# When Citizens Become Terrorists

A within-case analysis

## of the link between democracy and domestic terrorist activity in Greece after *Metapolitefsi*



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 $Source: \ http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/01/04/griekse-terrorist-plande-aanval-op-grote-gevangenis-in-athene/$ 

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## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

#### Research Topic and Research Question

"Can violent actions take place in a democracy? (...) Would someone want to overthrow such democracy? Of course, he would, since it is a self-negating system of democracy... a democracy that refutes itself"

[Excerpt from statement of alleged Greek terrorist, 17N member Giannopoulos, in his court testimony, 25<sup>th</sup> July, 2003]<sup>1</sup>

The past few decades have shown that domestic terrorism is a continuing social phenomenon that cannot be overlooked by the public, politicians and scholars alike. Both the acts of terror committed by radical leftist terror groups in the 1970s and 1980s against fellow citizens in Germany, Belgium and Italy<sup>2</sup> and to the present day Greek leftist splinter terrorist groups and the 'homegrown' radicalized Islamic organized terrorist cells in western Europe point at this continuum. The recent cold-blooded assassination of the editorial staff of the satirical magazine 'Charlie Hebdo' in Paris demonstrates that escalation to extreme violence can happen unexpectedly in a short time span and without much prior warning. For researchers and policy-makers in the field of terrorism studies, the most puzzling question that arises in the aftermath of such attacks is why certain persons in western liberal states are willing to commit gross atrocities against innocent fellow citizens instead of using non-violent manners for achieving policy changes. The thesis intends to contribute to existing academic literature by focusing on this question.

The attack in September 2001 by Al-Qaeda against American targets undoubtedly is the clearest example of a massive-scale international terrorist atrocity committed against large groups of innocent citizens. This form of terror, however, should be distinguished from domestic terrorism, also known by its popularized synonym 'homegrown terrorism'. The unique characteristic of the latter type is that such terror is largely independent from internationally operating terrorist cells and evolves out of mainly self-organized and selfradicalized individuals that have experienced their entire upbringing, schooling and cultural influence in the country that they are active in (Precht 2007, 9). Some locally organized

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Cited from Kassimeris (2013, 30)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Respectively the German RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion), the Belgian CCC (Cellules Communistes **CRespectatively and Cheritalian APC (Rither Ator Confirmation), Itadiano)** and CCC (Cellules Communistes Combattantes) and the Italian PCI ('Partito Communista Italiano').

activist groups have the willingness and capacity to shift their *modus operandi* into the usage of excessive violent political force aimed at the citizenry that they are part of. In this respect, domestic terrorism presents societies with a fundamental and structural social problem: they consist of members that have a sense of alienation and disconnectedness, combined with a deeply rooted hatred against general prevailing essential values of the (Western) community that were part of their upbringing (Precht 2007, 9). This has severe implications for the way the causal factors that lie behind domestic terror are perceived, since they seem to stem from intra-societal dynamics rather than inter-state mechanisms.

Moreover, it should be noted that the current numbers of 'homegrown' extremist individuals in Western Europe, mostly radical Muslims, do certainly not indicate that their occurrence is merely incidental. Instead, they point at a disturbing and alarming structural social problem. In November 2007, the Director General of the British MI5 stated that they had identified "at least 2.000 individuals who are believed to pose a direct threat to national security and public safety because of their support for terrorism." In addition, he declared, "We expect that there are as many again that we do not yet know off"(Precht 2007, 10). Political officials in all of Western Europe signal an alarming increase in numbers of radicalized Islamic youth. This statistic reaffirms the importance of disclosing what factors contribute to the radicalization of such extremist organizations and their willingness to carry out heinous acts against innocent fellow citizens.

I propose to focus exclusively on Western 'homegrown' terrorism for three reasons. Firstly, it is estimated by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)<sup>3</sup> that this form of political violence accounts for 90 to 95% of the total worldwide terrorist activity. Moreover, Engene (2004) argues that domestic terrorism has claimed nearly 3000 innocent civilian casualties<sup>4</sup> since the 1950s. Secondly, due to the recent perceived threat posed by primarily domestic Islamic groups in Western Europe, domestic terrorism has gained significantly more attention in the political and public discourse of European states over the past 10-15 years, thereby adding to its societal relevance. Thirdly, I find it particularly incomprehensible that such a resort to political violence has continuously occurred in liberal democracies, since such state

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Excerpt the website of the Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/: "The GTD is an opensource database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2013 (with annual updates planned for the future). Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on domestic as well as international terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period and now includes more than 125,000 cases"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> According to the TWEED Database (Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data): folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm: "The TWEED data set contains information on events related to internal (or domestic) terrorism in 18 West European countries for the 1950 through 2004 period." Side note: "TWEED does contain, however, cases where an agent from one West European country carries out attacks in a different country within the region."

regimes supposedly have a low active and passive participation threshold and should thus offer many opportunities for aggrieved citizens to exert political influence in non-violent ways. Moreover, democracies generally do not engage in brutal injustices against their own population and thus it seems illogical that citizens are being driven to outbursts of violent desperation even though little injustice is being inflicted against them. The fact that domestic terrorism occurs in democracies is odd and it points at the enduring theoretical and empirical puzzle that this thesis is going to engage in.

The link between democracy and the proliferation of domestic terrorism has received much attention in both the political and scholarly discourse (Chenoweth 2013, 356-357). The prevailing wisdom amongst many Western political leaders is that the global spread of democracy serves as a powerful remedy against the use of terrorism by aggrieved political groups that are seeking to express their discontent. Former American President George W. Bush was arguably one of the most passionate supporters of this premise. He proclaimed in his Second Inaugural Address: "The best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance kindled in free societies"<sup>5</sup>. Thus the overthrow of hostile and authoritarian regimes in support of democracy was deemed righteous, as its key defining traits (equality, freedom and justice) would ultimately lead to more just, prosperous and a 'terrorism-free' world. Recently, during the uprisings that occurred in the 'Arab Spring', many experts and policymakers still fiercely endorsed this policy rationale. They speculated that the unfolding events in the Arab World were to be understood as a clear sign that the transition to democracy would gradually bring about more political opportunities for dissatisfied citizens. They would be able to use their newly obtained rights as a peaceful outlet to manifest their political hardships.

#### *The democracy – terrorism link*

Much scholarly research has scrutinized the perceived negative relationship between democracy and terrorism. Historical analysis has actually given reason to believe that such an optimistic depiction of reality might not be valid. Data retrieved from the GTD has given evidence to suggest that "At least during the period 1968-1997, relatively poor and transitioning democracies with internally inconsistent institutions were more likely to experience domestic terrorism than advanced democracies and authoritarian regimes" (Chenoweth 2013, 356). Although this claim has not been uncontested, it does point at a striking second puzzle. Not only is it curious that domestic terrorism systematically occurs in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Washington Post, March 9th 2005, *Bush calls democracy terror's antidote*. Source: *http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/03/25/AR2005032504962.html* 

democracies. The fact that it even seems to occur with a higher frequency is even more counterintuitive (Chenoweth 2014, 1). Evenly perplexing is the variation of the prevalence of terrorism *amongst* democracies. Indeed the GTD also demonstrates that some states, such as Greece, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States have a disturbing track record when it comes to their experiences with domestic terrorism. Other states, such as the Scandinavian countries, Canada, Japan and South Korea have not struggled with these alarming numbers. This discrepancy is in need of a substantial explanation. Also, can such an explanation also spell out the recent emergence of domestic Islamic groups in Western Europe? This thesis also seeks to explore this secondary question.

Researchers have proposed numerous possible interactions between democracy and terrorism. While some scholars claim that the former leads to increasing levels of terror, others state exactly the opposite, claiming that democracy reduces citizens' tendency to escalate to terrorism as a political tool. Democracy is often portrayed as an open arena or forum where competing interests are expressed. Much scholarly discussion evolves around the ascribed consequences of this essential feature of democracy for levels of terrorism. Paradoxically, the debate consists of two theoretical positions that claim two competing effects. The 'democratic forum' is perceived to lead to various "avenues for interest articulation among citizens", which results in their endorsement of peaceful resolutions of conflict (Schmid 1992, 14-15). However, this forum is also perceived to lead to more competiveness in the public realm. This political competition in democracies tends to provoke acts of terrorism, as ideologically diverse groups compete with one another for limited influence (Chenoweth, 2010 16). Both strands come to different empirical conclusions, which are predominantly based on quantitative large n-studies. A preponderance of studies postulate "that something about democracy might promote terror" (Young and Dugan 2011, 19). However, due to the absence of substantial and systematic qualitative research, a full understanding of the complex causal chain by which democracy affects terrorism is lacking. This thesis primarily aims at addressing this scientific gap by conducting a case study to test which causal mechanism is at work, thereby adding to the explanatory value of either one (or both) scholarly position.

I propose to research the following general research question to address this puzzle:

Given democracy's opportunities to engage in legal channels to express political preferences and to change undesired policy, under what conditions are citizens of democratic states motivated to engage in costly and violent acts of terrorism?

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

Due to the grave physical and structural dangers it poses to Western governments and society, domestic terrorism has been a widely studied phenomenon. Scholars have identified many differing causal factors over the past few decades. Policy-makers have continuously deemed such preliminary investigations in causality crucial since such inquiries can offer fitting and thus adequate counter-terrorism strategies. This chapter intends to offer a thematic overview of the existing approaches that the literature has taken to explain domestic terrorism. Subsequently, their conclusions and weaknesses are critically evaluated. For the sake of clarity, I will present a workable definition of the concept of domestic terrorism based on similar definitions that have been established in the literature. But before doing so, I shall firstly outline a few persistent conceptual problems that have continuously hampered the study of terrorism.

#### A workable definition and conceptual difficulties

Academic study of domestic terrorism has been troubled because of the absence of an agreed definition of what the central concept constitutes of (Lutz and Lutz 2009, 2; Young and Ducan 2011, 19). Throughout the literature, social scientists cannot agree on what exactly defines terrorism and what distinguishes it from other types of political violence. Schmid and Jongman (1988), who conducted their search in the eighties, already collected no less than 100 definitions of terrorism. The absence of an agreed definition evolves out of an important persevering conceptual challenge that has afflicted many conceptualizations of terrorism. At the core of this conceptual flaw lies the struggle to identify those specific acts of violence that are exclusively linked to domestic terrorism and that are distinct from other forms of political violence, such as insurgencies and state-led warfare behaviour (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle 2009, 33). An abundance of social scientists have attempted to define terrorism in terms of which acts of violence that can be carried out by a multiplicity of actors. This, as I will argue in the following paragraph, affects any systematic coherent definition of terrorism.

A commonly perceived discerning feature of terrorism is its readiness to perpetrate acts against innocent individuals to advance political goals directed against a broader audience target, which usually is the established political elite. However, according to Wagner (2000, 469-484), such a contrast between the immediate target and a broader

audience can actually be observed in many examples of general warfare behaviour. The two atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the American Army, as well as the allied bombing on the German city of Dresden in World War II are plain examples of intimidation from the U.S. High Command directed against respectively the Japanese and German government. Clearly, in those cases, "the civilians attacked were not the audience target" (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle 2009, 33). In addition, insurgent groups in civil wars frequently perpetrate acts of violence against innocent civilians when they aim to coerce the established elite as the immediate target. For example, the Peruvian Maoist guerrilla insurgent organization *Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso)* deliberatively killed Peruvian Lima locals in the 1980s when it mounted attacks and sabotages against the capital's infrastructure.

The reliance on the threat of violence and spreading fear to achieve political objectives is also frequently identified as a typical terroristic action. Likewise, this phenomenon ought not to be distinctively labelled as exclusively 'terroristic'. The importance of instilling fear is a mechanism that is actually being implemented in all types of small and large-scale forms of political violence. "Violence is a means to generate compliance" (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle 2009, 33).

All these issues raised here demonstrate the core of the conceptual problem that troubles any definition of domestic terrorism that seeks to define terrorism on the basis of what kind of acts ought to be labelled 'terroristic'. As I demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, many actors, both individuals, organizations, insurgent groups, armies and governments, can ostensibly carry out acts of terrorism. Consequently, terrorism is being degraded to a simple 'catchall' concept that is used to denote any act of political violence whereby innocent individuals are harmed in order to advance some political goal.

