The Consequences of Differentiated Integration: Asymmetry in Access to European Commission Advisory Committees?

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Introduction

The European Union (EU) has witnessed a diversification of its membership in terms of the depth, width, matter and speed of integration (Phinnemore, 2007: 31; Stubb, 1996). Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) all have differentiated with regard to Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) or the European Monetary Union (EMU), or both (Junge, 2007: 393). Countries are often deemed to be rational actors and thus probably have their reasons for opting out of certain fields of EU integration (Naurin & Lindahl, 2010: 486). However, differentiated integration is likely to be accompanied by disadvantages.

Firstly, scholars believe differentiated integration is at odds with the original idea of European Integration: ever-widening and ever-deepening integration that is to be equally implemented by all members (Adler-Nissen, 2008: 665; Naurin & Lindahl, 2010: 486; Stubb, 1996; Junge, 2007: 393; among others). Secondly, on issues related to differentiated integration, member states would lose voting rights in the Council of Ministers (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2010: 138). Thirdly, EU member states with differentiated integration risk their reputation as attractive coalition partners (Alder-Nissen, 2008: 664-665). Fourthly, the "unity of EU law" could be at risk (Kölliker, 2006: 4). Fifthly, despite the differentiating integration, the EU is still in crisis – moreover, differentiation was not introduced as an indefinite phenomenon (Piris, 2012: 3). As a result of these points, several EU core values might be jeopardised (Junge, 2007: 399).

Despite the amount of interest in what differentiated integration is and what it could do to the EU's core ideals, there is little empirical work on its *consequences* (Adler-Nissen, 2008: 664). Kölliker asserts that "the bulk of the work done so far is of a conceptual, descriptive or prescriptive character" (2006: 3). Holzinger and Schimmelfennig note that:

> "[T]he focus has so far been on theorizing the consequences for future integration in the same area (…). In addition, however, research should also address the immediate *policy* effects of differentiation" (2012: 302; emphasis added).

Based on this, the goal of this paper is to link the theoretical and normative concerns in the literature to *empirical* analysis of how differentiated integration "relate[s] to the social and political practices to the EU" (Adler-Nissen, 2008: 666).

The focus of this paper is on the relation between differentiated integration as an independent variable (IV) and member state access to European Commission (EC) advisory committees as a dependent variable (DV). Of course, there are several ways in which states differentiate, spread over multiple policy areas (Stubb, 1996). As such, in addition to a general effect, there might be a particular effect for particular forms and particular EC policy areas. Based on the above introduction, this paper will deal with the following research question:

> How does differentiated integration affect the access of member states to EC advisory committees, and what are the differences between policy areas and the several existing forms of differentiation?

Access is used here in the formal and tangible sense as "the incorporation of an interest group [or government department] into EU-policy-making by (…) institutions" (Eising, 2007a: 386). Access to arenas facilitates input: being present at the negotiation table gives you at least a theoretical ability to influence outcomes. The EC is very important in agenda-setting and legislation (Moravcsik, 2002: 604), so access to EC advisory committees is crucial for influencing policy (Christiansen & Larsson, 2007: 4; Egeberg, 2007: 140). If member states differentiate, they risk their reputation as good coalition partners in the EU's policy arenas. In that case, the EC – being the gatekeeper for access – could be hesitant to give differentiated states 'sufficient' access. Either other member states pressure the EC into doing so, or the EC has an agenda of its own being the guardian of European integration (Thomson, 2008: 171; Egeberg, 2007: 151; Christiansen, 1997: 79).

In order to answer this question, this paper is structured as follows. This paper will deal with its main concepts and definitions first. Subsequently, this paper will deal with existing theory and derive its hypothesis from this theory. Thirdly, a methodology section will discuss how the aforementioned large-*N* study will measure 'access', as well as how the differences in this can be measured and how these differences are caused. Finally, a

results section will answer this paper's main research question and discuss to what extent the hypotheses hold.

Concepts

This chapter deals with the following concepts: differentiated integration; the workings of EC advisory committees; and, finally, 'access' to these policy arenas and what its causes and effects are.

The start of *codified* differentiated integration was the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Adler-Nissen, 2008: 665). According to the literature, a large part of differentiated integration is rooted in Euroscepticism. For instance, Sitter notes that voter dissatisfaction with European integration in Denmark and Sweden forced their governments to reject full EMU participation (2001: 22). Whereas its origins may be pointed to empirically, differentiated integration is heavily criticised on a *normative* level (see also: De Neve, 2007: 505; Junge, 2007: 392). However, some scholars argue that differentiated integration should be considered as an alternative design for an EU suitable for enlargement and the accompanying increase in heterogeneity (Sutter, 2000: 43). In this respect, the relevance of this paper is to show whether differentiated integration amounts to a trade-off in the loss of access and the loss of sovereignty.

Differentiated integration is defined in three categories, following Stubb (1996). The reason for that is that these different modes of differentiation are not equal in scope and nature (Stubb, 1996: 287). The importance of this distinction in scope and nature becomes apparent when considering the idea that a 'bigger' differentiation supposedly has a bigger effect on access. Stubb distinguishes between multi-speed (differentiation in Time); variable geometry (differentiation in Space); and Europe *à la carte* (differentiation in Matter) (1996: 285). The main difference between multi-speed and the other two is that a multi-speed Europe does not "admit to permanent differentiation" (1996: 287). The main difference between variable geometry and *à la carte* lies in the scope of the common ground outside of the differentiation (1996: 288). Variable geometry is a more integrationist concept, with even a *positive* evaluation of differentiation: a 'hard core' driving integration in unexplored areas (1996: 288).

In Stubb's classification, multi-speed differentiation is the 'softest' form of differentiation and *à la carte* integration the 'hardest' form (1996: 288). According to the theory, this difference in how 'hard' the differentiation is should show in its effects on the DVs listed in this paper. The most prominent examples of the three types of differentiated integration are listed in Table 1, below. It is possible for one policy area to witness multiple forms of differentiation. For instance, for Sweden the EMU is a case of multi-speed integration with a *de facto* opt-out (see also: Sutter, 2000: 41) and for Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK) they are *de jure* opt-outs: an *à la carte* differentiation (Adler-Nissen, 2009: 63-64).

State/States	**Multi-Speed**	**Variable Geometry**	***À la carte***
Denmark			EMU, CDSP[1], citizenship, AFSJ, Foreign policy
United Kingdom		Case-by-case opt-in: AFSJ	EMU, *Social charter*[2], AFSJ, Schengen, Charter of Fundamental Rights
Ireland		Case-by-case opt-in: AFSJ	Abortion, Schengen, AFSJ
Sweden	EMU (*de facto* opt-out)		*Snus*
New EU-27 members	EMU[3], Schengen (Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus)		Charter of Fundamental Rights (Cz, Pol)

Table 1: A list of differentiated integration of three types, per member state

EC advisory committees (or 'expert groups') are divided over several types and configurations (see Table 2, below). The focus is on *advisory* committees, not to be confused with comitology committees. The main difference is that comitology is part of the *implementation* of EU policy, rather than formulation (Wessels, 1998: 209-210). Advisory committees are "usually composed of national officials and other experts" (Egeberg, 2007: 150). The central mechanism for deciding who gets 'access' to EC advisory committees is crucial for this paper. The gatekeeper for the allocation of seats on EC advisory committees is 'the Commission' itself: they have "a rather free hand" in forming and filling these bodies as they please (Larsson & Murk, 2007: 64). The Chairs

[1] CDSP: Common Defence & Security Policy.
[2] This was abolished by the Blair government in 1995 (Schmidt, 2001: 259).
[3] As of January 1st, 2011, this includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.

and the secretarial staff are provided by the EC (Egeberg, 2007: 151). The EC decides on the structure of committees (as shown in Table 2). The EC also decides on how "the work performed by an expert group shall be used" (Larsson & Murk, 2007: 73). Subsequently, the EC invites member states and/or organisations. Three types of group compositions are acknowledged by the EC: groups with only national administrators; groups with only non-governmental representatives; and mixed bodies (Larsson & Murk, 2007: 77). Crucially, these groups can be either *inclusive* or *exclusive*, where the exclusive groups need not include groups or administrators from all member states (Larsson & Murk, 2007: 78). Open access *governmental* committees usually involve the automatic invitation of all 27 member states.

