military and economic power-sharing provisions. Their findings indicate that only the political has a significant positive effect on agreement sustainability whereas the others are not significant factors. These findings are based on the premise that power-sharing provisions reduce fear among belligerents and thus decrease the chances of either side reneging on the agreement (Mattes & Savun, 2009). Conversely, DeRouen et al. (2009) and Martin (2013) found that political power-sharing arrangements are actually negatively related with agreement sustainability, whereas military and territorial power-sharing provisions were found to increase its sustainability. They argue that former enemies often do not desire to accommodate each other's interests and how power-sharing can provoke insecurity among hardline factions on either side (Martin, 2013). Consequently, consensus on the specific effects of power-sharing provisions has yet to be reached.

Third, peace agreements that include provisions on the inclusion and involvement of civil society[7] are believed to improve the likelihood that the agreement is sustained (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007). It is argued that including such provisions commits the involved parties to encouraging and supporting civil society development activities post-conflict and calls for the involvement of local community representatives in peacebuilding processes (Belloni, 2001; Bell & O'Rourke, 2007). This matters because civil society - especially at the local level - is essential in mobilizing support for an

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[7] There are many definitions that can be used to describe civil society. In this context, however, I follow Bell & O'Rourke (2007) and I define civil society as the a channel that is necessary in providing basic services when governments fail to do to either out of unwillingness or out of incapacity. (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007). This channel can consist of organizations, collectives and/or individuals who are representative of group interests (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007).

agreement through, for example, the organization of intercommunity meetings or creation of grassroots organizations that help monitor and support goals outlined in the agreement (Belloni, 2001; Bell & O'Rourke, 2007; Nilsson, 2012). Civil society can thus increase agreement legitimacy through generating broader acceptance of it and, in turn, increase the likelihood that the agreement is sustained (Belloni, 2001; McKeon, 2004; Bell & O'Rourke, 2007). Furthermore, peace processes that include local development activities (i.e. activities organized and supported by civil society) instead of being merely top-down are thought to produce more stable outcomes in general, therefore also increasing the likelihood that a settlement is sustained (Nilsson, 2012).

Drawing on the civil society literature, many scholars argue that women, as a part of civil society, are particularly important actors in post-conflict peace processes despite the variation in experiences they have during conflict (Karam, 2000; Caprioli, 2003; Gizelis, 2009; 2011; Nilsson, 2012; Arostegui, 2013; Bell, 2018; Suteu & Bell, 2018). They are known to organize into grassroots organizations to end violence and to facilitate reconstruction processes (Gizelis, 2009) and to become activists and advocates for peace (Arostegui, 2013). Moreover, the importance of including women in the peace process was stipulated in 2000 with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (United Nations Security Council, 2000). This resolution called for the strengthened protection of women against sexual violence in post-conflict areas, and for the full and equal participation of women during conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes (United Nations, 2000). However, to this date there still exists a lack of in-depth systematic research on women's participation in the peace process (Krause et al., 2018). Plausibly, this is due to the general emphasis put on security in post-conflict reconstruction while civil society actors, such as women and the organizations they establish, are generally not acknowledged as being relevant (Gizelis, 2009). Nevertheless, addressing questions of exactly how women's inclusion and participation influences post-conflict peace is important as this can provide the international community with opportunities to increase the effectiveness of how conflicts are currently settled (Porter, 2003; Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011).

Theory

I base my argumentation on the premise that negotiated settlements form the basis for further peacebuilding activities (Bell, 2006). Agreements are 'road maps' for peace processes as they outline which interests and concerns will be prioritized and which rules are applied in the post-conflict society (Bell, 2006). They also influence security practices, such as what is considered security, who the relevant actors and legitimate parties in peace processes are, and who gets access to which resources and for what cause (Ellerby, 2013). As such, peace agreements strongly influence the many goals, priorities, funding flows, and socio-economic, political and institutional reforms post-conflict (Bell, 2006; Bell & O'Rourke, 2010; Ellerby, 2013). I therefore argue that there are three reasons why including provisions on women in negotiated settlements improves the likelihood that it is sustained: it increases (1) women's physical security, (2) state capacity, and (3) gender equality.

