Becoming a Politician

The Political Ambition of Party Members

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27 June 2019

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Words: 9,738

Abstract

Almost all over the world women are underrepresented in the legislature. This study contributes to the literature about female underrepresentation by studying the supposed gender gap in political ambition. By using the General Incentive Model, it is studied whether Dutch male and female party members are different with regard to the reasons why they joined a party. The study finds that party members are most motivated by altruistic incentives and collective outcome incentives. Both men and women are equally motivated by the selective outcome incentive: the idea of obtaining a political career. This is remarkable since it contradicts previous research that indicates that men have more political ambition than women. Being driven by this 'political ambition' incentive pays off, i.e. it results in a higher probability of getting a political function than members who are not motivated by the idea of getting a political career. The effect is the same for men and women. Despite the fact that this study finds that male and female members are not very different, one important distinction remains: there are numerically speaking fewer female than male party members. Therefore, it is suggested that future research focuses on the reasons why women are not joining political parties.

The image on the front page is a cover of The New Yorker, November 19 2018. It displays the arrival of new female politicians and politicians of color to the House of Representatives after the 2018 elections, creating a more diverse parliament.

1. Introduction

A century ago (1917/1919) female suffrage was introduced in the Netherlands. Since then, the rate of female parliamentarians has progressed, but women remain underrepresented: after the 2017 elections of March 15, only 36% of the Dutch MP's were women (Kiesraad, 2017, p. 21). This underrepresentation has also been noticed by the Dutch State Commission of the Parliamentary System that concludes that Dutch Parliament does not represent the population well from a descriptive perspective (Staatscommisse Parlementair Stelsel, 2018, p. 68). Moreover, recent polls show that half of the Dutch female population considers women to be underrepresented. In the same study, the majority of both men and women (54% and 70%) stated that half of the MP's should be female (I&O Research, 2019).

The Netherlands is no exceptional case. Almost all over the world women are descriptively underrepresented in parliament: on average about 24% of all parliamentarians are women (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019). Descriptive representation means that it is important *who* a representative is; the idea is that a parliament should mirror society (Pitkin, 1972; Philips, 1994; Celis & Meier, 2006). When women and men are equally represented in parliament, this symbolizes that both men and women can be present in the legislature and that both groups have equal political rights and opportunities (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 650). A diverse parliament also provides legitimacy to decision-making, because multiple societal groups are involved in the process (Philips, 1995; Mansbridge, 1999, p. 650; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005).

This study examines why women are underrepresented in parliament by focusing on political party members and their political ambition. To be more specific, the research question is whether male and female party members are different with regard to their motivation to join the party. Moreover, it is studied whether being driven by political ambition actually results in getting a political function. In short, the argument is that previous explanations of female underrepresentation that focused on voters (micro) or institutional characteristics (macro) do not account for the underrepresentation of women in the Netherlands. Therefore, the focus arguably

has to shift to the level in-between: the party. The party is still responsible for the recruitment of politicians. For most of the Dutch politicians the first step in their political career is being a party member. Therefore, it is important to get to know these party members better: who are they and why do they become active within their party. Do they join a party with the idea of getting a political career or do they have different motives? The General Incentive Model (1992) is used to identify the main incentives of party members to join a political party. Based on previous research it is expected that male and female party members have different incentives to become active.

In this study, the Leiden Party Member Survey 2008 is used, covering six of the main Dutch political parties. This study shows that male and female party members are not profoundly different from each other: both groups predominantly join a political party for altruistic reasons. They are equally motivated by instrumental reasons, i.e. to get a political career. Being motivated by the idea of getting a political career is also effective: the probability of getting a political career increases when a party member is motivated by this idea. The effect of political ambition is also the same for male and female party members. Since male and female party members clearly have the same level of political ambition, we suggest that the cause of underrepresentation of women cannot be found in a lack of political ambition of party members, but must be found elsewhere.

2. Why the party?

The puzzle of the underrepresentation of women in parliaments has been extensively studied, but as yet has not been solved. One of the first approaches scholars have taken is that of the macro level of institutions: which electoral systems benefit women and which do not? It is found that proportional systems are advantageous for women (e.g. Rule, 1987; Paxton, 1997; Paxton & Hughes, 2007; Diaz, 2005). Another beneficial institutional feature is the possibility to express a preference vote. In this way voters can surpass a potential bias of their party against women (Golden et al., 2015; Kunovich, 2012). In addition, district magnitude can benefit female representation: a large district is better for the success of female politicians than a single member

district, because in multi-member districts female politicians do not threaten or 'push away' male candidate from the list of candidates or the ballot paper (Matland, 2005, p. 6; Paxton & Hughes, 2007, p. 140; Matland & Brown, 1992, p. 471).[1] The Dutch system, the focus of this study, ticks all the boxes of these institutional benefits: the Dutch system has been classified as being extremely proportional (e.g. Lijphart, 1999); it has a 150 member district; and it has the opportunity to cast preference votes. This advantageous institutional system makes the puzzle of underrepresentation even more complicated.

Within each institutional system there are two 'markets' that determine who ultimately will be elected as politicians (see figure 1). The electoral market is that of the elections: parties supply lists of candidates and voters express their demand by voting for a certain type of candidate. Second, the recruitment market is the market within a political party. This market ultimately determines which candidates are supplied to the electoral market. In this recruitment market there are different actors on the demand and the supply side than on the electoral market. The supply side of the recruitment market consists of the people who apply to be a candidate on the list; the people who want to run for office. On the demand side gatekeepers, or the so-called selectorate, select the candidates (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995, p. 93; Krook, 2009, p. 156; Evans, 2008, p. 594; Ashe & Stewart, 2012, p. 689; Lovenduski, 2016, p. 514).



Figure 1. The two markets in the legislative recruitment chain.

[1] For a more elaborate review of explanations of women underrepresentation at the macro level see Wängnerud (2009, p. 59).

When scholars study the electoral market, that of the elections, they often try explain the underrepresentation of women by focusing on voters. Do voters discriminate against female candidates? Do voters prefer male politicians over their female counterparts because they have gender stereotypes that are disadvantageous for women? It is found that Dutch voters do have gender stereotypes about men and women. However, they do not seem to use these beliefs in their evaluation of politicians. In fact, female politicians are evaluated similar or even more positive than men (Van Dijk et al., 2017). This concurs with the findings of Dolan (1998; 2014), who found that American voters do not use gender and gender stereotypes in their decision whom to vote for.