Organisational character	Informal		Formal	
Group type	Temporal		Permanent	
Scope	Broad		Limited	
Access	Open		Closed	
Membership	Government	Non-governmental	Private person	Mixed
Location	One DG		Multiple DGs (one lead DG)	
Task	Drafting new legislation		Exchanging views for the EC with third parties	
	Monitoring existing regulations		Providing expertise on implementation	

Table 2: The nature of EC advisory committees (source: European Commission, 2012)

Crucially, Christiansen & Larsson believe that both governmental and non-governmental actors have big incentives to be on board because a large part of the agenda-setting power rests with the EC (2007: 4). The outcomes of these meetings are often lent weight by the fact that they were the result of 'expert' deliberations – as such, it is crucial to influence them while they are in the EC committee stage (Christiansen & Larsson, 2007: 5). Christiansen & Larsson assert that sometimes it is not clear whether states treat the committees like bargaining arenas or that they form their preferences based on the meetings of these expert committees (2007: 7). Dür notes that there are four 'channels of influence': direct lobbying, outside lobbying, selection of decision-makers and wielding structural power (Dür, 2008: 561). Two out of these four channels are directly related to access: firstly, in order to influence policy outcomes, states need to be selected as decision-makers. Secondly, they need to lobby directly *vis-à-vis* EC officials, and being

present at the negotiation tables of EC advisory committees is probably one of the most direct ways of lobbying in the EU policy process.

Central to this paper is the definition of 'access'. Eising defines access as "a successful attempt of an interest group to approach the EU institutions or the incorporation of an interest group into EU policy-making by these institutions" (2007a: 386). Eising uses this definition to analyse access of interest groups and (groups of) business ventures, but the focus in this paper is both on member states and on interest groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and business ventures. Unlike Eising, who believes access can be either informal or formal (2007a: 386), this paper uses only *formal* access. The obvious reason for restricting the definition to formal access is that this paper relies on data comprising *registered* access to committees. While these committees can be both 'formal' and 'informal' – in the EC's definition – the fact that all participants are registered formalises the access to these committees substantially. Eising also includes the possibility of a "successful attempt (…) to approach the EU institutions" (2007a: 386), which is excluded for two reasons. On the one hand this form of access is more like 'being in touch' than *inclusion* in a decision-making arena. On the other hand, the data used for this paper does not include the communication history of interest groups, member states and EU institutions.

The literature on the determinants and consequences of 'access' focuses mostly on the access of businesses and NGOs (Eising, 2004; Eising, 2007a; Eising, 2007b; Eising, 2009; Broscheid & Coen, 2003). One exception is Gornitzka & Sverdrup's study of advisory committee heterogeneity – but again, their study does not include member state access as an important variable (2008). Studies of member states and European decision-making focus mostly on *outcomes* in terms of policy 'power' and 'influence' (Arregui & Thomson, 2009; Selck & Kuipers, 2005; Michalowitz, 2007; Sutter, 2000; among others); or on *modes of interaction* in terms of diplomatic strategies (Adler-Nissen, 2008; Adler-Nissen, 2009; Grøn & Wivel, 2011; among others). By contrast, the point of departure for the analysis of member states within the framework of multi-level governance does not pay much attention to *initial conditions* for between-state variation of influence and power. By contrast, this paper argues access is crucial there. One paper does analyse access of nationally-based bureaucrats in a differentiated EU, but focuses

more on their *identity* or identities: are bureaucrats loyal to national interests, specific interests or to a supranational ideal (Trondal & Veggeland, 2003)? Their main conclusion is that EU-membership does move national officials more into a supranational role than non-membership, comparing Norway and Sweden (Trondal & Veggeland, 2003: 73). This paper, unlike the Trondal & Veggeland paper, looks at the *determinants* rather than at the *consequences* of differences in access of different member states.

Theory and hypotheses

In order to come up with reasonable hypotheses, the existing literature will be examined in detail. The most common normative claim is that the 'core idea' of what the EU is, is jeopardised by differentiated integration. This core idea is the 'ever closer union' (Adler-Nissen, 2008: 665; Naurin & Lindahl, 2010: 486; Stubb, 1996; Junge, 2007: 393; among others). Two broad empirical claims flow from this. Firstly, it is thought that the reputations of member states that differentiate risk their reputation. This means differentiated integration could affect the *overall degree of access*. The EC is engaged in political struggles with national governments and other EU institutions over many decisions – including the distribution of access (Smith, 2004: 202). Secondly, stronger differentiation might also imply stronger effects on access. In addition, there are several expectations in the literature that do not relate directly to these two categories but nonetheless could have an impact on the distribution of seats and on the distribution of *governmental* seats. In particular, this could mean that for different DGs the effects on access are different. This will be treated as a third category of expectations.

In the first category, Naurin & Lindahl note that "power relationships and coalition-building between the member states may be affected" by what Naurin & Lindahl call the 'free-rider effect' (2010: 486-487). This effect means member states that differentiate build up a reputation as free-riders by not participating fully in domestically unpopular programmes but making a profit from integration nonetheless. However, Naurin & Lindahl argue that 'network capital' can overcome bad reputations (2010: 505). The Swedish government is reported to have a 'constructive' reputation despite having a highly Eurosceptic population (Lindahl & Naurin, 2005: 66). Secondly, Adler-Nissen says most scholars argue that there is a trade-off between "autonomy and influence" for

differentially integrated member states (2008: 666; 2009: 64). Her conclusion is that differentially integrated member states use several broad diplomatic strategies to 'cover-up' the side-effects of differentiation (2008: 680-681). Fletcher, on the other hand, argues that Eurosceptiscism in the UK has "framed the policy responses and bargaining positions of successive UK governments" (2009: 71). Similarly, it is argued that Sweden often takes a relatively extreme position in policy negotiations (Selck & Kuipers, 2005: 159). Interpretations of which reputations are held by individual member states are disputed by some scholars. Fletcher (2009: 78) and Adler-Nissen (2009: 62) assert that the UK is generally considered to be an unpopular coalition partner. Adler-Nissen also asserts that Denmark is considered to be an unpopular coalition partner (2009: 63). However, Naurin and Lindahl believe that the UK, Denmark and Sweden are able to compensate for their bad reputation adequately (2010: 505; Lindahl & Naurin, 2005: 83). The results of the empirical studies listed above show that while it seems reasonable for differentiated integration to have an effect on the distribution of influence and access, in practice member states appear to be able to find ways to compensate for these effects through diplomatic activity. Based on these analyses, it makes sense not to assume that differentiated integration does not matter if member states try to 'make up for it'. Finally, all hypotheses include the possibility that while all member states have interest groups on expert committees, some have fewer government representatives. This is also argued by Egeberg *et al*., who claim that fellow countrymen representing interest groups are considered noteworthy coalition partners in advisory committees by less than 20% of national officials; whereas fellow government representatives are considered to be the best coalition partners in committees (2003: 33). Moreover, non-government experts might have agendas that diverge from what governments deem to be the national interest (Schneider *et al*., 2007: 123-124). Based on these expectations, H1 states that differentiated integration in general will have a negative effect on access:

> H1: Member states that have differentiated integration (lower X), have lower shares of access to European Commission (EC) advisory committees (lower Y1) or a lower share of *government* access to these advisory committees (*different* Y2).

