THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR
Tracing the peace process of Mali, Africa; 2013-2015

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED	ARMED ONFLICT LOCATION AND EVENT DATA
AEC	AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
AFISMA	AFRICAN-LED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT MISSION TO MALI
AQIM	*Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique*
AU	AFRICAN UNION
CAGs	COMPLIANT ARMED GROUPS
CMA	*Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad*
CPA	*Coalition du Peuple pour l'Azawad*
CMFPR	*Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Resistance*
DV	DEPENDENT VARIABLE
ECOWAS	ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
EU	EUROPEAN UNION
FMLN	*Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front*
FPLA	*Front Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad*
GATIA	*Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et allies*
HCUA	*Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad*
ICG	INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
IEDs	IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
IV	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
IVV	INTERVENING VARIABLE
MAA	*Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad*

MDSF	MALIAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES
MINUSMA	MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILIZATION MISSION TO MALI
MNLA	*Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad*
MPICE	MEASURING PROGRESS IN CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
MUJAO	*Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest*

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1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION

Almost daily we are confronted with news concerned with civil wars, its destructiveness and the attempts made by various actors to initiate or manage a peace process. Civil wars cause enormous suffering and instability throughout the world (Sambanis, 2002: 215). And due to its complex and indecisive nature, resolving the conflict, thus terminating the civil war and establishing a durable peace is a tedious process and a task that presents many difficulties and challenges. It is a task however, many should and do care about.

One of the difficulties presented during civil war termination is spoiling behavior. Some actors perceive peace as a threat and use violence to disrupt, thus spoil, the peace process (Stedman, 1997). The effects of spoiling behavior are, counterintuitively, not always detrimental to a peace process. Research has shown that renewed violence can remind everyone of the costs of fighting which makes spoiling behavior unpopular with the public. Spoiling behavior can result in an increase in international pressure to negotiate or hold on to an agreement. And spoiling behavior can increase awareness that other actors or interests need to be included in negotiations (Reiter, 2015; Newman and Richmond, 2006).

Most research on spoiling behavior though, concludes that its effects are detrimental for a peace process. Thus, scholars find that in cases where spoiling occurs, peace is threatened and peace processes are most likely to fail (Stedman, 1997; Darby, 2001). The nuances in the effects of spoiling behavior, such as the counterintuitive and possible productive effects mentioned above, are not completely ignored by those engaged in the study of conflict resolution and spoiling behavior. However, these effects lack research.

A reason for this literature gap has to do with an overall and general lack of clarity in terms of causality between spoiler behavior and the outcome of a peace process (Nilsson and Kovaks, 2011). In other words, the causal pathways between the effects of spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace process are often not made transparent. As such, there is no clear understanding of the overall effects of spoiling on a peace process. Subsequently, it is necessary to capture the range of effects spoiling can have on a peace process and look beyond those cases where spoiling behavior was present and peace has failed.

In order to test and further build upon existing theories of spoiling, it is of interest to examine the more nuanced and least expected effects of spoiling behavior, thus, the counterintuitive and possible productive effects. This thesis is an endeavor to do precisely that by providing causal clarity between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of a peace process. Subsequently, my research question is: *Under what conditions can spoiling behaviour be productive for a peace process?*

This thesis is structured as follows: First, the literature review will depict two major findings within the state of the art on spoiling behavior applicable to this research. Subsequently, I will elaborate on theories of Conflict Resolution and Bargaining Theory as the appropriate theoretical framework for this study. The two main hypotheses, derived from the literature review and within the context of Conflict Resolution and Bargaining Theory, conclude the first two chapters of this thesis.

Next is the presentation of the research design which is structured around the method of process tracing. The peace process of Mali, Africa between 2013 and 2015 is the instrumental case study for testing the proposed hypotheses and tracing the causality between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of the peace process. Mali's peace process is a case in which spoiling behavior has challenged the peace process, yet peace agreements have been signed and the peace process has not failed. So, it is an outlier case of mainstream theories of spoiling behavior, hence a case well-suited to research the possible productive effects of spoiling behavior. After elaborating on indicators and variables, case study selection and data collection in subsequent parts, the analysis of the research is conducted in chapter six and seven.

VALIDITY

With this study I provide transparency on the causality between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of a peace process. By focusing on the more nuanced effects of spoiling behavior and by tracing in detail causal pathways, I have identified an explanatory causal mechanism between spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace process. So, through this research an increase in knowledge is gained on how the specific process works, not just what the specific process entails.

The research design of this thesis enhances internal and external validity of findings in the following ways. First, through the method of process tracing, this study of the peace process in Mali has spelled out the effects of spoiling behavior in Mali. The internal validity of findings is high due to the chosen method of analysis and due to the contribution this study makes to existing literature on spoiling behavior.

The use of a single case study is often critiqued for the limitation it poses in terms of "how far the findings from one case study may be generalized to other contexts" (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 208). Nonetheless, by drawing upon theories of Conflict Resolution and Bargaining Theory when examining spoiling behavior and identifying a causal mechanism,

findings become part of a wider debate, adding to this study's external validity (Waldner, 2015: 76).

RELEVANCE

This research fills a gap in the literature on spoiling behavior by providing transparency of the causal relationship between the effects of spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace process. By focusing on the possible productive effects of spoiling behavior, existing theories of spoiling are tested and further built upon. Furthermore, as mentioned before, ending civil wars is complex. Hence, when the effects of violence, in this case spoiling behavior, are well understood and the causal mechanism between its effects and the outcome of a peace process is clarified, there will be a deepened knowledge of the threat or opportunities spoiling behavior poses to a peace process. As such, peacemakers will be empowered with that deepened knowledge aiding them in the management of spoilers during peace processes.

