Unveiling the Arab Spring: How Did Uprisings Affect Regime Stability in Algeria and Egypt?

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Introduction

The legal framework of democracies grants citizens the right to assemble and protest against state policies. Here democracy refers to "a political system, which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials."[1] Citizens of this political system have a higher chance to influence state policies compared to citizens of authoritarian states and illiberal or semi-democracies.[2] Authoritarian states, in contrast to democracies, do not have the obligation to regularly renew its political leadership. Muller & Seligson argue that governments of authoritarian states often violently suppress oppositional forces and that makes the costs of citizens to participate in anti-governmental protests high.[3] Moreover, citizens living in authoritarian states have a low perception for the chance of launching a successful protest. Muller & Seligson argue that due to the high costs of action and the low perceived chance of success, uprisings are unlikely to emerge in authoritarian states.[4]

In recent years, we have seen uprisings in democracies and authoritarian states. Examples include the Occupy Movement in various parts of the United States of America (USA) and Europe; the demonstrations held in Gezi Park in Istanbul, Turkey; and protests in Greece against economic policies of the European Union (EU). Further, large-scale revolts took place in several states: pro-Russian forces clashed with pro-European actors in Crimea and other places in Ukraine; a year after the death of Hugo Chavez, students and government forces clashed with each other in Venezuela; and in May 2014, the Thai population protested against its corrupted political leader resulting in a coup d'état by the Thai army. Given the destabilizing effect on both the domestic and international realm and the unpredictability of these events, it is increasingly important to investigate when and how uprisings affect regime stability.

Central in this thesis will be the political consequences of the Arab Spring for the political regimes of Egypt and Algeria in the period of 2010-2012. The Arab Spring refers to uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) varying in intensity from 2010 onwards. The Arab Spring led to regime change in several cases (i.e., Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen), but most regimes in the region endured (i.e., Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

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[1] Lipset 1959, p.71
[2] For a classification of political systems, see: Croissant & Merkel 2004.
[3] Muller & Seligson, 1987
[4] Muller & Seligson 1987

Emirates). Among academics, there is no consensus on the exact date of the start of the Arab Spring. Some scholars argue that the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian market vendor, marks the beginning of the Arab Spring, while others argue that the Arab Spring commenced when the Tunisian uprisings spilled over into Egypt and other states in the MENA. The consequences of the Arab Spring are still unfolding, while writing this thesis. What we do know, according to Hale, is that The Arab Spring occurred "rapidly" and "in apparent chain reaction," and that the events are of great importance to "how people live" in the region.[5]

This thesis investigates how uprisings in Egypt and Algeria in the period of 2010-2012 affected the stability of the respective regimes. The research question is: "Why did uprisings lead to regime change in Egypt, but not in Algeria?" For the purpose of this thesis, I will use the protests within Tunisia in late 2010 and early 2011 as a reaction to the self-immolation by Mohamed Bouazizi as the starting point of the Arab Spring. One explanation for the transnational spread of uprisings and its effects on regime survival can be found in the theory of modular diffusion. Amongst others, this concept was used to study the "colored revolutions" (i.e., a sequence of mass demonstrations that took place in Eastern Europe in the 2000s) and in that context it has been extensively debated by academics. Less scholarly attention has been given, however, to the interconnectedness of the recent uprisings in the MENA. Other explanations for the emergence of uprisings are focus only on the structural factors within a state. I contribute to this academic debate by examining the merits of these existing explanations on new cases. I aim to find new insights in the interaction between structural factors and mechanisms of modular diffusion. Moreover, this thesis could increase our understanding of how Egypt and Algeria experienced the Arab Spring. The findings of this research could to some extent apply to other authoritarian regimes.

The nature of uprisings in Algeria and Egypt had major consequences for their incumbent ruling powers: Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt was ousted, but Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the president of Algeria managed to hold on to power. The Arab Spring caught the attention of the international community. Policymakers and academics alike were concerned about the consequences of regime-change in the MENA. Israel for example feared that the removal of president Mubarak would lead to the emergence of anti-Israel sentiments within Egypt.[6]

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[5] Hale 2013, p.333
[6] Dalacoura 2012, p.77

So far, academics have neglected failed uprisings, resulting in lack of variation on the outcome. I account for this fact by investigating both a successful uprising and a failed uprising. Some academics argue that only differences between cases in terms of structural factors account for the nature and the effects of an uprising. I believe that such an explanation fails to capture the whole story. An explanation based on structural factors that incorporates mechanisms of modular diffusion could lead to a higher explanatory value.[7] Therefore, I argue that the events of the Arab Spring can be understood the best by examining the interplay between mechanisms of modular diffusion and structural factors. Thus, I argue that using a theory that combines structural factors and diffusion mechanisms could lead to a higher explanatory value in the cases of the Arab Spring.

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[7] One example of such an explanation can be found in Mark R. Beissinger's "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions" (2007).

Literature review

Here I will provide an analysis of contemporary studies on uprisings within authoritarian states and their relevance for regime stability. In the second part of the literature review, I will present and analyze existing literature that seeks to explain regime stability of Arab regimes in the wake of uprisings. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the usability of various explanations for the emergence of uprisings and their effect on regime stability. This analysis enables me to construct a theoretical framework that can be used to research the Arab uprisings.

Defining uprisings

Merriam-Webster defines an uprising as: "a usually violent effort by many people to change the government or leader of a country."[8] Oxford Dictionaries offers a shorter and slightly different definition: "An act of resistance or rebellion; a revolt."[9] I argue that both definitions underscore the violent character of an uprising, because rebellion and revolt imply armed resistance. In this work I will use the following definition (by Brownlee et al.) for the concept of uprising: "a major type of contentious collective action marked by 1) the eruption of nonviolent mass protest over multiple days, 2) the spread of that protest across multiple geographical locations, and 3) the control by protesters of public places…"[10]

Brownlee et al. argue that uprisings are nonviolent by nature.[11] They differ from normal demonstrations "in their size, national resonance, and persistence" and they cannot be equated with armed insurgencies, according to Brownlee et al. In this thesis I will treat uprisings as non-violent acts of resistance by citizens against their respective governments. At times, however, (non-violent) uprisings and armed insurgencies coincided during the Arab Spring.

How do uprisings emerge and how do they affect regime stability?

Here I will analyze current debates and controversies with regard to the emergence of civil uprisings. Explanations for the emergence of civil uprisings can be grouped (roughly) into two groups. In the first group of explanations, differences between states in terms of structural factors are the key cause for the emergence and outcome of uprisings. The second group of

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[8] Merriam-Webster. "Uprising."
[9] Oxford Dictionaries. "Uprising."
[10] Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p.35
[11] Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p.35

explanations seeks to explain the causes and consequences of uprisings by focusing on diffusion mechanisms.

Explanations based on structural factors

Explanations for the stability of authoritarian regimes based on structural factors focus on the presence of certain attributes within an authoritarian state that either empowers or weakens the regime and the opposition. The underlying logic is that a strong authoritarian regime has the means to prevent the outbreak of civil uprisings and if uprisings do emerge, it has to means to crackdown on dissent.

Now I will analyze structural factors that empower authoritarian states to survive in the wake of - or prevent the emergence of - uprisings. Way argues that the capabilities of authoritarian states to "defuse, coopt, or crush" uprisings are determined by "the presence of a single, highly institutionalized ruling party; an extensive and well-funded coercive apparatus that has won a major violent conflict; or state discretionary control over the economy."[12] Way specifies that parties organized on the basis of a strong ideology are more likely to survive, compared to parties that lack tradition or ideology.[13]

In order for autocrats to stay in power, they establish and maintain patronage networks while cutting off dissidents financially, according to Way.[14] Because this tactic is costly, Way argues that only regimes that have full control over the economy or those that rely on revenues gained by the export of natural resources are able to pursue this tactic. Radnitz agrees that regimes with a strong control over the economy are less likely to witness uprisings, compared to states with a more liberalized economy. Radnitz argues that state-control over the economy undermines dissent, while the loss of power over the economy by an autocrat fosters elite defection.[15]

Williamson & Abadeer argue that the loyalty of the military to its regime affects regime vulnerability to uprisings. Authoritarian regimes are likely to face the emergence of uprisings when the business sector supports the opposition, says Radnitz.[16] Further, autocrats that maintain strong ties to the West are less likely to consolidate their power compared to

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[12] Way 2008, p.62
[13] Way 2008
[14] Way 2008, p.64
[15] Radnitz 2010
[16] Radnitz 2010, p.134

those regimes that have weaker ties to the West. Way says this is the case because authoritarian states are sensitive to Western pressure.[17]

Explanations centered on political diffusion

Academics such as Bunce and Wolchik argue that uprisings could be diffused across borders and as such they study uprisings as interconnected phenomena. Bunce & Wolchik define diffusion as "a process wherein new ideas, institutions, policies, models or repertoires of behavior spread geographically from a core site to new sites."[18] Today's interconnectedness allows citizens and governments to monitor what is happening elsewhere in the world. Events that take place in one case could influence another case: known as cross-case influence or Galton's problem.

Political diffusion comes in many shapes and sizes (e.g., hierarchical; proximal; direct; and indirect); yet they all describe the following phenomenon: the sharing of an innovation (i.e., tactics, resources and information) between a transmitter and an adopter through a certain channel.[19] Campana and Ratelle argue that diffusion refers not to "a simple transposition of practices" but it "entails the adaption of a set of practices/and or discourses into a new context."[20] Variation on the presence and nature of diffusion mechanisms explain why uprisings appear in some cases, but not in other cases.

Regime stability of Arab regimes

The following structural factors affect the stability of Arab regimes in the wake of uprisings, I will elaborate on the relation between each of these structural factors and regime stability. It is fair to say that some structural factors might be interrelated. States that possess natural resources (e.g., oil and gas), for example, often have larger budgets for military spending compared to states that lack income derived from the export of natural resources.

Hereditary tradition

Monarchies and other regimes based on hereditary tradition have a lowered probability to experience the outbreak of uprisings and in the case of protests do occur they proof to be less of a threat to them compared to rulers in non-hereditary regimes, say Brownlee et al.[21] In the

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[17] Way 2008
[18] Bunce & Wolchik, 2007, p.93.
[19] Soule 2004, p.295
[20] Campana and Ratelle 2014, p.118-119
[21] Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p.35

context of monarchies, the rationale is that uprisings are "more manageable and pose less of a threat to the regime" because their institutional arrangements allow the incumbent ruler to be flexible in terms of reform, say Williamson & Abadeer. Goldstone argues for example that monarchs can hold on to power by "ceding legislative power to elected parliaments."