For the second category, the EC is expected to influence the distribution of access. Crucially, the EC is reported to be unwilling to believe in Sweden's compensatory strategies after their refusal to join the EMU (Lindahl & Naurin, 2005: 79). Secondly, Robert argues that many scholars disregard the agenda the EC has on its own, especially regarding Eastern Europe (2004: 17). The EC is strongly acting to advance the position of Eastern European countries in need of development, and will act in various policy instruments to achieve these aims (Robert, 2004: 19). This would include 'positively discriminating' them on advisory committee seats, for example – which would change the balance of access in favour of 'new' *lagging* member states vis-à-vis older *differentiated* states. Thirdly, there is a debate raging among scholars of the EU on the intergovernmentalist vs. supranationalist nature of politics – and this does not forego the EC. Quaglia argues that some parts of the EU are more supranational and some are more intergovernmental in nature, with differences even occurring *within* institutions (2008: 575). Egeberg agrees with this point of view, considering it to be relevant for EC advisory committees (2007: 140). Grøn & Wivel note that it is often believed that smaller states are traditionally given a platform by the EC (2011: 525). However, Grøn & Wivel disagree with this belief, saying that recent developments make the EU less mindful of smaller states' stakes and more majoritarian in nature (2011: 523). Thomson, however, expects the EC act "[in] favour [of] small and medium member states slightly more than large member states" (2008: 189). In line with Thomson, Puetter expects that expert committees are more consensus-oriented than other EU bodies (2008: 480). This could lead to a lower degree of politicisation of the degree of access than expected by some scholars. However, following the aforementioned categorisation by Stubb, this politicisation of access can differ *per type of differentiation*: do opt-outs affect access more than weaker forms of differentiation? H2 tests this reasoning:

> H2: The effect of a lower X producing a lower Y1 (or *different* Y2) is stronger for *harder* forms of differentiation in integration: ΔY for *Á la carte* differentiation > ΔY for Variable geometry differentiation > ΔY for Multi-speed differentiation.

The third category consists of five main arguments. Firstly, it is often argued that the bad reputation factor can be overcome by 'network capital' (Naurin & Lindahl, 2010: 505; Arregui & Thomson, 2009: 670). Secondly, it is argued that smaller states have relatively more bargaining success (akin to influence) because their interests are narrower (Arregui & Thomson, 2009: 670; Grøn & Wivel, 2011: 530). Thirdly, Grøn & Wivel argue that state administrative capacity is crucial, both in terms of quality of the experts sent to committees and in terms of the links with EU staff (2011: 533). Eising underlines this by saying that providing good information or good arguments gets you on board in the EU, rather than raw power or money (2007a: 386). Fourthly, it is argued that for most of the newer EU-27 members, NGOs and other non-governmental actors are underdeveloped when compared to their EU-15 counterparts. This "contributes to a shortage of suitable candidates from such constituencies" for EC advisory committees (Heard-Lauréote, 2008: 595). Fifthly and finally, Adler-Nissen argues that EMU integration leads to more tangible differences between members and non-members in that specific policy area, whereas less is known about the JHA area (2009: 64). As such, it could be that the effects of differentiated negotiation on the distribution of access differ *per policy area*. This echoes the idea that some DGs follow a more intergovernmentalist logic and others a more supranationalist one (Quaglia, 2008: 575). Linked to this, H3 expects access to be affected by differentiated integration differently *per policy area*:

> H3: The effect of a lower X producing a lower Y1 (or *different* Y2) is especially strong for policy areas related to differentiated integration (condition Z).

In addition to this, three main 'intervening variables' can be distilled from this theory section: 'state size' as a determinant of access and influence; 'state capacity' (network capital); and, finally, the *duration* of membership.

So how does this mechanism work in practice? These expectations would imply, for example, that Sweden – being a lower X country than, say, Finland – will have a lower Y than Finland. However, for Denmark, this effect would be even more severe since their differentiation is stronger. This effect supposedly shows even more in areas related to monetary and fiscal policy because these are areas fulfilling 'condition Z'. Because the

Danish *de jure* opt-out (*à la carte* differentiation) on EMU is 'harder' than the Swedish *de facto* opt-out (multi-speed differentiation), the effect should be stronger in Denmark than in Sweden.

The expectations based on the hypotheses are listed in Table 3 (below). H1 corresponds with the difference between the left-most column and the middle column in Table 3. H2 corresponds with the vertical differences in the middle column in Table 3. H3 corresponds with the difference between the middle and right columns in Table 3.

Form of X	**High X country**	**Low X country**	**Low X (*if* Z)**
No differentiated integration	Highest Y	-	-
Multi-speed	-	Slightly low Y	Lower Y
Variable Geometry	-	Low Y	Lower Y
À la carte	-	Lower Y	Lowest Y

Table 3: Expectations on the relation between X, Y and condition Z

Methodology and Data

For the methodology of this paper, three things are crucial. Firstly, the nature of the quantitative data used in this paper will be discussed. Secondly, the operationalisation of the IV and DVs will be dealt with. Thirdly and finally, the quantitative stage of the analysis will be discussed. In particular, the selection of the statistical method is important.

The dataset used in this paper is a dataset of the registry of the presence of all persons of all nations and organisations on seats of advisory committees of the European Commission, collected in March and April 2010. Included in this information is the name of the overarching Directorate General (DG), the name of the specific advisory committee, the nature of the specific advisory committee (informal/formal, permanent/temporary) and their role (NGO representative, business representative, central government representative, and so on). The total *N* of the dataset is 15448 seats. These 15448 seats are distributed over 27 DGs, listed in Appendix 1 with their respective number of seats. The main units of analysis in H1, H2 and H3 are the amount of seats per member state; the amount of seats per member state *per DG*; and the relative presence of

central government officials among these seats per member state and per member state per DG.

With the IV in this paper being degree of integration of member states into the EU – or rather, the degree of *non*-integration (X) – a classification of countries' relative non-integration is vital. There is a difference between differentiated countries in their nature, degree and scope of differentiation. The theory on the legal, institutional and political nature of differentiated integration discussed above argues that multi-speed differentiation is the 'weakest' form of differentiation and *à la carte* integration is the strongest form of differentiation. Based on this, this paper uses the differentiations listed in Table 1 to classify the member states' IV 'figures' in Table 4, below. There is a division into two groups that have a 'lower X'. Firstly, the classification in Table 4 uses two types of 'having a lower X'. On the one hand, there are member states that have a lower degree of EU-integration as a result of their recent entry – they are not yet deemed to be 'ready' to join all facets of European integration. This is called a lower X as a result of *lagging* in integration. This category of 'new member states' is limited to the EU-25 and EU-27 enlargements of the 2000s. On the other hand, some member states have *chosen* not to participate in certain areas. This *conscious* lower integration is simply called having a low or lower X. For both types, the classification of X is an *ordinal* ranking because it is not possible to 'quantify' the degree of integration. Crucially, the two types are treated as *separate* ordinal classifications because it is impossible to collapse them into one group.

Lagging is highest for Bulgaria and Romania, the two newest member states who are deemed not yet ready to join the Euro and also not deemed ready to join Schengen. Cyprus is classified as 'lagging' because it is not allowed to join Schengen as a result of the Turkish Cyprus issue's implications on border control policy (see also: Ker-Lindsay, 2009: 448-449). Several other 'newer' member states have not yet joined the Euro and are also classified as 'lagging'. Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia, on the other hand, are newer members that are not 'lagging' in their integration, so in this sense it will be interesting to see how they compare to the lagging new member states in terms of their DVs.

There are four 'conscious' differentiators – Sweden, Ireland, the UK and Denmark. They are spread across four classes in the classification. Sweden is the least differentiated with only a *de facto* opt-out on EMU[4]. Ireland has a lower X than Sweden because it is not integrated into Schengen and the CDSP/AFSJ areas but does take part in the Euro/EMU – unlike the UK. Therefore, the UK is classified as having an X lower by one class than Ireland. Finally, Denmark is classified as having the lowest X because they have the strongest differentiation in the most areas without having any opt-ins – unlike the UK and Ireland. This classification is in line with Adler-Nissen's argument that the UK and Denmark are the "opt-out champions" – but they are not treated as equally differentiated for the above reasons (cf. Adler-Nissen, 2009: 64). The Czech Republic and Poland are the only new member states with a formal opt-out.

Classification	**Member States**	***N***
'Highly Lagging' X	Bulgaria, Romania	2
'Lagging' X	Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland	6
Lowest X	Denmark	1
Lower X	UK	1
Low X	Ireland	1
Slightly Low X	Sweden	1
'Normal' X	The rest	15

Table 4: Classification of the IV – degrees of EU integration of member states

Several ways of operationalising the independent variable are used here in order to check for partial effects. Every single existing differentiation has been included as a single variable – and also the conscious and lagging differentiators, the type of differentiation, and so on. For example, it might be the case that only opting out of the Euro has significant consequences for overall or DG-specific access. In that case using differentiation and lagging as whole IVs will not pinpoint this effect. This is done for differentiation on Schengen, EMU and AFSJ.

