



Abstract

Due to the process of (media) personalization, the evaluation of politicians has increased in importance during elections. Especially infotaining or satiric messages are often linked to the personalization of politics, as well as to a general trend of increasing political cynicism in Western democracies. This research examines the influence of a neglected type of infotaining news message: the political cartoon. It was examined in a large-scale experimental design of three Dutch party leaders if cartoons have a negative influence on affinity, trust and likelihood of future vote for politicians. The results of this study show that cartoons - in contrast to the expectations - have close to no influence on affinity, trust and vote intent of its viewers. The results do give reason (1) to believe that personalization matters for vote choice, (2) to doubt if cartoons have a different impact based on the viewers background, and (3) to doubt the importance of perceived funniness and seriousness for the influence of cartoons.

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Introduction

That 'the pen is mightier than the sword' is something we are reminded of due to a special type of image: the cartoon. The controversy over the prophet Mohammed cartoons of 2005 and the Charlie Hebdo shooting in 2015 are clear reminders of the impact cartoons can have on society (Klausen 2009, 1-3; Jones 2015). Despite the controversies and public interest in this special type of political image, little is known about the influence and interpretation of cartoons by their public (Van Holsteyn 2015, 319-320). While cartoons are often intended to amuse their public, they also generally present a critical ideological or political message about a current issue or event (El Reffaie 2009, 184-185). There is an ongoing debate in science and society on how far the "licence to mock" (Manning & Phiddian 2004) of the cartoonist should reach. On the one hand this type of free press serves the purpose "to censure the actions of the powerful via the force of ridicule" (Manning & Phiddian 2004, 26; Duus 2001, 966; Jones 2015). On the other hand cartoons can be offensive, and they could have a negative influence on political cynicism (Hogan 2001, 28; 2004).

Despite the democratic value of a free press, satiric messages and infotainment media are often blamed for the 'media malaise': the trend of increasing political cynicism and a withdrawal from politics (Adriaansen et al. 2010, 434). Even though there is a large academic interest for the political influence of infotainment, this body of literature has stayed limited to entertainment television from the USA like *Saturday Night Live* and *The Daily Show* (e.g., Young 2004; Hmielowski et al. 2011; Feldman 2013). There is a need to take the research on the political influence of infotainment beyond the USA, and beyond late-night comedy shows (Holbert 2011, 188). This research adds to this body of literature by examining the cartoon, which is a typical infotainment message that lacks substantial examination (Townsend et al. 2008, 21). Shedding light on the political influence of cartoons is therefore the main aim of this research.

The most well-known politicians are a favourite targets for cartoonists, and for infotainment media in general (Niven et al. 2003, 121; Young 2004, 7). The growing attention in the media for well-known politicians instead of parties and political issues is described in literature as media personalization (Rahat & Sheafer 2007, 65). The central topic in this research is the influence of the way well-known politicians are pictured in cartoons. The research question is: *To what extent can cartoons of well-known politicians influence the affinity, trust and vote intent of their public?* This research question will be answered with a post-test only experimental design, with a case selection of three well-known Dutch party leaders: Mark Rutte, Geert Wilders and Diederik Samsom.

Personalization of politics

Personalization of politics is a central theme in political science literature, especially literature related to political behaviour. Personalization is the process were the importance of politicians increases and the importance of political parties decreases over time (Rahat & Sheafer 2007, 66). The persuasiveness of the politician would be one of the short term influences on voting behaviour that gained importance since the end of pillarization in Western democracies (Garzia 2011, 698). Personalization is especially pertinent due to a behavioural change of politicians and the public (behavioural personalization), organisational change in political parties (institutional personalization), and changes in the media (media personalization) (Rahat & Sheafer 2007, 67; Garzia 2011, 698). Media personalization is most relevant for this research.

Media personalization refers to the trend of increased attention for politicians in the media, because of the focus of journalists and because of the focus of political campaigns (Rahat & Sheafer 2007, 67). Especially entertaining or satiric media are focused on the most well-known politicians, since the large public will need some basic knowledge about the politicians to understand the jokes (Niven et al. 2003, 121; Young 2004, 7; Van Praag & Brants 2008, 25). Due to the process of (media) personalization, the character of the politician now seems to be a relevant factor in elections. There is "strong evidence that much voting seems to be driven, at least in part, by the image politicians project" (Olivia & Todov 2010, 105; also see Goodnow 2010; Mattes et al. 2010). Moreover, voters only need to glance at an image for a split second to be able to form an impression of the character of a politician (Olivia & Todov 2010; Willis & Todorov 2006). The influence of the way politicians are pictured in satiric news messages is central in this research.

Satire and infotainment

Research on the influence of media on politics was traditionally concerned with 'hard' news media, which are the traditional news sources like newspapers (Boukes 2014, 7). But since the early 2000s there has been a growing interest among scholars for the influence of 'soft' news media like entertainment programs, and the mixing of hard and soft news in what is now called 'infotainment' (Delli Carpini & Williams 2001). This research sends a clear message that we should take the influence of soft news and infotainment on the political preference and political knowledge of its viewers seriously (e.g., Young 2004, 2; Holbert 2005, 436). Infotainment media reach a large public, wherefore their message can influence many people (Baum 2003, 173). Even the people that are not politically interested can gain some political

knowledge or can form a political attitude as a by-product of being entertained (Boukes 2014, 11-12).

Research on the political influence of entertainment media and satiric news messages has so far mainly focused on late-night comedy shows from the USA (Holbert 2011, 2). This research has revealed that the influence of satire on political preferences depends on several factors, like the type of satire, the target of the satire, and characteristics of the recipient of the satire (e.g., Young 2004; Hmielowski et al. 2011; Feldman 2013). In relation to the type of satire, there seems to be a difference between the effect of lighter forms of satire (horatian satire) or a heavier and more bitter approach of satire (juvenalian satire). Juvenalian satire would lead to a more negative evaluation of the target of satire than horatian satire (LaMare et al. 2014; Holbert et al. 2011).

