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Master Thesis

Building the world: Situating Pyongyang's architecture between globalization, history, and inhabited space

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“You must have wondered why these streets are unlit, and so dark. No matter, how bright and lively the streets in capitalist countries are, there is no future in those streets. We may have difficulties now but we have hopes for the future. Our aim is to build perpetually lively streets not ephemeral ones.”

Kim Jong Il

Table of Contents

Introduction

The photo album 'Inside North Korea' by Oliver Wainwright (2018) was recently published by Taschen. It presents Pyongyang's architecture with colorful and animated pictures introducing the city, its propagandistic architecture, and North Korea as a unique and authentic place inviting the reader to further engage with it. In terms of urban research the album does a good job, but from an International Relations (IR) point of view, it provides an overly romanticized interpretation of Pyongyang and North Korea which is exemplified with subtitles such as *'constructing a socialist fairyland'* or the *'leader's embrace'*. On the one hand this makes the album the dismissal of North Korea as architectural propaganda, and it treats the socialist state on the level of a joke, framing it from a capitalist, outsider view, hinting at a hierarchy. Contrarily the album is a response to the information the ordinary observer receives from the media about North Korea, which tends to reduce it to its humanitarian issues, nuclear plans, and indoctrinating socialist state propaganda glorifying the Kim dynasty (Shim and Nabers, 2011). Propaganda is generally considered as the 'motor' of the North Korean state (Oh and Hassing, 2004) and it is usually associated by the outside world as 'evil' (Taylor, 2013). Consequently, North Korea becomes understood in a binary opposition, either framed as malevolent failed state, or something authentic that should be studied more closely, taking into account the everyday lives of the North Korean people.

The latter strand within academia is the so called 'alternative turn within North Korean studies' - taken on by, among others, Armstrong (2011), Kang (2011), Lankov (2013), MCeachern (2010), Young (2010), and Oh and Hassing (2004) These researchers aim to establish what 'true' North Korea is like by looking at the *inside*. However, given the closed nature of the North Korean state, it is incredibly difficult to access the everyday and give a 'true' representation through research and theory application. Especially in the case of North Korea, its construction from the outside is always mediated, and framed by the hierarchy of the power/knowledge production, a position that originates from a dominant Western view (Choi, 2014). Therefore, both mainstream IR accounts, presenting North Korea as a 'problem', and the 'alternative turn' showing North Korea as a unique object of study are continuously producing difference and 'Otherness' that "privileges those doing the constructing and subordinates the Other" (Choi, 2014, p. 9), often dealing with that difference through violence.

This study generally understands research or theory that claims to be a 'true' representation, never fully representational. Research and theory are rather always what Max Weber and Patrick Jackson called ideal-types; processes of the ordering of empirical realities, the transmutations of cultural values into useful analytical tools but always in terms of the specific theoretical interests. Moreover, Weber argues further that "in its conceptual reality this analytical construct is found nowhere in empirical reality, it is a utopia" (Weber, 1999, quoted in Jackson, 2010, p.143). So looking at the *inside*, and finding out what the everyday really means in North Korea is never truly possible, not just because the country is closed and there is a lack of so called research data, it is due to the characteristics of social scientific research itself.

Nonetheless, one research methodology many scholars of the 'alternative turn' refer to is to look at the specific aesthetic representations of North Korean propaganda culture, such as architecture (Kim, 2007, Joinau, 2014; Atkins, 1996), music and opera (Lim, 2017; Korhonen, Cathcart, 2017, Kim, 2014), posters (Heather and De Ceuster, 2008; Myers, 2011), cinema (Armstrong, 2002, Mironenko, 2016), through which North Korea projects itself both to the inside and the outside world. To this end, Roland Bleiker in 'The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory' (2001) argues for the study of world politics via its cultural and aesthetic representations. It is hoped the aesthetics will reveal the often problematic relationship between the 'body politic' and the 'social body' (Lefebvre, 2009), or in IR the tensions within the so called agent-structure debate (Wendt, 2004; Jackson, 2004, Suganami, 1999; Roberts, 2006; Adler, 1997). Although the production of propaganda is highly controlled by the state (de Ceuster, 2011, Lim, 2017) its interpretation, at least partially, is up to the viewer (the agent, or the individual within society). This therefore provides some limited agency in maneuvering the largely state controlled relation between the individual and the state. In relation to this, Bleiker makes the important point that there is always a gap between a form of representation and what is represented therewith; it is only the aesthetic and cultural insights that are able to recognize what exactly is in this gap between the representation and the represented where the location of politics is hidden (Bleiker, 2001, p. 510). In this study, this rule of politics of misrepresentation applies on two levels of analysis applied in IR: both at the national, state level, relating to the 'local clash' between the North Korean state and its citizens, and at an international level between a 'backwards, socialist North Korea' and the 'modern, globalized outside world'.

Similarly to previous research this study joins the 'alternative turn' in that it looks into North Korea via its aesthetic representations, especially focusing on Pyongyang's socialist propaganda architecture. By this, it may do 'violence' to the subject matter, which as Choi says is inevitable when encountering identity/difference (Choi, 2014). More important is to be mindful of the specific position that the research is constructed from (Choi, 2014, p. 10). This leads to a larger debate and the overall goal of this research: to join the group of *reflexivist* IR scholars (Shine Choi, Jenny Edkins, R. B. Walker , Ann Tickner, Patrick Jackson, David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah) who choose the decentering of Western hegemonic knowledge and power production as their prerogative. As a result, this study offers a take on Pyongyang's architecture as a cultural and aesthetic representation of North Korea, with a carefully positioned view that accounts for the hierarchy of the researcher's position. The thesis prioritizes a more pluralistic methodology of reflexivity, in that it is committed to a systematic analysis of the role of the knowledge producer. Therefore, the research will have the ability to yield knowledge within its broader social context (Tickner, 2011, p. 616). Consequently, the aim of this study is to discover how North Korea is constructed both by the outside world and from within; joining the two strands that try to understand it from the point of view of the everyday and from the angle of high politics and state relations. Instead of focusing on a clash of civilizations the emphasis is on creating a dialogue that shows the multiple ways in which civilizations borrow from each other. The dialogue happens at the edge of civilizations, where difference is encountered and a bottom-up logic of emancipation/resistance is entwined with a top-down logic of imperial domination (Hobson, 2007, p. 93).

One of the more recent concepts within IR that encapsulates the dialogical position of reflexivity is 'worlding' coined by Ole Weaver and Aerlene Tickner in the series 'Worlding Beyond the West' (2009). 'Worlding' helps to explore the geo-cultural factors in setting the epistemologies through which IR knowledge is produced and it identifies alternatives where researching the international is more in tune with local practices and traditions (Holden, 2014). Moreover, in the field of urban sociology 'worlding' practices are also applied when analyzing cities and their architectural landscape, as they are believed to be representational of 'entire worlds' and the center of accumulation of 'worlding; practices (Ong, 2011; Massey, 2005; Laszczkowski, 2016). As Ong (2011) put it, caught in the trajectories of particular histories, national ambitions,

and streams of cultures, cities and their urban development have always been the main sites for launching so called world-conjuring projects.

Applying the concept of 'worlding' will help this research, as it is focused solely on Pyongyang but extrapolates its findings to the entirety of North Korean society and then to the rest of the globe. Here Pyongyang is viewed not as a fixed locality but as a particular nexus of situated and transnational ideas, institutions, actors, and practices that may be drawn together for solving particular problems (Ong, 2011), relating to the relationship between the state and the everyday. Through looking at Pyongyang's evolving architectural landscape as a practice of 'worlding', the formation and entanglement of North Korean personal and state identities, the clash between the body politic and the social body, and the tensions between the socialist, utopian vision of the North Korean regime and a globalized, capitalist world are all encapsulated. Overall 'worlding' helps to put Pyongyang's architecture into a transnational historical context, examining the different myths, narratives, and imageries, that are endorsed and performed in the cultural realm, hoping to gain a deeper understanding on the construction of North Korea both globally and domestically. As a result of the deconstruction, the spatial categories of domestic and international and the different temporalities of modern (capitalistic) and traditional (socialist) represented in Pyongyang's built form, are reconfigured and understood as overlapping, interrelated and forever in motion and formation. Moreover, in being reflexive the study goes so far as to claim that it is North Korean propaganda and in this case propagandistic architecture that does the 'worlding', and creates that reflexive dialogue. It is the motor, the regulator but also the mediator in North Korean society, which goes against the general negative conception of propaganda. Consequently, the aim of this research is to deconstruct and reconstruct the view on North Korea and on North Korean propaganda, in advocating that it has the ability to equally fix and unfix space, time, and personal and state identities. Propaganda as a North Korean 'worlding' project, as much as it seems to be single mindedly propagating the interests of the Kim dynasty, instead is viewed a dialogical and organic exchange, which shapes alternative social visions and configurations, that is, 'worlds' (Massey 2005; Ong 2011; Laszczkowski, 2016).

The concept of propaganda as a 'worlding' practice is highlighted in the history of North Korea at times of socio-economic changes, which also translate into the built environment, as Lefebvre (2003) argued that each new politico-economic formation (mode of production) yields qualitatively different spatial relations.

Since the 1950s, in North Korea there have been several of these moments of change which can be considered 'heterotopic' (Foucault 2008; Stavrides, 2007) moments where different North-Korean socio-economic agendas contest each other. The reasons and origin of heterotopic moments vary from domestic to international pressures, such as forces of globalization or economic and social crises. As such, new forms of architectural tissue build a new 'layer' into the old landscape, representing each new politico-economic era, which can be read as text manifesting the characteristics of particular historical times.

Although this study mentions the heterotopic moments of the past in North Korean history, its main focus is on the recent past (Utopia then?), the present (Utopia now?) and the near future (Heterotopia). So to say, the lead up and the consequences of the heterotopic moment of 2002, when the North Korean regime transitioned to a capitalist market economy. In this regard, the period between 1989 and 2002, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting crisis of the North Korean economy, can be considered a leading up, 'threshold period' (Stravrides, 2007); where a mix of locally and globally influenced everyday practices relating to the inhabitation of Pyongyang give the impetus for the North Korean regime to transition its economy. Moreover, it is assumed that with regards to inhabitation, the heterotopic moment of 2002 is greater than the ones before because the state implemented an entirely new economic system with different conceptions of land ownership (Yim, 2017), which yielded entirely new everyday practices that eventually show in the built form of Pyongyang.