Access is split on two dimensions to get the full picture. On the first dimension, access will be analysed as 'access per member state' (Y1) and 'proportion of *governmental* access per member state' (Y2). The second dimension is whether or not

[4] *Snus* is not the subject of a much debate outside Sweden, so it is not treated as significant here.

different DGs show varying ways wherein differentiated integration affects access. This is necessary to test H3.

To examine the degree of access of the 27 member states, five new measures are made by the author. All these calculations are listed in Box 1, while the symbols will be explained in Table 5, below. Firstly, the analysis will examine whether the degree of access for each member state fits the so-called 'community method': a more supranational, consensus-seeking way of working (Devuyst, 2002: 110). The calculation for 'fit' with the community method examines whether or not the degrees of access equal the idea of 'one state, one vote' per state. Secondly and thirdly, the proportionality of access will be measured using both population size and Council voting weights (CVW) as measures of size. Fourthly, the 'total fit' of member states' degrees of access with their expected degrees of access will be calculated by combining their returns based on their size and the community method. Finally, the relative presence of (central) *government* officials will be calculated per member state.

Symbol	Explanation
A	Presence of *N* of nationals of all member states on advisory committee: the measure of 'access'
A_X	Presence of *N* of nationals of member state 'X' on advisory committee
Agov	Presence of *N* of *government representatives* on advisory committees.
P	Total number of seats
Gov't$_X$	Presence of government employees of member state 'X' relative to non-government employees' presence of member state 'X'
Pop	Population size of given member state
FitComm	How close is a state's access on advisory committees to the 'community ideal'? I.e. does access approach the *one state = one vote* principle?
FitSize	To what extent is a member state's presence on advisory committees a reflection of its relative *population* size?
FitPower	To what extent is a member state's presence on advisory committees a reflection of its relative voting weight, using CVW?
CVW	The official distribution of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers

Table 5: Explaining the symbols used in Box 1

Basically, the first three formulae in Box 1 are percentages – except TotalFit$_X$ and Gov't$_x$. The measures are constructed in a way that they represent 'deviations from 0': if a member state scores <0 on one measure, it means that they are 'underrepresented' there. For example, for FitComm$_x$ it would mean that if member state *X* has <0, it has less than the $^1/_{27}{}^{th}$ of seats the 'Community Method' ideal expects. This would imply that the

country is underrepresented – or that the Community Method ideal is not the inspiration for access distribution. Similarly, if a member state has a score of >0 on one measure, it is punching above its weight regarding the expectations of that measure. In order to test H1 and H2, the overall scores for the full dataset are calculated. In order to test H2 and H3, these measures are used *per DG* as well.

The reason for including both the calculation of 'fit' with the Community Method and the fit with relative size and voting power lies in the scholarly debate on the nature of the EC: is it more of a supranational or more an intergovernmental arena (Quaglia, 2008: 575; Thomson, 2008: 171; Egeberg, 2007: 140, 142, 151; Grøn & Wivel, 2011: 526; Puetter, 2008: 480; Juncos & Pomorska, 2008: 494)? This way of calculating access keeps open all possibilities and looks at the dominant factors in determining whether or not differentiated integration matters for degrees of access: differentiated integration might matter in different degrees for different states.

$$\mathbf{FitComm_x} = \frac{\sum \mathbf{A_x}}{\sum \mathbf{P}} - (\mathbf{{}^1/_{27} * 100\%})$$

$$\mathbf{FitSize_x} = \frac{\sum \mathbf{A_x}}{\sum \mathbf{P}} - \frac{\mathbf{Pop_x}}{\sum \mathbf{Pop}} \mathbf{* 100\%}$$

$$\mathbf{FitPower_x} = \frac{\sum \mathbf{A_x}}{\sum \mathbf{P}} - \frac{\mathbf{CVW_x}}{\sum \mathbf{CVW}} \mathbf{* 100\%}$$

$$\mathbf{TotalFit_x} = \mathbf{FitComm_x + FitSize_x + FitCVW_x}$$

$$\mathbf{Gov't_x} = \sum \mathbf{Agov_x} / \sum \mathbf{A_x}$$

Box 1: Measuring access for member states, relative to the Community Method ideal, population size, voting weights and government versus non-government ratios

This paper tests its hypotheses using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). In addition to 'predicting' covariance, MLE is an estimation method, much like Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (Eliason, 1993: 16). MLE assesses the *probability* of variation: it "maximises the likelihood of observing (...) [what is] actually observed" (Eliason, 1993: 7-8). The figures located in the results section show the relation between IVs, covariates and the DV in a way that is similar to regression coefficients as used in OLS. Like in regression, coefficients can be negative and positive. Stronger coefficients show that the relation between two variables is 'skewed' in a particular direction – with *significantly* strong relations flagged. The factor analyses displayed in the results section show which variables ('components') are related most strongly and most uniformly.

The reasons for using MLE in this paper are fourfold. Firstly, the common procedure for multivariate regression, OLS, assumes homoskedasticity and a normal distribution. This is not possible because this paper's sample – the EU – is very heterogeneous. In fact, this heterogeneity is what caused differentiated integration in the first place, so analysing the effects of heterogeneity with a method that cannot deal with heterogeneity of its sample is illogical. Bollen & Jackman argue that small-*N* regressions can be more sensitive to skewing by a small part of the sample – which the heterogeneous sample used here is likely to have (1985: 511). MLE is generally known for robustness (Hox, 2002: 37). Secondly, both the overall and the governmental proportion access measures in Box 1 are proportions, and the assumptions of "normality and homoskedasticity, are often violated when the dependent variable is a proportion" (Paolino, 2001: 325). Thirdly, MLE factor analysis is able to work both in an exploratory and a confirmatory way (Jöreskog, 1969: 183). Because several ways of operationalising differentiated integration are used in order to test specifically *which* differentiations influence access, MLE should suit this idea of combining exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. MLE is a useful tool to look for the best 'fit' by using rotations and simple models, gradually adding more factors for confirmatory testing (Jöreskog, 1969: 201). Fourthly and finally, the theory behind the analysis of differentiation is that both differentiation and lagging should have similar effects on access. MLE is able to pinpoint whether or not this is the case because it is a factor analysis, which pinpoints statistical commonalities between IVs on DV variance. The rotation method used here is oblique (direct oblimin)

because the IV, DV and intervening variables are likely to be interdependent (see also: Field, 2005: 636-637).

The two main intervening variables used here are measures of member state 'size' (CVW and population size) and whether or not a member state has recently joined or not. In addition, several ways of operationalising the lagging and differentiation are used in order to tease out all possible patterns. Variable names and the different operationalisations of differentiation shown in the tables and appendices are explained in Appendix 2.

Analysis

In this section, the focus lays on the analysis used to answer whether or not H1, H2 and H3 hold. In order to answer whether or not the hypotheses hold, it is necessary to look at five attributes of 'access'. Firstly, the *absolute* figures of access will be looked at. Secondly, the *relative* figures of access will be assessed – relative to population size, voting power and the Community Method ideal. Thirdly, this section examines whether or not H1 and H2 hold in terms of the overall picture of all committees. Fourthly, the two modes of Y: Y1 (overall access) and Y2 (*government* access) will be discussed. Finally, H2 and H3 will be tested by reviewing the relative and absolute distributions of access *per DG*.

The main results on access are listed in Table 7, below. The member states are sorted according to CVW. The columns 'diff' and 'lag' correspond with the categorisation of differentiation Table 4, with 'diff' corresponding with the *conscious* differentiation and 'lag' correspond with the 'lagging' states. When looking at Table 7, the first obvious pattern is that the bigger states have relatively (a lot) less access. Secondly, generally speaking, the government proportion (Y2) of most large and old states is lower.