Physical (in)security

Women are affected by conflict and the aftermath of it in different ways than men are (Porter, 2003). They often fall victim to gender-based violence (GBV)[8] during conflict and similar patterns of GBV frequently persists after the conflict ends (Chinkin, 2004; Manjoo & McRaith, 2010). This can result in a breakdown of community norms or break morality, but may also create an atmosphere of fear among the population and therefore poses a threat to successful peacebuilding (Manjoo & McRaith, 2010). If these issues are not properly addressed in the peace agreement that ends the conflict, this can decrease the likelihood of it being sustained as it detracts from three factors that are essential in achieving sustainable peace: social stability, economic recovery, and effective state authority (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010; Manjoo & McRaith, 2010). These three factors are explained below.

First of all, GBV and especially sexual violence ravages families both during and after conflict (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010; Manjoo & McRaith, 2010). It confuses bloodlines and inheritances, and leaves children orphaned because they were born as a result of rape or forced impregnation and

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[8] Gender-based violence consists of acts that are violent and publicly humiliating (Manjoo & McRaith, 2010). They include, but are not limited to sexual slavery, rape, unnecessary strip searches, forced nudity and forced impregnation (Manjoo & McRaith, 2010).

were therefore outcast (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010; Guterres, 2018). But it can also pose a health threat to society when sexually transmitted disease such as HIV are widespread (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010). When these issues are not dealt with properly post-conflict in formal institutions, this detracts from social stability and can adversely influence a society's ability to rebuild (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010; Guterres, 2018). Second, women are often important actors in the agricultural market; in many instances the key economic sector in societies ravaged by GBV (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010). Their willingness and ability to go out and engage in these economic activities, however, is largely dependent on measures that ensure their security against GBV (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010). If no such measures are specified in an agreement, women may be afraid or reluctant to participate in economic activities themselves or even let their daughters go to school (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010). Third, not addressing sexual violence in a peace agreement and thus failing to end impunity for those who commit it will cause a degree of delegitimation of the agreement and consequently undermine the authority of actors who seek to implement it, like the state (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010).

Moreover, provisions on women's physical (in)security can be used as leveraging material by advocacy groups to end GBV (Arostegui, 2013; Irvine, 2013). Having such leverage eases the implementation of post-conflict responses to GBV and thus can more rapidly improve women's physical security (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010; Irvine, 2013). Adding such provisions in an agreement therefore increases the likelihood that it is sustained, as it focuses attention on actions that constitute a violation of the agreement and ensures that these violations are monitored (Bell & O'Rourke, 2010; Jenkins & Goetz, 2010; Bell, 2013). This then ends the impunity that those who commit or condone GBV enjoy and so increases agreement legitimacy and thus also the likelihood that it is sustained.

State capacity

Women are increasingly recognized as active agents who fulfill many tasks and different roles both during and after conflict (Karam, 2000; Arostegui, 2013). The experiences they gain in times of conflict enable them to achieve long-term improvements in their position and status post-conflict

(Arostegui, 2013). Furthermore, previous research has shown that a relatively higher status of women in post-conflict societies reflects a dimension of state capacity[9] that is not captured by measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Hughes, 2001; Caprioli, 2003; Gizelis, 2009; 2011). Gizelis (2009), for example, argues that women's status reflects the existence of distinct social networks within society that a state can capitalize on in order to improve prospects of successful peacebuilding. This is because women often organize themselves into grassroots organizations to provide support for their communities, and tend to lay relatively high emphasis on the social requisites of peacebuilding such as improving health, education and equality instead of improving economic performance and wealth (Nakaya, 2003; Porter, 2003; Gizelis, 2009). These kind of activities foster interpersonal trust and reciprocity, build bridges across societal cleavages, and increase collaboration and solidarity within communities (Westermann et al., 2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2006; Gizelis, 2009). All of which has been proven fundamental to facilitating long-term peace and reconciliation at the community level (Karam, 2000; Porter, 2003; Gizelis, 2009; Bell, 2013; Arostegui, 2013).

