

Political Clientelism in Indonesia:

Origins of political clientelism in Indonesia: Some statistical evidence

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Abstract

The main aim of this thesis is to identify the main environment in which clientelism thrives in Indonesia. The environments selected were urban and rural divisions, poverty and economically undiversified areas. Throughout the literature read on this topic, many authors point to these three factors as determinants of clientelism. With the help of Ward Berenschot, from the Royal Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), and his Expert Survey on Clientelism in Indonesia, I was able to statistically support whether certain environments favour clientelism compared to others.

The key findings from this thesis was that in Indonesia, based on statistical evidence, there is one of the three factors which increases the likeliness of clientelistic practices to take place. Both urban and rural divisions and poverty did not have positive findings statistically. There was no significant correlation to suggest that these factors played a large role in the determining of political clientelism in Indonesia. The only factor which did yield positive results was the economic environment of the region. The pattern, as the thesis will demonstrate, tended to be that the more economically diversified a region, the less clientelistic practices it had. The reasons as to why centre around the fact that economic diversity is healthy for a region, as it does not allow for a single actor to set the informal rules and practices. Despite quantitative analysis, this thesis also discusses the effects clientelism holds over Indonesian political life.

Through the combination of quantitative and qualitative sources, this thesis effectively compares and contrasts literature to statistical findings. Therefore, I effectively can come up with independent opinions that are derived from these two sets of sources, and am able to support and contribute to authors which blame economic practices for clientelism.

I. Introduction

As the rest is catching up to the West, many predicted that its archaic forms of societal organization would disappear as well. This is most famously conveyed in Francis Fukuyama's Book *The End of History and the Last Man*. Essentially it predicted that the world would assimilate and model itself based on the western liberal democratic model. Instead, what we see today is hybridization in the place of homogenization. Hybridization in the sense that many non-Western countries have adopted values and ideas of Western political organization however; this has been met with locally embedded political prerogatives. The aim of this thesis is to explore an aspect of that so called hybridization, through examining patron-client relations, especially in the context of vote buying in Indonesia, and how such a traditional practice has merged and managed to survive with the rise of democracy. More specifically this thesis will aim to discover the extent to which population density, poverty and economic diversity affect the prevalence of clientelism in Indonesia. The rationale behind choosing these three factors came after analysing literature, which frequently mentioned these factors in relation to clientelism. These factors were claimed to be important elements in the thriving of clientelism. Furthermore, another reason is to detect which environment clientelism thrives the most in. Bearing this in mind I set out to validate these claims, frequently supported by secondary sources, and whether they had a role in the prevalence of clientelism in Indonesia.

Throughout the thesis, there will be two main concepts which shall be discussed. The first is clientelism which according to James C. Scott is "a special case of dyadic ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his influence and resource to provide protection or benefits, or both for a person of lower status (client) who for his part reciprocates by offering generous support and assistance, including personal services to the patron" (Scott 92). My personal interpretation of clientelism is that a client is to the patron, like what the taxpayer is to the state. It is services (monetary or not) in return for livelihood. For the purposes of this thesis I will create my own definition of clientelism, through a synthesis of Scott's and Hicken's work. The definition goes as follows: A person of high socio-economic status (the patron) who uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both for a person of the same or lower status (client) who for his part reciprocates by offering generous support, assistance or fulfilling a promise (Scott 92). The second part is that the relationship has to be mutually enforcing and has to have elements of power and violence attached to non-compliance (Hicken 293-4).

However, clientelism is not the only concept which will be discussed in this thesis. Ward Berenschot, working on his post-doctorate at the Royal Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV) has conducted an expert survey throughout Indonesia which discusses clientelistic exchange in the context of the 2014 elections which is called: "Expert Survey: on Election Campaigns in Indonesia". Vote buying and clientelism have relative close affinity, however there is a distinction to be had, which will be further discussed in the theory chapter. According to Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, vote-buying is defined as "proffering to voters cash or minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipients vote" (Brusco et al. 67). In addition, Brusco and her co-authors consider vote buying to be an intrinsic part of clientelism (67).

Due to the contentious discussion surrounding clientelism, the first chapter will devoted to creating a clear direction for the remainder of the thesis to be based upon. Thereafter, the second chapter will look at if urban and rural cleavages influence the nature of clientelism. Once more, the reason behind selecting urban and rural distinctions was that there was a high level of questions which implicitly were directed at differentiating the country side from the city. Moreover, there were some sociology scholars which pointed to the structural weakness of rural areas which would increase the tendency for clientelistic practices. Thus, that city spaces were areas which removed themselves from traditional ties, to more formal ties. The expected results were that rural settings would be home to much more clientelistic practices. Yet statistically this was not the case. Therefore, the third chapter aimed at determining whether poverty had an impact on clientelism. There is much supporting evidence for this theory, something which Brusco and Stokes comment on widely, and Aspinal to a certain extent. Anew, there was no statistical backing in order to consolidate such claims in the Indonesia specific case. Due to inconclusive statistical findings, the fourth chapter will concern the role of economic diversity and how different economic environments create for more or less clientelism. Throughout Indonesian literature on clientelism, a vast array of authors discuss the effects that resource intensiveness and lack of diversification bear effect on the levels of clientelism in certain areas in Indonesia. These ideas are statistically backed with Berenschot's data, leading to a positive outcome stipulating that certain economic activity can increase the levels of clientelistic behaviour. The effects of this are that the thesis has discovered that economic activity, instead of urban and rural divisions or poverty, bears the greatest influence on clientelistic behaviour in Indonesia. The final section of this thesis will look at all three factors and analyse how these three factors have an extremely negative impact on the Indonesian political scene today.

II. Chapter 1: Theory

The preliminary research for this topic was largely based around understanding what clientelism entails and what are its components. Furthermore, for this thesis a clear understanding of clientelism needs to be established. The most influential one for this thesis is Allen Hicken and his text “Clientelism”, which is a chronological discussion of how views and definitions of clientelism have changed through time. The first definition of clientelism was that it was primarily based around a dyadic relationship which is described as an instrumental friendship (Hicken 2011: 290). One major proponent of this view is James C. Scott, who described this type of relationship in the Southeast Asian context. Scott enforces the idea that there needs to be a face-to-face relationship between patron and client which will eventually create a level of trust between the pair (Scott 94). Besides individual relationships, Scott also goes on to describing how groupings of clientelist networks operate, which is through brokers and pyramid structures producing vertical power relations (Scott 96). These are all elements which Hicken discusses and associates to earlier writings on clientelism. But Scott was quite ahead for his time, despite exploring vertical relations of power, he also discusses horizontal relations of power which some authors do not mention in their discussion of clientelism. Horizontal clientelist relations are ones which are between people of similar socio-economic power (Scott 96). Scott’s and Hicken’s most valuable asset was to provide for reference points on how to define clientelism.