2. SPOILING BEHAVIOR; A LITERATURE REVIEW

The specific research focus is established by evaluating the state of the art on spoiling behavior and this literature review is structured around two major findings derived from this topic. First finding is the opacity of the causal relationship between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of a peace process. And second finding has to do with clarifying the research goal and using the relevant typology of spoiling behavior accordingly.

The majority of studies concerned with spoiling behavior assume it poses a significant threat to peace. Steadman argues that spoilers are the largest obstacle to peace (1997). And Walter states that extremists are successful in undermining peace efforts when they desire to do so (2002). As argued by Reiter, these prevailing views are based upon research conducted on case studies in which the peace process has failed oftentimes or lasted very long, such as the intractable conflicts of Israel-Palestine and Colombia. And in these cases spoiling behavior has had notable detrimental effects (2015: 91).

The effects of spoiling behavior are more nuanced though, as suggested by some other scholars. Violent spoiling behavior can remind everyone of the hardships it brings, making it unpopular. International actors might respond to spoiling by a variety of means, such as an increase in diplomatic pressure to negotiate an agreement and/or an increase in resources (Richmond and Newmond, 2006; Sisk, 2006). And, "spoiling can contribute to a stronger peace by forcing changes to the protocols or by the inclusion of new actors that increase the effectiveness of the agreement" (Reiter, 2015: 91). An example of a situation in which

spoiling behavior resulted in an increase in international resources is the peace process in El Salvador in 1992. After several violent spoiling acts aimed at spoiling the peace agreement signed by the government and the *Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front* (FMLN), the United Nations (UN) officials arrived and successfully averted the crisis (Wantchekon, 1999).

So, there is a wider range of spoiling behavior effects that needs to be considered in order to evaluate what spoiling behavior means for a peace process. As such, it is necessary to look beyond those intractable conflict cases when analyzing spoiling behavior in order to address this critical issue in the debate.

When answering the research question of this thesis, it is vital to note that spoiling behavior is not always aimed at ending a peace process (Nilsson and Kovaks, 2011). Parties differ in terms of their objectives, incentives and capabilities. For example, spoilers who actually want a peace process to fail can fail in their attempts to do so. This happened in 1994 when, in Israel, Hamas and Islamic Jihad conducted attacks in order to persuade the Israeli government to abandon the peace process. They failed however as key parties remained committed to the agreement and continued to meet on a regular base (Reiter, 2015: 97).

Other spoilers might want to shape a peace process as they have been left out of negotiations. The peace process of Mali in 1991 presents such a case as the Popular Liberation Front of Azawad or the *Front Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad* (FPLA), a party left out of the peace process, resorted to spoiling in an attempt to undermine it and gain also the dividends of peace. They eventually were included during peace negotiations resulting in the signage of the comprehensive National Pact peace treaty in April 1992 (Ibid: 102). Ultimately, these spoilers want their interests included in peace negotiations and use violence to achieve that goal. And they as well can fail or succeed depending on their capabilities and/or the significance of their demands for the viability of the peace process. In this light, spoiling behavior is argued to be a bargaining tool and the effects should fall anywhere short of actual failing a peace process (Greenhill and Major, 2007; Zahar, 2006).

Stedman also acknowledges the differences between spoilers. He divides them into three specific categories: total, limited and opportunistic spoilers. Total spoilers seek to destroy the peace process, limited spoilers want to modify the peace process in a way that serves them better when peace is achieved and opportunistic spoilers want either, depending on the cost-benefit calculation of the current situation (Stedman, 1997).

The distinctions between these types of spoilers and spoiling behavior and/or their motivations are blurry and overlap between studies. Scholars thus have adopted different

typologies for spoilers and spoiling behavior throughout their research. This has to do with overlapping research goals. Some scholars are interested in preventing spoilers by identifying potential spoilers. And some scholars are concerned with managing them, thus evaluating manifest spoilers (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2011: 607-615).

Accordingly, Nilsson and Kovacs argue that research goals should be made clear and a distinction should be made between the "prevention of spoilers and the management of spoilers" (Ibid: 624). Clarifying these distinctions will solve the blurriness of existing typologies for spoilers and spoiling behavior, reduce the polemic character of the current debate and identify those issues relevant to the specific research. For example, when concerned with the management of spoiling behavior, as I am in this thesis, empirically observed actions are relevant to the research. So, the actors and their goals are of larger importance than their private incentives to resort to spoiling (Ibid, 624-625).

Despite the ambiguities in the debate, it has become evident that not all aspects of spoiling behavior are of equal relevance to the outcome of a peace process. Spoilers might or might not be capable of achieving their goals and their demands might or might not be realizable. Reiter concludes, after asking the question whether or not spoiling works, that those actors that have the military ability to prevent implementation are a threat to a peace agreement (2015: 106). In addition, relevant actors, in terms of military capability, are not always ready or willing to negotiate. They might be only interested in terminating all attempts made towards peace. When they are strong and willing to negotiate though, they should be included in peace negotiations as they could pose a significant threat to the peace process when they are not engaged. In turn, when they are strong and unwilling to negotiate, they need to be weakened, thus eliminated as a threat (Ibid).