Additionally, this study postulates that when this heterotopic moment occurred, there was an alteration in how the North Korean state theorized itself and acted, due to the clash between the state and the social body. Since it is in heterotopias where different socio-economic agendas meet in order to create new/different futures (Stavrides, 2007), there must be an opening towards the new of the 'Other'. Consequently, this opening necessitates that the North Korean regime shifts from its generally authoritarian, mechanistic, and Hobbesian state of nature to a more organismic, Kantian entity. Here the change, whether it comes from a domestic pressure or it is influenced by international trends is adapted, providing a basis for a heterotopic future.

How the heterotopic moment occurs and translates into spatial relations and architectural form in Pyongyang is studied. Therefore the research is divided into two parts and conducted as follows:

Part one first explains the mechanisms of 'worlding', then establishes how Juche philosophy, propaganda, and the clash between the body politic and the social body work while also explaining the Hobbesian and Kantian theorizations of the state.

Then the study moves onto discussing North Korea's and especially Pyongyang's past regarding its architectural morphology. The section 'Power of Monuments' sheds light on how Hobbesian architectural propaganda works. Then, the sections 'Pyongyang's Monumentalization' and 'Social and Spatial Control Through Propagandistic Opera', explain Pyongyang's history and highlight its main monumental sites. It is concluded that although there have been heterotopic moments in each phase of the construction, the North Korean regime generally maintains its Hobbesian modus operandi.

Part two focuses on the heterotopic moment of North Korea's economic transitioning to a capitalist market economy, and as such the transformation from past to present. Moreover a possible future prediction is described with the help of the study: (Un)precedented Pyongyang (2016), which predicts how the city of Pyongyang could look if it took on a capitalist but still uniquely North Korean path. However, keeping the exercise of 'worlding' in mind, the meaning and use of such a prediction is contemplated, situating the research of Pyongyang's architecture and North Korea's personal and state identities in the bigger picture of reflexive International Relations research.

Part One – Worlding the model socialist city

'Worlding' – space-time and the city of Pyongyang

The focus of this study is the city of Pyongyang, and its evolving architectural representations, which are simultaneously produced by (understood as in Lefebvre's production of space, 2008) and projected onto both state and personal identities, which is a so called 'worlding' exercise. 'Worlding' practices are urban interventions which attempt to establish or break already existing horizons of urban standards in and beyond a particular city (Ong, 2011). Consequently, the importance of the city as the object of observation lies in the fact that cities have always been the main sites for launching world-conjuring projects, where national ambitions, different historical trajectories, and cultures could come together (Ong, 2011). Similarly to other capital cities, Pyongyang has been a center for enormous political and financial investment and cultural activity, providing the city with the ability to instigate North Korea's claims for global significance as part of a competition of defining global hierarchies of value (Laszczkowski, 2016). In short, the building and rebuilding of cities has consistently been one of the principal ways of exercising the power of 'world making' (ibid) and it is not any different in the case of Pyongyang. The construction of North Korean personal and state identities, involves a constant spatially and historically situated 'worlding' and 're-worlding' exercise represented in the built environment, where actors on multiple levels come together in an activity of space and place making. It is the interconnected but often uncoordinated relationships between officially produced ideologies, images and myths, and the details of everyday life (ibid) that together transform the city of Pyongyang and its citizens, which then have the power to affect North Korea but also the globe at large. Therefore, understanding Pyongyang's evolving landscape within the theory of 'worlding' helps to make connections and compare the constructions of different global imaginaries such as socialism, capitalism, modernization, and globalization. The above mentioned global imaginaries are also specifically situated in time, and carry a particular hierarchical value system dividing Western and non-Western in spatial and temporal terms. Consequently, it is key to consider the entanglements of space and time in built form and social dynamics when the focus is on reflexively de-constructing and re-constructing Pyongyang and North Korea.

Moreover, concerning the entanglement of space and time, constructing pasts and futures - and the identities they command - in the material form of the built environment is a crucial element of the politics of space and place (ibid). As it will be discussed in detail, Pyongyang, subject to different phases of reconstruction is a place where the politics of spatio-temporal entanglements are especially highlighted, because the erasure of old and construction of new city spaces were/are expected to establish new versions of history and embody desired futures (Laszczkowski, 2016, Atkins, 1996). In this manner, particular qualities and meanings of time are materialized in the landscape and built environment of Pyongyang. The meanings of various periods of history change along with the built environment and its social use, where national and personal temporalities often clash (Laszczkowski, 2016). However, within this clash, new and old visions of the state come together with the specific meanings that emerge from everyday practices of situated actors to create a co-presence of old and new in the built environment. Taking the above mentioned clash between the social and political body into account, 'worlding' projects are then spatializing interventions where the focus is on problems of mediation associated with modern life and specific national interests (Ong, 2011). Therefore, 'worlding' is a problem solving practice that is in play shaping the urban field. However, it is also an experiment in the midst of uncertainty without assurances of successful outcomes to the specific problems to be solved (Ong, 2011). As Ong put it, in "the art of being global[…]there has to be an awareness of the uncertainty of urban claims on the future" (Ong, 2011, p. 3). The social outcomes of urban development cannot be predetermined based on capitalist logics of modernization and globalization, instead the study of the construction of North Korea needs to be situated within constantly forming and highly dynamic circumstances, "where there is no singular standard of urban globality; there are many forms of the global in play" (Ong, 2011, p.12).

Overall by taking the view of 'worlding' as the basis for the construction North Korea, the research embraces the heterogenous practices that allow for the emergence of different configurations of global and local situations, which are seen as always in formation. 'Worlding', allows the study to understand and remap North Korea's relationships of power at different scales, times, and localities (ibid). The next chapter explains how it is actually North Korean propaganda that accumulates the different elements of space and time, and applies them in mediating the social and the political, which then assigns propaganda to be the executor of 'worlding' practices in North Korea, but especially in Pyongyang.

From a Western perspective, propaganda is generally considered to be as something evil. Philip M. Taylor (2013) gives a definition of propaganda which takes into account this Western view:

> "From the perspective of our modern information and communications age, the word 'propaganda' continues to imply something evil. Threatening our increasingly free and globalized society; afflicting our individual and collective capacity to make up our own minds […] It is […] utilized by 'mind manipulators' and 'brainwashers' […] who somehow subliminally control our thoughts in order to control our behavior to serve *their* interests rather than our own" (Taylor, 2013, p. 1).

From this, it follows that a state like North Korea, where propaganda is one of the most effective and frequently used tools to keep the authoritarian regime alive, is inherently looked at as an enemy of the West, while North Korean citizens are often portrayed as controlled and 'brainwashed', therefore to be pitied. Oh and Hassig (2004) argue similarly in 'North Korea through the looking glass' that:

> "[…]No government in the twentieth century has succeeded in exercising as much control over its people as has the Kim government. A half-century of propaganda and social control has shaped the attitudes, values, and behavior of the masses and the elite. The goal of this ideological and behavioral shaping is to transform the North Korean people into selfless socialists who unquestioningly obey their leaders. The Kims' attempt at total control, with multiple layers of control mechanisms reinforcing a corpus of lies, has created a society that on the surface is remarkably stable and resistant to change, considering the dire economic straits into which the people have fallen. But underneath this facade is a society riddled with corruption and plagued by dissatisfaction" (Oh and Hassig, 2004, p. 145).

Although, Oh and Hassig agree with the brainwashing capacity of propaganda, they also identify its possible incompleteness, which leaves the political subjectification and indoctrination of people via propaganda a complicated issue full of contradictions. With regards to the subjectification of people, Lefebvre in 'The State in the modern World' asks the question:

> "How can the centralized state submit millions and often hundreds of millions of people, their private affairs and their everyday lives to the management and homogeneity of the state?" (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 113).

In order to understand North Korea it is essential to answer this question, as the answers will identify further tensions between the North Korean people, propaganda, the North Korean state, and also the international community.

Inherently, the analysis of these tensions and the answer to this question runs on the two levels of the international system and the national sub-system, which always interact. Therefore, in order to study North Korea, IR's generally flat conception of the state needs to be dismissed (Singer, 1961). Additionally, the issue of systems and subsystems or, in other words, agents and structures need to be problematized. Here, the international, systemic level helps to examine North Korea's relations to the international community as a whole (ibid), while enabling the study of patterns of interactions with regards to global change and power relations. On the other hand, the national or subsystem level of analysis permits a detailed study of North Korea's domestic politics, which allows for comparison with other nation states while avoiding inaccurate generalizations and homogenization (ibid).

Therefore, the North Korean state is viewed both as an agent within the international systemic level, and a structure on the national level, under which individual agents are organized. Moreover, Alexander Wendt explains the reciprocal effects that structures and agents have on each other at both levels of analysis. He writes: 'structure exists, has effects, and evolves only because of agents and their practices' (Wendt, 1999, p. 185). Additionally, Wendt argues that if states are agents within the international community then, similarly to agents within the national level, states can be studied as persons, acting on the systemic level. However, as a response to the personhood of the state, and to highlight the importance of individual agents both under the state and the international community, Patrick Jackson argues, if states are people, then people are states too (Jackson, 2004), as in they are both social actors empowered to speak on behalf of each other (ibid). Overall, the consideration of the personhood of states and the statehood of individuals hints at a complicated relationship between states, people, and the international community: they are always overlapping, but incompatible at times, and the limitations mostly play out on the side of

the agents. Keeping in mind this complicated, and overlapping two level analysis, the research continues to explore the different tensions that arise from the question of how a state can submit its citizens to its will.

Therefore, the first tension to unfold is whether propaganda is evil according to the western perspective, or it is a tool aiding the identity formation of the North Korean the state. The second is about the complicated relationship between the body politic (the North Korean state) and the social body (the people) in North Korea and how propaganda is crucial in holding the two together. Moreover this tension also brings in a contradiction about the theorizing of the state and its relationship with the social body as Hobbesian (mechanical) or Kantian (organismic).

First tension - Propaganda - evil or state tool?