Despite the clarity and direction both these authors provide, understanding clientelism is not that straight forward. For the purpose of the thesis, I will discuss the schism which is between the more traditional old school definition of clientelism and the newer, more instantaneous version of the definition. In the very traditional sense, clientelism was extremely hierarchical, and centred around long standing face-to-face interactions, essentially clientelism was seen as an instrumental friendship (Hicken 290). These are views that both Hicken and Scott uphold. As mentioned earlier, Scott was quite revolutionary for his time, as he already recognized the eroding of the more traditional characteristics of clientelism. He stated that modernization has created multiple dependencies, thus there is no longer a strong need, hence a strong relation to the single patron one used to have prior to modernization (Scott 107). In addition to this, Daniel Arghiros not only blames modernity for causing the change in what constitutes clientelism, but also the scholars using the term. Arghiros makes the compelling case that today, many political scientists use the term clientelism to describe the relationship that would orthodoxly not fall under the term clientelism (7). According to him, “relations between politicians and their subordinate political campaigners, canvassers or

vote brokers do not often amount to multifaceted, dyadic relationships of patron-clientage” (Arghiros 8). Such a debate has equally strong arguments on both sides as to why the definition of clientelism should allow for flexibility and leniency or not. Based on what I have read for the thesis, I will side with the fact that clientelism can include vote-buying and adopt a wider and more flexible definition. I have made this assumption based on two strong notions. The first is that modernity has changed the face of clientelism, as Scott stipulates, single dependencies no longer exist on such a wide scale, thus there is a need for a new more flexible view of clientelism which has adapted itself to its current context. The second is that the ability to punish is intrinsic to clientelism and vote buying, especially when the counter party (either the patron or the client) defects on his or her part (Hicken 293). With this in mind it answers the question if vote-buying can be considered clientelism, and based on personal interpretation it can, due to the fact that punishment and exclusion are still possible with vote-buying.


III. Chapter 2: Urban and Rural Divisions

In contemporary academic literature, there are only few authors which discuss the influence urban or rural areas have on political behaviour, especially in the Indonesia specific context. Nevertheless, the survey made by researcher, Ward Berenschot, poses many questions to the interviewees to compare clientelism in the city and the country side. These two factors were what drove me to analyse the division in clientelism between urban and rural patterns of clientelism. This chapter will then aim to denote whether sociological patterns of organization greatly influence the prevalence of clientelism in urban and rural areas. With this I mean to test whether urban spaces have developed in contrast to rural spaces, whether they have moved beyond traditional and cultural informal ties in cities in contrast to rural spaces. The last reason to undertake this as a method of analysis was due to the fact that a more general division, as the one mentioned, would provide a good platform from which to create more specific divisions in order to detect whether there are other factors at play which greatly influence clientelism and vote buying.

On the whole, people like to analyse and denote the differences in general behaviour between people from cities and from the country-side. These behavioural differences are not just confined to the banal activities, but also stretch out to the realms of politics, economics, and conceptions about the environment. In general people from cities put forth different values than people hailing from rural areas. Interactions in cities are largely influenced by the fact that cities have very dense populations, thus making the exchange of information easier.

Moreover, cities are usually more developed infrastructure wise. There is much more transportation making it easier to get to the surrounding areas, thus broadening the horizons of its inhabitants. Another factor which influences city dwellers, especially politically, is that cities are usually the hubs of the country's political economy. Due to this context, political decisions matter a great deal to the inhabitants, coupled with the fact that cities are also the home to much of the media that spread information at much greater intensity with many varying kinds of opinions all concentrated in smaller space. Logically speaking this divide would be even bigger in countries that have not yet fully modernized economically and politically. The reasons for this, is due to the fact that lesser developed countries are lacking in infrastructure, thus there is not as great of a connection between the urban and the rural. Not only do I speak in terms of transportation, but also in terms of media and communication forms. Typically in developing countries, it is a known fact that there is less internet access and media coverage in the country side. The last major factor, based on my own intuition, which divides rural and urban modes of living, is the ability for anonymity in a city compared to the country side. When applying this notion to clientelism, one would expect anonymity to be a constraint to clientelistic practices. This claim is made due to the fact that an increase in population density allows for individuals to become anonymous and thus make sure they are less observed than in rural settings, where informal ties matter much more. Considering this, the expected results are that in Indonesia rural and urban cleavages matter greatly in the differing levels of clientelism in Indonesia. This is reflected by my research hypothesis for this section was that rural areas would have higher values in clientelism. My starting point was to look at section B and parts of A of the "Expert Survey: on Election Campaigns in Indonesia" done by Berenschot. The reason for this was that Section B centres on the action of the voter and the influences he or she faces when voting. The first test I ran was to understand how wide-spread vote-buying was. To visualize this, I took question A6 which was: "how common is the practice of handing out money or consumer goods to attract votes in your district" (Berenschot "Expert Survey")? The graph below demonstrates the difference between Urban and Rural, denoted as City and District. The division between city and district is based on how the Indonesian government categorizes both of them. Cities go under the name of *Kota* and district *Kabupaten*.

Graph 2.1: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”)




Excluding presidential elections, the overall trend demonstrates that, a perceived average of 60% of voters across Indonesia obtain money or consumer goods when voting for different kinds of elections. Thus the hypothesis that vote-buying is common practice in Indonesia is validated, however this is almost non-refutable. The hypothesis I was after is not validated in this test. The differences between city and district are so minimal that they are insignificant, thus showing that there is no general trend which divides urban and rural.

