



Universiteit Leiden

MASTERS THESIS

Saving the Libyans and skipping the Syrians, what's the deal with that?

A comparative study of international community responses to Arab Spring violence in Libya and Syria from the outbreak of conflicts until the end of 2013.

By

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Abstract

The year 2010 inaugurated a tumultuous period for a range of countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Protests compelling for democratization culminated in violent clashes between rebels and authoritarian regimes across the region. In response to the escalation of violence in Libya, an alliance of countries established a no-fly zone for halting the exorbitant regime violence against the rebels and the population. Shortly after, NATO took over command. A similar intervention in Syria did not occur, in spite of the widespread human rights violations and grave human suffering. A comparison between the cases of Libya and Syria sheds light on the factors that shaped the different international community responses to the conflicts and also contributes to the greater puzzle of why states intervene in some atrocities but not in others. This study found that a prime factor impacting humanitarian intervention occurrence in Libya and Syria is the UN Security Council's task to provide authorization within a context of disputed legality of humanitarian interventions. In addition, it is concluded that UNSC member's positions with respect to intervening were guided by their political interests and to a lesser extent by their economic interests. Finally, the anticipated outcomes of the two humanitarian intervention scenarios influenced intervention behavior, which explains why only one intervention was conducted. All these factors are indispensable components of an inclusive explanation for the different responses to the civil wars in Libya and Syria.

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“... The foreign policy of any government ... is a prolongation of its domestic policy. This is all too often forgotten in a period of 'summit' meetings, when the public is led to believe that three or four Big Men solve, or fail to solve, the world's predicaments according to whether they have or do not have the wisdom, the good will, or the magic wand needed for their task.”

Isaac Deutscher, *Great Contests: Russia and the West*

1. Introduction

The year 2010 marked the beginning of a series of uprisings against authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, popularly referred to as ‘the Arab Spring’. Violent clashes between regimes and rebel forces occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain.¹ Some other countries experienced less intense violence in what is generally perceived to be a rejection of authoritarianism and a demand for democracy.² Many initially celebrated the perceived end of authoritarianism and oppression across the Middle East and Northern Africa but the revolutions came at a high cost as many people suffered and died in the struggle for greater political freedom. Some protests led to regime change, some were brutally oppressed by regime forces and other clashes between rebels and regimes led to stalemates that still exist today.

One of the regimes that clashed with rebel forces was that of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi who had been ruling his country for 42 years. Gaddafi vigorously oppressed the protesting forces and he made his mission to remain in power explicit by pledging “to chase down the cockroaches and rats who had taken up arms against him inch by inch, room by room, home by home, and alleyway by alleyway, person by person.”³

Also Syria was hit hard by the Arab Spring and its ongoing consequences. The unrest in the country commenced in 2011 and sought the removal of the al-Assad rule. Up until

¹ Scott Williamson and Caroline Abadeer, “Protest, Uprising & Regime Change in the Arab Spring,” *Muftah* (blog), January 28, 2014, <http://muftah.org/protest-uprising-revolution-regime-change-explaining-outcomes-arab-spring/#.VMKtPkeG9o7>.

² Mary-Jane Deeb, “Arab Spring: Libya’s Second Revolution,” in *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*, eds. David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012), 68.

³ Peter Bouckaert, “Death of a dictator: bloody Vengeance in Sirtre”, *Human Rights Watch*, October 2012, 4, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya1012webwcover_0_0.pdf.

today, none of the conflict parties have managed to claim decisive victory and the country is thorn by the recent years of ongoing violence. It has caused high numbers of casualties and many people were injured. By the end of 2013, some 6.5 million Syrians were displaced and more than two million people had fled the country.⁴

France, the UK and the US intervened in Libya on March 19, 2011, and soon after NATO took over command over the mission. “Operation Unified Protector consisted of three elements: an arms embargo, a no-fly-zone and actions to protect civilians from attack or the threat of attack.”⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1973 provided the legal foundation for the intervention after receiving affirmative votes of permanent Security Council members France, the UK and the US, while China and Russia abstained from voting and thus facilitated an intervention by not using their veto power.⁶

Resolution 1973 was preceded by the unanimously adopted Resolution 1970, which made explicit mentioning of Libya’s obligations under the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P.⁷ Mohammed Nuruzzaman argues that the Libyan failure to uphold its responsibilities provided Western leaders with the grounds for justifying intervention under R2P for the first time.⁸ NATO involvement enabled the rebel forces to prevail in the battle, which eventually led to the capture and killing of Gadhafi on October 20, 2011.⁹ Francesco Francioni and Christine Bakker view the resolute response to ‘Libya’ as in sharp contrast with “the prolonged inertia of the international community vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis.”¹⁰ It was established that chemical weapons were used in the conflict by the Syrian regime, leading to the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2118 in September 2013, calling for the destruction of

⁴ “Syria Crisis: UN Launches Record \$6.5bn Aid Appeal,” BBC News Middle East, December 16, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25398012>.

⁵ “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats,” NATO, Brussels, 2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf.

⁶ “Security Council Approves ‘No-fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favor With 5 Abstentions”, *United Nations*, March 17, 2011, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>.

⁷ R2P is an instrument designed to address the absence of an adequate normative system for international community involvement in cases of human rights abuses and grave human suffering. The principle provides that if a state fails to uphold its responsibility to protect its citizens, this responsibility shifts to the international community and thus an intervention may be justified under R2P. Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa, The International Development Research Center, 2001).

⁸ Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Revisiting ‘Responsibility to Protect’ after Libya and Syria,” *E-International Relations* (blog), March 8, 2014, <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/08/revisiting-responsibility-to-protect-after-libya-and-syria/>.

⁹ Bouckaert, “Death of a dictator: bloody vengeance in Sirtre”, 23-25.

¹⁰ Francesco Francioni and Christine Bakker, “Responsibility to Protect, Humanitarian Intervention and Human Rights: Lessons From Libya and Mali,” *Transworld*, working paper 15, (2013): 3, http://www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW_WP_15.pdf.

Syria's chemical weapons. The Syrian regime cooperated and its chemical weapons arsenal was destroyed.¹¹ In spite of this response to the use of chemical weapons, the conflict rages on today and so do the human rights violations and humanitarian crisis.

It is a striking phenomenon that the people of one country receive sufficient international community assistance for stopping the mass killing campaigns in their country while the people of another country do not. This is especially so in a time in which statements and talks on reciprocal international community responsibilities, such as R2P, dominate global politics.

Scholars are entangled in widespread debate on the factors causing international community willingness or refusal to intervene in humanitarian crises. Among them is Roland Paris, who explains inconsistent responses to be rooted in the disputed legality of humanitarian intervention and R2P, because of which the use of the concepts backfire on both interveners and on the concept itself.¹² Robert Pape found asserts that states fear intervention costs to run out of hand, by which a humanitarian intervention can threaten the welfare of the intervening state's citizens.¹³

The main question that this thesis seeks to answer is why the Libyans were saved and the Syrians are not, hence the title of this thesis. Do characteristics or shortcoming of the international legal framework concerning humanitarian interventions contribute to an explanation for the difference in responding to Libya and Syria? Can the difference between the responses be traced back to the interests and motives of the most important potential interveners and the opponents of intervening? Finally, can differences in conflict dynamics and complexity, thereby simply causing one conflict to constitute a greater challenge to resolve, explain why an intervention emerged in only one of the two cases? Finding answers to these questions is important as it sheds light on which factors influence decision-making processes on humanitarian interventions. It should be noted that the scope of this thesis is limited to the identification of answers to these questions, rather than that it aims to evaluate the success of the Libyan intervention or advocates a certain policy or strategy for the conflict in Syria. What it will do is provide suggestions for further research on the basis of the findings.

¹¹ Carsten Stahn, "Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment: on 'Red Lines' and 'Blurred Lines'," *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 11 (2013): 955

¹² Roland Paris, "The Responsibility to Protect' and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Action," *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 5 (2014): 593, doi: 10.1080/13533312.2014.963322

¹³ Robert Pape, "When Duty Calls: a Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention," *International Security* 37, no.1 (2012): 80.

In order to find answers to the puzzle of the different responses, I investigate which factors drive *a state or an alliance of states*, to conduct a *humanitarian intervention*, either *with or without UN approval*, or to *refrain from doing so*. A definition of humanitarian intervention that is provided by Tom J. Farer is used for the conduct of this research. He defines humanitarian intervention as “The use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than the own citizens, without the permission of the government of the state within whose territory force is applied.”¹⁴

The literature review explores and studies different theoretical explanations for divergences in humanitarian intervention behavior. The first major issue addressed is the role of the international legal framework and its inherent imperfections. J.L. Holzgrefe argues that contrasting provisions within the plentitude of international legal and normative documents on the matter facilitate inconsistent state behavior in general behavior and also with respect to humanitarian interventions in particular.¹⁵ The second issue pointed out is the potential role of the interests and motives of potential interveners and opponents of intervention. This discussion draws from Robert Pattison’s work on the dichotomy between self-interested motives vs. humanitarian considerations as the perceived driving forces behind intervention plans. Douglas Lemke and Patrick Regan are among the authors who represent one side of the debate, asserting that states are eventually pursuing their own interests.¹⁶ Constructivist Martha Finnemore contrasts this view; she contends that humanitarian aspirations are sufficient for guiding state behavior concerning intervening.¹⁷ The third focus is the role of the anticipated feasibility of intervention objectives in light of the capacity or willingness of international community members to commit to a rescue mission. Nicolas Wheeler and Alex Bellamy assert that the difficulty, or perhaps impossibility, to make reliable estimations on the impact of an intervention and the financial burden it imposes upon the intervener causes reluctance to get involved.¹⁸

¹⁴ Tom J. Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11,” in *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, eds. J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 55.

¹⁵ J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, eds. J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8-43.

¹⁶ Douglas Lemke and Patrick M. Regan, “Intervention as Influence,” in *The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem*, ed. Paul F. Diehl (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), 164.

¹⁷ Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

¹⁸ Nicolas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics.” In *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (2nd edition), ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

The literature review facilitated the formulation of three hypotheses, of which each potentially contributes to an inclusive explanation for the different international community responses to Libya and Syria. The resulting hypotheses test for the role of political and economic interests and motives, for the impact of anticipated intervention outcomes and for the influence of relevant features to the international legal framework.

The study is a full-fledged two-case comparison between the cases of Libya and Syria, as this approach is anticipated to deliver the most insightful answers to the puzzling issue of different international community responses to the two cases, and presumably also to the general phenomenon of perceived inconsistent humanitarian intervention behavior.

2. Literature and theoretical framework

Literature review

The following literature review briefly addresses the definition, purpose and potential of humanitarian intervention. Thereafter the existing academic efforts to identify and explain factors that impact humanitarian intervention behavior are introduced and discussed.