Besides looking at the presence of prejudice against women and whether this affects vote choice in experimental settings, one can also study voting behavior: do voters vote for female candidates? How many female politicians are elected compared to the number of female candidates? If there are more women elected, this would be a sign that voters do not shy away from electing female politicians. As shown in figure 2, for a selection of European countries[2] the number of female candidates equals the number of elected politicians, except for Iceland, Belgium and Spain. In Spain and Belgium there are legal gender quotas that regulate the number of women on the ballot list.[3] In Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, where there are no legislated gender quotas, the relative number of elected candidates clearly exceeds the number of candidates. In the Netherlands the number of female elected politicians exceeds the number of candidates in the last four national elections.

The fact that there are no large differences between the number of candidates and the number of elected women, indicates that voters actually 'want' female politicians. This concurs

[2] The countries that are included in this graph have a higher percentage of female politicians than the Netherlands (Interparliamentary Union, 2019). These countries are similar to the Netherlands with regard to their – for women advantageous – electoral system: a proportional list system.
[3] In Belgium, the electoral law dictates that on party lists the difference between the number of candidates of each sex is not more than one. If a party fails to comply, the list will not be approved by the electoral authorities (IDEA, n.d.). For Spain, the electoral law determines that parties balance the proportion of men and women, so that either sex makes up 40 percent of the candidates. If parties fail to do so, their lists will not be approved by the Electoral Commission (IDEA, n.d.).

with the finding that the number of preference votes for women in the Netherlands increases (Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012).

In short, voters do not discriminate female politicians: Dutch voters are even slightly more positive about female politicians than about male politicians. Moreover, they vote in such a way that there are relatively more women elected than there were eligible. Voters thus express a clear demand for female politicians. Can the party comply with this demand by increasing the number of female candidates on the party lists?



Figure 2. Left: percentage of women who are on the candidate list and who are elected. Data retrieved from the Interparliamentary Union. Right: percentage of women who are on the candidate list and who are elected in the Netherlands. Data retrieved from the Kiesraad.

As previously argued, the supply of candidates on the electoral market is the outcome of the recruitment market within a party. Recruiting and nominating candidates for office is a classic and key function of the political party (Sartori, 1976, p. 63; Hillebrand, 1992, p. 2; Norris, 2006, p. 89; Hazan & Rahat, 2006, p. 109; Heidar & Wauters, 2019, p. 3; Den Ridder et al., 2019, p. 108). The crucial importance of candidate selection is nicely summarized by Schattschneider: '[t]he nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party' (Schnattschneider, 1942, p. 64). Although it is debated

whether parties still execute some of their core functions such as issue aggregation, there is a general agreement that political parties can still fulfil and dominate their recruitment function (Webb, 1995, p. 317; Webb, 2002, p. 4; Voerman, 2014, p. 45).

Candidate selection is a complex interactive process between the supply of candidates wishing to stand for elections and the demands of parties and party gatekeepers selecting these candidates (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Caul, 1998; Krook, 2009; Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Ashe & Stewart, 2012). Demand explanations focus on the selectors that pick the candidates. From this perspective, scholars look for example at the composition of the selectorate: when parties apply gender quotas for their selectorates, it is found that more women make it to the ballot (Vandeleene, 2014, p. 344). Moreover, the presence of a woman as gatekeeper signals to eligible female candidates that women are welcome in politics (Cheng & Tavits, 2011).

When one scrutinizes the demand for female candidates of Dutch political parties, one finds that formally, almost all parties state in their statutes that they aim to achieve gender parity on their candidate lists (Mügge & Damstra, 2013). Two exceptions are Christian parties: first, the Christian Union (CU) states that it wants to have at least a quarter of their candidates to be female (Mügge & Damstra, 2013, p. 350). Second, the Political Reformed Party (SGP), based on the bible, only exceptionally places women on the candidate list.[4] Besides these small Christian parties – they only have 8 out of 150 seats (5.3%) in the 2017 elections – the Dutch main political parties have a demand for female politicians.

To summarize, Dutch institutions are beneficial for women; in the electoral market voters express their demand for female candidates by casting preference votes and evaluating them at

[4] Only two women have been official candidates. One of them, Lilian Janse-van der Weele was a candidate for the local council of Vlissingen. She has been elected (Post, 2018, p. 113). The second is Paula Schot, who has been the first candidate of the list for the council of Amsterdam. However, she has not been elected (Boone, 2019). After a long discussion, only in 2006 women were allowed to become party members (Post, 2018, p. 110) and only in 2012, after a court ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, the SGP accepted passive female suffrage (Post, 2018, p. 113). The SGP still rejects the idea that women can stand for election in their statement of principles. For more information about the SGP and their standpoint about women, see Post, 2018. For more information about the SGP in general see Vollaard & Voerman, 2018.

least as or even more positive than men; and lastly, in the recruitment market political parties state that they aspire to achieve gender parity. So why is there still no equal representation? Perhaps the explanation is related to the supply side?

When we focus on this supply side, the attention shifts to the people who want to run for office. Do women have political ambition? Previous research among American, Canadian and British citizens suggests that women consider running for office significantly less than men (Fox & Lawless, 2004; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Preece & Stoddard, 2015; Pruysers & Blais, 2017; Allen & Cutts, 2018). The single-member districts that these countries have make the system very competitive, and Lawless and Fox acknowledge that due to these electoral systems it is harder for women to come forward and they are more likely to be discouraged to run for office (Lawless & Fox, 2005, p. 12). Most of the research about the gender gap in political ambition is carried out in countries with single-member districts, so that makes it difficult to apply these findings to countries with other electoral systems as well. Therefore, to account for the interplay between political ambition and the electoral system, it is necessary to study political ambition in countries with advantageous electoral systems for women, like proportional systems such as the Dutch case.

Another important aspect in studying political ambition, is to decide *whom* one studies. There are a lot of options: include all citizens (Allen & Cutts, 2018), a specific subgroup of citizens[5] (Lawless & Fox, 2005), party activists (Van Assendelft & O'Connor, 1994) or party members (Cross, 2019). In order to decide which population you need to study, it is important to know who are the most relevant actors in the recruitment process. The first step of the legislative recruitment chain is the application for a candidacy, which is mostly done by party members (Ashe & Stewart, 2012, p. 688). In some countries it is even formally required to be a party member when you want to run for office (e.g. Canada, see Ashe & Stewart, 2012). However, even when that is not the case, like in the Netherlands, political parties still mainly recruit party members to stand for office

[5] In the Citizen Political Ambition Study Lawless and Fox sampled 'successful women and men who occupy the four professions that most often precede a career in politics' (2005, p. 4). These professions were law, business, education and political activism.