Alternatively, terrorism should not solely be defined on the basis of which *actions* are perpetrated, but on basis of what *actor* commits those actions. This actor-approach avoids the problematic issue of overstretching the concept of terrorism. Essentially, what distinguishes terrorists from other kinds of insurgent political force, is "(...) the extreme asymmetry of power between them and the state" (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle 2009, 34). The difference between insurgent guerrilla factions then becomes evident. Whereas such political organizations have some sovereign control over some territory, terrorists in my definition do not have this authority. Subsequently terrorism exists merely as a clandestine underground political phenomenon. Whereas insurgent groups are highly dependant upon the popular support to maintain their conquered territory, "terrorist groups, instead, have very superficial

contact with the population because they cannot act in the open" (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle 2009, 35). This is what also distinguishes them from organizations that are engaged in civil wars, which have a clear interest in mobilizing the support of the local population in order to topple the state regime. Likewise, whereas insurgents can have the potential to at least partially defeat the state regime militarily, terrorists can solely challenge the state by contesting its monopoly of violence. The ability to employ their power to contest the state turns them into a long-term organized threat, which exceeds the political violence that occurs during incidental outbursts of violent street riots.

#### Proposed working definition

Lutz and Lutz (2009) have presented a fairly common and consequently comprehensible definition that is consistent with various prior definitions that can be found in the literature. Their definition consists of six separate but interrelated characteristics. Although this has arguably led to a more complex working definition, it has the major advantage of resolving the above-described conceptual challenge that hampered so many of the previously conducted theoretical studies on terrorism. Lutz and Lutz present the following definition of terrorism (2009):

- 1. "Terrorism has political objectives;
- 2. it relies on violence or the threat of violence;
- 3. it has a target audience beyond the immediate victims;
- 4. it involves organization and is not just the actions of isolated individuals;
- 5. it involves a non-state actor as the perpetrator or the target or both; and
- 6. it is the weapon of the weak designed to change the distribution of power."

Previously, I made the point that domestic terrorism is better defined in terms of who the actor is, in addition to which actions are characterized as 'terrorist'. This definition has the advantage of combining both action-based elements (features 1, 2 and 3) and actor-based elements (features 4, 5 and 6).

The first three elements describe which crimes are terrorist crimes: those that are motivated by political objections (1), rely on physical violence (2) and have a target audience beyond the immediate victim (3), are typified as 'terrorist'. However, as I discussed in the previous paragraphs, such a definition would be too broad, since it would not distinguish terrorism from other types of political violence such as insurgencies or state-led terror. The last three elements ascribe which actors can commit those actions is of great importance, since it narrows down the concept of terrorism. Only if a relatively weak non-state

organization (4, 5, 6) commits those actions, then it is fitting to label that type of political violence as terrorism.

Thus, according to my definition, the FARC-organization in Colombia, as well as the IRA in Northern Ireland are, to a certain extent, insurgent groups, because they have some control over several rural areas and because they intentionally enjoy some popular support. Meanwhile, the ETA in Spain, the Italian Red Brigades (BR) and both the Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ETA) and RO17N groups in Greece have always deliberately operated underground, have never controlled state territory and have not actively attempted to mobilize large groups of supporters for their respective causes.<sup>6</sup>

#### The difference between domestic and transnational terrorism

A key issue is to separate acts of domestic from transnational terrorism. This consideration does not only have a practical purpose. It also serves an analytical and theoretical objective; through a clear distinction, domestic terrorism can be studied as a separate social phenomenon, which contains its own causal determinants and mechanisms. On the one hand, "domestic terrorism involves terrorists, victims, and territory of one state. Support, financing and operations for the terrorist attack are homegrown and are conducted within one country" (Chenoweth 2007, 19). This characteristic thus refers to the physical *locus operandi* of terrorism, and is based on a legal requirement: the full act, both its preparation and its execution, have to occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the state it originates from.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, the perpetrators need to have had their upbringing in the state that they conduct their campaigns in.

On the other hand, the label 'transnational' is used in the literature when an attack involves more than one state (Rosendorff and Sandler 2005, 172). Strictly speaking this implies that an organization's intentional attack on foreign citizens, is to be considered as an act of international terror. ITERATE<sup>8</sup>, the commonly utilized dataset of international and transnational terrorist attacks, indeed counts some acts of the far-left 17N in Greece as international, because 7 of the 22 total fatalities were not Greek citizens, but primarily Americans. ITERATE disregards the fact that all of the killings were committed on Greek

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> It can be argued, however, that those anarcho-communist organizations actually did seek to mobilize the local population; in the sense that they used terrorism as a tool to raise awareness amongst the populace for the sake of inciting social revolution against the ruling class. These attempts have always been more idealistic in nature. On the contrary, insurgent groups need local support; otherwise they could not exert control over a certain territory and thus could practically not exist.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Based on the legal definition used by the American FBI and the United States Law: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The dataset can be accessed on: http://library.duke.edu/data/collections/iterate

territory. Meanwhile, the similar leftist Portuguese 25<sup>th</sup> April Popular Force movement (FB25) is excluded in this dataset, because their 20 killings in the 1980s are all on Portuguese nationals (Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle 2009, 37). According to my definition, those acts are both forms of domestic terrorism, since the perpetrators all had their upbringing in respectively Greece and Portugal and all had the objective to coerce their own government.

Lastly, a terrorist attack is also identified as transnational when terrorists commit their crimes outside the national boundaries. This requirement seems rather obvious. However, this part of a definition is also contentious when the attacks of the Northern Irish IRA are considered: some acts that were perpetrated in Northern Ireland while others on British targets overseas. The latter crimes would be viewed as international attacks, while the IRA is notoriously known for the frequent bombings that have occurred within its own national borders.

In conclusion, I assert, just as Sánchez-Cuenca and De La Calle (2009) do, that what matters the most in distinguishing domestic from international terrorism is whether a nonstate clandestine organization acts in its 'natural' territory and seeks to coerce its own government. Consequently, identities of victims and the physical location are of lesser relevance.

#### Towards a structural analysis of terrorism

Traditionally, the critical assessment of what factors lead to individuals' or groups' decision to engage in costly and violent acts of terrorism was based on an ideographic approach (Qvortrup and Lijphart 2013, 473). For this reason scientific research approached different incidents of terrorism solely from a historical perspective. Explanations of terrorism that took into account more than one case were not considered useful. As a result, no common causal patterns were identified from the isolated terrorist cases. Laqueur (1977, 22) even claimed that any nomothetic study that would attempt to draft causal links between concepts would be "exceedingly vague or altogether wrong".

Crenshaw was one of the first in the field of terrorism literature to search for "a general theoretical analysis of the causes of terrorism" (1981, 379). She was able to develop such a general explanation because she approached terrorism as a type of political behaviour that is the result of a deliberate rational choice made by the respective terrorist organization. This insight proved useful since it invited scholars in the field to view terrorists as rational actors whose actions could be explained and even predicted based on the presence or absence of certain pre-existing causal factors. Henceforth researchers could make general prepositions

about terrorism, which could both be logically compared, and of which variables could be specified and rank-ordered in terms of explanatory strength (Crenshaw 1981, 380). For the sake of clarity, Crenshaw organized the research topic into three separate workable questions that were ready to be properly analysed: how does the process of terrorism work, what are its social and political effects and why does it occur? The latter question is of particular interest to this thesis. It invited scholars to undertake nomothetic studies in order to identify common patterns of causation.

#### Overview of research on terrorism and democracy

Crenshaw's argument sparked a preponderance of research that sought to determine what factors caused groups to exert extreme political violence. An important strand of academia began emphasizing institutional factors as the primary causes of terrorism. In general, this approach assumes that institutions are relevant and matter in terms of presence of (domestic) terrorism. The study of the effects of regime type gained momentum as researchers observed an ostensible relationship between the presence of terrorist incidents and modern democracies. Many scholars namely claimed that the bulk of terrorism is directed against democracies and not against illiberal regimes. In the last decade, this view was reinforced due to the high-profile attacks by Al-Qaeda on American and European soil. All in all, these events endorsed the longstanding conviction "that democracies are inherently susceptible to terrorist attacks" (Abrahms 2007, 226). Weinberg and Eubank (1994) asserted based on rudimentary investigation that "a terrorist attack was four times likely to occur in democracy than in a non-democratic country" (418). In addition, Gurr (1979), Turk (1982), Chenoweth (2010), and Young and Dugan (2010) base their work on the theoretical preposition that terrorism ostensibly occurs more frequently in liberal regimes than in non-democracies. Although the validity of this observation has been thoroughly contested and criticized (Abrahms 2007, 2010), I shall ignore these at this point for they still hold much theoretical explanatory power.

#### Perspective 1: Effect of respect for civil and human rights

Scholars have critically evaluated and scrutinized the effects of various features of democracy. One perspective links the presence of civil liberties in a democracy to the occurrence of terrorist incidents. Respecting people's civil rights is said to facilitate terrorism. The literature attributes different effects to this fundamental feature of liberal democracies:

Gurr (1979), Ross (1993) and Eyerman (1998) argue that because of people's freedom of movement and association, terror organisations can more easily mobilize, manoeuver, arm themselves and subsequently act. Moreover, citizens' human and civil rights tend to paralyze democracies and affect their capabilities to crush terrorist organizations. Li (2005, 283) argues that democracies do not have the power to exert unconstrained and excessively repressive countermeasures, nor do they have a straightforward possibility to convict alleged terrorists beforehand. Weinberg and Eubank (1987, 46-47) advance the argument that democracies are vulnerable to terrorists' demands because their guarantees for civil liberties lead to citizens' low cost tolerance for sustaining casualties of the civil population. In addition, press freedom is also said to create incentives for terrorism. As Atkinson, Sandler and Tschirhart (1987) point out: "Press freedom increases the opportunities for terrorists to be heard and watched by a large audience and hence their ability to create widespread fear" (Li 2005, 282). Schmid (1992) furthers the point by asserting that free press is capable of offering detailed information of terrorist events, thereby encouraging the process of recruitment, education and training of future perpetrators.

However, it should be noted that the literature has also identified mitigating effects of civil liberties on terrorism (Li 2005, 281). The contention is that citizens, who enjoy more civil liberties, therefore also have more opportunities to influence the political process successfully. Schmid (1992, 15) argues that democratic participation through free elections makes sure that political and social change can be reached by peaceful means. This lowers the incentive to resort to political violence. Having a right to express political discontent can thus serve as a powerful remedy against violent outbreaks of political frustration and grief. Abrahms (2007, 242-251) also questions the positive relationship between civil rights and terrorism. Alternatively, he states that, precisely because democracies have a commitment to these rights, they are not inclined to fumble with these rights in the face of terrorist provocations. Consequently, liberal states can maintain "the support of the three constituencies – moderates, the international community and their own publics – essential to prevailing" (2007, 242).

Regardless of the positive or negative effect of civil liberties on domestic terrorism, this explanation suffers from two weaknesses that severely impair its explanatory power. Firstly, the constitutional institutional constraint on the executive branch of government, which prevents a democratic state from reacting oppressively against subversive terrorists, is not always in place. Historically, liberal states have circumvented those institutionalized restrictions in the face of terrorism. For instance, a few years ago, the U.S. Congress passed the American Service Member Protection Act (ASPA), thereby authorizing the Presidency much more powers to 'fight the war on terror'. In other words, liberal states' abilities to combat terrorism are not always restricted (Chenoweth 2007, 31).

The second, and more fundamental limitation of the civil liberties explanation is that it is exclusively 'opportunity-based' and that it fails to explain what the *motivations* are for terrorist groups to form (Abrahms 2007, 227; Chenoweth 2007, 30). The logic of the theory is that democracies, due to their openness and permissiveness, render rational terrorist organizations the greatest opportunity to undertake a successful terrorist campaign. However, such an explanation ignores that opportunity is merely "a necessary but not a sufficient condition" for a group to commit acts of terrorism (Ross 1993, 321-322). It fails to take into account that many political groups never use violence, although they might very well have the opportunity for it. And put differently, if opportunity alone would be a sufficient explanatory factor, then there should also be predominance of terrorism in the so-called 'weak' states that do not have the ability and authority to govern their own territory. However, several of these states, such as Belarus, Zimbabwe, Senegal and Honduras have not contained domestic terrorist movements (Stewart 2006, 31-32; Chenoweth 2007, 30-31), while any explanation based on the effect of civil liberties would expect so. This observation leads to the conclusion that there is something more fundamental, associated with the nature of a democracy, which attracts domestic terrorism.