The cases of Morocco and Jordan illuminate the strong standing of monarchs in the wake of uprisings, say Williamson & Abadeer, "[in Morocco and Jordan] protests movements never developed coherent-enough demands to threaten the regime, and were quickly diffused by the monarch's offers of reforms, which were often never fully realized."[22] Some of the monarchs of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco used income derived from oil money to "prevent or quell" unrest in their territory in the wake of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, says Gelvin.[23] Apart from providing their citizens economic relief, Arab monarchies reacted to uprisings with violence, according to Gelvin.[24] Co-optation took place in Morocco. The Moroccan king designated a committee to address the demands of the February 20 Movement, a leading force behind the Moroccan protests of 2011-2012, and change the constitution. The demonstrators had only limited success, because the newly adopted constitution had no meaningful changes.[25]

The possession of oil or other natural resources

Arab states that rely on oil export have had large budgets when oil prices were high to weaken opposition by "distributing resources through increased state salaries, higher subsidies for consumer goods, new state jobs, and direct handouts to citizens", according to Gause.[26] Non-oil-producing states, such as Egypt and Tunisia, needed to modernize their economies and this led to larger inequalities in the respective societies, according to Gause. Williamson & Abadeer provide empirical evidence for the oil-argument.[27]

Of the eight "oil-wealthy regimes" (i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya and United Arab Emirates) only two (namely: Bahrain and Libya) faced uprisings, while half (namely: Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Yemen) of the eight "oil-poor

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[22] Williamson & Abadeer 2014

[23] Both Jordan and Morocco "made economic concessions to protesters", such as restoring subsidies and lowering prices. Saudi Arabia promised its citizens a waiver of measures worth "130$ billion", consisting of "sixty thousand new government jobs", higher minimum wages in the public sector, giving bonuses to state employees, building half a million new housing units, and lowering the personal debt of citizens. The Bahraini monarchy reacted to domestic protests by promising $2,650 to every household. See: Gelvin 2012, p.126-135.

[24] Gelvin 2012, p.133

[25] Gelvin 2012, p.135

[26] Gause 2011, p.3

[27] Williamson & Abadeer 2014

regimes" (i.e., Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Mauritania, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen and Sudan) had major uprisings. These numbers show that regimes with vast financial budgets derived from oil export make effective use of their wealth by silencing the opposition and preventing the outbreak of uprisings.

I argue that some demonstrators were not motivated by money and they cared deeply about human right violations by their regime. Thus, the role of money should not be overestimated since other causes than economic grievances made citizens willing to contest their respective rulers.

Personal leadership

The reputation of an incumbent Arab ruler and his goodwill with his nation affects the respective regime stability, says Gelvin.[28] A favorable condition for the ruler is to have a "reputation as a reformer". One way to create goodwill is to take a tough stance against the United States of America (USA) and Israel.

Role of the security apparatus

A history of violent repression of a nation by a regime's security apparatus makes a regime more stable, says Gelvin.[29] The legacy of repression reminds citizens to obey the regime. Williamson & Abadeer argue that Arab autocrats could only stay in power in the wake of uprisings if they made effective use of their capability to "implement a crackdown that will scatter the opposition and help reassert its control over the state."

The roles Arab armies played during the uprisings were caused by unique, country specific factors, says Barany.[30] Williamson & Abadeer, however, dare to generalize if an army will loyal to its regime or not. The actions of an army are determined by its composition in terms of institutionalization versus kinship, say Williamson & Abadeer. Gregory Gause also asserts that a regime's survival depends on its relationship with the army. Gause distinguishes between "relatively professional", armies that are institutionalized and do not function as the "personal instrument of the ruler"; "less institutionalized forces" tied to the ruling elite; and armies concentrated around an "ethnic, sectarian, or regional minority."[31] In recent history, armies belonging to the first category (as in Tunisia and Egypt) have backed

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[28] Gelvin 2012, p.101-103
[29] Gelvin 2012, p.101-103
[30] Barany 2011
[31] Gause 2011, p.2

demonstrators. Libya and Yemen have "less institutionalized" armies and these "have split or dissolved" during the recent uprisings. So far, armies that are linked to a minority, as in Bahrain, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have stood their ground. From this logic we can conclude that states in which a minority group dominates the armed forces are more likely to prolong compared to states that have a military comprised of the majority group.

Bellin researched the strength of the coercive apparatus of authoritarian states and she pointed out four determinants for its robustness: finances; international support; degree of institutionalization; and the degree of political mobilization.[32] A coercive apparatus that receives a lot of income; has international backing from other states; is based on patrimonialism; and faces weak mobilization, is likely to stay loyal to the regime. Variations in these four factors could lead to defection of individuals from the security apparatus. Bellin argues that both Egypt and Algeria received financial support from the West because of security concerns (i.e., containing radical Islamists) and economic interests (i.e., access to the states' natural resources) and this in turn supported the security apparatus of the two respective regimes.[33]

In Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen the military stayed loyal to their respective regimes, therefore the incumbent leaders managed to stay (longer) in power, but only few of them managed to solve the chaos they find themselves in: the Bahraini monarch managed to regain control, while the regimes of Libya and Yemen failed to reassert their power, the outcome of the civil war in Syria is still not determined. In both Tunisia and Egypt, the army chose to support protesters leading to the downfall of president Ben Ali and president Mubarak respectively.[34]

External factors

Another important determinant for regime stability is the extent of foreign support a government receives, says Williamson & Abadeer.[35] The Syrian government has been fighting rebels and without Iranian military aid Assad's regime would have likely been collapsed, according to Williamson & Abadeer. The Libyan government had almost "crushed" rebel fighters until NATO intervened in the civil war. Thus, the meddling of foreign actors could alter the balance between the strength of the government and the opposition.

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[32] Bellin 2004, p.144-145
[33] Bellin 2004, p.149
[34] Gelvin 2012, p.27
[35] Williamson & Abadeer 2014

Another example of foreign influence is diplomatic pressure. Manheim says public diplomacy entails "efforts by the government of one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign policy of the target nation to advantage".[36] Another component of public diplomacy according to Tuch is to spread knowledge on the "nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals, and current policies."[37] These efforts are different by nature from the use of force but they can shape the behavior of another actor in a way that is favored by the actor using diplomatic pressure.

Relationship with minority groups

Gelvin states strong ties between minority groups and the government increases regime stability, because they decrease the likelihood of the emergence of uprisings.[38] One example of strong ties between government and minorities is the domination of minorities within the armed forces; see the paragraph below on "Role of the security apparatus". In Syria, ethnic or religious minorities tend to support the Assad-regime, since they are fearful of persecution under rule of Sunni Muslims.[39]

The role of the media

Social media, such as Facebook, Twitter and blogs facilitated communication between participants of the uprisings, says Gelvin.[40] A Facebook page called "We are all Khaled Said", dedicated to the life of Egyptian national Khaled Said, for example, functioned as a virtual place for people to express discontent with the Egyptian regime. Gelvin, however, argues "there is no evidence to demonstrate that social media have played any more of a role in the current uprisings than the printing press and telegraph played in earlier uprisings."[41] Plattner argues that social media could be effectively used by autocrats to "counter'" uprisings.[42] Whether this was the case in the Arab uprisings is unknown. Plattner says so far, social media

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[36] Manheim 1990, p.4
[37] Tuch 1990, p.3
[38] Gelvin 2012, p.101-103
[39] Khazan 2012
[40] Gelvin 2012, p.52
[41] Gelvin 2012, p.158
[42] Plattner 2011, p.11

seemed to be "more dangerous than helpful to authoritarians, especially in their remarkable ability to help mobilize large numbers of people in a very short time."[43]

One important transmitter for pan-Arabism during the uprisings has been Al Jazeera, a Qatar-based international news broadcaster with 60 news bureaus across the globe, argues Hale.[44] Media and the Internet, of which Al Jazeera is one example, have the potential to unite people by emphasizing parallels between them.

Research gap

What do we need to take from this literature review? I conclude that the following structural factors are important determinants for the strength of authoritarian regimes, its opposition, or a combination of both: the role of opposition; regime type; personal rule of the autocrat; role of the security apparatus; nature of the economy; and external factors.

While the Arab uprisings have been researched extensively on structural factors, they have not been thoroughly analyzed on the presence of diffusion mechanisms and its interaction with structural factors. I argue that we are missing a piece of the puzzle by solely focusing on structural factors. International media has hinted at the presence of transnational knowledge and tactics sharing between both elites and activists in the wake of Arab uprisings. It seems likely that diffusion mechanisms were present prior and during the uprisings and these in turn had some effect for the political outcomes. We should therefore in addition to structural explanations, also take into account the impact of decisions by elites and opposition actors alike for a better understanding of the nature and the outcomes of the Arab uprisings. To my understanding, however, no scholar has argued yet that diffusion mechanisms were present in the context of the recent Arab uprisings and how they affected the political events. Therefore, I aim to contribute to our understanding of the Arab uprisings by proposing the following theoretical framework.

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[43] Plattner 2011, p.11
[44] Hale 2013, p.340 & Al Jazeera, April 16, 2012

Theoretical framework

I will bring two competing explanations, namely an explanation based on structural factors and one centered on political diffusion, together in order to have a higher explanatory value for the roots and the results of the Arab uprisings. This method is based on how Beissinger operationalized his research on the colored revolutions.[45] His theory, however, has not yet been applied yet to study the cases of the Arab Spring. I will adapt the theoretical framework from Beissinger with the structural factors most salient for the context of the uprisings in Egypt and Algeria. Beissinger developed a valuable theory centered on the interaction between structural factors and diffusion mechanisms that seeks to explain the emergence of uprisings and their consequences for regime sustainability.[46] The key pillar of his theory is that certain preconditions or structural factors account for the emergence of uprisings within a state and the power of example could compensate for unfavorable structural factors. Thus, uprisings could emerge within a state that lacks (some) structural preconditions for uprisings due to the cross-case influence of the power of example. Beissinger argued that his theory is highly applicable to the colored revolutions and I want to investigate the explanatory value of his theory when applied to the Arab uprisings.

Modular diffusion
The theory of modular diffusion explains the geographical spread of collective action that follows a similar model. The theory of modular diffusion applies to uprisings, because uprisings are a type of collective action. I will evaluate the usability of studying the uprisings of Egypt and Algeria through the lens of modular diffusion. The driving force of modular diffusion, according to Beissinger, is the power of example: both political activists and political elites see successful uprisings that occurred elsewhere as a model that offers valuable lessons and tactics and they actively act upon the insights from prior experiences. Thus, prior uprisings serve as "an experience that has been consciously borrowed by others, spread by NGOs [stands for: nongovernmental organizations], and emulated by local social movements, forming the contours of a model."[47] Indicators of the presence of modular diffusion, according to Beissinger, are: the spread of "frames, strategies, repertoires and logos" from a successful

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[45] Beissinger 2007
[46] Beissinger 2007
[47] Beissinger 2007, p.263

uprising to an adaptor.[48] When assessing if mechanisms of modular diffusion are present we should look for cross-border communication and support between two or more actors. In the cases of Egypt and Algeria I will look at communication between government elites from different states as well as communication between citizens from different countries.

Beissinger argues that the following five characteristics apply to the diffusion of modular phenomena. First, modular diffused activity is based on the inter-connectedness between cases, caused by similarities in "institutional characteristics, histories, cultural affinities, or modes of domination, allowing agents to make analogies across…" Second, the prospect of achieving success by emulating a specific model is the driving force of modular diffusion. In other words: people are motivated to copy strategies of prior uprisings when these are likely to change their *status quo* to something better. Thirdly, the influence of prior examples on the emergence of collective action elsewhere follows a "tipping model" (see figure 1). A successful uprising in one state leads to a higher proportionality for emulation in another state.[49] In the long run, however, this cumulative effect of successful collective action decreases and a second tipping point will be reached: the power of example eventually weakens. Fourthly, participants of former uprisings usually teach oppositional movements elsewhere how to organize themselves. Other parties that facilitate the proliferation of the model are "foreign states or NGOs". They often provide "resources" and "skills." Finally, two factors shape the timing and action of modular phenomena, namely the power of example and the structural conditions of a state.[50]

Figure 1. Structural requirements and influence of example

—— Influence of successful example on subsequent action across groups
—◆— Structural requirements for action

In this figure we see the interaction between two curves: the required structural factors for the outbreak of modular activity and the influence of prior examples on movements elsewhere. Original figure comes from Beissinger (2007, p.269) and goes by the name: "Figure 4 Structural requirements for action and the influence of example in modular phenomena."