Consequently, women's grassroots organizations have the ability to supplement and partially substitute formal institutions that were destroyed during conflict and as such, reflect a dimension of state capacity different from GDP (Pouligny, 1999; Belloni, 2001). This, in turn, is important when it comes to implementing peace agreement provisions and to sustaining settlements (DeRouen et al., 2010). However, if not properly addressed in a peace agreement, these grassroots activities are often overlooked (Porter, 2003; Gizelis, 2009). As mentioned before, peace agreements determine priorities and funding flows for the subsequent peacebuilding activities (Bell, 2006; Bell & O'Rourke, 2010; Ellerby, 2013). Therefore, I argue it is plausible that without proper agreement provisions on how women's grassroots activities can be employed to support the peacebuilding process, they will remain unincorporated in the peace process and thus miss out on important funding as their goals are not prioritized in the agreement (Bell, 2004). On the other hand, when such provisions are included, these

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[9] State capacity here is broadly defined as a state's ability to mobilize resources in order to reach its goals (Gizelis, 2009).

may facilitate the work of women's grassroots organizations and as such increase the likelihood the agreement is sustained.

Gender equality

Addressing gender equality in peace agreements is also important because it impacts women's inclusion as individuals in post-conflict society itself (Bell & O'Rourke, 2010). Moreover, it affects their ability to participate in public life and the way their roles are viewed (Arostegui, 2013). When gender equality is addressed in an agreement through, for example, provisions on gender quotas in government or granting women the right to hold property, this forms the basis for implementation of these measures (Nakaya, 2003). Furthermore, Nakaya (2003) argues, it is important to address issues of equality at the right from the beginning of the reconstruction processes. If this is not done, persistent and unaddressed inequalities will be institutionalized and it will become very hard to accomplish change in this area at a later stage (Nakaya, 2003). There are three reasons why it is important to aim for a more equal post-conflict society in a peace agreement. For one, societies that are more gender-equal tend to enjoy lower levels of intrastate armed conflict and less state sponsored human rights abuses (Melander, 2005a; 2005b). Also, for peacebuilding to be legitimate and sustainable, an inclusive process that entails full participation from all parts of society is required (Karam, 2000; Porter, 2003; Nakaya, 2003; Arostegui, 2013). Finally, chances of relapsing into conflict decrease when women are equally included and represented in the post-conflict social and political society (Demeritt et al., 2014). All of these arguments are supportive of the idea that agreements are more likely to be sustainable when they include provisions on gender equality. Given the aforementioned three considerations of why addressing women in peace agreements would increase the likelihood that an agreement is sustained, the following hypothesis is formulated:

> *H1: Negotiated settlements that include any mention of provisions on women will more likely*
>
> *be sustainable.*

Data and method

To explore the influence of addressing women's rights, their inclusion and participation in negotiated settlements on the likelihood this settlement will be sustained, I analyze 157 peace agreements and ceasefires in 54 armed conflicts from 1990 to 2011. This sample covers all settlements that were signed by at least two primary opposing parties to a conflict within the given timeframe and that were signed either with the intention of solving the dispute, regulating it, or outlining a process to solve it (Högbladh, 2012). The unit of analysis is the negotiated settlement itself.

Peace agreement sustainability

The dependent variable in this thesis is peace agreement sustainability. To determine which negotiated settlements have been signed between 1990 and 2011, I use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset (Petterson et al., 2019). In line with Doyle & Sambanis (2000) and Gizelis (2009; 2011), I define a settlement as sustained if conflict remains absent after the settlement is signed.[10] Both studies use two dichotomous variables as thresholds to measure this; a lenient one for conflicts that recur within two years and a strict one for conflict that recur within five years after signing. In order to identify whether or not peace agreements broke down (i.e. were followed by a recurrence of conflict), I use the definition of an armed conflict as stated by Gleditsch et al. (2002). They describe an armed conflict as "...a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calender-year [sic]." (Gleditsch et al, 2002: 618-619). Therefore, a conflict is considered to recur if it meets the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in any calendar-year after the peace agreement is signed within the given timeframe of, respectively, two or five years. Data on recurrence is derived from the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz, 2010) and negotiated settlements are coded as 1 if they broke down and 0 if they were sustained. Exactly 83 (48,5%) settlements in the dataset broke down within two years, and 101

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[10] In this thesis I thus use the term conflict recurrence to describe the phenomenon of a peace agreement breaking down (i.e. it not being sustainable).

(59,1%) broke down within five years. Because the dependent variable in this thesis is dichotomous, I will use a logistic regression analysis to predict the influence of addressing women in peace agreements on the likelihood that this agreement will be sustained.