Another result that this graph demonstrates which raises curiosity is that District-level Legislative Assembly has almost 60-80% of voters which receive money before they vote. This level stands far out of the norm compared to the other 3 types of elections. The reason for this is quite simple. It is due to the fact that legislative assembly elections are extremely contested. On aggregate, thus combining all cities (Kota) and districts (Kabupaten), there are 19,699 seats contested (Aspinall 2014 98). However, for each those 20,000 seats, there were 180,000 candidates in the 2014 elections (Aspinall 2014 98). The sheer amount of candidates for comparatively few seats provides all the more reason for each candidate to hand out money prior to the election. Furthermore, in resource rich area for district legislative assembly elections, it is normal to see as much as \$15 to be handed out for that particular election type (Aspinall 2014 106). Comparatively in many parts of Indonesia, \$3 for all three election

types: district/mayoral, governor and legislative assembly elections is the norm (Aspinall 2014 106).

Aspinall states that such tactics are common in Indonesia, and are seen as part of “Indonesia’s gift-based public culture” (Aspinall 2014 106). It is a widely known phenomenon that vote-buying is intrinsic to Indonesia, and is extremely successful compared to other areas of the world, especially western countries. According to David Henley this is due to local ethical reasons, it is a duty to repay a gift (Henley 2014). Not only do ethical reasons enforce a sense of duty, but for Indonesians, the use of money during campaigns show that candidates are serious about their ambitions (Aspinall 2014 108). The following graph puts these notions to test in order to see whether there is reciprocity from the recipients part.

Graph 2.2: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”)



The graph above is based on question C1 from the questionnaire which asks: “please assess how effective politicians are in their efforts to mobilize voters by offering money or consumer goods”? (Berenschot “Expert Survey”). On the overall level we note that there is a sense that vote-buying does strengthen the compliance the recipient feels, and does create a certain level of effectiveness. Once more, there are no major differences between urban and rural cleavages. Another similarity between graph 2.1 and 2.2 is that the high amount of money given for legislative assembly elections also represents high amount of obligation held by the recipients. Therefore, a correlation can be found that with money handed out, results in an


increased propensity for the recipient to reciprocate by voting for that candidate. More importantly, the district population is more likely to feel obliged to vote. This reflects Aspinal's conclusion that more remote resource rich areas tend to give more money for legislative elections. Yet, the influence of resources on clientelism and vote-buying will be discussed in chapter 4.

Yet, the graphs above might not fully demonstrate the divides in Indonesia between urban and rural. The Indonesian state is set up with multiple levels of governance, there is the national, provincial and regency/district (*Kabupaten*) and City (*Kota*) as the final subdivision. However, these divisions are quite arbitrary, as they do not precisely represent the words that label them. In many districts there are still some highly urbanized and industrialized areas. With this in mind, another way of dividing urban and rural special areas was created. The subsequent graph is the same as graph 1.2, but compares the two different modes of dividing urban and rural.

Table 2.1: (Source: Berenschot: "Expert Survey")

	City	District	Urban	Rural
District Head/Mayoral Election	2,98	3,46	3,12	3,39
Governor Election	2,92	2,89	2,99	2,82
Legislative Assembly Elections	3,6	3,98	3,7	3,94
Presidential Elections	2,13	2,14	2,13	2,13

Graph2.3: (Source: Berenschot "Expert Survey")




The new classification: Urban and Rural, was based on how much of the GDP was based on agricultural revenue. This data was acquired from Ward Berenschot's "District Statistics". The threshold was at 20%, but it has to be said that few districts or cities were at the 20% mark, either far below or above it. Thus, below 20% constituted an urban location and above was classified as rural. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, any moment that urban and rural is used in a graph, it will be based on the same criteria, unless stated otherwise. As the graph and table demonstrate, this changed very little in the outcome of how effective money was in persuading voters to vote for a certain candidate. In fact, when one takes a look at the exact numbers, the new division brought less difference between urban and rural than there exists between city and district. Another point of interest that this latest graph raises, is that both forms of division demonstrate an equal level of effectiveness in two types of elections, the legislative and presidential. Once more, this confirms Aspinall's hypothesis, that these elections are so hotly contested, thus they create for more pervasive tactics during the election campaign. In addition it also confirms the fact that, Indonesians see the use of money in an election as the level of commitment by a certain candidate, and this is also seen in the tables, the more money given results in its effectiveness (Aspinall 2014 108). Nonetheless, this still leaves the question, as to why the presidential elections have such low vote-buying and effectiveness. Does this mean that there is generally less of a need to repay the debt during the presidential elections? I believe this to be down to the fact that the presidential election is the one which is the furthest removed from the people. By this I mean that unlike the Mayoral/District head, governor or legislative elections, less people are affected by the presidential elections on a daily basis. In addition, there is less of the social control factor at play during presidential elections. Like in every country, there is a distance felt between the nation-state's head and the voter. Any Indonesian voter has more anonymity during a presidential election, as there are 240 million other voters voting for that same election. Whilst that distance is reduced between the mayor and the voter, simply due to the geographical and numerical factors limiting the election. Taking this into account there might also be more pressure on the money recipient to repay the favour as there might be more of the candidates *tim sukses* present due to the fact that these agents have less territory to cover, meaning that they can keep tighter control on their constituents, consequently heightening the incentive to repay one's debt. Moreover, there is less impetus for predatory interests at the presidential level, due to the decentralized nature of Indonesia, meaning that more of these interests get contested at the provincial or city/district level. These are the personal interpretations of why presidential elections do not involve as much vote-buying. On the other hand, Mujani and

Liddle draw a different conclusion. They state that over recent years, Indonesian voters have become more rational, really focusing and setting “standards for individual leaders such as: personal integrity, social empathy, professional competence” (Mujani & Liddle 91). Hence the data demonstrates that money does play a role in presidential elections, nonetheless, there are other factors, such as personal integrity, which play large roles in the individual’s decision making.

Simply looking at C1 does not shed enough light if the alternative classification between urban and rural does provide any sound conclusions. Therefore, the next graph will look at other questions of the survey which have a stronger emphasis on the “purer” form of clientelism. These indicators really centre around punishment.