Examples of modular diffused uprisings are: the democratic revolutions of Slovakia (1998) and Croatia (2000), the Bulldozer Revolution (2000) in Serbia, the Rose Revolution of Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution (2004) in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution (2005) in Kyrgyzstan.[51] All these uprisings that took place in former Soviet territory, collectively labeled as the "colored revolutions", successfully ousted their authoritarian rulers. Uprisings in the former Soviet Union states Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan did not succeed.

A slightly different example of a modular diffused uprising is the so-called Cedar revolution in Lebanon, which took place in 2005. The Lebanese uprising adopted several innovations from the successful revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. The main differences, however, between the colored revolutions and the Lebanese revolution are the causes that lead to the uprisings as well as the type of demands by those oppositional figures involved.

Activists in the colored revolutions primarily sought to move their country towards democratization, while the core demand of Lebanese protesters was the withdraw of Syrian armed forces from Lebanese territory and an international-led investigation to the murder on former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. Further, the colored revolutions were sparked by electoral fraud by respective regimes, while the Lebanese uprising was caused by a high profile political assassination. Lehoucq defines electoral fraud as "clandestine and illegal efforts to shape election results."[52] These actions can range from "procedural violations of electoral law" to "the outright use of violence to intimidate voters and poll watchers."

Outcome of an uprising
Beissinger argues that uprisings have the highest probability to undermine regime stability during or immediate after elections, because in that timespan the regime is the most vulnerable to oppositional forces.[53] We have seen that a national event that has nothing to do with elections (e.g., political assassinations) could also trigger the mobilization of the masses. A national event here refers to: a political situation that activates sentiments felt by a large part of the society and it must takes place in the immediate period (i.e., within one year) before the outbreak of protests.

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[51] Beissinger 2007
[52] Lehoucq 2003, p.251
[53] Beissinger, 2007, p.263.

The outcome of an uprising is also dependent on the extent the opposition learned from prior uprisings. Learning from prior cases could to some degree compensate for disadvantaged structural factors. Therefore, uprisings that might be considered less likely to succeed could sometimes succeed due to expertise gained through learning from prior examples. Thus, in cases where protesters have been in contact with or learned from protesters that were involved in prior successful uprisings, we expect a higher probability for a successful outcome compared to those cases that did not have cross-case learning.

The probability for a successful outcome of an uprising increases when the movement involved in the uprising receives support from foreign governments or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Thus, cases that received foreign aid are more likely to have a successful uprising compared to cases lacking foreign aid. The American government and democracy-promoting NGOs are well-known contributors to spread democratic values across the globe.[54] The USA has given substantial financial and material help to prodemocracy movements in foreign states over time.[55] Therefore, I will investigate if the opposition in Egypt and Algeria received support from the American government or USA-based organizations.

Elite defection

Regime stability is affected by the way political elites preempt or react to uprisings, either by elite defection or by elite learning, see figure 2 and figure 3. When elites from the security apparatus defect it becomes harder for the political regime to suppress an uprising. In that situation oppositional forces have a heightened chance to undermine regime stability. This causation is visualized in figure 2 by a drop in the functions "Institutional constraints on action" and "Structural requirements for successful action", whereby the former refers to the strength of the government in opposing an uprising and the latter to the lowered demands of structural factors. Elite defection is fueled by "doubts about their [i.e., the political establishment] own legitimacy and the future of the structures they are defending" and it leads political elites to "co-opt opposition demands" or to "bail out".[56]

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[54] Ledeen, 2005.

[55] The US Congress allocates approximately 100 million US dollar (a small sum of money compared to its military and anti-terrorism budget) on a yearly basis to The National Endowment for Democracy, an umbrella organization that seeks to spread democracy in authoritarian states or developing nations by financing projects of The National Endowment for Democracy spreads it budget on projects by the International Republican Institute; the National Democratic Institute; and Freedom House. See: Nixon, April 15, 2011.

[56] Beissinger 2007, p.269

Figure 2. Elite defection

— Influence of successful example on subsequent action across groups
—●— Institutional constraints on action
—▼— Structural requirements for successful action

Here we see the impact of elite defection on the resistance of a government against an uprising and the threshold for a successful outcome of an uprising. Original figure comes from Beissinger (2007, p.269) and goes by the name: "Figure 5 Influence of example and institutional constraints on structural requirements for success in modular phenomena."

Elite learning

Elite learning, on the other hand, entails the learning of "critical lessons" derived from prior collective action (in this thesis: uprisings) and incorporating "additional institutional constraints" (i.e., repressive measures) by political elites in order to oppose political change.[57] Thus, in this model political elites learn valuable lessons from prior uprisings elsewhere and they take steps accordingly to prepare against unrest within their states. When this mechanism is present political elites are in a stronger position (all conditions held constant) compared to uninformed political elites. Consequentially, oppositional forces are less likely to start an uprising in this scenario and their chances of waging a successful uprising are much slimmer compared to that situation without elite learning. The mechanism of elite learning is visualized in figure 3 by a small increase over time in the functions "Institutional constraints on action" and "Structural requirements for successful action", whereby the former refers to the strength of the political elites in resisting an uprising and the latter to the prerequisites of a successful uprising.

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[57] Beissinger 2007, p.269

Figure 3. Elite learning

—— Influence of successful example on subsequent action across groups
—●— Institutional constraints on action
—▼— Structural requirements for successful action

Here we see the impact of elite learning on the resistance of the political elite against an uprising as well as the threshold for a successful outcome of an uprising. Original figure comes from Beissinger (2007, p.269) and goes by the name: "Figure 5 Influence of example and institutional constraints on structural requirements for success in modular phenomena."

Argument

I argue that states with more favorable structural factors for the emergence of uprisings are more likely to experience uprisings. If uprisings succeed elsewhere and citizens learn valuable lessons from prior uprisings, then a state requires less favorable conditions for the emergence of uprisings. Thus, learning by citizens could lower the threshold for successful collective action. Moreover, successful uprisings could function as a model that protesters elsewhere seek to emulate, while failed uprisings lower the probability of follow-ups. Therefore, the actions of political elites and opposition actors in one case influence other cases.

Further, I argue that the outcome of an uprising is determined by the stability of the incumbent regime and the presence and nature of mechanisms of modular diffusion. A more robust presence of learning by the opposition increases the probability of the opposition to wage a successful uprising and therefore endangers regime continuation. The presence of elite defection also undermines authoritarian rule, since it lowers the threshold for collective action. The presence of elite learning, however, increases the odds for authoritarian sustainability and makes it harder for protesters to contest their government.

I argue that the interaction between modular diffusion and structural factors, as formulated by Beissinger, is a valuable theory in addition to the existing (mostly structural) explanations for the Arab Spring. To some extent, the emergence and consequences of uprisings in Egypt and Algeria can be explained by interplay between modular diffusion and structural factors.

Hypotheses

Here I will formulate the four hypotheses that I will put to test:

- H1: A case in which the opposition learns from other uprisings, has a higher probability for the emergence of a successful uprising and therefore endangers regime continuation, while lower levels of learning by the opposition decreases the probability for the advent of a successful uprising and therefore pose less a threat to the incumbent political elite.

- H2: Higher levels of elite defection lead to more collective action by the opposition, posing a greater threat to incumbent leaders compared to a case with lower levels of elite defection.

- H3: Higher levels of elite learning increases the odds for authoritarian sustainability while lower levels of elite learning make it easier for the opposition to contest their government and therefore undermine authoritarian rule.

Research design

The Arab Spring provides an excellent context to investigate how uprisings and the presence or absence of mechanisms of modular diffusion affect the sustainability of authoritarian regimes. I will conduct in-depth case studies of Algeria and Egypt. The backbone of these analyses will be literature studies of both primary and secondary sources. Algeria and Egypt are both authoritarian states with a fairly homogenous society. The rule of these states is not based on hereditary, as is the case in many states in the region. Moreover, the ruling elites do not in particular represent any subset of the society. Thus, the political leaders of Algeria and Egypt represent the entire nation.

These two cases are both republics, and the respective political elites have used repressive tactics to stay in power for over a long time, often under the façade of emergency laws or the war on terrorism. Algeria and Egypt are located in close proximity to each other in the region of the MENA and their structural factors are somewhat similar, but these cases had different outcomes in terms of regime continuation and regime change. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak needed to leave his position shortly after mass demonstrations commenced, while Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika managed to stay in power. Algeria and Egypt share largely similar independent variables, yet they had different outcomes of the uprisings. Therefore the research design is a Most Similar Systems Design.

Operationalization

The dependent variable (further abbreviated to: DV) is the effect of uprisings on regime stability, see table 1. In this thesis I judge whether an uprising succeeded or failed based on its ability to meet its most vital demands within half a year after the emergence of the initial protest. In the cases of Egypt and Algeria the crucial demands of the opposition were the removal of their respective authoritarian leaders. Thus my interpretation of a successful uprising is as follows: a successful uprising leads to the removal of the chief of state or head of government from power within six months after protests began. The variation on the DV allows investigating the causal logic between the IVs and the DV.

I use three independent variables (further abbreviated to: IV): independent variable 1 (IV_1) refers to the probability for the emergence of uprisings within a state; independent variable 2 (IV_2) indicates regime robustness in the wake of uprisings. The third independent variable, (IV_3), entails the presence or absence of mechanisms of modular diffusion.

In this work I don't make any predictions on the long-term effects of the uprisings, since these effects of the Arab Spring are yet to be materialized. Therefore I focus solely on the immediate results of uprisings in Algeria and Egypt.

Table 1. Dependent variable and independent variables

Variable	Description	Attribute	Value
DV	The effect of uprisings on regime stability	Regime continuation or regime change	Yes/no
IV$_1$	The probability for the emergence of uprisings within a state	Emergence of uprisings or lack there of	From very unlikely to very likely
IV$_2$	Regime robustness in the wake of uprisings	Strength of the regime	From very weak to very strong
IV$_3$	The presence or absence of mechanisms of modular diffusion	-Elite learning -Elite defection -Learning by the opposition	Yes/no; and in-depth qualitative report

Structural factors for the emergence of Arab uprisings

Below I present the structural factors most salient to the context of Egypt and Algeria for the emergence of uprisings. These structural factors are based on the literature review and theoretical framework. IV$_1$ is a composite of these structural factors. These structural factors are grouped in the sub-categories economic factors; demographics; social factors; and regime factors see table 2.

Table 2. Structural requirements for the emergence of uprisings

Structural factor	Relation
Strength of ties between the regime and the West	Stronger ties increase the probability for the emergence of uprisings
Enrollment rates in higher education	High rates of enrollment in higher education increases the chances for uprisings
Level of wealth of citizens	Higher levels of wealth increases the chances for uprisings to emerge
Economic dependency on export of natural resources	A higher dependency on the export of natural resources decreases the chance for the emergence of uprisings
Unity of opposition	A fragmented opposition decreases the prospect for the emergence of uprisings, while a unified opposition increases the chance for uprisings
Political rights	More repressive states have a lowered chance for the emergence of uprisings, compared to less repressive states

Structural factors that advance regime stability in the wake of uprisings

Here I present the structural factors most salient to the context of Egypt and Algeria for regime stability in the wake of uprisings. These structural factors are based on the literature review and theoretical framework. IV_2 is a composite of these structural factors, see table 3.

