

**China's continuing cultural governance policy:
*Comparing Xi Jinping's and Hu Jintao's plans regarding China's
culture***

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Ever since the Communist party of China rose to power in 1949, some form of cultural control has been present within the Chinese art world. While over time the amount of control has shifted greatly, with its peak during the Cultural Revolution, this governance has always been present in some form. Already in 1942 the leaders of the Communist party declared literature and arts to be in service of the socialist society and saw the potential power artistic expression could wield.¹

More recently both Hu Jintao, who was the General Secretary of the Communist party between 2002 and 2012 and Xi Jinping who took over this position in 2012, have pushed for Chinese culture to become more important in portraying China to the rest of the world and thus also have set the agenda for its cultural governance.² Hu stated in 2012 that “Cultural construction is an important component part for constructing the general composition of socialist undertakings with Chinese characteristics, cultural flourishing and development is an important goal for completely constructing a relatively well-off society.” He urged China to recognize the importance of promoting cultural reform.³ One year later he went even further in highlighting the importance of culture within his policy and called to “enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests.”

Even though when Xi took over from Hu in 2012 the details of China’s policy on cultural governance might have changed, Xi continued to see culture as a vital part of Chinese society. He for instance stated that “culture is a country and nation’s soul. Our country will thrive only if our culture thrives, and our nation will be strong only if our culture is strong.”⁴ Both under Xi and Hu, the importance of Chinese culture is something that has been emphasized within their cultural governance policies.

Recent research however, notices that a change within China’s cultural governance policies has occurred.⁵ Brown for instance noticed that Xi Jinping seems to be much more active in delivering his ideological view within his cultural governance

¹ Mao (1942)

² Xi (2014, 2017), Hu (2007, 2011, 2012)

³ Hu (2011)

⁴ Xi (2017)

⁵ Brown (2018), Cai (2017), Wang (2018)

policy than his predecessor Hu Jintao.⁶ While there are multiple researchers that corroborate this view of a changing policy, research on continuity within recent cultural governance policy is not yet done. To fully understand the cultural governance situation in China, it is however important to also investigate these continuities.

To close this knowledge gap, I have researched continuities between Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping's policy. Xi promotes his ideological views more energetically and actively than Hu, making him perhaps being looked at more in terms of a threat to the world. Viewing this ideological change under Xi as a threat occurs however perhaps too soon, since not much research on the continuities between the policies of both leaders has been done. By conducting a discourse analysis to analyze these continuities, this research will give more knowledge on this possible threat and will show that Xi's policy is not that different from Hu's after all.

I focused my research on the policies of Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao, because their policies are most relevant to today's situation. Because there has not been much research done on continuation in recent cultural governance policies, and because of a change in policy when Xi Jinping rose to power, it is most logical to start comparing the two most recent leaders and for now leave former leaders out of my analysis.

In order to do this, I briefly discuss the existing literature on cultural governance in chapter two, after which I will move on to a discussion of China's contemporary situation regarding cultural governance policies. Emphasis is placed on recent changes between Hu and Xi's cultural governance policies and the chapter will include a discussion on research about China's soft power strategies. This literature review is crucial in placing the analysis I present in later chapters in context and provides the necessary background to understand its relevance.

In Chapter three I discuss the methodology behind the discourse analysis of the seven documents I selected and explain how I selected and analyzed the documents.

In Chapter four I analyze these documents to find continuities within Xi Jinping's and Hu Jintao's cultural policies focusing on the way they both address dealing with foreign cultures. Soft power has become something through which China increasingly attempts to legitimize its rule abroad to gain more influence.⁷ It is important to take note

⁶ Brown (2018)

⁷ Perry (2013), 2

of existing continuities within the cultural governance policies of Xi and Hu that focuses on dealing with the ‘outside’ world on a cultural level.

Chapter five contains an analysis of the same set of documents regarding the ideological plans of both leaders within their cultural governance policies. As is mentioned before, Xi Jinping has become more active in the way he promotes ideology as part of China’s cultural governance policies, which scholars such as Brown characterize as a “break” in policy.⁸ This however, does not mean that the ideological message itself also drastically changes, which is why in chapter five I investigate what exactly from this message stays the same when focusing on cultural governance policies of both leaders.

In chapter six I conclude with my findings from chapter four and five, which are then placed in a broader context. I will briefly note the limitations of this research and suggest approaches for future research on this topic.

⁸ Brown (2018), 124

Chapter 2: Literary review

2.1 Culture as a way to legitimize power

Over the years, China's cultural governance policies have changed a lot. Even though these changes are important to take a look at, there is one constant factor that is specific to China's situation and needs to be looked at first: the influence of China's Communist Party, from now on referred to as the CCP, on its cultural sector. Gramsci, Williams as well as Bourdieu's research contributed to the understanding of this type of influence and looking into their work thus helps in understanding China's situation. It is also important to be able to put some later research on China's cultural sectors that has used their work as a guideline, like for instance that of Hockx, in perspective.⁹

Especially when looking at China's cultural governance policies, their work is crucial to start with, since this type of influence will be directly reflected within these policy documents. Because within this thesis, I will be researching China's cultural policy documents as well, I will have to rely on Gramsci's, Williams and Bourdieu's findings and take it as a beginning point from which I can draw my own conclusions.

Firstly, Gramsci's notion of cultural hegemony plays a big part in understanding this type of control. According to him a ruling party can exercise their power and maintain their rule through ideological or cultural means.¹⁰ For him, however, power not only derived from political society, which ruled through force, but also from a civil society, which ruled through consent.¹¹ This consent in his view is crucial to gain hegemony and is created through cultural life as well as social institution such as the media, universities and religious institutions. This way, those in power can strongly influence the people's values, norms, ideas, expectations, worldviews and even control the behavior of the rest of society.

But only using culture to force your view upon other groups is not enough to get this consent, as Gramsci states. He argues that the dominant group therefore has to negotiate with subordinate classes and provide some type of accommodation for their clashing values in order to gain hegemony and create consent.¹² Raymond Williams

⁹ Hockx (1999)

¹⁰ Gramsci (1971)

¹¹ Gramsci (1971)

¹² Gramsci (1971)

agrees, and adds that to get this consent more easily, dominant cultures could use education, philosophy, religion, advertising and art to make their dominance appear normal and natural and secure their hegemony.¹³

This strategy of trying to justify the legitimacy of your rule and getting people to 'consent' to this rule, as Gramsci would argue, is something that, since the Chinese Communist revolution and the Chinese Communist party rising to power in 1949, has been present to varying degrees within the Chinese cultural sector. Already in 1942 for instance, in his famous speech on literature and arts, Mao declared that its function should be to serve politics and the advancement of the socialism in particular.¹⁴ This can be directly linked to Gramsci's ideas on cultural hegemony that are explained above, as Mao planned China's cultural sector to legitimize the CCP's rule by furthering its ideology and views.

Bourdieu also touches upon this political side within the art world. Firstly, he explains that art is influenced by the background and for instance political and social influence of its creator and other 'agents' that are relevant to the artwork, which influence the work in their own way.¹⁵ Secondly, instead of looking at this political influence within culture from the perspective of the dominant ruling party, like Gramsci, he makes a valid remark about what this means for the people who actually create art. He mentions that an artists' success partly depends on their economic, cultural, symbolic capital,¹⁶ and their political capital.¹⁷ According to Bourdieu it is precisely this aspect, which sets China's cultural sector apart from other countries.¹⁸

2.2 Cultural governance in China

Studying cultural governance in China is crucial to understand how cultural sectors work in China. When looking at research focusing on different cultural sectors within China, this political layer is something various researchers confirm to be present within different sectors.¹⁹

13 Williams (1981)

14 Mao (1942)

15 Bourdieu (1984)

16 Bourdieu (1984)

17 Bourdieu (1998), 14-18

18 Bourdieu (1998), 14-18

19 Cai (2017), Hockx (1999), Perry (2103)

Cai for instance looked at recent political messaging within the entertainment industry, like TV series. She writes that China's cultural governance has to take into account the promoting of the efficacy and legitimacy of the CCP rule.²⁰ This is something Perry also mentions while researching China's overall cultural policies.²¹

Looking at China's literary field, Hockx in turn confirms this political influence to be present.²² He directly uses Bourdieu's theory to explain what a successful Chinese writer has to keep in mind and states that political capital plays an important role in their success. Hockx states that the most successful writers are those who create a literary masterpiece without losing sight of its economic success and its political implications. Finding the perfect balance between the three and keeping the economic and political factors behind their work concealed, will result in the most success, according to him.²³

Following the need for the Chinese government to legitimize their rule within Chinese arts, and the existing of a political type of capital that Bourdieu proposes, some researchers have focused on the censorship China is placing upon its cultural sector.²⁴

Cai mentions that the CCP's strategy within the entertainment industry is to copy various popular and influential cultural events, entertainment programs and products that are already familiar by the public and use aesthetic imagery they are already used to.²⁵ She finds censorship to be highly commercialized and depoliticized over the last few years, this as a way to hold on to positive propaganda.²⁶ This way of exercising control by using appropriation strategies ties into the importance Gramsci and Williams appoint to presenting the message the dominant power wants to force upon the rest as something natural and familiar. This way the consent Gramsci talks about is easier reached, as is something Cai seems to imply the CCP is using as a strategy here as well.