#### Perspective 2: Effect of democratic systems and their political institutions

Another cluster of literature focuses on the consequences of the various democracy types and their corresponding institutions. The basic argument is that these systems aggregate political preferences differently, and thus they affect citizen satisfaction and frustration differently. Accordingly, this leads to varying effects on citizens' incentives to engage in terrorism (Li 2005, 283-84). An example of this perspective is the work by Qvortrup (2012, 516-17), who found empirical evidence that European states with first-past-the-post electoral systems are considerably more likely to experience domestic terrorism. Qvortrup and Lijphart (2013) have extended this literature by linking general democracy types to levels of domestic terrorism. Based on quantitative research, they claim that "The political system – or rather the type of democracy – is a major factor responsible for the presence of fatal terrorist attacks perpetrated by home-grown terrorist groups" (2013, 482). Using Lijphart's well-known typological distinction between consensus and majoritarian democracies, they found support for their hypothesis that the more opportunities democratic citizens have for political

influence, the less they are inclined to engage in acts of terrorism (2013, 472). A high level of consociationalism in a democracy is associated with a low level of domestic terrorism. And so broad multiparty coalitions, multiparty systems, proportional representation, corporatist and coordinated interest groups systems and constitutional balance between the executive and legislative powers are all seen as predictors for low levels of domestic terrorism. On the contrary, one-party governments, two-party systems, majoritarian electoral systems, pluralist and competitive interest group systems and the dominance of the executive power are all indicators that positively influence domestic terrorism (2013, 478). Qvortrup and Lijphart's work has built further on previous single-country case studies that had already anecdotally shown the importance of consensus institutions in mitigating the proliferation of domestic terrorism (2013, 474). For instance, McGarry and O' Leary (2006) have given this support with their case study of the effects of consociationalism in Northern Ireland. The fact that their theory is backed by both qualitative and quantitative research strengthens their proposed theory.

The strength of this argument is that it, unlike the first perspective, can explain citizens' motivations to adopt violence. Majoritarian democracies generally leave far less space for opposing views to be taken into consideration, and this could encourage violence as an ultimate means to advance a controversial policy goal. The second advantage of this rationale is that it can account for variation amongst liberal states. Indeed, majoritarian democracies, such as the U.S. and the UK, historically have suffered from more terrorist incidents than the consociational Scandinavian democracie states.

On the contrary, a weakness of this claim is that it cannot explain fluctuations in terrorism over time. Greece, since it transitioned to modern democracy in 1974, has experienced an awful lot of terrorism, but the flow has not been constant. GTD data demonstrate that right after the transition terrorism peaked, and then gradually declined (see chapter 4) until it peaked again a few years later. The proposition is that terrorism is associated with a certain 'cycle'. The presence or absence of certain indicators of consociationalism or majoritarian insufficiently account for such a cycle.

#### Perspective 3: Effect of social mobilization

Another subset of literature focuses on the interest group dynamics that can take place within a democracy. Chenoweth (2007, 2010) has an impressive record of published works on this matter. Her reasoning is based on the central premise that a democracy, due to its commitment to pluralism, freedom and equality, is inherently susceptible to all kinds of social

and political mobilization. This presumption leads her to assert that terrorism proliferates in democracies due to the dynamics between various mobilizing political interest groups that are active within the political realm. Such a rationale fits in the tradition of political mobilization theory. Scholars within this theoretical framework have been preoccupied with explaining terrorism as merely another mobilizing tactic that organizations may utilize "to increase their chances of achieving their goals and to enhance their uniqueness or attractiveness to potential recruits" (Chenoweth 2013, 367). An important difference between such a mobilization theory and the earlier mentioned 'civil liberties theories' (see perspective 1), is that the former relies less on tactical and strategic opportunities to explain groups' resort to terrorist violence. Instead, mobilization theory associates violent attacks are more with the density and intensity of the polity's interest group environment (Chenoweth 2013, 367). I will go into more detail on mobilization and Chenoweth's theory in the following paragraphs.

#### Interest group dynamics

According to Becker (1983, 394-395), political organizations of all sorts necessarily push for influence and control in the public sphere. In democracies, these competitors can range from political parties, corporations, unions and lobby groups to terrorist groups. All these actors are examples of interest groups and henceforth I shall only use the term interest group to refer to any group that seeks to influence the polity, regardless of its means to do so. Central to the competition amongst them is their desire to achieve space and influence, by setting and maintaining a particular interest on the political agenda "to the exclusion of other issues, especially those in ideological opposition to the given issue" (Chenoweth 2007, 33). This is what makes the agenda-setting process, which usually originates in the public domain and secondarily takes place on an institutional level (the government's schedule), so highly competitive. Interest group politics is defined in terms of which group can "influence controversial public policies in a manner disproportionate to their votes" (Congleton 2002, 48). Social mobilization theory recognizes various resources that groups can choose to reach their policy goal. Conventional interest groups will make use of people and money to push their interests on the agenda. This is where the 'agenda selection problem' can happen; due to the inherent strains between competing organizations, an interest claim of one group can affect other groups' interests. According to Chenoweth (2007, 36): "The probability and degree to which a group succeeds in obtaining space on the agenda increase as the resources devoted to exerting its influence expand. Conversely, the probability and extent to which it succeeds will decline with opponents' efforts to resist its aims." This means that one group's success is always relative to another's failure. Groups are thus compelled to engage in a zerosum conflict game with one another. When groups are heavily opposed to each other in the political realm, this competitive dynamic can lead to an intensification and escalation of one's methods to resist the possible loss of agenda-setting power. Those interest groups that 'lose' the power to influence the political agenda will "trim their losses and the gain to winners by lobbying, threats, disobedience, migration and other kinds of political pressure to raise their influence" (Becker 1983, 377). Such escalating tactics are a clear indication that the agenda is politically 'saturated'. Inter-group conflict then is conceived as unresolvable and bound to getting out of hand. They can be motivated to escalate their political activities to the use of violence. Competing groups perceive a need to 'outdo' one another for influence thereby resulting in an overall escalation of violent activity. If the interest group playing field becomes so dense, competitive and ultimately violent, then the political realm becomes overly competitive and dangerous. This process has been called a 'crowding effect' (Chenoweth 2007, 32-45 and 2010, 28).

## Chenoweth's theory of the competitive logic

Essentially, the main motivation to become violent is not inherently different from non-violent groups' motivation to use additional resources such as money; they seek to preserve either the status quo or to bring about political chance (Chenoweth 2007, 37). Given that the 'game' of political competition leads to a zero-sum outcome, a decision to utilize violent expressions can be perfectly rational. Violence "may be less costly and more effective in achieving attention in the short-term than investing abundant conventional resources that are lacking" (Chenoweth 2007, 38). As, according to Chenoweth (2007, 2010), these groups potentially arise out of all kinds of organizations, their ideologies will also become more extremist to justify their use of violence. However, they also endorse a more extremist ideology as this can consolidate their political frustrations into a coherent identity. Subscribing to extremism can solve collective action problems within a violent group. Indeed, a strong group identity can advance a sense of togetherness and collective responsibility, which buttresses individuals' decisions to comply with acts of extreme violent behaviour.

Chenoweth's theory makes the fundamental underlying assumption that terrorism is merely interest group politics by other means. It can be just another plan by which interest groups can determine or alter government's policy outcomes. Adoption of violence simply is another more extreme method that arises out of an exhaustion of all the previously attempted tactics. Although terrorism is a high-risk undertaking, it is also far less costly and undoubtedly leads to much effect since terrorism naturally leads to instant high levels attention from the public and policy-makers.

As has been argued by many authors (Crenshaw 1981, Ross 1993), ultimately a terrorist offensive commences "with a precipitating event or circumstance that turns a group to adopting violence rather than utilizing conventional political means" (Chenoweth 2007, 38). For Chenoweth, the initial act of violence is crucial. This is because, just like any other interest groups, terrorists are highly responsive and sensitive to the pressures exercised by other organizations. Here is where the quintessential element of her theory plays out:

"The constant competitive tensions between conventional and violent interest groups in asserting themselves may lead to a "cascade effect" during which more groups adopt terrorism in response to a diminishing space on the public agenda due to initial violence" (Chenoweth 2007, 40)

Once again this demonstrates the rational logic behind the proliferation of domestic terrorism. As one group favours terrorism, which is a low-cost and short-term efficient undertaking, other groups will be driven to the same suboptimal outcome in the zero-sum game by also adopting violence. That is, essentially, the causal mechanism by which the democratic competition process lead to a domestic groups becoming terroristic. By the way, terrorists do often overestimate their political success of their tactics. Indeed an escalation to violence on a short-term can be highly successful since the impact of such acts often is significant. However, often they are not able to control the more long-term political effects of their tactical attacks (Chenoweth 2007, 38).

#### Why uniquely democracies enhance the competitive logic

The theory of the competitive logic is grounded on the effects of an overly crowded or saturated interest group sector. Interest group competition occurs in all political systems, even in non-democracies. However, Chenoweth makes three compelling arguments of why this logic applies solely to (certain types of) democracies.

Firstly, democracies naturally have a much more competitive and densely populated interest group policy arena due to its commitment to freedom and consequently its incentive for association. This pluralist tradition inevitably results in more dense and competitive interest politics. In autocracies such a diverse environment in which interest groups pit against each other is usually absent.

Secondly, democracies inherently tolerate the existence of a free media, which have the power to set the political agenda without the government's interference. This open and transparent information society bolsters widespread media coverage on terrorist activity, which very often is highly sensational. Subsequently, interest groups become easily aware of one another's actions and reactions. The competitive logic subscribes to a 'cascade effect', in which groups are obliged to react as a way to 'outbid' the others for political influence. This reaction is particularly present in the case of groups that are ideologically heavily opposed to each other.

Thirdly, as I already have described extensively in the previous chapter, democracies' commitment to civil liberties prevents them from reacting fiercely against terrorist organizations. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes often react to initial violence with extreme disproportionate counter-violence. The much more powerful repressive state authority can invite various violent interest groups to form a unified front against the state, thereby halting the increasing escalation of interest group violence. In other words, "The power asymmetry is so distorted under these conditions that terrorist groups will circumvent normal operations and solicit the help of other outcasts in order to confront a major threat to their very survival" (Chenoweth 2007, 55). Whereas non-democracies are more inclined to enhance cooperation between terrorists, democracies tend to provoke heavy competiveness amongst terrorist organizations. The harsh measures that the Israeli authorities impose on the Palestinian territories are a good example of this phenomenon. Palestinian organizations often have occasionally overcome their strategic and ideological difference to form an alliance of convenience against the Israelis.

#### Core strengths and weaknesses

This outlook on the relationship between democracy and domestic terrorism is promising. Chenoweth's approach has three significant advantages. The claims that she makes are promising and offer a clear frame by which domestic terrorism should be considered and researched in the future.

In the first place, her theory is unique in the sense that she is able to explain the theoretical link between domestic terrorism and democracy not merely on the basis of the *opportunities*, but on the basis of terrorists' *motivations*. The competitive logic subscribes to a situation in which interest groups, due to the initial escalation of violence of a rival group, are motivated to react and also make use of violent methods to influence the agenda-setting process.

In the second place, her theory is able to offer an explanation for the variation in domestic terrorism amongst democracies (Chenoweth 2013, 367). I already indicated that this is one of the puzzling facts that need more clarification. Indeed, this theory gives a plausible account for the discrepancies that exist between for instance the Scandinavian countries, which have always been relatively invulnerable from terrorism and Greece, which has an unfortunate track record of high levels of domestic terrorist violence ever since that country gradually democratized in the mid-seventies. Following the logic of the effect of a highly competitive interest group sector, it can be argued that states that traditionally have low levels of mobilization and thus hardly any extreme political competition (consociational democracies), also are less susceptible to domestic terrorist violence.

In the third place, the competitive logic, unlike other theories of domestic terrorism, has the "potential ability to identify the timing of different waves of terrorism" (Chenoweth 2013, 367). It assumes that terrorism proliferates the most during times of political mobilization. Democratic regime transformations and election cycles are classical examples of times when citizens mobilize. These moments are therefore the most vulnerable and attract the most political violence. The potential to predict terrorism is unprecedented. Not only does this have promising opportunities for further analysis; it also can be of great use for policy-makers that are preoccupied with counter violent extremism.

In the fourth place, Chenoweth has been able to find much support for her hypothesized claims by means of a substantial quantitative large-N study<sup>9</sup>. She found a statistically significant and positive correlation between terrorist group competition and the number of new terrorist groups emerging within a country. Likewise, she discovers a positive and statistically significant relationship between participation competition and new terrorist groups emerging. According to her conclusion, "participation competition, inter-group competition, and interest group density are fairly good predictors of whether terrorist groups will form in a state" (Chenoweth 2007, 81).

The weakness of Chenoweth's account, however, is the lack of existing with-in case studies that have tested whether this causal mechanism is indeed at work. Her core explanatory independent variables (participation competition, inter-group competition, and interest group density) are complex variables, which are difficult to quantify in a large-N study. Therefore, these variables are in need of more in-depth observation by means of a single within-case study. Chenoweth has acknowledged this shortcoming, and claims any

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Chenoweth conducted a longitudinal analysis of 119 states for the period 1975-1997 using *number of attacks originated in specific country* as DV and *Political competition* as one of the IVs.

large-N analysis is "susceptible to a great deal of residual error, much of which contains the most interesting nuances of causality. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to identify necessary and sufficient conditions using a large-n framework" (Chenoweth 2007, 82). The 'cascade effect' has been backed up by statistical evidence, but which intervening variables play a role in this 'path of causality' is unclear. Although she did conduct two separate more or less anecdotal case studies (Chenoweth 2007), in which she researched terrorist proliferation in the United Kingdom and Italy overtime, she did not subject her theory's proposed causal mechanism to an in-depth analysis. She merely investigated a few preliminary observable implications but never analysed the full causal mechanism extensively.