Provisions on women

My main independent variable in this thesis is provisions on women in peace agreements. Data on whether peace agreements contained provisions on women is taken from the PA-X Peace Agreement Dataset (PA-X, 2018). A peace agreement is coded as including provisions on women if any of the provisions in it contain specific references to women or their inclusion and rights (Bell et al., 2018). More specifically, this binary variable takes the value of 1 if a negotiated settlement contains any reference to "...girls, widows, mothers, sexual violence (or forms thereof), gender violence, UNSC[R] 1325 or CEDAW [The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women], lactating women." (Bell et al., 2018: 19). If an agreement does not contain any such references, it is coded as 0. After having coded all agreements in the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset using the information mentioned above, 62 (36,3%) settlements contained any provision mentioning women, their inclusion or their rights, whereas 109 (63,7%) did not.

Control variables

Eight control variables are also included in the analysis. Five variables are included to control for external factors and three to control for the effects of other agreement provisions. First, several scholars argue that the security concerns and stakes of warring parties are higher and more divisive in *identity conflicts* (i.e. religious, ethnic, linguistic or racial conflicts) thus making settlements less likely to be sustainable (Licklider, 1993; Kaufmann, 1996). I use two dichotomous variables; ethnic incompatibility and religious incompatibility, to identify whether a conflict was about identity. Data on ethnic incompatibility is taken from the ACD2EPR dataset[11] and coded as 1 if any party to the

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[11] This is a dataset that links the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset to Ethnic Power Relations data (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012).

conflict has made any exclusive claim to fight for an ethnic group in the year that the peace agreement was signed or in the last active conflict year preceding the agreement (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). Data on religious incompatibility is taken from the Religious and Armed Conflict Dataset (Svensson & Nilsson, 2018) and coded as 1 if there was any religious component to the incompatibility that was fought over in the year that the agreement was signed or the last active conflict year preceding the agreement.

Second, higher *conflict intensity* is thought to be correlated with lower chances of achieving sustainable peace agreements, as the high human costs of the conflict inflicts 'socio-psychological' barriers such as greater feelings of insecurity and mistrust (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; DeRouen & Bercovitch, 2008; Hartzell et al., 2001). Therefore, using the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010), I coded a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a conflict was classified as a war (i.e. exceeding 999 battle-related deaths in a given conflict-year) and 0 otherwise.

Third, rebels who are debating whether to (re)commit to fighting have higher opportunity costs to consider in developed countries and thus are less likely to choose to start or resume fighting (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Higher state capacity is also generally thought to be associated lower risk of civil war onset (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Therefore, I included *real GDP per capita* as a measure for development and state capacity coded from Gleditch's (2011) GDP and population data.

Fourth, *conflicts over territory* are more likely to remerge as the side that lost territory when the conflict ended has an incentive to win it back whereas the winning side might want to claim even more territory (Fortna, 2003). This situation, Fortna (2003) argues, causes a tense atmosphere of mistrust in which either side is particularly wary of possible attacks and small clashes can escalate quickly into renewed violence. Therefore, using the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010), I coded a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if (part of) the incompatibility of the conflict was over territory.

Fifth, as discussed in the literature chapter of this thesis, GBV and especially *sexual violence* are generally believed to adversely affect the peacebuilding process (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010; Manjoo

& McRaith, 2010). Sexual violence during conflict may cause long term psychological trauma that affects the post-conflict period (Manjoo & McRaith, 2010). Sexual violence that takes place post-conflict may negatively impact social stability, economic recovery and effective state authority (Jenkins & Goetz, 2010). Therefore, a variable on sexual violence is included in the analysis. Data on this is taken from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Dataset (Cohen & Nordås, 2013). The variable takes the value of 1 if sexual violence was perpetrated by any of the warring parties[12], either during the conflict itself or within five years after the peace agreement was signed, and if at least two sources reported this[13].

Sixth, as discussed in the literature review chapter of this thesis, several agreement provisions have been found to increase the likelihood of a peace agreement to be sustained such as *political power-sharing provisions* (Mattes & Savun, 2009), *military power-sharing provisions* and *territorial power-sharing* provisions (DeRouen et al., 2009; Martin, 2013). I thus included three variables from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Petterson et al., 2019) that are coded as 1 if an agreement contained any provisions on, respectively, political, military or territorial power-sharing.