Looking at the cultural policies in general in China, Zhang verifies that in recent years it can be characterized by indeed commercialization and privatization with at its core the development of their own cultural industry.²⁷ This shift towards a more

20 Cai (2017), Conclusion

21 Perry (2013), Conclusion

22 Hockx (1999), 12

23 Hockx (1999), 12

24 Cai (2017), Fung (2014)

25 Cai (2017), Conclusion

26 Cai (2017), Conclusion

27 Zhang (2015), 597

commercialized type of control on the art worlds has its roots in 1978. This is the moment when Deng Xiaoping opened up the Chinese market to the world and as a result the Chinese policies on all levels significantly changed. From that moment onwards, the government started to focus on the development of the economic side of cultural production more and more, resulting in the ideological control on the art worlds to become more open as well.²⁸

2.3 Changing dynamics

Multiple researchers have taken notice of this shift and have described it in terms of a challenge or struggle for the ones in power between upholding and pushing for the right ideological attitude within cultural production on the one side, while on the other the development of its cultural sector economically.²⁹ They have however described this struggle in different ways, which is important to take a look at when trying to understand recent cultural policies.

Liu for instance explains this struggle between ideological and economic factors within China's cultural sector to be coming from globalization.³⁰ To him, cultural globalization in particular has, with the improvements of transport and transport infrastructure, advances in communications and information technologies, and particularly with the rise of the internet in the 1990's, developed remarkably. As a result the world has seen a "greater intensity and extensity of cultural flows."³¹ Opening-up in 1978 has led China to get in touch with and respond to this type of globalization.

Liu describes globalization not only as a framework in which china's policy changes can be understood, but also as a new set of values or ideologies by which the world, including now China, is judged.³² Because China opened up, it rejected the idea of total self-reliance, and accepted the trajectory of other development theories. This means that China automatically also accepted to be judged by this new set of values and ideologies. What Deng failed to do in the 1980's, when China's opening up strategies unfolded, was "reconstruct a new cultural and ideological counter hegemony,"³³ as Liu states.

28 Zhang (2015), 596

29 Liu (2004), Tong and Hung (2012), Brown (2018),

30 Liu (2004), 4-5

31 Hopper (2007), 29

32 Liu (2004), 2

33 Liu (2004), 13

Brown also notices this mismatch between the openness of the economy and the cultural moral message the party wants to send to its people.³⁴ After 1978, according to him, the party's sole function was now to be an enabling body, helping Chinese people grow rich and prosperous, and less about teaching them the 'right' way through cultural means.

Tong and Hung also agree with this and in turn note that now "it is no longer possible to insist on the total authority of cultural policy emanating from the state ideology."³⁵ They too notice that ideology doesn't totally dominate cultural policy anymore. Instead of creating both ideological and economic plans for its cultural development, the CCP chose to fully explore the possibilities of reform for which a momentary lapse of censorship, as they write, apparently was accepted.³⁶

They do however add that politics is not completely out of the picture either. This is something Zhang agrees with as well.³⁷ She too writes that even though China opened up its markets, the government is still very wary about the influence of the West on Chinese culture and arts and this political control on the arts in the form of for instance surveillance is to a degree still in place. Still, now that China has opened up, it has however separated culture from politics, according to Zhang. To her this means that "culture policy is separated from politics as an independent policy arena, but cultural production and creative freedom are not free from politics."³⁸

Because this shift has taken place within China's cultural governance policy, Tong and Hung write that China now faces a new set of problems. As they see it, the Chinese party now needs to "reconcile a centralized social structure with the marketised diversity of cultural labor."³⁹

2.4 How to deal with foreign cultures?

In the midst of this set of problems China is facing internally, they increasingly also have to deal with the 'outside' world and foreign cultures. Over the years more and more is said about how China plans to deal with these other cultures and soft power and

34 Brown (2018), 122

35 Tong and Hung (2012), 265

36 Tong and Hung (2012), 276

37 Zhang (2015), 596

38 Zhang (2105), 601

39 Tong and Hung (2012), 276

international influence are something that become important to the cultural governance policy of China.

The first researcher to coin the term 'soft power' is Joseph Nye. He describes it as a type of power that is gained through attraction instead of coercion.⁴⁰ According to himself a countries soft power is derived from "its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority)."⁴¹ But he describes soft power to be more than just influence or persuasion, and to him for all three factors seduction and attraction play a big role.

This seduction is for instance present in many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities that for this reason then also play a big role in gaining soft power, as he argues.⁴² According to him, the attraction present within these terms often leads to acquiescence, which is of the utmost importance in gaining soft power.⁴³

2.5 Soft power in China

Since Hu Jintao mentioned the term at a National Congress in 2007, which was the first time this term was mentioned at these gatherings, many academics started looking into China's soft power and the way China's government wants to brand their culture.⁴⁴

By looking at current cultural governance policies in China, Keane and Zhao for instance mention a steady rise of significance of soft power.⁴⁵ Before the CCP rule had to be justified through cultural governance and propaganda only within China itself, but according to them, this now seems to expand into the international society.⁴⁶ Perry agrees with them and writes that "the Party-state makes a case for its "right to rule" in terms that resonate both at home and abroad."⁴⁷

By looking at China's soft power in particular, Joshua Kurlantzicks describes it to be "a potent weapon in Beijing's foreign policy arsenal."⁴⁸ It is of such great importance

40 Nye (2004)

41 Nye (2011), 84

42 Nye (2004)

43 Nye, (2004)

44 Shambaugh (2015), Keane (2010), Kurlantzick (2007), Huang and Ding (2006), Nye (2005)

45 Lim and Lee (2014), H9

46 Lim and Lee (2014), H9

47 Perry (2013), 2

48 Kurlantzick (2007), 5

to China since their understanding of the term includes anything outside of the military and security realm, from popular culture to economic aspects like aid and investment, as he describes.⁴⁹

However, multiple researchers question the effectiveness of China's charm offensive and see potential problems.⁵⁰ Nye himself for instance states that even though China has a traditionally attractive culture, which can be used to gain soft power, China's strategy does not work well in the West. He states that China's soft power in the West is undercut by its corruption, inequality and a lack of democracy, human rights and the rule of law within its politics.⁵¹ Shambaugh agrees and adds that only by loosening 'draconian restraints' and reducing efforts to control opinion abroad, China will be able to use its unrealized soft power.⁵²

In their case studies on Confucius institutes and cultural festivals, Ying and Luk as well as Maags corroborate the views on the effectiveness of China's soft power strategy of the above-mentioned researchers.⁵³ Ying and Yuk for instance conclude that these Confucius institutes in some cases are viewed as propaganda tools or even an educational threat by the countries they reside in.⁵⁴ By analyzing cultural festivals, which promote Chinese culture, Maags agrees and states that these negative political images of China will likely hamper the impact of Chinese cultural diplomacy in Europe.⁵⁵

Zhao and Soon state that this international interest in Chinese culture appeared for an important part as a result of China's economic boom.⁵⁶ Because China was rising economically on a very fast pace, and gained international power quickly because of it, the world became skeptical and started viewing their development as something to fear, as they stated.⁵⁷ But this research was published in 2007 and since then a lot has changed.

More recently, Kang has conducted a domestic analysis focusing on the political narratives of the different leaders Communist China had over the years, in which he includes recent leader Xi Jinping. He specifically researches soft power in relation to

49 Kurlantzick (2007), 6

50 Nye (2005), Shambaugh (2015), Ying and Luk (2016), Maags (2014)

51 Nye (2005)

52 Shambaugh (2015), 107

53 Ying and Luk (2016), Maags (2014)

54 Ying and Luk (2016), 641

55 Maags (2014), 51-52

56 Zhao and Soon (2007)

57 Zhao and Soon (2007)

three policy lines: 'peaceful co-existence,' 'harmonious world,' and the 'China dream' in order to compare Mao, Hu and Xi's soft power strategies.⁵⁸ One of the major differences between Hu and Xi regarding soft power is that Xi, as Kang notices, is much more active in his effort to gain soft power.⁵⁹ Hu, according to him had a more passive and reactive approach.⁶⁰

This indirectly fits into the conclusions other research has drawn about Xi's more ideologically driven cultural policy, and would indirectly emphasize this break between Hu and Xi. Kang however does add that even though there are many differences to be found in China's diplomatic approach over the years, there are continuities as well, such as the domestic emphasis both leaders place on their foreign diplomacy strategies.⁶¹

His conclusions are however drawn from the analysis on these three political campaigns I mentioned above, which include sometimes more than just China's cultural development. For this reason it is important to see if Kang's conclusion, as well as others that are mentioned above, also apply when only comparing Hu and Xi's cultural governance policies, which I will do in chapter four.