The targets of satire are often the most well-known politicians (Niven et al. 2003, 121; Young 2004, 4). The effect of satire does not seem to be the same for all politicians, the effect of satire seems to build on pre-existing opinions of politicians. The influence of satire can therefore depend on factors like partisanship and the popularity of the targeted politician (Baumgartner 2008, 738; Young 2004, 2; Baum 2003, 187). Besides the characteristics ascribed to the politician, the characteristics of the recipient of the satire are also important. Research on late-night comedy pointed out that persons with certain characteristics are more receptive of satiric news messages, like young persons and persons that are more knowledgeable about politics (Hmielowski et al. 2011; Young 2004). It is clear that quite some knowledge has been gathered in recent years on the influence of infotainment. Despite this research there is still a lack of attention for the influence of a special type of image that fits perfectly in this interest for satiric infotainment: the cartoon.

A neglected case: the political cartoon

It is remarkable that while there is a body of research on the influence of the latest infotainment programs, close to nothing is known about the influence of the political cartoon, an infotaining message that has been popular since the 17th century (El Reffaie 2009, 183). Research of cartoons exists in the niches of several disciplines it touches upon, like political science, but has not been fully embraced by any (Diamond 2002, 252; Manning & Phiddian 2004, 2). Cartoons do not seem to be taken seriously yet by political scientists, which could be because of the often humoristic character of these images (Van Holsteyn 2015, 320; Langeveld 1989, 7). While cartoons often (but not necessarily) are intended to be humoristic or satiric, they are also generally intended to present a critical view on society from a

particular political or ideological viewpoint (El Reffaie 2009, 184-185; Manning & Phiddian 2004, 26; Duus 2001, 966). In this research the focus will be on *political* cartoons specifically, which deal with "the ridicule, debunking or exposure of persons, groups and organizations engaged in power struggles in society" (Streicher 1967, 432).

The controversies around the prophet Muhammed cartoons and Charlie Hebdo cartoons have shown us the power cartoons can have on society. While it is clear that cartoons can have an impact on society, it is surprising how little we know about the influence of these age-old images on public opinion (Van Holsteyn 2015, 322). The little research that does exist about political cartoons has either examined cartoons related to a specific political event or person (e.g., Walter & Van Holsteyn, 2006; Diamond 2002; Conners 1998), or if cartoons are understood correctly. In the research that examines the interpretation of cartoons, it seems to be the case that cartoons are misinterpreted or not understood on a large scale (El Refaie 2009; Van Holsteyn & Cupido 2013). This is not strange since "it is in the nature of cartoons to be complex, ... the problem with cartoons is ... how to 'unriddle' the 'deep reflection' they may hide" (Abraham 2009, 121). Due to the complexity of the message of cartoons, the influence of these images can be quite different for different members of the audience based on their knowledge and background (Manning & Phiddian 2004, 27).

What influence cartoons have on their viewers is not a foregone conclusion. There are legitimate reasons to expect cartoons will have a negative influence, a positive influence, or even no influence at all, if the negative and positive influences cancel each other out. The most intuitive expectation is that a cartoon of a politician will have a negative influence on the evaluation of this politician. It is in the nature of cartoons to be negative (Baumgartner 2008, 737; Van Holsteyn 2015, 321), and the receiver of the message is therefore likely to be left with a negative impression about the one being criticised. Humour can have a negative influence because of the absorption of the message (Boukes et al. 2015, 727). Previous research showed that when viewers are more absorbed they are more likely to accept a critical message as true, and they are more absorbed when the message is meant to entertain (Slater & Rouner 2002). Humorous messages would also be more memorable and persuasive (Baumgartner 2008, 738), and it would lead the viewer to like the creator of the source better, which might make them more acceptant of the critical message (Nabi et al. 2007, 30).

In contrast to these negative influences for the evaluation of politicians, there are reasons to believe cartoons might have a positive influence. The first and most important reason cartoons might have a positive influence is because the receiver of the message beliefs the cartoon should not be taken seriously. This perception of cartoons can cause the critical

message of the cartoonist to be discarded as a joke (Boukes et al. 2015, 723; Feldman 2013). Humour can also diminish the credibility of the source, as a result of which the critical message can be seen as less credible (Nabi et al. 2007, 30).

Since there are reasons to believe cartoons will have both a negative and a positive influence on the evaluation on the politician, these effects could cancel each other out. Boukes et al. (2015, 739) found that counter arguing a message is decreased by deep absorption and finding the message serious, while counter arguing is increased when the message is considered to be funny. When a message is considered to be both serious and funny, this could lead to a balance of the positive and negative effects of cartoons. Another reason cartoons could have no effect on its viewers is because of a lack of understanding of these messages (Lamb 2004, 49). While the cartoonist has a certain message he tries to bring across with the cartoon, it is uncertain if the receiver of the message will correctly understand this message. If cartoons are not understood correctly, this will have an impact on the influence these images can have (Baumgartner 2008, 738; Boukes et al. 2015, 723). Since the influence of cartoons is not obvious, there is a need to examine the influence of this type of image.

Visual news messages and affinity, trust and vote intent

There are two types of news messages that have to be distinguished: verbal and visual messages. While there is much research on the influence of verbal news messages on the evaluation of politicians, relatively little is known about the influence of visual news messages (Domke et al. 2002, 133). This is remarkable since "nonverbal cues can be more influential on assessments of individuals than verbal ones" (Barrett & Barrington 2005a, 99). Research that examines the influence of visual news messages on politics is focused on the influence of photographs of unknown or fake politicians (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010; Banducci et al. 2008; Todorov et al. 2005; Barrett & Barrington 2005a,b; Rosenberg et al. 1986, 119; Rosenberg & McCafferty 1987). While photographs are undeniably the most frequent used type of visual message in the papers, it is not the only type of visual news message, and perhaps also not the most influential one. This research will use the insights from research of photographs of unknown politicians, and will examine how they hold for photographs and cartoons of well-known politicians.