Table 3. Structural factors and regime stability in the wake of uprisings

Structural factor	Relation
Loyalty and effectiveness of the security apparatus and the military	An authoritarian regime that possesses a loyal and effective security apparatus as well as military, is more likely to survive uprisings, compared to regimes lacking such a structural factor
Penetration of new and alternative media outlets	A state that has a deeper penetration of new media or social media and alternative media outlets poses a greater threat to regime stability compared to a state that has a lower presence of new media and alternative media.
Timing of the uprising	The stability of a regime is more endangered when uprisings take place in close proximity to fraud elections or a national event, compared to uprising that takes place outside of this timeframe.

Mechanisms of modular diffusion

Here I will explain the way I will operationalize IV_3. The mechanisms of modular diffusion are sorted in the three sub-groups: elite learning, elite defection and learning by the opposition.

Elite learning

We will measure elite learning in Algeria and Egypt by analyzing public statements of government officials on content that references to uprisings in other states, such as Tunisia for example. I will also investigate scholarly and newspaper articles that engage in elite reactions in the wake of Arab uprisings. While elite rhetoric not always coincides with elite behavior or political decisions, it is one of the only reliable instruments to measure elite learning. I expect political elites to gain a good understanding of elite reactions that are highly successful and those that are doomed to fail in the wake of mass mobilization. While designing policies I expect political elites to adapt successful innovations of prior uprisings to the unique political characteristics and demands of their state. Again, when elites in certain states perform similar behavior as those elites in other states we do not have traced elite learning yet. Elite learning encompasses knowing and analyzing what happens in other cases, subtracting valuable lessons from them and implementing these in their own unique political landscape. I aim to find references in public statements to the presence of these steps.

Elite defection

Elite defection refers to those political elites belonging to the government, judiciary, or security apparatus that either refuses to obey orders in the wake of uprisings or chooses to step down from power or join the opposition. I will use scholarly and newspaper articles to find evidence the presence or absence of this mechanism and its consequences for the outcome of an uprising.

Learning by the opposition

Indications of learning by the opposition are the use of tactics and innovations that were used in prior uprisings, combined with a reference to the uprising. When similar behavior takes place in various states there need not to be diffusion per se. But when we find statements of individuals that support the causal chain then we can be more secure of the presence of learning by the opposition. When we find evidence for the fact that Egyptians or Algerians intentionally copied strategies from prior uprisings, then we can be confident about the presence of the learning by the opposition mechanism.

An introduction to the Arab Spring

The analysis is structured as follows: in the first part I will present the Tunisian uprisings. This will be helpful later on in the analysis. Then I will provide an overview of the Arab Spring as a whole, in order to have a general understanding about the turmoil in the region.

I conclude the analysis by arguing that the absence of significant citizen learning in Algeria explains why the Algerian uprisings did not succeed. Algeria had a less favorable structural makeup for successful uprisings, compared to Egypt. I found evidence for the fact that elite learning was present with the Algerian political elite. Consequentially, the structural requirements for successful action in Algeria rose.

Uprisings in Egypt on the other hand severely undermined regime continuation. Egypt was more prone to successful uprisings, due to its favorable structural factors. Moreover, elite defection was common with the Egyptian political elite during the uprisings. On the other hand, a significant level of citizen learning took place in Egyptian.

The Tunisian uprisings

We need to investigate the key characteristics of the recent Tunisian uprisings in order to understand the Arab Spring as a whole and to evaluate if the Tunisian uprisings influenced political events in Egypt and Algeria respectively. I argue that the Tunisian experience set an example for Egypt, Algeria and the entire region of the MENA. The Jasmine Revolution of Tunisia was the first uprising in the region that resulted in the fall of an authoritarian ruler.

In Tunisia, police and security forces often cracked down on political dissidents. Peaceful demonstrations in 2008 by mineworkers in the Southern places Gafsa and Gabés were violently crushed by Tunisian security forces. That event marks the beginning of organized protest against the regime. Earlier, people shared anti-government sentiments only in private places. To publicly question the regime was something unprecedented.

Mohamed Bouazizi was a Tunisian national who repeatedly sold fruit in forbidden areas and therefore often clashed with a police officer. He was treated badly by the police on December 17, 2010 and frustrated with the state of affairs he poured fuel over his whole body in front of the municipal building the next day and somehow he was set on fire. Some say that Mohamed didn't intend to commit suicide, but believe that the event was a tragic accident. In the hospital Mohamed died of his burnings. Shortly hundreds of citizens marched on the street to protest in result of the death of this young man. In December 2010 the news agency Reuters wrote that "riots are extremely rare" and that Tunisia "is one of the most prosperous

and stable [states] in the region."[58] The journalists are clearly surprised that hundreds of citizens marched the street unexpectedly in such a stable state. Protests spread within Tunisia and transnational. On December 24, lawyers in Kasserine gathered to show support for the people of Sidi Bouzid. In these demonstrations the regime used live ammunition on the protesters, resulting in the spread of revolutions to the North of the country and an increase in the intensity of the demonstrations. On December 28, president Ben Ali visited Mohamed Bouazizi in the hospital. Meanwhile demonstrations were held in the capital city Tunis, with approximately 1000 people attending.

The Tunisian regime could not keep up with the power of the Internet. Videos of the demonstrations and the funeral of Bouazizi spread within the country and across the globe, by Facebook and Al Jazeera. Even when the Tunisian government disconnected the Internet, citizens were able to send images and videos captured with cellphones to Al Jazeera. On January 9, 2011 the regime ordered Special Forces sniper units to shoot on the demonstrators in Kasserine. Videos of the massacre quickly spread across the world, since users uploaded captured images of the event on Facebook. Approximately 20 people were killed in this violent crackdown. Police forces used live ammunition on protesters in Tunis (i.e., the capital city of Tunisia) on the 13th of January. President Ben Ali enacted emergency laws and ordered his army to shoot at citizens, yet senior military officials disobeyed the command and told their president to leave. This resulted in the departure of Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali around January 15, 2011, that's only a month after the outbreak of protests.[59]

A local demonstration against the municipal government of Sidi Bouzid took place a day after the self-immolation by Muhammad Bouazizi.[60] Protests spread to towns in the region and reached Tunis by January 13, 2011. The government used violent tactics in an effort to suppress demonstrations. These acts caused several deaths in Thala and twenty-one deaths in Kasserine. On January 13, 2011, the army was ordered not to shoot at demonstrators.[61] President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011.

The Tunisian economy performed relatively well, yet the regime was involved in all sort of activities that discredited its legitimacy. Two driving forces of the Tunisian uprisings were dissatisfaction of Tunisians with the prospect of their economic development and the impossibility to express their political opinions freely. Chomiak argues that citizens

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[58] Reuters Africa, 2010.

[59] Chrisafis & Black, January 15, 2011.
[60] Gelvin 2012, p.42
[61] Gelvin 2012, p.42

collectively protested against the regime because of "widespread and longstanding feelings of oppression, mostly socio-economic but also political and symbolic."[62] The direct cause for the emergence of protests in Tunisia was the self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid.[63]

I argue that electoral fraud did not cause the emergence of uprisings in Tunisia. Electoral procedures in Tunisia in 2009 contradict free and fair elections. Human Rights Watch argues that a few days prior to the 2009 Tunisian elections a large amount of deviations from good practices of democracy occurred: "tailor-made laws have prevented the candidates from some of the stronger opposition parties from running, and severe constraints on freedoms of expression, the press, and assembly have deprived challengers from making their case to the public."[64] In 2009 Human Rights Watch stated that the "government is restricting access to media for the parties and candidates that remain in the running."[65] A body appointed by the president performs the electoral monitoring in Tunisia and there is no domestic or foreign organization that independently monitors the elections. Whether the Tunisian government has consciously fraud the elections of 2009 is unsure.

The nature of the Arab Spring

The MENA was ruled by dictatorships, prior to the Arab uprisings. With the closure of the Cold War, many states made the transition from authoritarian rule to democratic rule.[66] Initially, this transition seemed to have found follow-up in the MENA, but soon autocrats in the region tightened their authoritarian stronghold. In late 2010 and 2011, the region faced events of historic proportion that potentially could lead to democratization.

The Arab Spring consists of "a wave of turmoil" that reached "nearly every Arab country" and anti-government demonstrations varied in terms of "size and intensity", according to Williamson & Abadeer.[67] The uprisings originated in Tunisia in late 2010 and spread throughout the region, from Morocco in the west to Yemen in the east. Gause says that the Arab uprisings were homegrown and not manipulated by external powers, "…the Arab

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[62] Chomiak, 2011, p.77.
[63] Gelvin 2012, p.26-28
[64] Human Rights Watch. October 23, 2009.
[65] Human Rights Watch. October 23, 2009.
[66] Albrecht, 2004.
[67] Williamson & Abadeer 2014.

revolts resulted not from policy decisions taken in Washington or any other foreign capital but from indigenous economic, political, and social factors…"[68]

The protests of the Arab Spring were spontaneous, leaderless, diverse, and loosely organized, and these characteristics in turn have been "their greatest strength and their greatest liability," says Gelvin.[69] Each Arab uprising had its own origins, experiences and outcomes. Millions of Arabs wanted their respective president to leave office; in their eyes their rulers lacked legitimacy.[70] News outlets commonly describe this collection of events as the calls through peaceful demonstrations of ordinary citizens in the MENA for human dignity, democratization and civil rights.

After several weeks of protests in Tunisia protests spread across borders into for example Egypt, Libya and Syria. Protests in Tunisia and elsewhere were filmed and uploaded to Facebook and or Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera broadcasted these images and videos on their television channel.

The revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt have been relatively peaceful. Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain face a different reality. There the situation deteriorated into widespread violent confrontations or civil war and foreign intervention, since the regime will stop at nothing. In the case of Libya, the international community decided upon the establishment of a no-fly zone in order to protect citizens against the use of violence by the Gadhafi regime.[71] The Syrian government used live fire on its nation. Likewise, the Bahraini monarch ordered his security forces to shoot at protesters and invited the GCC to suppress the domestic unrest.

In January 2011 protests took place in Yemen similar to those in Tunisia and Egypt. President Saleh was supposed to rule until 2013, but protesters wanted to see him leave earlier.[72] Another demand of protesters was the release from prison of several human rights activists and journalists.[73] The protesters used multiple strategies such as the translation of protest slogans into English in order to gain the attention of the international community.[74] The uprisings in Yemen have been described as follows, "the uprising here was not swift and triumphant like the revolutions of Tunisia or Egypt, or the all-out warfare of Libya and Syria. Rather, a slow-burning revolution of sit-ins, negotiations and international pressure has

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[68] Gause III July/August 2011
[69] Gelvin 2012, p.158
[70] Hamoudi, 2012.
[71] United Nations Security Council, March 17, 2011.
[72] Boone, November 10, 2011.
[73] Holmes, January 24, 2011.
[74] Boone, November 10, 2011.

pushed out Mr. Saleh, making him the fourth Arab autocrat forced from power in the wave of popular uprisings that continue to roil the region."[75]

Tawakkol Karmam is a Yemeni journalist and human rights activist. She belonged to a peaceful student movement and she worked for the non-profit organization Women Journalists Without Chains. Women Journalists Without Chains is one of the four Yemeni-based NGOs that receive assistance from the National Democratic Institute (a major USA-based pro-democracy NGO).[76] A speech by Ms. Karmam shows the interdependence between uprisings of the Arab Spring, "we will continue this struggle and the Jasmine Revolution until the removal of this corrupt system that looted the wealth of the Yemenis."[77] Another example is that Yemeni students showed a Tunisian flag on a banner at Sana'a University, while shouting, "hail Tunisia — the sweet smell of Jasmine woke us up!"[78] The words "Jasmine" or "Jasmine Revolution" refer to the Tunisian upheavals of late December 2010 and January 2011. Another indicator of interdependence is that Yemeni protesters wore pink bandanas and pink scarfs referring to Jasmine Revolution on February 3, 2011.[79]

Yemeni activists learned from Egyptian protesters that operated at Tahir square. Emulating the model of Egyptian demonstrators, Yemeni protesters searched other demonstrators on weapons upon entering protests in order for the protests to stay nonviolent. Similarly to the Egyptian revolution, the American-based and American-funded NGOs the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House aided the Yemeni revolution.