2.6 A new era

With the rise of Xi Jinping as new leader of China in 2012, some research notices a shift within the China's cultural governance policies.⁶² Brown, Ning Wang and Cai for instance argue that China, under Xi Jinping's influence has entered a new era.⁶³

The emphasis within this more recent research seems to be on a much stronger ideological message Xi embeds within his cultural policy. According to the researchers mentioned above, this had been pushed to the background before that time.

Some research indirectly implies a break from earlier leaders by noticing Xi to become ideologically much stricter, like for instance Cai does when researching the entertainment industries. She writes: "the Xi Jinping government seems to uphold a more energetic and stringent system of monitoring and disciplining its ideology."⁶⁴ Even though this is the case, she does note that Xi does this in a depoliticized and

58 Kang (2017)

59 Kang (2017), 120-122

60 Kang (2017), 122

61 Kang (2017), 125

62 Brown (2018), Cai (2017), Wang (2018)

63 Brown (2018), Cai (2017), Wang (2018)

64 Cai (2017), conclusion

commercialized way in order to hold on to positive propaganda. Like we have seen before already, this is one of the ways in which this message evokes the most amount of 'consent' from the public. But, however this message is put into the world, the important thing is that this ideological layer within the cultural sectors has become more prominent than before, according to her. This could be considered as signaling a break between Xi's policy and that of his recent predecessors.

Ning Wang, who looked specifically at Marxist literary theory and its remnants within recent cultural policies, directly corroborates the existence of this break, by saying that we are now in the so called "Xi Jinping era."⁶⁵ He emphasizes this break by comparing Xi's ideological standpoint about the arts to that of Mao's and writes that Mao's legacy in literature and art can be found within his speeches and policies. He says: "Obviously, Xi and his comrades have inherited Mao's legacy in literature and art, which finds particular embodiment in the recent holding of the 19th National Congress of the CCP which has ushered a new era, the Xi Jinping Era in which Mao Zedong Thought is still attached importance to and has been developed to a new stage."⁶⁶ He concludes this by for instance looking at two landmark speeches given by both leaders on culture: Mao's 1942 speech in Yan'an and Xi's 2014 speech held at the forum on literature and arts.⁶⁷ These speeches resemble quite a few similarities, something other researchers and the international media have also noted.⁶⁸

Other research, like that of Su who focuses on China's policy strategies on cultural industries up until the point of Hu Jintao's leadership, corroborates this break between Xi and former leaders indirectly and confirms what Wang has said about Xi taking Mao's legacy to a next level. She points out that during Hu's time in office, he stepped away to a certain degree from Mao's orthodox cultural policy, which creates a mode of cultural governance that is increasingly open and flexible, as she writes.⁶⁹ Even though she doesn't directly mention a break between Xi and Hu since she does not compare the two leaders directly, her findings in comparison with that of for instance Ning Wang, does imply that a shift has happened between Hu and Xi's cultural policies.

65 Wang (2018), 7

66 Wang (2018), 7

67 Wang (2018), 7-8

68 Luo (2016), Jaivin (2015), Chinafile (2014), South China Morning Post (2014), BBC (2014), The New York Times (2014)

69 Su (2014), Conclusion

Brown on the other hand, talks about this break in policy very directly. He not only states that this break is present, but even talks about it in terms of China going through an ideological renaissance under Xi Jinping.⁷⁰ Xi, he argues, has a great ambition to stand by the ideological position of the CCP, which in turn supports Cai's remark about Xi being much stricter now within the cultural sectors.⁷¹

He adds that in order to achieve the national rejuvenation of the people, something that has been one of the most important goals of the CCP from the beginning of its foundation, Xi is now using semi-capitalist means while putting this in a perfect socialist framework.⁷² This is something that was not present within policies preceding Xi's time in power, according to both Brown, and Zhao. The latter writes: "Xi's ideological campaign sets him apart from his two predecessors, who tolerated limited expression of liberal ideas and downplayed the official ideology."⁷³

2.7 Continuities

As shown above, within recent research there seems to be a strong emphasis on a break between policies under leaders since 1978 and Xi Jinping's policy. Not much attention however, has been given to what remains the same between Xi's cultural policy and that of his immediate predecessor Hu Jintao. Clearly, Xi's ideological approach is different from that of Hu, but that does not mean that his whole cultural policy changes as well. This however, is not given much room within recent research on Chinese cultural policy.

Since China has become more and more important on the international stage, the world has also become more and more involved in its culture and thus also China's governance policies regarding its cultural sector. If this focus on Xi's break within research continues, it might create a picture in which the international society becomes even suspicious of China's cultural governance policies and the intention behind it, because the only thing they are pointed out is this strong socialist ideological emphasis.

Only focusing on an ideological break between Xi and his predecessors and for instance the various comparisons between Xi and Mao, would result in a one-sided picture of China's cultural governance situation. It would therefore be important to research what has remained the same to avoid oversimplifications of China's cultural

70 Brown (2018), 124

71 Brown (2018), 124

72 Brown (2018), 130

73 Zhao (2016), 1175-1176

policies. For this reason I have researched the continuities between Xi Jinping's and Hu Jintao's cultural governance policy. In doing so I hope to fill a knowledge gap and therefore also provide some nuance on contemporary cultural policy studies about China.

Chapter 3: Methodology, limitations and scope

To get an answer to the question what continuities there are between Xi Jinping's and Hu Jintao's cultural governance policies, I carried out a qualitative discourse analysis of relevant speeches given by the two leaders on the topic of cultural governance and government documents on this topic from the time they were in power. Within the sections about cultural governance within the documents I identified the most commonly used terms for the topics: Dealing with the 'outside' world and their cultures, and ideology. For these five terms in total, I selected all the times these terms were mentioned within the documents and compared those written by Hu with those written by Xi.

I then analyzed what kind of verbs both leaders used when mentioning these terms, to find out what trajectory both leaders' plans have. I also separated the quotes of these terms into different categories. This way I separated what both leaders have said about for instance the strategy or reasoning behind these terms, making it easier to compare statements from both leaders to each other. Through this analysis I was able to make more detailed conclusions about the continuities in Xi and Hu's cultural governance policy discourse and give insight in their intended plans. I will however only be able to draw conclusions on the discourse and not on the execution of these plans.

I specifically decided to start researching the discourse of the policy, and leave the execution of plans out of my analysis, because there has not been any research done solely on these continuities of both leaders' cultural governance policies. It is important to start at the beginning, and build a solid foundation for future research into other areas of continuities in cultural governance policies. In this case this meant starting with researching the discourse of these policy documents. This foundation will only make future research into for instance the actual situation of the governance of the art worlds, much more valuable.

Among the documents I have selected, I will analyze three political reports from the 17th, 18th and 19th National Congresses, which took place in 2007, 2011 and 2017. These are moments in which the highest body of the Chinese Communist party presented its plans, including those for its cultural governance, for the upcoming five years. I will also analyze two Central Committee documents from 2011 and 2015. They

are the only two documents on this level of government that are solely focused on decisions regarding cultural development. For this reason they are an important source for studying China's cultural governance policies.

All together, these five documents give a good impression on where Hu wanted and now Xi would like to take China's cultural governance, but also reflect on achievements and remaining struggles. Furthermore, I focus on two important documents that are not directly made by or produced at a government body. I analyze Xi's speech at the forum of literature and arts held in Beijing in 2014, and Hu's article published in Qiushi magazine in 2011. Both documents are solely on the importance of culture and discuss which direction their plans regarding China's cultural governance policy go. Thereby they both received quite a lot of attention within China and on the international stage.

These seven documents are by no means the only instances both leaders address details about their cultural governance policy. There are definitely more speeches or documents in which both Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao address their views on culture from the time they rose to power. In this research however, since it is a first outline of continuities within both leaders' policy, I will not take note of those documents and speeches. Focusing for a majority on the plans from the highest body of government, gives me the best general sense of what the priorities of these two leaders regarding culture are. I believe it is important to first locate the continuities on this highest level and analyze the most important and influential documents.

3.1 Analysis

To uncover similarities between Xi and Hu's plans on dealing with the outside world and the internal ideological message, I have selected five terms in total on these two subtopics within the Chinese cultural governance policy. I collected all instances in which these terms were mentioned and compared the quotes from Hu's documents to those of mentioned in Xi's documents.