Moreover, goals and demands of spoilers are often unrealizable or insignificant in terms of representativeness of the population. Two examples are illustrative of these findings. First, when Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, in 1991 demanded absolute power after signing a peace agreement, he resorted to full scale attacks when his demands were not met. His demands though were unrealizable as all parties would oppose the former President regaining absolute power which would break up the peace process. So, interests were not realizable, thus not relevant for the peace process (Waugh, 2011). Second, the Songhay ethnic groups in northern Mali, 1994, represented a large ethnic group who were excluded from peace negotiations as they had not been a major player during the civil war. They were concerned with the division of material concessions, like opportunities for state employment, set forth in existing peace agreements (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010: 20). The exclusion of

these actors' interests sparked renewed violence and undermined the peace process. Consequently, instability and insecurity remained in northern Mali as a significant size of the population of Mali had not been heard, resulting in subsequent rebellions. So, these interests were representative of a significant size of the population, hence should have been included in peace negotiations.

Ultimately, it can be argued there is a relationship between the capabilities and the goals and demands of spoilers, the effects of spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace process (Reiter, 2015: 624). As such, the puzzle that needs to be solved entails finding the specific causal pathways linking certain factors of spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace process together. The usage of appropriate typologies is essential in doing so.

For the purpose of this thesis and the endeavor to analyze the causal pathways and solve this puzzle, I take into account the typology distinctions made throughout the literature, yet, converge it into two categories appropriate for the development of strategies for spoiler management; relevant actors and relevant interests. These two categories acknowledge the important insights of the current spoiler debate and aid this research by summarizing these important insights into measurable categories. I will elaborate more on conceptualization and operationalization in chapter five of this thesis.

In sum of the literature on spoiling behavior, it has first become apparent that in most cases scholars assume that spoiling behavior is detrimental for a peace process. Yet, it is not clear how this is manifested (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2011: 613). So, the causal pathways need to be made clear in order to assess the effects of spoiling behavior, the outcome of a peace process and ultimately establish the causal mechanism between both.

Lastly, it is necessary for all further research concerned with spoiling behavior, to clarify the research goal and use appropriate typologies in order to avoid further ambiguities within the spoiling debate and establish findings useful for further research. Hence, when concerned with increasing and deepening the knowledge of those who manage spoiling it is necessary to focus on spoiling behavior in which there are relevant actors and relevant interests to be identified.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to answer the research question, "under what conditions can spoiling behavior be productive for a peace process?", one must be familiar with theories of Conflict Resolution and Bargaining Theory. Both theories have contextualized a peace process and provide for insights on the complexity of a peace process, thus are applicable and useful for this research.

3.1. CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Throughout the literature concerned with civil war termination, scholars mostly consider four possible outcomes of civil wars bringing the warring parties to lay down their arms: Victory, a peace agreement, a cease fire and other (Kreutz, 2010: 244-245). The latter category entails those cases in which there have been no victory and/or agreement. For example, the conflict might have changed from intrastate to interstate and/or a warring party could have withdrawn.[1] In this light, multiple studies have shown that since the end of the Cold War, the majority of civil wars ended in negotiated settlements, often with third party assistance (Babbitt, 2009). So, in the majority of contemporary civil wars, through peace agreements, warring parties agree to lay down their arms and resolve incompatibilities. Subsequently, scholars have tried to "better understand the negotiation and dispute resolution dynamics in civil and regional conflict situations where parties have turned to negotiated approaches to resolve their differences" (Babbitt and Hampson, 2011: 47). These endeavors have converged into a greater interest in Conflict Resolution theories.

Explained by Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman: "Conflict Resolution is about ideas, theories, and methods that can improve our understanding of conflict and our collective practice of reduction in violence and enhancement of political processes for harmonizing interests'' (2009). Conflict Resolution can be regarded as a settlement process and a transformation process in which a deal is struck and relationship- and peacebuilding efforts are undertaken (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011: 47). So, theories of conflict resolution are about the transformation of war into peace through settlements in which mutual gains have been negotiated.

By conceptualizing conflict resolution as a process, the complexity of the matter is recognized and there is acknowledgment of the fact that most contemporary civil wars end through negotiated settlements opposed to a one-sided victory. This means that it has become clear it is insufficient to resolve conflict and achieve peace by merely reaching a single peace agreement after negotiations or the successful implementation of a peace agreement

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[1] Kreutz presents the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Termination dataset in this article

(Hampson, 1996; Walter, 2003). Phases in the peace process overlap and negotiations do not cease after particular agreements have been made. Some peace agreements for example are not comprehensive and do not address all incompatibilities, so additional negotiations are required along the way.

As mentioned before, spoiling behavior is observed when certain actors perceive peace as a threat and use violence to disrupt, thus spoil, the peace process (Stedman, 1997). As such, spoiling behavior plays a role during the transformation of war into peace, thus during the peace process in which peace negotiations are undertaken and peace agreements are to be struck. Framing spoiling behavior within this higher level of abstraction, namely conflict resolution, is appropriate and adds to the external validity of this research.

3.2. BARGAINING THEORY

Bargaining theory, very usefully, explains why it is so difficult to end civil wars and reach a negotiated settlement during a peace process. As summarized by Findley, the bargaining model of war is based upon the premise that war is costly and there is always an agreement to be struck that is preferable to war as it costs less (2012: 58). These agreements are difficult to achieve as the warring parties are uncertain about each other's resolve, capabilities and intentions. And even when a bargain can be struck there is a lack of credible commitments to keep or establish peace (Fearon, 1995). This means that there is no guarantee that an agreement will be abided by when one or more parties give up arms.