Gause notices the similar (re-) actions of Arab autocrats in the wake of Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, "Seeing what happened in Cairo and Tunis, other Arab leaders rushed to placate their citizens by raising state salaries, cancelling planned subsidy cuts, and increasing the number of state jobs."[80] Jordan for example halted its economic liberalization and Saudi Arabia pledged to provide more financial relief.[81] Shortly after the downfall of president Ben Ali, the government of Kuwait promised its citizens "US$3,500 as well as a year's worth of free staples such as sugar, cooking oil, and milk."[82] In February 2011 Saudi Arabia's government announced a "$80-billion package of public-sector wage hikes, unemployment

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[75] Kasinof, February 21, 2012.
[76] The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, April 24, 2007.
[77] Holmes, January 24, 2011.
[78] Holmes, January 24, 2011.
[79] Raghavan, January 27, 2011 & Finn, February 3, 2011.
[80] Gause III 2011, p.3
[81] Gause III 2011, p.4
[82] Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p. 33

payments, increased college stipends, and investments in low-income housing."[83] In September 2011 the government of Qatar tried to prevent unrest by announcing public spending worth $8 billion, says Brownlee et al.[84]

Causes of the Arab uprisings

Brownlee et al. argue that there were no structural factors in the Arab states that account for the emergence of uprisings and as such they came unexpected to the respective governments.[85] I believe in retrospect, however, that many indicators should have alarmed governments and experts alike. One such indicator is the emergence of so-called "bread riots" in the region ever since 2007, due to rising food prices.[86] Food prices had risen in the Arab world since the early 2000s due to crop failures and drought. The global economic crisis of 2008 put even more pressure on the already vulnerable Arab food supply chain and economies.

Al Jazeera agrees that the MENA was prone for uprisings, due to the presence of the following structural factors: the prolonged rule of dictatorships using so-called "emergency laws"; the violation of human rights; the high amount of political prisoners; the use of torture by the regime; the lack of free press and the extensive use of censorship; high numbers of poverty; especially large numbers of youth unemployment over 50%.[87] Of these factors, the most important causes of the Arab Spring were dissatisfaction among young middle class students with the lack of career prospects and the high number of unemployed youth. Gelvin argues that in recent years the youth cohort increased severely in the Arab world and most of the respective governments could not provide them with jobs.[88]

The Arab economies combined elements of a state-controlled economy with those of liberal markets, increasing the gap between rich and poor and deepened corruption. This type of economy was labeled "crony capitalism", because public assets came in the hands of wealthy and corrupt individuals, "so-called crony capitalists."[89] Privatization in Tunisia and Egypt undermined regime stability, says Gause, since it led to the emergence of a new class of super-rich individuals that was highly unpopular with the rest of the nation. Overall, the Arab economies grew steadily in the years prior to the Arab uprisings but so did the ever-increasing

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[83] Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p.33
[84] Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p.33
[85] Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p.30
[86] Gelvin 2012, p.22
[87] Al Jazeera, April 22, 2011.
[88] Gelvin 2012, p.107
[89] Gelvin 2012, p.108

divide between rich and poor citizens. These two processes led citizens belonging to the middle class and high-educated youngsters to participate in protests, says Gelvin.[90]

Some argue that not violations of political and civil rights, but economic concerns caused the massive unrest in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, "Mohamed Bouazizi [i.e., the Tunisian fruits seller that set himself on fire and caused the Tunisian uprisings] didn't set himself on fire because he couldn't blog or vote. People set themselves on fire because they can't stand seeing their family wither away slowly, not of sorrow, but of cold stark hunger." [91]

Egyptian protesters wanted to get rid of president Mubarak, because in their eyes he was a dictator. Egyptians did not necessarily want to change the legal and constitutional make-up of the state, since the constitution provided democratic principles. The key cause for the Egyptian revolution was that citizens were dissatisfied with certain policies of the Mubarak administration leading to "torture, poverty, corruption and unemployment."[92] An incentive for Egyptians to rebel was the murder on Egyptian national Khaled Said, according to Gelvin.[93]

Pan-Arabism, the "idea that all Arabs share a common political identity and fate", facilitated the transnational spread of uprisings, says Gause.[94] It allowed Arabs to relate to each other identities and destinies and it drove Arabs to rebel. When the people of Tunisia and then Egypt overthrew their corrupt dictators, other Arabs found they could identify with them. The fact that these revolts succeeded, gave hope (in some cases false hope) to Arabs living in other states.

Effects

Some argue that the Arab Spring is not a result in itself, but rather a first step for the MENA to make a democratic transition and it is a sign to the world community that these states will fight against economic and political injustice.[95] Some are skeptic, such as Rabab el-Mahdi from the American university in Cairo. El-Mahdi argues that the Arab Spring, so far, failed to bring upon any structural change yet. In most cases, the protesters did not replace the ancient régime.

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[90] Gelvin 2012, p.18
[91] Shah, 2011.
[92] Joya, 2011, p.367.
[93] Gelvin 2012, p.49
[94] Gause III 2011, p.4
[95] Heydarian, April 18, 2014.

Tunisia is the only Arab Spring' state that indicates some sort of democratic transition. Internet activist Lina Ben Mhenni argues, however, that there is still a long road ahead for Tunisia in the post-Ben Ali era.[96] Ben Mhenni argues that Tunisian citizens still lack freedom of expression and that the police forces still use disproportional violence in reaction to demonstrations.[97]

After 30 years of rule president Saleh needed to step down from power as a result of domestic and foreign pressures. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi led the Yemeni regime after the removal of president Saleh.[98] The Gulf Cooperation Council pressured president Saleh to step down from power and have vice-president Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi take over his position.[99] President Saleh managed to stay in power much longer after the outbreak of democratic protests compared to his counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt.

The unrest in Yemen developed into a violent state of affairs: "while rival political and military factions continue to battle in Yemen's urban centers, fighting endures in the country's rural tribal areas as well. Virtually impossible for Western journalists to cover, fighting in the Arhab and Nihm regions of the Sana'a governorate between tribesmen and loyalist military forces have gone on for months with Arhabis threatening to seize control of the Sana'a airport several times."[100] Another layer in the demonstrations that turned into widespread conflict is religious-inspired violence. In the northern provinces Al-Jawf and Sa'ada we see the violent struggle between Houthi, "a Shiite insurgent group that is reportedly supported by Iran," [101] and fundamentalist Suniis.[102]

The outcome of the Egyptian uprisings would be crucial for the United States, since the political processes that Egypt experiences create a "precedent for smaller countries in the region."[103] Vital issues for the USA at stake in these events were: the relationship between Islam and democracy; and the dealings between Israel *vis-à-vis* Arab states.

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[96] Oslo Freedom Forum, 2012.
[97] More information on the post-Ben Ali era can be found in the Annual Report of 2013 "Public Governance in Tunisia: Principles, Status and Prospects" by the Association Tunisienne de Gouvernance, a Tunisian think-tank and partner of POMED.
[98] Stuster, April 22, 2014.
[99] Naylor, February 16, 2012.
[100] Boone, November 10, 2011.
[101] Hassan, April 22, 2014.
[102] Boone, November 10, 2011.
[103] Shane, November 20, 2011.

Analysis

First, I will introduce the history, political system, economic and social system of Egypt and Algeria in order to create a context in which I will investigate the interplay between structural factors and mechanisms of modular diffusion. The crux of the analysis will be the behavior of the opposition and the political elite of Egypt and Algeria respectively in the wake of uprisings.

Recent history of Egypt

Egypt (formally: The Arab Republic of Egypt) gained some degree of independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1914 and partial independence in 1922. Egypt only gained full independence from Britain on July 23, 1952.[104] Ever since the *coup d'état* of Nasser in 1952, Egypt has been ruled by military dictatorships.[105] Hosni Mubarak rose to power on October 14, 1981,[106] shortly after Anwar al-Sadat, former president of Egypt, was murdered.[107] Mubarak ruled over Egypt for almost three decades.

Political situation Egypt

Prior to the Arab uprisings, Egypt had multiparty systems in which one party dominated. The dominating party of Egypt was the National Democratic Party.[108] The Mubarak administration erected so-called emergency laws right after the death of Sadat. The emergency laws led to restrictions on civil liberties such as the prohibition on gathering with more than five individuals to perpetrate a peaceful demonstration.[109] ElBaradei argues that these laws enabled the government to monitor university campuses to "ensure that students do not engage in political activities."[110] In March 2010, the American government criticized the Egyptian government for using emergency laws to restrict Egyptians in their civil rights.[111]

Domestically, president Mubarak successfully used a variety of tactics to maintain its power: suppressing oppositional forces; manipulating public opinion; establishing emergency laws to prohibit political demonstrations and persecuting citizens without trial. US Assistant secretary Posner argues that the Egyptian government has made it difficult for nongovernmental organizations to do their work.

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[104] Gelvin 2012, p.36
[105] Shatz, 2010.
[106] Walt, February 2nd, 2011 A.
[107] Farrell, 1981.
[108] ElBaradei, 2010.
[109] ElBaradei, 2010.
[110] ElBaradei, 2010.
[111] U.S. Department of State, 2010.

Recent history of Algeria

The 20th century C.E. of Algeria (formally: The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria) has been violent according to Gelvin.[112] A long and violent war of independence was fought between Algeria and colonial power France. The duration of this war of independence was eight years, resulting in more than a million deaths.[113] France and the USA recognized Algeria's independence on July 3, 1962.[114]

The key events that took place in Algeria after it gained independence were a *coup d'état* by the Algerian army in 1987,[115] followed by a civil war, which lasted from late 1991 until 2002. The civil war commenced after the results of democratic elections were announced and the war was fought out between Islamists and the army.[116] Between 100.000 and 120.000 Algerians were killed in the civil war and the whole society suffered from posttraumatic stress syndrome.[117]

Gelvin says that uprisings were common ever since 2001.[118] Achy argues, however, that uprisings are not likely to occur in Algeria, because Algerians prefer the *status quo* to the prospect of extreme violence.[119] Gelvin argues that participants of these revolts were dissatisfied with economic policy and "arbitrary rule".[120] Moreover, high numbers of Algerian youth tried to leave their country illegally because they were fed up with humiliation, poverty and corruption.[121]

Political situation Algeria

Prior to the Arab Spring, Algeria also had a multiparty system dominated by one party, namely the National Liberation Front. The key figure of the National Liberation Front is president Abdelaziz Bouteflinka. He has been in office ever since April 27, 1999, and he is still in power.[122] The government did not allow the emergence of a free and fair political system, therefore the Algeria political system could not flourish. The opposition is manipulated, co-opted or undermined.[123] The Algerian government has enforced so-called emergency laws. These were officially designed to smoothen the fight against terrorism, but

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[112] Gelvin 2012, p.94
[113] Rogan, 2013.
[114] U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian.
[115] BBC News, 1965.
[116] Gall, 2013.
[117] Gelvin 2012, p.97
[118] Gelvin 2012, p.97
[119] Achy, May 31, 2012.
[120] Gelvin 2012, p.97
[121] Busch 2011
[122] Testas, 2002.
[123] Gall 2013

some argue that these laws have been abused by the regime in order to suppress the opposition.[124]

The Algerian government has been described as: "a clutch of army generals, intelligence officials and aides, including Saïd Bouteflika, the president's brother, surrounds the president, and only loyalists are promoted."[125] The prime minister of Algeria heads the committee that monitors the elections.