Research examining the influence of photographs on the evaluation of unknown politicians finds support for the influence of these images. Barrett and Barrington (2005a) found that a positive photograph can influence if a politician is considered "compassionate, unfriendly, a strong leader, shallow, incompetent or trustworthy" (Barrett & Barrington 2005,

103). This last trait, trustworthiness, is an important trait in relation to visual news messages, since the media are often accused of diminishing political trust (Adriaansen et al. 2010, 435). The higher ranking on positive personality traits will in turn have an important influence on a stronger electoral preference for this politician. Respondents are more likely to vote for an unknown politician after seeing a favourable image, and they are more likely to believe this person is competent for office (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010; Banducci et al. 2008; Todorov et al. 2005).

This research will contribute to our knowledge of the effect of visual news messages on affinity, trust and likelihood of future vote in two ways. Firstly by highlighting the political cartoon, a visual news message that has been neglected in previous research (Manning & Phiddian 2004; Van Holsteyn 2015). Secondly by examining well-known politicians instead of unknown politicians as in previous research, which gives the current research much real-world relevance. A major disadvantage of this past research is that the 'politicians' in the experimental design were fake or unknown to the participants (see Barrett & Barrington 2005a; Banducci et al. 2008; Rosenberg & McCafferty 1987; Rosenberg et al. 1986). The disadvantage of using unknown or fake politicians is that "the faces of unknown individuals essentially constitute 'blank slates' on which superficial cues ... provide the only basis for social judgement" (Keating et al. 1999, 595). In the real world, voters nearly always have prior knowledge of the ideology and appearance of politicians. The effect of visual news messages therefore needs to be explored for politicians "that come packaged with reputations" (Keating et al. 1999, 595).

Trust and the ABI-model

Trust is the willingness of an individual "to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other party will perform a particular action important to the trustor" (Mayer et al. 1995, 712). There is a special kind of trust relationship for trust in leaders like politicians since the relation is one-directional: the voter (the trustor) puts trust in the politician (the trustee) (ibid, 710). This relation is an interpersonal trust relationship, where a person accepts "vulnerability based on positive expectations of another" (Rousseau et al. 1998, 395). While trust is largely recognized as an important factor for the appreciation of leaders (Dirks & Skarlicki 2004, 21), there is not much agreement on the dimensions of the trust concept. The most established and cited model in work on interpersonal trust relationships is the ABI-model created by Mayer et al. (1995). This model is named after the dimensions that together construct interpersonal trust: Ability, Benevolence and Integrity

(ABI). What makes the ABI-model particularly apt for this research is that the model is designed to measure a one-directional trust relation in which a voter (the trustor) puts trust in the politician (the trustee).

According to the ABI-model, the level of trust is high when the trustor considers the trustee to have abilities, to be benevolent and to be integer, and this relation is dependent on the trustors general propensity to trust others (ibid, 715). A strong point of this model is that it includes the propensity of the trustor to trust, in other words how likely this person is to trust others or politicians in general. When trustors believe the trustee has abilities, they believe the trustee is skilled and competent in some specific domain, in this case politics (ibid, 717). When a trustee is believed to be benevolent, he is believed to act in the best interest of the trustors, and not in his own benefit. A benevolent trustee will act with good intentions and a clean motive (ibid, 719). When the trustors find a trustee integer, they believe he will act in accordance with acceptable principals, and that this person has respect for justice (ibid, 719-720). Since the ABI-model is well-tested and has proved to be good construct to measure trust in leaders, it will be used in this research to examine trust in politicians (e.g., Colquitt et al. 2007; Mayer & Davis 1999; Moro & Kodwani 2010).

Expectations

As is discussed, the political influence of cartoons is not obvious, wherefore there is a need to examine the influence of this special type of image. Even though there are reasons to expect cartoons will have a positive influence on the evaluation of politicians or to expect cartoons will not have an influence at all, it is expected in this research that cartoons will have a negative effect on the evaluation of politicians. This effect is plausible because of the negative and criticising nature of this type of image (Hogan 2001, 29), and because previous research on the influence of satire (Baumgartner 2008) and the influence of visual images of unknown politicians (e.g., Barett & Barrington 2005a,b; Armstrong et al. 2010; Banducci et al. 2008; Todorov et al. 2005) found negative effects for the evaluation of politicians.

It is expected that visual newspaper messages of well-known politicians can influence vote intent for the politician, affinity with the politician, and trust in the politician. The differences in likelihood of future vote, affinity with politicians and trust in politicians will be examined with a between-subjects design. For all three politicians in the research there will be four randomized groups in the research: a 'photograph group', two 'cartoon groups', and a 'control group', which is the group that will not see an image of the politician. There are two cartoon groups for each politician to make sure the found effect cannot be attributed to the

cartoons of a single cartoonist. The cartoon groups will be compared to the photograph group and the control group, and it is expected that the cartoon groups will have lower scores for affinity, trust and vote intent than the photograph group and the control group.

The type of photographs that will be used in this research are official press photographs of the politicians. These photographs are chosen because they show the politician in the way the politicians apparently want to appear to the public. They also show the politician without a setting that could be of influence, since they show the politician against a neutral background. Since these photographs often show the politicians in their finest way, it is expected that the photograph group will have a higher score on affinity, trust and vote intent than the cartoon groups and the control group. The relation between affinity, trust and the likelihood of future vote is also examined, since less affinity and less trust for a politician is expected to be related to a lower likelihood of future vote. All expectations are formulated in the following three hypotheses, and all expected relationships are presented in figure 1.

- H1. Affinity with a politician is positively influenced by an official press photograph of the politician and negatively influenced by a cartoon of the politician.
- H2. Trust in a politician is positively influenced by an official press photograph of the politician and negatively influenced by a cartoon of the politician.
- H3. The likelihood of future vote for a politician is positively influenced by an official press photograph of the politician and negatively influenced by a cartoon of the politician.




Figure 1. expected relation between the independent and the dependent variables. The variables in the dotted square form the ABI-model.

There also are some important control variables included in this study. Age is included as a control variable since younger persons would be more receptive to satiric news messages like the political cartoon (Hmielowski et al. 2011, 109; Boukes et al. 2015, 727). Higher-educated and well-informed persons would also be more receptive towards cartoons, and they would be better able to understand the underlying message. Young, well-educated and well-informed people should therefore be more familiar with cartoons, and they are expected to be more receptive of the message (Rhee & Cappella 1997; Young 2004, 4).