I selected these terms specifically, because they were the ones that were most mentioned and thus most important to the strategies and goals behind the two topics within these seven documents. In narrowing the scope of the research this way, I am able to be more specific and more detailed in my analysis.

In chapter four, on dealing with the outside world, I analyzed and compared how the terms ‘soft power’ (软实力), ‘international influence’ (国际影响力), and ‘exchange’ (交流), are referred to in these seven documents. Since the terms ‘exchange’ and ‘international influence’ within these documents can relate to more than just cultural governance, I made a selection of which quotes I would include in my analysis. I only selected the quotes regarding cultural governance and left other times these terms were mentioned in context with for instance the economy out of my analysis.

In the Central Committee documents for instance and the two speeches given by Hu and Xi, this is not an issue, because these documents only cover the topic of cultural governance and therefore automatically only refer to these terms in the context of cultural governance. For the three National Congress reports, which cover the entire policy plan of the People’s Republic of China including culture, these terms are mentioned in context with other topics as well. Within these sources, I only selected quotes in context of China’s cultural governance policies.

For all the three terms, I selected all the verbs that were mentioned within all the quotes to find out if both leaders shared the same direction within their plans. From all these quotes I also identified which reasons and strategies the two leaders mentioned when they mention strengthening soft power and their overall international influence and compared them to each other to find out where the plans of the two leaders’ overlap and where they differ.

In chapter five I selected the terms: ‘core socialist values’ (社会主义核心价值观) and ‘morality’ (道德). These terms are closely related to the ideological layer arts should keep in mind within the documents I have selected for this research and are again the ones that are most mentioned and therefore more important and influential to this topic. For these two terms I again excluded quotes on anything that was said that did not directly had something to do with culture in the National Congress documents. The term ‘core socialist values’ was only mentioned in relation to China’s cultural governance policy, but for the term ‘morality’ this again meant to exclude quotes that involved economic and other policy.

I again investigated what types of verbs both leaders used in relation to both these terms to find out what direction Hu was and Xi were taking with their policy. In addition I also further researched what strategies both leaders adopted with regards to these two terms, to reach their intended goal of raising ‘morality’ or promoting ‘core

socialist values' for instance. In doing so, I analyzed where the policies of the two leaders overlapped and where it did not.

In general, I mostly focus on similarities between the policies of the two leaders. This however, does not mean that there are no differences to be found at all within the references on these terms, or within the two topics I discuss. Nor does it mean that previous research is faulty for stating differences between the policies of the two leaders. Within my analysis I very briefly note where the policies of the leaders differ on the topics that I am discussing. My overall focus however, will remain on the similarities, since they are not given much attention in previous research yet.

3.2 Definition culture

I found that in the analyzed documents both Xi and Hu use a broad and a narrow definition of culture. Within one paragraph of the same document, they sometimes refer to culture as being 'the arts world within China', but also a broader system of ideas, sets of beliefs and social behavior particular to their country.

Since both leaders are ambiguously using the term culture depending on the topic they talk about, I will also discuss culture both in narrow and broad terms within my analysis. They themselves do not make a difference within their own cultural governance policy, and since I am researching and comparing these policies from both leaders, I do not want to eliminate either the narrow or broad definition of culture.

Chapter 4: Dealing with the culture of the ‘outside’ world

As discussed in chapter two, there seems to be a focus on a break between Xi Jinping’s cultural governance policy and that of Hu Jintao. Even though the strategies of the two leaders can differ, there are continuities on the importance of dealing with ‘other’ cultures within these policies.

Firstly, I will analyze the way both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping mention the terms: ‘soft power’, ‘international influence’ and ‘exchange’ with regards to culture. Secondly, I will further identify the similarities of the reasons both leaders have in strengthening this type of power. And lastly I will compare the strategies in acquiring soft power both leaders uphold.

4.1 Mentioning soft power

The terms ‘soft power’ and ‘international influence’ are quite clearly terms that are related to dealing with the international cultural sector, but ‘exchange’ might not be as obviously linked to it. Within the discourse of cultural governance policy both leaders mention exchanges with foreign cultures as a way to gain cultural influence for instance.⁷⁴ For this reason it is important to also take a look at this term and include it in the comparison of the policy of the two leaders.

The first thing that immediately signals a continuation when analyzing the quotes is the usage of the same type of verbs. This is most visible when identifying all the verbs used in connection to the three terms, which I collected in tables two, three and four and can be found in the appendix. The verbs that are used the most are: ‘to strengthen’ (加强) and ‘to improve’ (提高). From the 37 quotes in which these three terms are mentioned in total, these two verbs were used together with the term ‘soft power,’ already 19 times. This signals that roughly half of all the statements that include these three terms have a similar trajectory, which means that the policies of both leaders might have a similar goal as well.

Apart from these two most mentioned verbs, the majority of the others are of a similar nature as well. A few examples of the verbs that are also mentioned and are similar to the two mentioned above are: ‘to promote’ (促进), ‘to strengthen’ (加强) and ‘to

⁷⁴ Hu (2007), VII, Central Committee (2015), I

develop' (□□). When putting these type of verbs all in one category there are actually 29 out of 37 quotes that express the need to improve, develop and strengthen soft power within both leaders' cultural development plans.

When splitting up the documents to compare the two leaders however, these findings are less definitive. Looking at Xi's documents for instance, these three terms are mentioned only 11 times, whereas in Hu's documents they are mentioned 28 times. The argument could be made that 'soft power' has become less important throughout the years based only on the number of times these terms are written, but that is too simply stated. When investigating the quotes and taking into account the context in which they appear in the complete documents, Xi also has a lot to say about China dealing with other cultures.

First of all as is shown in table five in the appendix, in percentage terms, dealing with other cultures becomes increasingly more important within Xi's policy. When focusing for instance on the three National Congress reports, the percentage of the amount of words of all the quotes on these three terms and the indirect quotes on the topic only gets higher every year and the times 'soft power' is mentioned directly also gets more every time. In 2007 for instance it is mentioned only once, in 2012 it is said twice, and in 2017 Xi directly mentions the term 'soft power' three times within his part on cultural development.

In addition, in 2007 the percentage of all the quotes on these three terms including all the quotes on dealing with other cultures not mentioning these terms directly is 13,7%. For the 18th National Congress report this number is 20,2% and in the 19th National Congress report these quotes contain 21,6% of the total amount of words within the section on cultural policy. And this is not only the case for the National Congress reports. Within the Central Committee documents this number goes from 2,9% in Hu's time in office, to 3,0% during Xi's time in office. These numbers prove that for Xi dealing with other cultures is also a priority and perhaps even more important than it was for Hu. At least it is mentioned and explained more often than before.

Secondly, Xi does not directly mention these three terms as much as Hu does within his documents, but otherwise says more about these terms than Hu does most of the time. Where Hu in a majority of the documents just states that 'soft power' should be strengthened in order for China to reach its goals for instance, Xi talks about it and the

international cultural sector in a lot more details. He only does not mention the actual term 'soft power' as much as Hu did.

This is confirmed when looking at table five in the appendix. The percentages of other quotes on dealing with other cultures in Xi's documents are much higher than that same percentage within Hu's documents. On the other hands, the table also confirms, that the three terms are much more often mentioned directly in Hu's documents, than in Xi's documents. In other words, Xi explains more about what he means with a certain statement about how to deal with foreign cultures, than Hu did before him.

When analyzing the content of the quotes this is also the case. For instance, in his 2014 speech on the forum of literature and arts in Beijing, Xi states that the world is giving more and more attention to China now and that they want to get to know Chinese culture on a more serious level. It is according to him, however, very limited to rely on foreigners to come to China and Chinese culture for themselves, and he states that literature and art are the best way to communicate these Chinese stories abroad.⁷⁵ As is apparent here, he actually explains why 'soft power' is an important power to acquire without using the term itself. Hu on the other hand often only stated that 'soft power needs to be improved.'

In addition, in Xi's 2017 political report on the 17th National Congress he talks about improving china's international communications strategies by learning from other cultures so as to be able to tell China's stories well and present a panoramic view of China.⁷⁶ Hu never really elaborated in both his reports on this matter. He namely talked about being more visible in the international cultural stage, but no further explanation was mentioned. Xi clearly has a more specific vision on 'soft power' and wants to create more influence as far as 'soft power' goes, as well as create a more nuanced picture of China internationally. These are only two examples of many more instances when Xi is giving a more detailed explanation or strategy on how he wants China to deal with other cultures.

In short, it seems that overall, soft power gets more and more important. Hu does say the term itself as well as connected terms much more often than Xi does, but when actually looking at the context in which 'soft power' is discussed, it becomes something that is described in more detail and becomes a much better defined term over the years.

75 Xi (2014), □□□□

76 Xi (2017), VII

Xi simply uses other terminology to describe his plans regarding 'soft power' and describes what he means, rather than just give a statement about it needing to be strengthened.