Seventh, provisions on the *presence of a third party*, either as a signee/guarantor to the agreements or as a (UN) peacekeeping operation, have been found to increase the likelihood that a peace agreement is sustained (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Svensson, 2007; Joshi, 2013; Ruggeri et al., 2016). Two measures for this are therefore included in the analysis. One takes the value 1 if the agreement was signed or mediated by a third part. The other takes the value of one if the agreement provided for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. Data on this was taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh, 2012; Petterson et al., 2019).

Eighth and last, Mattes and Savun (2009) argue that one major concern when testing the effects of any peace agreement provision is whether or not the agreement was actually implemented. They argue that provisions that are especially prone to *implementation failure* are those that are

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[12] Variable is only coded as 1 if sexual violence prevalence was coded 2 or higher in the SVAC data set. This means it was reported to be commonplace, recurring, widespread or systematic (Cohen & Nordås, 2013).
[13] SVAC looks at three sources of sexual violence reporting; the state, amnesty international or human rights watch (Cohen & Nordås, 2013).

usually not set up the moment an agreement is signed, but are more often put in the agreement as plans to be implemented at a later stage. Due to this time-inconsistency there is a greater possibility that these provisions are not actually implemented (Mattes & Savun, 2009). I argue that the same could be true for provisions on women's inclusion and rights. This effect is measured by using the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset, which includes a variable for implementation failure (Petterson et al., 2019). An agreement is coded as 1 if agreement implementation failed. This means that the validity of the agreement was contested by one or more parties that signed the agreement. Withdrawal from the agreement by one or more parties is also considered failure (Högbladh, 2012). In Table 1, an overview of all variables included in the analysis is given.

Table 1: Descriptives

	N	Min.	Max.	Std. Deviation
Recurrence within 2 years	171	0	1	,501
Recurrence within 5 years	171	0	1	,493
Provisions on women	171	0	1	,482
Religious incompatibility	171	0	1	,428
Ethnic incompatibility	160	0	1	,401
Intensity >999	171	0	1	,342
Real GDP/capita (divided by 100)	167	1,33	268,62	50,715
Conflict over territory	168	0	1	,427
Sexual violence prevalence	170	0	1	,469
Shared government provisions	171	0	1	,336
Military provisions	171	0	1	,468
Territorial provisions	171	0	1	,477
3rd party signee	171	0	1	,376
PKO	171	0	1	,405
Implementation failure	171	0	1	,445
Valid N (listwise)	157			

Analysis and results

My empirical analysis begins with running six logistic regression models, three for my lenient measure of conflict recurrence within two years and three for my strict measure of conflict recurrence within five years. The results of the analyses are presented in Table 2. Variables that have regression coefficients greater than 0 - positive - increase the likelihood of conflict recurring (i.e. the peace

agreement breaking down) and variables with regression coefficients smaller than 0 - negative - decrease the likelihood of conflict recurring (i.e. increase the likelihood that the agreement is sustained). Drawing on previous literature on women and peace agreements, my hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between including provisions on women in an agreement and the likelihood of that agreement being sustained. I have estimated several models to test this hypothesis.

In Table 2, Models 1 and 4 show positive, but not significant results if only the main independent variable is included in the analysis without adding control variables. When control variables are added, as is done in Models 3 and 6, these Models as a whole become significant[14], but my main independent variable remains not significant and gives mixed results (i.e. Model 3 shows a positive result and Model 6 negative). Models 2 and 4 only include the control variables, and are also highly significant. Therefore, it is probable that the significance of Models 3 and 6 is explained by the control variables while my main independent variable, provisions on women, remains insignificant. As a consequence, the results of my analyses lend no definitive support for my hypothesis. This finding is quite surprising, as the existing literature on the topic would suggest a significant positive relationship between my independent and dependent variable (Porter, 2003; Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002; Gizelis, 2009; 2011; Ní Aoláin et al., 2011). There are three possible explanations for this outcome.