While research on the influence of visual news messages with unknown politicians was designed "to take partisanship out of the equation" (Barrett & Barrington 2005a, 101), the design of this research aims for the opposite. Since the politicians in this study are well-known politicians, party preference can moderate the influence of visual messages on voting behaviour. Previous research has pointed out that partisanship biases the attitude towards political objects (Bartels 2002, 138; Goren 2002), and that a politician belonging to the same party as the trustor is more likely to be trusted (Carlin & Love 2013; 2016). People that have voted for the party of the politician in the past or people that are close to the party on the left-right scale are therefore expected to have a better evaluation of the politician.

Another important control variable for the trust variables is the trustors propensity. If a person is very trusting of others and of politicians, he is likely to be more trusting of the trustee even before any information is available (Mayer et al. 1995, 715; Colquitt et al. 2007, 911). For the political cartoons perceived funniness and perceived seriousness can also be of importance. When a cartoon is perceived to be more funny, it is expected to have a more positive influence, while if a cartoon is perceived to contain a serious message it is expected to have a more negative influence (Boukes et al. 2015, 739).

Case selection: Dutch party leaders

This research is an examination of well-known Dutch party leaders. The Netherlands is a typical Western democracy in which voting behaviour was predictable because of strong party affiliations in the time of pillarization, but since the end of pillarization elections have become less predictable. The country now has high electoral volatility, creating space for other short-term explanations of voting behaviour like the popularity of the party leader (Mair 2008; Rahat & Sheafer 2007, 67).

The Dutch political leaders are selected from the pool of current party leaders of the parties in parliament from both the right and left side of the political spectrum. The primeminister Mark Rutte of the VVD is included, as well as two other well-known Dutch party

leaders of the largest political parties, Diederik Samsom of the PvdA and Geert Wilders of the PvVV. It is clear from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study of 2012 that all of these party leaders are well-known by the electorate. Mark Rutte is known by 99.2 percent of the electorate, Diederik Samsom by 96,9 percent, and Geert Wilders even by 99.5 percent (DPES 2013). The media play an important part in the knowledge the electorate has of these politicians (Kriesi 2011, 826). Respondents will therefore be familiar with being exposed to information about these politicians through the news media.

Including this group of three party leaders increases the chance that effects will not be specific for one politician. Examining how the effect of visual messages fits in with pre-existing knowledge and opinions about the politicians gives this research good external validity and real-world relevance are higher than in previous studies, because the research is more in line with what one can expect to find in reality than in research with unknown or fake politicians (Keating et al 1999, 595). Using real, well-known and even outspoken politicians is a least-likely case study. If voters will change their evaluation of a well-known and outspoken politician based on a single image, they are even more likely to change their opinion of less known politicians of whom they have a less strong prior opinion: "if it [the theory] works here, it will work anywhere" (Patton 2015, 276; Odell 2001, 165).

Method and operationalization

The hypotheses were examined with a post-test only experimental design. The stimulus in this experiment was the visual news message, and the examined causal relation was how exposure to the visual message could influence respondents' affinity, trust and vote intent. The experiment took the form of an online questionnaire that was built in the online data collection program Qualtrics, in which the respondents were randomly assigned to the groups as visualised in figure 2.

The stimulus for group 1 to 3 was an official press photograph of the politician. The stimulus for groups 4 to 6 was a cartoon of the politician created by cartoonist Joep Bertrams, and the stimulus for groups 7 to 9 was a cartoon created by cartoonist Bas van der Schot¹. The cartoons can be found in the complete questionnaire in the appendix². Group 10 to 12 were

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¹ To make sure the visual part of the cartoon was examined and not the verbal part, the captions of the cartoons of Joep Bertrams were erased from the cartoons.

² Before the questionnaire was used to collect data of a random sample of the population, the quality of the questionnaire was examined with a convenience sample for one politician (Mark Rutte). Based on this pre-test some small adjustments were made to the questionnaire.

the control groups in the experiment, they did not receive a stimulus. The stimulus was shown on a page accompanied by a short text to explain that some questions would be asked about this politician. A non-visible timer was set on this page to make sure the respondents saw this screen for at least 5 seconds (the time it takes to read the accompanying text). The respondents were not asked to examine the accompanying image. This is not necessary since the participants will observe the image 'en passant', and they only need to glance at the image for a split second to be influenced (Willis & Todorov 2006, 596; Todorov et al. 2005, 1624). Not asking the participants to examine the image will also make it less likely that they know what they are being examined for. At the end of the questionnaire there was a post-manipulation check to examine if the respondents saw the image, and if they believe this image gave a positive or negative image of the politician. If the respondents saw a cartoon, they will also be asked if they found the cartoon funny (1= not funny, 7= very funny) and if it contained a serious message (1= not serious, 7= very serious).

Figure 2. The randomized groups in the experiment.

Randomly = selected stimulus	Experimental groups
photograph	1. Rutte photograph
cartoon Bertrams	Wilders photograph
cartoon Van der Schot	Samsom photograph
control group	Rutte cartoon Bertrams Wilders cartoon Bertrams Samsom cartoon Bertrams
	7. Rutte cartoon Van der Schot
	Wilders cartoon Van der Schot
	9. Samsom cartoon Van der Schot
	10. Rutte control group
	11. Wilders control group
	12. Samsom control group
	photograph cartoon Bertrams cartoon Van der Schot

Operationalization of the dependent and control variables

The dependent variables in the analysis were affinity, trust and vote intent for a politician. A feeling thermometer was used to measure general affinity with the politician (0= very low affinity, 100= very high affinity), and likelihood of future vote for the politician (0= certainly never, 100= certainly ever). The trust scale was constructed based on the ABI-model and

consisted of six statements: two measuring ability, two measuring benevolence, and two measuring integrity (Mayer et al. 1995; Mayer & Davis 1999; Colquitt et al. 2007; Moro & Kodwani 2010). The statements had to be answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1= completely disagree, 7= completely agree).