The first tension is about the different Western and North-Korean conceptions of propaganda as evil and 'brainwashing' or functional in the creation of state and personal identities. In order to understand the latter, the implementation and basic tenets of North Korea's Juche philosophy, which serves as the ideology of propaganda needs to be explained.

North Korea's Juche philosophy as the basis of the propaganda machine was implemented in the mid 1950s (Oh and Hassig, 2004; Schinz and Dege,1990), after the soviet liberation of North Korea from the Japanese colonial occupation in 1945, the establishment of the DPRK under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, and North Korea's - and especially Pyongyang's - destruction in the Korean war (1950-53). Although devastating, it provided an opportunity for Kim Il Sung to establish a new socialist state, using propaganda and Juche as tools that would strengthen the sovereignty of North Korea.

Juche essentially means self-reliance and it is a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideas with Confucianism. As a tool to advance the state, Juche shows a "new viewpoint and attitude toward the world" (Il, 1982, p. 7), with the focus on "man as the master of his destiny in transforming the world", (Il, 1982, p. 5) after an era of oppression and war. Juche also dictates that "man maintains his existence and achieves his aims socially […] as a part of the masses of the working class that is the subject of history (Il, 1982, p 7-8). "History then develops through the struggle of the masses to transform nature and society" (Il, 1982,p. 8), which then becomes to serve the masses. "Juche opens up a new era in the development of human history, where the struggle of the masses of the working class is to carry out the historical mission of the revolution … [but only under] the correct leadership" (Il, 1982, p. 9).

Relating to the creation of state identity under the correct leadership, James Scott in 'Seeing like a State' (1998) sums up the necessary elements for the implementation of propaganda or how he calls it "great utopian social engineering schemes":

> It is "the legibility of a society that provides the capacity for large scale social engineering, high modernist ideology provides the desire, the authoritarian state provides the determination to act on that desire, and incapacitated civil society provides the leveled social terrain on which to build" (Scott, 1998, p. 5).

By 'legibility of society' Scott means simplifications and standardizations of everyday life, such as the design of cities, population registers, the introduction of legal discourse and the organization of natural world. According to Scott, they are vital to the maintenance of society's welfare and freedoms but can also be tools for social control in an authoritarian state, such as North Korea. A 'high modernist ideology' is understood as the state's general focus and *faith* in scientific and technical progress and rational order, which is often carried out in visual, aesthetic terms, such as in rationally organized or model cities like Pyongyang. According to Scott, carrying out the construction of such cities is highly dependent on the rulers of states or powerful officials who prefer certain forms of planning and social organization answering to the political interests of those in power. Overall, in the case of North Korea, the implementation of 'great utopian social engineering schemes', or simply propaganda and Juche, was/is about bringing forth a desired utopian transformation, where the high modernist and authoritarian state breaks down all traditional orders and creates a new worldview encompassing and invading the life of its people (Scott, 1998, p. 5). This is a perfect example of a 'worlding' practice that strengthens the sovereignty of the state, which was especially necessary for North Korea following its crisis after the Japanese occupation (1910-45), the revolution (1945-50), and the Korean war (1950-53). As a result, in an emergency situation, the authoritarian state was legitimized under Kim Il Sung who was able to seize power and fulfil his grandiose plan due to a war ridden civil society's lack of capacity to resist the authoritarian state power. By wiping out what has existed before, a new world was conjured up and enforced with the violent repetition of propaganda, which according to Lefebvre (2009), gave the state the power to invade the everyday lives of citizens. As such, the state was able to homogenize the subjective

identities of people as it acted as a "reducer of diversities, autonomies, multiplicities, and differences, and as an integrator of the national whole" (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 108).

One of the major steps of creating a new, uniform North Korean state as well as social identities was the re-construction of Pyongyang as the showcase socialist paradise (Kim, 2007, p. 26). This was envisioned as a 'worlding' practice of propaganda, representing and imposing the interests of the Kimist regime in every possible manner. Here propaganda architecture is used as a tool for keeping the state "myths and phantasm" - as Lefebvre calls them - alive and so overpowering that it makes people identify with the "Master" unconditionally (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 97). Therefore, propaganda and Juche, from a Western perspective, is a purely indoctrinating device. On the other hand, from a North Korean point of view propaganda helps to project state sovereignty and the development of the state in unity under the correct North Korean leadership in accordance with the tenets of Juche. From the North Korean view, propaganda and its function as a state tailoring tool thus provides certainty and a way forward for the entire nation after a period of crisis. This answers Lefebvre's question on the mechanisms of political subjectification, although only valid during a certain period of emergency. Moreover, according to Lefebvre over time, such subjectification always leads to a clash between the body politic and the social body as the needs and freedoms of individuals are dismissed; only what is important for the official observer, in this case, the North Korean regime is taken into account (Scott, 1998). To explain, the next section unfolds the tension between the body politic and the social body also with reference to the different theorizations of the state.

Second tension – The clash between the body politic and the social body

The Hobbesian (mechanical) theorization of the state

As discussed above, through using propaganda in an emergency period, as a tool for the creation of state and personal identities, the clash between the body politic and the social body is totally erased. The conflict between state representations (ideology, myths, and norms), and the actual practice of the citizens (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 108) is thought to be non-existent. However, then Juche as the basis of propaganda is contradicting itself: how can man be self-reliant and a master of his destiny when his personal goals and way of being are prescribed by

the state to carry out the historical mission of the revolution in mass? In this sense, Juche understands man's development exogenously, where the state, or the 'correct leadership' is an alien, authoritative source. Therefore, propaganda and its capacities to remake nature and transform the world to man's liking, is used, as Scott (1998) writes, for social control in an authoritarian state, where individual interests, and identities are homogenized to the interests of the state. This also corresponds to the theorizing of the North Korean state as a Hobbesian mechanical entity. According to Pheng Cheah (2003), the absolutist state's hierarchical nature is justified by the idea that the sovereign and its powers articulate the common good, and to that account society and the state form a contract between atomistic individuals who associate in order to pursue self-interest. This self-interest is understood in terms of separate components in a mechanical body that are only put together for a specific purpose, and the coercive force of the state is there in order to hold together and maintain the association formed similarly to the physical forces that hold a machine together (Cheah, 2003, p. 25). However, the specific purpose of immortalizing the legitimation of a historical mission of the revolution in mass is questionable as it could never accurately represent the collective interests of society.

This problem of legitimacy and representation in a Hobbesian absolutist state is explained by Pitkin (1967), who writes that according to Hobbes, "a multitude of men authorize a man, or an assembly of men […] the right to represent the person of them all […] to be their representative: everyone shall authorize all their actions and judgements of that man, or assembly of men […] as if they were his own " (Pitkin 1967, p. 29). Thus, it is precisely because one person represents them that they constitute a unity (Pitkin 1967, p. 30). Yet, according to Hobbes this unity belongs to the representer and not to the represented (Pitkin 1967), so to say the purpose and development of North Korea is delineated by the Kim regime, which possibly causes a clash between the people and the state. However, the authorization in the form of representation given to the sovereign (the regime) is not unlimited for the subjects acknowledge themselves to be authors of what the representative says and does p30. Therefore the sovereign has duties, although according to Hobbes they cannot be claimed by the subjects, - as the sovereign is "representative unlimited" (Pitkin 1967, p. 31) - still the sovereign must interpret his duties in the light of his own conscience, which derive from the purposes for which his subjects formed civil society and authorized him, therefore, he is obliged by the law of nature (Pitkin, 1967).

Regarding the problem of representation in a Hobbesian state, this study holds that as different historical circumstances and therefore different purposes of civil society arise through the development of North Korea, the Kimist regime (the sovereign) needs to adapt itself (its conscious) and its propaganda to changes in the global world and within its society. As a result, the interpretation of 'correct leadership' in the tenets of Juche, with regards to the regime's duties and manner of representation must also change in order to be legitimate in accordance to the circumstances of a given historical period (Rhodes, 1996). Such a change requires a breaking with the exogenous, mechanistic and hierarchical model, and necessitates an endogenous conception of the relationship between the social and political body outlined in the next section.

The Kantian (organismic) theorization of the state

The above outlined representational problems necessitate a more dynamic, organismic, and endogenous social contract or representation of the social body by the North Korean state and its propaganda. Here, regarding the question of representation, the interests and autonomy of individuals need to be taken into account. In this sense, Juche can also be understood by the North Korean regime with an emphasis on man as a truly autonomous and self-reliant being, that is able to reconfigure the world, nature and history according to its own reason but still under the conduct of the Kimist leadership. As Juche dictates:

> "The masses of the people who have become legitimate masters of their own destiny are transforming the world and creating a new history of mankind in accordance with their aspirations. This is the basic trend of modern history which no force can ever stop." (Il, 1982, p.9)

How to conceive of such individual agency is given by Kant on various accounts, which apply culture as a link between the cultivation of agency and the phenomenal world (Koyama, 2016) (the national and the international system). Here man's freedom and autonomy is a gift from nature (Cheah, 2003), and therefore it is man's moral obligation and sole purpose to follow his reason and rework history and nature, through culture. According to Pheng Cheah:

> "Culture is the subjective capacity for prescribing rational ends to nature and the activity of actualizing them. But more importantly, it is a self-reflexive activity that brings forth in a rational creature this ability to set ends at all. Because it enables us to be independent of nature, culture frees us. …" (Cheah, 2003, p. 97)

Similarly to Kant, Juche dictates man's independence and freedom as masters of nature through creativity:

> "As history advances, man's position and role as master of the world is strengthened, and the extent of people's domination over the world increases daily through their independent, creative and conscious struggle". (Il, 1982, p.)

Hence, culture provides the possibility of realizing mankind's progress, but this leaves the problem of how to conceive of life in a way that allows for contingent freedom yet purposive direction. Given this issue, Kant turns to an organismic conception of the state, where development as unfolding emerges from man's attempt to theorize his freedom without external forces. Kant's organismic metaphor rejects the derivation of life from an alien source and replaces the hierarchical, mechanical relationship with an egalitarian interdependence between citizens and the state, similar to the relation of parts and whole in an organism (Cheah, 2003, p. 91). Thus, the organismic metaphor of the political body becomes an emancipatory hope, sustaining man's image as an autonomous being with the possibility of spontaneity, creativity and envisioning agency as inherent to man (Koyama, 2016). Society is not formed by a contract for the pursuit of individual self-interest, it is instead a harmonious whole in which individual self-fulfillment and self-development are fostered through social interaction and cooperation (Cheah, 2003, p. 32). The community is therefore held together not by external force and coercion, but by culture where together the individual and the state are able to set common goals for their development. Referring back to Lefebvre, according to the Kantian theorization of the North Korean state, the subjects are not submitted to the will of the state, instead there is a common will to be achieved.