- *Humanitarian intervention: definition, purpose and potential*

There are different definitions of the concept humanitarian intervention in circulation but most do not dispute the core aspects. A definition that is often used is provided by J.L. Holzgrefe who explains the phenomenon as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than the own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”¹⁹ Tom J. Farer adopts this definition in his work but leaves out ‘the threat of force’ and thus limits the use of the term to the application of force only.²⁰ Robert Pattison identifies four conditions of humanitarian intervention. He contends that a humanitarian intervention must be a forcible (military) intervention without ‘invitation’ and that it must be carried out during the occurrence of grave human suffering and not after. In addition, he argues that a humanitarian purpose must be present and that humanitarian interventions must be conducted by an external power.²¹

Humanitarian intervention is an intervention of modern times, nor is its disputed status. For example, Sean Murphy elaborates on Hugo the Grotius’ 17th century attempts to promote the idea of protecting nationals of other states. The Grotius argued for kings to have “the right for demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any person whatsoever.”²² Many scholars, among them Klejda Mulaj and Muzaffer Yilmaz, argue that the humanitarian intervention doctrine has been rather invisible during the Cold War era. The end of the Cold War is explained to have inaugurated a new period for humanitarian intervention as with the

¹⁹ Holzgrefe, “The humanitarian intervention debate,” 18.

²⁰ Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11,” 55.

²¹ James Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 25 - 27

²² Sean D. Murphy, *Humanitarian Intervention: the United Nations in an Evolving World Order.* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1996), 44.

disappearance of the main ideological dividing line, intra-state conflict became the main threat to peace.²³

In spite of the early conceptualization of humanitarian intervention, the concept remains controversial and contested today. Jerry M'bartee Lucola argues that opponents of the concept have rather obscure motives; "Most states that reject the principle of humanitarian intervention are at the forefront of human rights abuses ... and hide behind the concept of sovereignty."²⁴ The scholarly debate on humanitarian interventions is frequently given the shape of a tradeoff between the protection of individuals on the one hand and the upholding of the sovereignty principle on the other. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan addressed the issue by rhetorically questioning if sovereignty is really such an important value at stake in this discussion. He stated that "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"²⁵

Roland Paris identifies five structure problems inherent to preventive humanitarian action that mark the concept's limited potential. These are the mixed motives problem, the counterfactual problem, the conspicuous harm problem, the end-state problem and the inconsistency problem²⁶. The mixed motives problem refers to a perceived dichotomy between altruistic humanitarian objectives vs. self-interested objectives as providing the true underlying motivation for intervening. The mentioning of the counterfactual problem addresses the impossibility of evaluating humanitarian interventions' relative successes, noting that the results of non-executed alternative policy options need to be imagined. The conspicuous harm problem refers to the issue of obvious costs in combination with immeasurable benefits of interventions and the end-state problem touches upon the question of how to disengage after intervening without recreating a situation similar to prior to the intervention. Finally, the inconsistency problem concerns the perceived imperfection of

²³ Klejda Mulaj, "Dilemmas of Reacting to Mass Atrocities: Humanitarian Intervention to End Violent Conflict in the Western Balkans," *Democracy and Security* 7, no. 2 (2011): ?, doi: 10.1080/17419166.2011.572783; Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, "Intra-state conflict in the post Cold-war era," *International Journal on World Peace* 24, no. 4 (2007): 140.

²⁴ Jerry M'bartee Locula, "The Theory and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and the Interest of Western Powers: Liberia, Darfur, Rwanda, Iraq, and Libya," *University for Peace and Conflict Monitor*, last modified may 3, 2011, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=796#_ftn3.

²⁵ Alex J. Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 35.

²⁶ Paris, "The 'Responsibility to Protect' and the Structural Problem of Preventive Humanitarian Action," 570.

norms, causing that interventions are established in some cases and not in other cases. Paris concludes that such inconsistency heavily impacts the credibility of humanitarian interventions.²⁷ Klejda Murai summarizes the consequences of the controversies inherent to humanitarian interventions, stating, “The complexities of humanitarian intervention insofar as its implementation is concerned seem to suggest that intervention is doomed if it happens (because of the stringent criteria applied for its justification) and doomed if it does not happen (because of inaction in the face of large-scale atrocities).”²⁸

Research towards potential factors of influences on humanitarian intervention behavior, causing or promoting policy decisions for intervention and for non-intervention respectively, yielded three main explanatory factors.

- *The disputed legality of humanitarian interventions and the role of the UNSC*

Antony D’Amato states “International law only exists in the sense that nation-state officials in their international dealings refer to it, both by direct literal reference and by the use of legal argumentation in claim-conflict situations.”²⁹ Holzgrefe agrees by stating that the sources of international law are generally stipulated as in accordance with the Statute of the International Court of Justice.³⁰ Article 38(1) of the Statute reads that the sources are “(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law...”

Problems arise when attempting to determine more specifically the content of international law by looking at international conventions and state practice, as prescribed by the ICJ. Holzgrefe observes that the essence of international agreements is disputed because of the contrasting nature of different international conventions, whereby the occurrence of different interpretations is facilitated.³¹ Antony D’Amato addresses the difficulty of determining the content of international custom. He explains that observing state behavior does not necessarily lead to knowledge on the content of customary law. He views custom to be rooted in state beliefs rather than in state practice, and argues that states may not always

²⁷ Ibid., 571 – 579, 593

²⁸ Mulaj, “Dilemmas of Reacting to Mass Atrocities: Humanitarian Intervention to End Violent Conflict in the Western Balkans,” 143.

²⁹ Antony D’Amato, *The Concept of Custom in International Law* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 33.

³⁰ Holzgrefe, “The humanitarian intervention debate,” 36-37.

³¹ Ibid., 38-43.

act in accordance to their true convictions if certain (vital) state interests are at stake.³² Ian Hurd applies the notion of ambiguity of international law to the question of humanitarian intervention legality, stating “There is no consensus over the legality of intervention, in part because there is no consensus over the sources of international law more generally.”³³ Hurd concludes that the intervention problem is inseparable from the questions that have been at the heart of international law for centuries. Holzgrefe downplays the controversy somewhat by carefully suggesting that the sources of law may be subject to a certain order of authority. He provides the example that for claiming there to exist a ‘right’ or ‘obligation’ to intervene, one is required to conduct a rather selective reading of the documents of international law.³⁴

The argument for humanitarian intervention ambiguity is countered by scholars who contend the phenomenon to be formally sheer legal or illegal under international law. Advocates of humanitarian intervention illegality often refer to the UN Charter as the primary source of law, and put forward the numerous restrictions on the use of force that it contains.³⁵ It is argued that the brief mentioning of ‘faith in human rights’ in the Charter’s preamble cannot be read as to the restrictions on the use of force that are set out in the remainder of the legal document.

Innocent Okoronye and V.O.S. Okeke advocate the contrasting view and state “The right to interfere in the territorial integrity and political independence of a state by another state on humanitarian grounds had been firmly established under customary international law.”³⁶ They deem the prohibition of the use of force as stated in the UN Charter not to prohibit humanitarian interventions as such interventions were consolidated long before the Charter was written, and also, the Charter is explained to not regulate all uses of force in international relations.³⁷

As provided in article 42 of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council is charged with the task of authorizing interventions as international law forbids the use of force unless it concerns an act of self-defense or has received UNSC approval. Wheeler and Bellamy explain that it is

³² D’Amato, *The Concept of Custom in International Law*, 73.

³³ Ian Hurd, “Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 25 (2011): 311.

³⁴ Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 49.

³⁵ UN Charter article 2(1) emphasizes the principle of sovereignty and equality between states, article 2(4) explicitly prohibits the use of force against other states and article 2(7) determines that the content of the Charter does not authorize action within the jurisdiction of a state. Articles 42 and 51 provide two exceptions to the rules of article 2. These are Security Council authorization and the necessity of self-defense respectively.

³⁶ Innocent Okoronye and V.O.S. Okeke, “An Appraisal of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law,” *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence* 2 (2011): 147.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 146-147.

subject of debate if humanitarian intervention should be exempted from the general ban on the use of force.³⁸ The reason for this is the perception that the UNSC's role in determining legality constitutes an undesirable coincidence of politics and law. The permanent SC members have been accused of failing to sufficiently disregard their own interests in UNSC decision-making on humanitarian issues. Eve Massingham criticizes this state of affairs, stating "Even if you argue that the United Nations Charter legally supports a wider use of force for humanitarian ends ..., the reality is that, only when and where it meets the self-interest criteria of those nations with the capacity to protect vulnerable populations will such populations be protected."³⁹

- *The role of political and economic interests and motivations*

James Pattison views motives and intentions to play determining roles in decision-making processes on whether interventions are conducted or not.⁴⁰ He distinguishes between two issues of relevance concerning intentions: the role of the nature of intentions and the role of the successful political communications of intentions. The former issue, the nature of intentions, is by Pattison explained as a dichotomy between humanitarian considerations vs. self-interested motives as the true underlying rationale for humanitarian interventions.⁴¹ This dichotomy forms a major dividing line between scholarly explanations. Douglas Lemke and Patrick Regan advocate a realist perspective on the matter, emphasizing that states are ultimately self-interested entities and their highest purpose is to protect their own citizens.⁴² Constructivist Martha Finnemore asserts that a state's aspirations to improve humanitarian circumstances elsewhere in the world can suffice as a foundation for humanitarian action⁴³. Jon Western arrives at a similar conclusion and states that the promotion of peace and humanitarian goals is a viable intervention motivation.⁴⁴ Theodora Gizelis and Kristin Kosek argue for the existence of a trend break in time with the end of the Cold War. They assert that "Where states traditionally have intervened in the affairs of other states to defend either their strategic or private interests, humanitarian concerns, such as preventing human suffering in

³⁸ Wheeler and Bellamy, "Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics."

³⁹ Eve Massingham, "Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes: Does the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Advance the Legality of the Use of Force for Humanitarian Ends?" *International Review of the Red Cross* 91, no. 876 (2009): 831. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1816383110000196>.

⁴⁰ Pattison, "Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?" 155.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Lemke and Regan, "Intervention as Influence", 164.

⁴³ Finnemore, *The purpose of intervention*.

⁴⁴ Jon Western, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia," *International Security* 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002).

severe civil wars, have increasingly become cited as a rationale for involvement in other states.”⁴⁵

Some may question the relevance of studying state’s true intentions given that real life action may rescue people but mere beliefs are unlikely to do so. Robert Pattison and also Sang Kim counter this argument, contending that humanitarian interventions rooted in self-interest enjoy greater dedication and thus the chances of their actual realization increase or decrease depending on the intervener’s interests and motives.⁴⁶ This argument contrasts the findings of Seung-Whan Choi, whose quantitative analysis of US intervention behavior between 1981 and 2005 led him to conclude that US interventions have been rooted in humanitarian considerations and the preserving of liberal norms and moral values, and not in motivations fuelled by national interests.⁴⁷

- *The role of anticipated intervention outcomes and costs*

An important question is if one should conduct a humanitarian intervention if it is uncertain that an improvement of the humanitarian situation will occur. Skeptics say that in case of such uncertainty interventions should not carry the humanitarian label as the lack of a credible humanitarian foundation for the policy plan makes it a ‘regular’ war. Bellamy supports this line of reasoning by asserting that it must be successfully demonstrated by decision-makers that “The overall good that an intervention will produce is likely (we can never know for certain) to outweigh the overall evil that the war will produce. This involves demonstrating that intervention is a humanitarian necessity, that the chosen strategy will not produce more harm than good, and that once war is over a just peace will be restored in the region.”⁴⁸ On a practical level, Pattison notes that humanitarian intervention objectives need to be viewed as convincingly feasible in order to gain sufficient domestic support for intervening in a humanitarian crisis elsewhere in the world.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Kristin E. Kosek, “Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail: the Role of Local Participation,” *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 40, no. 4 (2005): 365.