Graph 2.4: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” & “District Statistics”)



Graph 2.4 measures the frequency of welfare programmes distributed during election campaigns. The question goes as follows: “in your estimation, when implementing welfare programmes (handouts of cash, rice, or subsidize healthcare) after elections, how often do these local government representatives prioritize the people who voted for their preferred candidate” (Berenschot “Expert Survey”). In the introductory paragraph of chapter 2, the expected results would be that social control in villages and the lack of state infrastructure would facilitate and encourage candidates to employ such tactics of gaining popularity and votes. This was expected to be especially the case with question A3a, as it specifically targets the question of lack of infrastructure, because typically districts and less urbanized areas tend to lack healthcare and grand mechanized ways of distributing the necessities for living. In contrast, the cities are usually the metropolises of nation-states, thus those basic infrastructure elements are usually present there. Joel D. Barkan who wrote “Elections in Agrarian

Societies” directly supports this argument, and furthers it by stating that during elections “they (people from agrarian societies) focus on the basic needs of their community... whether they have adequate water, schools, health-care facilities” (107). In addition, question A3a also addresses the role that social control and population plays in elections in urban versus rural societies. Typically, agricultural societies are less densely populated than urban ones thus there a greater tendency to have closer and personal relations with a greater amount of people. Furthermore, this facilitates the task at hand for clientelistic organizations when running rice handouts or other political patronage tactics. Despite these anticipated conclusions this is not the case that is shown by the quantitative data. In fact, when taking the agricultural mode of defining urban and rural, there is a greater similarity between the two. The discussion as to possible reasons why there is no disparity will be relegated to the conclusion this chapter.

Graph 2.5: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”)




Similar results were expected with graph 2.5. The question which was quantified in this graph was A8a: In your estimation, of all the major contracts that the district government awards, how many go to companies or businessmen that have supported election campaigns of the ruling politicians” (Berenschot “Expert Survey”). In general the result is quite astounding, where at least 60-80% of the government contracts are given to business men which supported the winning candidate in the 2014 elections. In the more rural areas (classified as district/rural) one does note a slightly higher value for contracts given. Nonetheless, the fact that on average 60-80% of the contracts are given to supporters is quite shocking. Moreover, this is quite a worrying situation for Indonesian democracy, as it shows that meritocratic values are not upheld. Thus the contract for building a certain road does not go to the “best” company, instead to the one with the most avid supporting campaign. This should not be seen

as a temporary phase states Hadiz, instead he ties such practices to the notion of gift-giving culture in Indonesia, claiming that money politics is “fundamentally inherent to the logic of power relations that define an illiberal form of democracy already consolidated and entrenched” (Hadiz & Robinson 231).

Another point of worry that is brought up through this graph is that it demonstrates the lack of acknowledgement or perhaps respect for the existing formal procedures that any given entrepreneur needs to follow in order to get the contract awarded. Following the argument concerning infrastructure, it could have been argued that rural areas were more prone to “backroom deals” and informal manners of granting and obtaining contracts. Essentially, there are three main types of characteristics that make up rural social relations. They are very intense, durable and have frequent occurrence, they are conduits for exchange of more than one social resource and based on kinship, rural solidarity rather than on personal friendship (Beggs et al. 309). Sociological studies would then support the idea such intense rural personal relations would be a breeding ground for patronage to thrive in. Therefore, many saw clientelism as a pre-modern form of society, and modernization would lead to official and established forms of governing which would erase such relations. However, Indonesia has proved the contrary, perhaps demonstrating that such personal ties are still essential to daily life in Indonesia. The last graph of this chapter demonstrates exactly that.

Graph 2.6: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”).



The question posed was B1: How strong is the capacity of the following organizations and individuals to influence voters in your district during elections for *bupati* (district head) or *walikota* (mayor). The graph shows again that there is no divide between city and district, yet what is most surprising is the relatively strong amount of influence that religious leaders and local state officials still hold. Another key difference that this highlights, is that in other parts of the world apart from Western Europe, religion has not been effaced with the rise of modernism and rationality. Once more, it also demonstrates the intrinsic value of personal ties, especially to people of status, thus also enforcing the notion that due to the survival of such relations, it has also been possible for clientelism to survive in Indonesia.

The six graphs and 1 table in this chapter altogether undermine the original hypothesis, which was that urban and rural areas would have great differences in the levels of clientelistic practices. As mentioned throughout this chapter, the reasoning behind this was that village and rural life allows for more personal relations, facilitating clientelistic exchanges. On top of that, the lack of infrastructure in these two distinct areas would also enable clientelism to flourish in areas with little effective infrastructure. What seems to have prevailed in Indonesia is economic and political development, yet this has not resulted in the disappearance of traditional modes of social organization, such as for example the culture of gift giving. Nonetheless, this does not answer the question as to why there is no dissonance between urban and rural levels of clientelism. There is however one author who addresses this phenomenon. Terence McGee, in his co-edited book, *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia* discusses the spatial organization between cities and rural areas in Asia. He explains this phenomenon through describing the average “Asian region” which he labels as a *Desakota*, Indonesian for town (*kota*) and village (*desa*) (McGee 7). The inspiration for such a name comes from Indonesia. These *desakota*'s are, “regions with an intense mixture of agricultural and non-agricultural activities that often stretch along corridors between large city cores” (McGee 7). Besides those characteristics, other characteristics such as rising household income, improved transportation linkages and improved infrastructures are what characterize Indonesia, especially Java (McGee 8). The attributes of the *desakota* demonstrate how Asian regions, especially Indonesian ones have synthesized their country side and urban living modes. Through high population density, improving infrastructure, increased communication levels, there are no longer any barriers between city and village life. This then explains the reason why the data did not demonstrate enormous differences in urban and rural levels of clientelism, as Indonesia is a very densely populated country, with little cleavages between

city and village modes of living. As a result, we can state that such proximity of urban and rural living has resulted in the overall upholding and widespread prevalence of informal political ties and modes of organization. Moreover, these widespread informal ties are not more concentrated in cities than in rural areas. As a result, the hypothesis that rural and urban divisions are determinants of clientelism can be negated. On the other hand, this chapter does not aid in shedding light on certain environments where clientelism thrives.