(Voerman, 2014, p. 45). Since party members are the ones that *can* run for office, it is necessary to look at this group of people. Who are they? Are they motivated to run for office? And are male and female party members different with regard to their political ambition?

3. Party members and political activism

In the Netherlands the number of party members is relatively low: in the last 10 years around 2.3% of the people entitled to vote are enrolled as a party member.[6] A party member is someone who is formally registered to a party (Den Ridder et al., 2019, p. 135), as is common in most other European political parties. In regard to their personal characteristics, Dutch party members are predominantly male, highly educated and relatively old (Whiteley et al., 1994; Childs, 2013; Den Ridder et al., 2019; Heidar & Wauters, 2019). There are some relevant differences, however: GroenLinks and Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) respectively have 43% and 37% female party members, the SGP only 5% (Den Ridder et al., 2015, p. 144). Hence, all Dutch parties show a major or minor gender gap, i.e. there are more male than female party members, compared to their electorate (Den Ridder et al., 2019, p. 112).

In many countries the number of party members is low: for example, in Norway only 5% of the electorate is a party member (2009), in Sweden only 4% (2008), in the UK it is even 1% (2008) (Van Biezen et al., 2012, p. 28). Thus, the Netherlands is not unique in this regard. From a rational choice perspective, this is understandable since people are rational actors, i.e. people who maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of an action, consequently they will not participate in politics (Olson, 1971). The 'products' of political parties can be considered collective goods, which are goods that are non-exclusive and the consumption of one does not reduce the amount available to anyone else (Olson, 1971, p. 15). Since the costs of participating in politics are high and the benefits are as a general rule available for non-participators as well, in most cases it is not

[6] In 2017 2.2% of the electorate was a party member, in 2012 2.5% and in 2010 also 2.5%. See appendix A for a table displaying the number of party members.

rational to participate. However, this argument raises a question: why do people nevertheless become active? To account for this, Olson suggests that people receive selective incentives by participating, that are not related to the collective good (Olson, 1971, p. 134). These are private goods, that are not available for non-participators.

Seyd and Whitely adopt and amend this idea. They argue that people also join a political party to promote policy goals, which is not explained by Olson's model (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992, p. 56; Whiteley et al., 1993, p. 84). Their General Incentive Model goes beyond the purely and narrowly defined economic rational incentives: it includes moral concerns and social norms (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et al., 1993, p.81; Whiteley et al., 1994; Whiteley et al., 2005). They specify the selective incentives by making a distinction between outcome and process incentives. When people have a *selective outcome* incentive, they become active because they consider involvement as an investment in their (political) career (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992, p. 60). The second rational incentive is the *selective process* incentive: people participate in politics because they want to meet like-minded people and they want to learn more about the political process (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992, p. 61; Whiteley et al., 1993, p. 85).

Seyd and Whiteley add a third rational *collective outcome incentive* to their model. They argue that people not only think about themselves but also about the collective (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992, p. 62). The logic is, for example, that parents think about what is best for their family instead of their individual interest. By doing this they place the family interest, i.e. a collective interest, above their individual interest. The same can be done in politics: a citizen not only thinks about her self-interest but also about a particular social group she (or he) belongs to (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992, p. 61). Although it may not seem rational to pursue collective goals, when the costs of this activism are perceived as negligible, people will participate in politics to further these collective objectives (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992, p. 61).

Next to rational incentives Seyd and Whiteley include incentives that are based on emotional attachments. The fourth incentive is that of *altruism*. Party activists that are motivated

by this incentive participate out of a sense of loyalty, although their individual contribution to the collective goals is negligible (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992, p. 63; Whiteley et al., 1993, p. 86). The final incentive that Seyd and Whiteley include into their model is *social norms*: people are motivated to participate because they seek the approval of socially significant others, like family members (Seyd & Whiteley, 1993, p. 64).

Initially, Seyd and Whitely used the General Incentive Model to explain why people joined a party. They subsequently extend the use of the model to explain party activism, since activism can also be explained from a similar cost-benefit calculation (Seyd & Whitely, 1992, p. 86; Whitely et al., 1994, p. 100). They theoretically distinguish three categories of political activism: contacting, campaigning and representing (Seyd & Whitely, 1992, p. 87). Even though they acknowledge that these categories are different, they combine them together in one single measure of political activity.

This pooling of different forms of party activism in one measure is often criticized (e.g. Fisher, 1999; Bäck et al., 2011). Bäck et al. (2011) argue that different forms of activism can result from different incentives. They demonstrate that these different forms of activism also need to be measured separately. People who participated in party activities, such as going to a party meeting, work for the party or hold office for the party were mostly driven by selective incentives, while other forms of participation such as donating money to a party or taking part in a demonstration were driven by collective and selective incentives (Bäck et al., 2011, p. 86).

In line with this work, this study expects that having a selective outcome incentive positively influences the probability of attaining a political function. If you join a political party because you expect that it is beneficial for your career, a party member very likely has the ambition to get a political function. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1: being motivated by the selective outcome incentive increases the probability of getting a political function.

The key question here is whether men and women are driven by the selective outcome incentive in an identical or similar way. Costantini (1990) examined whether American men and women have different motivations to become politically active. More specifically, he aimed to explore 'what female party activists "want" from politics' (Costantini, 1990, p. 741) and he showed that female activists are less motivated by political ambition to be involved in politics than men, i.e. by the desire to gain power (1990, p. 749). Although he identified a significant gender gap in ambition, Costantini also found that over time – from 1964 until 1984 – political ambition increased among women: 'an awakening of political ambition' (1990, p. 754).

Van Assendelft and O'Connor conducted a similar study in 1992, testing whether there are different motivations to become politically active among American Democratic and Republican party activists. They found that the opportunity to meet new business contacts, which can be classified as a selective outcome incentive, was more important for men compared to women. This is due to the fact that men are more often self-employed and therefore in need of business contacts; this need is relatively absent for women since they tend to more involved in education (Van Assendelft & O'Connor, 1994, p. 85). There was no significant difference found among men and women with respect to their interest in elected office. The authors argue that this could be explained by the increasing importance of the women's movement (1992, p. 86). However, there still was a large difference in the relative number of women who were not at all motivated by their interest in elected office (48.9%) compared to men (40.0%) (1994, p. 83).