The private information perspective has originally been used to explain interstate wars. Nevertheless, many argue that information problems in civil wars matter (e.g., Kirshner, 2010; Mattes and Savun, 2010). More specifically, information problems could have considerable effects on civil war resolution (Findley, 2012: 908). For example, during a peace process, the situation often changes. Warring parties could split into fractions when specific terms of an existing or prospect agreement are unsatisfactory to all. Subsequently, information on the distribution of power could be revealed and a new or other, more durable, peace agreement can be struck as it is based upon current information in which there is less or no uncertainty on the distribution of power (Guelke, 2008: 76). And this disclosure of relevant, previously private, information could move the peace process further towards an actual peace agreement.

In sum, when there is private information between warring parties and/or between the warring parties and other possible relevant actors, uncertainty prevails and striking a bargain is inhibited (Walter, 2009). Overcoming this problem is an important step in a peace process

as the ability to strike a bargain between relevant parties, i.e. establish a peace agreement signed by relevant parties, is necessary for the sustainment of a peace process (Guelke, 2008: 63). So, how can spoiling behavior be assessed and what hypotheses can be proposed in line with this broader theoretical abstract of conflict resolution and bargaining theory, more specifically?

4. HYPOTHESES OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

It has become evident that a peace process faces many challenges in terms of uncertainty and actors' inability to strike a bargain from which the peace process can move forward towards actual peace. It seems that, despite the challenges spoiling behavior on its own poses to a peace process, spoiling behavior could be a part of the solution to this overarching challenge. As discussed in the literature review, some of the more nuanced effects of spoiling behavior entail the inclusion of new interests and actors in the peace process. Could it be that, prior to the act of spoiling, information on these interests and actors were private, contributing to overall uncertainty and inefficient negotiations? If so, then it could be argued that spoiling behavior discloses information, thus reduces uncertainty and ultimately signals that a peace process needs to change for it to remain viable.

In these cases, spoiling behavior can be productive when the disclosure of information has been dealt with appropriately. Based upon findings within the literature on spoiling behavior, this means three things. First, the relevance of new actors and interests must be determined. Second, relevant interests must be included in peace negotiations. And third, actors must be included in peace negotiations when willing to negotiate and weakened when unwilling to negotiate. I will elaborate more on these findings in paragraph 5.2.3. when discussing the intervening variables.

From these insights I have developed the following two hypotheses in which the measurement of the degree of productivity for a peace process relates to the following sub question: *Has the peace process progressed?* The conceptualization and operationalization of all significant elements of the hypotheses will be explained in chapter five of this research.

H1: *When spoiling behavior discloses information on a new set of relevant interests in the peace process, the peace process progresses when those relevant interests have been included in peace negotiations.*

FIGURE 1: **HYPOTHESIS OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 1**

*H2: When spoiling behavior discloses information on new and relevant actors to the peace process, the peace process progresses when those relevant actors willing to negotiate have been included in peace negotiations and when those relevant actors unwilling to negotiate have been weakened.*

FIGURE 2: **HYPOTHESIS OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 2**

5. RESEARCH DESIGN

5.1. SINGLE CASE STUDY

A qualitative single case study is conducted in which I have analyzed the causal pathways between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of a peace process.

5.1.1. THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015

In previous paragraphs it is argued that theories of spoiling behavior assume, and in several cases have shown, spoiling has a detrimental effect on a peace process, hence its outcome. This is despite scholars' acknowledgment of more nuanced effects of spoiling behavior and because of the lack of research on the same. So, selecting a case in which the peace process has not failed, despite the presence of spoiling behavior, is therefore an outlier case of mainstream theory and a crucial case for testing the assumptions concerned with the more nuanced and possible productive effects of spoiling behavior.

The peace process in Mali that started in 2013 presents such a case. Achieving peace in Mali is a challenge and it has been tried before. Instability and insecurity have persisted ever since the first rebellion in 1960 and despite of several peace agreements (Poulton and Youssouf, 1998). The most recent rebellion started in 2012 when Tuareg and Arab groups from northern Mali, strengthened by Islamist groups residing in Mali and in neighboring countries, gained control of most northern cities (Pezard and Shurkin, 2015). The rebellion, more specifically the Jihadist movement that had gained momentum because of the rebellion, was contained by the French led military intervention later that year. The French also initiated the peace process, which was made official when the main warring parties signed in 2013 the *Declaration of accession to the preliminary agreement for the presidential election and inclusive peace talks in Mali*, popularly known as the Ouagadougou Accord.

Spoiling behavior has been present and ongoing since this event. The peace process moved forward though and in June, 2015 the *Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali* was signed, ending the rebellion and civil war. It is too soon to assess the durability of peace as the peace process remains ongoing in subsequent implementation phases. However, the peace process of Mali narrowed temporally between 2013 and 2015 provides for a controlled and well-suited case from which hypotheses can be tested.

5.2. VARIABLES AND INDICATORS

5.2.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable (DV) of either hypothesis relates to the following sub question: *Has the peace process progressed?* It is argued by many scholars that

continued dialogue provides for an important indicator of progress in conflict resolution efforts. This coincides with findings within the literature rendering that most civil wars after the Cold War have been settled through negotiations (Kreutz, 2010; Babbitt, 2009).

In order to reduce this level of abstraction of continued dialogue towards measurable indicators of a peace process progressing, I use indicators set forth by the framework of Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) of the United States Institute of Peace. These indicators have been filtered from a multitude of generic indicators appropriate for this research and in accordance with guidelines set forth in the MPICE Handbook (Agoglia et al, 2010). This means that these indicators are chosen based upon a research focus on uncertainty and the difficulties of striking a bargain, thus the findings of bargaining theory. And, indicators are chosen upon available data and based upon the provisions set forth by the Ouagadougou Accord in order to suit the conflict and peace process of Mali.