The implications of Table 7 for the aforementioned hypotheses are quite clear in two respects. Firstly, it seems that the dominant factor in determining access is 'size', rather than differentiated integration. Secondly, it seems that for the government proportion of access, size matters even more. In addition, new member states have a much higher government proportion: hypotheses concerning a 'different Y2' do not seem to hold.

member state	cvw	pop[5]	diff	lag	total *N*	rel_27	rel_cvw	rel_pop	totalfit	Y2[6]
France	8.41	65.05	.	.	945	-6.83	-2.29	2.42	-6.7	0.63
Germany	8.41	81.75	.	.	1130	-8.95	-1.09	3.62	-6.42	0.65
Italy	8.41	60.63	.	.	844	-6.6	-2.94	1.77	-7.77	0.63
UK	8.41	62.44	III	.	897	-6.61	-2.6	2.11	-7.1	0.62
Poland	7.83	38.2	.	I	546	-4.06	-4.29	-0.16	-8.51	0.72
Spain	7.83	46.15	.	.	704	-4.63	-3.27	0.85	-7.05	0.65
Romania	4.06	21.41	.	II	456	-1.31	-1.11	-0.75	-3.17	0.77
Netherlands	3.77	16.66	.	.	660	0.96	0.5	0.57	2.03	0.69
Belgium	3.48	10.95	.	.	815	3.1	1.8	1.58	6.48[7]	0.67
Czech Rep.	3.48	10.53	.	I	495	1.11	-0.27	-0.49	0.35	0.75
Greece	3.48	11.31	.	.	463	0.75	-0.48	-0.7	-0.43	0.72
Hungary	3.48	9.99	.	I	498	1.24	-0.26	-0.47	0.51	0.71
Portugal	3.48	10.64	.	.	493	1.07	-0.29	-0.51	0.27	0.71
Austria	2.9	8.4	.	.	573	2.04	0.81	-0.01	2.84	0.7
Bulgaria	2.9	7.5	.	II	432	1.31	-0.1	-0.9	0.31	0.78
Sweden	2.9	9.42	I	.	591	1.96	0.93	0.13	3.02	0.7
Denmark	2.03	5.56	IIII	.	495	2.1	1.18	-0.49	2.79	0.71
Finland	2.03	5.38	.	.	593	2.77	1.81	0.14	4.72	0.7
Ireland	2.03	4.48	II	.	487	2.26	1.12	-0.55	2.83	0.72
Lithuania	2.03	3.24	.	I	429	2.13	0.75	-0.92	1.96	0.78
Slovakia	2.03	5.44	.	.	445	1.8	0.85	-0.82	1.83	0.72
Cyprus	1.16	0.8	.	I	382	2.31	1.31	-1.23	2.39	0.77
Estonia	1.16	1.34	.	.	422	2.46	1.57	-0.97	3.06	0.77
Latvia	1.16	2.23	.	I	414	2.24	1.52	-1.02	2.74	0.77
Luxembourg	1.16	0.51	.	.	395	2.46	1.4	-1.14	2.72	0.75
Slovenia	1.16	2.05	.	.	456	2.54	1.79	-0.75	3.58	0.75
Malta	0.87	0.42	.	.	383	2.4	1.61	-1.22	2.79	0.8

Table 7: Overall picture of member states' access scores, sorted by CVW

Hypothesis 1

It appears that H1 (Y1) does not hold for older member states, since the UK is equal to other large states (as shown in Table 7) and Denmark, Ireland and Sweden have adequate access as well. However, both Denmark and Sweden score a lot worse than their Nordic neighbour Finland. For Hungary, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, the hypotheses seem to work better. Poland does worse than expected – potentially due to its relatively large size. For Romania and Bulgaria H1 seems to work, except that there is an unexpected

[5] Population in millions.
[6] Government proportion of all seats.
[7] In the Belgian federal arrangement, most powers are transferred to the sub-national political entities. Only the residual powers rest with the federal government (Deschouwer, 2009: pp. 9-10). This implies that often Belgium sends two or even three people whereas less decentralised member states (can) send only one.

difference between them. Thus, it appears that newer member states have more trouble compensating for the negative effects of lagging.

In theory, H1 implicates that differentiation and lagging (as described in Table 4) should work in the same way: predicting a significantly negative effect on the quantity of access of member states (Y1) or on relative government access (Y2). The statistical analysis below answers what effect differentiated integration and lagging in integration have on access – and whether these effects are similar.

Table 8 (below) shows that neither lagging nor differentiation is significantly associated with overall degrees of access. The main determinant of access on the overall level appears to be member state size – with CVW the best 'fit' with access degrees. A simple dummy denoting only member states with >60 million inhabitants also shows that the four largest states have far less access than their size would suggest. However, the fact that this relation is weaker than that of the CVW and pure population measures for the whole sample shows that this effect is more widespread than just among the four largest states. Based on the information in Table 8, it is clear that the strict version of H1 (Y1) must be rejected here. Especially conscious differentiation appears to have no relation whatsoever with overall levels of access. 'Size' and the aforementioned 'Community Method' ideals appear to be the dominant pattern in determining overall degrees of access, as shown in Table 9 (further below). If proportionality of access is offset against this 1/27 access distribution, it clearly shows that mitigating the effects of size is an important directive in allocating access. This linearity of the relation between access and the two measures of size is shown in Appendix 3a.

Variable	**1** [1.476]	**2** [19.050**]	**3** [177.805**]	**Factor 1**	**Factor 2**
lag	-.089 (.629)	-.089 (.629)	-.089 (.629)	.163	.799
diff	-.013 (1.006)	-.013 (1.006)	-.013 (1.006)	-.068	-.303
old_new		.137 (.506)	.137 (.506)	.388	.673
large_yesno			-.918** (2.626)	-.956	.099
pop_millions			-.881** (23.519)	-.999	-.002
CVW			.686** (.362)	.882	.168
totalfit (dependent)				.883	-.321
Dependent Variable: totalfit. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Model N: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses. Model Bartlett's χ^2 in brackets behind model numbers. Rotation method: direct oblimin. Factors that have loaded together are highlighted.					

Table 8: H1 (Y1): are lagging and differentiation similar?

Table 9 shows that while the dominant pattern is 'size', it also shows that, generally speaking, newer members have less access than older ones. Closer statistical analysis shows that one reason for this is that newer member states are significantly smaller than older member states (as shown in Appendix 3b). As such, this relation appears to be spurious. However, one can still say that lagging is negatively related with access in proportion to the Community Method, since lagging is unrelated to member state size (see Appendix 3b). This pattern is diametrically opposed to the idea of H2, which proposes that conscious differentiation should have more of an impact than lagging since differentiation is a 'harder' and more permanent form of differentiated integration than lagging.

Variable	**1** [279.343**]	**1** [239.400**]
lag	-.368* (.629)	-.128 (.629)
diff	.102 (.1006)	.002 (.1006)
old_new	-.585** (.506)	.148 (.506)
CVW	.821** (2.6265)	-.910** (2.6265)
pop_millions	.887** (23.519)	-.795** (23.519)
large_yesno	-.832** (.362)	.543** (.362)
	Dependent Variable: **prop_27**.	Dependent Variable: **prop_CVW**.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Model *N*: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses. Model Bartlett's χ^2 in brackets behind model numbers.		

Table 9: Overall degrees of access with relaxed assumptions on differentiation

The final part of H1 is the 'different' Y2, expecting lower *government* proportions for differentiated and lagging member states. Table 7 has already shown that it is highly unlikely that this is the case, since newer member states have much higher government proportions. This relation is examined in detail in Appendix 3c. Much like H1 (Y1), H1 (Y2) shows that there is no simultaneous effect for lagging and differentiation. Again, larger member states have fewer seats – both non-governmental and governmental ones. Moreover, newer member states have higher government proportions – including lagging ones. In this sense, H1 (Y2) is indeed the same as H1 (Y1): lagging and differentiation do not work similarly. The key pattern that emerges when taking apart government proportions is that this relation is not what Y2 should be looking for. It clearly appears that new member states have lower *non-government* access to advisory committees. This

is completely in line with the aforementioned argument that most new EU-27 members have an underdeveloped civil society (Heard-Lauréote, 2008: 595). Appendix 3c shows that this is especially true for lagging new member states. At the same time, newer member states score worse in terms of government representation. So their government *proportion* might be higher, but this does not mean that the amount of seats allocated to new member states' governments is *proportional to their size*.