⁴⁶ Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* 156; Sang Ki Kim, “Third-Party Intervention in Civil Wars: Motivation, War Outcomes, and Post-War Development” (PhD thesis, University of Iowa, 2012), 19, <http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3484&context=etd>.

⁴⁷ Seung-Whan Choi, “What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 2 (2013) doi:10.1177/0738894212473916.

⁴⁸ Alex J. Bellamy, “Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention,” *Journal of Military Ethics* 3, no. 3 (2004): 230, doi: 10.1080/15027570410006192.

⁴⁹ Pattison, *Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect: who should intervene?* 175.

Next to the difficulty of estimating intervention outcomes, the difficulty of estimating intervention costs prior to intervening is argued to play a role. Michael Barnett and others explain that it was learned from hard lessons in the past that a humanitarian intervention must include a post-intervention commitment and strategy. “Nearly 50 percent of all countries receiving assistance slide back into conflict within five years.”⁵⁰ Thus, halting violence should be seen as only one of the objectives of modern humanitarian missions as a failure to establish positive peace may lead to relapse into violence. The post-intervention commitment requirement is an example of a factor further complicating the making of reliable cost estimations, as it introduces that both short-term and long-term objectives must be included in policy trade-offs attempting to enhancing peace and security.

Pape says that in case of “Absent serious discussion of costs, opponents can more easily argue against any moral action for fear of creating a precedent for limitless obligations that would jeopardize the wealth, power, and security of the intervening state.”⁵¹ Thus, a humanitarian intervention for which it is relatively difficult to estimate the necessary scope and the thereto-connected price tag, is likely to be unpopular among foreign policy decision-makers. It is only logic that a similar unpopularity is attributed to intervention plans for which the costs are deemed too high. High costs, either in straightforward monetary terms or in the form of e.g. negative domestic or international political consequences, may cause an intervention to directly contrast the self-interest of a potential intervener.⁵²

The gap

The literature on humanitarian intervention behavior identifies many factors that may contribute to an explanation for humanitarian intervention behavior. Among the most prominent ones are political interests and motives. In addition, anticipated intervention outcomes and the estimated costs of interventions are viewed to play a role. Finally, a set of features, or imperfections, to the international legal and normative provisions on humanitarian intervention influence intervention behavior, as it leaves vacuum in which other factors can take precedence over humanitarian considerations.

This thesis contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. Firstly, it brings together contemporary theory and recent cases. It is concluded from the review that most of the literature on humanitarian interventions can be categorized in two types. There is an

⁵⁰ Michael Barnett et al., “Peacebuilding: What’s in a Name?” *Global Governance* 13 (2007): 35.

⁵¹ Pape, “When Duty Calls: a Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention,” 49.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 55.

extensive body of literature that focuses on the legal and normative dimensions of humanitarian intervention on the one hand and there is an array of works evaluating humanitarian intervention successes on the other hand. What remains underexposed is the linkage between the research towards the theoretical and practical aspects of humanitarian interventions, given that the legal and normative aspect may poorly corresponds to the actual conduct of humanitarian interventions. Secondly, a recurring conspicuousness is identified within the second type of literature; the evaluation of intervention examples. The focus is disproportionately on interventions that were established as opposed to the adequate inclusion of interventions that failed to materialize for whatever reason. In this respect, the study of responses to humanitarian crises is incomplete. The advancement of academic knowledge on the factors that determine humanitarian intervention behavior depends on the inclusion of non-materialized interventions in the equation, as the one-sided nature of the current research focus paints an incomplete picture. This thesis addresses the gap by the conduct of a two-case comparison between an intervention that did materialize and one that did not.

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

This section outlines the dependent variable and the independent variables that are derived from the literature review, and that will give shape to the remainder of this thesis.

Dependent and independent variables

The main subject under investigation, or dependent variable, is the difference in responses to humanitarian crises. The international community chose for a policy of intervention in one case and for non-intervention in the other, in spite of both cases representing situations of large scale human rights violations and human suffering. The research includes single states and alliances of states, with or without UNSC approval, as the parties that may determine the outcome variable.

As outlined in the review, three potential explanations are subject of investigation, with the possible conclusion that one, two or all three of those contribute to an inclusive answer to the central question of why there was an intervention in Libya but not in Syria. The first explanation is rooted in *the characteristics of the international legal framework* as providing an explanation. International law sets the framework for state behavior but lacks central authority and enforcement mechanisms (that characterize most national legal systems). The inclusion of this hypothesis may be surprising, given that Libya and Syria were subject to the same legal framework. However, the assumption is not that the legal

framework has caused the different responses; rather it is assumed that it has facilitated them. Providing an inclusive answer to the outcome variable is the main aim and thus the facilitating features of the legal system need addressing. Thus, the question of legality does not constitute a typical explanatory variable, and should not be viewed to operate on equal footing with the other explanations. Rather it illustrates the context in which the other explanations may impact intervention behavior.

Main factors impacting intervention behavior are assumed to be *interests and motives* for an intervention; these at least partly determine if interventions are conducted by international community members or not. An analysis of broader political and economic interests at stake will deliver insight into the impact of interests on intervention.

Expectations on a humanitarian intervention's likelihood to improve a humanitarian situation, *the anticipated intervention outcomes*, are viewed to be a major factor impacting on intervention establishment. As resources are limited, a cost-benefit analysis is a logical expectation when assessing the feasibility of outcomes. The monetary cost issue is excluded, as decision-makers do not write up a specific budget prior to intervening. Instead, the focus is on broader factors that complicate conflict resolution.

For the purpose of practical application to the cases, the explanatory variables are operationalized as follows:

1. *The ambiguity of humanitarian interventions under international law and the role of UNSC authorization*

International law may guide behavior but (in many respects) it fails to bind its subjects. The main assumption with respect to the impact of legality is that imperfections of the international legal system have facilitated the occurrence of different outcomes. The UNSC is charged with the task of authorizing humanitarian interventions while their general rightfulness is disputed. This leads to the impression that the permanent UNSC members may make use of the ambiguousness around humanitarian interventions, aligning their votes with the own agenda rather than humanitarian considerations. The scheme for further investigating the UNSC's voting behavior looks as follows:

- *The impact of the UNSC's role in authorizing, and thus legalizing, humanitarian interventions.*
 - SC voting on Libya

- SC voting on Syria
- How 'Libya' influenced SC 'Syria'

2. *Political and economic interests and motives*

The interests of the countries that are seen to most prominently mark international community actions, the permanent members of the UNSC, are identified, analyzed and discussed. These countries are referred to as 'great powers'. As established in the literature review, self-interest is perceived to play a large role in the decision-making processes preceding humanitarian intervention plans. An analysis of interests at stake is thus an indispensable replenishment to the analysis of voting behavior.

A qualitative interpretation of the findings provides insight into the role that political and economic interests may have played, in the decision-making processes that preceded the international community responses of intervention and nonintervention to crisis in Libya and Syria respectively. The results are presented according to the following scheme:

- Political and economic interests at stake in the Libyan crisis
 - USA, France and the UK
 - Russia and China
- Political and economic interests at stake in the Syrian crises.
 - USA, France and the UK
 - Russia and China

3. *Anticipated intervention outcomes*

Part of the decision-making process preceding policies of intervention or nonintervention is the careful estimation of the usefulness of that intervention. As such, perceived simplicity or difficulty to resolve a humanitarian crisis is likely to, and should, impact the decision-making processes. This issue is addressed by investigating three main factors that are deemed relevant for the feasibility of intervention objectives.

The military capacity of regimes is an important consideration for determining intervention objectives' feasibility, as the 'receiving' regime is the military opponents that the intervening party encounters. The levels of domestic and international support for the regimes are assumed to complicate the establishment of an intervention. Domestic regime popularity may be an indicator for resistance against an intervention and international support for the regime impacts intervention establishment as it can for example incur political costs on

interveners and problematize UNSC decision-making. Finally, the composition of society is an important factor for the long-term objectives of intervention. Highly fragmented societies with troublesome relations among the different groups may require a greater post-conflict commitment after an intervention has destabilizing society. The scheme looks as follows:

- Libya
 - Military capacity of the current regime
 - Domestic and international support for the regime
 - The composition of society
- Syria
 - Military capacity of the current regime
 - Domestic and international support for the regime
 - The composition of society

The set of hypotheses designed on the basis of the variables looks as follows:

H1 The disputed status of humanitarian interventions under international law and the UNSC's role in authorizing interventions cause a poor correspondence between intervention legality and humanitarian necessity.

H2 The great powers' political and economic interests at stake caused the occurrence of an intervention in Libya but not in Syria.

H3 Expectations regarding the necessary commitment for resolving the Syria crisis prevented an intervention for ending the conflict, as seen in Libya.

It should be noted that the hypotheses are not strict alternatives to one another; rather they are potential components of an inclusive answer to the question of different international responses. The use of 'inclusive explanation' here refers to the multi-faceted character of the explanation, rather than to an (impossible) aim of unveiling all factors of relevance in the literal sense.

It is possible that one, two or all three of the hypotheses are confirmed. Alternatively it can be the case that none of the hypotheses have significant explanatory value. The fact that the hypotheses are components rather than alternatives stems from decisions made in the design of this study, rooted in the ambition to provide an inclusive answer.

If one or more hypotheses are confirmed, subsequent research needs to be conducted on the basis of those hypotheses. If none hold, additional hypotheses need to be formed or the case selection needs to be reviewed. Finally, given the qualitative nature of this research and the general character of the hypotheses, the hypotheses may be proven partially true if they explain some phenomena but not all. In this case the formation of additional, more specific, hypotheses offers a solution.

3. Research design

Case selection

The cases of Libya and Syria are chosen on the basis of a number of considerations. This section introduces the cases as well as their specific characteristics that make them suitable subjects of analysis in the comparison at hand.

Libya

After 42 years of tyranny and oppression, the Libyan Revolution was one that was long in the making when the uprisings started in Benghazi on February 15, 2011.⁵³ The international community was baffled by the exorbitant use of violence as Gaddafi's security forces used their weapons indiscriminately and fired at the protesting crowds. The rebel forces formed the National Transitional Council, or NTC, and challenged the Gaddafi regime as the representative body of the Libyan people. The UN recognized the NTC as the rightful representation of Libyans on September 16.⁵⁴

Earlier that year, in March, the continued violence by the regime forces caused the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973 for the establishment of a no-fly zone and the protection of the Libyan people against Gaddafi's forces 'by means of all necessary measures.'⁵⁵ The Gaddafi regime was overthrown and Muammar was captured and killed by Libyans, after NATO jets had fired at former leader's convoy.

Many scholars have discussed the factors responsible for the course of events in Libya. Gaddafi's isolated position and attitude with respect to his people is explained to have caused his popularity to wane early in the conflict, thereby enabling the uprisings to spread swiftly over the country. For example, Libya is generally seen to have great potential because of its oil resources, but high levels of nepotism and corruption under Gaddafi's rule prevented ordinary Libyans from benefitting.⁵⁶ In addition, Gaddafi left a range of minorities within Libya's society deeply dissatisfied as the regime actively discriminated against different

⁵³ Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *Libya, From Repression to Revolution* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 123.

⁵⁴ Emily O'Brien and Richard Gowan, "The International Role in Libya's Transition, August 2011 – March 2012," *Center on International Cooperation*, http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/libya_diplomatic_transition.pdf.

⁵⁵ Constantine Antonopoulos, "The Legitimacy to Legitimize: the Security Council Action in Libya Under Resolution 1973 (2011)," *International Community Law Review* 14 (2012): 371.