Even though the number of times these terms are mentioned are not evenly divided between both leaders when only looking at the numbers and not the percentages, when mentioning 'soft power' and related terms directly, 29 out of 37 times both of them use verbs that signal the same type of message. From this point of view both of the leaders seem to uphold a similar standpoint and both would want to develop, strengthen and improve China's 'soft power.'

4.2 The reasons and strategies behind enhancing China's soft power

Just like above, I have selected the pieces of text in which Xi and Hu mention the reasons behind enhancing China's 'soft power' and the strategies they both uphold in order to achieve these goals. From the selected pieces of text within these documents, I have found that over the years there have been a few different reasons behind enhancing China's 'soft power,' but that again a continuation of their policy can be found within these reasons and strategies. Turn to table six, seven and eight in the appendix for an overview of all the reasons and goals behind China's soft power policy.

In total, the two leaders mention four different reasons for developing China's 'soft power.' They say it is a way in which the outside world can better understand them, a way to develop a strong Chinese culture, a way to achieve the rejuvenation of the whole nation and a way to build a moderately prosperous society.

The first reason, that the outside world is able to better understand China, has only become a topic in Xi's policy and has been mentioned only two times in total. Enhancing 'soft power' in order to develop a strong Chinese culture, however, has been a consistent factor throughout the cultural governance policy of both Xi and Hu and has been mentioned four times by Hu and two times by Xi within these documents.

The two most mentioned reasons for enhancing 'soft power' however are: achieving the rejuvenation of the whole nation, which is mentioned eight times, and building a moderately prosperous society, which is mentioned six times in total. These two reasons are China's ultimate and overarching goals that new policy plans are aiming towards, as it is for instance mentioned in all National Congress reports these two

leaders have given.⁷⁷ They are something Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao have been working towards for a longer time already as becomes clear from their National Congress reports. These reasons are something that have been mentioned by both leaders and is also something that is almost always mentioned as a goal for any strategy and plan within the Chinese cultural governance policies. They are therefore one of the continuities to be found within the cultural governance policies of both leaders.

These reasons also align with Kang's argument about the continuities in the China's 'soft power' policy over the years.⁷⁸ He noticed that even though Xi seems to be more active in his 'soft power' policy than Hu, they both share similar reasons for enhancing it, which are rooted in China's domestic situation. From analyzing these reasons behind enhancing 'soft power,' it becomes clear that Kang's conclusion is correct. The three most mentioned reasons within these documents are focused on China's internal development: building a prosperous society, rejuvenating the country and developing a strong Chinese culture.

Xi has now more recently involved the international community by stating that he wants to enhance china's 'soft power' so as to make the 'outside' better understand China and its views. But since this is only included in two out the twenty-five statements on the reasons behind enhancing 'soft power' between the two leaders, we can conclude that a continuation of policy is much more present in comparing the two leaders. Only the future can show us if this new strategy focusing on the international world rather than China itself, is something that will be continued and emphasized more by Xi and if the internal factors and goals will move to the background of his policy.

While the reasons of the two leaders behind enhancing 'soft power' are quite big and related to the overall goal of building a moderately prosperous society and rejuvenation of the nation, the strategies behind these policy lines are often more diverse. Hu for instance namely wants to focus his attention on 'international exchange' to draw from other excellent foreign cultures, as he specifically mentions in three of the four documents I analyzed from his time in power. Xi however, puts the focus more on 'being able to tell china's stories well' and teaching the world about China when talking about these international exchanges.⁷⁹

77 Hu (2007), Hu (2012), Xi (2017)

78 Kang (2017), 122

79 Xi (2017), VII, Xi (2014), 中国

This does not however automatically mean that there are no continuities to be found. Hu's strategy of drawing from other countries is for instance still present within Xi's policy documents, such as his political report on the 19th National Congress. Xi even repeats the same concerns on the influence of outside forces that Hu also mentioned before in his 2011 speech. Xi said: "we will strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges with other countries, giving prominence to Chinese culture while also drawing on other cultures."⁸⁰ He adds here that Chinese culture should come on the first place. Similarly, in 2011, Hu warned the country for too much international influence on Chinese culture.⁸¹

On other occasions Xi emphasizes the fact that China's stories should be told well to the outside world.⁸² Even though he emphasizes the fact that China should tell their stories to the outside world much more than Hu, a continuation of policy is still present. In 2011 the Central Committee decided that in showing the international world more about itself, China should present an image of their countries civilization, democracy, openness and progress.⁸³ Hu here wants the world to be shown the values China stand for, much like Xi plans on doing when he emphasizes that China's stories should be told and told well.

In a way there are still a few continuities to be found when focusing on the strategies of enhancing 'soft power' of both leaders. Even though there are differences to be found, it seems more like Xi is incorporating his own views into the already existing policy instead of making a solid break in his policy.

80 Xi (2017), VII

81 Hu (2011), I

82 Xi (2014), 中国道路, Xi (2017), VII

83 Central Committee (2011), VII

Chapter 5: Ideology

5.1 'Core socialist values'

Similar to continuities in policy on dealing with other cultures, do Xi Jinping's and Hu Jintao's cultural governance policies contain continuities on the ideological message they want the arts to convey as well. From analyzing all the documents it becomes clear that the term 'core socialist values' is something important to both leaders' cultural governance policies. The term itself is directly mentioned within the documents a total of 52 times, with Hu mentioning it 27 and Xi 25 times, as can be found in table nine in the appendix. The fact that this term was mentioned as often as it was, and the fact that both leaders more or less name the term the same amount of times, signals a continuation in itself. Since four of the seven documents are from the time Hu Jintao was in power, one could even argue that this term's importance increased once Xi took over in 2012.

This however, reveals little about the details of both leaders plan regarding this term are. When analyzing all the quotes in more detail for instance, there are more ways in which the discourse around this term is continuing Hu's into Xi's cultural governance policy.

Hu Jintao's predecessor, Jiang Zemin did not mention the term 'core socialist values' as part of his plans regarding cultural governance during the National Congress reports.⁸⁴ Because this is a relatively new term within cultural governance policy, Hu is introducing and gradually building the structure for the values to be embedded within the party over the course of his time in office. He does this by stating that these values need to be constructed within party politics and have to be seen as a fundamental task within Chinese cultural governance policies."⁸⁵ He mentions that China needs to find effective ways of developing these values and that it needs to be incorporated into education for all party members and the general public.⁸⁶ It is clearly something that he deems important enough for him to want it to be imbedded into the party. To reach this goal he is planning to educate the party cadres so they can embody and serve as an example of upholding these ideals.

84 Jiang (2002)

85 Hu (2012), VI

86 Hu (2007), VII

When Xi took over in 2012, he did not refute the importance of promoting these values. On the contrary, he states that he wants to “concentrate on the issue of nurturing and practicing the core values of socialism.”⁸⁷ Xi however, does not mention education cadres as much as Hu did, but instead wants to bring the values to the people. He plans to do this by emphasizing the need for these values to be reflected by Chinese art and literature.

While the strategy around the promotion of these values thus slightly changed, it is evident that there are continuities in policy. From analyzing all the quotes mentioning this term it becomes clear for instance that Hu laid the foundation for these values to become more and more important within party politics, while Xi build further upon this foundation and emphasized the importance of these values within Chinese arts.

This is especially emphasized, when analyzing the usage of verbs in all 52 quotes in which the two leaders mention the term ‘core socialist values’. As can be found in table ten in the appendix, 17 out of 27 quotes that include the term core socialist values in Hu’s documents for instance use a verb that reflects the policy is being ‘constructed’ and that the values need to be build and strengthened. 14 out of 25 verbs Xi uses, on the other hand express Xi wants to ‘uphold’ or ‘build on’ Hu’s foundation of these values.

In other words, 63% of all the quotes in which Hu mentions ‘core socialist values’, use verbs that indicate he wants to construct these values as something important within the overall cultural governance policy. In 2007 he for instance states he wants to “build up the system of socialist core values and make socialist ideology more attractive and cohesive.”⁸⁸ Later in 2011 he again emphasizes wanting to build this system by stating he plans to persist in moving forward the construction of a socialist core value system.⁸⁹

56% of the times Xi mentions this term on the other hand, reflects him wanting to build upon this foundation Hu constructed. Already in 2012 he for instance mentioned that he wants China to “vigorously carry forward and practice the core values of socialism in the whole society, so that it is as ubiquitous as the air, and it is the common value pursuit of all the people.” In 2017 he again emphasized wanting to further promote these values and stated: “We must (...) nurture and practice core socialist values, while

87 Xi (2014), □□□□□

88 Hu (2007), VII

89 Central Committee (2011), I

making continued and greater efforts to maintain the initiative and ensure we have our say in the realm of ideology.”⁹⁰

The fact that in the majority of the quotes Xi uses these types of verbs that signal nurturing these values firstly introduced by Hu, thus in turn signal a continuation of Hu’s policy.