Hypothesis 2

According to H2, there must be a difference between the different types of differentiated integration, with stronger differentiation having stronger negative effects on access. As shown above in Table 7 and the related discussion, this argument is undermined by the fact that lagging seems to have more of a relation with lower degrees of access than differentiation. Conscious differentiation appears to have less impact on access, despite being a 'stronger' form of differentiation than 'lagging'. Moreover, it does not appear that Denmark and the UK are 'shunned' more than their Irish and Swedish counterparts despite having stronger and more differentiations.

In order for H2 (Y1) to be true, consciously differentiated non-Euro members must have lower degrees of access than Eurozone countries. Those who do not have the Euro because they are lagging members should be between these two categories in terms of access, because lagging is a weaker form of differentiation but a form of differentiation nonetheless. As such, there should be a different effect for differentiation and lagging in the first model – rather than the simultaneous effect that is necessary for H1. This logic is followed in all three analyses for H2: on DG ECOFIN; on DG Taxation and Customs (DG TAXC); and on DG AFSJ. The MLE analyses then look for a) autonomous effects of 'all' differentiations on access; b) differences between *conscious* and *lagging* differentiations; c) differences between the different legal forms of differentiation; and, finally, d) differences between the three aforementioned DGs.

Table 10 (below) examines this relative impact of stronger differentiation on EMU-related access. In order to 'confirm' this hypothesis, statistical analysis should show that the effect of differentiation on access should be higher for conscious differentiators (UK, Sweden, Denmark) and even more so for the conscious *formal* opt-out states (UK,

Denmark). Therefore, four different operationalisations of EMU differentiation have been employed. Firstly, the overall effect of all differentiations on access is checked. There is a variable for all conscious non-EMU members. Thirdly, lagging non-members of the EMU are coded in a dummy variable. Finally, there is a category for conscious *À la carte* differentiation. Table 10 then shows that while the strongest effect on access is member state size, again, not being a member of the EMU decreases access to EMU-related advisory committees. However, H2 (Y1) must be rejected here because formally opting out and consciously opting out of EMU membership has no significant effect on access. Instead, it appears that lagging on EMU membership has a more distinctly negative effect on access to EMU-related advisory committees. This can be seen on the right-hand side of Table 10. These results closely echo the outcomes for H1.

Variable	**1** [129.395**]		**Variable**	**2** [102.250**]
euro_opt	-.171 (.267)		euro_conscious	-.193 (.6405)
euro_yesno	-.362* (.492)		euro_lag	-.260 (.447)
euro_conscious	-.193 (.6405)		CVW	-.504** (2.6265)
CVW	-.504** (2.6265)		pop_millions	-.374* (23.519)
pop_millions	-.374* (23.519)		old_new	.298 (.506)
old_new	.298 (.506)			
Dependent Variable: totaldiff_ecof. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Model *N*: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses. Model Bartlett's χ^2 in brackets behind model numbers. Rotation method: Direct Oblimin. Factors that have loaded together are highlighted.				

Table 10: The effects of EMU differentiation on H2 (Y1)

As shown in Appendix 3d, for DG TAXC the pattern expected by H2 (Y1) does not hold. There is no significant factor for either stronger differentiation, or for any differentiation whatsoever. One factor in this might be the relatively small size of the DG itself in terms of advisory committees[8], so that it is hard to have any differences at all.

For DG AFSJ, Y2 must be rejected in a fashion similar to the rejection of DG TAXC. On the one hand, the DG's advisory committees have a lot more seats (>400 instead of <150), but it appears that differentiation on AFSJ has no specific effect on access to AFSJ-related committees. On the other hand, the effect of *full* opt-out differentiation is even smaller than the effect of the opt-in/opt-out differentiation, as shown in Appendix 3d. This amounts to a strong backing for alternative hypotheses, such as the ability of

[8] <150 seats for all advisory committees linked to this DG, as shown in Appendix 1.

member states like Denmark and Sweden to compensate adequately for their differentiations. Another possibility is the idea that in the AFSJ area, the difference between the opt-in/opt-out differentiations and the full opt-out differentiations is impossible to spot legally. Fletcher argues that the opt-in/opt-out arrangement of the UK and Ireland is a very complicated legal differentiation, with more of a cosmetic or symbolic effect than a legal effect (2009: p. 95). As such, the effects for H2 might be minimal – which they are.

The final part of this hypothesis concerns the effect of the relative strength of differentiation on the government proportion of access (Y2). It is unlikely that statistical analysis would agree with H2 (Y2), given the fact that Appendix 4 already shows there are no differences between states in this respect, and if there are, they run counter to the expectations. For DG ECOFIN, it appears that the statistical results are diametrically opposed to the hypothesis. This is clarified in Appendix 3e. Differentiation on DG ECOFIN results in a higher Y2 instead of a lower one. However, of all EMU-differentiated countries, those with multispeed differentiation or a lagging EMU integration, the effect is the most positive on Y2.

For both DG TAXC and DG AFSJ, differentiated integration has no negative effect on the government proportion of access (Y2). This is shown in more detail in Appendix 3f. Conscious differentiation has no bigger effect than lagging differentiation for DG TAXC, and full opt-outs have no bigger effect than case-by-case opt-outs for DG AFSJ. Rather surprisingly, in both instances the effect of the less strong differentiation was 'stronger' negative. However, the coefficients are so small that this result is negligible. One of the mechanisms behind this is the possibility that there simply is no effect because the DGs are not so big, and not among the main EC domains. As such, H2 (Y2) is rejected for DGs ECOFIN, TAXC and AFSJ.

Hypothesis 3

H3 argues that access levels and government proportions are more strongly affected by differentiated integration if the DG you look at is related to that particular differentiation. H3 (Y1) implies that within DGs ECOFIN, AFSJ and TAXC, access should be lower for states that have differentiated integration related to these particular DGs. As shown in the

discussion of H2 this is not the case for DGs AFSJ and TAXC regarding both Y1 and Y2. For DG ECOFIN, H3 (Y2) must be rejected as well, as shown in Appendix 3e. However, the discussion of H2 has already shown that differentiating on EMU integration in any configuration has a negative effect on access to DG ECOFIN. When one looks at Table 10, it is clear that this effect of EMU differentiation on access to DG ECOFIN is mainly caused by the lagging states. Similar to the results for H1, it appears that lagging states see most effects of their differentiation than conscious states. Nonetheless, it appears that EMU-related differentiation has the strongest negative effect on access of any main IV used here. This result is no surprise given the aforementioned Adler-Nissen argument that EMU integration is unique in how big the effects of differentiated integration are (2009: 64). In sum, H3 has to be rejected in terms of Y2, that there is no negative effect of differentiated integration effect on government proportions. In terms of Y1 it seems that H3 is supported only by advisory committees related to DG ECOFIN. This is not as surprising given widespread belief that differentiation on EMU has the most profound impact on institutional structures of the EU and on member states.

Conclusion

This paper sought to shed more light on the consequences of differentiated integration, by focussing on the distribution of access to EC advisory committees among member states. While differentiated integration itself is a major topic for EU scholars, inadequate attention has been given to measuring tangible consequences for differentiating states (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012). By conducting an MLE analysis of access to advisory committees, this paper has found several striking patterns. This conclusion examines the impact of the findings presented in this paper, as well as indicating where future research seems warranted.

The main impact of the results presented here is that normative and theoretical claims on the dire effects of differentiation appear to be unfounded empirically. However, the main result that *is* in line with these views is that even in the EC advisory committees the Eurogroup is an exclusive group, effectively keeping non-members out of EMU-related arenas. Crucially, moving the EMU into closer cooperation on economic and budgetary matters is one of the main contemporary options for EU widening and deepening –

especially since the current EMU structures are not deemed to be suitable to tackle the current economic crisis. This enhanced cooperation is likely to bring along more *differentiation* as well (Piris, 2012: 143). This, in turn, would strengthen the effects of differentiation on access already found by this analysis on EMU-related access.

Secondly, it appears access has less to do with differentiation, rather than simply being a new EU member. Newer members generally have less access across the board, and lagging new members even less so. These findings support the claim by some authors that newer member states have weaker civil society and are thus underrepresented in some arenas. At the same time, it is necessary to partially reject the notion that the EC is adamant newer member states are represented well. One main entrance for further research in this would be to reassess new members' access in a longitudinal analysis: is this effect (gradually) disappearing or not? If not, there could be a problem in terms of influence for newer member states.