The above outlined two theorizations or outlooks on the world will be helpful in understanding how the North Korean regime and its propaganda can be both enablers and prohibitors of politico-economic, social and thus spatial transformation, in heterotopic

moments. It is assumed that in each heterotopic moment the regime switches from theorizing itself as a Hobbesian state to a Kantian understanding, therefore allowing societal influences to penetrate its decision making. To better understand these heterotopic moments, the next sections focus on the Hobbesian conception of the state and propaganda as a 'worlding' practice relating to architectural form and spatial relations. The power of monuments in Pyongyang as representations of the Kim dynasty myth and the spatial and social control of propaganda architecture between the 1950s and 1980s is discussed.

The Power of Monuments - naturalization and hyperreality

In terms of propaganda architecture as a Hobbesian 'worlding' practice, Peter Atkins talks about the manipulative power of landscape in North Korea and the importance of heritage making in creating a past on which an ideology of the present and the future can be based. According Atkins, within the power relations between landscape and individuals, the latter only have a limited amount of agency due to the processes of naturalization to the dominant ideologies represented in built form. When talking about ideology and naturalization in the monumental landscape of Pyongyang, Atkins writes that the exercise of power in and through landscape has a moral or normative function, which prescribes how the world should be (Atkins, 1996, p. 202). This is either ideologically pursued or is combined with socio-economic processes, where the agency of individuals in power is crucial (ibid), such as the Kim family being in full charge of urban planning. As Kim Dovey points out, no built form can be ripped away from its relations to power because the practice of architecture and urban design depends on those who control the land and the resources (Dovey, 2014). Such power relations in the case of Pyongyang are taken to the extreme, where the physical presence of monuments is deliberately authoritative. Regarding the authoritative and normative function of monumentality Atkins refers to Lefebvre:

> Monumentality … "embodies and imposes a clearly intelligible message ... yet it hides a good deal more: being political, military, and ultimately fascist in character, monumental buildings mask the will to power and the arbitrariness of power

> beneath signs and surfaces which claim to express collective will and collective thought" (Lefebvre, 1991, p143, quoted by Atkins, 1996, p. 202).

So, the world should be in North Korea how it is being prescribed by the Kim family, whether that is the collective will or not, and this world is strongly projected by Pyongyang's architecture. However, following the thoughts of Lefebvre and Atkins, the authoritative, legitimizing and imposing effect of architecture is subtler in the case of Pyongyang because the exact prescriptions of how the world should be are hidden via the process of naturalization. Atkins explains naturalization as an inherent and crucial function of landscape where the familiar images and forms that the citizens pass everyday become normative (Atkins, 1996). To further explain he refers to Duncan who elaborates on the phenomenon of naturalization as the following:

> "It is 'cultural amnesia' which allows the landscape to act as such a powerful ideological tool. By becoming part of the everyday, the taken-for-granted, the objective, and the natural, the landscape masks the artifice and ideological nature of its form and content. Its history as a social construction is unexamined. It is, therefore, as unwittingly read as it is unwittingly written" (Duncan, 1990, p. 17, quoted in Atkins, 1996, p. 202).

Regarding propagandistic architecture, Atkins holds that the North Korean regime plays exactly onto the mechanisms of naturalization, when it carefully selects the historical images, myths, traditions, and relics displayed in an urban landscape as elements of conservation and preservation (Atkins, 1996). Undoubtedly, such culmination of heritage is ideologically and often politically charged (ibid). According to Atkins "Heritage may be *fake* history but it is often of more significance than the *real* past in shaping the future. It may be consumed as highly significant by those who live in societies where people are familiar with the latent messages of embedded signs…" (Atkins, 1996, p. 203). He also discusses the importance of the reconstruction of revolutionary sites, celebrating national heroes and their achievements in the Fatherland Liberation war and the Korean war. He makes the crucial observation that the revolutionary sites are

juxtaposed as leisure parks creating an opportunity for a dual use of free time. He argues that when this principle of dual use of free time is extended to the whole of Pyongyang, the entire landscape of the city (consequently also the DPRK) becomes a realm of "hyper-reality" (ibid); a theme park fashioned to immortalize and celebrate the Great Leader. The North Korean regime excels in the creation of propaganda architecture, so far that Pyongyang became the model of the socialist propaganda city. According to Atkins: "the surreal content of heritage and leisure sites is paralleled on a larger, heroic scale in the extravagance of the city plan which has emerged as a self-conscious epic". (Atkins, 1996, p. 205). Atkins holds that as a result and without even realizing it, the consumers of landscape became obedient and willing participants (Atkins, 1996). This connects to Lefebvre's argument of homogenization and reduction of personal identities to that of the identities of the state. Referring back to Lefebvre's question about the power of the centralized state on its citizens: the state is able to command the everyday lives of millions of people through the naturalizing effects of propagandistic architecture. Although North Koreans are best at understanding and reading the signs embedded in landscape, as it constitutes their everyday surrounding, there is no interpretive debate about the representations and meaning within built form. From a phenomenological point of view, such embedded and fixed meaning of landscape is often referred to as 'a spirit of places', which creates a certain blindness to seeing the effects of social structure and ideology on everyday experience (Dovey, 2009, p. 4). Therefore, the ideological framings of landscape remain hidden and hence powerful (Dovey, 2014, p. 44). According to this argument, with the use of propagandistic architecture and urban planning the North Korean regime achieves 'master manipulation' of its citizens, where the regime's will to power is hidden in every corner. Taking into account the above outlined power of monuments, the following section gives an overview of Pyongyang's reconstruction. The sources generally underline the notion that North Korean propaganda architecture is an oppressive 'worlding' tool of the North Korean regime.

Architecture as Kim dynasty myth

The history of Pyongyang's monumentalization in three phases

Benjamin Joinau (2014) gives meaning to the reconstruction in light of the Kim dynasty myth using a topo-myth analysis. His methodology borrows from Gilbert Durand's "mythodology"

(1993) and treats cultural landscape as text and narrative. Although academic literature may differ, this study joins Joinau in dividing the reconstruction of Pyongyang into the three major phases of: reconstruction and founding (1950-1960), ideological works (1970-1980), and consolidation (1990-2000). The city was planned from the beginning according to the 1953 master plan (Yim, 2016, Schinz and Dege, 1990), but not all parts of the construction were carried out as such.

Each phase of the reconstruction marks a turning point, a heterotopic moment, when different economic and social agendas and intended meanings of the regime were implemented. They are signs in the development of Pyongyang and North Korea as a whole, displaying its changes in perception towards itself and towards the rest of the world through built form.

During the founding period (1950s), the focus was on erecting key monuments according to the master plan of 1953, which included the construction of buildings for the ruling Party, and buildings that would house education and culture, such as The Korean Central History Museum and Kim Il Sung University. Such a move would seem logical for a new regime in the reconstruction of any city. Then, at the time of the reconstruction period (1960s), the focus shifted to the re-building of housing and infrastructure.

Later, in the 1970s and 80s, Pyongyang's main ideological monuments were built. Importantly, this coincides with Kim Jong Il's rise to political power. As the leader on the propaganda and agitation department of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea, he took a particular interest in city planning and architecture (Oh and Hassig, 2004, p. 128). In the 1970s the Kim dynastic cult was strengthened by building recreational sites enhancing the socialist propaganda through sports and culture; socialist culture was reduced to propagandistic entertainment highlighting the importance of revolutionary operas, movies, North Korean mass games, films, and literature (Joinau, 2014). The ideological or mythical center of Pyongyang became situated at the Mansudae complex, while the physical center of the city became Kim Il Sung Square (ibid).

The 1980s was the decade of finalizing the building of great ideological works. This stage was the peak of the monumentalization of the cult of personality and the transformation of that into urban landscape. This showed in the regime's megalomaniac tendencies in wanting to connect North Korea's past and future by re-drafting the city around the Kim family's major achievements and around the Juche ideology. Monuments such as the Grand People's Study House, the Tower of the Juche Idea, the Arch of Triumph, and the Ryugyong Hotel were built or renovated.

The 1990s was the period of economic crisis, famine, and Kim Il Sung's death. The latter meant that the regime was dedicated to consolidating its founding myth by building Kim Il Sung's Mausoleum, and the Iconic Monument to the Party Founding. Conversely, due to the famine and economic hardship, the intensity of constructions decreased, especially compared to the 1980s.

The 2000s was marked by the leading ideas of confirmation and renovation, as the nation was still suffering from economic hardship. Other than the newly erected statue of by Kim Jong Il next to Kim Il Sung, there was no construction of new monuments. However, 100.000 apartment buildings were built from Chinese investment. The construction was supposed to be completed by 2012, marking the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung's birthday. The establishment would serve as the new face of Pyongyang's ideological center and strengthen the rule of Kim Jong Un by linking him to the figure of his grandfather (ibid).

To conclude Pyongyang's reconstruction in terms of "mythodology", by now Pyongyang fully expresses the cult of the totalitarian regime and its myth (ibid) , even though the three phase reconstruction deviated from the original plans. All monumental buildings represent the state activities of the central government and, crucially, the power of the regime. The city of Pyongyang serves as a 'three-dimensional political education' (ibid), constantly reminding its citizens to follow North Korea's Juche ideology and its creator. Citizens are required an "unrestricted readiness to sacrifice everything for the Party and the leader […] to put the interest of revolutionary organizations before everything and to keep rigid discipline" (About the Juche Ideology, 1978, quoted by Schinz and Dege, 1990). Joinau writes that as such Pyongyang became the model for the propaganda city by developing and nationalizing propaganda architecture based on North Korea's Juche philosophy and its myth. In Pyongyang, architecture became a monumental exercise serving as monumental propaganda, where the urbanistic ideological discourse was fully radicalized (Joinau, 2014), though still influenced by global changes.