5.2 Terminology

There is however, the issue of terminology, with which I mean that Xi refers to core socialist values slightly differently than Hu did. Where Xi refers to “core socialist values” 社会主义核心价值观, Hu refers to “core socialist values system” 社会主义核心价值观体系. The subtle change here is in the end, when Xi changes 体系 (tixi), meaning ‘system’, to 观 (guan), meaning ‘concept’ or ‘outlook’. This change could be used as an argument to emphasize the more vast and active ideological twist Xi arguably has taken, since (guan) 观 is mostly used in the context of a person’s view or opinion and in context can mean ideology. The word for system (tixi) 体系, which is not related to opinions and views, is therefore a much more objective way of describing this policy line.

That does not mean however, that these core socialist values were not there before and that they did not matter until Xi became more active in carrying out the plans behind promoting them. On the contrary, Hu describes these core socialist values multiple times as ‘a fundamental and the basic task of Chinese society,’⁹¹ and Xi continues his line of policy to a certain degree by emphasizing that he wants to nurture and build on these already established values.

5.3 Mentioning ‘morality’

Within all the documents, the term ‘morality’ has been mentioned 71 times in a total of 62 quotes, making it something that is of great importance to this ideological layer within cultural governance policies. Turn to table nine in the appendix for all the quotes I selected on the topic of ideology.

Firstly, both Xi and Hu emphasize the need for promoting and improving ‘morality.’ They both see this task as something that is very important to China’s cultural development since 22 out of the 62 quotes in total directly express the same need for

⁹⁰ Xi (2017), III

⁹¹ Hu (2011), I, Central Committee (2011), II

improvement and development on this topic, which can be found in table eleven of the appendix. When comparing the number of quotes between the two leaders however, this seems to be different. Xi only directly mentions the need for improvement on this matter six times, whereas Hu mentions it sixteen times. At first glance this seems like Xi finds this topic to be of less importance than Hu ever did.

This is however not completely accurate, because while the documents all are comparable in occasion and formality, they are not all of the same length. When looking at the percentages of all the quotes on 'morality' both leaders use within these documents as shown in table thirteen, this apparent decrease in importance of this policy line, is not as apparent anymore. Where Hu in 2007 spends a total of 15% of his political report on the term, Xi also spent 12,4% on the topic in his first political report. When comparing the percentages of the Central Committee documents this difference is similar. In the 2011 document they use 5,7% of the text on this term, whereas under Xi's time in power the Central Committee document from 2015 also uses 4,1% of the total text on the term.

From these percentages, the term 'morality' becomes a policy line that gets a little less attention, but this difference is very small and therefore does not immediately prove that this policy line gets less important under Xi's rule. This slight decrease in percentage could also be explained by the fact that he maybe needs fewer words to describe his plans regarding this policy line.

For this reason it is important to compare the different types of documents in more detail. It is important to isolate for instance the three National Congress documents from the rest. Because they are the most formal and given at the highest body of government possible, they are very long and therefore also only mention the most important parts of the policy. Only if something is really important to the leaders the topic will be explained in more detail. These three documents are therefore important in understanding what the leaders want their overall policy lines to be. For this reason, excluding the other documents for a moment, and focusing on these three documents will be an important step to do in determining if Xi continued Hu's policy regarding the term 'morality,' or if this data is a reflection of their overall policy plans.

During the 17th National Congress report, Hu mentions the need for improving the term 'morality' six times, but does not offer much detail on how he plans to do this. In his second political report during the 18th National Congress in 2012, he mentions wanting

to improve China's morality a total of three times, and elaborates much more on how he plans to do this. Most importantly, during National Congress report in 2017, he does not omit this term from his plans at all. On the contrary, he repeats the need for improving the countries morality a total of four times and also adds details on how he wants to do this. While, looking only at the percentages, the amount of words Xi uses on this term might be less then the amount of words Hu used, this does not proof that the term 'morality' becomes less important.

Looking at the overall times this term is mentioned within these documents it seems like it has gotten a slightly less prominent spot within policy under Xi. This however is not the case when only taking into account the National Congress documents and is given quite some importance by Xi in the National Congress report of 2017 when a strategy regarding this policy plan is added within his speech. In addition the overall message of what both leaders want to achieve when talking about the term 'morality' has not changed. Hu emphasizes that he wants to "improve civic morality in an all-round way,"⁹² while Xi writes that he wants to "raise intellectual and moral standards."⁹³ For these reasons there is definitely a continuation of policy in some degree of the term 'morality' when comparing Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao's plans regarding cultural governance.

5.4 Strategies of raising 'morality'

When analyzing the documents and in particular the statements both leaders make about what they consider being moral behavior and what they plan to do to achieve the promoting of these morals within the cultural sector, there are again some more continuities to be found within their policy.

In general Hu seems to find education of the party and the general public regarding 'morality' very important, as he mentions it a total of eight times. Turn to table twelve for an overview of all the strategies mentioned on the term 'morality.' Xi however, only mentions this once directly within his documents. He lays the focus more on the art workers and their products. According to him, these need to embody and promote the moral standards that he is setting within these documents. This change in policy that

92 Hu (2012), VI

93 Xi (2017), XII

seems apparent when first looking at the data, is however slightly less obvious when looking at the quotes in more detail.

First of all, Xi does not totally exclude education from his policy. He instead incorporates it with his view on the importance of literature and art workers in the promotion of this matter. According to his plans, they should be taught these morals through professional ethics vocational education. This way Xi wants to “guide literary and art workers to consciously abide by the ‘Chinese literary workers’ professional ethics convention.”⁹⁴

Furthermore, the art these art workers then produce will automatically also be embedded with these values and morality, which in turn then can guide the general public to follow these values and morals. In a way this is another form of education that will show them what morals should be promoted and upheld and which should be rejected.

In addition, this emphasis on embedding arts with these morals is also not something Xi came up with first. In 2011, when Hu was still in power, this plan was already mentioned three times by the Central Committee. When Xi took over in 2012, he just put more emphasis on this particular part of the plan in raising the overall ‘morality’ of the Chinese society. That however does not mean it is not a continuation to some degree of former plans.

Secondly, both leaders emphasize the ‘good’ at one point within the documents. In 2012, during the 18th National Congress, Hu for instance mentioned China “should press ahead with the program for improving civic morality, exalt the true, the good, and the beautiful and reject the false, the evil, and the ugly.”⁹⁵ Xi emphasized more or less the same in his speech in 2014, and the Central Committee document from 2015. He emphasized art should “convey the truth, the good and the beautiful, the values of the upward and the good, and guide the people to enhance their moral judgment and moral honor.”⁹⁶ This again seems like Xi is continuing Hu’s policy.

The third continuation of policy can be found when looking at what both leaders consider to be ‘good,’ ‘beautiful’ and ‘true’. Every document I have analyzed in this research, except for Hu’s speech in 2011, mentions the moral standards both leaders view as something they want to promote. Hu for instance wants encourage practices

94 Central Committee (2015), V

95 Hu (2012), VI

96 Xi (2014), IV

such as to “promote social ethics, professional codes of conduct, family virtues and individual morality”⁹⁷ In 2017 Xi almost includes the exact same type of morality he want to promote as Hu did in 2011, and plans to: “raise public ethical standards, and enhance work ethics, family virtues, and personal integrity.”⁹⁸

They further elaborate on these moral standards within a total of eight quotes, from which they both wrote four. Xi further elaborates that these standards include “helping the poor, helping others, being brave, and filial piety.”⁹⁹ Hu in turn also writes he wants to “encourage practices such as upholding gender equality, respecting the elderly, caring for the young, showing concern for and helping each other and coming to the rescue of the others even at risk to oneself.”¹⁰⁰

In short, both leaders aim to educate its citizens on these morals. Xi and Hu choose to do this in their own way as Xi chooses to focus his attention on the arts who needs to convey this moral message, while Hu places more emphasis on education for the Communist party cadres. No matter how they want this message to be incorporated within the Chinese cultural sector, no one policy plan is exclusively used by one leader, nor has Xi directly refuted one of Hu’s plans in his speeches and other government documents I have analyzed.

97 Hu (2007), VII

98 Xi (2017), XII

99 Xi (2014), IV

100 Hu (2007), VII

Chapter 6: Conclusion

While recent research into cultural governance policies point towards a break in policy after Xi rose to power in 2012, there is still quite some continuity present when comparing his policy lines with those of Hu Jintao. Throughout this thesis I have argued that there are continuities of policy regarding the topics of dealing with other cultures and the promotion of an ideological message within the arts. In my analysis of the most important terms within these two topics I have found two different types of continuities: continuities on how both leaders address these terms, and continuities in strategies and reasoning behind these terms.