IV. Chapter 3: Poverty

Due to such inconclusive results in urban and rural determinants of clientelism, I will now test whether poverty plays a role in the prevalence of clientelistic behaviour. The research hypothesis for chapter 3 will be that poverty bears great influence on clientelism and vote-buying. This section will go more into depth on the vote-buying side of clientelism. This is a view mainly upheld by Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes. In their text, they use quantitative information to determine whether poverty influences a person's susceptibility to vote buying or not. Despite this being discussed in the Argentinian context, the findings from Brusco and her co-authors state that 1 in 4 poor people claim that campaign handouts influenced their voting behaviour (Brusco et al. 69). The primary explanation given as to why poor people are inclined to be influenced by vote buying propositions, is that a poorer person has more utility to a "campaign package" than a rich person (Brusco et al. 72). This is a view which is shared by Hicken, when stating that the poor tend to be more risk averse, thus meaning that they are more likely to think about the immediate future instead of the long term, meaning that they easily fall into vote-buying mechanisms (299). These are two authors that comment on the nature of poverty and their risk averseness in relation to clientelism. The only qualitative evidence that exists which depicts a similar picture is in Aspinall's "Indonesia's 2014 Elections: Parliament and Patronage". In this text Aspinall states that ordinary Indonesians see the election time as a way for them to supplement their incomes (2014 108). With these qualitative statements there seems to be enough evidence supporting the argument that poverty has influential attributes in relation to clientelism.

When correlating poverty (amount of population below the poverty in 2012) and question C1a, we find there to be dissonance between the quantitative and qualitative research done. C1a asks to assess the effectiveness of vote-buying was in their district or mayoral elections (Berenschot "Expert Survey").

Table 3.1: (Source: Berenschot “District Statistics” and “Expert Survey”)

		C1a	Poverty
C1a	Pearson Correlation	1	,201
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,220
	N	39	39
Poverty	Pearson Correlation	,201	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,220	
	N	39	39

The table shows us that there is no significance to this data, seeing as the significance result is far above 0.05. As a result, the research hypothesis cannot be accepted, which means that there is no relation between poverty and the effectiveness of vote-buying in Indonesia. The alternate hypothesis is strengthened when looking at the following table.

Table 3.2: (Source: Berenschot “District Statistics” and “Expert Survey”)

Location Name	C1a	% of Population Below Poverty
Karawang	4,15	11,1
Minahasa Selatan	4,14	8,61
Kutai Kartanegara	4,08	6,94
Jayawijaya	4,08	39,04
Bulungan	4,08	11,73

Table 4.2 depicts the fact that both poor regions and less poor regions make up the top 5 areas with the highest values for effectiveness of vote-buying. Thus it cannot be said with full confidence that Stokes’ hypothesis holds true in Indonesia. A causal factor for this is that Indonesia has had a strong history of development. This has been present throughout Suharto’s reign, as a way to deter poorer members of society to swing towards the communist threat. As a result, Indonesia invested quite large sums of money in developing its infrastructure and outer islands, in an effort to alleviate people from poverty. Such a trend has continued since the fall of Suharto, which is shown by the fact that Indonesia has one of the fastest growing middle classes in Southeast Asia (IFAD). Moreover, it has been able to reduce poverty from 17% in 2004 to 11% in 2014 (IFAD). Nonetheless, it is not just the poverty reduction that has acted against poor people’s susceptibility to clientelism and vote-buying.

Instead, it's the widespread and deeply engrained nature of such practices throughout Indonesia. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, in order to be taken as a serious candidate in Indonesian political life, one needs to be active in the culture of gift-giving (Aspinall 2014 107). Moreover, such a cultural norm is so deeply engrained in Indonesia, that even activists which speak out against corruption and clientelism still use tactics that might be seen as vote-buying and clientelism (Aspinall 2014 105). The only difference is that they will use strategies that are considered as communitarian development instead of individual vote-buying (Aspinall 2014 105). Consequently the deeply widespread phenomenon of vote-buying and clientelism is not something that is isolated and allocated to disfavoured areas of Indonesia. Instead it takes on a more global scope, reducing the influence poverty has over clientelistic behaviour. In turn, this means that now the second research hypothesis, that poverty increases the propensity for clientelistic practices to occur has been statistically negated in the Indonesian context.

V. Chapter 4: Economic Diversity

The last major factor which is discussed in much of the literature on clientelism, is economic characteristics and its effect on the matter. What such literature claims is that the neo-liberal and decentralized state that Indonesia finds itself as one of the main causes for the persistence of clientelism in a democratic Indonesia. The main reason that most scholars rally around is the idea that during Suharto's time period there was a centralized state which created a predictable and steady clientelistic state, however today, "neoliberalism and clientelism are linked and in some senses mutually enforcing... (they) work to strip Indonesian politics of its ideological trappings and reveal the workings economic calculation at its core" (Aspinall 2013 29). The reason why money has been able to hold such large influence over politics in Indonesia today is down to, "poorly developed regulatory institutions, a lack of state capacity, or a civil society with inadequate social capital to support markets" (Hadiz & Robinson 221). As a result chapter 4 will try to prove the research hypothesis, which claims that economic activity, especially undiversified economies are niche's for clientelism to thrive in.

Due to the heavy influence of such theories in texts discussing clientelism in Indonesia, the next section will aim at validating such claims that authors make with statistical backing. Most importantly, many scholars make reference to the resource curse, making claims that resource intensive areas in Indonesia are breeding grounds for predatory interests. The fact of the matter is, that decentralization in Indonesia has allowed for predatory interests to control public institutions and resources, especially at the local level (Hadiz and

Robinson, 232). By combining the data from the “Expert Survey: on Election Campaigns in Indonesia” and data collected by Ward Berenschot on the economic and social composition of each district and city, “District Statistics”, I will be able to test whether the claims made by authors such as Hadiz, Robinson, Aspinall and others are legitimate, and offer my own conclusions on the statistical data.

The following table and graph will focus on state dependency and if it plays a role in clientelism in Indonesia.


Table 4.1: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” “District Statistics”)

Correlations			
		Perc_Govt_Ex	A8a_dis
Perc_Govt_Ex	Pearson Correlation	1	,404*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,011
	N	39	39
A8a_dis	Pearson Correlation	,404*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,011	
	N	39	39

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The table above is taken from the SPSS software and which runs a correlation test. This test is to determine whether the first variable, percentage of government expenditure in each district or city determines A8a. A8a was a question from the “Expert Survey” which posed the question: “In your estimation, of all the major the major contracts that the district government awards, how many go to companies or businessmen that have supported the election campaigns of ruling politicians during elections” (Berenschot “Expert Survey”)? The level of government expenditure in each district was taken from Berenschot’s “District Statistics”. Underneath table 3.1, one can notice the note that states that if the significance level is above 0.05 then the research hypothesis has to be rejected. However, the significance level is 0.01, thus the research hypothesis can be accepted, therefore, according to this test the amount of government expenditure has a slight influence on the outcome of A8a. However this value is not exceptionally high, 0.4 means that there is a weak positive correlation.