The final – and perhaps most important – main contribution of this paper is that it shows quite clearly that the dominant causal factor in determining access to EC advisory committees is some sort of Community Method-based EC logic that tries to take the middle ground between size, power and a fair 1/27 distribution of seats. Contrary to what Grøn & Wivel believe, the EC still has a strong supranationalist effect in terms of access distribution (cf. Grøn & Wivel, 2011: 523). It appears that the prominent supranationalist/intergovernmentalist debate in EU politics must be settled in favour of the EC being slightly more supranationalist in allocating seats on advisory committees.

Further research on this particular subject should – among other things – focus on disentangling the obfuscating effects of the heterogeneity of the cases on the dependent variables. Secondly, further research should delve deeper into the nature, origins and effects of the relatively low degree of access for new member states – lagging new member states and non-lagging new member states alike. The main question that remains from the results of this paper in this respect is whether this is a (semi-)permanent pattern or a pattern caused by a period of adaptation. If this is a structural issue for some new entrants, this might lead to negative consequences associated with low access in the theory section of this paper. Moreover, new enlargement is not out of the question – and in order to learn from the present problems regarding integration of new member states,

this phenomenon can be a valuable lesson. Thirdly, further research on the broader subject of the effect of differentiated integration on informal power of member states should include other arenas of EU governance to provide a better picture of a more high-politics area like AFSJ or Schengen. Fourthly and finally, further research into the unique nature of the EMU-related areas might yield huge insights into the workings of differentiated integration as a model or as a problem. It appears that of all areas of differentiation, EMU-related differentiation has by far the biggest impact on the EU's political arenas. This paper adds weight to that observation shared by many scholars, administrators and politicians alike.

In sum, this paper has shed light on the effects of differentiated integration for the informal power resources of individual member states – and differentially integrated member states as a whole. While for the older differentially integrated member states the picture has not become clear, this paper still yields valuable insights into the effects of differentiated integration. In terms of access, the biggest negative effect can be found for committees related to EMU differentiation. In other respects, this paper has yielded insights into the supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism debate; raised a potential concern on new member states' degrees of access; and, crucially, tested the limits and possibilities of large-*N* analysis with regard to the specific field of differentiated integration. Differentiated integration might not have the dramatic, tangible effects on member states' interests predicted by some, but some effects are quite clear – and potentially problematic if member states' compensatory strategies fail to keep the adverse effects of differentiated integration at bay. This paper has delivered a preliminary analysis on tangible consequences of differentiated integration, something that ought to have been studied before (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012; Adler-Nissen, 2008: 664; Kölliker, 2006: 3). While the jury is still out on the precise overall effects of differentiated integration, the stark contrasts in access to EMU-related areas pinpoints to the dangers of the EU moving towards a genuine two-speed Europe based on Eurozone integration (Piris, 2012: 6). Given the fact that especially the 'lagging' new member states are hit in terms of access, European integration must address this problem in order for the EU27 to steer clear of what Piris fearfully calls "two-class Europe" (2012: 6-7).

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Appendix

EC DG	**Related differentiations**	***N* of total seats per DG**
Agriculture and rural development DG (AGRI)		1285
Budget DG (BUDG)		7
Bureau of European policy advisers (BUR)		44
Development DG (DEVE)		469
Economic and financial affairs DG (ECOF)	EMU	542
Education and culture DG (EDUC)		1683
Employment, social affairs and equal opportunities DG (EMPL)	Social Charter / Charter of Fundamental Human Rights	1506
Energy and transport DG (ENTR)		1335
Enlargement DG (ENLA)		13
Enterprise and Industry DG (INDU)		3464
Environment DG (ENVI)		1579
EuropeAid (EAID)		49
European anti-fraud office (FRAU)		116
Eurostat (STAT)		84
Health and consumer protection DG (HEAL)	*Snus*	2103
Humanitarian aid DG (HUMA)		173
Human resources and security DG (HRES)		14
Information society and media DG (INFO)		1162
Internal market and services DG (MRKT)		953
Justice, freedom and security DG (AFSJ)	AFSJ, CDSP, Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, *Snus*, Schengen	444
Maritime affairs and fisheries DG (FISH)		88
Publications office (PUBL)		33
Regional policy DG (REGP)		95
Research DG (RESE)		2425
Secretariat General (SeGe)		75
Taxation and Customs Union DG (TAXC)	Schengen	147
Translation DG (TRLA)		60

Appendix 1: All European Commission DGs (and their abbreviations as used here) and differentiations in integration related to their field of work, also listing the total number of seats per DG

Main IVs – Variable name	Explanation	Coding
lag	Denotes all lagging states as explained in Table 4	{0 = no lag/old states, 1 = lag category I, 2 = lag category II}
diff	Denotes all differentiated states as explained in Table 4	{0 = no diff/new states, 1 = diff category I, 2 = diff category II, 3 = diff category III, 4 = diff category IV}
Main covariates and intervening variables		
CVW	Council voting weights (%)	
pop_millions	Population size in millions	
old_new	Old/new states dichotomy	{0 = EU15, 1 = new member state}
large_yesno	Dichotomy for large states (>60 million population)	{0 = yes, 1 = no}[9]
Main dependent variables		
totalfit	$TotalFit_x$	
Gov_vs_nongov	Relative proportion of governmental seats ($Gov't_x$)	
gov_fit	Overall access score of governmental seats per member state – relative measure, calculated like $TotalFit_x$	
nongov_fit	Overall access score of non-governmental seats per member state – relative measure, calculated like $TotalFit_x$	
DG-specific variables		
euro_opt	Full opt-out of Eurozone membership	{0 = no/new member state, 1 = À la carte differentiation on Eurozone membership}
euro_lag	Lagging non-membership of the Eurozone	{0 = no/old member state, 1 = new member state lagging on EMU}
euro_yesno	All member states that are not in the Eurozone.	{0 = no, 1 = all member states that are not a part of the Eurozone}
euro_conscious	Conscious differentiation of Eurozone membership.	{0 = no/new member state, 1 = conscious differentiation}
euro_multispeed	Multispeed differentiation of Eurozone membership (see Table 4).	{0 = no, 1 = multispeed differentiation}
Schengen_conscious	Dichotomy denoting whether a state is differentiated on Schengen	{0 = no, 1 = consciously not in Schengen}
Schengen_yesno	Dichotomy denoting whether a state is differentiated on Schengen	{0 = no, 1 = not a part of Schengen}
afsj_yesno	Dichotomy denoting whether a state is differentiated on DG AFSJ	{0 = no, 1 = not a part of AFSJ}
afsj_full	Dichotomy denoting whether a state has a full opt-out on AFSJ matters (Table 4).	{0 = no + UK + Ireland, 1 = Denmark & Sweden}
totaldiff_ecof	$TotalFit_x$ score for DG ECOFIN	
totaldiff_taxc	$TotalFit_x$ score for DG TAXC	
totaldiff_afsj	$TotalFit_x$ score for DG AFSJ	
seats_ECOF	Relative share of Government access for member states on DG ECOFIN	
seats_TAXC	Relative share *N* of Government access for member states on DG TAXC	
seats_AFSJ	Relative share *N* of Government access for member states on DG AFSJ	

Appendix 2: Explanation of all variable names used in tables and appendices

[9] This particular variable might seem like it is coded the wrong way around, given the fact that it is coded the other way when compared to other 'state size' variables. However, this is not the case, because it is coded in the same direction as other 'yes/no' variables in order to avoid confusion on that part.