All control questions and answer options were fashioned after questions that have been used in the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (Van der Kolk et al. 2013). The control variables in the questionnaire included some demographic variables (age, gender, education) and questions related to the political interest (1= very interested, 3= not interested), political knowledge (1= very little knowledge, 7= much knowledge), following political news (1= almost always, 4= rarely/never), political preference (party voted for in 2012), self-placement on the left-right scale (1= left, 10= right), and general trust in others and trust in politicians (1= most people/politicians can be trusted, 2= cannot be careful enough).

Participants

The participants were collected with the service of Survey Sampling International (SSI). This research therefore has the advantage to have a participant group that is a random sample of the population instead of using university students like previous work on the influence of visual news messages (e.g., Barrett and Barrington 2005a,b; Keating et al. 1999; Rosenberg et al. 1991). A total of 3060 respondents participated in the study. The participants were between 18 and 90 years old, with a mean of 43 years (SD= 15.03). 52.4 percent of the respondents were females, and the respondents seem normally distributed for their level of education, and their knowledge and interest in politics. All descriptive statistics can be found in the appendix.

Results

The statistical program SPSS was used to analyse the results (IBM Corp. 2012). Before interpreting the findings of the hypotheses, the construction of the trust scale was checked. It was also checked if the dependent variables relate to each other as would be expected, and if the other variables in the model relate to the dependent variables as was expected based on previous literature. After discussing all of these factors, the results of the hypotheses will be discussed.

The trust scale

With the help of the Factor Analysis routine it was examined if the trust variables load on

three factors as was expected with the ABI-model. This analysis gives reason to doubt the relevance of the ABI-model to predict trust in politicians. For all three politicians, the variables did not load on three factors, but on one factor: general trust. All variables load strongly on the underlying factor, all factor loadings can be found in the appendix. For Rutte 74.88 percent of the variability in all trust variables can be accounted for by this one factor. For Wilders this is 73.10 percent, and for Samsom 75.22 percent. Since the general trust scale seems to work well, the trust variables will be treated as one factor in the rest of the analysis.

Relation of affinity and trust with the likelihood of future vote

It was examined if affinity with and trust in politicians has an influence on vote choice to determine if the personality of the politician actually has an influence in elections. A multiple linear regression model was employed for each politician to examine the relation between the dependent variables. It was examined whether trust in the politician and affinity with the politician explain the likelihood of future vote for this politician. For Rutte, 36.4 percent of the variance for the likelihood of future vote can be explained by affinity and trust, the model is a good fit for the data F(2,857) = 246.29, p < .001). Both trust (B = 4.75, SE = .84, p < .001) and affinity (B = .39, SE = .05, p < .001) add significantly to the model. For Samsom 35.8 percent of the variance is explained by the model F(2,752) = 209.27, p < .001). Again both trust (B = 4.51, SE = .84, p < .001) and affinity (B = .44, SE = .05, p < .001) add significantly to the prediction. For Wilders, a large proportion of 70.3 percent of the variance in likelihood of future vote is explained by the model (F(2,849) = 1005.42, p < .001), but only affinity adds significantly to the prediction (B = .94, SE = .03, p < .001). It is remarkable that while the variance explained is twice as high for Wilders, this is only due to affinity with this politician. It is clear from this analysis that affinity and trust are important factors to explain the likelihood of future vote for politicians. This finding is in line with what was expected based on literature, and it also confirms the importance of affinity and trust for politicians for electoral success.

Perceived funniness and seriousness of the cartoons

Since previous literature argued that perceived funniness and seriousness are important factors that explain the influence of satire (Boukes et al. 2015), the relations between these two factors and the dependent variables were examined. It was examined with a separate MANOVA model for each cartoon if the perceived funniness and seriousness of the cartoon had an influence on the dependent variables. The results of these analyses show that perceived

funniness and seriousness of the cartoons do not have an effect on likelihood of future vote, affinity, and trust in the politician. This finding is not in line with the findings of Boukes et al. (2015, 738), who found that perceived funniness had a positive effect on the evaluation of the target of satire, and that perceived seriousness had a negative effect on the evaluation of the politician. Since neither of those effects was found in this research, these findings create reason to doubt the underlying mechanism proposed by Boukes et al. (2015) to explain the influence of satire.

Effect of cartoons on affinity, trust and vote

The main expectations of this research are investigated with a MANCOVA model for each politician. The experimental groups are the independent variable and vote, affinity and trust are the dependent variables. The results for Rutte, Wilders and Samsom are presented in table 1. Before interpreting the findings of the hypotheses, it is checked if the other variables in the model have the expected relation with the dependent variables.

Age is a significant control variable for vote and affinity with Rutte, for vote and trust for Wilders, and for all dependent variables for Samsom. For Rutte and Samsom, there is a negative relation between age and the dependent variables. This means that younger persons are more likely to vote for Rutte and Samsom, to have affinity with Rutte and Samsom, and to trust Samsom. For Wilders the effect is in the opposite direction: the older a person is, the more likely he/she is to vote for Wilders and to have trust in Wilders. Gender is only significant for the affinity with Wilders and the likelihood of future vote for Samsom. Males generally have more affinity with Wilders than females, and are more likely to vote for Samsom. The level of education has an impact on all dependent variables for Rutte and Wilders, but only on affinity for Samsom. For Wilders this means that the lower the education of the respondent, the better he is evaluated. For Rutte the opposite is true, the higher the education of the respondent, the better he is evaluated. The higher educated are also more likely to have more affinity with Samsom.

Political knowledge, political interest and if a person follows political news do not have an effect on the way Rutte is evaluated. For Samsom, people that evaluate themselves higher on political interest are more likely to have affinity for Samsom. For Wilders, following political news has a positive influence on the likelihood of future vote. People with a higher self-rating of political knowledge are also more likely to vote for Wilders in the future, to have affinity with Wilders and to trust Wilders.

Trust in others and trust in politicians are two important variables that have an

Table 1. Results of the analysis of the effect of the experimental groups and control variables on vote, affinity and trust in Rutte, Wilders and Samsom.