Consequently, the peace process progresses when the following two indicators exist: The conflict remains to be addressed through a viable peace process and political leaders and elites remain in acceptance with and in support of the peace process. The former is measured through the existence of dispute resolution mechanisms and active communication between various parties in which the goal is to clarify and resolve remaining vital issues among parties to the conflict (Agoglia et al, 2010: 22). The latter indicator is measured first through key parties' renouncement and condemnation of the use of violence and then through the number and severity of violations of the Ouagadougou Accord by faction (Ibid: 22-23). I will elaborate more on the details of the indicators and measures and the provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord in chapter 6 of this thesis.

5.2.2.   INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The independent variable (IV) of either hypothesis is; spoiling behavior during a peace process and it is operationalized as: Violent acts undertaken by key individuals and parties in order to disrupt, undermine, hinder, or delay a peace process and in doing so jeopardize the peace efforts. Such groups can be found on the inside or the outside of the peace process and be either non-state actors or state-related actors. (Hogland and Zartman, 2006; Newman and Richmond, 2006; Nilsson and Kovacs, 2011). Furthermore, spoiling behavior is viewed in relation to a specific peace agreement or a publicly committed pact and it implies multiple violent acts that inhabit this trait. As such, it is a form of political violence, hence narrowed in scope. The fundamental unit of observation is the event or the violent act and this coincides with available datasets on political violence, such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event

Database (ACLED) and news sources reporting on political violence. Violent acts are defined as kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, military operations and armed attacks on civilians (Reiter, 2015: 92).

Lastly, it is essential to explain the nature of the peace process in order to establish the appropriate scope of this research as it directly relates to the indicators and measurement of the DV and the IV. The peace process is operationalized as follows: It commences when "at least one of the parties to the conflict is either engaged in, or committed to, a peace process" (Nilsson and Kovaks, 2011: 614). As such, the Ouagadougou Accord represents the start of the peace process as the main warring parties for the first time overtly expressed their desire to end the conflict. Additionally, the Ouagadougou Accord represents the agreement from which the IV of spoiling behavior can be assessed.

5.2.3. INTERVENING VARIABLES

The intervening variables (IVV) for hypothesis 1 are: A) the disclosure of information on a new set of interests in the peace process; B) the assessment of relevant interests; and C) the inclusion of those relevant interests in peace negotiations. The IVV's for hypothesis 2 are: A) the disclosure of information on new actors to the peace process; B) the assessment of relevant actors; C1) the inclusion of those relevant actors who are willing to negotiate in peace negotiations; and C2) the weakening of those relevant actors unwilling to negotiate. The interests and actors are considered new when these interests or actors have not been included in peace negotiations. Interests are considered relevant when they are realizable and when they are representative of a significant size of the population. And actors are considered relevant to the peace process when their military capability is strong and when they are willing to negotiate as explained in chapter two.

It is important to note that, when new actors have weak military capabilities, independent of their willingness to negotiate, they could still be relevant to the peace process. However, their relevance would primarily depend on whether or not their interests are relevant to the peace process, as per hypothesis 1.

5.3. DATA COLLECTION

I have collected information on spoiling behavior in Mali by analyzing existing datasets, such as ACLED, literature and news sources such as Keesing's Record of World Events. As argued by Reiter, Keesing's Record of World Events constitutes "a respected and reliable source for coverage of peace processes and political violence, and it is used widely in the field" (2015: 94). The data on spoiling behavior entails those violent events in which the

perpetrators have made reference to the peace process. This means that, in order for the event to be coded as an act of spoiling, reference must have been made to the Ouagadougou Accord, its provisions and implementation and/or peace negotiations. When necessary, I have used the method of data triangulation, thus the use of multiple sources to contrast different explanations and to validate findings, to ensure accurate empirical results.

The data on new interests and actors has been obtained from International Crisis Group (ICG) reports, the databases of the UN and the United States Institute of Peace. Data on realizable interests and interests representative of a significant size of the population has been obtained from existing literature addressing the root causes of the conflict and demographical statistics. Additionally, the relevance of interests is assessed by evaluating the decision making processes before, during and after peace negotiations, thus the reports particular to peace negotiations.

Data on the indicators for relevant actors has been obtained from literature concerned with the Mali conflict and open sources such as the CIA World Fact Book. Data relevant to the inclusion of relevant interests in peace negotiations and relevant actors willing to negotiate has been found in the peace process reports from ICG, the databases of the UN and the United States Institute of Peace. This information has been weighed against information on spoiling behavior in order to assess whether or not the actions undertaken by peace makers, if any at all, have weakened those relevant actors unwilling to negotiate.

Finally, data on the indicators for the DV has been obtained from peace process reports as mentioned previously and news sources reporting on the peace process.

In addition to previously mentioned strategies for data collection and as proposed by the MPICE Framework, I have conducted two interviews with representatives of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) who worked in the peacekeeping field in Mali between in 2015. The aim of these interviews has been twofold. First aim is to gain expert knowledge necessary to measure some of the indicators for the DV of interest (Agoglia et al, 2010; 22). Second aim is to gain practical knowledge on the evaluation of and dealing with spoiling behavior. The latter has reinforced the validity of the assessment of relevant interests and actors, the effects of spoiling behavior on the peace process and the causality between these effects and the outcome of the peace process.