First of all, there is a need to address problems regarding definitions and accountability in peace agreements (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007). There exists a difficulty in defining which exact groups should be granted the rights outlined in peace agreement provisions on civil society - thus also on women - as groups within this category may constantly shift, disband or emerge (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007). The same is true for any domestic (human rights) organization in the post-agreement phase (Bell & Keenan, 2004). As a result, these problems of definition can undermine the intended role for women's human rights organizations in the post-conflict peace process (Bell & Keenan, 2004). Second, and relating to the previous point, there is a chance that provisions on women were not implemented after an agreement was signed and therefore the effects cannot be measured (Mattes &

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[14] When looking at the significance of the Chi-squares in all models, only those that include the control variables are significant.

Table 2: The influence of provisions on women on agreement sustainability

	Model 1 Recurrence within 2 years	*Model 2* Recurrence within 2 years	*Model 3* Recurrence within 2 years	*Model 4* Recurrence within 2 years	*Model 5* Recurrence within 5 years	*Model 6* Recurrence within 5 years
Provisions on women	,397 (,320)		,643 (,466)	,040 (,324)		-,033 (,446)
Religious incompatibility		2,191*** (,680)	2,182*** (,681)		1,428** (,619)	1,430** (,630)
Ethnic incompatibility		-,729 (,524)	-,773 (,515)		-,006 (,514)	-,005 (,515)
Intensity >999		1,560** (,760)	1,585** (,759)		,795 (,702)	,783 (,703)
Real GDP/capita		,013** (,005)	,013** (,005)		,012** (,005)	,012** (,005)
Conflict over territory		,845 (,747)	,972 (,759)		,700 (,707)	,694 (,711)
Sexual violence prevalence		,224 (,535)	,055 (,550)		,420 (,525)	,429 (,538)
Shared gov. provisions		1,588** (,640)	1,617** (,649)		1,351** (,658)	1,354** (,659)
Military provisions		-,731 (,479)	-,800 (,491)		-,257 (,460)	-,255 (,461)
Territorial provisions		-,2,435*** (,700)	-2,682*** (,735)		-2,401*** (,638)	-2,392*** (,650)
3rd party signee		,173 (,593)	,151 (,600)		-,057 (,557)	-,055 (,557)
Peacekeeping operation		-,510 (,566)	-,465 (,569)		-,469 (,540)	-,471 (,541)
Implementation failure		1,425*** (,478)	1,427*** (,486)		1,114** (,471)	1,115** (,471)
Constant	-,203 (,193)	-,050 (,682)	-,102 (,686)	,354* (,195)	,143 (,658)	,145 (658)
-2 Log likelihood	235,363	157,200	155,265	231,390	165,808	165,803
Chi-square	1,547	60,441***	62,376***	,015	43,971***	43,977***
Nagelkerke's R^2	,012	,426	,437	,000	,331	,331
N	171	157	157	171	157	157

Note: Binary regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01

Savun, 2009). As Nakaya (2003) points out, women in post-conflict societies continue to be marginalized and discriminated against even if there are agreements in place that should prevent this. She names, for example, the case of Kosovo, where only 8.2% of the electorate is female while quotas stipulate this number has to be as high as 30%. Table 2 provides support for this argument, as there is a very significant and strong positive relation between the failure of agreement implementation and the recurrence of conflict (i.e. the agreement not being sustained) in all four models that include control variables. The fact that agreement provisions might not be implemented at all could explain why no significant results for the effect of provisions on women on peace agreement sustainability was found. Third, and again related to points one and two, the PA-X Peace Agreement Dataset is an important addition to research on negotiated settlements and opens research on peace agreements up to many new possibilities. However, when it comes to the coding of provisions on women, the data may lack specificity. Agreements are coded to include provisions on women if there is any mention of women or conflict issues specific to women.[15] However, this could mean that women are mentioned, but agreement provisions did not elaborate or specify exact measures to provide for women and therefore making implementation more difficult. Such mentions would still be coded as 1 while no concrete actions are provided for to achieve what is stated in the agreement.