In another 1990s study among American citizens, Schlozman et al. (1995) found no differences between men and women regarding the effect of the selective material incentive[7] on the likelihood to vote, to work in a campaign or to become active in an informal campaign activity (Schlozman et al., 1995, p. 279; see also Burns, Schlozman & Verba, 2001, p. 116). Booth-Tobin and Han also found no significant differences between young American male and female

[7] The selective material incentive is defined by them as getting 'material benefits, such as jobs, career advancement, or help with a personal or family problem' (Schlozman et al., 1995, p. 277).

campaigners in the presidential campaign in 2008 with regard to their interest in politics to gain material benefits, such as networking and building a strong resume (2010, p. 123).

Research concerning political ambition and gender is predominantly carried out in the United States (Galais et al., 2016, p. 597). Recent studies in the European context mirror the mixed findings concerning the gender gap in political ambition. In a study among Danish party members, Kosiara-Pedersen found that female party members are less likely to consider themselves as a potential candidate to run for local, regional or national office than male members (2019, p. 165). A study among Swedish and Spanish members of parliament (MP) found that in Spain more men wanted to proceed in politics than female MP's. However, in Sweden no gender gap was found (Galais et al., 2016, p. 608).

Despite the mixed findings, the majority of studies indicate that men have more ambition to get a political function than women and that more men than women are driven by the idea that they will get selective benefits, such as a political career, from participating in politics. In accordance with these findings, we expect that men are more likely to be motivated by the selective outcome incentive: the idea that political involvement is an investment in their political career. Therefore, the second hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 2: the selective outcome incentive is more important for men than for women.

But what happens with women who are motivated by the selective outcome incentive? Is the effect of having the selective outcome incentive on getting a political function the same for men and for women? Women motivated by power fulfilling goals such as the selective outcome incentive, can be disadvantaged in two ways for behaving in a way that does not fit their communal female gender role (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Koenig et al., 2011, p. 616). Firstly, a woman herself can think it is not appropriate to behave in such manner (Stevens, 2007, p. 86). Recent research found that American women who want to get a political function are primarily driven by the idea of achieving collective

goals instead of fulfilling power-related goals that serve their individual self-interest, which is more in line with the communal gender role (Schneider et al., 2016, p. 515). Secondly, women can be disadvantaged by other people, such as other party members or even gatekeepers, who might think politics is not appropriate for women and therefore discourage motivated women to run. Since women driven by the selective incentive can hold themselves back and can be held back by other people, we expect that when women have the selective outcome incentive it will have less of an effect than male members who will not be held back in such a manner.

> **Hypothesis 3:** when held by female party members, the selective outcome incentive has less of an effect on getting a political function compared to male party members.

4. Data and methods

To analyse whether Dutch party members differ in their incentives to participate in politics, the Leiden Party Member Survey is used (LPMS).[8] The survey consisted of four blocks of questions: (1) about party membership; (2) about party activism; (3) about the internal functioning of the party; and (4) questions about the respondent's personal background characteristics.

The LPMS 2008 was conducted in June and July 2008.[9] At that time 10 political parties were represented in the Tweede Kamer and seven political parties participated in this study CDA, D66, PvdA, VVD, GL, SGP and CU (for more information about the number of seats and party families see appendix B). The Socialist Party (SP) and the Animal Party (PvdD) refused to participate in the survey and the Freedom Party (PVV) only has one individual party member and is thus not relevant for this study. The seven participating parties have drawn a random sample of approximately 1,500 members from their party membership records to whom paper-and-pencil

[8] For more information about the LPMS see Den Ridder (2014).
[9] The 2008 LPMS is used instead of the 2017 version, because the 2017 questionnaire does not include questions about having a political function. SGP-members are excluded from the analysis because only since 2013 women could run for office (Post, 2018, p. 113). Since female party members of the SGP had a different position within the political party than female members of other political parties, they are not comparable and thus excluded.

questionnaires were sent. In total, 4,251 party members participated; an overall response rate of 41%. Response rates and sample sizes per party are shown in table 1.

Table 1. Sample sizes and response rates

Party	Size of random sample	Response
CDA	1,486	470 (31.6%)
CU	1,482	524 (35.4%)
D66	1,488	921 (61.9%)
GL	1,493	676 (45.3%)
PvdA	1,481	555 (37.5%)
VVD	1,493	552 (37%)
SGP	1,490	553 (37.1%)

Note: based on Van Holsteyn & Koole (2009).

The survey contained questions to measure the incentives from the General Incentive Model (see appendix C for a translated version of these questions). Respondents are asked whether they strongly disagreed, disagreed, agreed or strongly agreed to statements about their motivations to become a party member such as 'being a party member is a good way to meet interesting people'.[10] To establish whether the various indicators of the incentives cluster as predicted by the model, a principal component analysis is performed.

It is also asked whether party members have been a candidate or a member of different representative bodies (local, provincial and national). When respondents indicated that they have been a candidate, member or are currently a member of one of these representative bodies, this is classified as a party member explicitly wanting to fulfill a political function. Descriptive statistics of the main variables are presented in appendix D.

To establish whether and how strong the selective outcome incentive predicts the probability of having a political function, a logistic regression analysis is used. The hierarchical character of the data (party members are nested in political parties) urged for a multilevel logistic analysis. It can be expected that there is variation on party levels (see e.g. Caul, 1998), for example in the number of women that have a political function. As Kittilson pointed out: 'variation in the

[10] Respondents could leave the question open if they did not know or did not want to answer the question.

proportion of women to men is even greater across parties than across nations' (2006, p. 8). So if one wants to account for group-level variation, a multilevel model has to be performed (Gelman & Hill, 2007, p. 246). The analyses were done with R; the used packages are presented in appendix E.

5. Results

To first test the empirical relevancy of the General Incentive Model, a principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation was conducted.[11] Although the General Incentive Model distinguishes only five components, the PCA showed that 5 or even 6 components could be extracted. However, when one extracted six components, the sixth component had no theoretical meaning: there was no overlapping theme that connected the two questions.[12] Hence, it is chosen to follow up on the original model of Seyd and Whitely with five incentives.