5.4.   QUALITATIVE METHOD OF PROCESS TRACING

Establishing and validating specific causal pathways is the key to answering the research question and contributing to existing theories of spoiling behavior. As such, it is vital for the

validity of this research to draw upon the method of process tracing in order to seek causal explanations "Process tracing is a mode of causal inference based on concatenation, not covariation" (Waldner, 2015: 68). So, it is a process in which conclusions are derived from a detailed analysis of a sequence or chain of events that are linked together. The ultimate goal is to not only find the causal pathways between a causal factor and a certain outcome, but also identify the explanatory causal mechanism between the two. For the purpose of this thesis, this means that the ultimate goal is to understand why and how spoiling behaviour has been productive for the peace process.

Additionally, process tracing allows for the "exploration of causal ideas embedded in the narratives, the consideration of the kinds of evidence that may confirm or disconfirm these ideas, and the identification of the tests appropriate for evaluating this evidence" (Collier, 2011, 828-829). Subsequently, an important element throughout this research will be the confirmation of proposed hypotheses through consideration and falsification of kinds of evidence, tests and alternative hypotheses that could disconfirm the proposed hypotheses. So, in order to strengthen the analysis, I consider, besides the proposed hypotheses of information disclosure, an alternative causal pathway that could move forward the peace process.

5.5. SOME LIMITATIONS

This study is limited in three ways. First, it is limited to violent tactics of spoiling behavior. Non-violent behavior could also have an effect on a peace process as argued by Pearlman (2009: 79). There has not yet been much research on this finding and it has been acknowledged that more work needs to be done. This is however beyond the scope of this research.

A second, yet central limitation of this thesis is the vast amount of violent acts to be observed during the peace process and the limited availability of primary sources. The peace process of Mali is assessed as a conflict environment that falls into state zero of the three objective states on the trajectory toward sustainable peace as proposed by the MPICE framework. This means that "drivers of violent conflict persist which requires the active and robust presence of external military forces, in partnership with a sizable international civilian presence, to perform vital functions such as imposing order, reducing violence, delivering essential services, moderating political conflict, and instituting an acceptable political framework pursuant to a peace accord" (Agoglia et al, 2010: xiv). So, violence on the part of spoilers is difficult to distinguish from normal violence associated with the conflict.

Additionally, when it is not known that peace negotiations are ongoing, or peace

negotiations are temporally spaced, thus not ongoing all the time, it is also difficult to distinguish acts of spoiling from normal violence associated with the conflict (Reiter, 2015). By evaluating spoiling behavior after a public agreement has been made on the commencement of a peace process, as I do in this thesis, this limitation is partly solved. Nonetheless, acts of spoiling often overlap with other violent acts and confirmation of an act of spoiling is only possible through data triangulation of mostly secondary sources, such as news sites that specifically mention the violent act in reference to the peace process.

These limitations have resulted in a small number of spoiling events that can be analyzed. However, a small number of spoiling events allow for an in-depth analysis in which causal pathways can be identified between these acts of spoiling and the outcome of the peace process. These causal pathways provide initial insight in certain trends and are to be considered, due to presented limitations, a first necessary step for additional research on spoiling behavior and its effects.

Lastly, the MPICE Framework used for measuring the DV of interest provides for an extensive list of generic indicators for measuring progress in conflict environments. Even though guidelines exist that assist in choosing those indicators applicable for the research, the MPICE Framework designers recommend full scale courses for policy makers before doing so. This is neither feasible nor desirable for the purposes of this thesis, thus chosen indicators are based upon generic guidelines that stress the importance of case specifics, hence a peace process in which a peace agreement is to be negotiated while implementing the provisions of the first preliminary agreement. When moving forward on the findings of this research, this given context must be considered.

6. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015

6.1.   THE SITUATION IN MALI IN 2012; A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ONSET OF THE REBELLION AND THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

Mali's population is diverse and divided. The southern part of Mali, a subtropical area south of the Sahelian belt, inhabits eighty-five percent of the population (circa 13 million), mostly from two ethnic groups; the Bambara and the Senoufo. The remaining fifteen percent of the population (circa 1.5 million) in the desert north of the Sahelian belt, represent the Tuareg, Arab or Moor, Songhay and Fulani ethnic groups (See Figure 3 on page 26 and Figure 2 on page 27). These groups consist of numerous clans, communities and sub-groups and are divided internally along political lines. For example, the town of Kidal, one of the three larger cities in northern Mali, has more than sixty Tuareg sub-groups, all with distinct interests and agendas (Chauzal and van Damme, 2015).

Ever since Mali gained independence in 1960 from France, the Northern Tuareg and Arab communities have challenged the authority of Mali's government, rooting and aggravating distrust. Scholars argue that the Malian government together with southern elites marginalized and underdeveloped the north over time (Chauzal and van Damme, 2015: 8; Pezard and Shurkin, 2015: 23-44). There have been rebellions in 1963, 1991 and 2006 in response to this marginalization. In 2012 the fourth rebellion commenced when Tuareg groups, in collaboration with certain Islamist groups, took up arms against the Malian government and gained control over all northern cities, including Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. Adding to the chaos of the rebellion, one month after its onset, the Malian military forces, strongly divided on how the government should deal with the evolving crisis, lost overall command and control culminating in a military coup in Mali's capital, the city of Bamako. The military coup ended the Presidency of Amadou Toumani Touré and the conflict remained un-answered by the Malian government.