Furthermore, I included several control variables in the analysis. Some of these report interesting results that I will discuss here. First, Table 2 shows the effect of conflict intensity is strong, positive and significant for the two year measure of conflict recurrence. However, it loses its significance in the models estimating its effects for the five year measure. This means that in the first two years after an agreement is signed, the likelihood of this agreement breaking down increases if it concludes a conflict of high intensity. This is partially consistent with existing literature, as several scholars argue that conflicts of high intensity generate greater feelings of mistrust and insecurity, which makes it harder to sustain a settlement (e.g. Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; DeRouen & Bercovitch, 2008; Hartzell et al., 2001). However, the results presented here indicate that these effects wane over time. Second, Table 2 also suggests that states with higher GDP per capita - here used as an indicator

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[15] See method section of this thesis and Bell et al. (2018, p. 19)

of higher levels of development and state capacity - are slightly more likely to see a negotiated settlement break down. This is counterintuitive as existing literature suggests the opposite (e.g. DeRouen et al., 2010). Possibly, this effect is due to the way data on GDP per capita was coded and/or analyzed. This analysis has included a 'snapshot' of a state's GDP per capita at the time an agreement was signed, but has not looked at how GDP per capita has developed during the 2 or 5 years post-conflict measured here. If GDP per capita within a state had been decreasing before an agreement was signed and continued to decrease afterwards, this could signal a higher likelihood of an agreement breaking down that was not captured here. The opposite is also true, if GDP per capita was increasing, this would signal an increased likelihood that a settlement is sustained. This effect may have been missed in the analysis here. Third, I have also included a control variable on the prevalence of sexual violence both during conflict and after an agreement is signed. One might expect that this signals a decrease in the likelihood that a settlement is sustained (e.g. Manjoo & McRaith, 2010; Jenkins & Goetz, 2010). However, results for this variable are not significant and thus this statement is not supported here[16]. Fourth, My measures for third party signees also presents a result that is not significant, meaning that agreements that are signed by a third party are not necessarily more likely to be sustained. As Walter (1997) argues, third parties have to adhere to certain conditions in order to be effective; the third party must be willing to use force, should be able to signal resolve and must have some self-interest in upholding the settlement. Arguably, not all third party signees adhere to these conditions thus explaining the insignificant result found here. Fifth, the effects of provisions providing for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation show no significant results here. In light of this it should be noted that even if peacekeeping operations are deployed to keep peace after an agreement is signed, these operations often do not meet their mandated size (Hultman et al., 2014). Therefore their ability to sustain an agreement might be limited, which explains this insignificant effect. Sixth and last, my variables on power-sharing provisions (i.e. governmental, military and territorial) shed some light on the ongoing discussion about the effects of such provisions. Similar to DeRouen et al. (2009)

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[16] This effect remains unexplained by existing literature, future research should thus focus on the complex mechanisms by which sexual violence does or does not affect peace in order to explain this finding. To discuss it here in detail would be beyond the scope of this thesis.

and Martin (2013), I find a strong, significant and positive effect of shared government provisions on the likelihood that conflict will recur and an agreement will break down. Also, I find territorial provisions to strongly increase the likelihood that an agreement will be sustained. However, contrary to their studies, I find no significant result for military provisions.

The problem of endogeneity

I continue my analysis by addressing a common problem - and critique - in researching peace agreement provisions: the problem of endogeneity (Fortna, 2003; Mattes & Savun, 2009). Critics argue that whether or not an agreement is sustained depends on the conditions that lead warring parties to pursue peace rather than on the provisions that are included in the settlement itself (Fortna, 2003; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Badran, 2014). This implies that agreement provisions themselves do not have an autonomous effect on the likelihood that an agreement is sustainable (Badran, 2014). It is important to deal with this problem if one wants to show that it is in fact agreement provisions that increase the likelihood of a settlement to be sustainable instead of the conditions surrounding it (Mattes & Savun, 2009). A possible way of dealing with endogeneity, is by estimating a model in which the main independent variable is predicted by control variables that are generally believed to predict the dependent variable as well (Mattes & Savun, 2009). To clarify, if external factors that are thought to predict peace agreement sustainability (control variables) also predict the presence of provisions on women (independent variable) in such an agreement, the found (non-)effects in my earlier analysis are nothing but a result of the conditions under which the settlement was signed (i.e. epiphenomenal). However, if external factors that are thought to decrease the likelihood that a settlement is sustainable predict the presence of provisions on women, this suggests that the found (non-)effects in my earlier analysis are actually functional (i.e. *not* a result of the conditions under which the agreement was signed).