Graph 4.1: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” “District Statistics”)



The graph above depicts the weak correlation that exists when plotting these two variables. Overall, the graph demonstrates that there is in fact a very high level of contracts which go to supporters of political candidates. The lowest figure that was given was just below 3, which is between 20-40% of the contracts that go to active supporters of political candidates. This goes in accordance with the hypothesis set forth by Blunt, Turner and Lindroth, which states that Human Resource Management (HRM), “which is manifested in the purchase of jobs, promotions, exam results, transfers and placements... becomes integral to patronage” (Blunt et al. 215). On the whole there are few authors who comment on state dependency and its influence over clientelism. Despite the lack of qualitative support, intuitively it can be said that clientelism flourishes in state dependent areas due to the increased concentration of governmental money that runs through certain locations. Furthermore, due to democracy’s unconsolidated position in Indonesia, it has been reconstructed to fit the needs of the ruling parties in order to facilitate predatory interests (Blunt et al. 219). As a result, areas in Indonesia with high state dependency are more likely to be vulnerable to predatory interests as political parties and candidates are able to use state resources to benefit their constituents, friends, family and supporters. Lastly, the resource curse theory states that resource rich areas are more likely to experience corruption and patronage politics (Shaxson 1123). Hypothetically, if we took state budgets as a resource, the same would hold true, that dependence on one or few resources causes bad governance and patronage. Aspinall applies

this idea to the Indonesian context. He coins the term as *Proyek* (meaning the project), which is a “self-contained collaborative, and funded activity intended to achieve a designated end” but which now is a pattern that permeates through bureaucracy, political actors and organizations that clutters around the state (Aspinall 2013 30). Essentially Aspinall depicts the state’s pervasive influence in project creation and seeking. Seeing as they are the main providers of projects they are the perfect hunting ground for patronage hunters (Aspinall 2013 30). In turn, this confirms the notion that with an economy that is not heavily diversified and the state as a primary actor, it increases the likelihood of clientelistic practices.

This hypothesis is further enforced when correlating the level of government expenditure as part of the GDP to question A1a. This question looks at how likely it is for the population of a village to obtain funding from the government to improve their basic amenities if the population did not vote for that candidate (Berenschot). The result is the following:

Table 4.2: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” “District Statistics”)

		Perc_Govt_E xp	A1a
Perc_Govt_Ex p	Pearson Correlation	1	-,339*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,035
	N	39	39
A1a	Pearson Correlation	-,339*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,035	
	N	39	39

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

This time there is a quite weak correlation between the two variables, yet the data is significant. What this means is that the less people vote for the successful candidate, the less likely they are to get basic reparations to facilities such as: roads, electrification, schools etc, shown by the -0.3. McMann sets forth the idea that economic independence and autonomy is critical in order for democracy to function (4). If it is not the case, an area is too dependent on the state, there is a tendency for state interference in private ventures, consequently inhibiting democratic practices (4). McMann’s hypothesis is directly reflected in this data analysis, which demonstrates that if the state is able to have its way, it results in clientelistic practices that are put forth.

In contrast to this, when measuring the level of industrial activity in contrast to the same variable, A8a, the other side of the coin comes to light.

Table 4.3: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” “District Statistics”)

		Correlations	
		A8a_dis	Perc_Ind_Gd p
A8a_dis	Pearson Correlation	1	-,356*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,026
	N	39	39
Perc_Ind_Gd p	Pearson Correlation	-,356*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,026	
	N	39	40

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Again, what is most important is to confirm whether the findings are statistically significant, which in this case it is. As a result, the research hypothesis can be confirmed, meaning that industrial activity reduces the level of clientelism, specifically the amount of contracts given to supporters of political candidates. Industrial activity refers to the percentage of the areas GDP made up by industrial output, as with government expenditure, this data was also found on Berenschot’s “District Statistics”. Typically the level of industry is already a move towards economic diversity and less dependence on natural resources or on the state as a way to sustain livelihood. What this table demonstrates is that there is a weak negative correlation between the two variables, thus economic diversity has certain negative influence over clientelistic practices. Table 3.4 stands in contrast to table 3.2 and 3.3, despite the weak levels of correlation demonstrates, the set of tables denote the effect that economic practices have over the levels of clientelism. Once more, if one takes McMann’s ideas into consideration we find the same conclusions drawn. Moreover, economic independence (as is the case with industry, as it is usually outside of the realm of state control), provides for certain classes with the economic resources to stand against the government (McMann 4-5). Conversely, if we were to apply this case to an area where much of the population’s budget is derived from the state, then they are not equipped with the tools to act against the government. Intuitively, competition between economic sectors allows for healthy governance. This is because not one economic sector is able to set all the informal rules and practices within society. Hypothetically, if a construction firm owner is looking to supply roads, he will more likely be susceptible to engage in clientelistic behaviour if there is one industry or company to supply


roads for. Without his engagement in such practices he would lose out in the market to supply roads, this is also known as the phenomenon of the tragedy of the commons. However, in an economically diverse sector, that firm owner can supply roads to many different industrial sectors, thus he is not compelled to engage in clientelistic behaviour.

In order to further enforce the argument that undiversified economies create clientelism, the case study of Banten will be used to prove this. Syarif Hidayat discusses this in detail in his essay “Shadow State?: Business and Politics in the province of Banten”. On paper, Banten seems like quite a diversified economy, with 50% of the GDP deriving from the processing industry, 17% from the trade, restaurant and hotel sector, and 10% from agriculture (Hidayat 207). On the other hand, Banten has many disfavoured areas, which led to the Indonesian government injecting 216 billion Rupiah in the region, which, “has become one of the main objects of attention from business people in their informal economy practices” (Hidayat 207). What this example demonstrates is the ability for even a relatively diversified market to become undiversified, through the huge sums of money becoming the main target of clientelistic practices. Throughout the chapter, Hidayat only makes Banten specific claims, but the general idea obtained, is that when the construction sector provides for such lucrative possibilities (financed by the state), combined with a weak decentralized state, it creates more incentive for local politicians and business elite to collude and monopolize state resources for personal benefit.