Drawing on the above outlined model socialist city, the next section explains the connections between the myth of the state, propaganda, and the everyday lives of Pyongyang's citizens through discussing propagandistic opera and architecture.

Spatial and Social control through propagandistic opera and architecture

When analyzing the relationship between North Korean revolutionary operas, architecture and everyday life, Suzy Kim bases her study on the concept of North Korea as a 'theatre state' coined by Clifford Geertz (1980). In investigating North Korea as a theatre state and especially the relevance of Pyongyang as such, she focuses on the two revolutionary operas: *True Daughter of the Party (1971)* and *Song of Mountain Keumkang* (1973). These stage a utopian vision of the capital city and its citizens and characterize Kim Il Sung as the father of the nation's capital.

The creation dates of the operas are the early 1970s, about twenty years after Pyongyang's destruction in the Korean war, which means - as it was stated earlier - that Pyongyang served as a blank page onto which the ideology of the regime could be built on. According to Kim Suzy the revolutionary operas were tools helping to envision the new city. Although Pyongyang as an actual site served as the source of Pyongyang as theatrical illusion in the operas, at the same time, the "real city is reciprocally re-envisioned and consequently reshaped by the image created on stage; in fact, the imagined onstage city served as the blueprint for the real city" (Kim, 2007, p. 26). Here the focus is on a prescribed, ideal, Utopian future Pyongyang, which could be envisioned and presented to the public, through the revolutionary operas. Kim states that "indeed, the overriding mission of every North Korean stage production is to simulate this ideal world as if it were already a part of reality" (Kim, 2007, p. 26). In the opera *Song of Mountain Keumkang*, the projection of Pyongyang as the ideal city, is executed so far that the "scenographic rendering of Pyongyang is a near- photographic depiction of the real city's skyline; the female protagonist envisioned Pyongyang many long years before it was built" (Kim, 2007, p. 29).

Moreover, Kim Il Sung is characterized as the father of the nation – following Juche philosophy, and a Hobbesian top-down hierarchy – applied in the operas as a reference to the future state of Pyongyang. The stage projection of Kim Il Sung's statute in the center of Pyongyang depicts the leader "as the mediator between the dark dystopian present of the Korean War and North Korea's utopian future" (Kim, 2007, p. 30). It seems that in the 1970s, during the production of the operas and arguably during the most intense period of the reconstruction of Pyongyang, the myth of the Kimist state, is inherently connected to the notion of progress. Progress is acted upon by the (re)building of Pyongyang, hence the nation, and simultaneously being represented in artistic creation.

However, through the revolutionary operas not only the ideal Pyongyang was envisioned but also the ideal citizen living in it. As revolutionary opera became the leading national performance genre, sanctioned by the state, it was its a fundamental function to "accurately depict the historical struggle of the founding of the country and the achievements of contemporary national life" (Kim, 2007, p. 27). Recognizable fictional characters from the opera performances became the ideal heroes of North Korea, which one is/was ought to follow (Kim, 2007, p. 33). Adding to the visual and artistic power of the performances, these characters were also painted and displayed on public buildings in Pyongyang (Kim, 2007, p. 34). Consequently, the boundaries between the ideal worlds on stage and the quotidian became blurred (Kim, 2007, p. 33). "North Korean revolutionary operas as propaganda tools created a continuum between the stage and the city by means of visual culture" (ibid), entering the lives of citizens by prescribing both a personality and a Utopian Pyongyang based on North Korea's revolutionary ideology.

By highlighting the significance and power of visual culture- specifically the combination of architecture and opera - in North Korean nation building, Suzy Kim provides also provides answer to Lefebvre's question. The state submits its citizens through the genre of revolutionary opera, which creates a full-blown state identity by projecting of a Utopian Pyongyang, while it prescribes and simultaneously reduces its ideal citizen to the homogeneity of the revolutionary opera hero. The relevance of city planning and monument building in the operas lies in creating both state and personal identities, where personal identities are totally subdued to state identities. Both the staged image of the Utopian Pyongyang and the real-life experience of the built Pyongyang becomes authoritative and legitimizing; a limiting space where only a particular kind of person is allowed to exist.

In connection to Lefebvre's repetition of propaganda as a latent form of violence invading everyday lives, Suzy Kim also emphasizes the importance of repetition in the performance of the operas. From this it follows that monuments alone are not legitimizing enough for establishing and maintaining the authoritarian myth and the power of the Kim dynasty. For the so-called naturalization process to become fully effective in the everyday lives of people, not only people's surroundings but their actual personalities need to be prescribed. The double use of free time and what Atkins called North Korea's hyper-reality is taken even step further through the revolutionary operas. As an example, *The True Daughter of the Party* was not only performed in theatres but also in North Korean mass games, by the citizens. In this sense, both the repetition of the ritual

(opera performance in a form of a mass game) and the surrounding ideal space is necessary for the system to function, which is inherently a combination of spatiality and sociality. As Massey puts it: while space is socially constructed, the social is spatially constructed (Massey, 1993). Therefore, as Kim Dovey writes; place becomes an inextricably intertwined knot of spatiality and sociality (Dovey, 2009, p. 6). Through the mass games performed at Kim Il Sung Square the regime creates its own social and spatial reality. However, Suzy Kim argues that this is a dystopia masked in utopia, where the extravagance of the mass games becomes an absurdity considering the discrepancy between the robust, corpulent opera characters the citizens must perform, and the realities of their meager daily existence" (Kim, 2007, p. 35). The major act that reinforces the North Korean state and myth is a propaganda maneuver that connects space and sociality through mobilizing thousands of people every year to perform and rehears. Here the rehearsals become not a means to an end but an and end in itself, which give a coercive education to the citizens on how to embody the Utopian collective life in a Utopian city (Kim, 2007, p. 37), which also becomes a show, and a projection of a particular image for the outside world.

Space and time in the model socialist city

It seems that architectural propaganda as representation of the Kim dynasty myth resists the modern as it is 'prescribed by other global narratives'. Instead North Korean propaganda production in the period between the 1950s and the 1980s looks inwards to its own history and founding. It uses its own symbols in the reconstruction of Pyongyang to create a unique place within the world; the model propaganda city. From this it follows that propaganda and the myth of the North Korean state are inherently connected since propaganda serves as a 'worlding' tool for keeping the myth thus the state alive. Because of the regime's wish to establish a Utopian self via the projection of a future Pyongyang, in the model socialist city time can be understood in a cyclical manner. The projection of time moves backwards from the future into the present, while somewhat also altering North Korea's past. However, due to its utopian nature the projected future could never be perfectly achieved.

On spatial terms, the combination of a cyclical understanding of time, and the fixed but unachievable future identities and heroes create a collective inhabitation of Pyongyang. In theory everyone has a place to live in the city, while at the same time no one does, as Atkins explained it is living in a "hyperreality". Although Pyongyang's citizens may be blinded and naturalized to the

power and symbols of the city's monuments, being naturalized can also mean not recognizing the signs anymore, hence not associating with them. This eventually creates a reverse effect of what the regime wanted to achieve with propaganda. Throughout its strictly planned reconstruction phases, Pyongyang became so overly framed around glorifying the leaders as part of the regime's utopian vision, that over time its citizens may have become alien to it. By the period of the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the economic crisis, Pyongyang became a city for everyone but for no one as it could never truly exist in how it was imagined. The images of propaganda may have effectively worked during and right after the revolution, when new generations come along who do not necessarily associate with propaganda messages conjured up from revolutionary times, the state needs to adapt its propaganda. It seems the clash between society and the state is amplified, due to the crisis; shown in a mismatch in what the state signals via its propaganda messages, and what the people actually need. Part Two therefore, highlights the problem of the recent past, the present, and the near future, where in terms of 'worlding' North Korean propaganda seems to be stuck in the past time of the model socialist city. Concurrently, propaganda has not adapted to the everyday practices that the recent state ordered transition to a market economy has resulted in. It is an in between period with great tension between the political and the social body as the projections of state propaganda seem to be lagging behind what everyday practices necessitate, hence propaganda has not found its way to be both representative and effective.

Part Two – 'Worlding' the Heterotopia of a Capitalist Juche Communism

At the end of her essay Kim Suzy asks the question: Will the North Korean people ever be able to speak back?" (Kim, 2007, p. 38). To give a partial answer; it is possible that the Utopian vision of Pyongyang and the nation projected through propaganda, glitches with everyday practice. This effectively builds up a threshold situation and a heterotopic moment. This is further theorized as a 'heterotopia' using the prediction of (Un)precedented Pyongyang (2016) in Part Two.

Utopia then, Utopia now? - Pyongyang the city of thresholds

'Utopia then?' relates to North Korea's past where Suzy Kim's comment in "Mothers and Maidens Gendered formation of Revolutionary Heroes in North Korea' is relevant. She says that the heroes projected by propaganda "may have once been representative of new forms of subjectivity for a historically specific struggle but they have now become a part of an idealized past mapped onto a romanticized epic narrative, casting the revolution and its revolutionary agents no longer within time, but outside of it, at once ahistorical and fixed" (Kim, 2014, p. 276). From a Western point of view, and possibly from a North Korean perspective as well, the Utopian image of social life prescribed by the operas, other 'worlding' propaganda tools, and crucially for this research architecture are based on outdated historical inventions, or what Atkins (1996) called "carefully selected heritage" displayed onto the people. Such social engineering is similarly described by what Scott (1998) referred to as 'state maps of legibility': the administrative ordering of society via simplification and standardization of everyday life, prescribing a particular way of *being* via propaganda. However, it seems that North Korean propaganda is shaped via an un-reflexive process, as the regime is stuck with projecting a particular past image that many North Korean's may not be able to reconcile with. The ideal hero that is promoted through different sorts of medium, is based on the times of the revolution in the 1950s, where the projection of a specific socialist Utopian image was necessary in order to advance the state. However, there is no revolution at the moment. Instead, North Korea experienced a huge blow from the economic collapse, from which attempts to recover with cautiously turning to a market economy, inviting foreign investment, multilateral aid, and foreign technical assistance in economic management (Nixson and Collins, 1996). Consequently, it is assumed that by now, the fictional heroic

characters may appear in the minds of North Koreans as far-fetched abstractions created to fuel the North Korean state in a time where they are not relevant anymore. Therefore, projecting an ideal socialist propaganda, in a Hobbesian manner is too rigid and mechanical; instead of fueling, it inhibits the 'worlding' process, hence the nation from progressing. Thus, the heroes, as Harry Harootunian put it, are ghosts of a surviving past that return from a different temporality to haunt and disturb the historical present (Harootunian, 2005, p. 47), and draw it away from modernity. Since the past heroes could be considered as a haunting disturbance to North Korean's present time, to associate with, deify, or even to become these characters may be problematic.