⁵⁶ Jan Maessen, "The Libyan Intervention, Triumph and Downfall of the Responsibility to Protect in One," (Master's thesis, Leiden University, 2012), 16. <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/19368/MA%20Thesis%20Jan%20Maessen.pdf?sequence=1>.

groups, subjecting people arbitrarily to arrests and conducting political terrorism against exiles abroad.⁵⁷

It is a common observation that a robust patronage system is an important pillar on which authoritarian regimes rely.⁵⁸ Gaddafi's system proved to have been rather brittle, given the rapidity with which his regime crumbled. High-level professionals such as lawyers, businessmen and politicians joined the rebels in an early stage of the revolt and they were exactly the people Gaddafi should have kept close.⁵⁹

During his more than four-decade rule, Muammar Gaddafi developed a tradition of keeping his military forces weak, as he feared military coups to be organized. The weakness of the military caused it to split up soon after the outbreak of violence. One part joined the revolutionaries and thus the rebels, later the NTC, enjoyed a significant influx of military professionals, while Gaddafi was forced to hire external militias from the countries located south of Libya.⁶⁰

Syria

The uprisings in Syria started in March 2011 and initially protested against the high levels of corruption and human rights abuses in the country.⁶¹ The civil conflict became a civil war after many had defected from the regime forces and joined the Free Syrian Army, which was an amalgamation of different rebelling groups. The international community witnessed a humanitarian catastrophe that left 6.5 million people displaced at the end of 2013 of whom many fled to neighboring countries. Life in the overcrowded refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Egypt is said to be not much better than in Syria itself.⁶²

The Syrian society is highly fragmented, yet the al-Assad regime is perceived relatively strongly anchored within it. Many people support the regime for its stabilizing

⁵⁷ Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *Libya: From Repression to Revolt*, 123.

⁵⁸ Lisa Blaydes, "Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt" (paper presented at the Conference on Dictatorships, Stanford University, April 2008), <https://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/Dictatorships042508/Blaydes.pdf>; Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *Libya: From Repression to Revolt*, 70, 123.

⁵⁹ Deep, "The Arab Spring, Libya's Second Revolution," 71.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ David W. Lesch, "The Uprising That Wasn't Supposed to Happen: Syria and the Arab Spring," in *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*, eds. David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012), 79.

⁶² "An International Failure: the Syrian Refugee Crisis," *Amnesty International*, December 13, 2013, <http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/ACT34/001/2013/en/8a376b76-d031-48a6-9588-ed9aee651d52/act340012013en.pdf>.

capacity.⁶³ The al-Assad family belongs to the Alawite minority and Assad is by many seen as a protector of the different minorities in the country. The fact that roughly 75 percent of the population belongs to the Sunni Muslim majority is deemed to give al-Assad a baseline of support among the minorities. Minorities fear that a revolution will lead to the Sunni Muslim Majority taking over control, thereby inaugurating the end of the secular state and relative protection of (non-Muslim) minorities.⁶⁴

The al-Assad regime has convinced many Syrians that ‘foreign evil’ is to blame for the current state of Syria. External forces are accused of organizing and manipulating the rebels and are thus held responsible for the unrest, rather than a range of deeply rooted societal wrongs. Syria’s elite, e.g. businessmen and military officials, has remained relatively loyal to the Assad-rule. On the global political level the Syrian regime finds itself backed by Russia and China, whose support prevents strong UN action from materializing. International sanctions failed to end the violence as Russia and also Iran continued to provide material support to the regime.⁶⁵

A remarkable chapter in the Syria crisis is the chemical weapons issue. More than two years after the outbreak of violence President Obama of the US addressed circulating rumors on the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. He said: “That is a red line for us and there would be enormous consequences if we would be seeing movement on the chemical weapons or the use of chemical weapons. That would change my calculus significantly.”⁶⁶ Many interpreted this statement as a signal for action, based on the belief that it was a matter of time before evidence on chemical weapons use would surface. The UK, France, the US itself and finally the relevant UN commission, all concluded that chemical weapons were used. However, Russian diplomatic interference prevented the US from having to act upon what was by many interpreted as a promise for intervention. The Russians negotiated a deal and offered the Syrian regime to comply with the destruction of its chemical weapons. More disastrous international action was thereby averted.⁶⁷

⁶³ Joshua Landis, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad Regime is Likely to Survive to 2013,” Middle East Policy Council 19, no. 1 (2012), <http://www.mepec.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/syrian-uprising-2011-why-asad-regime-likely-survive-2013>.

⁶⁴ Lesch, “The Uprising That Wasn’t Supposed to Happen: Syria and the Arab Spring,” 83.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Citizen Media for We The People, “Obama Syria and the Red Line 8-20-2012,” YouTube video, 3.00-3.18, August 26, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LfFeLmYe_BQ.

⁶⁷ Raluca Cozma and Claudia Kozman, “The Syrian Crisis in the News,” *Journalism Practice* (2014): 2. doi:10.1080/17512786.2014.982940 .

Commonalities and differences

The two cases have in common the wider Arab Spring context and they experienced similar scenarios of escalating regime violence against the rebels and population, leading to all-out civil wars. A major difference concerning the two leaderships is the language they used. Gaddafi promised to destroy every single one of his opponents, while al-Assad has not expressed such strong language. Another example is the fundamentally different position the leaders had in domestic and international politics and society. Concerning the dynamics of the conflict it should be noted that the Syrian society is much more fragmented in composition than the Libyan society, and that external stakeholders have different interests in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Finally, a very important note to be made is that the handling of the Libyan conflict is by many observed to have affected the handling of the Syrian conflict.

Data collection and methods

The theoretical foundation of this thesis is provided by the existing literature on humanitarian interventions. The availability of literature is unproblematic as humanitarian interventions have been at the center of scholarly discussion. The quality of the case studies depends on the obtainments of reliable information on the crises of Libya and Syria. The Arab Spring may be a recent phenomenon but scholars have fundamentally enriched the academic account of the matter. In addition to academic articles, among the sources used are government reports, produced by different governments and publications by different organizations such as the UN, NGO's and human rights institutions. PhD and master's theses are used as students developed an early interest in the Arab Spring and have contributed significantly to the available information. Finally, articles by major news sources, such as BBC and CNN, are limitedly used, as well as blogs written by international relations specialists.

The gathered information is presented according to the operationalized independent variables and the hypotheses. The findings are discussed in a separate section at the end of each chapter.

4. The disputed legality of humanitarian interventions and the role of the UNSC

As discussed in the literature review the sources of international law contain diverging provisions on humanitarian interventions and thus their status remains ambiguous. The fact that the permanent members of the UNSC, the US, France, the UK, Russia and China, are charged with the task to determine intervention legality by means of authorization does not resolve the ambiguousness.

An analysis of the general legal framework concerning interventions is expected to deliver few interesting results; the two cases occurred during the same time period and were thus subject to the same legal framework. A focus on the UNSC's voting allows for interesting conclusions on the legality of interventions; the interpretation of the framework rather than the framework itself becomes the central issue. In addition, the research provides insight into how the Libyan case may have affected Syria.

This section analyzes the voting behavior of each of the permanent UNSC members. The intervention in Libya was authorized by the SC and was thus legal, while a proposal for a similar intervention in Syria was not submitted to the SC, and thus, a hypothetical intervention in Syria remains illegal (unless it is an act of (collective) self-defense, as provided by article 51 of the UN Charter). The relevant hypothesis reads: *The disputed status of humanitarian interventions under international law and the UNSC's role in authorizing interventions cause a poor correspondence between intervention legality and humanitarian necessity.*

UN Security Council voting on Libya

On February 26, 2011, the Council adopted SC Resolution 1970. The resolution's main provision was the condemnation of violence and human rights breaches by the Libyan regime. It referred the case to the International Criminal Court, imposed sanctions such as travel bans upon key figures related to the Libyan regime and froze their assets. The US, France, the UK and Germany proposed the resolution. Russia demanded the inclusion of a provision to secure that Resolution 1970 could not be used to justify an intervention in Libya. Defected Libyan diplomats promoted the inclusion of a provision for establishing a no-fly zone. In spite of their efforts, the final resolution remained peaceful in nature.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Simon Adams, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," *Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect*, no. 3 (2012): 12, <http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/libyaandr2poccasionalpaper-1.pdf>.

The adoption of Resolution 1973 followed upon Gaddafi's failure to comply with Resolution 1970. It authorized the intervention in Libya and was deemed necessary on the basis of some strong words by Gaddafi, as he had "expressed clear intent to continue committing massive human rights violations."⁶⁹ The international community's interpretation of this statement led to the conclusion that many lives were at risk. Russia and China abstained from voting on the resolution and thereby facilitated its adoption without explicitly consenting to an intervention.⁷⁰ The resolution demanded the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and an end to the violence, imposed a no-fly zone, authorized the use of force with an 'all necessary measures' mandate, except for foreign occupation.⁷¹ Gaddafi's initial response to the resolution indicated willingness to comply with the call for a cease-fire and a direct end to the violence. However, the explicit threats addressing the Libyan opposition in one of his speeches shortly after unveiled that his intentions were otherwise.

Paul Williams and Colleen Popke argue that UNSC Resolution 1973 provides a blueprint for humanitarian action; it was characterized by swift UNSC authorization and constituted a well-drafted resolution providing the necessary mandate for aggressive and immediate implementation.⁷² In other words, Resolution 1973 is explained to have been a model framework for humanitarian action.

Prior to the intervention, Russia was suspicious of the interpretation that Western states would give to the resolution, and expressed its concern about the perceived inadequate demarcation of the appropriate rules of engagement. The Russians feared that the West was given a free hand in handling the Libya crisis and foresaw that a much greater intervention would occur than deemed necessary for the halting of violence.⁷³

⁶⁹ Marianne Mosegaard Madsen and Simone Sophie Selsbæk "The Responsibility to Protect and the Intervention in Libya," (Master's thesis, Roskilde University, 2012), 16.
<http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/10308/1/The%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect%20and%20the%20Intervention%20in%20Libya.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Adams, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect", 7.

⁷¹ Julian M. Lehmann, "All Necessary Means to Protect Civilians: What the Intervention in Libya Says About the Relationship Between the Jus in Bello and the Jus ad Bellum" *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* 17, no. 1 (2012): 119.

⁷² Paul Williams and Colleen Popken, "Security Council Resolution 1973: a Moment of Legal & Moral Clarity," *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 44, no. 1 and 2 (2011): 226-27

⁷³ Constantine Antonopoulos, "The Legitimacy to Legitimize": The Security Council Action in Libya under Resolution 1973 (2011), 363; Dannreuther, "Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution," 83.