The first hypothesis states that being motivated by the selective outcome incentive increases the probability of getting a political function. To test this, a dichotomous variable has been created of either (1) having (had) a political function and/or being a candidate for a position and (0) not having a political function.[13] This regrouping resulted in 1,496 (61.7%) party members having no political function and 928 (38.3%) party members having a political function or having been a candidate for such a function.

To test whether being motivated by the selective outcome incentive increases the probability of getting a political function, a multilevel logistic regression analysis is performed. The

[11] The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified whether the pattern of correlation between the variables is compact or not: almost all KMO values for the individual items were above 0.72, i.e. above the acceptable limit of 0.5 (Kaiser, 1974, p. 35; Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999, p. 225). The scree plot (see in appendix F) showed that 5 or 6 components could be extracted. This was confirmed by Kaiser's criterion of 1; 6 components had eigenvalues above 1.

[12] The only difference between the analyses was that two questions that were classified as belonging to the 'selective process' component (Because I liked the internal democracy; Because the party works for people like me) in the analysis with 5 components, were now classified as being a separate component (see factor loadings for both analyses in appendix F).

[13] This political function could have been on the local, regional or (inter)national level.

first model (see table 2), in which only the selective outcome incentive is included, shows that the selective outcome incentive has a statistically significant positive influence on the probability of having a political function. The odds of having a political function for a party member with the maximum score on the selective outcome incentive is 3.00 times higher than for party members that have the minimum score. When the other four incentives are added, the effect of the selective outcome incentive is still positive and statistically significant (model 2), although the odds ratio slightly decreases from 3.00 to 2.18. After controlling for the sociodemographic variables age and gender and political efficacy variables, the selective outcome incentive remains an important positive predictor.

For model 4, predicted probabilities are also included. These numbers show the percentage point change in the probability of having a political function from the lowest to the highest level of a variable when other variables are held constant. For example, the difference in the probability of getting a political function of people having the lowest score on the selective outcome incentive variable (1) and the highest score (4) is 57.65 percentage points. Only the effect of internal efficacy is bigger with 63.15 percentage points change.

These models support the first hypothesis: the selective outcome incentive has a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of having a political function.

Table 2. Logistic regression models including GIM to explain having a political function

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	*Predicted probabilities model 4*
Intercept	-2.51***	-3.03***	-4.49***	-6.85***	
	(0.24)	(0.39)	(0.45)	(0.68)	
General Incentive Model					
Selective outcome	1.10***	0.78***	1.12***	1.00***	57.65
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	
Collective outcome		1.01***	0.86***	0.62***	35.35
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	
Selective process		0.11	0.02	0.02	1.04
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	
Norms		-0.13	-0.24*	-0.18	-9.69
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	
Altruism		-0.58***	-0.49***	-0.53***	-30.92
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	
Sociodemographic variables					
Gender (1=female)			-0.39***	-0.26*	-4.99
			(0.11)	(0.12)	
Age			0.03***	0.04***	48.95
			(0.00)	(0.00)	
Political efficacy					
Internal efficacy				1.34***	63.15
				(0.16)	
External efficacy				-0.32*	-17.93
				(0.13)	
AIC	2811.26	2587.01	2535.90	2348.54	
BIC	2828.50	2626.85	2587.12	2410.66	
Log Likelihood	-1402.63	-1286.50	-1258.95	-1163.27	
Num. obs.	2311	2190	2190	2094[14]	
Num. groups: Partij	6	6	6	6	
Var: Partij (Intercept)	0.18	0.14	0.09	0.07	

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

First differences are obtained with the observed value approach

[14] The number of observations slightly deviates from the other three models. This is because predicted probabilities can only be obtained when there are no missing observations. The missing observations in the estimation are removed of the fourth model.

Table 3. Mean scores general incentives grouped by gender

	Mean score		
	Men (n=1,729)		Women (n=695)
Selective outcome	1.8	=	1.8
Collective outcome	2.8	=	2.8
Selective process	2.2	=	2.2**
Altruism	3.1	<	3.2***
Social norms	1.3	=	1.3

***p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

The second hypothesis claims that for men the selective outcome incentive is more important than for women. Calculating the mean score for every incentive per gender shows which incentives are important for the party members. If there are differences between the mean scores of men and women, a t-test can test whether this difference is statistically significant. Since all five variables measuring the incentives are not normally distributed according to the Shapiro-test, robust independent t-tests with trimmed means are performed (trimmed means not shown in table 3).[15] The incentive that is most prevalent among party members is altruism, with a mean score of 3.1. The incentive that has the lowest score refers to social norms, with a mean score of 1.3. Comparing the average scores per gender (see table 3), strongly suggests that men and women are not very different with regard to the incentives they had to become active in politics. Men and women have the same average score for the selective outcome incentive, the collective outcome incentive and the social norms incentive. They are only statistically significant different with regard to the collective outcome incentive and the selective process incentive: women score slightly higher on these incentives than men. However, the differences are not very substantive. In terms of the effect size, a robust version of Cohen's d is used. For the altruism incentive the effect of gender was small; the other effect sizes were negligible. Zooming in on gender differences per party, the general pattern remains intact: for almost all parties, except for the VVD and CU, there is a statistically significant gender difference with regard to the selective process incentive. With regard

[15] Since the difference between the mean and the trimmed mean is close to zero for all five variables, it is suggested by Mair and Wilcox to also use the bootstrapping function (Mair & Wilcox, p. 6). Bootstrapping (599 bootstrap samples) did not alter the results.

to the altruism incentive, it appears that the gender difference is only present for D66, GL and VVD members (see appendix D). Despite some small gender differences on this altruism incentive, there appear to be no substantive differences for the other incentives. Based on these data, the second hypothesis must be rejected: for men the selective outcome incentive is not more important than for women.

The third and final hypothesis concerns the effect of the selective outcome incentive on having a political function: it is argued that this effect is different for men and women. More specifically, it is hypothesized that it is stronger for men than for women. To test this hypothesis multilevel logistic regression is performed in which an interaction effect is included: gender interacts with the selective outcome incentive.

In model 5 in table 4 this interaction effect is added. It is a positive effect, suggesting that for female party members a higher score on the selective outcome incentive results in a higher probability of getting a political function. The effect, however, is not significant. As figure 3 shows the selective outcome incentive is not different for men and women: the confidence intervals overlap. The model with the interaction effect also has a lower AIC score compared to the fourth model in table 2 without the interaction effect, which indicates that model 5 is not a better fit than model 4. This makes sense because the interaction effect does not have any added explanatory value: the effect is the same for men and women. Based on these findings, the third hypothesis is rejected: the selective outcome does not have a different effect on getting a political function for men or women.