Secondly, her theory cannot really predict a decline in the number of emerging terrorist groups. The logic of competing interest groups suggests that, once a single group initiates violence, other groups follow that strategy to ensure a suboptimal outcome in the zero-sum conflict game. Theoretically, the implication of this argument is that terrorist groups are proliferating infinitely, "since the emergence and activity of a new group should compel even more groups to form leading to an endless cycle of competition and reactionary violence" (Chenoweth 2007, 249). Chenoweth does mention that the number of terrorist groups can decline when the so-called 'carrying capacity' of a democracy increases (Chenoweth 2007, 42). This can happen when structural long-term changes in the government are made, or when there is a shift in the existing social cleavages in society. However, this type of structural change typically takes place at a very slow and gradual rate. Historically, a more sudden rapid decline in the number of terrorist groups has occurred over time, "indicating that at least some groups tend to exercise at least some restraint even while they compete with other groups for power" (Chenoweth 2013, 368).

Thirdly, her theory deals primarily with the explaining an increase in the number of terrorist *groups*, and not so much an increase in the number of terrorist *incidents*. Of course we can make the implicit argument that an increase in the number incidents follows logically from the increase in the number of groups. This claim, however, should be researched by means of a with-in case study.


## **Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework**

According to my evaluation of the existing literature about the link between domestic terrorism and democracy, the first perspective fails to explain why the vast majority do *not* become terrorists, although they might be evenly deprived of political influence. The second perspective overcomes this issue. However, it cannot identify the timing of different waves of terrorist violence.

Chenoweth's theory of the competitive logic (2007, 2010) does not suffer from these deficiencies. The weakness of this theory, however, is the lack of existing with-in case studies that have tested whether this causal mechanism is indeed at work. This thesis will therefore scrutinize her work by means of a within-case analysis to further investigate the intervening variables that are an inherent part of the theory's causal chain. That will be the primary contribution of this thesis.

In order to be more precise on which aspects of her theory need to be subjected to more thorough investigation and testing, this thesis presents here the causal chain that I derived from Chenoweth's theory of the competitive logic.

## Figure 1: Causal path of the Theory of the Competitive Logic



The causal path as depicted in chart 1 demonstrates the theory. However, the causal inferences (the arrows) are still highly contested, for it is unknown under which exact circumstances each different step occurs. Indeed, under many circumstances interest groups *do not* decide to use violence as a political tool, making it more worthwhile to illuminate the causal mechanism that does produce a proliferation of terrorist groups and incidents. Moreover, as is demonstrated by the chain, the path does not account for a decrease in the number of domestic terrorist groups.

#### The full causal chain subdivided in hypotheses

This thesis presents six hypotheses that give a possible explanation of how each of the separate steps in the 'path causality' comes about. Each of the hypotheses is derived from Chenoweth's theory and is framed as a directly observable mechanism. Such a design is well suited to research the causal mechanism. I will elaborate more on this claim in the following chapter ('research design').

## Step 1: formation of interest groups

Since Chenoweth's account is derived from more general social mobilization theory, the very first step in the causal process ultimately leading towards the proliferation and prevalence of domestic terrorism concerns the formation of citizens into interest groups. Much of the research, which discusses the link between domestic terrorism and democracy, claims that democracies encourage citizens' mobilization. This is because democratic governments respect and uphold citizens' civil liberties and because they ensure opportunities for citizens to influence the public agenda and change public policy. The positive relationship between democracy and social mobilization is portrayed in the following first hypothesis:

*H1:* If groups have more opportunities for political influence, then citizens are more likely to mobilize themselves collectively by forming interest groups to influence the public agenda.

Disconfirming evidence would be that new interest groups form, without the government being responsive and susceptible to the various interests. Other disconfirming proof would be the reversed finding: that no new interest groups arise, although there are more opportunities for political influence. Both findings would make an alternative outcome in the first step of the causal process.

#### Step 2: interest groups become competitive for public space

The mobilization of citizens into interest groups subsequently leads to a more competitive interest group sector, in which one group's winning of space on the public agenda is perceived as a loss for the other group. Competition thus stems from the notion that gains of one group are relative to others' failure. This leads to a competitive and possibly hostile environment in the polity, in which groups are pitted against other. It is still vague, however, under what circumstances this process of interest groups being competitive towards each other takes place. More specifically, what causes groups to perceive their possible loss as a possible win for the other? Why can there not be a sense of compromise between the various interest groups? A possible explanation for this mistrust and lack of understanding between groups could be the government's preference for dealing with certain interests and disregard for others. This leads to the second hypothesis, which infers a causal relationship between the government's actions and high levels of competitiveness of the interest group sector:

*H2:* If a government is only susceptible to a limited number of interests, then interest groups that strive for ignored interests are more likely to become highly competitive towards each other.

This hypothesis thus assumes that the government (consciously or unconsciously) plays an important role in stirring up the tensions between various societal interest groups. Disconfirming evidence would be that groups are being instigated by some other external factor, or that they themselves are responsible for the friction amongst them due to their own actions. Other disconfirming evidence would be the vice-versa outcome: that the IV (government being insusceptible) is present, without an increase in the occurrence of competition. These are other possible and contradicting explanations that are in need of more clarification.

## Step 3: Competition leads to outbreak of initial violence

Arguably the most crucial part of Chenoweth's causal chain, is the initial outbreak of violence. In other words, the moment, in which any group of citizens decides to become terrorists in order to advance their policy goals better and perceivably in a more effective way, sets in motion the cascade effect and leads to a further escalation of the number of (domestic) terrorist groups. Regarding the immediate cause of this outbreak of initial violence, Chenoweth only claims: "A terrorist campaign will usually begin with a precipitating event or circumstance that turns to adopting violence rather than utilizing conventional political means" (2007, 38). This leads to the formulation of the third hypothesis, which is directly derived from Chenoweth's account:

*H3:* If one interest group's interest threatens to become completely marginalized due to an external precipitating event or circumstance, then that interest group is more likely to resort to violence.

This leaves open what such a 'precipitating event or circumstance' could be. I assert that it has to be an event that leads to the sudden marginalization of one group's interests. My case

study should illuminate what such an event could potentially be. Disconfirming evidence would be that the initial moment of violence did not result from some external event. An alternative explanation would be that intra-group dynamics play an important role in the group's decision to become violent. An interest group leader, for instance, can play a meaningful role in the groups' decision to use violence. Also, I argue that it is worthwhile to examine how long a political organization used conventional means before they initiated violence. My argument is that interest groups that have a long history of using conventional means in the 'political arena' are more likely to stick to these means out of habit although it might be rational not to do so. It is therefore also interesting to examine for how long an interest group was in existence before it started using violence as a political tool.

Alternative disconfirming evidence would be the reversed outcome: namely that there is a 'precipitating event or circumstance', but that there is no occurrence of violence. This finding would be detrimental to Chenoweth's theory, because the alleged connection between inter-group dynamics and an outbreak of violence is the centrepiece on which her account is built on. If an interest groups decides to stick to conventional means of action, even if the polity is at its maximal level of 'saturation' and its interests are maximally degraded, then the theory of competitive logic requires fundamental re-thinking.

## Step 4: The cascade effect

The next step in Chenoweth's account is a defining feature of her theory. She claims that groups are not only responsive to the government but also towards each other. Because they are involved in a zero-sum conflict game with one another, they will likewise resort to violence as a low cost rational decision. Consistent with Chenoweth's theory, this 'cascade effect' will also be tested through the fourth hypothesis:

*H4:* If one interest group resorts to the initial use of violence, then other interest groups are more likely to also resort to violence to compensate for the sudden significant decrease in attention received on the public agenda.

Disconfirming evidence would be that a terrorist group escalates its attacks, without any groups responding by using violence to counterbalance the initial escalation. It is also useful to examine not only an increase in numbers of groups, but also an increase numbers of *incidents*. Do interest groups react differently to a group, which has a long history of violence, or will one relative low-key attack suffice for others to also escalate their means to the use of violence? In addition, it should be considered whether the *type* of violence and *type* of

terrorist organization matter in terms of whether or not it triggers a violent counter-balancing reaction from other groups. It would be logically sound to suggest that groups of an opposing ideology have much greater incentive to adopt violent strategies (Chenoweth 2007, 47).

## Step 5: A decrease in numbers of group and incidents?

A weakness of Chenoweth's account is that her theory has difficulties with explaining and predicting a decrease both in the number of terrorist groups and the number of incidents. To offer an explanation for these events, I will test two hypotheses, which give two different explanations for a sudden decrease in the number of incidents. This thesis will primarily focus on a decline in incidents and less so on a decline in numbers, because I contend that fluctuations in the number of incidents happen at a relatively fast rate, while the difference in the number of groups overtime generally is not that variable. Studying a sudden significant increase or drop in terrorist incidents is thus more meaningful, since it is easier to infer causality from any sudden change. The possible explanations are laid out in the following fifth and sixth hypotheses:

*H5:* If a government decides to compromise on all the various interest groups' demands, then interest groups are more likely to cease their acts of violence.

*H6:* If the number of terrorist interest groups and incidents peaks, then domestic terrorist interest groups are more likely to cease their acts of violence due to the 'terrorism taboo'.

H5, just like H2, assumes an important role for the government in not only the proliferation but also the diminishment of domestic terrorist activity. Possibly terrorist groups cease their violent perpetrations when the government 'bows'. Consequently, any confirming evidence indicates that domestic terrorism can pay off. Alternatively, it could be the case that the finite rate of terrorism is not caused by some external entity such as the government, but because of moral objections that group themselves may have towards the use of violence. As the population in democracies often is not understanding at all about acts of terrorism, extremist groups could find themselves in a situation, in which their acts are so against the norm ('the terrorism taboo') that they might conclude, out of moral objections, to stop the violence and to either dissolve or to turn to conventional means again (Chenoweth 2007, 250).

## **Overview** of variables

As this thesis will trace an entire causal process, there multiple intervening variables in each of the steps that need to be investigated. The analysis starts with the independent variable (IV) that stands at the very beginning of the causal 'path'.

## Independent Variable

- IV: The democratic freedom of association

## Dependent Variables

Ultimately, the outcome of interest of this thesis is twofold. I am not only interested in examining an increase of group proliferation, but also in what causes changes in the number of incidents. Therefore I present two dependent variables (DVs):

- DV1: Number of domestic terrorist groups
- DV2: Number of domestic terrorist incidents by groups

## Intervening variables

As this thesis aims to identify the full 'path of causality', I therefore derive a sequential chain of intervening variables that are expected to ultimately lead to the DVs. In accordance with the hypotheses, I will examine the following intervening variables (InterVs), which express the consecutive steps in the final outcome of interest:

- InterV1: Formation of interest groups
- InterV2: Government's susceptibility to a limited number of interests
- InterV3: Competitiveness of interest groups
- InterV4: External precipitating event
- InterV5: Likeliness to resort to initial violence
- InterV6: Likeliness to become violent as reaction to initial violence
- InterV7: Government's willingness to compromise
- InterV8: Absolute peak in terrorist groups and incidents at given moment

## **Chapter 4: Research Design**

I have discussed the need to unravel the full causal mechanism in Chenoweth's theory by which an domestic interest group, which formed itself as a consequence of citizens' civil liberty to do so, may use violence and thus become terroristic to influence public policy. In addition, I stipulated the need to further examine how these groups respond to each other, and by which causal mechanism groups might cease their violent perpetrations. The starting point for analysis is examining democratic competition, which is the fundamental determinant of the proliferation of domestic terrorist groups according to Chenoweth. Also, I extend the research interest to investigating changes in the number of *incidents*, and thus not just the number of *groups*.

#### Operationalization of key intervening variables

In her doctoral dissertation, Chenoweth (2007) established through a large N-study a significant positive relationship between inter-group competition (IV) and terrorist group proliferation (DV). Her indicators for inter-group competition were all statically quantified indexes (Chenoweth 2007, 57-62):

- Participation competition (*parcomp*); operationalized as the level of agenda openness based on level of citizens' civil and human rights, derived from the POLITY IV dataset score;
- Ideological intensity of group competition (*compindx*); operationalized as the degree of ideological heterogeneity in a given year (*communist, nationalist, religious, right-wing reactionary, racist*).