Achy argues that corruption and poor economic planning was common in Algeria, "The World Bank Doing Business report of 2011 ranked Algeria 136 of 183 countries for overall ease for businesses there—behind Tunisia, Morocco, and most other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly, the Transparency International report rated Algeria poorly because of its public finance mismanagement and the prevalence of bribery."[126]

Probabilities for the emergence of uprisings

Here I will look at the structural make-up of Egypt and Algeria prior to the emergence of the Arab Spring. First, I will evaluate the strength of ties between the West and the government of Egypt and Algeria respectively. The rationale is that strong ties between an authoritarian regime and the West increase the probability for the emergence of uprisings within an authoritarian state. In the aftermath of 9/11, many dictatorships of the MENA collaborated with the USA in the so-called "Global War on Terror (GWOT)."[127] I conclude that Egypt had the strongest ties with the West, far stronger than the ties between the West and Algeria. Consequentially, based on this structural factor, Egypt has a higher probability for the emergence of uprisings compared to Algeria.

Algeria has strong diplomatic ties with the entire international community, including the West.[128] Gall argues that Algeria is a strategic ally of the USA since it has "vast oil wealth, a powerful army and intelligence service, and experience in fighting Islamic terrorism."[129] Sanjeev Bery from Harvard University argues, however, that the West had the strongest ties with Mubarak's Egypt.[130] The West invested in Mubarak for decades, due to centrality of Egypt in the Arab world. In its thirty-year existence, the Mubarak-regime received military

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[124] Kasinof & Slackman, February 3, 2011.
[125] Gall 2013
[126] Achy, February 7, 2011.
[127] Wilson & Al Kamen, 2009.
[128] Maclean, William. February 24, 2009.
[129] Gall, Carlotta. November 8, 2013.
[130] Bery, Sanjeev. April 10, 2011.

aid (1.3 billion US dollar annually) from the USA in exchange for democratic reform that never came.[131] Gelvin argues that Egypt was of great importance to the American government due, because it is "key to resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict" and it "carries a great deal of weight in the Arab World simply because of its size." Gelvin argues that the USA also has strong ties with Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but he does not name Algeria.

Next I will compare the enrollment rates in higher education between Egypt and Algeria. This is of major importance, since higher rates of enrollment in higher education increases the chance for the emergence of uprisings. To measure the proportion of high-educated citizens within Algeria and Egypt I used the indicator School enrollment tertiary (% gross) from the World Development Indicators by the World Bank. This indicator points out the percentage of the total population that is enrolled in higher education. I argue that Egypt is more probable to experience uprisings, due to a higher rate of school enrollment in tertiary education. In 2009 and 2010, however, the difference between Egypt and Algeria in terms of school enrollment was very small, see table 4.

Table 4. School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Algeria	15	17	18	18	20	20	22	-	29	29
Egypt	31	32	29	30	32	31	32	32	32	33

A "-" refers to the lack of data in that year. More information about the variable can be found in the Appendix.

The next structural factor that will be analyzed is the level of wealth of citizens. The underlying logic is that higher levels of wealth of citizens increase the chances for the emergence of uprisings. As a measure for economic performance I will use GNI per capita, PPP. This indicator stands for the Gross national income (GNI) based on purchasing power parity (PPP). As such it could help us to grasp how much money citizens of Algeria and Egypt respectively had available to purchase goods and services prior to the Arab uprisings. I have used data from the World Development Indicators by the World Bank. I conclude that Algeria had a slightly higher level of citizen income and that relative increases the chance for the emergence of uprisings in Algeria, compared to Egypt. However, the differences between these two states with regard to this structural factor are small and decreasing in the period from 2005-2010.

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[131] Bery, Sanjeev. April 10, 2011.

Table 5. GNI per capita, PPP

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Algeria	10.290	10.690	11.440	11.760	11.780	12.220
Egypt	7.610	8.560	9.100	9.760	10.070	10.360

Now, I will proceed by comparing the dependency on the export of natural resources between Egypt and Algeria. A lower dependency on the export of natural resources increases the chance of the emergence of uprisings. Based on this structural factor, I therefore argue that Egypt had a far higher chance for the emergence of uprisings, compared to Algeria. In 2010, the export of petroleum and natural gas made up 25.14% of Algeria's GDP. That is more than double the share (11.51%) of the export of natural resources to the Egyptian GDP.

Table 6. Revenue export petroleum and natural gas combined (% of GDP)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Algeria	42,68	41,02	37,51	40,90	25,60	25,14
Egypt	25,74	23,98	22,70	25,88	11,50	11,51

Here I will argue that the Algerian opposition was more fragmented compared to Egypt. A fragmented opposition decreases the prospect for the emergence of uprisings, therefore Algeria had a lower chance to experience uprisings compared to Egypt. Achy argues that in Algeria, in contrast to Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, different segments of society did not unite in their fight against the government, "in spite of the sporadic demonstrations and of the calls for change from prominent intellectuals and political figures, a unifying movement that transcends societal divisions is yet to be seen in Algeria."[132] Markey and Chikhi argue that the Algerian opposition is "weak and divided."[133] Gelvin states that in Algeria there are "divisions within the protest movement on everything from tactics to goals."[134] The Algerian protests umbrella organization The Coordination for Democratic Change in Algeria lacked legitimacy according to Boundaoui.[135] This was caused because Algerians believed several political parties used the protests for personal gain.

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[132] Achy, March 31, 2011.
[133] Markey, Patrick and Lamine Chikhi. March 21st, 2014.
[134] Gelvin 2012, p.214-215.
[135] Boundaoui, Assi. March 2nd, 2011.

Egypt, on the other hand, had a more unified opposition. Both secular and religious Egyptian for example worked together guided by Dr. ElBaradei, Nobel laureate and opposition leader. [136] The main participants in the Egyptians uprisings were urban professionals and government employees.[137] Egyptian youth from all walks of life worked together in an umbrella organization or coalition. Hill says the following about this coalition, "The youth coalition officially includes six groups: April 6, Justice and Freedom, and the ElBaradei affiliates, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Democratic Front party, and independents."[138] I conclude that the Egyptian opposition was far more unified compared to the Algerian opposition and therefore (based on this structural factor) Egypt was more likely to experience the emergence of uprisings.

Lastly, the nature of political rights influences the mobilization of movements. Movement formation is harder in more repressive states compared to less repressive states. Consequentially, it is more probable that uprisings emerge in states in which citizens have more political freedom compared to states in which citizens enjoy less political freedom. To assess the political freedom in Egypt and Algeria respectively, I will use the political rights score from the Freedom House' Freedom in the World 2010 report. Political rights are expressed in a number ranging from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). Thus, a lower number refers to a higher level of political freedom. In the 2010 report I found that the political rights of Algeria and Egypt were comparable, since they both have allocated the number 6. I conclude, based on this measurement, that the political rights in Algeria and Egypt did not significantly differed. Moreover, the repressive nature of the respective regimes of Egypt and Algeria could be a strong impediment against the formation of opposition.

I argue that Egypt had is more favorable structural factors for the emergence compared to Algeria, since Egypt has the strongest ties with the West; the highest level of tertiary school enrollments; is less dependent on the export of natural resources and it's opposition was way more unified. Algeria, however, has a slightly higher level of citizen income, expressed in GNI per capita. Algeria and Egypt had comparable political rights prior to the Arab uprisings. These structural factors indicate that the probability for the emergence of uprisings was much higher in Egypt than in Algeria, see figure 4.

This finding implies that Egypt would also be an earlier riser in the sequence of uprisings. Both Egypt and Algeria faced uprisings in 2010 or 2011 and the abovementioned

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[136] Shabid, Anthony and David D. Kirkpatrick. January 30, 2011.
[137] Beissinger et al. 2012
[138] Hill, Evan. February 10, 2011.

structural factors, to some extend, shaped the impact of these uprisings on the respective regimes. In relation to Algeria, many more citizens participated in uprisings in Egypt. Also, unity within the Egyptian opposition posed a greater threat to the incumbent ruler compared to the fragmented opposition in Algeria. I will elaborate on -and add to- these arguments in the next section.

Figure 4. Structural requirements for action and the influence of the Tunisian uprisings

Influence of successful example on subsequent action across groups
Structural requirements for action

This figure is an adaption of Beissinger's figure entitled "Figure 4 Structural requirements for action and the influence of example in modular phenomena," see Beissinger (2007, p.269). I adapted this figure to visualize the interaction between structural factors and the influence of prior examples of Egypt and Algeria respectively. We see three curves in this graph: the required structural factors for the outbreak of modular activity in Egpyt (expressed with black cubes); the influence of prior examples on uprisings elsewhere (visualized by a black solid line); and I added an extra line, a black-coloured dashed line, to indicate the required structural factors for the outbreak of uprisings in Algeria.

Regime stability in Egypt and Algeria

Now we will proceed by analyzing the course of the uprisings in Egypt and Algeria and its direct impact on regime stability. I will do this by applying the structural factors that strengthen authoritarian regimes in the wake of uprisings to the cases of Egypt and Algeria.

Loyalty and effectiveness of the security apparatus and military

First, I will evaluate the loyalty and effectiveness of the security apparatus and the military. The underlying logic is that authoritarian regimes that posses a loyal and effective security apparatus as well as military are more likely to survive uprisings compared to regimes lacking such capabilities. To analyze the efficiency and the loyalty of the authoritarian regimes of Algeria and Egypt we need to incorporate the size of its armed forces as well as its security forces. A large quantity of armed forces and security forces could strengthen the capacity of a repressive regime to crackdown on dissent citizens when necessary. Apart from knowing the size in absolute numbers of the different segments of armed forces and security forces in Algeria and Egypt, we need to know more about their motivations and composition.

Egypt has a far larger security apparatus (1.3 million[139] versus 170.000[140] security forces) and military (450.000[141] compared to 140.000[142] active members) than Algeria. The main security organization of Algeria is the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS). Ghanem-Yazbeck calls the DRS "an all-powerful and feared force protecting the Algerian state" and this security apparatus fully supports the Algerian president.[143] Moreover, the DRS is very experienced in fighting threats to the Algerian state, such as radical Islamists. Egypt's prime security force is the Central Security Forces (CSF). Frish argues that the CSF was responsible for defending the Egyptian state.[144] The CSF has been established "to intimidate the political opposition and silence public expressions of dissent."[145] The CSF had been successful repressing uprisings prior to the Arab Spring due to the fact that on those occasions, the CSF outnumbered protesters. The CSF is not as effective as the Algerian DRS, due to the fact that the conscripts of the CSF are under-trained, underpaid and unmotivated.