Table 4. Multilevel logistic regression model explaining the probability of having a political function

	Model 5
(Intercept)	-6.74***
	(0.68)
General Incentive Model	
Selective outcome	0.95***
	(0.14)
Collective outcome	0.62***
	(0.13)
Selective process	0.02
	(0.12)
Norms	-0.18
	(0.12)
Altruism	-0.53***
	(0.10)
Sociodemographic variables	
Age	0.04***
	(0.00)
Gender (1=female)	-0.65
	(0.42)
Political efficacy	
External efficacy	-0.32*
	(0.13)
Internal efficacy	1.34***
	(0.16)
Interaction effect	
Selective outcome * Gender	0.21
	(0.22)
AIC	2349.64
BIC	2417.40
Log Likelihood	-1162.82
Num. obs.	2094
Num. groups: Partij	6
Var: Partij (Intercept)	0.07

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. The model is a logistic regression model with random effects for party.



Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of gender x selective outcome incentive on the probability of having a political function.

6. Discussion and conclusion

One of the most recent Dutch campaigns to get more female politicians is *Stem op een vrouw.*[16] This campaign urges people to vote for a woman who would not be elected based on her position on the candidate list (Daams, 2019). Although the intention may be noble, casting preference votes for women will not likely solve the problem entirely (Marx & Amir, 2017), since it is parties that create the candidate lists: political parties determine how many men and women can be elected. Therefore, the focus of this study was on this crucial party level. Despite a clear demand for female politicians from voters, parties do not give them what they want. This is even more puzzling given the fact that the main Dutch political parties indicate that they aspire to achieve gender parity on their lists. Is it then the supply of female candidates that is the problem?

[16] Campaigns like these have been organised before. For example, the Dutch Organisation for Female Interests (*De Nederlandse Vereniging voor Vrouwenbelangen)* started the campaign *Stem eens op een vrouw!* in the 1970s to convince voters to vote for women (Atria, n.d.).

To answer that question this study focused on party members, since party members are the main recruitment pool parties use to select their candidates. The research question was whether male and female party members are different with regard to their motivation to join a political party and whether being motivated by political ambition actually results in getting a political function. To study this question, the General Incentive Model (GIM) of Seyd and Whitely was used as an analytical framework. The GIM distinguishes five different incentives for people to become active in politics: the selective outcome incentive, the selective process incentive, the collective outcome incentive, the altruistic incentive and the social norms incentive. Being motivated by the selective outcome incentive, the main focus of this study, entails that someone becomes active in politics because she or he thinks this is beneficial for her or his political career. It was hypothesized that being motivated by this incentive would increase the probability of getting a political function. Moreover, it was expected that for men the selective outcome incentive was more important than for women. The final hypothesis posited that when held by women, the selective outcome incentive would have less of an effect on the probability of getting a political function.

The results showed that there were no major differences with regard to the motives people had when they joined a political party: women were only significantly more motivated by the selective process incentive and the altruistic incentive. However, this difference is very small. It is found that, although it is not the most prevalent incentive, the selective outcome incentive is equally important for male and female party members. Members motivated by this incentive joined their party because they consider joining a party as an investment in their (political) career. And indeed, being motivated by this incentive pays off: there is a positive effect on the probability of having a political function. Contrary to the expectations, this effect turned out not to be different for female and male party members. A short answer to the research question is, therefore, that male and female party members are not very different with respect to their motivation to become active and participate in or on behalf a political party.

Although we did not find the solution to the puzzle of the underrepresentation of women, we still have an important result in the form of a 'non-finding': female underrepresentation does not result from the fact that female party members are not ambitious enough.[17]

What then is the solution to this as yet unsolved and seemingly everlasting puzzle? There are several ideas that needs more exploration. First, we must know more about what truly happens inside the party in the selection and recruitment process. Parties could, for example, encourage more women to become active in politics since this is important for people to become politically active (Wille, 1994, p. 9). Being encouraged is for both men and women an important predictor to run for office (Fulton et al., 2006, p. 242; Lawless & Fox, 2010, p. 110).[18] Whether female Dutch party members are being encouraged and whether this has an effect, could be an interesting question for further study.

Another interesting avenue for new research is the low number of female party members. Despite the similarities between male and female party members, there is one major difference: the number of female party members is substantively lower than the number of male party members. Why are so few women joining political parties?

We end on a positive note: female and male party members are not different. Female members that are motivated by the idea of having a political career seem not to be 'punished' for their ambition and have the same probability of having a political function as men. However, the puzzle of female underrepresentation in elected representation bodies is not yet solved. Nevertheless, this study contributes importantly to the literature, since it shows that we need to focus on what happens inside political parties and suggests a fundamental question: why do women not join parties? Joining a political party is the first step to become a politician and future attempts to solve the puzzle of female underrepresentation in advanced western democracies that are structured by political parties should try to answer this deceptively simple question first.

[17] See e.g. Franco et al. (2014) for an article about the importance of null-findings.
[18] A contrary finding is that of Cross (2019) who found that female party members in Canada were relatively more often encouraged than male party members (p. 25).

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Appendix A: number of party members

Year	Number of party members[19]	Percentage of the electorate	Electorate[20]
2019	315,019		
2018	317,325		
2017	289,456	2.2	12,893,466
2016	285,851		
2015	295,326	2.3	12,777,145
2014	308,846		
2013	315,109		
2012	312,981	2.5	12,689,810
2011	319,552	2.5	12,532,127
2010	308,389	2.5	12,524,152
2009	307,700		
2008	309,429		
2007	318,144	2.6	12,238,814
2006	300,201	2.4	12,264,503
2005	303,942		
2004	311,022		
2003	310,099	2.6	12,054,954
2002	290,488	2.4	12,035,935
2001	290,170		
2000	294,540		
1999	302,200	2.6	11,801,338
1998	305,273	2.6	11,755,132
1997	303,921		
1996	311,077		
1995	326,116	2.8	11,498,738
1994	321,710	2.8	11,455,924
1993	316,790		
1992	328,965		
1991	345,240	3.1	11,234,345
1990	346,994		
1989	356,309	3.2	11,091,070
1988	374,006		
1987	387,029	3.6	10,777,685
1986	389,483	3.6	10,727,701
1985	390,262		
1984	416,727		

[19] Data retrieved from Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen https://dnpp.nl/dnpp/themas/lt/per_jaar on June 20, 2019

[20] Data retrieved from the Kiesraad. The number of the electorate is for both the national and the provincial elections.