Although this operationalization gave her the possibility to execute a large N-study in order to establish correlation between the key IV and DV, such indexes lack the nuances that naturally exist in each different country that has experienced domestic terrorism.

Therefore this thesis will operationalize my interVs in a way that captures the variation of the variables more thoroughly:

- InterV2: expressions from government conveyed through communiqués, speeches by political leaders, government legislation, scholarly analysis on post-junta Greece;
- InterV3: expressions from interest groups conveyed through communiqués, public statements, and presence or absence of hostile incidents directed towards other groups;
- InterV7: government communiqués, speeches by political leaders, government legislation;

Furthermore, InterV1, InterV4, interV5, interV6 and InterV8 are operationalized quantifiably:

- InterV1: numbers of formed groups<sup>10</sup> \_
- InterV4: absence or presence of an event \_
- InterV5 and InterV6: absence of presence of an attack by a group \_
- InterV8: an absolute peak in incidents in certain time frame

## **Operationalization of outcome of interest**

The data for the DVs are taken from two databases:

- The Global Terrorism Database ('National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism'). It is composed by the University of Maryland includes terrorist group profiles from the period 1970 till 2012. The date of group formation and its ideological background are also mentioned. It also contains data on the known terrorist incidents for which the respective group is responsible. GTD is renowned for its data richness (it is comprised of more than 125,000 incidents of terrorism). Therefore it is used to compose the annual Global Terrorism Index, published by the global non-profit Institute for Economics and Peace. In addition to its data richness, GTD offers the possibility to filter out specific data from specific countries and time frames.<sup>11</sup>
- The TRAC Database ('Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium'). This consortium is a supplement of the GTD. TRAC also offers an overview of terrorist groups since the 1960s.<sup>12</sup> In addition, it offers analytical and evaluating articles on terrorism worldwide.

The GTD defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation"<sup>13</sup> Practically, this means that the GTD only includes an incident in its selection when all three of the following attributes are met:

- 1. The incident must be intentional;
- 2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Quantitative data on interest groups for the period 1973-1983 is limited. Empirical research on Greek civil society did not commence until the 1990s. Eurostat, a profound data source of the European Commission, does have information on the organized voluntary activity of Greeks, but only started to collect data after Greece's accession to the European Community in 1981. Therefore, I rely primarily on general statements about the emergence of Greek interest groups.<sup>11</sup> GTD accessed online (December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014): http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/process\_request.asp

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> TRAC accessed online (December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014): http://www.trackingterrorism.org/groups

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Definition cited from the GTD Codebook, p.8; accessed online (December 18th, 2014):

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf

3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.<sup>14</sup>

This definition does not differ substantially from my working definition of terrorism.

Sometimes the GTD did not clarify when a group was formed or when it was dissolved. Most of those profiles simply state that the group is currently 'inactive'. In that case, I relied on the dates of the first and last attack of the organization as the respective dates of formation and dissolution.

The GTD is well suited for terrorism research. Nevertheless, there are some reliability concerns that need to be addressed. Firstly, we cannot know for sure whether data on groups or incidents may be omitted from the dataset simply because they were unreported. Unfortunately, this is an issue that is nearly impossible to resolve. Secondly, GTD does not distinguish between domestic and transnational incidents, in the sense that it includes any attack that occurred on a country's territory, even if the attack was not directed at the government of the respective state. Therefore, I have made sure that every group under examination meets the requirement which I have outlined that are needed to count as a valid domestic terrorist group.

#### Case selection for within-case analysis

In order to test the hypotheses, this thesis has selected studying the case of modern post-authoritarian Greece. From the outset, Chenoweth's theory of competitive logic should also apply to this case. According to POLITY IV data (which measures the democracy level of countries from -10 - +10 range), Greece ascends from a -7 score (autocracy) in 1974 to a spectacular +8 score in 1977.<sup>15</sup> After 1977, Greece's democracy level score stabilizes and remains between +8 and +10.

Meanwhile, Greece has witnessed a continuous fluctuating flow of domestic terrorist activity from multiple terrorist groups since its complex democratization process, which commenced in 1974. This pattern is peculiar, since one could expect that democratization, and the subsequent guarantees for civil and human rights, would give less incentive for aggrieved citizens to express their dissatisfaction with public policy violently. Figure 2.1 illustrates this puzzling increase in terrorist activity in Greece, which experienced its first peak just a few years after the democratization period commenced:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Idem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Greece's POLITY IV data were accessed through: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/grc2.htm





Figure 2.1: Number of terrorist incidents in Greece (1970-2013, N=1154)<sup>16</sup>

In accordance with the increase in the number of terrorist increase in Greece in the mid-1970s, figure 2.2<sup>17</sup> likewise indicates an increase in the total number of Greek domestic terrorist organizations:



Both figures suggest that there is a certain pattern in the cycle of terrorist proliferation and diminishment. The period 1973-1983 is of great interest. In terms of the total number of

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Figure taken from GTD: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=greece&sa.x=-424&sa.y=-208&sa=Search (accessed December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014)
 <sup>17</sup> Data taken from GTD and TRAC

terrorist incidents and groups, there is a sudden unprecedented rise observable in the period 1973-1977. The puzzling increase of the values of the number of terrorist groups and incidents coincides with the moment that Greece transitioned to a modern democracy. Such a decisive event could have a large impact on the proliferation of domestic terrorism in Greece. Whereas the number of groups continues to rise until its peak in 1981, the level of incidents decreases after 1977. This is a second puzzling pattern that requires analysis.

By focusing on a longer period of time that contains variation in levels of the DV, my case selection is not biased to manipulate the desired outcome of interest. This 'terrorist cycle', together with its sudden transition to modern democracy, makes Greece makes an interesting longitudinal case study.

#### Method of analysis

As a tool for testing and evaluating the causal chain proposed in this thesis, and as a way to systematically reformulate and rule out alternative explanations, this thesis will use Collier's *process tracing* method. Collier (2011, 824) defines this method of analysis as "An analytical tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena" (Collier 2011, 824). Process tracing is a preferred analysis method since it can help making systematic causal inferences about both singular and recurring events. Careful and thorough description of these events is essential to successfully execute the process tracing method. As it traces and analyses the process of overtime change and causation, it thus also "fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are not adequately described" (Collier 2011, 823).

In order to evaluate my explanatory hypotheses, discovering alternative explanations and other causal chains, and assessing and scrutinizing these assertions, it is not only important give an extensive descriptive historical narrative overtime. According to Collier (2011), for a full causal chain process to be properly outlined, "We must be able to characterize key steps in the process, which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence" (Collier 2011, 824). Therefore the events in Greece should not only be marked as a set of interlinked 'snap shots' of specific moments in time, which formulate the chronological order by which causal mechanism of Chenoweth's theory plays out. To test the hypotheses, this thesis will analyse these claims as follows:

 Describing the historical narrative of the Greek democratization process and the events that preceded the social mobilization and subsequent emergence of domestic terrorism in Greece.

- 2. Outlining the various emerged terrorist groups and the attacks they perpetrated in the course of the period 1973-1983.
- 3. Zooming in on active terrorist groups and tracing the key phases of their evolvement into a fully developed terrorist organization. This process is to be assessed on the basis of each of my hypotheses, which have construed the anticipated causal mechanism. In practice, it means that I will gauge whether the predicted levels of the InterVs and/or DVs and the expected chronological order are present.

The evidence that is needed to evaluate the variables will be assessed and structured by asking questions such as:<sup>18</sup>

- Which interest groups emerged and what are their ideological positions?
- Which terrorist group emerged and what are their ideological positions?
- What did the group do?
- What did the group say/express publically?
- What did the government do?
- How did the government respond?

I recognize the challenges that are inherently part of this method. In the first place, there is the issue of limited available data: "both terrorist groups and governments are fairly secretive about their strategies and tactics. (...) Secondly, it is difficult to discern actual motives from stated motives" (Chenoweth 2007, 94).

Once the descriptive inferences are completed in the analysis, I can go over the various hypotheses and subject them to empirical tests.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> These questions are based on Chenoweth (2007, 93-94), who asked herself roughly the same questions.

## Chapter 5: Analysis

This part of the thesis aims to address the general research question of this thesis from an empirical perspective – why was there an increase in domestic terrorist activity despite the 1974 democratization process that should have brought less incentive for citizens to become violent, and why did it decline only a few years later? Before analysing the causal mechanisms that are associated with Chenoweth's theory of the competitive logic, I shall first present a descriptive chronological overview of the turbulent socio-political situation in Greece before and during the process of democratization, for, as Kassimeris argues, "Revolutionary behaviour cannot be studied apart from its socio-political and ideological environment" (2013, 9).

#### Historical narrative of events prior to democratization process

To get a deeper understanding of the rise of domestic terrorism after the fall of the dictatorial regime in 1974, we need to go back in time, as Greece's turbulent national history after World War II is irrefutably linked to periods of deeply rooted and even institutionalized mistrust, hatred and violence between a far-reaching ideological cleavage within the Greek society and elite. "Greece had for decades been riven by deep splits between Right and Left under governments dominated by the Right, and experienced numerous periods of political instability; from civil war, to military revolts, to periods of military and authoritarian rule" (Xenakis 2012, 439)

#### From civil war to repression to reform to dictatorship

The profound divide between the right-wing conservative and authoritarian rule, and leftist activist subset of the population has its foundation as early as the mid 1920s. Here is where the first struggles between the political elite and the working class arose. Subsequently, in the aftermath of World War II these increasing tensions culminated into a traumatic civil war (1946-1949) that has left many open wounds and bitterness amongst the Greek. There no accurate casualty estimations, but there is some consensus that the death toll amongst the Greek populace has to be around 60,000-100,000 (Close 2002, 37-39; Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 563; Kassimeris 2013, 10). This tragedy, as Kassimeris (2013, 10) argues, inflicted deep political and social that have still not fully healed.

Eventually, with the help of American military and economical aid, the anticommunist side of the conflict prevailed, leading to a vengeful systematic discrimination and exclusion by the victors (the Right) against the vanquished (the Left). This sharp divide arguably was the main element of social, economical and political life in Greece, which lasted for about thirty years (Kassimeris 2013, 10; Fakitsas 2003, 10). Weary of any more gruesome fighting, the 1950s were a period of relative stability, which was sustained by fearsome police intimidation and harassment of leftist activists. Any resistance was harshly smothered by the parakratos, which were extremist paramilitary organizations that presumably had close ties with the feared state security authorities. Until 1974, the Central Service of Information (KYP), the Greek secret service kept large files of on almost all citizens, and Greeks were assorted into two categories, namely the ethnikofrones ('healthy', nationally minded) and the miasmata ('unhealthy, dangerous enemies of the state and society) (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 564; Close 2009, 89). The Greek state had a modern constitution and formally upheld democratic values. However, the rigid institutionalized cleavage between left and right remained insurmountable. A series of special para-constitutional legislations (laws 509/1947, which also banned the Greek Communist Party (KKE), and 516/1948 in particular) operated alongside and in violation with the constitution. They authorized state control over the miasmata and upheld the sharp societal and political divide in Greece. All and all, the situation led to a political culture engrained with hatred and mistrust (Xenakis 2012, 439; Kassimeris 2013, 10-12; Fakitsas 2003, 10; Samatas 1986, 35).

In 1963, the centrist President Papandreou was elected and advocated the notion that liberal measures were better able to control communism than harsh repression. He attempted to reform the Greek state in the early 1960s (Close 2002, 106-107; Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 564-565; Fakitsas 2003, 10; Kassimeris 2013, 11). The Greek Army, which traditionally had close ties to the authoritarian Greek Rightist state regime, anxiously sought to prevent any wave of liberal progressiveness within the realm of Greek politics, as a more powerful parliament would distort the old political order. Fearing any new distribution of power, the Army, led by 'Colonel' George Papadopoulos, decided just before the scheduled elections of 1967 to intervene. The coup d'état, which occurred swiftly by surprise on the 21<sup>st</sup> April, 1967, was effective. The military junta seized power and avertedly turned its back to parliamentary rule. The junta no longer viewed parliament's role as the protector and arbitrator of the Greek ruling class (Fakitsas 2003, 11).

#### The 1974 'Metapolitefsi'

However, after seven years of military dictatorship, the junta's failure to establish, at least an appearance of, legitimacy as the righteous expression of the general Greek interest became apparent. The dissatisfaction amongst many (primarily Leftist-orientated) Greek citizens culminated into massive national strikes and student uprisings in November 1973, who were outraged about the junta's control on the universities (Close 2002, 122). The harsh repression from the junta that followed also alienated the remaining conservative supporters of the Colonels (Sotiropoulos 2010, 451).