'Utopia now?' then refers to the influences of the recent past on the present, where it is not only that people might not be able to associate with these heroes, but considering the specific effects of architectural propaganda; people are presented with spaces where a common feeling of belonging (Stavrides, 2007, p.3) may be lacking. Or so to say, people might not feel at home in the 'model propaganda city' of Pyongyang. Instead, people's identities are spatially and conceptually framed to be part of a North Korean show for the outside world. Leading them to fantasize or even act on becoming independent and deviant from the state projected norm, through beginning to use the city on their own terms and interests.

During the 1990s and in the present, this is shown in an common negative ambiance, where the younger generation of North Koreans are generally less interested and loyal to the regime (The Guardian, 2018, Radio Free Asia, 2018). Moreover, as Oh and Hassig (2004) point out, under the surface of a perfect, mechanically organized Utopian state model, there is great deal of dissatisfaction in the everyday lives of the North Korean people**.** According to Enzo Traverso (2017), this can be attributed to a feeling of loss and emptiness, resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union, thus the end of socialist utopias (Traverso, 2017, p. 137). The 1990s is a period of "leftist melancholy" (Traverso, 2017, p. 137), although negative, it is a necessary premise of the mourning of lost socialism; a step that allows mourning to be a motivational force for subjects to become active again in reaching out for different futures (Traverso, 2017).

The negative effects of the crisis on society mark the 1990s as a leading up, 'threshold period' (Stavrides, 2007, p.3); demarcated by everyday life that is not represented by state propaganda. Therefore there is an indication to a potential movement towards otherness (ibid). Accordingly, the Hobbesian, mechanical nature of the North Korean regime resulted in conflict between state identities (ideology, myths, and norms), projected by architectural (and also other) propaganda,

and the actual practices of the citizens (Lefebvre, 2009, p.108). The clash between the body politic and the social body is the hardest, due to the unsuccessful and mismatched representations of society and state interests, because only what is interesting to the official observer (the regime) is taken into account (Scott, 1998).

However, the threshold period has the power "to mediate actions that open spatially as well as socially fixed identities, which provide opportunities to defy the dominating socialist myths of progress […] in the urban experience" (Stavrides, 2007, p.3). Moreover, through everyday practices, citizens challenge and oppose the dominant will of the North Korean state to fix spatial meanings and uses (Stavrides, 2007, p.1) and participate in what Lefebvre called, "the production of space": where "space lays down the law because it implies a certain order—and hence a certain disorder" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 143). In this sense, according to Dovey, the power of built form is a two sided coin, "buildings necessarily both constrain and enable certain kinds of life and experience; they are inherently coercive in that they enforce limits to action […] However, this coercion is a large part of what enables agency in everyday life to take place" (Dovey, 2014, p.183-184). So in terms of agency, the porosity of everyday life describes the way in which urban space is performed and produced, as in being inhabited, and appropriated (Stavrides, 2007). As a result, instead of socially and spatially fixing monuments, in *real* life; Pyongyang's architecture serves as a creator of passages (Stavrides, 2007, p. 2) to new 'worlds'. Borders or 'thresholds' are delineated by porous/normal living, which both locates and maintains the connections between old and new 'worlds'. Here "the built environment does not inherently oppress or liberate; rather, people use built form in the attempt to do so" (Dovey, 2014, p.183). Consequently, the everyday inhabitation of a city can be an opportunity for change, towards futures that already exist in the present. Consequently, the city of Pyongyang can be experienced as a city of discontinuities, turning points, and unexpectedness, where otherness emerges not only as a threat but also as a promise (Stavrides, 2007).

As a result of emerging otherness as in different kinds of inhabitation, the state needs to alter its propaganda, so that it stays an effective motivational force. The state needs to project a more 'socially agreeable' present and future in realizing a new 'world'. Therefore, it needs to become a mediator; aware of this in between threshold period, and the emancipatory powers of inhabitation. This means a propaganda of involvement and negotiation (Stavrides, 2007, p.4) in city planning

as a 'worlding practice', where the interests of the social and political body are attuned in a symphony (Harootunian, 2005, p. 51).

In reacting to the crisis of the 1990s, and the signals towards necessary change, the state intervened in a form of a new a new 'worlding' practice; it implemented the capitalist market economy in 2002, which is a heterotopic turning point. Therefore, the future that opened up after the economic transitioning, could be considered as Foucault's Heterotopia (2008), which is a place where differences meet (Stravides, 2007). In the case of North Korea, these differences are marked by a contact between an old utopian socialist world and a modern capitalist one. Interestingly, the heterotopic turning point leans towards capitalist practices, which actualizes the mutual recognition and interdependence of different identities (Stavrides, 2007, p. 4) on the multiple levels of the national and the international. However, this unusual dialogue both between the West and North Korea and the North Korean social and political body, unexpectedly comes from the social body. Resultantly, North Korea is constructed both from the outside world and from within. Yet, the construction from within does not originate from the state level, but from a bottom-up logic of emancipatory everyday practices; a resistance from the social body. The above-outlined Heterotopia of differences is what the prediction of the book, (Un)precedented Pyongyang (2016) builds on, which will be discussed in the final part of this study. Yet, first, the possibilities of even thinking about a Heterotopic Pyongyang and North Korea, need to be explored in the next section.

'Worlding' in a Kantian Heterotopia

So, if the state ordered economic transitioning was a 'heterotopic' intervention; a response to the crisis and its effects on the social body, then it is logical to assume that the act of responding requires listening. This indicates a certain change in how the North Korean regime perceives itself. The economic transitioning as an opening both towards the outside world as well as towards the needs of the social body indicates a shift in terms of behavior from a purely Hobbesian state into a Kantian notion of the state as an organismic entity.

This Kantian, organismic state model overturns the mechanistic Hobbesian model, where the hierarchical top-down relationship between the parts and the whole is replaced by their complete interdependence (Cheah, 2003, p. 32). A subtle shift towards a Kantian understanding of the state provides an overarching reflexive awareness by the regime; including the acts of listening, responding, and intervening, or so to say mediating the needs of the social and the political body.

This means that social resistance, and an inherent wish for freedom of reason and individual development is taken into account by the regime. Therefore, Juche and propaganda are re-interpreted with keeping the autonomy of individuals preserved in a harmonious unity (ibid), as it is the only way to maintain the legitimacy of the regime. Consequently, 'worlding' is grasped symphonically, so that the in-between threshold period leads to mutually aware, interdependent, and involved personal and state identities, (Stavrides, 2007, p.1) that are representative of each other.

Thus, in the Kantian theorization of the state, propaganda's role is to catch-up with everyday practices, and become a bridge between old and new futures. Propaganda is both a means and an end, as it is influenced by the agency of citizens, but it is also the glue that keeps the organism moving together hence, the state alive. As such the Kantian theorization corresponds to the philosophy of Juche - although not to its communist goals considering the opening towards capitalist practices - which prescribes that "only under correct leadership, would the masses, though creators of history, be able to occupy the position and perform their role as subject of socio−historical development" (Il, 1982, p. 9). Respectively, the progress of North Korea as a whole is only possible through the realization of the Kantian state as an organismic relationship between the social and political body. Such mediation by the state and its propaganda translates into a heterotopia (Foucault, 2008) of 'Capitalist Juche Communism'; which the prediction of (Un)precedented Pyongyang (2016), the topic of the next section builds on.

Heterotopia - 'Capitalist Juche Communism'

In the previous sections the heterotopic moment of the economic transitioning was discussed. The following sections build on Lefebvre's (2003) argument that the transformation of the economy results in new politico-economic formation (mode of production), which requires qualitatively new spatial relations. Therefore, this section analyzes the possible results of the economic transitioning in the future transformation of Pyongyang. The analysis is based on Dognwoo Yim's prediction in '(Un)precedented Pyongyang' (2016), which is theorized to be a heterotopia.

Heterotopias are where the differences of the self and the other (both on a national and international level) meet to create new futures. Here the other has the potential to bring in new ideas, myths, and desires. To explain, heterotopias are not simply places of the other, inhabited

differently but also places where otherness has the capacity to overturn, proliferate, and spill over into the sameness of what is considered normal inhabitation (Foucault, 2008; Stavrides, 2007). Heterotopias are therefore spatiotemporal conjectures that can become places of an emerging new order that will turn the experience of otherness into a new rule of sameness (Hetherington, 1997). In a Heterotopia the desires of everyday practices of inhabitation, and state ordered city plans are merged in the collective process of normalizing otherness in new forms of urban life.

Gaining back the people? – Predicting urban transitioning

The prediction shows the emerging global and everyday practices after the economic transitioning, and how they could turn Pyongyang into a socialist-capitalist heterotopia, where the North Korean regime is a mediator in a Kantian manner between the social and the political body. According to this study the prediction describes a possible future scenario of official city planning, in which the regime uses propaganda as a 'worlding' practice that 'catches-up' with the emerging inhabitation practices of the social body as well as foreign influences tied to the market economy. Here, the processes of the market economy such as, direct investment, flow of capital and land privatization, will directly influence the physical form of the city because of their close relations to urban development projects. The prediction questioning whether Pyongyang will take on its own unprecedented development path, where it has already entered into fast transformation stage with numbers of developments both in public and private sectors since the new regime of Kim Jung Un. To understand such developments, the underlying moments and mechanisms of North Korea's economic transitioning are outlined.

After the end of the Cold War, North Korea lost its aid and trade relations with the rest of the communist world, which caused a loss of revenue and an economic collapse resulting in the famine of the 1990s. As a possible solution, the North Korean regime decided to secretly implement the capitalist free market economy in 2002, through the new economic plan of 'Improvement Strategy for Economic Management' (Yim, 2016, p. 307-308).