Appendix B: parties in Leiden Party Member Survey

Abbrev.	Full English name	Founded	Short description	Seats 2006	Seats 2017	Coalition/ Opposition 2006
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal	1973	Christian-Democratic Party	41	19	Coalition
PvdA	Labour Party	1946	Social-democratic party	33	9	Coalition
VVD	Liberal Party	1948	Conservative liberal party	22	33	Opposition
GL	GreenLeft	1989	Environmentalist and leftist party	7	14	Opposition
CU	Christian Union	2000	Orthodox Calvinist party	6	5	Coalition
D66	Democrats '66	1966	Progressive-liberal reform party	3	19	Opposition
SP	Socialist Party	1972	Former Maoist, now leftist populist party	25	14	Opposition
PVV	Freedom Party	2006	Populist and anti-Islam Party	9	20	Opposition
PvdD	Party for the Animals	2002	Animal rights party	2	5	Opposition
SGP	Political Reformed Party	1918	Orthodox Calvinist party	2	3	Opposition

Partly based on Andeweg & Irwin (2009, p. 65), Kiesraad (2006) and Kiesraad (2017)

Appendix C: translation of questionnaire

Question number	Question wording	Answer options
1	Are you currently a member of [party]?	1 = yes 2 = no
2a	In what year did you become a member of [party]?	In … 8 = missing
8	I joined the party … [*see statements below*]	1 = really unimportant 2 = not important 3 = important 4 = really important
8a	… because I want to collaborate with fellow party members.	
8b	… to get political influence.	
8c	… because I can meet interesting people.	
8d	… because it is important for my career.	
8e	… because it is my duty as a citizen to be active in politics.	
8f	… to get more managerial experience.	
8g	… to express my sympathy for the party.	
8h	… because it is common in my surrounding.	
8i	… to express my religion.	
8j	… to make an effort for the party's goals.	
8k	… to contribute to the influence of the party.	
8l	… because the party does its best for people like me.	
8m	… to get to know more about politics.	
8n	… because family, friends and acquittances urged me to.	
8o	… to work myself up in society.	
8p	… to meet nice people.	
8q	… to work for a more righteous society.	
8r	… to influence the political course.	
8s	… because I aspire to have a political function.	
8t	… because I liked the democratic relations in the party.	
8u	… to give support to the principles of the party.	
10ai	As a member of [party] you can be active in a lot of ways. Can you report how often you have participated in the last 5 years to the next activities? Having a function in or on behalf of the party.	1 = rarely or never 2 = occasionally 3 = often 4 = very often
11b	Could you report whether you have been a candidate or a member of the following democratic body?	1 = never been a candidate or a member 2 = ever been a candidate 3 = ever been a member 4 = currently a member
11ba	Neighborhood council, municipal district, or municipal council.	
11bb	Executive board of the municipality.	
11bc	States-Provincial or the Provincial-Executive.	
11bd	Senate, Parliament or European Parliament	

26	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements.	1 = totally disagree 2 = disagree 3 = agree 4 = totally agree
26a	I am able to play an active role in politics.	
26b	I have a good image of the most important problems in our country.	
26c	Sometimes politics to so complicated that it is hard for people like me to understand what is going on.	
26d	Against their better judgement, politicians make more promises than they can keep.	
26e	Ministers and State Secretaries are after their own interest.	
26f	It is more like that you will become a Member of Parliament because of your political friends than because of your skills.	
26g	It would be better for the party when there are more party members like me.	
26h	People like me truly can influence politics if we would only arouse their interest in politics.	
26i	Much work of the party remains unnoticed for regular party members.	
26j	The party board pays too little attention to people like me.	
31	What is your gender?	1 = man 2 = woman
32	In which year are you born?	In 19...
34	What is the highest level of education you have pursued?	1 = primary school 2 = vocational education 3 = preparatory middle-level vocational education 4 = middle-level vocational education 5 = high school 6 = higher education or university 7 = different, … 8 = don't know/don't want to tell

Appendix D: descriptive statistics main variables

Descriptive statistics are shown for respondents that are included in the analysis. The subset is created by excluding SGP-members, missing data and wrong entries.

Gender	**N**	**%**
Men	1,729	71.3
Women	695	28.7
Education	**N**	**%**
Primary school	12	0.5
Vocational education	79	3.3
Preparatory middle-level vocation education	151	6.3
Middle-level vocational education	332	13.7
High school	116	4.8
Higher education or university	1,734	71.5
Political party	**N**	**%**
VVD	405	16.7
CDA	293	12.1
CU	359	14.8
D66	593	24.5
GL	430	17.7
PvdA	344	14.2
Political function (local level)	**N**	**%**
Never been a candidate or a member	1,542	63.6
Ever been a candidate	410	16.9
Ever been a member	327	13.5
Currently a member	145	6.0
Political function (local executive)	**N**	**%**
Never been a candidate or a member	2,286	94.3
Ever been a candidate	42	1.7
Ever been a member	72	3.0
Currently a member	24	1.0
Political function (regional level)	**N**	**%**
Never been a candidate or a member	2,288	94.4
Ever been a candidate	91	3.6
Ever been a member	37	1.5
Currently a member	8	0.3
Political function ((inter)national level)	**N**	**%**
Never been a candidate or a member	2,372	97.9
Ever been a candidate	44	1.8
Ever been a member	8	0.3
Currently a member	0	0

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	N
Selective outcome incentive	1.76	0.56	1	4	2,311
Selective process incentive	2.20	0.58	1	4	2,302
Collective outcome process	2.80	0.52	1	4	2,312
Altruistic incentive	3.12	0.57	1	4	2,373
Social norms incentive	1.31	0.47	1	4	2,359

Appendix E: R packages used

Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B. & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4. *Journal of Statistical Software, 67*(1), 1-48.

Dahl, D. B., Scott, D., Roosen, C., Magnusson, A. & Swinton, J. (2018). xtable: Export Tables to LaTeX or HTML. R package version 1.8-3. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=xtable.

Fox, J. (2003). Effect Displays in R for Generalised Linear Models. *Journal of Statistical Software, 8(*15), 1-27.