Although the regime by now was completely delegitimized, the uprisings did not cause the fall of the regime. In the end this happened as a result of its own inability to counter-battle the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus. Incapable of accomplishing any successful policy, combined with internal disagreements led the junta to annul its own position of power (Sotiropoulos 2010, 451). It summoned the pre-junta beloved Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis from exile to manage the transition to civilian rule and to form a temporal government of national unity. Shortly after, in October 1974, Karamanlis formed the centre right-wing New Democracy (ND). On 17<sup>th</sup> of November, exactly one year after the infamous Athens Polytechnic University revolt, the first (free) elections were held after the seven-year rule of the junta. In Greek political history, this 1974 transition from an authoritarian regime to a reformist multiparty democracy has come to be known as 'Metapolitefsi' in Greek. As figure 5 demonstrates, Karamanlis and his centre-right New Democracy won a landslide victory, with the centrists (EK-ND) second, the socialist PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) third and the communist coalition EDA-KKE fourth. The electoral system by design facilitated the formation of majority single-party government. ND received a little more than half of the votes, but occupied 72% of the seats in parliament (216 of 300) Sotiropoulos 2010, 456).

Party	Votes	%
New Democracy (ND)	2,669,133	54.4
Centre Union – New Forces (EK-ND) (continuation of former EK which held power in the early sixties before the military junta)	1,002,559	20.4
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	666,413	13.6
United Left (coalition EDA-KKE, center left and communist party)	464,787	9.5
National Democratic Union (EDE), extreme right	52,768	1.1

 Table 1: Results of Greek Parliamentary Election of 1974

Now that a general historical narrative has been provided on the political developments in Greece before Metapolitefsi, it is now essential to test the causal mechanism as suggested by Chenoweth's theory of the competitive logic.

 Table 2: Domestic terrorist group emergence in Greece (1967-1983)

Year of Emergence	Name of Group	Ideology	Year of dissolution	Total Number of Reported Attacks*	Total Groups
1967	Free Greeks	Nationalist/ separatist	1974	unknown	1
1968					1
1969					1
1970	Makriyannis Fighting Group	Leftist	1971 (merged with LEA)	0	2
1971	Popular Revolutionary Resistance Group (LEA)	Leftist	1972	1	2

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Results taken from: Nohlen and Stover, 2010. "Elections in Europe, a Data Handbook": 830.
 <sup>20</sup> Data taken from GTD and TRAC (see Research Design)

	Resistance, Liberation and				
1972	Independence Organization	Anti-American	1972	1	2
	(AAA)			1	-
1973	Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth	Nationalist/	1973	1	1
	(EAN)	separatist			
1974	Greek Anti-Regime	Nationalist/	1974	1	1
	Movement (LAOS-11)	separatist	1771		
1975	<b>Revolutionary People's</b>	Anti-globalist/	1995	90	1
	Struggle (ELA)	Communist			
"	<b>Revolutionary Organization</b>	Anti-globalist/	2001	114	2
~~	17 November (RO17N)	Communist/ Nationalist			
1976		Nationalist			2
1770	Greek National Socialist				
1977	Organization	Fascist	1978	3	3
"	Fighting Popular Rally	unknown	1977	7	4
"	Kentavros	unknown	1977	1	5
1978	Organization for National	Rightist/	1978	unknown	4
1778	Recovery (OEA)	Conservative			
		Anti-Globalist/		3	5
"	Group June 1978	Communist/	1980		
1070		Nationalist	1070		
1979	Group Popular Resistance	anarchist	1979		6
1980		Fascist/Racist	2005 (margad with	unknown	5
1980	Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avyi)		(merged with Patriotic Alliance)		5
	New October 1980				
"	Revolutionary Organization	Anti-Globalist/	1981	2	6
	(EO80O)	Leftist			
1001		Rightist/	1001	unknown	5
1981	Blue Archer Group (GT)	Conservative	1981		
" Re	Revolutionary Anti-Capitalist	Anarcho-	1981 Unknow	unknown	6
	Initiative (RACI)	Communist		ulikilowii	0
"	Revolutionary Nucleus	Communist	1981	1	7
"	Autonomous Resistance	Leftist	1981	2	8
1005	Group (AA)			_	
1982					5
1983	Greek National Socialist	Fascist/Racist	1983	1	6
	Struggle				

\*This number presented in this chart is based on data from the GTD. However, the real number of terrorist incidents could be higher. The problem of underreporting of terrorism prohibits the provision of actual numbers of total terrorist incidents.

### Testing of hypotheses: tracing the causal mechanism in the case of ELA and RO17N

As evidenced by table 2, of all the domestic organizations that emerged, two ultra-left terrorist groups, which both emerged shortly after the commencement of *Metapolitefsi*, stand out: ELA (*Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas*) and RO17N. Whereas the vast majority of emerged groups in the 1970s and early 1980s were short-lived in terms of their early demise and number of attacks, these two groups managed to remain vigorous perpetrators of terrorist acts for almost 30 years. This thesis therefore will primarily zoom in at the emergence of far-leftist interest groups and its ties with the communist ELA and RO17N. It will trace the key phases of their evolvement into fully developed terrorist organizations in the 1970s. This process is to be assessed on the basis of each of the hypotheses.

## Phase 1: Democracy (freedom of association) leads to formation of more interest groups (H1)

On 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1974, the dictatorial military officially surrendered power. Since the junta regime did not fall directly as a result from popular pressure, despite the strikes and uprisings of November 1973, it was junta official and self-proclaimed 'head of state' General Gizikis who swore in Karamanlis. Aware of the ambiguity of Gizikis' legitimacy, as his position was derived from usurped power, Karamanlis quickly issued the Constitutional Decree of 1<sup>st</sup> August 1974. This act restored the Constitution of 1952, with the exception of the articles that referred to Greece as a 'Crowned Democracy'. Karamanlis' decree left the decision on the future of the monarchy open to a referendum. It was the first Act of constitutional value and therefore the first step in the process of *Metapolitefsi* and the return of legality in Greece (Katsoudas 1987, 19-20; Clogg 1987, 61-62).

Eventually, following the November 1974 elections, the new Greek constitution came into force in 1975. It was of republican nature and included all the rights and guarantees for popular sovereignty (Art. 1 and 2). In terms of the civil rights to assemble and associate, the legal environment for Greek interest groups was positive and fairly enabling, as is evidenced by the 1975 constitution<sup>21</sup>:

Art. 11.

1. Greeks have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms as the law provides.  $(\ldots)$ 

Art. 12.

1. Greeks shall have the right to form non- profit associations and unions, in compliance with the law, which, however, may never subject the exercise of this right to prior permission.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> English translation of original text cited from: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf

2. An association may not be dissolved for violation of the law or of a substantial provision of its statutes, except by court judgment.

3. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply, as the case may be, to unions of persons not constituting an association. (...)

Freedom of association was thereby guaranteed. Within the provision as set by Greek law, any state-autonomous interest group may be founded, its legality cannot depend on prior approval of state authorities, and only by decision of a court of law could any association potentially be dissolved (Kohler 1982, 137).

The fall of the Colonels' regime was followed by the re-establishment of a parliamentary system that included the legalized Communist Party. This ended the institutionalized discrimination of primarily leftist political groupings and meant the strengthening of the rights of free speech and free association. In terms of political rights, these were enhanced as a result of the abolition of the monarchy, the safeguards installed against a future interference by the army in parliamentary politics, the elimination of electoral fraud and the termination of repressive political practices on the countryside (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, 8). These structural changes yielded possibilities for Greeks to associate and participate in voluntary, self-organized, self-supported and state-autonomous groupings of individuals that represent any social, political, professional or economic interests outside formal political circles. Combined, those groupings are commonly referred to as part of the 'civil society' (Sotiropoulos 2004, 11).

This civil society is rendered as important to any democratic transition as it can serve as a *corps intermediaire* between state and society and as a safeguard against state authoritarianism (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002, 2). Schmitter (1986) even argues that, in order for any system of liberal democracy to remain a viable alternative to authoritarianism, "a country must possess a civil society in which certain community and group identities exist independent of the state" (1986, 6).

It is therefore not surprising that the process of democratic transition is linked to an outburst of social and political mobilization (Sotiropoulos 2004, 8). To what extent is this dynamic observed in Greece after *Metapolitefsi*? And, could the domestic terrorist groups be linked to this mobilization?

### Emergence of interest groups after Metapolitefsi

With regards to the emergence of interest groups in Greece, Fakiolas (1987) argues that "there are thousands of interest groups in Greece (...). The groups inevitably cover a

wide range of interests, from strictly economic to cultural, educational, ethnic, religious, and conservationist" (1987, 174). Of all these different interests, the trade unions have been the most prominent set of groups (Mahaira-Odoni 1995, 240). However, contrary to what would be expected, many of these groups already had existed before the fall of the dictatorship. For instance, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), the prime union for the Greek workers of the private sector, which represents 90% of all unions, was established as early as 1918 (Fakiolas 1987, 175). In fact, the number of groups that was established since 1974 is limited. The new interest groups primarily consist of a handful of strong political parties. As Fakiolas (1987, 175) writes:

Among them are about two dozen political societies and discussion groups, as against about a dozen functioning before the dictatorship; three new peace movements, as against one before; half a dozen new women's organizations; (...) about a dozen new environmental, consumer and TV viewers protection associations."

Can any of these interest groups be associated with ELA, RO17N or any other terrorist organization? Kassimeris (2005, 761) claims that the extra-pariamentary left immediately disassociated itself from them, since they perceived ELA and RO17N as "avant-gardist, dogmatic and militaristic". As a result, these terrorist cells viewed themselves as part of the Greek autonomous movement; that is to say a more or less loosely tied cell of individuals that "had consciously broken off links not only with the communist left and its unions (...) but also with the various new extra-parliamentary leftist groups" (Kassimeris 2013, 66). This finding indicates that domestic terrorist groups in the 1970s never considered using conventional persuasive tactics to further their interests. From the outset, these groups have perceived their demands as to be beyond the scope of the mainstream conventional political arena.

Fakiolas (1987, 175) asserts that the number of newly established interests groups does not signify a significant outburst in social and political mobilization as one could expect after a democratic transition. This leaves the question open how this absence of mobilization can be explained. My argument and answer is the following: that any substantial social and political mobilization in Greece after *Metapolitefsi* was inhibited due to the continuation of an overbearing control of the state over the most potent interest groups and due to the pervasiveness of a few strong political parties. Sotiropoulos (2004) has named this situation a 'Greek paradox', "Since, normally, state corporatist structures accompany authoritarian, not democratic political regimes" (2004, 20).

How did this overbearing Greek state manifest itself after the fall of the junta and how did it hinder the development of interest groups? Indeed the most prominent interest groups, the unions, could now operate without fear of persecution and police interference. However, Kohler (1982, 137), Fakiolas (1987, 179) and Sotiropoulos (2004, 18) argue that after the transition the Greek government maintained a considerable degree of influence over the handful already existing labour associations. For instance, the respective ministry staffed the top of the various organizations by pro-government leaders. Moreover, about 80-90% of their income came from state subsidies granted by the Ministry of Labour, thereby ensuring a firm control over its finances (Kohler 1982, 138; Sotiropoulos 2004, 18). Such s system did not only result in far-stretching dependence upon the state, it also had a severe corrupting effect on peak union representatives, as it relied primarily on the personal exchange of favours. Strong close ties between the central state apparatus and unions inhibited the latter from playing an autonomous role. Political clientelism thus failed to produce a new vibrant interest group sector, even though formally the legal environment was present in post authoritarian Greece (Mahaira-Odoni 1995, 241).

The Greek political culture based on patron-client relationships was the result of a long-term historical pattern, which can be traced back to the early 1900s. The sociologist Mouzelis<sup>22</sup> (1986, 126-133) has made a compelling argument about the origins of Greek clientelism. He claims that this political behaviour is rooted in the delayed development of industry and capital. Traditionally, the Greek oligarchy, consisting of influential landowners, functioned as the sole employers in a predominantly agricultural society. Competing private employers, which would have emerged through industrialization, were practically absent. When the masses gradually entered the political system, they were thus naturally incorporated in the system in a *vertical* manner, since the state remained the ultimate employer and the organizational centre for the exchange of favours. As a consequence, "organizations neither managed to put a decisive check on the incorporative/paternalistic tendencies of the state, nor could they eliminate the all-pervasive particularistic, personalistic features of the polity" (Mouzelis 1986, 127). Obviously, the sudden transition to democracy in 1974 did not immediately end this deeply rooted aspect of the Greek political system. This historical development is fundamentally different from the situation in Western democracies, where industrialization preceded the incorporation of the masses into politics. This opened up

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> I wish to thank Dr. Vrousalis, assistant professor Political Philosophy at Leiden University for his suggestion to look into Mouzelis' work.

opportunities for private employment, and broke off the close ties between the patron (the state) and the client (the masses).