Consequently, since each new politico-economic formation or mode of production requires qualitatively new spatial relations, the new economic plan started to influence the physical morphology of Pyongyang. The biggest changes appear due to the different conceptions of land ownership between the two economic systems. In capitalist cities land is usually privatized, and

the supply demand structure creates competition for land buyers, hence creating land value. Contrarily, in socialist cites land is owned by the state and has no capital value; the most important factor that determines the usage of land is the state's overall master plan, instead of the flow of capital (Yim, 2016, p. 305-306).

Yim (2016) discusses that the implementation of the 'Improvement Strategy for Economic Management' caused an incredible increase in foreign, especially Chinese investment due to low tax regulations and low cost of production, showcasing Pyongyang as hugely profitable. In terms of changes in the urban landscape this meant that bigger construction projects were initiated and financed by foreign investment. Additionally, small scale commercial activities and retail shops have emerged in Pyongyang, indicated by the proliferation of mobile vendors on major streets and squares. Yim (2016) argues that, it is especially mobile vendors and kiosks that are the first to emerge in a newly transitioned economy because the typologies are very flexible and can easily fill in the gaps between people's needs and the capacity of controlled production and distribution (Yim, 2016, p. 308).

Although the development of Pyongyang's different parts are predicted by Yim, this study includes only the part of 'city of symbolism'; explaining the transformation of monumental buildings. This is because the monumental sites of museums, squares, and state buildings, have the strongest socialist ideological character and a lack of capitalist logic and land value (Yim, 2017). Therefore, their transformation according to capitalist standards may reveal a larger change in the angle of propaganda's 'worlding' project. Moreover since monuments have great infrastructural value, they become the most flexible and profitable areas of transformation (ibid).

The methodology of the prediction

Yim holds that after the economic transitioning, Pyongyang will end up with a mixed morphology of free market development and controlled master plan structure (Yim, 2017, p. 306). To analyze such a mixed character of urban landscape Yim applies the combination of the economic theory of 'transitology', and the urban theories of 'incremental urbanism' coined by Michel Gabmle and Jude Leblanc (2004) and 'soft urbanism' by Michael Speaks (2000). The applied theories are strongly connected to Bernard Tschumi's 'events', stipulating that space does not exist without event, and there is no architecture without program. Tschumi (1983) argues that

“architecture – its social relevance and formal invention – cannot be dissociated from the events that ‘happen’ in it” (Tschumi, 1983, p. 7). His observation sheds light to both the significance and revival of historicism in looking at built form, but also to the importance and effect of people and their everyday experiences in inhabiting space, therefore the methodology of the prediction is in line with the practices of ‘worlding’, and Heterotopias.

To explain, Yim connects ‘transitology’ to urbanism by describing it as a fluid, anarchic, hybrid culture of urban action through which urban mutants are improvised as a result of change from one economic regime to another. In Pyongyang such urban action is fueled by the logic of supply and demand, where citizens are in need of new social spaces to carry out actions that are dictated by the new socio-economic system. The incremental urbanism model generates new developments at “greyfield” areas defined as underutilized, therefore activating “dead” spaces in the city. The model is based on integral urbanism which offers dead and neutral spaces as punctuation points to inflect the landscape and human experience in it. By acknowledging abandoned and neglected spaces via transformation projects, human activity is increased and connections between space and people’s experiences are made (Yim, 2017, p. 309).

In opposition to master plan like types of development, the model focuses on ‘catalytic urban projects’ that can influence and generate further developments in Pyongyang. Incremental urbanism is also a form of ‘soft urbanism’ described by Michael Speaks (2000); a flexible model that keeps the existing structure of the city because projects happen gradually on a smaller scale, maintaining the original urban fabric. Moreover, according to Speaks, it is in monumental spaces that “we find the most maddening sedimentations of power disguised as powerless, and the most exciting collection of possibilities disguised as impossibilities” (Speaks, 2000, p. 108), which corresponds to the general view of this study that space cannot be fixed (Dovey, 2014, , Ong 2001, Lefebvre 2003, Laszczkowski, 2016). Therefore, the prediction assumes that by opening up these ‘dead’ monumental spaces to the public, the processes of ‘naturalization’ explained by Atkins (1996) are broken, and the hidden power of monuments is revealed.

Although Pyongyang is a heavily planned city, Yim argues that urban changes motivated by economic influences are not alien to it. Deviating from the 1953 master plan, various macro-economic strategies realized the idea of socialism in alternate ways. The phases of Pyongyang’s reconstruction, discussed earlier, were results of these macro-economic strategies, being represented in new *layers* of build tissue. Thus, Yim suggests that the new incremental model

should consider this and keep the unique socialist urban structure of Pyongyang, while reflecting the economic transitioning (Yim, 2017, p. 309). With keeping the socialist urban fabric of the city recognizable, the built-in meanings representing the myth of the North Korean regime would not be lost, instead they would be used as a backbone (Yim, 2017, p. 310). Yim suggests that such gradual changes, or construction via *layering* can be carried out by different strategies that transform the function of monumental buildings. These strategies are: change of program, diverse use of surface, and redevelopment, explained in the following sections.

Transformation of symbolic spaces in Pyongyang

Yim argues that it is 'symbolic spaces' situated in Pyongyang's city center that are first to go through a transformation after an economic transitioning, due to their profitability. Moreover, according to the theory of incremental urbanism, the symbolic monuments in the heart of the city have the greatest catalytic effect of generating transformation in other areas of Pyongyang (Yim, 2017, p. 315). In the analysis the three ideologically foundational and most distinctive monumental structures of the Grand People's Study House, the Kim Il Sung Square, and the Ryugyong Hotel are highlighted. According to Yim, the basis of the transformation of the Grand People's Study House is a change of program, while the Kim Il Sung Square is going to be refashioned with a diverse use of surface. Finally the Ryugyong Hotel is going to go through a redevelopment.

The Grand People's Study House: Change of Program

The original function of the Grand People's Study House is a library, a built space to accommodate the Juche idea that people should study while they work. It is situated on Kim Il Sung Square next to the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Agriculture, The Korean Central History Museum, and the Korean National Art Gallery. Although the original program of the Study House is to have great political and ideological effect on society, it could easily be replaced by another program in the market oriented era (Yim, 2017, p. 317). Instead of a library it could be transformed into a bank or another financial institution, following the needs of Pyongyang's citizenry to deposit and handle their accumulated capital. Moreover, it could provide loan opportunities for future entrepreneurial investments in the new economic era. Consequently, the Study House could satisfy

what Dovey (2014) called human desire, in that it presents itself as a seductive possibility for urban transformation into an institution that is essential for society to function.

Furthermore, the change of program into a financial institution would result in a different pattern of privatized land usage, which the original public program of the building is unable to compete with. Therefore, according to Yim, the transformation would cause the neighboring ministries and other public buildings to move elsewhere due to their weakness of capital power. Instead, the ministry buildings - currently only used by the state hence being 'dead' or 'neutral' spaces in terms of inhabitation - could be renovated as cultural centers or museums generating a more open flow of the public (Yim, 2017, p. 317). Consequently, allowing entrance into buildings formerly occupied solely by the state; the so called "events" (Tschumi, 1983) would increase human activity, thus making connections between space and everyday experiences.

Regarding the connection between change of program and ideological meaning; the space of the Study House and its adjacent environment - as Speaks (2000) and Dovey (2014) argue - cannot be fixed. Even though the Study House represents the ideology of the regime and its Juche philosophy, its change of program would follow economic circumstances. Here, instead of being a fixing authority the state acts as a mediator in a Kantinan understanding between the needs of Pyongyang's citizens and the necessary global influences of an economic change. Simultaneously, the change of program could embody new desired futures (Laszczkowski, 2016) embraced by society, plausibly creating new personal and state identities that act on resolving the clash between the body politic and the social body.

Kim Il Sung Square: Diverse use of surface

Yim argues that the Kim Il Sung Square, is one of the most important areas for potential transformation, in terms of different use of surface. Currently it serves as a space for military and symbolic propaganda parades. However, in a market oriented era it could be the perfect space for retail. It was built in 1954 according to the 1953 master plan, and it is organized as the center of Pyongyang, representing the social and political system of the whole of North Korea. It is the biggest symbolic space in the city, the 16th largest square in the world with a possibility to accommodate 100,000 people. It ties the development of the East side of the Taedong River with the old part of Pyongyang, hence providing a directional axis to the development Pyongyang (Yim, 2017, p. 318).

According to Yim, as the square gathers a high flow of pedestrians, it is an ideal location for flexible retail shops and kiosks to emerge as it happened in the beginning of the transition. Yim argues that in the initial stages of the market economy, the importance of these small vendors is huge, as they introduce new capitalist characters of trading forms and lead to the emergence of shopping practices based on the needs of people. Yim also discusses that the vendors who started out with operating kiosks, gradually became real-estate owners in the city's retail, trade, and service sector. Therefore, these entrepreneurs can later hold the major shares within the local retail capital market (Yim, 2017, p. 318).

The most important asset of the diverse use of surface is that it depicts the entrepreneurs as new future heroes to associate with who 'teach' capitalist practices to the citizenry. Moreover, the square's diverse use and function refers to a mixed construction of both Pyongyang and North Korean identities, where the retail function does not exclude the old traditional practices of mass games and military parades. Therefore, the square's diverse use of surface helps to display a North Korean image - both to its society and towards the rest of the world - that embraces new/foreign as well as old/traditional practices, creating a Heterotopia.

Ryugyong Hotel: Redeveloping a monumental building

According to Yim, the possible redevelopment of the Ryugyong Hotel Yim is an 'icon driven project' (Yim ,2017, p. 321). The hotel's iconic structure can be seen from all parts of Pyongyang, while it is also one of the most internationally recognized buildings. Therefore its redevelopment would open a new direction in the restructuring of Pyongyang.

The Ryugyong Hotel was part of the 1953 master plan intended to serve as a function to the core of the satellite residential district it is situated in. Originally planned as a generator for foreign investment the North Korean state expected to attract 230 million dollars with the project. Its building started in 1987 and was designed as a 105 story building with 3000 rooms. At the time it would have been the tallest hotel in the world. It is currently the 28th tallest building of the world, hence still displaying potential international significance.