UN Security Council voting on Syria

The Security Council's attempts to take a position in the Syrian crisis started off with two proposals that were blocked by Russia and China in October 2011 and February 2012. The rejected proposals contained that the Syrian state had a responsibility to protect its people and condemned the use of violence and the continuous breaches of human rights by the regime.⁷⁴

The following Resolution 2042 was adopted in April 2012 and authorized the dispatching of an unarmed military mission to Syria for a period of 90 days. Subsequent Resolution 2043 was adopted only a week after and attempted to arrange the implementation of a peace plan for Syria.⁷⁵ The plan was developed by the Arab League in cooperation with the UN and included the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. The initial Syrian response to the plan was promising but within several weeks it became clear that the al-Assad regime had failed to keep the peace as the observed level of violence was on the rise again. This was also to be attributed to the continuation of 'defensive action' by the Free Syrian Army, which as an organization of defected military, against the al-Assad troops.⁷⁶ Due to the relapse into violence, the peacekeeping mission was cancelled in June 2012. Resolution 2059 extended the military observation mission that resulted from Resolution 2042 with another 30 days.⁷⁷

On 19 July 2012, another proposal was submitted, attempting to attach consequences to the Syrian failure to comply with the peace plan, by means of imposing economic sanctions. This proposal was vetoed by Russia and China.⁷⁸

After a relatively long period of Security Council inaction concerning the matter, Resolution 2118 was adopted in September 2013. The Syrian conflict's character had changed and received renewed attention. In response to the UN's affirmation that chemical weapons were used in Syria, the resolution deemed the possession of such weapons a threat to international peace and security and compelled the destruction of the arsenal. As seen in previous resolutions, also this document emphasized the territorial integrity of Syria. Finally, it advocated the formation of a transitional government, which should include members of the current government, the rebel organization and other groups.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Dag Hammerskjöld Library: Security Council – Veto List, last modified January 21, 2015, <http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Cansu Atilgan, "Arab Spring The Responsibility to Protect and a Selective International Response," *Air and Space Power Journal – Africa and Francophonie* 3rd quarter (2014): 90-91.

⁷⁷ Dag Hammerskjöld Library: Security Council – Veto List

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

None of the resolutions adopted on the case of Syria contains provisions of similar strength as those addressing the case of Libya. Not only was an intervention explicitly excluded but also a condemnation of both regime violence and rebel violence was not part of any resolution that succeeded in the SC. As such, the resolutions failed to ascribe accountability to any of the warring parties.

How ‘Libya’ influenced ‘Syria’

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suspected that NATO would do more than stipulated in Resolution 1973. He later on stated that the decision to not veto the resolution was a mistake as it authorized the West to do whatever it wanted against a sovereign state. The NATO intervention in Libya was anticipated to be interpreted as allowing for regime change, which was certainly not intended in the eyes of Russia and China.⁸⁰

The regret about the ‘silent approval’ for Resolution 1973 thus surfaced before the intervention took place. The expectations for a ‘mission creep’, a term for the perceived exceeding of the NATO mandate, were deemed correct after the intervention started. This was deemed to have severe consequences for humanitarian intervention in the future. Roland Dannreuther asserts “It is this broader context of a resolute opposition to Western military intervention to support opposition forces to existing regimes which provides an explanation for why, after Libya, the Russian stance towards Syria was so uncompromising.”⁸¹ The events in Libya and the dissatisfaction about them are explained to shape the international community’s limited capacity to respond to internal conflicts in the future.⁸²

Findings: the ambiguous impact of the UNSC’s role

The intervention in Libya was officially legal as it was preceded by SC authorization. No proposals were submitted to the Council attempting to formulate a resolution of similar thoroughness for ending the violence in Syria and, for that reason, an intervention on Syrian territory would be deemed illegal in strict terms.

The proposals that were blocked by Russia and China have caused a gap between the rejected proposal of July 19, 2012 and the adopted Resolution 2118 on the chemical weapons issue more than a year later. The members of the SC presumably realized that a deadlock was

⁸⁰ Dannreuther, “Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution,” 83; Pierre M. Atlas, “Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and interests,” *Digest of Middle East Studies* 21, no. 2 (2012): 360.

⁸¹ Dannreuther, “Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution,” 83-84.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 84

reached and that little could be done for the faith of the Syrians at that point. The chemical weapons issue apparently changed the dynamics as ‘a threat to international peace and security’ was mentioned. Some may have seen such an inclusion as a pretext for intervention under the heading of self-defense.

Russia and China abstained from voting on Resolution 1973, and thereby (silently) allowed for the intervention. Proposals addressing the situation in Syria, condemning the violence in the country and ascribing responsibility to the Syrian regime were time after time rejected by Russia and China. This may explain why no proposal was submitted to the SC in which an intervention was called for. Russia and China are likely to have blocked condemnations, as they were perceived to be a pretext for intervention. The SC thus already ‘stranded’ one step before interventions even came into question, namely in ascribing responsibility.

At this point in research, it is found that the decisions made by the Security Council do not logically correspond to the humanitarian necessity for an intervention; two atrocities encounter different responses. Resolution 1970 addressing Libya ascribed clear obligations under R2P to the regime and, upon the regime’s failure to comply, an intervention was facilitated by the adoption of Resolution 1973. The relative plentitude of resolutions addressing the Syria case led to a deadlock, only to be overcome after the situation worsened as chemical weapons were used. A resolution seemed Russia’s best strategy to prevent an intervention in Syria. Finally, it was found that the Russian and Chinese unwillingness with respect to the Syrian crisis might be seen as a direct consequence of the perceived mission creep in Libya.

It is concluded that the hypotheses is confirmed, as the ambiguity of the status of interventions gives the UNSC members extensive possibilities to include non-humanitarian considerations in their decision-making.

5. The role of political and economic interests and motives

As outlined in the literature review, the puzzle of the true intentions and motives for humanitarian interventions remains subject to scholarly disagreement. The production of claims on stakeholder's true motives for either intervening or refraining from doing so is therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. The main aim here is to identify the interests that are deemed to have shaped motivations for the intervention behavior of the great powers, which are the US, France, the UK, Russia and China. These countries are assumed to have the greatest impact on whether or not humanitarian interventions are organized as they hold veto power in the UNSC.

The findings are put into the context of the role that the states play in international society, in order to provide insight into how their actions were influenced. The relevant hypothesis reads: *The great powers' political and economic interests at stake caused the occurrence of an intervention in Libya but not in Syria.*

'Great power' interests at stake in the Libya conflict

The US, France and the UK

Just prior to the intervention in Libya, the US communicated to have modest intentions and emphasized its intended involvement to be limited in scope and time. Only ten days after initial US engagement in the establishment of the no-fly zone, the attacking forces were replaced for a low-profile background role.⁸³

Relations between the US and Libya were described as 'a cold understanding', which logically reflected upon the political and economic ties between the countries. Gaddafi's actions, such as the established support for terrorism⁸⁴ and the nationalization of American oil companies in the 1970s, negatively impacted the relations.⁸⁵ Prior to the Libya crisis, the US purchased only around seven percent of Libya's crude oil, while Germany and Italy received together as much as 57 percent of Libyan production.⁸⁶

⁸³ Madelene Lindström and Kristina Zetterlund, "Setting the Stage For the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO," *Swedish Defense Research Agency* (October 2012): 41, <http://www.foi.se/Global/V%C3%A5r%20kunskap/S%C3%A4kerhetspolitiska%20studier/Europa%20och%20Nordamerika/foir3498.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Perhaps the most damaging incident was the Libyan role in the 1988 Lockerbie incident. "A bomb placed by Libyan agents on board of the aircraft on route to New York detonated over Lockerbie, Scotland, resulting in the deaths of 270 civilians, including 189 Americans". (Jonathan B. Schwartz, "Dealing With a "Rogue State": the Libya Precedent," *The American Journal of International Law* 101 (2007): 553-54.)

⁸⁵ Maessen, "The Libyan Intervention, Triumph and Downfall of the Responsibility to Protect in One," 14.

⁸⁶ For more information on Libya's crude oil exports see figure 1 in the Annex on page 53.

The US's broader political interests are deemed numerous and diverse. Firstly, political scientists equated the Libya crisis with a major window of opportunity for the US, potentially enabling it to gain influence in Northern Africa while improving damaged relations with some Arab countries. The French traditionally dominate the region and over the years economic relations with China intensified.⁸⁷ As the intervention in Libya was preceded by an Arab League call for action, many deem that US's role in the intervention constitutes at least partly a US attempt to ingratiate itself with the Arab world.⁸⁸ A more explicitly communicated US objective was the strengthening of relations with European allies; US involvement was also a payback strategy for the European support during the Afghanistan war.⁸⁹ US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addressed the European loyalty stating: "They have been there, and a lot of them have been there despite the fact that they were not attacked. The attack came on us... They stuck with us... When it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the UK, France, Italy, other of our NATO allies... This was in their vital national interest..."⁹⁰ Clinton concluded her speech by remarking that vital interests of close allies are vital interests of the US itself.

The perceived role of human rights deserves mentioning as some observed that the US engagement in Libya was 'largely driven by domestic human rights groups'. Also the US itself frequently argued to have 'a moral duty to protect' under R2P.⁹¹ In spite of the often-perceived dichotomy between self-interests and humanitarian motives as the underlying foundation for humanitarian interventions, they are more compatible than one would expect. The US, arguably more than any other state, commits to the promotion of liberal values and human rights. Advocates of hegemonic stability theory may argue that the active upholding of the principles on which the hegemony is founded, serves the self-interests of the hegemon as it preserves the credibility of the system it created and strives to maintain.⁹²

⁸⁷ "Operation Libya and the Battle for Oil: Redrawing the Map of Africa," last modified March 9, 2013, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/operation-libya-and-the-battle-for-oil-redrawing-the-map-of-africa/23605>.

⁸⁸ Diaa Hadid, "Arab 'League Asks UN for Libya No-Fly Zone'" Huffington Post, March 3, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/12/arab-league-asks-un-for-libya-no-fly-zone_n_834975.html.

⁸⁹ Ryan Haddad, "What Libya Reveals About NATO," *Foreign Policy Association* (blog), April 3, 2011, <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/04/03/what-libya-reveals-about-nato/>.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Madelene Lindström and Kristina Zetterlund, "Setting the Stage For the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO," 46.

⁹² See for example Rob van Leeuwen's thesis on neo-Gramscian hegemony. Rob van Leeuwen, "Just War or just war?" (Master's thesis, Leiden University, 2014), 5.

The linkages between France and Libya are short in both geographical and historical terms, which resulted in relatively strong economic ties between the countries. For example, France imported roughly 10 percent of its entire oil consumption from Libya.⁹³

France was one of two countries to take the lead in the international action against the Qaddafi regime. The French were perceived to be the most vocal supporters of EU and UN sanctions against the regime, as well as the most assertive proponents for Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973.⁹⁴ In addition, France was the first country to recognize the rebel organization that challenged the Libyan regime's legitimacy, the Transitional National Council, as the rightful representation of the Libyan people. The country dropped the first bombs on Libyan territory while an emergency meeting, attended by the Secretary Generals of the UN and the Arab League and the EU's High Representative, was still going on in Paris.⁹⁵

The French were frequently accused of having responded rather hastily to the Libyan crisis, thereby causing poor coordination within the Anglo-Franco alliance and frustrating the European Council, as the French attitude prevented the much-desired unified European position.⁹⁶ Many observed the French response to have been shaped by a clear top-down political process; a major role is attributed to President Sarkozy himself. An explanation for Sarkozy's determination to react swiftly to the crisis, thereby causing poor coordination and dissatisfaction among other stakeholders, is found in domestic politics. Prior to the Libyan crisis, the President suffered from decreasing popularity and elections were coming up. In France there was strong support, both within politics and society, for a mission to save the Libyans and thus many deemed that Sarkozy identified an opportunity for a popularity boost.⁹⁷

The British took, together with France, the lead in the Libyan intervention but their actions are generally perceived as having been more cautious than those of the French. The UK took considerably more time to assemble with key parties for gathering intelligence. As a result British Prime Minister David Cameron "repeatedly found himself diplomatically one step

⁹³ Madelene Lindström and Kristina Zetterlund, "Setting the Stage For the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO," 23.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 13

⁹⁵ Ibid. 17

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ "Libya: Beyond Regime Change," *Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier*, 2011, 1, http://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/libya_beyond_regime_change.web.pdf.

behind the French President.”⁹⁸ For example, the NTC recognition by the British was announced more than four months later than the French recognition. Prior to intervening, the UK constructed a set of requirements on demonstrable need, legal basis and regional support for intervening. Only upon the fulfillment of all these requirements the British took action.⁹⁹

The British economic interests in relation to Libya were rather limited; the UK’s oil import from the country was much smaller than that of other major European countries such as France, Italy and Germany. However, the NTC seems to have understood the importance of UK support for intervention as it promised the British lucrative oil contracts in return for its support.