It is argued throughout the literature on Mali's security situation that an understanding of the dynamics of northern Mali's ethnic groups is "crucial to achieving a long-term peace agreement and meeting local needs that are currently ignored or fulfilled by others" (Chauzal and van Damme, 2015: 34) This complex diversity among northern ethnic groups poses a substantial challenge to the peace process. Furthermore, it reflects upon spoiling behavior as it coincides with many heterogeneous needs and demands, not always transparent, consistent or in harmony with the peace process. In other words, there are many parties who are likely to spoil the peace process as it is highly likely not all needs and demands can or will be

listened to in due time satisfactory to the spoilers at hand (Hogland and Zartman, 2006;

Newman and Richmond, 2006).

FIGURE 3: **MAP OF MALI.**[2]

FIGURE 4: **ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION.**[3]

	Number	as % of total pop.
Bambara	4 040 000	25
Senoufo	1 996 000	12
Songhay	1 591 000	10
Fula	1 475 000	9
Malinké	1 294 000	8
Soninké	1 252 000	8
Dogon	907 100	6
Moor	840 000	5
Touareg	813 000	5
Bozo	762 900	5
Bomu	248 000	2
Khassonké	222 000	1
Toucouleur	231 000	1

6.2.   KEY PARTIES AND THEIR INTERESTS

There are several parties relevant for this research: Parties who are the official signatories of the Ouagadougou Accord, parties that have become part of the peace process during subsequent peace negotiations and those parties outside of the peace process. Analysis shows that all of these parties have engaged in spoiling behavior during the relevant time frame.

The governmental signatories to the Ouagadougou Accord are the Malian government, the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) and Mali's interim President Dioncounda Traore. After the elections, delayed from April 2012 to July 2013, Ibrahim Boubaka Keita was elected President (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).

The non-governmental signatories to the Accord are; the National Movement of the

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[3] Chauzal and van Damme, 2015: 35.

Liberation of Azawad or the *Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad* (MNLA) and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad or the *Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad* (HCUA), representative of most Tuareg and some Arab groups. So, despite the extensive divisions between and among ethnic groups in northern Mali, the rebel groups responsible for the onset of instability in the north, mostly Tuareg groups, collaborated.[4]

During the peace process and for a variety of reasons, the MNLA split into several factions, yet most of these newly formed groups eventually became, in 2014, a part of the coordination of Azawad Movements or the *Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad* (CMA); a movement compliant to the peace process and representative of the majority of Touareg and some Arab rebels. The CMA consists of the MNLA, the HCUA, the Arab Movement of Azawad or the *Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad* (MAA), a faction of the Coordination of the People of Azawad or the *Coalition du Peuple pour l'Azawad* (CPA) and a splinter group of the *Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Resistance* (CMFPR). It must be noted that the non-signatories to the Ouagadougou Accord within this movement did acknowledge their adherence to the Accord within weeks after the official signing in June 2013.

The other main non-governmental and compliant movement in the peace process is the Platform; a pro-government coalition established as well in 2014 and consisting of the *Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Resistance* (CMFPR), the Tuareg Imghad and Allies or the *Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Allies (*GATIA); a Tuareg militia backed by the Malian Army, and splinter groups of the CPA and MAA (Nyirabikali, 2015). As such, the Platform consists mainly out of Songhay and Fulani groups who oppose the Tuareg and have been supported by the Malian government in Bamako during the peace process (Chauzal and van Damme, 2015: 39-41). Additionally, these groups within the CMA and Platform are often referred to as the Compliant Armed Groups (CAGs).

Other key parties to the Malian conflict are Islamist Jihadist groups. Some are considered Malian extremist armed groups such as Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa or the *Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO). Others are considered transnational extremist armed groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or *Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique* (AQIM) and the Signed in Blood Battalion. Ansar Dine was initially an ally of the MNLA, yet split off shortly after the onset of the rebellion as they not only pursued self-determination for Azawad, yet were also

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[4] Azawad is the Tuareg given name to northern Mali

dedicated to the establishment of Sharia law throughout the north. Touareg groups within the MNLA opposed this goal and their use of terrorist tactics (BBC News, 2013a).

At some point during the peace process, with the notable exception of all Islamist Jihadist groups, all parties were recognized. Inherent to this recognition are the magnitude of diverging claims made against the Malian government increasing the complexity of peace negotiations and the resolution of the conflict. Despite the chaotic nature of these divergent claims and the challenge it presents to the peace process, the general claim made by all Malian rebel groups is that they fight for the rights of Mali's minority ethnic groups. Nonetheless, there is one distinguishing feature between claims made by the CMA and the Platform. According to Nyirabikali, the former seeks self-determination, thus greater autonomy and the latter seeks to resolve existing political and socio-economic grievances (2015).

The pursuit for self-determination and greater autonomy is problematic. The Malian government suggested that it will make concessions during negotiations, yet has set a "red line" in terms of national unity, territorial integrity and secularity. This means that the Malian government will not discuss any of these demands (Agence France-Presse, 2014c; United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, SC11726). Even though all signatories and compliant groups to the Ouagadougou Accord have agreed to adhere to these "red lines", they still seek to achieve the greatest autonomy possible.