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[139] Dunne & Revkin, 2011.
[140] Achy, March 31, 2011.
[141] The CNN Wire Staff.
[142] Achy, March 31, 2011.
[143] Ghanem-Yazbeck, Dalia. April 16, 2014.
[144] Frish, Hillel. March 12, 2013.
[145] Adam, Mohamad and Sarah Carr. November 11, 2012.

Sympathy for Islam has infiltrated the Egyptian army says Frish, "At least half of the army recruits, it must be assumed, are supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis…" Moreover, the composition of the Egyptian army does not represent the different political segments of Egypt according to Frish, "The Egyptian army hardly recruits Copt or the Sunni Egyptian upper class that equals roughly 20 percent of the population. The implications of such a recruitment pattern are that the secular and liberals are severely underrepresented in the army and the Islamists overrepresented." Feldman argues that the Algerian army is more loyal to its regime compared to Egypt, because the Algerian military of Algeria is more intertwined with the Algerian government than is the case in Egypt.[146]

The Algerian military is more intertwined with the political system compared to Egypt and it has been an important political actor since 1962.[147] The army and the security apparatus are major stakeholders in the political system based on patronage and therefore they receive a large extent of the state's income. The army and the security apparatus belong to *"le pouvoir"* (i.e., the elite that runs the country.[148]

I conclude that although Egypt has more security capabilities than Algeria, but the Algerian security capabilities are trust worthier due to their loyalty to the regime. Based on this structural factor, the Algerian regime is more likely to survive uprisings compared to Egypt.

New media

Next I will analyze the level of penetration of new media (such as social media) and alternative media outlets. I argue that higher levels undermine regime stability, because new media is more difficult to control. The high level of penetration of new media and alternative media endangered Egyptian regime stability, while this was not the case in Algeria.

Mobile phones and the Internet were the core communication channels for revolutionary activity during the Arab uprisings. Al Jazeera was the most influential non-state actor during the uprisings, according to Hugh Miles, because protesters would film atrocities committed by their regime with their cellphones and upload the movie clips to the worldwide web.[149] Al Jazeera would then pick up these images or videos and broadcast them by satellite television. Even when the Internet was cut off, citizens of the Arab world could receive

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[146] Feldman, Noah April 14, 2014.
[147] Achy, March 31, 2011 & Mandraud, February 25, 2014.
[148] Sadiki, May 10th, 2012 & The Economist, March 12th, 2012.
[149] Al Jazeera. April 22, 2010.

reporting of Al Jazeera by satellite television. The interaction between social media and satellite media proved to be dangerous to autocrats of the region, since it connected citizens across the region.

The Egyptian government temporarily cut off the Internet and mobile networks on January 28th, 2011 in an attempt to contain the uprising.[150] Prior to this black down, the government blocked Facebook and Twitter. Political activists used these channels to create awareness about the use of excessive violence by Egyptian police- and security forces.

Egypt has had more than 473,000 Facebook users in 2011.[151] That is the highest number of Facebook users in the whole Middle East and North Africa. The most visited websites in Egypt were Google, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Egypt had almost three times more citizens with access to the Internet compared to Algeria (31.4% and 12.5% respectively).

In the summer of 2010 Egyptian detectives brutally killed Egyptian blogger Khaled Said.[152] His family uploaded a horrific photo to the Internet of the beaten up face of Mr. Said. Soon "Google executive" Wael Ghonim stumbled upon the photo and he decided to create a Facebook page entitled We Are All Khaled Said.[153] A third of Egypt's Facebook users followed this Facebook page and thereby they received information about developments with regards to the prosecution of the police officers that killed Mr. Said. In a later stage the page was used to mobilize protesters, "it was that web site which first called for Egyptians to gather in protest on a day of anger on January 25."[154]

It is clear that new media and alternative media facilitated protesters to confront their incumbent autocrat. The penetration of these media was much higher in Egypt than in Algeria. Therefore, based on this structural factor, Egypt had a slightly better prospect for ousting its ruler compared to Algeria.

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[150] Al Jazeera. April 30, 2011.
[151] Preston, February 5, 2011.
[152] Preston, February 5, 2011.
[153] Londono, Ernesto. February 9, 2011.
[154] Ross & Cole, February 4, 2011.

Timing of the uprisings

Now I will evaluate the timing of the Egyptian and the Algerian uprisings respectively. The timing of uprisings affects regime stability. When uprisings take place within the electoral cycle or in close proximity to a national event, then these uprisings have a heightened chance to succeed. Especially when elections are fraudulent the probability for unrest increases.

In Egypt the uprisings did not coincide within the electoral cycle. The last Parliamentary elections before the Arab uprisings reached Egypt were held on November 28, 2010.[155] The Egyptian uprisings began almost a month later, on January 25, 2011, according to Gelvin.[156] That day was a national holiday for Egyptians, the National Police Day. Several organizations, such as "We are all Khaled Said," the April 6 Movement and individuals from political parties and labor unions called upon their fellow citizens to join demonstrations on January 25th, 2011. A second round of protests commenced on January 28, 2011.

Shenker argues that while the Mubarak has committed electoral fraud during the 2010 Parliamentary elections, this did not lead to major mobilization against the government. The Egyptian government interfered in the parliamentary elections of November 2010 using various methods, such as curtailing the mobilization of the opposition by setting in plain clothed security forces that had beaten up individuals belonging to the opposition; another method of the government is rejecting the opposition to partake in the monitoring the elections.[157]

On November 30, 2010 the White House released an official statement saying that the US Government is unhappy about the circumstances in which the Egyptian parliamentary elections took place: "irregularities at the polls, the lack of international monitors and the many problems encountered by domestic monitors, and the restrictions on the basic freedoms of association, speech and press in the run-up to the elections are worrying."[158] The Independent Coalition for Elections' Observation, a coalition of Egyptian rights groups claim that the 2010 Egyptian parliamentary elections "were full of widespread violations that brought Egypt at least 15 years back."[159]

The Algerian uprisings did not coincide with the electoral cycle either. The most recent Algerian elections before the wake of the Arab Spring were the Presidential elections

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[155] Shenker, 2010.
[156] Gelvin 2012, p.44-45
[157] Londono, 2010.
[158] The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2010.
[159] BBC News. December 7, 2010.

held on April 9, 2009.[160] While these elections were not independently monitored,[161] the elections have been classified as "largely fair."[162] The National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD), an umbrella of political activists, announced mass protests to be held on February 12, 2011 in the capital city Algiers. I argue that the timing of uprisings in Algeria was far weaker than that of Egypt. Egypt had chosen the national police day to commemorate gross human right violations by the police, symbolized by the murder on Khaled Said. That makes the Egyptian uprising more likely to succeed.

To conclude these structural factors of regime stability (effectiveness and loyalty of the security apparatus and army; penetration of new and alternative media; and timing of an uprising) in the wake of uprisings, I argue that the structural composition of Algeria made it harder for Algerians to topple their leader compared to Egypt.

Modular phenomena

A few days after former Tunisian president Ben Ali fled his country, Hamzawy argued that the Tunisian experience would have important lessons for both governments and citizens of the Arab World, "Regimes should keep the lessons in mind to avoid repeating Tunisia's experience in their own countries, while citizens can draw inspiration in hopes of effecting democratic change."[163]

That statement coincides with the logic of the modular diffusion of uprisings and illuminates two important processes. First, citizens could use prior successful uprisings as an example and as a source of valuable lessons for their own uprising. Second, the political elite could learn from uprisings that take place elsewhere and in turn they could design state policies accordingly.

Elite defection model

The elite defection model describes the case of Egypt the best. On January 28, 2011 the police forces withdrew from the site of protests because the interior minister disobeyed the order of President Hosni Mubarak to use live ammunition on protesters.[164] The same day the army deployed at Tahrir Square and soon after it announced not to shoot at demonstrators. These events lowered the structural requirements for successful action in Egypt.

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[160] International Foundation for Electoral Systems.
[161] The Economist, March 1st, 2014.
[162] Center for Systemic Peace, 2010.
[163] Hamzawy, 2011.
[164] Gelvin 2012, p.46

Elite learning

The elite learning model describes the experiences of Algeria the best. The political elite of Egypt and Algeria sought to learn valuable lessons from the Tunisian uprisings. Elite learning in Algeria raised the structural requirements for successful action. The Egyptian security system was concerned with the possibility of a spillover of revolutionary activity from Tunisia to Egypt, due to the overthrow of Tunisian president Ben Ali, "we are obviously being very alert about possible demonstrations that could be prompted by any of these incidents. We are keeping our eyes wide open."[165]

The political elite of Algeria was prepared for a spillover of demonstrations from its neighboring countries into Algeria: "for months now, Algerian authorities have been busy pre-empting a potential threat of revolution. The success of popular movements in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt sent alarming signals to government circles that Algeria was next in line to experience revolutionary change."[166]

The Algerian regime has combined repressive measurements with providing financial aid (derived from financial buffers due to oil resources) in order to prevent the outbreak of a revolution.[167] In February 2011 security forces quickly circumvented an uprising. The regime gave even more financial resources to its population after protests occurred in order to weaken the opposition. Public spending for services like food subsidies, an increase of wages and providing loans to entrepreneurs doubled in the year 2010 and 2011.[168]

When the uprisings reached Algeria, the Algerian government reacted to these protests with a mixture of the following acts: "ordering prices lowered, […] offering other economic and political concessions, and […] by displaying a considerable show of force."[169]

Learning by citizens

The Tunisian Jasmine Revolution proved to be an example for Algerian and Egyptian citizens of what was possible to achieve. Gelvin argues that although the nature of protests and the goals varied across states of the Arab Spring, there have been examples of transnational learning and sharing of mobilization techniques and symbols.[170]

The founder of the April 6 movement (i.e., an influential organized group within the Egyptian opposition), Ahmed Maher, says that the organization was in contact with the

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[165] Al Ahram Weekly, January 20-26, 2011.
[166] BBC News, July 27, 2011.
[167] Nossiter, May 19, 2012.
[168] Achy, May 31, 2012.
[169] Gelvin 2012, p. 209
[170] Gelvin 2012, p.31

Tunisian youth by Facebook. The youths of Tunisia and Egypt taught each other ways to make their struggle against their respective autocratic ruler more efficient: the Tunisian activists shared information with the Egyptian youth on how to cope with armed vehicles; tear gas bombs; and with police cordons. Furthermore, the Tunisian activists recommended the April 6 Movement to start the demonstrations at night because by then the security forces would be very exhausted. Protesters from elsewhere (e.g., Libya) came to Egypt to seek advice from the April 6 Movement. The fact that Egyptians learned a great deal from Tunisian protesters furthered Egyptians prospect to successfully overthrow their authoritarian leader. No significant learning by citizens occurred in the case of Algeria. Therefore, the structural requirements for successful action in Algeria stayed constant.

Course and outcome of uprisings in Egypt

The April 6 Youth Movement was one of the key actors in the Egyptian uprisings of 2011.[171] The movement originated after a textile strike in Mahalla attended by 70.000 protesters in April 6, 2008. The April 6 movement formulated the following demands with regard to the 2011 uprisings: Mubarak and his sons should not be allowed to run for the presidential elections; dissolve the National Assembly; disable the Emergence Laws; reform the constitution and the government; and all of these measurements need to be implemented directly.