Continuation one, that focuses on how both leaders' address the important terms I have analyzed, can be found within both topics. In chapter four for instance, in which I analyzed the documents on the topic of dealing with 'other' cultures, both leaders want to enhance 'soft power.' They both use similar types of verbs in connection to this term to emphasize their plans in enhancing this type of power. Similarly this can be said for the terms 'exchange' and 'international influence' that are closely connected to both their cultural governance policy on this topic.

In chapter five, when researching the ideological message arts need to convey, both Xi and Hu also mention the most important terms within their policy on this topic in a similar way. When analyzing the term 'morality' for instance, both leaders take the need for promoting and raising 'morality' as their main objective.

The same continuation can be found when analyzing the term 'socialist core values.' In analyzing the different verbs both leaders use in connection with this term, I found that Hu focused his policy on building a solid foundation for this policy line. Xi then extended this foundation and used it to further the policy regarding these values. While they do not directly mention these terms in a similar way, they do work towards the common goal of enhancing and spreading these values.

Continuity two, that focuses on the similarities behind the strategies and reasoning of these terms, can also be found within both topics. In chapter four for instance, when focusing on the reasoning behind enhancing 'soft power', both leaders mention wanting to rejuvenating the nation and building a moderately prosperous society by enhancing China's 'soft power.' Both leaders also focus on building a strong

Chinese culture with this strategy. In chapter five when analyzing the term 'morality,' Xi and Hu both established that they want to promote the 'good,' 'beautiful' and 'true' and mention almost the exact same morals that they find important to promote, which again signals a continuation of policy.

There are however also differences to be found within both topics. In chapter four for instance, when focusing on the reasoning behind enhancing 'soft power,' Xi introduces a reasoning that focuses on the 'outside' world. He mentions that the outside world should learn about China's views, which is something Hu never emphasized. The fact that it is mentioned alongside other goals both leaders mention, such as 'rejuvenating the country' and 'building a prosperous society and culture,' shows however that a solid break in policy is not the case in this situation. Rather there seems to be a slight evolution in policy, in which Xi incorporates new plans while still taking Hu's points as a core and basis of his policy. The same can be said when comparing Xi's strategies in enhancing 'soft power' to those of Hu. Where Hu focused on drawing from other countries, Xi added that China should give prominence to its own culture while drawing from other countries and cultures.

Also within chapter five, on the ideological message within the arts, are differences in policy present. The two leaders talk for instance about different strategies and pinpoint different aspects when addressing their plans regarding the terms 'core socialist values' and 'morality'. Xi puts much more emphasis on the 'core socialist values' and his version of 'morality' to be promoted through the works produced by art workers than Hu. Both leaders however have worked towards the same goals for both these terms. They have for instance taken the construction and further development of the 'core socialist values' for instance itself as the primary goal, and also both want to promote and enhance 'morality,' which in both cases is the essence of the discourse and therefore an important factor of continuation of both leaders' policy.

These findings suggest that this sharp break in policy recent research has been emphasizing, is perhaps not as sharp as suggested at least with regards to these two topics. It is not incorrect research notices a break; Xi is way more active in getting his message and views across. This can for instance be seen in his heavy focus on arts needing to reflect the right type of morals in order for the general public to be guided by these. Other research has rightly focused on this change, since it is something that has been present in a lot of policy Xi has presented. This is something that Hu did not want

to achieve as actively as Xi now does. For this reason researchers have perhaps not yet focused on continuities in policy until this point. It was important to first understand what Xi does differently, because this was one of the things perhaps most visible. Since this change has been researched already, it is also very important to further analyze the continuities. This will further our knowledge on Xi's cultural governance policy and show that the growing fear and apprehension for this changing cultural policy is to a degree misplaced, as the discourse of this policy does not change as much as is now assumed.

In general, governance in China apparently does not change that quickly. While the tone of the plans might shift, which has been proven by researchers analyzing this ideological shift of Xi, the actual content and goals behind specific policy lines are much harder to completely turn around in a short amount of time. At least within researching these five terms of both leaders' cultural governance policy, these overall goals of the policy lines they are connected to, have not been completely altered.

There are however also limitations to what this research has proven. Firstly, I only focused on researching the discourse of both leaders' cultural governance policy. This was an important step to be made at this point in researching this topic. Analyzing this discourse allowed me to get a closer look at both leaders' plans and put together the groundwork onto which other research can build. This however means these findings do not draw conclusions about how these plans are executed. Future research is necessary to find out how these findings compare to the actual cultural governance.

Secondly, the findings of this research are mostly limited to policy made at the highest body of government, since most of the documents I analyzed come from this high level of government. While this strategy gave me the best general sense of what the priorities of these two leaders regarding culture are, which was an important first step in the research, this does not represent the entirety of their policies. Further research needs to corroborate these findings with the various other speeches and statements about culture given by these two leaders, like for instance speeches given when the leaders visit other countries, or speeches given at openings of important cultural institutions or cultural events. Analyzing these data, will further our knowledge on this topic and with it, the conclusions of this research can be put into context.

In addition, I have narrowed down the scope of this research to two topics within the cultural governance policy of Hu and Xi. Because I selected these two topics within

the cultural governance policies of both leaders and these five key-terms I have analyzed, my conclusion is also limited to these specific topics. In narrowing the scope of my research this way, I was able to be more specific and more detailed in my analysis, but further research will have to investigate if my findings also apply to other topics and terms within the cultural governance policies of Xi and Hu.

Even though much work still has to be done to give a complete overview on all the ways Hu's cultural governance policy is continued by Xi, this thesis has shown that, already within this small scope, there are a lot of continuities to be found. It is therefore of the utmost importance to our overall view on this ideological change within policy to further this line of research and see what else remains the same within this part of the discourse on Chinese cultural governance policy. Just because Xi more actively promotes his ideological views, does not mean that Hu did not also promote these values or that his views were any different in the first place. In fact, analyzing these documents on continuations in policy between the two has shown that these leaders' ideas have more in common than is presumed and showed that China's cultural rise has a different, perhaps even less threatening side to it as well that should not to be ignored.

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Appendix

Table 1: Quotes on dealing with other cultures

Leader	Hu	Hu	Hu	Hu		Xi	Xi	Xi
Terms	17 th National Congress report 2007	Central Committee 2011	Article Qiushi magazine 2011	18 th National Congress report 2012		Speech 2014	Central Committee 2015	19 th National Congress report 2017

<p>Soft power</p>	<p>101</p>	<p>(...) 102</p> <p>103</p> <p>104</p>	<p>105</p> <p>106</p> <p>107</p> <p>108</p>	<p>110</p> <p>111</p>	<p>--</p>	<p>18 112</p>	<p>113</p> <p>114</p> <p>115</p>
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- 101 Hu (2007), VII
 - 102 Central Committee (2011), I
 - 103 Central Committee (2011), I
 - 104 Central Committee (2011), II
 - 105 Hu (2011), I
 - 106 Hu (2011), I
 - 107 Hu (2011), I
 - 108 Hu (2011), I
 - 110 Hu (2012), III
 - 111 Hu (2012), VI
 - 112 Central Committee (2015), IV
 - 113 Xi (2017), VII
 - 114 Xi (2017), I
 - 115 Xi (2017), IV

<p>Exchange</p>	<p>127</p>	<p>128</p> <p>(...)</p> <p>129</p> <p>130</p> <p>131</p>	<p>132</p> <p>133</p>		<p>134</p> <p>135</p>	<p>136</p> <p>137</p>	<p>138</p>
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127 Hu (2007), VII
128 Central Committee (2011), I
129 Central Committee (2011), I
130 Central Committee (2011), VII
131 Central Committee (2011), VII
132 Hu (2011), I
133 Hu (2011), II
134 Xi (2014),
135 Xi (2014),
136 Central Committee (2015), I
137 Central Committee (2015), IV
138 Xi (2017), VII

<p>Other quotes on soft power and the international involvement of Chinese culture</p>	<p>□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹³⁹ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁴⁰</p>	<p>□□□□□□□□□□ □¹⁴¹ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁴² □□□□□□□□□□ □□¹⁴³ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁴⁴ □□, ¹⁴⁴</p>	<p>□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁴⁵</p>	<p>□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁴⁶</p>	<p>□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁴⁷ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁴⁸ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁴⁹ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁵⁰ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□</p>	<p>□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁵⁸ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□ (…)¹⁵⁹ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁶⁰</p>	<p>□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□¹⁶¹</p>
	<hr/> <p>139 Hu (2007), VII 140 Hu (2007), VII 141 Central Committee (2011), I 142 Central Committee (2011), I 143 Central Committee (2011), VII 144 Central Committee (2011), VII 145 Hu (2011), I 146 Hu (2012), VI 147 Xi (2014), I 148 Xi (2014), II 149 Xi (2014), II 150 Xi (2014), II 151 Xi (2014), □□□□□ 152 Xi (2014), □□□□□ 153 Xi (2014), □□□□□ 154 Xi (2014), □□□□□ 155 Xi (2014), □□□□□</p>						