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Left-right scale 2.79*** 1.15* .04 4.08*** 4.44*** .19*** -1.19** -1.85***	09***

	(.45)	(.46)	(.03)	(.49)	(.45)	(.03)	(.45)	(.39)	(.02)
Vote 2012 ^a	26.99***	14.66***	.65***	47.38***	30.52***	1.16***	26.72***	14.64***	.44**
	(2.72)	(2.77)	(.16)	(3.00)	(2.78)	(.15)	(3.11)	(2.74)	(.17)
\mathbb{R}^2	.22	.36	.18	.43	.51	.27	.30	.26	.19
Adjusted R ²	.21	.34	.17	.42	.50	.26	.28	.24	.17
N	699	699	699	677	677	677	604	604	604

Note: Table entries are estimates (B) with estimated standard errors (SE), and significance: *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. The variables that are close to significance (*< .10) are also marked in the table.

^a = Vote 2012 is a dummy variable that measures if a person voted for the VVD (0=vote VVD, 1= vote other party), for the PVV (0= vote PVV, 1= vote other party), or for the PvdA (0= vote PvdA, 1= vote other party) in 2012.

influence on the evaluation of the politicians. For both Rutte and Samsom, trust in others and trust in politicians are significant for all dependent variables, with the exception of trust in others for the likelihood of future vote. People with more trust in others and/or more trust in politicians evaluate Rutte and Samsom more positively, and the size of the effect is quite substantial in all cases. For Wilders the respondents that believe you cannot be careful enough with trusting other people are more likely to vote for Wilders, and to have more affinity for Wilders. So people that are more trusting in others and/or in politicians are more likely to vote for Samsom and Rutte, and people who have less trust in others are more likely to vote for Wilders.

The last two variables in the table, left-right scale and vote in 2012, indicate how the party preference of the respondents influences the evaluation of the politicians. Self-placement on the left-right scale matters for all dependent variables but trust in Rutte. The more to the right a person is on the left-right scale, the more a person is likely to have a positive evaluation of Rutte and Wilders. For Samsom the relation is in the other direction, the more a person places himself to the left of the left-right scale, the more this person is likely to evaluate Samsom positively. This relation is according to expectation, since the PvdA of Samsom is on the left side of the political party spectrum and the VVD of Rutte and the PvV of Wilders are on the right side of the spectrum. 'Party voted for in 2012' is also of significant influence for all dependent variables. This means that people that voted on the party of the politicians in 2012 are more likely to evaluate the politicians positive.

Answers to the hypotheses

When comparing the cartoon of Bertrams with the control group, affinity is close to significance for both Rutte and Samsom. For Rutte, the cartoon of Bertrams has a lower score than the control group (B= -4.95, SE=2.58, p <.10), but there are no significant differences for the groups with a 95 percent confidence level. There are some significant group differences for Samsom. The respondents that saw the cartoon of Samsom by Bertrams had less affinity with Samsom then the respondents that saw the photograph (B= -6.11, SE=2.34, p <.01) or the cartoon of Van der Schot (B= -5.37, SE=2.37, p <.05). Samsom is also less positively evaluated after the cartoon of Bertrams compared to the control group, but this difference is not significant (B= -4.62, SE=2.41, p <.10). The cartoon of Samsom by Bertrams therefore had a negative impact on the affinity respondents have for Samsom. The differences for the groups are visualised in figure 3. While the first hypothesis is supported by the cartoon of Samsom by Bertrams, it is contrasted by all other cartoons. The negative effect therefore seems to be specific for the one cartoon, and cannot be generalized for all other cartoons. The

first hypothesis is therefore not supported by the findings.




Figure 3. Estimated marginal means for affinity per politician per experimental group.

Despite the small impact for affinity with Samsom, there are no significant effects at all for trust and the likelihood of future vote. Since the images therefore do not have an influence on trust and the likelihood of future vote for the politicians, hypotheses two and three have to be rejected based on the findings in this research. It is clear from these results that the impact of seeing a cartoon or photograph of a politician is not as was expected in any of the hypotheses.

It is not only remarkable in this research of well-known politicians that cartoons had no influence, but also that the positive photographs did not have a positive influence on the evaluation of the politicians like it did in previous research with unknown politicians. Since most important politicians in a country are well-known by the majority of the electorate, this results brings doubt to the generalizability of earlier findings of unknown politicians. According to the findings of this research it is not likely that one positive press photograph can make a difference on the evaluation of well-known politicians.

It was also examined if there were cross-over interactions between the groups and

other variables, like age, knowledge and if a person voted for the party of the politician in 2012. It could be possible that even though there is not an overall effect, there is an effect for a group of persons with certain characteristics, like younger people or males. This was also not the case, there are no significant interactions between the image groups and other variables in the model. This finding therefore goes against the expectation that there would be a different effect of satire for certain groups of people with different backgrounds. This finding is highly surprising in relation to findings in previous literature on the influence of infotainment.

Conclusion and discussion

The results of this research are remarkable, and while the findings answer our main question, it raises many more. It was expected that cartoons have a negative influence on affinity (H1), trust (H2) and the likelihood of future vote (H3) for the well-known politician portrayed in the cartoon, but none of these hypotheses could be confirmed. In contrast to previous research, this study does also not support the idea that cartoons have a different influence for people with a different background. Exposure to a cartoon seems to have no influence, no matter the political knowledge, age or preferences of a person. Since the hypotheses cannot be confirmed for the group as a whole or for any specific subgroups, the research question can be answered unambiguously. The results show that a single photograph or cartoon of a well-known politician is not able to influence affinity, trust and vote intent of its public.

Even though it was expected that cartoons would have a negative effect on the evaluation of the politician portrayed in the cartoon, it is clear from previous research that this was not the *only* possible outcome, merely the most plausible one. The current findings are in line with earlier findings of Boukes et al. (2015), Nabi et al. (2007), and Slater and Rouner (2002), who found no influence of satire on the evaluation of politicians. Although this research supports their claim that there is no influence of satire on the evaluation of politicians, the results do not support their proposed underlying mechanism: which is that the effects of funniness and seriousness of the message would cancel each other out (Boukes et al. 2015; also see Feldman 2013). This research therefore leaves us wondering *why* cartoons do not have an influence. Does a single image simply not change someone's mind, or do people not understand cartoons enough? Both of these answers are plausible, but more research is needed to be able to get more insight in this underlying mechanism.