Nevertheless, the hypothesis that natural resources influences clientelistic behaviour has yet to be verified. The only data available on all the districts and cities in terms of natural resources is the percent of GDP that is derived from mining activities. When correlating this data to question A11a, When a campaign donor asks for help to get a permit to build a commercial building in area officially designated for farming, how likely is it that the District head/Mayor will arrange the building permit?” or A8a, inconclusive results are found. In her text: “Elite Competition in Central Sulawesi” found in *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local politics in post-Suharto Indonesia*, Aragon demonstrates how the use of natural resources are key for political rents (39). Furthermore, the creation of new districts throughout Indonesia are key to controlling lucrative positions, migration flows, control of construction and so forth (Aragon 52-53). This idea is reflected in Aspinall’s text “Nation in fragments” stating that when Indonesia democratized it had 341 districts. By 2010 the figure stood at 497” (Aspinall 2013 39). Hence, the creation of new districts presents for many predatory and economic opportunities of itself. Coupled with the abundance of natural resources, Aragon explains that

new districts are a real playground for patrons and their predatory interests to gain control of resource rich areas (61). Hadiz and Robinson reflect this idea, that for local political actors in resource rich regions outside Java, there is immense economic sense for them to break from the shackles of central control and monopolize those resources for themselves (235). Aspinall pushes this argument further, by synthesizing the notion of decentralized and weak state of Indonesia he claims that a gold rush mentality took over with “local politicians, bureaucrats, and their allies plundering state budgets, regional assets, and natural resources” (2013 38). This demonstrates the abundance of authors that make reference to the notion that natural resources are one of the main determinants of clientelistic practices, especially within the state’s context. As mentioned earlier, the data shows immense incongruence with the qualitative research done.

Graph 4.2: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey” “District Statistics”)



What the graph reveals is that there is no effect of the level of mining on the amount of contracts distributed to close political connections. According to the authors mentioned above, the only area that holds true to their hypotheses is Kutai Kartanegara, a district in the east of Kalimantan.

Table 4.4: (Source: Berenschot “District Statistics” And “Expert Survey”)

A11a	Mining as part of GDP	Location
4,77	1,78	Kota Kupang
4,62	0,85	Kota Bandar Lampung
4,55	1,62	Kota Palangka Raya
4,54	83,92	Kutai Kartanegara
4,43	0	Kota Medan

What the table above demonstrates is the 5 highest values based on question A11a. Thus this completely counters the argument that the authors above propose. In fact four of the five highest values are from cities in Indonesia. Does this mean that infact urban areas are susceptible to clientelistic practices? Indirectly yes, the 4 other cities are all provincial capitals. Potentially this means that clientelistic practices, especially contract allocation, is extremely prevalent in provincial capitals.

Table 4.5: (Source: Berenschot “Expert Survey”)

A8a	Location
5,57	Semarang
5,46	Garut
5,45	Kota Padang
5,36	Batang
5,15	Manggarai Barat

Despite it being a lower number, in the table above there are 2 of the 5 areas which are provincial capitals. Question A8a also concerns the hanging out of contracts to political supporters. Beneath the top 5, many other provincial capitals took the top spots, such as Kota Banda Aceh, the capital of the Aceh province. As a result, there is some consistency that is found, in terms of the function of the city and its vulnerability to clientelistic practices. Aragon alludes to this phenomenon as well. Despite her text being Sulawesi specific, she constantly refers to provincial capitals as a way for agendas to become reality. Furthermore, due to decentralization of Indonesia, these provincial capitals have a lot more autonomy. In contrast, under Suharto choices were made in Jakarta (Aragon 65). What this means is that because of decentralization, provincial capitals have final say over economic decisions. Like with Brussels, provincial capitals are places where lobbyists are able to influence legislative outcomes, as Aragon discusses in her Sulawesi specific discussion (55). Thus there is great interests for many parties to be present and ready to lobby in such cities, especially in cities

that represent resource rich provinces. In table 3.4, out of the 4 provincial capitals 2 are provincial capitals in areas that are mining intensive, Medan in Aceh and Kota Palangka Raya in Central Kalimantan. Thus there is incentive for many individuals to take advantage of the economic context. Moreover, Aceh and Central Kalimantan are also known for their other natural resources such as gas, coal and timbre. With this in consideration, Aspinall, Hadiz and Robinson's arguments may hold some truth. Nevertheless, the data demonstrates that such behaviour does not directly occur in the resource intensive areas, instead in the locations where decisions are made; a similar phenomenon to the legislative assembly described in Chapter 2.

Another similarity that is seen with Chapter 2 and 3 is the disproving of certain qualitative information. The main impetus for looking at natural resources and its influence on clientelism is the breadth at which it is discussed in a multitude of texts. Thus, a great deal of data which supported the hypotheses put forth by a multitude of authors was expected. Yet what can be concluded is that resources do have a limited influence on clientelism, as it incentivizes predatory interests, especially when competing parties work to determine legislative outcomes. Yet, overall what this chapter demonstrates is that, where high levels of money are invested and are to be made, both in terms of state dependency and resource intensiveness, it increases the likelihood for clientelistic enterprises. Therefore, based on the statistical analysis chapters 2 to 4, there is only a single factor which yields influence over clientelistic behaviour, which is economic characteristics and diversity of particular areas. What this entails is that where there is great opportunity to make money, either through natural resources or through state funded projects, there is an increased impetus from the behalf of political actors and businessmen to partake in clientelistic behaviour. Money making opportunities breeds for clientelistic inclinations in Indonesia.

VI. Chapter 5: Consequences of Findings and Survey Discussion

The "Expert Survey" has demonstrated throughout this thesis that clientelism and vote-buying are very widespread in Indonesia. There are certain factors that exacerbate clientelistic strategies, however, on the whole, it seems that there is not one area in Indonesia which seems to be free of this phenomenon, and throughout the thesis the data confirms the entrenched nature of clientelism in Indonesia. But what impact does this have on life in Indonesia?