Table 2: Verbs used when mentioning ‘soft power’

Soft power	Leader	Mentions	软	力	文	化
17 th National Congress report 2007	Hu	1		1		
Central Committee 2011	Hu	3	3			
Article Qiushi magazine 2011	Hu	5	2	2		1
18 th National Congress report 2012	Hu	2	1	1		
Speech 2014	Xi	-				
Central Committee 2015	Xi	1			1	
19 th National Congress report 2017	Xi	3	1	1	1	
Total		15	7	5	2	1

Table 3: Verbs used when mentioning ‘international influence’

International influence	Leader	Mentions	国	际	影	响	文	化	交	流	... 文 ... 化
17 th National Congress report 2007	Hu	1	1								
Central Committee 2011	Hu	3	3								
Article Qiushi magazine 2011	Hu	2		1						1	
18 th National Congress report 2012	Hu	2	1		1						
Speech 2014	Xi	1					1				
Central Committee 2015	Xi										
19 th National Congress report 2017	Xi	2		1				1			
Total		11	5	2	1		1	1		1	

Table 4: Verbs used when mentioning ‘exchanges’

156 Xi (2014), 文

157 Xi (2014), 文

158 Central Committee (2015), III

159 Central Committee (2015), IV

160 Central Committee (2015), IV

161 Xi (2017), VII

Exchanges	Leader	Mentions	17 th National Congress report 2007	Central Committee 2011	Article Qiushi magazine 2011	18 th National Congress report 2012	Speech 2014	Central Committee 2015	19 th National Congress report 2017	Total
	Hu	1	1							
	Hu	3		1	1			1		
	Hu	3						1	1	1
	Hu	-								
	Xi	1				1				
	Xi	2					1	1		
	Xi	1	1							
			2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
										1

Table 5: Percentages on quotes on dealing with other cultures versus the total amount of words of the documents

Sources	Leader	Total amount of words	Total amount of words of the quotes on 'Soft power,' 'International influence,' 'Exchange'	Other quotes on dealing with foreign cultures	Total % of all the quotes
17 th National Congress report 2007	Hu	1.675	118 (7%)	113 (6,7%)	13,7 %
Central Committee 2011	Hu	15.895	411 (2,5%)	78 (0,4%)	2,9%
Article Qiushi magazine 2011	Hu	5.496	537 (9,7%)	54 (0,9%)	10,6%
18 th National Congress report 2012	Hu	1.671	315 (18,8%)	24 (1,4%)	20,2%
Speech 2014	Xi	12.617	172 (1,4%)	936 (7,4%)	8,8%
Central Committee 2015	Xi	7.464	112 (1,5%)	113 (1,5%)	3%
19 th National Congress report 2017	Xi	1.674	284 (16,9%)	79 (4,7%)	21,6%

Table 6: Soft power goal and strategy quotes

Leader	Hu	Hu	Hu	Hu	Xi	Xi	Xi
Soft	17 th	Central	Article Qiushi	18 th National	Speech	Central	19 th National

power	National Congress report 2007	Committee 2011	magazine 2011	Congress report 2012		2014	Committee 2015	Congress report 2017
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- 206 Central Committee (2011), IV
- 207 Central Committee (2011), VIII
- 208 Central Committee (2011), IX
- 209 Hu (2011), I
- 210 Hu (2011), III
- 211 Hu (2011), II
- 212 Hu (2011), III
- 213 Hu (2011), III
- 214 Hu (2011), III
- 215
- 216 Hu (2012), III
- 217 Hu (2012), VI
- 218 Hu (2012), VI
- 219 Xi (2014), □□□□
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- 226 Xi (2014), □□□□
- 227 Xi (2014), □□□□
- 230 Central Committee (2015), I
- 231 Central Committee (2015), II
- 232 Central Committee (2015), II
- 233 Central Committee (2015), V
- 234 Central Committee (2015), VI
- 235 Xi (2017), I
- 236 Xi (2017), III
- 237 Xi (2017), III
- 238 Xi (2017), VII
- 239 Xi (2017), VII
- 240 Xi (2017), VII

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228 Xi (2014), □□□□

229 Xi (2014), □□□□

Table 10: Verbs used when mentioning ‘core socialist values’

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- 261 Central Committee (2011), III
 - 262 Central Committee (2011), III
 - 263 Central Committee (2011), III
 - 264 Central Committee (2011), III
 - 265 Central Committee (2011), III
 - 266 Central Committee (2011), IV
 - 267 Central Committee (2011), VIII
 - 268 Central Committee (2011), VIII
 - 269 Central Committee (2011), VIII
 - 270 Hu (2011), I
 - 271 Hu (2012), I
 - 272 Hu (2011), II
 - 273 Hu (2011), III
 - 274 Hu (2012), I
 - 275 Hu (2012), VI
 - 276 Hu (2012), VI
 - 277 Hu (2012), VI
 - 278 Hu (2012), VI
 - 279 Hu (2012), VI
 - 280 Hu (2012), VI
 - 281 Hu (2012), VI
 - 282 Hu (2012), XII
 - 283 Hu (2012), XII
 - 284 Xi (2014), I
 - 285 Xi (2014), II
 - 286 Xi (2014), II
 - 287 Xi (2014), IV
 - 288 Xi (2014), IV
 - 289 Xi (2014), □□□□
 - 290 Xi (2014), IV
 - 291 Xi (2014), IV
 - 292 Xi (2014), IV
 - 293 Central Committee (2015), III
 - 294 Central Committee (2015), III
 - 295 Central Committee (2015), IV
 - 296 Central Committee (2015), V
 - 297 Central Committee (2015), V
 - 298 Central Committee (2015), V

Leader	Hu	Hu	Hu	Hu		Xi	Xi	Xi
Verbs	17th National Congress report 2007	Central Committee 2011	Article Qiushi magazine 2011	18th National Congress report 2012		Speech 2014	Central Committee 2015	19th National Congress report 2017
□□- □□	2	2	2	1				1
□□		1		1				
□□			1	1				
□□...□...		1	2					
□□	1	1	1					1
□□								1
□□		1				4		2
□□						3	1	2
□□						5	2	1
□□						1		
□□	1							
□	1	1	1	1		1	1	1
□...□						1		
□...□						1		
□...□□							2	
□ .. □□	1	1		1				
□□...□□							1	
□□								1
□□□□				1				
total	6	8	7	6		11	6	8

Table 11: Categories of what is said regarding ‘morality’

Leader	Hu	Hu	Hu	Hu		Xi	Xi	Xi
	17th National Congress report 2007	Central Committee 2011	Article Qiushi magazine 2011	18th National Congress report 2012		Speech 2014	Central Committee 2015	19th National Congress report 2017
Already achieved	1	2						
We should Improve	4	6	2	3		1	1	4

- 299 Xi (2017), XII
- 300 Xi (2017), XII
- 301 Xi (2017), XII
- 302 Xi (2017), XII
- 303 Xi (2017), XII

morality							
Strategy on how to improve morality	1	11	1	6	7	5	1
Other		1			1		
Total	6	22	4	10	9	6	5

Table 12: Strategies of raising ‘morality’

Leader	Hu	Hu	Hu	Hu	Xi	Xi	Xi
Strategies	17th National Congress report 2007	Central Committee 2011	Article Qiushi magazine 2011	18th National Congress report 2012	Speech 2014	Central Committee 2015	19th National Congress report 2017
The good and the beautiful				1	1	1	
Traditional values	2	1		1	2	1	1
Education	1	4	1	2		1	
Propaganda		2					
Moral practice activities		1		1			
Fully Incorporate in party				1			
Civic morality campaign							1
Incorporate it in literature and arts		3			3	3	

Table 13: Percentages of quotes on the term ‘morality’ versus the total amount of words in the document

Sources	Leader	Total amount of words	Amount of words of all the quotes expressing the plan to promote ‘morality’	Percentage	Amount of words on all quotes on ‘morality’	Percentage
17 th National Congress report 2007	Hu	1.675	125	7,5%	252	15%
Central Committee	Hu	15.895	173	1,1%	902	5,7%

2011						
Article Qiushi magazine 2011	Hu	5.496	117	2,1%	262	4,8%
18 th National Congress report 2012	Hu	1.671	76	4,5%	361	21,7%
Speech 2014	Xi	12.617	77	0,6%	516	4,1%
Central Committee 2015	Xi	7.464	8	0,1%	304	4,1%
19 th National Congress report 2012	Xi	1.674	153	9,1%	207	12,4%