Approximately ten thousand protesters managed to gather in Tahrir Square, the central square of Cairo on January 25, 2011. Uprisings also took place outside the capital city in places such as Alexandria, Suez, Asyut and even in the Sinai desert.[172] In these places, Gelvin argues, demonstrations were "more violent" compared to those in Cairo.

Pro-Mubarak forces appeared at Tahrir square on Wednesday morning February 2nd, 2011,[173] one day after Mubarak gave a public speech in which he told not to take part in future elections.[174;175;176] That day President Hosni Mubarak unleashed "goons on horseback and camelback" as a last resort to stop the protests.[177] Pro-Mubarak forces used live ammunition and other weapons, such as Molotov cocktails, to fight anti-Mubarak protesters, while the

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[171] Al Jazeera. April 30, 2011.
[172] Gelvin 2012, p.45
[173] Kirkpatrick and Fahim, February 2nd, 2011.
[174] The Guardian, February 2nd, 2011.
[175] Walt, February 2nd, 2011 B.
[176] Shenker et al., February 2nd, 2011.
[177] Gelvin 2012, p.46-47

army retreated.[178] From the 8th of February many workers began to strike. On the 11th of February vice-president Suleiman declared that president Hosni Mubarak would step down and that the army would take control over the state.

The recent Egyptian uprisings forced an end to the rule of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. At this height of the revolution approximately 1 million Egyptians marched the street against president Mubarak. Many scholars and citizens alike hoped that the removal of Mubarak from power would allow Egypt to make a meaningful transition to democracy. It is too early to judge whether the uprisings are true revolutions or not. Initial reports on Egypt, indicate that both the Muslim brotherhood regime led by Morsi and the military regime led by Al-Sisi again showed autocratic tendencies.

Egypt faced an extraordinary follow-up of events, amongst others: the overthrow of president Hosni Mubarak; followed by a transition period; then free elections took place in which Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi was elected and ruled for only 13 months;[179] followed by a bloody conflict between the army and anti-Morsi forces on the one hand and pro-Morsi forces on the other hand; then the army under leadership of general Abdul Fattah al-Sisi took control over the political system again.[180]

A result of the Egyptian uprisings is that the Egyptian nation is no longer afraid of those ruling over them.[181] Some argue that the military leadership is as much part of the Mubarak regime as former president Mubarak himself. The army behaved similar to the Mubarak era after the overthrow of president Mubarak. The army used live ammunition on protesters for example. The Egyptian army also murdered Copts that attended a peaceful protest.

Nature and effects of the uprisings in Algeria
Protests took place in Algeria in January and February 2011, says Gelvin.[182] Algerians marched the streets because they were dissatisfied with rising prices of "basic staples" (e.g., food), "housing", and "unemployment", says Gelvin.[183] Gelvin says Algerian demonstrators were outnumbered by police forces on that day as well as on an attempt a week later. This undermined the protestors to march. Although Algerians were unable to mobilize vast masses of demonstrators, such as those in neighboring Tunisia, "sporadic rioting" and strikes carried

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[178] Walt 2011A
[179] BBC News, March 24, 2014.
[180] Kirkpatrick, May 24, 2014.
[181] Al Jazeera. April 30, 2011.
[182] Gelvin 2012, p.98
[183] Gelvin 2012, p.98

on. Gelvin says that these riots were organized at the local level and "triggered by specific grievances."

Although major uprisings took place in January 2011, president Abdelaziz Boutefklika managed to stay in power. President Bouteflinka used a combination of "political reforms and pay rises."[184] The state was "heading towards an explosion," according to former Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour. Algerian authorities believe that riots such as the ones that took place in 2011 will no longer controllable in the future. Furthermore, the government is unable to provide jobs to the annual draft of graduates coming from the 1.5 million students enrolled in the university.

Gelvin argues that the Algerian protests did force the government to make some changes, such as the restoration of subsidies on consumer goods, the lifting of the emergency law in all places except for the capital city. Furthermore, the Algerian government promised, "limited political reform."

Why did the Algerian protests of January and February 2011 not succeed? Gelvin summarizes several explanations from "observers": "[…] effective repression; the inseparability of the military from the regime; the reluctance on the part of Algerians to revisit the horrors of civil war; Algeria's two-decade-long hemorrhaging of young professionals, the very people who played a leading role in the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings; divisions within the protest movement on everything from tactics to goals; the leading role in the CNDC played by a political party identified with an ethnic minority; the lack of support from labor on nonbread-and-butter demands; and the key role in the initial riots played by slum dwellers."[185]

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[184] The Guardian. April 28, 2014.
[185] Gelvin 2012, p.214-215.

Conclusion

I argued that Egypt was more prone for the emergence of uprisings that contested its political regime. The elite defection describes the events of Egypt during the Arab Spring the best. While elite learning occurred in the case of Algeria, raising the structural requirements for successful action. The most important structural factor for the outcome of uprisings was the loyalty and effectiveness of the security forces and army. When the Egyptian army disobeyed orders to use violence against protesters, the bar for successful action dropped. In Algeria, however, the military stayed loyal to the political elite and obeyed to its orders.

The findings of this research might be applicable to other states in the MENA. The successful overthrow of the regime in Tunisia inspired citizens elsewhere in the region, such as in Egypt and Algeria, to step up against their suppressive and authoritarian regimes. The interconnectedness of uprisings was possible due to pan-Arabism, similar destinies and modern media outlets.

Egyptians successfully ousted their repressive leader, resulting in an immediate turbulence of events. In the case of Algeria, the uprisings failed to bring results. These events are relevant for the entire region.

The spread of uprisings and regime stability is not only relevant for political scientists, but also for those responsible for designing foreign policies. When Israeli policymakers for example conduct their foreign policy, they need to take into account the political situation of its neighbors. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are dictatorships that have strong ties with the USA and they have a relative moderate stance against Israel.[186] Israeli policymakers fear that these states will take a more hostile stance against Israel when their respective dictators are ousted.

One implication of this thesis is that when investigating uprisings we cannot fully treat cases independent from each other, but we must accept that cases are, to some extent, interdependent. Further, a structural explanation for the presence or absence of a civil uprising should incorporate an assessment of diffusion mechanisms. Mechanisms of modular diffusion played a significant role in terms of the outcome of the uprisings in Egypt and Algeria. While structural requirements for a successful uprising dropped in Egypt as a consequence of elite defection, the Algerian case experienced elite learning, raising the threshold for successful action.

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[186] Bery, February 14, 2011.

A limitation of the research is the exclusion of the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On June 23rd, 2009 the so-called Green Revolution, a "model for non-violent civil rights movements," commenced in Iran.[187] The protests were stopped as a result of brutal repercussions by the government. I have chosen to exclude this case because it does not fit in the context of the Arab Spring. However, Iran does play a central role in the region for various reasons (e.g., the only Shiite-majority state; bad political relations with the West; the potential of becoming a regional hegemon), therefore I believe that incorporating the Iranian case will improve our understanding of the topics at hand.

Another shortcoming of this research is that only two cases of the Arab Spring are investigated. In order to expand our knowledge on this topic we should enlarge the number of cases. New insights in the topic of this thesis could be gained by replicating this research with the cases Libya, Bahrain, Syria and Morocco. In these cases uprisings emerged, but led to different outcomes: a regime-change took place in Libya, while uprisings in Bahrain, Syria and Morocco failed to oust the political leadership. Revolutions in Bahrain, Syria and Libya were influenced by foreign governments: the army of Saudi Arabian intervened in the Bahraini protests;[188;189] Iran provided military assistance to president Assad;[190;191;192;193;194] and the international community established a no-fly zone over Libya and used airstrikes to attack military targets.[195]

The four extra cases can also be found in the MENA and these cases have similar structural factors. One such a similarity in structural factors is the longevity of the rule of the authoritarian leader: president Muammar Gaddafi has ruled Libya for 42 years;[196] Bahrain has been ruled by prime minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa for 42 years and he is still in power;[197] president Hafez al-Assad ruled Syria until his death in 2000 and his successor was his son Bashar al-Assad. The Assad family has thus held the Syrian presidency for over four

[187] Dabashi, June 12, 2013.
[188] Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), August 9th, 2011.
[189] Ulrichsen, May 2012.
[190] Fisk, June 16, 2013.
[191] Middle East Monitor, May 18th, 2014.
[192] Saul & Hafezi, February 21st, 2014.
[193] Fassihi, August 27, 2012.
[194] Vick, May 7, 2014.
[195] Watt et al., March 18, 2011.
[196] Webley, October 20, 2011.
[197] Leigh, February 17, 2011.

decades;[198] and the Moroccan monarchy has been restored in 1956, ever since the monarchy ruled over Morocco.[199]

Another similarity is that the political regimes of Libya, Syria and Bahrain used ruthless tactics of violence in order to suppress peaceful protests. In contrast to Libya, Syria, Bahrain, the Moroccan security forces under leadership of King Mohammad VI didn't use "excessive violence" on peaceful demonstrators in 2011 and 2012.[200]

A major actor in the Moroccan demonstrations was the February 20 movement that managed to mobilize tens of thousands of Moroccans to demonstrate for political and economic reform. In the run-up to February 20, 2011 the organization, described as "a popular, nationwide protest group, [that] has proven to be the most significant political change to occur in Morocco over the past year,"[201] used social media to spread a video urging citizens to join peaceful demonstrations.[202] King Mohammad VI promised a new constitution and thereby managed (for the time being) to prevent revolution, thus the Moroccan experience was nor a revolution, nor repression, but accommodation or a "third way."[203]

Another recommendation for future study are the protests of April 2014 that preceded the 2014 Algerian presidential elections. A group called Bakarat (translation: enough) led these protests. It would be insightful to analyze whether the reactions of the government to this opposition follow the model of modular democratic revolution.

Only one type of diffusion, namely modular diffusion, has been be analyzed in this thesis. Other types of diffusion could potentially have a greater explanatory value. Moreover, it is important to investigate if other types of diffusion also interact with structural factors.

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[198] Parvaz, December 18, 2012.
[199] BBC News, April 24, 2014.
[200] El Amrani, February 21, 2014.
[201] Rahman, December 13, 2011.
[202] Lalami, February 17, 2011.
[203] Schemm, February 18, 2012.
[203] Human Rights Watch, April 18, 2014; Bouraoui & Bennoune, April 2, 2014; Zerdoumi, Jalal & Gall, April 13, 2014.

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Appendix

Name indicator:
"GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)"
Website:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD
Operationalization:
"GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current international dollars based on the 2011 ICP round."

Name indicator:
"GDP (current US$)"
Website:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
Operationalization:
"GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used."

Name indicator:
"Internet users (per 100 people)"
Website:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2?display=default
Operationalization:
"Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network."

Name indicator:
"Electoral fraud"
Operationalization:
To assess whether the Algerian and Egyptian government conducted electoral fraud I have conducted short literature analyses on reports and articles regarding prior Algerian and Egyptian elections.

Name indicator:
"Size of armed forces and security forces"
Operationalization:
To measure the size of the army and security apparatus of Algeria and Egypt respectively I will look into both number of personnel and financial budget. I will look for this information

in international reports and literature. An army consists of land forces, air force and navy. The security apparatus refers to police forces, secret service members and others that represent national security.

Name indicator:
"Composition of military and security apparatus"
Operationalization:
To assess the nature, composition and history of the army and security apparatus of Algeria and Egypt respectively I will look into literature regarding the degree of institutionalism and kinship within these institutes. The security apparatus refers to police forces, secret service members and others that represent national security.