Similar to the decision-making in France, the British lead in international community action in Libya is popularly attributed to the efforts of one political figure; David Cameron. A similar explanation rooted in domestic politics is lacking, as no elections were scheduled before 2015. International politics arguably provides a more adequate explanation; it was observed that the British responded to the US call for a European power to take the lead to secure their Atlantic ties.¹⁰⁰

Russia and China

Roland Dannreuther asserts that in Russia, the view of the Arab Spring uprisings as movements for democratization is rejected; rather a process of strengthening and consolidating extremism was identified. As such, the Arab Spring was perceived to potentially undermine regional stability, thereby constituting a major threat to Russian national security interests.¹⁰¹

The initial Russian response to the events in Libya is deemed hesitant and incoherent. Analyzing the Russian interests at stake in the Libyan crisis suggests that both political and economic interests are present. Russia had significant commercial interests in Libya, ranging from oil-and-gas contracts to railway construction.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Lindström and Zetterlund, “Setting the Stage For the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO,” 32.

⁹⁹ Kjell Engelbrekt, “Why Libya? Security Council Resolution 1973 and the Politics of Justification,” In *The NATO intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign*, eds. Kjell Engelbrekt, Marcus Mohlin and Charlotte Wagnsson (New York: Routledge, 2014), 53.

¹⁰⁰ Lizette van Loon, “Libya: the EU’s Failure to Act in Concert,” (Master’s thesis, Leiden University, 2012), 32, <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/19750>.

¹⁰¹ Roland Dannreuther, “Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution,” 78.

¹⁰² Hannah VanHoose, “Understanding the Russian Response to the Intervention in Libya,” *Center for American Progress*, April 12, 2011, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2011/04/12/9529/understanding-the-russian-response-to-the-intervention-in-libya/>

Some link the perceived incoherent Russian response to the Syria crisis to a growing disharmony among the Russian political elite. In March 2011 Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the Russian Parliament's International Affairs Committee, explicitly addressed that a responsibility to protect comes with statehood, and is thus a precondition for Libyan sovereignty. In addition he mentioned to be supportive of the rebel forces. Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister at the time, "compared the military operation against Gaddafi to a colonial military invasion".¹⁰³ Dmitry Medvedev, President of Russia at the time, expressed in May 2011 that he "not only shared the Western policy view toward Libya but publicly indicated that Gaddafi has de-legitimized himself by brutally oppressing his own people".¹⁰⁴

The later controversy on the alleged 'mission creep' by the Western powers, having served the objective of regime change rather than the protection of the Libyans, "was a significant embarrassment for Medvedev and Russian elite support and public popularity shifted towards Putin."¹⁰⁵

Some scholars concluded that although Russia was in principle against an intervention, its objections were minor as the interests at play were relatively unimportant. Some explain the Russian abstinence concerning Resolution 1973 as a Russian reconciliation effort with the West. 'Giving the US its way' allegedly served the 'reset' agenda for developing a more cooperative understanding with major Western institutions such as NATO and the EU.¹⁰⁶ "In other words, the Libyan debates were not about Libya but about Russia and its (re) positioning vis-à-vis the West."¹⁰⁷

Chinese economic interests in Libya may seem extensive in absolute terms but do not convince when compared to Chinese interests elsewhere. Roughly 30.000 Chinese worked in Libya prior to the uprisings and virtually all of these were evacuated to China.¹⁰⁸

The Chinese abstinence from voting on Resolution 1973 is explained by Michael Swaine to serve Chinese interests in a broader sense. The country significantly invested in the Middle East and on the African continent and thus being at odds with the Arab League and

¹⁰³ Andrey Makarychev, "Russia's Libya Debate: Political Meanings and Repercussions," *PONARS Eurasia Memo* no. 178: (2011), 1.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Dannreuther, "Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution," 83.

¹⁰⁶ Makarychev, "Russia's Libya Debate: Political Meanings and Repercussions," 2.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ "29,000 Chinese Nationals Pulled Out of Libya," *China Daily*, February 28, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-02/28/content_12090820.htm.

African Union, the two primary regional organizations that were supportive of an intervention in Libya, could damage ties with numerous countries.¹⁰⁹

‘Great power’ interests at stake in the Syria conflict

The US, France and the UK

The relations between the US and Syria have known ups and downs but generally speaking the negative issues overshadow the positives ones. Syria was put on the US’s list of countries supporting terrorism in 1979 and was never removed from that list. Still, relations between the countries somewhat normalized during the 1990s when Syria became part of the anti-Iraq coalition during the Gulf War. The improved relations deteriorated again during the last decade due to various issues, such as Syria’s close relationship with a prime antagonist of the US, namely Iran, and the Syrian support for Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon. These organizations are listed as terrorist organizations by the US.¹¹⁰

The economic relations between the US and Syria are non-essential for either side. This is mostly the result of ongoing economic US sanctions against Syria. In 2010, the total volume of mutual trade equated less than a billion USD.¹¹¹

A main US stake in the Syrian conflict concerns the security of Israel, which is traditionally a close US ally. Decreased regional stability, especially the emergence of ungoverned or poorly governed lands, has implications for the Israeli. “These areas host or could attract terrorists, weapons traffickers, criminal networks, refugees, and migrants, and thus contribute to trends that appear to threaten Israeli security.”¹¹² Some indicated that Israel has little interest in regime change in Syria, as a replacing regime might be of a more aggressive nature with respect to Israel’s presence in the region.¹¹³

The French have provided humanitarian, economic and diplomatic support to the Syrian rebels from the beginning of the crisis in 2011. French politicians have attempted to unblock the dead-end for action in Syria that paralyzes the UNSC. This French stance with respect to an intervention in Syria has known different phases; initially France opposed intervention

¹⁰⁹ Michael Swaine, “Chinese views of the Syrian conflict,” *China Leadership Monitor* no. 39 (October 1, 2012): 6.

¹¹⁰ Stefan Hasler, “Explaining Humanitarian Intervention in Libya and Nonintervention in Syria,” (PhD thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 72, <http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3484&context=etd>.

¹¹¹ Ibid. 74

¹¹² Jim Zanotti, “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” *Congressional Research Service*, 2014, 15, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33476.pdf>.

¹¹³ Ibid., 18

unless a UN mandate was received.¹¹⁴ Later, after the chemical weapons issue arose, France expressed willingness to take part in an intervention if the US were to undertake such action.¹¹⁵

France is observed to maintain closer relations with the Arab states and its former colonies than other major Western powers.¹¹⁶ Also France and Syria have generally been on good terms since the signing of the Franco Syrian Treaty of Independence in 1936. On a personal level the different French presidents generally went along well with the al-Assad family. However, some major political issues deteriorated the good relations over the last decades. Among these are the French disapproval of Syrian hostilities towards Lebanon and the French attempts to become closer to the US.¹¹⁷ Several attempts to improve the Franco-Syrian understanding were undertaken, of which some were successful, such as the Syrian attempt to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel.¹¹⁸ In spite of the improvement, the economic interests of France in Syria prior to the outbreak of violence were relatively small; the 2007 market share of French products in Syria constituted 1.8 percent of the total Syrian import.¹¹⁹

“Paris has continued to pursue a wide range of diplomatic, cultural, economic and other interests with states of the Arab world, despite periodic difficulties, in search of an overarching objective of influence and status on the international stage.”¹²⁰ The French political interests in Syria are summarized as a search for prestige, rather than clearly defined set of interests that drive French involvement.¹²¹

Direct British interests at stake in the Syria crisis are difficult to identify, as relations between the countries were minimal. However, the British have taken the lead, together with France, in putting pressure on the al-Assad regime. The UK assertively advocated the lifting of the EU arms embargo to Syria, as this was necessary for supplying the rebels. British supplies were reported to be non-lethal equipment, humanitarian assistance and training.¹²²

¹¹⁴ Tsilla Hersheo, “France and the Syrian Civil War: From Diplomacy to Military Intervention,” *BESA Center Perspectives Paper*, no. 212 (2013): 2.

¹¹⁵ “France’s Hollande backs US on Syria Action,” *BBC News Middle East*, August 30, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23897775>.

¹¹⁶ Rachel Utley, “France and the Arab Upheavals: Beyond Sarkozy,” *RUSI Journal* 158, no. 2 (2013): abstract.

¹¹⁷ Barah Mikail, “France and the Arab Spring: an Opportunistic Quest for Influence,” *Fride*, working paper 110 (2011): 2, http://fride.org/download/wp110_france_and_arab_spring.pdf.

¹¹⁸ Stefan Hasler, “Explaining Humanitarian Intervention in Libya and Nonintervention in Syria,” 75.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Rachel Utley, “France and the Arab Upheavals: Beyond Sarkozy”, 69.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Christopher M. Blanchard and Jeremy M. Sharp, “Possible US Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, 2013, 40, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43201.pdf>.

With the 2013 chemical weapons issue, the diverging positions of David Cameron and the British House of Commons became painfully clear; Cameron strongly advocated British involvement if an intervention was conducted by e.g. the US. However, the Parliament rejected any scenario of British partaking. Polls have indicated that three-quarters of the British population deem the Parliament's decision correct.¹²³ The Parliament's decision was described as being a humiliation for Cameron and a blot on UK-US relations. Especially the Atlantic ties are generally seen to shape the British foreign policy and the Parliament's decision is deemed to have long-term consequences for those ties.¹²⁴ Avoiding that the UK 'blindly' followed the US into war is said to be a prime motivation for the Parliament's decision. Some have related this motivation to the events that led up to the British fighting in Iraq in 2003. British Labour leader Ed Milliband criticized Cameron's pro-intervention position, stating that Britain "doesn't need reckless and impulsive leadership, it needs calm and measured leadership."¹²⁵

Russia and China

Russia and China put great emphasis on the United Nations as the world's prime governing body. The countries have issued joint statements in the past in which they explicitly commit to the further strengthening of the UN. Some defined the Russian and Chinese position of countering Western interventionism, as an act of balancing US hegemony and an attempt to strengthen the multipolar trend.¹²⁶ As such, they block the US's value spreading by use of their veto. "That shared fundamental objective underpins their foreign policy in general and keeps them pointing in the same general direction."¹²⁷

Russia is among the Syrian regime's main allies; the two countries have bonded over their shared aversion of Western international politics. "The principal instruments that Russia utilized in pursuit of its objectives in Syria were primarily diplomatic rather than military or

¹²³ Brett Logiurato, "Britain Doesn't Care if Syria Affects Their Special Relationship With the US," Business Insider, September 2, 2013, <http://www.businessinsider.com/britain-syria-vote-special-relationship-us-poll-obama-cameron-2013-9?IR=T#ixzz3Q9T1H8mD>.