In 1992 the hotel's construction stopped due to the economic crisis. Only recently an Egyptian company finished the construction, and covered the building with glass. Because of its scale and design, the hotel provides a new space that if crafted correctly can be a significant contributor to the urbanity of the city at large (Yim, 2018). According to Yim, the relevance of such icon driven projects lays in their ability to operate on multiple levels and scales and "to endow diverse geographies with significant worldwide recognition" (Yim, 2017, p. 321).

Concretely, the redevelopment would mean the conversion of the ground floors into office and service functions, such as medical facilities, architectural and engineering studios, and travel as well as real-estate agencies (Yim, 2017, p.321). Additionally, since the hotel's surrounding area is designated as a major a major public space, after a redevelopment, it is likely that the rest of its district would follow. Moreover, as this part of the city is a residential zone, and barely has any administrative institutions and programs, the area can possibly become the city's future financial center. Although it was discussed that the Grand People's Study House could serve the same function, Yim argues that since the hotel is situated in a residential district, it would be easier to relocate people than official institutions. Overall, the redevelopment of the Ryugyong Hotel would cause a competition between the original socialist/residential and a capitalist/financial program within the area (Yim, 2018, p324). Similarly to the previous examples of possible transformation, such a change would require the regime to catch-up with globalized capitalist trends, and project a new image. Again, this would result in keeping the ideological significance of the Hotel and its surrounding district, while assigning an entirely different function the area; activating 'dead' spaces on capitalist terms.

Space and time in Capitalist Juche Communism

The prediction shows the transformation of monumental buildings according to a new hypothetical official city planning, which would turn Pyongyang into a Heterotopia of Juche Capitalist Communism. Here the 'worlding' exercise of state propaganda is recalibrated through a reflexive shift towards a Kantian, organismic understanding of the state, which therefore mediates in line with global standards, while also catering for its citizens and to the rest of the world. IN the heterotopia, the state becomes is an initiator of new future identities via implementing a market economy as a response to dire need, assigning the future development of North Korea in more egalitarian terms.

By initiating, the regime inherently signs up to agree to the emergence of social activity that is more fitting to capitalist market economy, allowing for greater sense of autonomy and agency. The 'worlding' is performed via an interaction of the social body and the political body, where it is exactly because of the strong ideological meaning of these monumental buildings - which has already been naturalized via the processes of cultural amnesia - that the state may see it possible to transform them. It is in this predicted heterotopia that power is disused powerless and impossible is made possible.

However, in terms of space and time, the prediction of Pyongyang as a 'Capitalist Juche Communism' makes the city into a monumental exclusionary heterotopia. It is a heterotopia simply because Pyongyang becomes a place where "otherness meets" (Foucault, 2008), where the 'other' can potentially become an official new order that turns the otherness of capitalistic practices, into a new rule of sameness (Hetherington, 1997). It is monumental, since through the logic of layering the old ideologies of socialist and Juche representations and the Kim dynasty myth are maintained, only the functions of buildings and their surroundings are changed. And finally, on spatial terms, it is exclusionary, because in contrast to the socialist unachievable but collective inhabitation of the city, the heterotopia creates a spectacular and uneven inhabitation dictated by capitalist standards, only available for the fortunate few in Pyongyang. The city as an exclusionary spectacle (Debord, 2012) constantly runs the risk of revealing the rest of the country as obsolete and backwards. This means that the prediction plays into the Kimist regime's usual aim in using propaganda to project a particular image to the outside world, while it paranoidly hides what it does not want to show. Therefore, North Korea catches-up with the outside world only partially, in a form of an 'alternative modernity' (Choi, 2014) of Pyongyang as a heterotopia. Yet constructing North Korea on the terms of an 'alternative modernity is flawed as it does not take into account the position of the constructor, therefore the prediction becomes a violent assumption, already placing the future Pyongyang as a second rate city within the global competition for hierarchies and values.

In terms of time, the prediction prohibits the socialist utopian imagination which is directed towards the future and is fueled from the past in a cyclical manner. Instead it provides a capitalist vision and fills in the emptiness that the loss of socialist utopias caused. In this sense the prediction serves as a motivational force towards the future, yet since it is only a prediction, an ideal-type and therefore a capitalist utopia it can never be delivered. Moreover, the prediction is stuck with the assumption that *rational* and in terms of growth *linear* capitalist practices (Harootunian, 2005), or the "cold stream of economic reason" (Traverso, 2017 p. 49-50) available in the present will solve the 'problem of North Korea'. Thus the prediction, instead of providing a future, becomes an exercise of eternal but failed capitalist "presentism" (Traverso, 2017, p. 51), where the past is lost but the future is denied or viewed only as an 'alternative modernity' (Choi, 2014; Harootunian, 2005). Human becoming is reinforced through capitalism, placing everything else behind that does not work according to its processes, therefore the 'not yet' is abandoned in favor of an eternal present (Traverso, 2017). However, in this, the external measure of globalization and capitalism

superimposes itself on an internal measure of North Korean time, "where the two can never assimilate, since they do not share either the same beginning or the same end" (Harootunian, 2005 p. 51). Instead there should be a double measure of time, embracing the temporalities of different non-capitalistic spaces. The present of liberal-capitalist time is not the final stage for North Korea, which has the capacity to resolve all the previous ones, there should be a "polyrhythmic" and "multi-spatial" (Harootunian, 2005, p.52) conception of space and time, where Pyongyang can be truly Unprecedented.

Conclusions

By considering Pyongyang's propagandistic architecture, this research analyzed the reciprocal effects of possible politico-economic and spatial transformations and North Korean personal and state identities. In this sense the study offers an aesthetic re-reading of Pyongyang's architectural history. Through the analysis, the research treats architecture as text, and North Korean propaganda as a 'worlding' project. The combination of these two into, one could say, an interrogation of 'ArchiteXtual worlding', allows an aesthetic re-reading of various social, economic, and political phases of North Korea and Pyongyang.

In this, Part One established 'worlding' as the reflexive positionality of the research, which considers North Korean propaganda, and Juche ideology - depending on their interpretation - as a fixer and un-fixer of identities. Moreover, Part One focused on the period between the 1950s until the end of the 1980s, where the (re)construction of Pyongyang and the implementation of propaganda as a 'worlding' practice was carried out with the regime's mechanistic Hobbesian outlook on, and relationship towards society. Consequently, in this period, propaganda architecture fixed both state and personal identities; the future of North Korea was imagined collectively on socialist utopian terms. However, the resulting negative societal effects of the economic crisis of the 1990s forced the Kimist regime to adapt the capitalist free market economy. According to the research, this marked a shift in the state's relationship towards society and the world, from a Hobbesian to a Kantian theorization. The shift permitted a more organismic, and reflexive state behavior, allowing social resistance and foreign influences to penetrate the project of propagandistic world making. The implementation of the market economy was a heterotopic moment that necessitated changes in everyday practices of inhabitation and spatial relations, which are happening in the present. According to the research, it is inevitable that the North Korean

regime will react to these changes in terms of building a somewhat different city. However, the exact outcome of Pyongyang's morphology is open-ended at the moment. Therefore, to see the possible future development of Pyongyang and North Korea, in terms of propaganda architecture as a 'worlding' practice; parts of the prediction of (Un)precedented Pyongyang were analyzed.

The prediction of Pyongyang as a Heterotopia presented an ambiguous counter-paradigm to the socialist, utopian 'model propaganda city' discussed in Part One. The heterotopia bears traces of the prevailing socialist culture, yet it combines the new cultural habits of capitalism, which together could become metastable, insinuating itself into society. In this sense, the different phases of Pyongyang's reconstruction and monumentalization are held in the collective memories of individuals, and recognized within a history full of turning points and thresholds. These were brought about by previous macro-economic changes, possibly also leading to smaller heterotopias then the ones predicted by Yim (2016). Therefore, the new monuments corresponding to a heterotopic 'Capitalist Juche Pyongyang', would only mark one possible national narrative, and in time they would become equally normal and outdated.

Overall the study holds that the prediction is not reflexive, and does not live up to the methodology of 'worlding', as it does not keep neither state nor social identities open. Through its reliance on capitalistic logic, it restricts the development of Pyongyang, hence curtails North Korea from having a dialogue with the international world by projecting a particular maybe too capitalistic future image in terms of Pyongyang's morphology. In this sense, the prediction is an ideal-typical capitalist utopia, depicting only one particular and possible phase in the history of Pyongyang and North Korea. However, the importance of contingency and open-endedness in the construction of North Korean identities through analyzing urban phenomena cannot be overlooked.

According to the research, the prediction of (Un)precedented Pyongyang is a violent assumption, a pre-knowing on capitalist terms, in a form of an 'alternative modernity', which from a Western point of view already places Pyongyang and North Korea in a second rate position. Still, the importance of the prediction lays in its experimental base as a comparison, in times of uncertainty, as all ideal types do.

Although, this study establishes the flaws of the prediction, it also provides a path for further research on the effects of the politico-economic transitioning, relating to a broad range of topics not only to architectural propaganda and built form. The importance of future research lays in

avoiding the creation of a particular North Korea instead a scenario of "constant becoming without ever having arrived" (Choi, p.202) should be kept in mind. From the point of view of international relations research, North Korea but also other nation states, or even regions, cities, and people should not purely be considered as objects of study but complex sites of power relations, where the hierarchical binary of subject/object must be challenged with a dialogical reflexive view. In this regard, this research, applied the methodology of worlding as a general outlook on phenomena, which prescribes that in configuring the environment, the role of actors whether that be states, individuals, or the international community, is to rethink and remake the contemporary world rather than being passively globalized by it (Ong, 2011, p. 10). Therefore, there is no singular standard of individual, urban, or national tonality, as Ong (2011) argues, in the "art of being global" […]"there are many forms of the global in play" (Ong, 2011, p.12).

This inquiry hopefully provided an impetus for further reflexive engagement with North Korea and identity/difference at large. Additionally, perhaps the investigation has the potential to activate the agency of Others (here specifically the North Korean people), which generally should be a more widespread goal of International Relations research, because after all it is *we* who live in this world.

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