This research is one of its kind with its large-scale experimental design to examine the influence of political cartoons; a type of image that is underexposed in science despite its age-

old tradition in our history. This research addressed many relevant topics of media and political behaviour: the influence of visual messages, infotainment, and media personalization. While this research found no proof for the influence of cartoons on the evaluation of politicians, the findings do support the importance of media personalization for elections. There is a very strong relation between affinity and trust in a politician, and the likelihood of future vote. Although it cannot be said based on these findings if people like the politician they vote for, or if they vote for the politician they like, voters hold an opinion on the personality of the one they vote for and this personality seems to matter.

In relation to the question how far the 'licence to mock' of cartoonists should reach, the results of this research do not find proof for the negative political consequences Hogan (2001, 2004) feared for. The absence of negative political consequences is a good message for the 'licence to mock' of cartoonists. Even though exposure to a cartoon does not have a direct political influence, their relevance for society should not be underestimated. Cartoons are a unique tool to mock the ones in power, to voice discontent of the public, and to lighten up a straining situation. Cartoons are a democratic weapon, and they are here to stay (Duus 2001).

Limitations of this research and directions for future research

This research on the political influence of cartoons has many strengths, but it is only the first in its kind. There is plenty of room for improvements and further work building on this research. This research was limited to showing one cartoon at one measure moment, while longer exposure to multiple cartoons might have a different effect. The type of satire, the intention of the creator, and the understanding of the viewer are also factors that deserve further examination (see Manning & Phiddian 2004, 40). While Boukes et al. (2015) proposed an underlying mechanism to explain the effect of satire, this research puts doubt on the working of that mechanism. Since this mechanism does not explain why cartoons do not influence the evaluation of politicians, it needs to be examined how this can be explained.

This research found influence for the cartoon of Samsom by Bertrams, and for Rutte the result was close to significance. While this is not enough to support the hypotheses, it might point out an interesting finding in relation to the type of cartoon. The cartoon of Rutte by Bertrams, but especially the cartoon of Samsom by Bertrams, are more violent and harsh than the other cartoons. This might indicate that a lighter form of satire (horatian satire) has less influence than a heavier and more bitter form of satire (juvenalian satire) (Holbert et al. 2011; LaMare et al. 2014). This might indicate that the type of cartoon is important for the influence these images have. The cartoons in this study were furthermore consciously kept as

context-independent as possible, to keep opinions on specific political situations out of the equation. While this was a good design to examine the influence of the visual message, cartoons rarely come completely without context. When cartoons are not context-independent, their influence could be more severe, since these cartoons are often drawn as a critique to a tangible political event. Research on the influence of cartoons should therefore be broadened to include differences *between* cartoons like their context and the type of satire.

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Appendix I.Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and the covariates used in the analysis.

Descriptive statistics of the depende	N	Min.	Median	Max.	Mean	SD
Dependent variables						
Rutte vote	1013	0	7	100	23.92	27.80
Rutte affinity	1019	0	50	100	47.21	26.70
Rutte trust	866	1	4.33	7	4.16	1.54
Wilders vote	1013	0	12	100	33.16	36.92
Wilders affinity	1007	0	44	100	41.17	31.60
Wilders trust	860	1	4.83	7	4.72	1.60
Samsom vote	1013	0	8	100	22.60	25.95
Samsom affinity	1019	0	50	100	43.53	23.18
Samsom trust	760	1	3.17	7	4.04	1.45
Covariates						
Age	3029	18	45	90	43.02	15.03
Gender	3043	1	2	2	1.53	.50
Education	3022	1	3	6	3,67	1.26
Political interest	2994	0	1	1	.74	.44
Political knowledge	2999	1	4	7	4.08	1.62
Follows political news in the paper	3031	0	0	1	.41	.49
Trust in others	2876	1	2	2	1.61	.49
Trust in politicians	2797	1	2	2	1.82	.39
Left-right self-placement	2497	1	6	10	5.73	2.21
Voted VVD in 2012	3060	0	0	1	.11	.31
Voted PvdA in 2012	3060	0	0	1	.10	.30
Voted PVV in 2012	3060	0	0	1	.15	.36
Perceived funniness cartoon	1095	1	4	7	3.86	1.83
Perceived seriousness cartoon	1039	1	4	7	3.91	1.70

Appendix II.

Results of the factor analysis of the trust variables.

		Factor 1	oadings	
ABI-factor	Statement	Rutte	Wilders	Samsom
Ability	Knows the political world very well	.80	.84	.80
Ability	Is able to follow political developments	.87	.90	.87
Benevolence	Is involved in society	.90	.89	.91
Benevolence	Pays attention to the concerns and interests of	.90	.89	.90
	voters			
Integrity	Is honest in negotiations with other politicians	.89	.88	.89
Integrity	Is decisive in his behaviour	.83	.72	.83

Note: for all three politicians the trust variables load on one factor: general trust.

Appendix III. Original questionnaire in Dutch³ Beoordeling Politici

Prof. dr. Joop van Holsteyn Instituut voor Politieke Wetenschap (Universiteit Leiden) Mei 2016

Welkom bij dit korte onderzoek over politiek en verkiezingen. De vragenlijst bevat algemene vragen en vragen over een politicus. We beginnen met de algemene vragen.

1a) Als er in de krant binnenlands nieuws staat, bijvoorbeeld nieuws over regeringsproblemen, leest u dat dan altijd, vaak, zo nu en dan, of zelden of nooit?

- 0 (bijna) altijd
- 0 vaak
- 0 zo nu en dan
- zelden of nooit/ik lees geen krant 0
- weet niet/wil niet zeggen

1b) Hoe geïnteresseerd bent u in de landelijke politiek van Nederland? Bent u daarin zeer geïnteresseerd, tamelijk geïnteresseerd of niet geïnteresseerd?

- 0 zeer geïnteresseerd
- tamelijk geïnteresseerd 0
- niet geïnteresseerd 0
- 0 weet niet/wil niet zeggen

³ An English translation of the questionnaire can be received upon request.