¹²⁴ Tom Rogan, "Why the British Parliament Vetoed Intervnetion in Syria," *Tom Rogan Thinks* (blog), August 29, 2013, <http://www.tomroganthinks.com/2013/08/why-british-parliament-vetoed.html>.

¹²⁵ "Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Vote on Syria Action," *BBC News UK Politics*, August 30, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783>.

¹²⁶ Peter Ferdinand, "The Positions of Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the Light of Recent Crises," *Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union*, 2013, 10, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433800/EXPO-SEDE_NT%282013%29433800_EN.pdf.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

economic in nature.”¹²⁸ Russia has backed the Syrian regime throughout the crisis and blocked various Security Council Resolutions on the matter.

Russian policy makers are said to believe in only two possible scenarios for the future of Syria. Either al-Assad reaffirms control over the country and stability returns, or the regime falls and Syria falls prey to radical Islamism. The latter scenario constitutes a threat to Russian national security, due to “the potential spillover from Syria to the Caucasus and Central Asia, and to Russia itself...”¹²⁹

Westerners have frequently accused Russia of giving precedence to economic benefits by the perceived reprehensible continuation of weapon deliveries to the country. The Syrian hunger for armament has proven fruitful; the net worth of current weaponry contracts is estimated to be worth 1.5 billion USD, which is 10 percent of total Russian arms exports.¹³⁰ The analysis of Russian economic interests at stake becomes more difficult when including its broader economic interests. The strongest and most significant relations between Russia and the region are with countries critical towards the Syrian regime and supportive of intervening. Notably Turkey imports 63 percent of its natural gas from Russia and the value of trade between the countries reached 34 billion USD in 2012. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has turned to Russia and warned that the country will not be forgiven for assisting the Syrian regime.¹³¹

Chinese direct interests in the Syrian conflict are much less significant than the Russian ones. Thus, a first explanation for the Chinese opposition to the Western position on Syria is found in tradition, or ideology. The assertive Western promotion of human rights and liberal values collide with the Chinese Communist Party’s tradition of nonintervention. China seems to identify in the UN a vehicle for contrasting those Western policies and thus the Chinese vetoes in the Syria case may be seen as a balancing act against Western dominance.¹³² Another explanation for the Chinese tradition of nonintervention is that it is at least partially rooted in the own domestic struggles with ethnic minorities and separatist movements. The handling of these issues in China is in the West perceived to be rather hard-handed. Chinese support for

¹²⁸ Dannreuther, “Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution,” 84.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Richard Galpin, “Russian Arms Shipments Bolster Syria’s Embattled Assad.” BBC News Middle East, January 30, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16797818>.

¹³¹ Dannreuther, “Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution,” 88-89.

¹³² Adrien Morin, “China’s instructive Syria Policy,” *The Diplomat*, May 18, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-instructive-syria-policy/>.

the Western promotion of human rights around the globe would be illogical given that Western voices are critical of the Chinese domestic human rights record as well.¹³³

Findings: dealing with a ‘foolish’ Gaddafi and a sly al-Assad

The identification of US interests at stake delivers some interesting insights. It was found that especially its geopolitical interests are reconcilable with the country’s response to the crisis. Prominent examples are the ‘window of opportunity’ to gain influence in Northern Africa and repair relations with Arab League members that were supportive of an intervention. The perception of US involvement as reward for European loyalty indicates that the US sought to further strengthen good relations with the European powers. Finally, the US’s human rights agenda was promoted, as in line with its liberal ideology and the global system it seeks to maintain. The French assertiveness in responding to the crisis was linked to its historical ties to the region. The method of engagement, hasty and uncoordinated action, is best explained to have been the result of domestic politics, domestic public opinion, and a much needed popularity boost for President Sarkozy. The British more thoughtful response could not be traced back to existing economic interests but potentially to future benefits, and also to the greater political objective of maintaining good Atlantic relations.

The Russian hesitance for intervening was partly rooted in a fundamentally different interpretation of the Arab Spring events and the thereto-connected different interpretation of the implications for Russian security. The formulation of the country’s response was plagued by ‘a growing disharmony within Russian politics’. The Russian decision to abstain from voting on UNSC Resolution 1973, thereby facilitating the intervention, is explained as serving the improvement of the poor relations to the West; sacrificing the isolated and unpopular Gaddafi regime to the Western interventionists was a small price for an improved understanding between Russia and the West.

Chinese economic interests in Libya were extensive but not in comparison to its interests with other countries in the region that supported the intervention. As such, allowing for an intervention served the greater Chinese economic interests best, it is thus found that China’s economic considerations took precedence over its ideological aversion against intervention.

¹³³ Randall P. Peerenboom, “Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?” *Cornell International Law Journal* 38 (2005): 72-73.

Analyzing the interests at stake in the Syria crisis delivers a different overview as the Middle East is of much more importance to the great powers for a variety of reasons. The US relations with Syria have been troublesome for a long time. Stability is what the US needs in the region for its close ally Israel, and the US seem to lack a specific strategy. One clear issue is that the US does not see the removal of al-Assad as the key to Israel's safety as both lawlessness and a successor regime in Syria may decrease the Israeli security position. Historical ties shaped the French position in Syria, an ambition for regional influence and global positioning. In other words, the French response to Syria may serve to bring the country close to the position it desires to fulfill within the international community. The British took a leading role in pressurizing the Syrian regime. The chemical weapons issue brought trouble to the UK as it caused the unwillingness of politicians and British society to 'blindly' follow the US (again) to surface. It turns out that British engagement was largely driven by the personal efforts of Prime Minister David Cameron.

Russia has chosen a strategy for dealing with the Syria conflict that comes at a high cost, as it cannot be reconciled with the greater political and economic interests of the country. Indeed, Russia and Syria are political and economic allies, but the relations sacrificed by Russia's uncompromising position, e.g. with Turkey, are much more substantive than those with Syria. Looking at the issue of security, a rather convincing argument for Russian support to al-Assad is the Russian naval base on Syrian ground, providing Russia with access to the Mediterranean. However, the near unconditional Russian support for al-Assad may cause the loss of that naval base if regime change eventually happens. Other than the naval issue, the motivations of Russia seem to have been rooted in ideological factors; it rejects Western interventionism, especially after the experiences in Libya. China is seen to largely follow the Russian lead, although with less noise, in countering the West. This response most likely served the Chinese agenda of tradition and ideology. By respecting Syria's state sovereignty China provides an alternative to Western interventionism within the UN framework.

Ideological factors have influenced the responses of all great powers. As a state's politics are assumed to serve its ideology, ideology is seen as a political interest. The conclusion is drawn that the hypotheses assuming a role for political and economic interests in intervention behavior is confirmed, as policies of choice served especially the broader political agendas of UNSC members.

6. The role of anticipated intervention outcomes

The hypothesis used for investigating the role of anticipated intervention outcomes rests on the simple assumption that a humanitarian intervention should not be conducted if it is deemed unlikely to improve the humanitarian situation that it addresses. The crises in Libya and Syria result from deliberate human rights breaches by regimes. An investigation of the military capacity of those regimes is a first step in establishing the feasibility of intervention objectives. Domestic and international support for the regimes is among the factors that complicate humanitarian interventions; domestic popularity may cause resistance and international regime support problematizes the establishment of an intervention in the first place. Finally, the composition of society, and the thereto-linked post-intervention commitment, is deemed an important factor for shaping intervention policies. The hypothesis for testing the role of anticipated outcomes on intervention behavior reads: *Expectations regarding the necessary commitment for resolving the Syria crisis prevented an intervention for ending the conflict, as seen in Libya.*

Libya: military capacity, regime support and the composition of society

Qaddafi had long been aware that the Libyan military could one day turn against him; a faith not uncommon for authoritarian regimes as was illustrated by the demise of the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes earlier in the Arab Spring. For this reason Gaddafi kept his army weak.¹³⁴ Moreover, the decades of sanctions and embargos added to the military weakness as the purchase of military equipment was troublesome. An additional effect of the slow and limited modernization capability of Libya's army is that the international community was well informed on its material capacity.¹³⁵ This is an essential point as the international community is risk-averse when it comes to the deployment of its resources for humanitarian interventions, as indicated in the literature review. The Libyan army had at its disposal around 530 tanks, 2840 infantry vehicles, 580 anti-air weapons and 480 aircrafts.¹³⁶ Adequate information on Libya's army enabled leading international community members, such as France and the UK, to more accurately assess the situation.

It was earlier explained that the Libyan leadership was controversial and unpopular; domestically, regionally and internationally Gaddafi was isolated. Main reason for this is

¹³⁴ Vivian Salama, "Qaddafi Military Spending Below Sweden, Leaves Authority Gap," *Bloomberg Business*, March 2, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-01/qaddafi-military-spending-below-sweden-s-leaves-authority-gap>.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ For a complete overview of Libya's military equipment, see figure 2 in the Annex on page 54.

often deemed the unpredictable behavior of Gaddafi and his proven support for terrorism. Since the late 1990s Gaddafi made serious reconciliation attempts, which were necessary to pull the technologically lagged oil industry out of the doldrums. In December 2003 it was announced that Libya would give up its weapons of mass destruction.¹³⁷ This development was well-received, as US President Bush said: “Leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them will find an open path to better relations with the United States and free nations.”¹³⁸ Broadly speaking the reconciliation attempts were only minor successes, as the outside world’s compliance seemed to have been driven by an interest in the Libyan oil-industry rather than forgiveness.¹³⁹

As discussed earlier, the antagonistic attitudes of countries as Russia and China with respect to the intervention in Libya were rooted in ideological differences with the West concerning sovereignty and interventionism, rather than in any affiliation for the Gaddafi regime.

Gaddafi’s perceived ‘isolation from reality’ caused regional players, such as the Arab League and the African Union, to support the NTC and also the establishment of an intervention. Gaddafi was written off because of his support of ‘despots, bizarre foreign policy and general disrepute.’¹⁴⁰ The interests of the regional players were just as well served by supporting a future Libyan regime. It was argued that the regional support for the NTC, which also translated into military support, increased the clashes between regime loyalists and regime opponents and thus the regional actors have played a significant role in the heightening of the conflict into civil war.¹⁴¹

Within Libya, Gaddafi seemed similarly unpopular. The typical authoritarian combination of a luxurious lifestyle and a failure to let large parts of the population benefit from the country’s economic potential presumably contributed to this. Meanwhile, corruption and nepotism were widespread and concentrated the wealth around the elite. The high centralization of wealth required Gaddafi to similarly centralize power around himself and his entourage, thereby setting the pretext for the heavily isolated position in which he found

¹³⁷ Gawdat Bahgat, “Oil, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Libyan Diplomatic Coup,” *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 29, no. 4 (2004): Article excerpt.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Amin Saikal, “Gaddafi: the Ruler the West Embraced and Disliked,” ABC, August 24, 2011, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-08-24/saikal-gaddafi-the-ruler-the-west-embraced-and-dislik/2853592>.

¹⁴⁰ Maya Bhardwaj, “Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War,” *Washington University International Review* 1 (2012): 84.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

himself to be when the protests commenced.¹⁴² This isolated position is a key factor in understanding the vulnerability of the Qaddafi regime; when the Libyan conflict became the center of international attention, the Libyan elite soon crumbled as anti-Gaddafi sentiment prevailed domestically and internationally.