Fox, J. & Weisberg, S. (2011). *An {R} Companion to Applied Regression, Second Edition*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Grosjean, P. & Ibanez, F. (2018). pastecs: Package For Analysis of Space-Time Ecological Series. R package version 1.3.21. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=pastecs.

Meyer, D., Zeileis, A. & Hornik, K. (2017). vcd: visualizing Categorical Data. R package version 1.4-4.

Murdoch, D. (2018). tables: Formula-Driven Table Generation. R package version 0.8.7. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=tables.

Revelle, W. (2018) psych: Procedures for Personality and Psychological Research, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA, https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=psych. Version = 1.8.4.

Venables, W. N. & Ripley, B. D. (2002) Modern Applied Statistics with S. Fourth Edition. New York: Springer.

Wickham, H. (2016). ggplot2: Elegant Graphics for Data Analysis. Springer-Verlag New York.

Wickham, H., François, R., Henry L. & Müller, K. (2019). dplyr: A Grammar of Data Manipulation. R package version 0.8.0.1. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=dplyr.

Wickham, H. & Miller, E. (2018). haven: Import and Export 'SPSS', 'Stata' and 'SAS' Files. R package version 1.1.2. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=haven.

Wickham, H. & Henry, L. (2018). tidyr: Easily Tidy Data with 'spread()' and 'gather()' Functions. R package version 0.8.1. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=tidyr.

R script available on request.

Appendix F: supplementary tables

Principal Component Analysis General Incentive Model



Figure 2. Scree plot from principal component analysis of GIM data.

Table A1. Summary of exploratory factor analysis

	Varimax rotated factor loadings				
	Selective outcome	Collective outcome	Selective process	Altruism	Social norms
Because it is important for my career	0.77				
To get managerial experience	0.76				
To get societal progress	0.75				
Because I want a political function	0.72				
To get to know politics better	0.50				
Because I want to have political influence		0.70			
To influence the political goals of the party		0.61			
To help the party gain influence		0.61			
To help the party achieve its goals		0.60			
To work for a more just society		0.56			
Because it is my duty as a citizen to engage in politics		0.50			
Because I meet interesting people	*0.56*		0.50		
Because I liked the internal democracy			0.70		
Because I like collaborating with fellow party members			0.60		
To meet nice people	*0.46*		0.55		
Because the party works for people like me			0.53		
To express my sympathy for the party				0.81	
To support the ideals of the party				0.72	
To also express my faith in politics				0.46	
Because it is common in my environment					0.76
Because my friends and family urged me to					0.73
Eigenvalues	3.38	2.62	2.10	1.78	1.57
% of variance	16	11	10	8	7
Cronbach's α	0.79	0.73	0.69[21]	0.55[22]	0.54[23]

The loading scores in italics are not included in the final scaled variable.

[21] When the question about whether the party works for people like me, is excluded, Cronbach's alpha would increase to 0.72. However, there are no variables that have a correlation coefficient below 0.3, which signals that all items correlate properly with the overall score for the scale.

[22] When the question about religion is excluded, the Cronbach's alpha would increase to 0.61. However, there are no variables that have a correlation coefficient below 0.3, which signals that all items correlate properly with the overall score for the scale.

[23] Although the Cronbach's alpha is a bit low, the items do correlate with the overall scale, since the correlation coefficient of both items is not below 0.3

Table A2. Summary of exploratory factor analysis

	Varimax rotated factor loadings					
	Selective outcome	Collective outcome	Selective process	Altruism	Social norms	Unknown category
Because it is important for my career	0.77					
To get managerial experience	0.69					
To get societal progress	0.77					
Because I want a political function	0.73					
To get to know politics better	0.42					
Because I want to have political influence		0.72				
To influence the political goals of the party		0.66				
To help the party gain influence		0.62				
To help the party achieve its goals		0.61				
To work for a more just society		0.52				
Because it is my duty as a citizen to engage in politics		0.42				
Because I meet interesting people			0.74			
Because I liked the internal democracy						0.64
Because I like collaborating with fellow party members			0.67			
To meet nice people			0.77			
Because the party works for people like me						0.73
To express my sympathy for the party				0.81		
To support the ideals of the party				0.69		
To also express my faith in politics				0.53		
Because it is common in my environment					0.76	
Because my friends and family urged me to					0.73	
Eigenvalues	2.84	2.65	2.20	1.84	1.56	1.36
% of variance	14	13	10	9	7	6

Crosstabulations of political function and gender

Table A3. Gender and having a local political function (district council or city council)

	Men (%)	Women (%)
Never been a candidate or a member	1,058 (61.19)	484 (69.64)
Have been a candidate	314 (18.16)	96 (13.81)
Have been a member	250 (14.46)	77 (11.08)
Currently a member	107 (6.19)	38 (5.47)

χ^2= 15.73, p< 0.05, Cramer's V = 0.081

Table A4. Gender and having a local political function (executive board of a municipality)

	Men (%)	Women (%)
Never been a candidate or a member	1,621 (93.75)	665 (95.68)
Have been a candidate	35 (2.02)	7 (1.01)
Have been a member	56 (3.24)	16 (2.30)
Currently a member	17 (0.98)	7 (1.01)

χ^2= 4.62, p=0.202, Cramer's V = 0.044

Table A5. Gender and having a regional political function (provincial parliament or provincial executive board)

	Men (%)	Women (%)
Never been a candidate or a member	1,620 (93.70)	668 (96.12)
Have been a candidate	75 (4.34)	16 (2.30)
Have been a member	28 (1.62)	9 (1.29)
Currently a member	6 (0.35)	2 (0.29)

Fisher's Exact Test p<0.10, Cramer's V=0.05

Table A6. Gender and having a European/national political function (Senate, Parliament or European parliament)

	Men (%)	Women (%)
Never been a candidate or a member	1,688 (97.63)	684 (98.42)
Have been a candidate	36 (2.08)	8 (1.15)
Have been a member	5 (0.29)	3 (0.43)

Fisher's Exact Test p=0.25, Cramer's V=0.033

Table A7 Summary table of hypothesis 2 per party

	Party					
	VVD	CDA	CU	D66	GL	PvdA
Local	Ø	Ø	**	Ø	Ø	Ø
Local executive	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	**	Ø
Regional	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
(Inter)national	Ø	Ø	Ø	**	Ø	Ø

Ø = no significant association, ***p<.001, **p<.05 and *=p<.10
When necessary a Fisher's Exact test is executed instead of a Chi-square test.