In addition to a political culture engrained with clientelism, there is another reason why *Metapolitefsi* did not result in an outburst of mobilization. Albeit under pressure, it was the military junta that independently made the decision to surrender power to Karamanlis and parliamentary rule. The rapid regime change came by surprise. Therefore, with the exception of political parties, it simply did not allow for mobilization because there was no time for interest groups to form. The 'window of opportunity' was kept shut (Sotiropoulos 2004, 17).

Lastly, the excessive concentration of power in the hands of a few political parties also prevented the emergence of other interest groups. This argument is articulated by Sotiropoulos (2004). He contends that "A few political parties "sapped", as it were, the political energies of the populace" during *Metapolitefsi* (2004, 17). Figure 4 illustrates the high interest in party politics in the 1980s:

	Year	Attendance of Party Rally	Participation in Party Campaign	Active Involvement in Party Campaign
YES	1985	36.0	31.9	31.7
	1996	24.9	16.5	12.6
NO	1985	63.7	67.6	68.0
	1996	75.1	83.5	87.4

 Table 3: Active participation in politics 1985-1996

The major parties successfully established party-led associations in many domains, especially labour, and exerted heavy influence on them. Relying on the 'old' form of clientelistic exchange of political favours, the parties emerged "as the natural broker for aggregating interests" (Mahaira-Odoni 1995, 241). For instance, ND managed rapidly expand its party membership (130,000 registered members by 1979) and to set up close ties with farmers' associations and large sections of the trade union leadership (Kohler 1982, 120). Above all, PASOK realized the importance of using interest groups effectively by placing them into the party mechanism (Fakiolas 1987, 183-184; Kohler 1982, 130). This evidenced by the fact that by the mid-1980s, PASOK had around 75,000 members, 100 local organizations, 500 sector

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Cited in: Lyberaki, Antigone and Christos J. Paraskevopoulos. 2002 "Social Capital Measurment in Greece". *In*: OECD-ONS International Conference on Social Capital, London:

http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI\_Greece\_Executive\_Summary.pdf

organizations and 700 smaller party-affiliated groups (Kohler 1982, 130. Sotiropoulos (2004) even claims that PASOK, in particular, "orchestrated the synchronization of government and almost all labour and professional associations, so as to acquire full-control over civil society, in the manner the Nazi party had in inter-war Germany" (2004, 18).

This explains why nearly all interest groups that emerged had such strong affiliation with political parties. Also, it explains why the new extra-parliamentary groups remained rather insignificant in terms of their influence in the political realm. They lacked the resources and public appeal to the broader public as this was 'sapped' by tight party-led organizations. This bold concentration of power simply did not allow for any other interests to be heard in the polity.

This evidence disconfirms H1. In fact, it gives proof for an alternative finding: that the right to associate guaranteed due to *Metapolitefsi* (IV) did not result in any substantial thriving and vigorous independent interest group sector (InterV1) to proliferate. My analysis suggests the interference of two omitted variables, namely state control over interest group sector and, closely linked, the power concentration of political parties, which have prevented the proliferation of interest groups. Regarding the first signs of the proliferation of domestic terrorism, my analysis also signifies that none of the interest groups that did emerge after *Metapolitefsi* had any direct links to terrorist organizations like ELA or RO17N.

Lastly, it appears that in the case of Greece democracy's freedom of association (IV) as explanatory factor is not a valid necessary condition in the causal chain. It prompts that the IV is not a necessary variable for setting in motion the sequence of events that will eventually lead to the DVs. These events will be further explored hereafter.

*Phase 2: As the Greek government ignored many interest groups' demands, these groups become more competitive towards each other (H2)* 

As the first post-junta liberal government, top priority for the Karamanlis government was to advance the process of '*Apohountopoiisi*', or de-juntification. The new prime minister declared that from now on there would be "Room for all Greeks" in "A genuine and progressive democracy" (*The Times, July 26<sup>th</sup> 1974*: Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 567). The severe oppression by the junta forced the new government to lay the foundations for thorough political and societal reconciliation through the pursuit of the administration of transitional justice. As a consequence, balancing out the interests of the traditional Left and

Right, which had had such a long history of mistrust and violence towards each other, was a key assignment for Karamanlis (Xenakis 2012, 440; Sotiropoulos 2010, 452).

Indeed, Karamanlis moved swiftly to reinstate fundamental freedoms. However, elsewhere, his approach to de-juntification was much more conservative and cautious. Karamanlis remained hesitant about the 'cleansing' of the state apparatus of the civil servants that served under the Colonels' regime (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 567; Sotiropoulos 2010, 452; Kassimeris 2005, 750-751): only 200 of the 100,000 junta supporters that held important positions within the state were removed (*Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia* (Greek newspaper), *July 29<sup>th</sup> 1975*: Kassimeris 205, 751). Karamanlis did not want to alienate the military at a time of great military tensions over Cyprus with neighbouring Turkey. Moreover, he faired a destabilizing effect of punitive policies, and, lastly, he was aware that most Greeks had in fact never resisted the junta. As Karamanlis declared in an interview (Sotiropoulos 2010, 457):

"As for the demands for a more widespread purge (...) half the Greek population would be in jail if I had not stood out against it."

He re-emphasized his commitment to this view in 1975 when he announced to reduce the death sentence for the junta's leaders and to commute them to life imprisonment:

"When we say life imprisonment, we mean life imprisonment" (Greek newspaper *Ta Nea: issue August 30<sup>th</sup>, 1975*: Sotiropoulos 2010, 457)

All political parties demanded the process of de-juntification. However, to what extent the transitional justice had to be administered, differed substantially.

New Democracy fully supported the view of the popular and dominating leader Karamanlis. On the contrary, the socialist PASOK fiercely opposed the government's view. Its leader Papandreou demanded harder punitive action and dismissed Karamanlis' argument that the opposition ought to be, in principle, against capital punishment (Greek newspaper *I Avgi, issue: August 26<sup>th</sup> 1975; Greek newspaper Rizospastis, issue: August 26<sup>th</sup> 1975; Sotiropoulos 2010, 457).* 

The communist left, which turned out be of little political threat after the 1974 election results, were internally split in a Euro-communist-faction and a 'classical' Moscow-line faction. Although they had lived through systematic suppression for so long, paradoxically, the KKE "was not as determined as PASOK to impose the most severe sentences possible

against those involved in the 1967 coup, the suppression of the 1973 uprising and the torture of resistance members" (Sotiropoulos 2010, 458). They refrained from reacting fiercely against Karamanlis' de-juntification, since they were more preoccupied with pressing for a full re-instauration of democracy, with the systematic oppression that faced in the 1950s and 1960s. Their minimal electoral strength did not put them into a position to use aggressive ant-Karamanlis rhetoric (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 567).

How did the new extra-parliamentary leftist interest groups and communist terrorist groups react to the Karamanlis government's reluctance to proceed with de-juntification and deliver the irreversible change that the Left had fervently demanded? According to Kassimeris (2005, 751), they felt guilty that they had not undertaken sufficient action prior to *Metapolitefsi*, and felt convinced that the time had come to finally ensure structural revolutionary change and social justice for the working class.

ELA and RO17N, as is evidenced by published manifestos and court testimonies, were outraged with the government's conservative stance towards de-juntification. Tsigaridas, an ELA head figure who in 2009 stood trail for his terrorist acts, explained how little the Karamanlis regime actually differed and how much it was just a continuation of the same state authority under a different name and under different deceptive symbols and a constitution:

[The Karamanlis regime] "Did everything it could to leave Greek people in no doubt that it helped to facilitate a dynastic about-turn, a real change within the elite political personnel of a capitalist state power. Apart from the junta leaders, all the key people that made up the junta state apparatus remained unpunished. Not even an elementary catharsis of the state mechanisms was attempted. All the appointees of, and collaborators with, the junta in state bureaucracy, the police apparatus, education and the judiciary remained untouched" [Excerpt from court testimony of ELA head figure Christos Tsigaridas, delivered 29<sup>th</sup> October, 2009] (Kassimeris 2013, 64)

For this reason ELA also despised the notion of *Metapolitefsi*. They viewed it as no more than a democratic farce; a well-developed and well-played out trick by the Greek elite to deceive the Greek people into thinking that their dreams of social justice and equality would now become reality. In his same testimony, Tsigaridas referred to it is a mere deceiving *cosmic change*:

"The dictatorship was finished by the same powers which had imposed it in the first place; *Metapolitefsi* was a cosmetic change imposed by the Americans and NATO. (...) mainstream parties made certain that any popular scepticism was channelled to harmless for the system directions, while at the same time a new political establishment was created to run the capitalist socioeconomic system"

[Excerpt from court testimony of ELA head figure Christos Tsigaridas, delivered 29<sup>th</sup> October, 2009] (Kassimeris 2013, 63)

With regards to the communist stance on the matter, ELA believed that the KKE had betrayed and mistreated the interests of the Greek working class by accepting Karamanlis' position:

[KKE] "has abandoned illegality and underground activity – the methods of political practice that support and strengthen the development of the popular movement. By abandoning the organization and exercise of revolutionary violence, it has effectively deprived the popular movement of the two most preconditions for the seizure of power and the creation of socialism in Greece. Instead, KKE insists on organizing and promoting a political struggle that is reduced to a legally accepted bourgeois framework, cultivating the illusion that only gradual and peaceful protest can lead to revolutionary change and a fundamental break with advanced capitalism – something which historically has proved to be unrealizable."

[Excerpt from ELA manifesto 'Yia tin anaptyxi tou Ellinikou Laikou kai Epanastatikou Kinimatos' ('*For the Development of the Greek Popular and Revolutionary Movement*'), published publically June/July 1978]

In April 1977, RO17N released a 28-page manifesto, which was titled "*A Response to Political Parties and Organizations*". They declared all Greek political parties to be repressive. In addition, they accused the Greek state of being "an American vassal". Their purpose was to perpetrate violent campaigns against what they viewed as "a superficial democratic transformation" in order to change Greece (Xenakis 2012, 441; Fakitsas 2003, 16).

About its relationship with the communist party KKE, RO17N made it clear in their manifesto:

"[...] Not only did they not carry out a single act of resistance, but at the same time they continued at every opportunity to denounce all those who did, which explains why Karamanlis legalized them"

[Excerpt from the 17N manifesto "A Response to Political Parties and Organizations"] (Kassimeris 2001, 69)

My analysis confirms H2. As it turns out, the Greek government ignored the demands of the Leftist political parties and its grassroots organizations, which demanded harsh punitive measures be taken to promote reconciliation and de-juntification (InterV2). This led to two outcomes: more competition between the socialist and the conservative political forces. It also lead to more competition between the traditional communists, who advocated a softer stance, and the autonomous revolutionary left that later brought forth ELA and RO17N. Karamanlis proved to be resolute in his ideas about transitional justice. Inevitably, this infuriated the Left: they demanded the Right to fully redeem themselves after decades of prosecution. The

analysis demonstrates that not only governmental actions can cause more inter-group competition.

Phase 3: As one Greek interest group's interests are completely marginalized due to precipitating event, it resorts to violence, as they perceive no other way out of the zero-sum conflict game (H3)

The first terrorist attack after the start of *Metapolitefsi* occurred on April 29<sup>th</sup>, 1975, as eight cars belonging the US servicemen at a military base of Elifsina were firebombed (Kassimeris 2013, 59). The previously unknown ELA claimed responsibly for this attack. What was the immediate cause for this escalation of violence?

As outlined in the previous paragraphs, the revolutionary left was particularly outraged with the government's moderate position towards de-juntification and with the communist party's declining sense of radicalism and reformism. Violence was deemed the only viable solution to set in motion a notion of unity and consciousness amongst the working class when confronting the capitalist political and economical situation in Greece. In the ELA manifesto of 1978, the group argues that structural social change can only come about if an armed 'professional' vanguard commits itself to a "long, hard and violent struggle" (Kassimeris 2005, 758)

These findings lead me to disconfirm the H3, on account that ELA's reason for using violence did not stem from a zero-sum conflict game. There are two arguments for this contention. Firstly, ELA did not exist as an established interest group before it claimed responsibility for its first attack. In fact, ELA's decision to adopt violence was made immediately upon its formation. Therefore it had never had the chance to be involved in a conflict game with any other interest group. Secondly, as is evidenced from their manifesto, the revolutionary ELA members, from the very beginning, had never contemplated using anything but violence to promote their interests. ELA could have attempted to use conventional means, but it never changed its military methods and strategies. Throughout its existence it sought to educate and publicize a potential message for broader public (Kassimeris 2005, 759). The use of violence was not perceived as an 'ultimate way out'. Instead, it was deemed as a justification for its existence.