This is a widely discussed topic in today's literature on Indonesian political life. For Edward Aspinall, clientelism has led to the fracturing and loss of polarity in Indonesian

Politics. What he states is that fragmentation due to clientelism has resulted in a lack of powerful and permanent poles of attraction (Aspinall 2013 35). The fact that there is an absence of a strong central state means that now on the local level there is no direction from central authority and ministries are constantly fighting for control over patronage networks. Political openness today means that more actors can join the clientelistic field, without the constrain of Suharto and his party (Aspinall 2013 31). Consequently, politics in Indonesia are no longer determined by ideological rational, instead it is a matter of where money can be made. This is exemplified by the fact that according to Aspinall, today there is an ease with which organizations from starkly differing backgrounds can work together with ease (2013 36). Based on the claims made by Aspinall, the theme of a weak decentralized state is at the roots of clientelistic practices. This is not an isolated opinion. What Hadiz and Robinson recommend in order to better the situation in Indonesia, is that “economic and political reform... need to be enforced politically and through political struggle” (Hadiz and Robinson 237). A very similar opinion on betterment is put forth by Syarif Hidayat, where he recognizes that re-centralization of power in the hands of central government is a potential option according to many academics (224). A central control over political affairs could mean that there is an end to the poorly constructed projects, created by project racketeering, throughout Indonesia, which is accepted as business as usual (Aragon 53). Such inefficiencies are not limited to the construction and infrastructure section. They are found throughout Indonesia, where, “the wrong people are recruited, placed, promoted and transferred for the wrong reasons” (Blunt et al. 219). This paints a worrying picture of Indonesia, a country far removed from meritocratic elements, where it is all about who you know and what you can supply that person. Such an image is reflected in our data findings, where on average, people claim that 40-60% of major district/city contracts go to businessmen which have supported the successful political candidate (Berenschot Expert Survey).

Despite the fact that the “Expert Survey” does come into agreement with the entrenched nature of clientelism in Indonesia, its weaknesses need to be addressed. First and foremost, this survey is based on perception. Thus it questions local experts on the ground, however, it is a matter of perception. The responses given by the interviewees are only based on how they view the situation. Nevertheless, in each area, multiple amounts of experts were interviewed, from varying political backgrounds, thus their perceptions synthesized to create a more neutral outlook on the questions posed. Tied to this is the fact that perception does not lead to very accurate answers. For many of the survey’s questions, the possible answers given were either, a range of percentages, such as 40-60%, or another form of estimation, such as:

likely, very likely and so forth. This results in answers that are perhaps quite removed from reality, as even the word likely can differ from person to person based on what they perceive is frequent or likely. Another questionable part of the survey is that the interviewees might have been scared to give their honest opinion. This is a common problem with all surveys, that often people might not bring their full opinion to light. In order to tackle this potential problem, Ward Berenschot added a section in his “Expert Survey” where he rated the trustworthiness of the interviewee, and only counted the responses given by those deemed trustworthy.

Despite the negative sides of the survey, there are some things I would like to commend Berenschot on. He carried out parts of his survey in Indonesia, however, he delegated his tasks to other people such as professors throughout Indonesia. These people were known in their respective regions and were therefore able to carry out the survey to maximum efficiency and create increased reliability of the responses. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Ward Berenschot to share his work with me. Through his efforts I was able to compare and contrast qualitative and quantitative work done on clientelism in Indonesia, and create my own conclusions from the two sets of sources. His incredible efforts to culminate a wide range of answers on the polemic of vote-buying and clientelism in Indonesia provide a very well rounded and global perspective on how different regions vary or not in their clientelistic practices, and provide a great background in order to determine what influences clientelistic practices.

VII. Conclusion

As mentioned several times in this thesis, the combination of primary sources, constituting the “Expert Survey” and the “District Statistics” along-side the secondary sources, allowed for the confirmation or negation of certain hypotheses. This thesis provides for a well-rounded argumentation on what constitutes clientelism, what its driving forces are in Indonesia and what the impacts are of such practices. By looking at three potential determinants of clientelism, this thesis was able to confirm some of those perceived determinants and create alternate hypotheses for other determinants.

The main aim of this thesis was to discover the source of clientelism in Indonesia based on three prominent factors from the literature. The first of these factors was to look at urban and rural divisions and whether such cleavages were integral to clientelistic behaviour. What was seen in Chapter 2 was that these cleavages played no role in the level of perceived clientelism. Instead what was concluded was that Indonesia has largely held on to informal

and more traditional forms of societal and political organization, as has been claimed by Scott. Consequently, political actors active in cities or in the country side do not adapt their behaviour, due to the pervasiveness of clientelistic behaviour in this respect. Seeing as there was a lack of conclusions that could be drawn from urban and rural divides, the next division that was to look at whether poverty—a topic much discussed in literature on clientelism—had any effect on the political behaviour of people in Indonesia. Once more, the statistical results were that in Indonesia poverty plays no role in the presence of clientelism in Indonesia. Therefore, this could be discarded as a possible source of clientelism. Lastly, the remaining factor of clientelism which was noted in literature was economic activity. The results that were found was that non-diversified economies, especially state dependent economies are likely to suffer from clientelistic practices, due to a monopolization of economic and political practice conventions by few actors, as demonstrated through the tragedy of the commons idea. Therefore, what can be said is that it is not a matter of urban or rural distinctions which exacerbates traditional political ties, nor is it poverty which inclines people to partake in political clientelism. Instead it can effectively be said that the main driver for clientelism and vote-buying is found in centres where large sums of money and profits are up for contention.

I believe that this thesis successfully analyses the different urban and rural divisions and whether there are certain aspects which tend to influence clientelism more. Seeing as I had statistical data at my disposal, this gave me more liberty in determining what the actual contributors to clientelism are in Indonesia. The short-comes of this thesis were that there was a plethora of data available and thus endless graphs could be constructed in order to arrive at a conclusion. But the scope of my thesis did not allow for me to discuss every determinant of clientelism in great detail. An important area in where this topic could be expanded, is in creating more concrete reasons as to why Indonesia does not embody large sociological divisions in clientelism, especially in the realms of urban and rural and why poverty does not cast such great influence over clientelism as is with other countries. On the whole, given my scope, I believe that I provided plausible reasons to explain certain divisions in clientelistic practices in Indonesia, yet there is room to expand on these further.

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