As Table 3 shows, only the prevalence of sexual violence during conflict and after the agreement is signed is significantly related to the inclusion of provisions on women in negotiated

settlements. However, since the prevalence of sexual violence is generally associated with a decrease in the likelihood that an agreement is sustainable, this finding only supports the notion that the results of my main independent variable from my earlier analysis are not due to the conditions under which the agreement was signed.

Table 3: Model to test endogeneity

	Provisions on women
Religious incompatibility	,362 (,452)
Ethnic incompatibility	,655 (,537)
Intensity >999	-,596 (,583)
GDP/capita	,002 (,004)
Conflict over territory	,133 (,534)
Sexual violence prevalence	1,668*** (,451)
Constant	-1,807***
-2 Log likelihood	179,404
Chi-square	26,315***
Nagelkerke's R^2	,211
N	157

Note: Binary regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01

Conclusion

I began this thesis by noting that many conflicts end in a negotiated settlement, but that roughly half of these settlements collapse and warring parties resume their fighting (Kreutz, 2010). I argued that previous research on why settlements collapse focuses on the inclusion of certain provisions in the agreement, but mainly emphasizes those that could mitigate security concerns. Subsequently, I argued - like several scholars - that more attention should be focused on the social requisites of peacebuilding such as the inclusion of provisions on civil society actors and, more specifically, women. As of today

our understanding of the roles women play in sustaining negotiated settlements remains limited. Therefore, I sought to address the question of how including provisions on women in a negotiated settlement affects the likelihood that this settlement will be sustained. Drawing on previous literature, I argued that including provisions on women should increase the likelihood of an agreement being sustained as it improves their physical security, and increases state capacity and gender equality. I employed commonly used data from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Kreutz, 2010) and combined this with data on provisions on women from the new PA-X Peace Agreement Dataset (PA-X, 2018) to estimate several statistical models, but found no support for my hypothesis. Even so, my findings suggest several reasons why there seems to be no link between provisions on women and agreement sustainability that are relevant for policymakers.

Most importantly, there appears to be a gap between the inclusion of provisions on women and the actual implementation of those provisions that could not be addressed here. As Ni Aolaín et al. (2011) rightfully note, this could be due to the focus of policymakers on straightforward political incorporation of provisions instead of addressing the broader and deeper cultural and societal roots that endorse the continued discrimination and marginalization of women despite what agreement provisions may state. Policymakers should thus shift part of their attention from ensuring that provisions on women are institutionalized in theory to altering the norms and values that prevent them from being executed in practice. Furthermore, my results should encourage policymakers address the problems of definition and accountability of women's organizations in peace agreements and to encourage a more flexible way of dealing with the constant shifting, disbanding and emerging of new women's grassroots activities and organizations that could facilitate the peace process and increase the likelihood that a settlement is sustained.

At the same time, several avenues for future research emerge from this thesis. For one, more research is required to identify the exact effects of how specifically provisions on women are described in a negotiated settlement on the implementation thereof. As Fortna (2003) argues, how specifically provisions are expressed matters. Answers to this question may shed a light on how it is

possible that no significant results were found here in spite of what existing literature suggests. Also, more qualitative research on the topic is called for to uncover and disaggregate the specific influences of women in post-conflict societies that either relapse into conflict or remain peaceful and link these influences to the peace agreements that are signed in the process. Many times, resolving a conflict requires multiple peace agreements (DeRouen et al., 2009), which makes it hard to quantitatively distinguish between the effects of one or the other. This problem could not be addressed in this thesis, but should be examined in future research. Another question that remains is whether there are certain types of provisions on women that affect the likelihood that a settlement is sustained more than others. Do provisions on the prevention of sexual violence, for example, prove to be more impactful than those on the inclusion of women in government when it comes to sustaining a settlement? This thesis is fairly limited in the sense that I could not disaggregate between different provisions on women 'simply' because data on this is not yet available in sufficient amounts to study it quantitatively. It is therefore vital that scholars continue to gather, dissect and specify how provisions on women are expressed. The PA-X dataset that was released last year and used here makes an excellent start with this and has the potential to provide scholars with the data needed to uncover the exact dynamics by which women influence agreement sustainability. To this end, my thesis has provided a starting point for further quantitative research into this topic.

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