2) Als u moet aangeven hoeveel kennis u hebt van de landelijke politiek, waar zou u uzelf dan plaatsen op de onderstaande schaal?

								weet niet/
	← weinig	wil niet zeggen						
Γ	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9

3) Bij de Tweede Kamerverkiezingen van 2012 heb ik gestemd op:

0	VVD	0	GroenLinks	0	andere partij
0	PvdA	0	D66	0	blanco
0	PVV	0	ChristenUnie	0	dat weet ik niet meer
0	CDA	0	SGP	0	wil niet zeggen
0	SP	0	Partij voor de Dieren	0	in 2012 niet gestemd/
					mocht nog niet stemmen

4) In de politiek wordt soms gesproken over links en rechts. Als u denkt aan uw politieke opvattingen, waar zou u zichzelf dan plaatsen op deze schaal van links (1) naar rechts (10)?

										weet niet/
← link	S							rec	ehts →	wil niet zeggen
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

5a) Vindt u over het algemeen dat de <u>meeste mensen</u> wel te vertrouwen zijn of vindt u dat men niet voorzichtig genoeg kan zijn in de omgang met mensen?


- 0 meeste mensen wel te vertrouwen
- 0 je kunt niet voorzichtig genoeg zijn
- 0 weet niet/geen mening

5b) Vindt u over het algemeen dat de <u>meeste politici</u> wel te vertrouwen zijn of vindt u dat men niet voorzichtig genoeg kan zijn in de omgang met politici?

- 0 meeste politici wel te vertrouwen
- 0 je kunt niet voorzichtig genoeg zijn
- 0 weet niet/geen mening

In maart 2017 worden verkiezingen voor de Tweede Kamer gehouden. Politieke partijen en hun lijsttrekkers gaan dan weer de onderlinge strijd aan. Zij vechten om uw stem. Bij de volgende vragen gaat het over één van die politici, namelijk XXX.

→ 4 varianten (zie onderstaand): hier a) geen afbeelding; b) officiële foto van XXX; c) cartoon Bertrams van XXX; d) cartoon Van der Schot van XXX



6) Kunt u op de onderstaande schaal aangeven hoe bekend of onbekend u bent met XXX?

							weet niet/
← niet be	wil niet zeggen						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9

7) En hoe sympathiek of onsympathiek vindt u XXX?. U kunt hem een cijfer geven van 0 tot en met 100. Een 0 betekent dat u hem zeer onsympathiek vindt en 100 zeer sympathiek. De score 50 betekent dat u hem niet sympathiek maar ook niet onsympathiek vindt.

Ik geef XXX de score

8) Kunt u aangeven in hoeverre volgens u de volgende eigenschappen van toepassing zijn op XXX? [eigenschappen gerandomiseerd aanbieden]

XXX is											
								weet niet/			
	← hel	lemaal :	niet		h	elemaa	l wel →	wil niet zeggen			
- een zwakke leider	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9			
- consistent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9			
- besluitvaardig	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9			
- aardig	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9			
- vriendelijk	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9			
- arrogant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9			

9) En kunt u aangeven in hoeverre u het eens of oneens bent met de volgende stellingen over XXX? [stellingen gerandomiseerd aanbieden]

								weet niet/
	← hel	← helemaal					mee	wil niet
	mee o	neens				ee	ns >	zeggen
- XXX kent de politieke wereld heel	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
goed.								
- XXX is betrokken bij de	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
samenleving.								
- XXX is in staat om politieke	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
ontwikkelingen goed te volgen.								
- XXX heeft aandacht voor de	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
zorgen en belangen van zijn kiezers.								
- XXX is eerlijk in onder-	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
handelingen met andere politici.								
- XXX is standvastig in zijn gedrag.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9

10) Nu zou ik willen weten hoe waarschijnlijk het is dat u in 2017 op de [partij] van XXX stemt. Kunt u op een lijn van 0 tot en met 100 aangeven hoe waarschijnlijk dat is? Daarbij betekent 0 dat u zeker niet op de [partij] van XXX zal stemmen en 100 dat u zeker wel op de partij van XXX stemt.

de kans dat ik op de [partij] van XXX stem is

11) [bij foto of cartoon bij introductie politicus] Bij de aankondiging van de vragen over XXX stond een [foto/politieke tekening] van XXX. Wat vond u van deze afbeelding?

- O ik heb die afbeelding niet gezien
- O ik heb de afbeelding wel gezien, maar kan me die niet goed herinneren
- O ik heb de afbeelding wel gezien, en die gaf een positief beeld van XXX
- O ik heb de afbeelding wel gezien, en die gaf een neutraal beeld van XXX
- O ik heb de afbeelding wel gezien, en die gaf een negatief beeld van XXX
- O weet niet/wil niet zeggen

12a) [alleen bij cartoon bij introductie politicus & alleen bij het zich voldoende herinneren van de cartoon] Een cartoon is een <u>grappige tekening</u> met een <u>serieuze</u> <u>boodschap</u>. Kunt u aangeven hoe <u>grappig</u> u de cartoon vond die u zojuist hebt gezien?

							weet niet/
← helema	aal niet gra	appig			heel erg	grappig →	wil niet zeggen
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9

12b) [alleen bij cartoon bij introductie politicus & alleen bij het zich voldoende herinneren van de cartoon] En hoe <u>serieus</u> vond u de boodschap van de cartoon die u zojuist hebt gezien?

							weet niet/
← helemaal niet serieus heel erg serieus →							wil niet zeggen
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9

Tot slot wil ik nog enkele gegevens van u weten.

11) Ik ben een

- 0 man
- 0 vrouw
- 0 wil niet zeggen

12) Mijn geboortejaar is

. . . .

0 wil niet zeggen

13) De hoogst genoten opleiding die ik heb gevolgd of nu nog volg is:

- 0 lager onderwijs, basisonderwijs
- 0 lager beroepsonderwijs (LBO, VMBO, e.d.)
- 0 middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (MBO), MULO, MAVO
- 0 voortgezet middelbaar onderwijs (HAVO, VWO)
- 0 hoger beroepsonderwijs (HBO)
- 0 wetenschappelijk onderwijs (WO), universiteit
- 0 iets ander, namelijk ...
- 0 weet niet/wil niet zeggen

Dit is het einde van de vragenlijst. Hartelijk dank voor het invullen!