Appendix 3a: Linearity of the relation between access and member state size (CVW, pop)

		old_new	CVW
old_new	Pearson Correlation [10]		-.380
	Significance (2-tailed)		.050*
	N	27	27

		CVW	Lag
CVW	Spearman's rho[11]	1.000	-0.25
	Significance (2-tailed)		.902
	N	27	27

Appendix 3b: Correlation between independent variables and covariates ($p < .05$)*

Variable	**1** [176.344**]	**2** [186.758**]	**3** [151,012**]
lag	.528** (.629)	.039 (.629)	-.392* (.629)
diff	-.252 (1.006)	-.063 (1.006)	-.116 (1.006)
old_new	.747** (.506)	.237 (.506)	-.284 (.506)
CVW	-.789** (2.6265)	-.931** (2.6265)	-.577** (2.6265)
pop_millions	-.775** (23.519)	-.950** (23.519)	-.571** (23.519)
large_yesno	.699** (.362)	.813** (.362)	.399* (.362)
	Dependent: gov_vs_nongov	**Dependent: govfit**	**Dependent: nongovfit**
Dependent Variable: totalfit. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Model *N*: 27. Univariate standard errors in parentheses. Model Bartlett's χ^2 in brackets behind model numbers.			

Appendix 3c: H1 (Y2): government proportions

[10] CVW is an interval/ratio level variable. Since old_new is a dichotomy, it can be treated as an interval/ratio level variable as a result. Therefore, Pearson Correlation is an appropriate correlation coefficient.

[11] Lag is an ordinal variable and therefore it is necessary to use Spearman's rho as the correlation coefficient.

Variable	**1** [121.894**]	**Variable**	**2** [85.187**]
Schengen_conscious	-.034 (.2593)	afsj_yesno	-.137 (.362)
Schengen_yesno	-.034 (.19)	afsj_full	-.110 (.267)
CVW	-.372* (2.6265)	CVW	-.233 (2.6265)
pop_millions	-.235 (23.519)	pop_millions	-.118 (23.519)
old_new	.172 (.506)	old_new	.081 (.506)
Dependent Variable: **totaldiff_taxc**		Dependent Variable: **totaldiff_afsj**	
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Model *N*: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses. Model Bartlett's χ^2 in brackets behind model numbers.			

Appendix 3d: Testing H2 (Y1) for DGs TAXC and AFSJ

Variable	**1** [145.740**]	**Variable**	**2** [99.180**]
euro_opt	.285 (.267)	euro_conscious	.401* (.6405)
euro_lag	.427* (.447)	euro_multispeed	.522** (.465)
euro_yesno	.648** (.492)	CVW	-.223 (2.6265)
CVW	-.223 (2.6265)	pop_millions	-.228 (23.519)
pop_millions	-.228 (23.519)	old_new	.465** (.506)
old_new	.465** (.506)		
Dependent Variable: **seats_ecof**		Dependent Variable: **seats_ecof**	
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Model *N*: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses. Model Bartlett's χ^2 in brackets behind model numbers.			

Appendix 3e: Testing H2 (Y2) for DG ECOFIN

Variable	**1** [116.347**]	**Variable**	**2** [83.085**]
Schengen_conscious	-.163 (.2593)	afsj_yesno	-.114 (.362)
Schengen_yesno	-.194 (.19)	afsj_full	.086 (.267)
CVW	-.210 (2.6265)	CVW	.036 (2.6265)
pop_millions	-.242 (23.519)	pop_millions	-.011 (23.519)
old_new	.165 (.506)	old_new	.193 (.506)
Dependent Variable: **seats_taxc**		Dependent Variable: **seats_afsj**	
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Model *N*: 27. Univariate standard deviations in parentheses. Model Bartlett's χ^2 in brackets behind model numbers.			

Appendix 3f: Testing H2 (Y2) for DGs TAXC and AFSJ

STATE	Seats AGRI	Seats DEVE	Seats ECOF	Seats EDUC	Seats EMPL	Seats ENTR	Seats INDU	Seats ENVI	Seats HEAL
AUT	1	1	0,9	0,6	0,67	0,69	0,83	0,78	0,57
BEL	1	0,76	0,79	0,65	0,63	0,59	0,8	0,88	0,54
BUL	1	1	0,92	0,7	0,72	0,84	0,89	0,7	0,7
CYP	1	1	0,86	0,65	0,71	0,85	0,9	0,76	0,63
CZE	1	1	0,89	0,68	0,67	0,84	0,87	0,73	0,73
DEN	1	1	0,91	0,67	0,69	0,78	0,82	0,71	0,55
EST	1	1	0,95	0,67	0,67	0,86	0,84	0,76	0,63
FIN	1	1	0,82	0,65	0,73	0,74	0,82	0,71	0,7
FRA	0,37	0,94	0,79	0,69	0,65	0,59	0,84	0,73	0,64
GER	1	1	0,8	0,58	0,63	0,67	0,85	0,77	0,6
GRE	1	0,82	0,79	0,73	0,7	0,79	0,87	0,64	0,69
HUN	1	1	0,83	0,64	0,68	0,79	0,86	0,67	0,6
IRE	1	1	0,83	0,61	0,72	0,8	0,87	0,67	0,62
ITA	1	1	0,88	0,66	0,52	0,64	0,87	0,77	0,6
LAT	1	1	0,94	0,62	0,72	0,86	0,88	0,74	0,63
LIT	1	1	0,91	0,69	0,64	0,84	0,93	0,77	0,68
LUX	1	1	0,87	0,65	0,73	0,77	0,89	0,72	0,71
MAL	1	1	0,88	0,75	0,65	0,95	0,91	0,84	0,65
NET	1	1	0,84	0,51	0,63	0,7	0,85	0,83	0,65
POL	1	1	0,91	0,59	0,68	0,81	0,9	0,79	0,65
POR	1	0,91	0,8	0,68	0,63	0,79	0,88	0,71	0,57
ROM	1	1	0,94	0,7	0,74	0,81	0,9	0,76	0,68
SVK	1	1	0,88	0,68	0,68	0,83	0,88	0,78	0,6
SVN	0,91	1	0,84	0,62	0,83	0,73	0,85	0,74	0,7
SPA	1	1	0,81	0,67	0,54	0,66	0,83	0,64	0,62
SWE	1	1	0,94	0,65	0,77	0,77	0,8	0,78	0,63
UK	1	1	0,93	0,57	0,64	0,61	0,82	0,81	0,73

Appendix 4: Government proportions per DG (differentiation-related DGs are highlighted, as are the differentiators and their scores)

STATE	Seats INFO	Seats MRKT	Seats AFSJ	Seats FISH	Seats REGP	Seats RESE	seats TAXC
AUT	0,88	0,48	0,86		0,33	0,44	0,33
BEL	0,67	0,53	0,9	0	0,2	0,56	0,4
BUL	0,91	0,6	1		0,33	0,74	0,5
CYP	0,92	0,65	1		0,33	0,55	0,5
CZE	0,79	0,56	0,83		0,33	0,52	0,5
DEN	0,71	0,56	1	0	0,33	0,57	0,67
EST	0,86	0,62	1	1	0,33	0,65	0,5
FIN	0,84	0,43	1	0	0,33	0,49	0,33
FRA	0,63	0,33	0,77	0,13	0,33	0,48	0,43
GER	0,74	0,38	0,94	0,33	0,33	0,35	0,29
GRE	0,85	0,57	0,75	0	0,33	0,51	0,67
HUN	0,82	0,52	1		0,33	0,44	0,5
IRE	0,71	0,59	0,8	0	0,5	0,53	0,5
ITA	0,55	0,38	0,98	0	0,33	0,36	0,67
LAT	0,87	0,77	0,43	1	0,5	0,69	0,5
LIT	0,87	0,68	1	1	0,25	0,61	0,5
LUX	0,91	0,57	0,75		0,33	0,56	0,5
MAL	0,9	0,6	1		0,33	0,74	0,67
NET	0,8	0,32	0,88	0	0,33	0,44	0,75
POL	0,76	0,46	1		0,33	0,49	0,5
POR	0,79	0,56	1	0,75	0,33	0,51	0,5
ROM	0,83	0,65	1		0,33	0,58	0,33
SVK	0,87	0,67	1		0,33	0,59	0,67
SVN	0,86	0,6	1		0,33	0,51	0,67
SPA	0,82	0,37	1	0,6	0,33	0,4	0,5
SWE	0,73	0,42	0,9	0,33	0,33	0,47	0,33
UK	0,69	0,18	0,8	0,21	0,33	0,32	0,44

Appendix 4 (continued): Government proportions per DG (differentiation-related DGs are highlighted, as are the differentiated states and their scores)