Furthermore, my analysis does not support the notion that some external precipitating event (InterV4) had led to a sudden marginalization in the polity and subsequently caused the violent escalation (InterV5). My evidence only points at two circumstantial reasons for the

reason to adopt violence: fury about the government's moderate position towards dejuntification and the perceived KKE's betrayal of the working class. A more immediate cause for violence is not found. Alternatively, I suggested in chapter 3 that intra-group dynamics, such as the presence of a dominating leader, could be decisive for the terrorists' decision to use violence. However, ELA was far from a hierarchal leader-dominated organization. ELA rejected the principle of strong hierarchy and leadership (Kassimeris 2013, 67). Thus its organizational structure likely did not impact their intent to become violent.

There is some preliminary support for the claim that the decision to adopt violence is contingent upon how long a political grouping had existed as a conventional interest groups, given that ELA immediately adopted violence after its formation. The reason could be that it had not yet accustomed itself to the conventional rules of the 'political game', and thus had no difficulty with exerting brute force. Unfortunately, findings do not evidence this claim.

# *Phase 4: As this Greek interest group resorts to violence, other Greek groups respond by also resorting to violence (H4)*

Table 2 outlines the emergence of the various domestic terrorist organizations. It demonstrates that after ELA's formation, 14 new groups emerged in 8 years. Is there any reason to suggest that Chenoweth's cascade-effect has occurred?

RO17N, which was the first group to form after ELA, committed the first attack 8 months after ELA, when it assassinated Athens-based American CIA chief Richard Welch on December 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1975. Unlike ELA, which viewed terrorism as a political tool to 'educate the proletariat' before the real social and political revolution could take place, the more nationalist and secretive RO17N considered violence as an end in itself (Kusher 2002, 315) Regardless of these differences in approach, RO17N essentially had the same political agenda and in this sense it can be called a compatriot of ELA.


In terms of the emergence of other groups, it is worth noting there were also four right-wing groups that eventually arose. This confirms the expectation that groups of an opposing ideology have an important incentive to become violent to counter-balance the left-wing terrorism.


In terms of the number incidents, figure 2.1 demonstrates that after the peak year 1977, the number of (GTD reported) incidents gradually declined. This information suggests that a rising number of groups did not result in a rising number of incidents.

These findings suggest that there is some preliminary support for H4. The emergence of right-wing groups suggest some cascade-effect as these groups sought to counter-balance left-wing violence (interV6). However, sources that confirm this perspective are absent. Moreover, evidence suggests that, at least in the case of RO17N, other left-wing groups emerged out of support for ELA's cause. This notion suggests that one terrorist groups could inspire and infuse others to strive for the same interest goals. However, this claim is only merely a theoretical expectation, since no source confirms it.

Phase 5: There is a decrease in the number of terrorist incidents, either because the government compromises between the various demands, or because the groups are impacted by the 'terrorism taboo' (H5 and H6)

Although figure 2.1 demonstrates that overall the number of incidents declines sharply after 1977. However, according to the GTD data that are illustrated in figure 3, ELA and RO17N do not fall in this pattern.





How can this operational continuity be explained? ELA en RO17N never attempted to become broad-based movements with wide involvement of many supporters Instead, they relied on strong emotional bonds, which reinforced a sense of trust and silence amongst the members (Kassimeris 2007, 108). These intra-group dynamics likely account for their long-

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=perpetrator&casualties\_type=b&casualties\_max=&start \_yearonly=1973&end\_yearonly=1983&dtp2=all&country=78&perpetrator=271,582 (accessed January 9th, 2015)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Figure taken from GTD:

lived terrorist campaign. In the case of ELA and RO17N, both H5 and H6 are thus disconfirmed, since the DV2 (number of terrorist incidents) did not decline during the period under investigation.

Is there any evidence to suggest that the government has given in to extreme leftist or rightist terrorist demands, which has led other organizations to cease operations and dissolve themselves? Evidence actually suggests quite the opposite. In 1976 the Karamanlis government introduced special anti-terrorist legislation (Law 480/1976 and 495/1976) and in 1978 it passed another law, named the "Bill to Combat Terrorism and Protect Democratic Polity" (Law 774/1978), which provided for severe penalties and strict court procedures for alleged perpetrators of terrorism<sup>25</sup>.

In addition, Fakiolas (2003) claims that until the mid-1980s, incidents of domestic terrorism were viewed "as casual events perpetrated by isolated anarchic agitators rather than a sustained campaign of violence" (2003, 29). In 1983, PASOK Minister of Justice Mangakis stated during a parliamentary debate:

"What we have in this country is not terrorism but isolated episodes of terrorism like the ones experienced by nearly all nations, even the most peaceful as Austria and Switzerland" (Fakiolas 2003, 30-31)

This evidence demonstrates that the Greek state not only reacted aggressively to terrorism, but that it also decided not to take the threat very seriously. InterV7, the government's willingness to compromise, is thus completely absent. This leads me to disconfirm H5.

Is there evidence to suggest that any terrorist organization ceased operations due to a 'terrorism taboo' as a result of a peak in terrorist violence? I have found no evidence to support this hypothesis. The reason for this is that all the short-lived organizations have operated secretively and have refrained from publicizing their message. Consequently, it is impossible to discern the motives for their abandoning of violence. Alternatively, they might have ended their campaign simply because Greek state authorities arrested them. However, the Greek state's inability to curtail terrorist activity is widely recognized in the literature on Greece. H6 is thereby disconfirmed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> According to Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/36/425, dated September 21<sup>st</sup>, 1981) http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/36/a36425.pdf

# **Chapter 6: Conclusion**

## Main findings and arguments

In this thesis, I investigated the relationship between democracy and domestic terrorism. Data suggest that this phenomenon systematically occurs in liberal democracies, and even with a higher frequency than in authoritarian regimes. Moreover, there seems to be variation amongst democracies. Poor and transitioning democracies appear to be the most susceptible to terrorism within their borders. These observations are striking, since the prevalent rationale in the West amongst many policy-makers and experts alike is that democracy serves as a powerful remedy against terrorism. After all, citizens in liberal states have so many legal and non-violent channels to express their political preferences and to change undesired policy. To address this societal and scientific puzzle, this essay sought to unravel under what conditions citizens in democracies are motivated to engage in acts of terrorism against the state or their fellow citizens.

Construing the causal mechanism by which democracies give rise to domestic terrorism has sparked much scholarly debate. I laid out three perspectives on this matter that have formed the major contradictions in the academic field. The third perspective, which associates social mobilizations of citizens into competitive interest groups, appeared the most promising. It explains citizens' motivations and has potential to foreshadow waves of violence. Agenda competition, interest group organization and a plurality of ideas are elements of a democracy that can encourage terrorism.

The exact mode by which the competitive logic plays out in democracies is absent, since little qualitative case studies have been conducted to examine this theory. This thesis sought to fill this gap and strengthen the theory by testing and further specifying the exact causal mechanism by which democracies give rise to terrorism. Greece's democratization process was selected as a study case, because its transition period went with an unprecedented peak in political violence, and because the violence went through a certain cycle in time. The causal path, by which the two most prominent groups ELA en RO17N developed, was traced.

My first finding is that there was no significant outburst in social mobilization after the *Metapolitefsi*. Apart from mainly a few overbearing political parties and affiliated interest groups, new interest groups were barely formed. Secondly, I have found support to suggest that the government, by its insusceptibility to interest group demands, leads to an increased sense of competitiveness amongst rival political forces. Thirdly, however, my analysis does not support the claim that this competiveness led to the initial adoption of violence, as the terrorist organization were autonomous groups that had never functioned as conventional interest groups, nor did they ever wish to use non-violence. Fourthly, the formation of RO17N cannot be explained by the theory, since no evidence suggests that it aimed to counter-balance ELA. However, the proliferation of right-wing groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s preliminary supports the notion of a cascade-effect, but this claim lacks empirical proof. Fifthly, ELA and RO17N's operational continuity cannot be explained by the theory, nor can it account for the decline in terrorist incidents in the late 1970s.

Overall, my analysis disconfirms and thereby challenges the causal hypothesized mechanisms. There is a possibility that Greece is an 'outlier case'. This could explain the low applicability of the theory. Greece makes an exceptional case because its democratization process did not result in an outburst of social mobilization. In fact, there hardly was an independent interest group sector present in post-junta Greece. This has been called the 'Greek paradox'. Further qualitative research should be done to assess whether Greece indeed is an exceptional case and whether the theory is supported in other cases that experienced democratic transitions in the 1970s, such as Portugal and Spain.

My findings illustrate a different causal mechanism that led to the formation and lethality of ELA and RO17N. I assert that, in the Greek case, not democracy's commitment to pluralism, but rather *a lack of pluralism* led to a few disillusioned citizens to adopt violent strategies. Indeed, Greece after the *Metapolitefsi* formally and legally created the right environment for interest groups to form and was thereby committed to pluralism. However, a large corrupt and clientelist overbearing state, combined with the omnipresence of a few strong political parties immediately halted the 'political energies' that naturally arose after the fall of the junta. Even the communists in post-junta Greece did not utilize their newly acquired civil rights to mass-mobilize against the new elite and seemed to be satisfied with Karamanlis' conservative de-juntification policies.

With more democracy comes the promise of equal rights and opportunities for a better future. In Greece, which had a political history marked by polarization, hatred and mistrust prior to its democratization, this better future was particularly desired by so many who had suffered from exclusion and discrimination. However, the aggrieved revolutionary leftists quickly were disillusioned when no new vibrant interest group sector emerged, and felt betrayed when the desired de-juntification process was not fully advanced. They discredited *Metapolitefsi* as a mere cosmic change. They viewed it as a democratic farce designed to trick the masses into believing they had the promised new rights and opportunities.

This disillusionment also explains why ELA and RO17N immediately adopted violence upon their formation, as they realized that their interests would never be heard on a public agenda that was overwhelmingly dominated by a handful of dominant corporatist political parties. Furthermore, I suggest that like-minded aggrieved citizens can inspire each other to also use violence. The initial violence by ELA could have sparked both RO17N and so many other leftist short-lived terrorist cells. This claim should be researched more thoroughly.

Also, I assert that intra-group structures are vital to understand its continuity or demise and should not be underestimated when explaining a pattern of incidents. ELA and RO17N, because they were comprised of family members and close friends, were immune to infiltration and could stay underground for so long. Future research should reveal if the other Greek terrorist organizations had a different intra-group organizational structure, as this could help explaining why they were short-lived.

## *Limitations*

The major advantage of Chenoweth's account is that it can explain why citizens are motivated to become violent, and why others are not. However, there is no evidence to suggest that ELA and RO17N were engaged in a zero-sum conflict game with competing groups. The motivation of its members to adopt violence can thus not be explained by the theory of the competitive logic. In fact, this thesis fails to come up with an alternative immediate cause for ELA and RO17N's decision to utilize terrorist means. My analysis only suggests two circumstantial reasons for the reason to adopt violence: fury about the government's moderate position towards de-juntification and the perceived KKE's betrayal of the working class. These variables do not clarify why so many Greek citizens refrained from becoming terrorists.

Furthermore, this thesis could not render an explanation for the decline in terrorist incidents in the late 1970s. Also, by design this thesis only focused on ELA and RO17N. This impacts the extent to which definite claims can be made about the impact of other groups. Future research on the Greek case should focus exclusively on all the other terrorist organizations that I have identified.

Regarding a methodological issue, it should be noted that my decision to use process tracing to analyze the hypotheses had the disadvantage that lots of data were required in order to uncover the complete causal path. As terrorism generally is an underreported social phenomenon, it turned out be a challenge to collect an abundance of data.

#### Future of terrorism

Dealing with violent radicalized homegrown Islamic extremists is the challenge of today's world. What lessons can be learned from the Greek case and the effect of democracy on its proliferation? Is there reason to suspect that the causal mechanisms are comparable? There is a pressing ideological differences between leftist revolutionary and Islamic terrorism. The latter endorses a 'martyr culture' and the use of suicide violence against Western democracies. However, both ideologies are inherently hostile towards Western democracy, because of either of its secularism and hedonism, or its market strategies. This explains why both have ever attempted to use conventional means before they adopted violence.

If something is to be learned, I assert that Western states should not adopt the strategy of the Greek state in response to terrorism. For over two decades, it responded to Greek terrorism against a background of half-measures, polarization, rivalry and exaggeration (Kassimeris 2007, 114). Given that the Islamic cells are just as secretive as RO17N and will likely maintain a similar operational continuity, Western states should, in their counterterrorism policies, stand firm and united. This is the only way to counter violent extremism. The recent terrorist events that have unfolded in France offer reason to be cautiously optimistic, as the West expressed a sense of togetherness and determination in its aftermath. Only then, history will judge present and future terrorists as failed organizations.

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