The Libyan society was considered rather homogenous, as over 90 percent of the country's population is Sunni Arab.¹⁴³ As such, the intervening states gave little attention to the formation of a post-intervention strategy. Later the notion of Libyan population homogeneity was deemed a complete misapprehension as the Libyan society is divided along different lines. "The country is an amalgamation of three historically and geographically different regions with diverse ethnic, tribal and socio-cultural identities: Tripolitania in the west, Cyrenaica in the east and the Fezzan in the southwest."¹⁴⁴ The historical and geographic differences, and the resulting diverging identities, found no recognition under the Gaddafi regime.¹⁴⁵ As such, different groups had a shared interest to depose of Gaddafi. The international community has arguably mistaken this marriage of convenience, which was merely based on the existence of a shared enemy, for homogeneity. The intervention in Libya was conducted without realizing the post-intervention challenges that such an intervention entailed.

Syria: military capacity, regime support and the composition of society

In terms of military capacity, an intervention in Syria should be seen as a much greater challenge. The Syrian army is large, powerful, well equipped by Russia, China and Iran, and presumably most important; it is highly motivated. As the al-Assad regime managed to modernize the military over time, there is limited clarity on the actual risk that it would pose with regards to an intervening party, which undeniably decreases the likelihood an intervention occurs.¹⁴⁶ Estimates are that the Syrian military possesses over 4950 tanks, 6610 infantry fighting vehicles, 3310 anti-air weapons and 830 aircrafts.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Alison T. Meuse, "Syria Deeply Asks: Why Did NATO Intervene in Libya and Not in Syria?" *Syria Deeply* (blog), March 22, 2013, <http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2013/03/2296/syria-deeply-asks-nato-intervene-libya-syria/>.

¹⁴⁴ Ines Kohl, "Libya's 'Major Minorities'. Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple Narratives of Citizenship, Language and Border Control," *Middle East Critique* 23, no. 4 (2014): 435

¹⁴⁵ Maya Bhardwaj, "Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War," 83.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 86.

¹⁴⁷ For a complete overview of Syria's military equipment, see figure 2 in the Annex on page 58

An important feature to the Syrian conflict is its richness of stakeholders, which is mostly the result of its location in the tumultuous Middle Eastern region and the strong ties with Russia. Dealing with Syria means dealing with Hamas, Hezbollah, Russia and Iran.¹⁴⁸ As such, estimating the commitment that would be required for an intervention in Syria is troublesome but most would conclude that it is beyond any state's intervention willingness at this point.

Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad was seen as an educated and reform-oriented politician at the time of his appointment; the Western hopes for positive reforms were high. The presence of corruption has done little damage to the position of al-Assad. The al-Assad family lives a life largely devoid of excessive luxury, thereby giving the opposition little to blackguard them of self-enrichment. As such, corruption is seen as a societal problem rather than a product of the regime's governing. An important reason for the sustained support of the al-Assad regime, in spite of the violent crackdown on anti-regime forces, is that the regime enjoys the image of a beacon of stability in a fragmented country that would otherwise collapse. Al-Assad has exploited this image during the crisis and accused the West of controlling the rebels for the purpose of destabilizing Syria.¹⁴⁹

Many people in Syria seem to accept the regime's repressive character in return for the stability and security that it has, before the conflict, proven to provide. Around 74 percent of the Syrian people are Sunni Muslim, 12 percent are Alawite, 10 percent are Christian and 3 percent are Druze. The al-Assad family belongs to the Alawite minority and many anticipate that if the regime falls, the Sunni Muslim majority will take power and retaliate for decades of repression by the Alawite minority. In short, the regime is controversial for its repressive nature but celebrated for the stability and secularity that it brings. Especially the minorities fear the consequences of the Syrian swing to Islam that is expected to follow from a revolution.¹⁵⁰

Breaking down the Syrian society according to its religious dividing lines fails to grasp the complexity of the conflict. Dividing lines are crosscutting; the presence of different religions, ethnicities and nations further complicate the conflict. Witnessing from the outside, the international community sees sheer anarchy and struggles to identify who is fighting

¹⁴⁸ Krishnadev Calamur, "Who are Syria's Friends and Why Are They Supporting Assad?" *NPR* (blog), August 28, 2013, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/08/28/216385513/who-are-syrias-friends-and-why-are-they-supporting-assad>.

¹⁴⁹ Maya Bhardwaj, "Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War," 84-86.

¹⁵⁰ Tom Heneghan, "Syria's Alawites are Secretive, Unorthodox Sect," Reuters, December 23, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/23/us-syria-religion-alawites-idUSTRE7BM1J220111223>.

whom in the war zone that Syria is today. This poor insight causes the international community to lack viable strategies for Syria's future. An intervention without such a strategy is widely deemed to produce more chaos or facilitate the creation of just another dictatorship.¹⁵¹

Findings: two different tales of perceived conflict complexity

It was found that the Libyan military capacity was not an issue that impacted the intervention plans. The Libyan military was relatively weak, disloyal to the regime and the international community was informed about its capacity. The Libyan leadership was unpopular; both on the domestic and international level many preferred to see Gaddafi go. The reasons for his domestic isolation included his luxurious lifestyle and his unpredictable behavior. On the international level Gaddafi was never forgiven for the terrorist acts in the past and the regional organizations failed to see the benefit of having Gaddafi over not having Gaddafi. Finally, the intervention in Libya seems to have followed from a misapprehension with respect to the societal complexity. As such, the intervening parties failed to develop a post-intervention strategy. However, for the analysis at hand it suffices to conclude that the perception of societal homogeneity contributed to intervention occurrence.

In comparison to the Libya conflict, the Syrian conflict is deemed relatively complex. Militarily speaking, Syria poses a much greater threat to an intervening party; the Syrian army is large, well equipped and also motivated to serve the regime. Syria's close relations to a number of key parties, among them Hamas, Hezbollah, Russia and Iran, protect it from an intervention. Interveners simply cannot estimate how far the loyalties of these allies go, and uncertainty is an important demotivating factor for the conduct of a humanitarian intervention. The al-Assad regime continues to enjoy support within segments of the Syrian society; a lack of political freedom is apparently a price people are willing to pay when their security is at stake. When not being 'destabilized by foreign evil', the Al-Assad regime provides such security. Finally, the international community lacks a strategy for future Syria, as it cannot grasp the conflict's complexity. An intervening party would thus take on a burden of unknown difficulty and scope, which makes intervention occurrence highly unlikely.

¹⁵¹ Amir Taheri. "Has the Time Come for Military Intervention in Syria?" *American Foreign Policy Interests* 35 (2013): 218-19.

The hypotheses concerning the role of perceived conflict complexity is confirmed as on all themes related to complexity, the findings correspond to the view of an 'easier' intervention in Libya and a 'more difficult' intervention in Syria.

7. Conclusions and recommendations

The main question that this thesis sought to answer is why the Libyans were saved and the Syrians are not. In other words: why did the international community respond to the Libyan crisis by means of a humanitarian intervention, while it failed to conduct a similar intervention in response to the crisis in Syria?

Three hypotheses were tested on their capacity to explain the different international community responses. The first hypothesis addressed the impact of the UN Security Council's task to provide authorization within a context of disputed legality of humanitarian interventions. It was concluded that the voting behavior of the UNSC members failed to correspond to the humanitarian necessity of such an intervention. In addition, actions related to the case of Libya have affected the positions on Syria, which is seen as an additional shortcoming with respect to the prioritization of humanitarian considerations. The second hypothesis tested for the impact of political and economic interests on humanitarian intervention behavior. It was found that especially the broader political interests of the great powers explained their positions with respect to intervening in Libya and Syria. Economic interests were at stake and may have played a role, but failed to convince as an explanation for the great power's foreign policy. The third hypothesis tested for the impact of conflict complexity on intervention willingness. It was found that the different factors that influence perceived conflict complexity, the regimes' military capacity, their domestic popularity and international level of support, and the differences in societal composition, all correspond to the different international community responses to the crises in Libya and Syria. In conclusion, all three hypotheses are confirmed, and the variables they investigated should all be seen as indispensable components of an inclusive explanation of why an intervention in Libya occurred and an intervention in Syria did not. Additional research should be conducted in order to see if more factors that were of influence could be discovered.

This thesis contributes to the existing literature by responding to an important shortcoming within it, namely the scholarly propensity to either focus on theoretical contemplations that underlie humanitarian intervention decision-making or on the retrospective evaluation of intervention success. The decision-making process preceding a recently established intervention was compared with the decision-making that led to a policy of nonintervention. Thus, the research subjected an intervention policy and a nonintervention policy to equal treatment. The latter policy type, nonintervention, is largely underexposed in the research on

humanitarian intervention behavior and thus an incomplete picture results which only represents the considerations causing an intervention to be established, failing to include the factors that cause states or alliances of states to refrain from intervention.

The study needed to make some inevitable compromises. Due to the complexity of factors and actors at play within the topic of humanitarian interventions, the research relied on theoretical foundations that were obtained from the existing literature. Thus, existing explanations were applied to novel theories, rather than that theory was developed from the outset. In essence this is not viewed as a disadvantage as the use of existing theories delivers insightful conclusions on the status of the current scholarly debate. The confirmation of all three hypotheses indicates that the contemporary theoretical explanations for factors of influence for intervention behavior are adequate. However, additional research is recommended in order to learn more about how cases of humanitarian intervention either materialized or not, affect one another. It was found that the so-called ‘mission creep’, referring to the Russian and Chinese accusation of UNSC mandate exceeding in Libya, significantly changed position on the Syria crisis. Additional research should investigate how the effect of this reciprocity relates to the existing explanations for intervention behavior.

The international community has, in spite of the perhaps slow but continuous modernization of the international legal framework, not found a way of dealing with intra-state conflicts whereby the highest priority is given to the humanitarian needs of the victims. Instead, whether or not people are saved depends on the position of the great powers in the UNSC and their ability to overcome the ideological issues that divide them.

An interesting question that arises is if the control over the conduct of humanitarian interventions should be concentrated around just five countries, or if an alternative system is thinkable. Researchers could deliver a valuable contribution by investigating the possibility of a system that does not rely on the great powers as much and that minimizes the possibility for misuse of the humanitarian label.

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
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Annex

Figure 1: Libyan export of crude oil at the time of the outbreak of the conflict.



Retrieved December 17, 2013, from <http://gentleseas.blogspot.nl/2012/09/so-why-did-nato-invade-libya-but-not.html>

Figure 2: Libyan export of crude oil at the time of the outbreak of the conflict.

	Libya	Syria
Forces		
Active Personnel	80,000	292,400*
Reserves	45,000 (Militia)	352,500
Tanks	530	4950
Infantry fighting vehicle	2840	6610
Artillery	650	2160
Anti air weapons	580	3310
Aircraft	480	830
Navy Ships	21 (2 Frigates) (2 Submarines)	19 (2 Frigates)
Long range strike systems	--	Existing, number unknown
Force Readiness	Low	Low-media
Sustainment	Poor	Poor
Country		
Population	6,400,000	22,500,000
Geography	Mainly desert	Stony desert Mountains

*Other estimates range from 300,000 to 400,000.

Steven Hasler, "Explaining humanitarian intervention in Libya and nonintervention in Syria," 94.