The extent to which the peace negotiations reflect this goal is directly related to factionalism of armed groups and acts of spoiling. In other words, acts of spoiling have been conducted by parties inside the peace process and rebel factions of these parties and/or other parties who are outside the peace process. They all seek to gain as much autonomy as possible in order to safeguard their competing interests regarding "security in the Sahara, organization of the Malian state structure and local balance of power" (ICG, 2014: 1). A prevalent interest, for example, is the unfettered access for illicit trafficking in northern Mali.[5] And according to reports published by the UN, spoilers will seek to maintain their access for illicit trafficking through violence when the road towards peace threatens this interest (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/219: 15). It is argued by Colonel MPP Timmermans, the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the MINUSMA force between February and December, 2015, that "pure pragmatism is an important driver of all parties in which they seek the best

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[5] Stated by N. Woudstra; *Contingents commandant* of the Dutch Forces in Mali between January and November 2015, in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016.

results for their own clan".[6]

Despite the commitment of certain parties to the peace process, insecurity, instability and tensions in northern Mali remained high due to the vast amount of competing interests that incentivize parties to spoil the peace process. The more extremist spoiling behavior though has mostly been conducted by Islamist Jihadist groups who are considered terrorist organizations by the Malian government and the international community. Consequently, they are denied a seat at the negotiation table (ICG, 2014:1). Their use of insurgency tactics does not always result in a violent act that can be coded as an act of spoiling though as they, for example, frequently commit acts against civilians with intended high fatality levels in order to induce fear and build on their violent repertoire.[7] Nonetheless, some of these groups have often announced that they want to derail the peace process completely and are unwilling to negotiate as long as the "red line" of a secular state remains (Agence France-Presse, 2014c).

In sum of the insights on key parties and their interests provided in previous paragraphs, it can be argued in general that there is a deficit of trust between all parties involved in the peace process and that communities are very much polarized. Figure 5 on page 31 illustrates a simplified typology of all armed groups operating in Mali and Table 1 on page 32 schematically figures the key parties of the peace process and their interests.

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[6] Stated by Colonel MPP. Timmermans; Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the MINUSMA force between February and December, 2015, in an interview conducted by the author on April 10, 2016.
[7] Stated by Colonel N. Woudstra; *Contingents commandant* of the Dutch Forces in Mali between January and November 2015, in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016.

FIGURE 5: **ALL ARMED GROUPS OPERATING IN MALI.**[8]

Malian "Compliant Armed Groups" (CAGs)
represented in the inter-Malian negotiations in Algiers

("Coordination" MNLA/HCUA/MAA-Sidatti + CMFPR2/CPA
&
"Platform" CMFPR/MAA-Ahmed/CPA + GATIA)

Malian "Extremist Armed Groups"

(Ansar Dine, MUJAO)

Transnational "Extremist Armed Groups"

(AQMI, Al Murabitun)

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[8] http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.fz/
The transnational extremist group Al Murabitun is a faction of MUJAO

TABLE 1: **KEY PARTIES AND THEIR INTERESTS**

KEY PARTIES	ETHNIC GROUP REPRESENTATION (MAJORITY)	SPLIT OFF FROM	MAIN INTERESTS IN PEACE PROCESS	INSIDE/OUTSIDE PEACE PROCESS
MALIAN GOVERNMENT	BAMBARA		PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECULARITY	INSIDE
MDSF	BAMBARA		AS ABOVE	INSIDE
MNLA	TUAREG		PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND SELF DETERMINATION OF AZAWAD	INSIDE (CMA)
HCUA	TUAREG		PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND GREATER AUTONOMY FOR AZAWAD	AS ABOVE
MAA	ARAB		AS ABOVE	AS ABOVE
MAA FACTION	ARAB	MAA	AS ABOVE	INSIDE (PLATFORM)
CPA	TUAREG		AS ABOVE	INSIDE (CMA)
CPA FACTION	TUAREG	CPA	AS ABOVE	INSIDE (PLATFROM)
CMFPR	TUAREG, ARAB, FULANI AND SONGHAY		AS ABOVE	AS ABOVE
CMFPR FACTION	FULANI AND SONGHAY	CMFPR	AS ABOVE	INSIDE (CMA)
GATIA	TUAREG		AS ABOVE	INSIDE (PLATFORM)
ANSAR DINE	TUAREG		SHARIA LAW THROUGHOUT MALI	OUTSIDE
MUJAO	VARIETY OF ALGERIAN AND SAHARAN ETHNIC GROUPS	AQIM		OUTSIDE
IMA	TUAREG	ANSAR DINE	PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT	OUTSIDE
AQIM	VARIETY OF ALGERIAN AND SAHARAN ETHNIC GROUPS		RETURN TO ISLAM IN MALI AND BEYOND	OUTSIDE
SIGNED IN BLOOD BATTALION	VARIETY OF ALGERIAN AND SAHARAN ETHNIC GROUPS	AQIM	AS ABOVE	OUTSIDE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (e.g. UN, AU, Algeria)	N/A	N/A	PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECULARITY	INSIDE

6.3.   THE OUAGADOUGOU ACCORD; THE START OF THE PEACE PROCESS

On June 18, 2013, the Government of Mali and the MNLA and HCUA signed the Ouagadougou Accord which is the preliminary agreement for the presidential election and inclusive peace talks (Pezard and Shurkin, 2014: 6). This Accord, named after the capital of Burkino Faso where the agreement was signed, is the first step of the peace process and entails two phases: The first phase addresses the immediate management of the crisis and the holding of the Presidential elections in a stable and secure setting. The second phase of the Accord is designed to commence after the Presidential elections and entails an immediate cease fire, a cantonment of combatants, redeployment of MDSF to the northern regions, a return of basic civil services, further prevention of hostilities and inclusive peace negotiations (Institute for Security Studies, 2014).

A substantial goal of these negotiations is to define the administrative status of northern Mali and future development strategies in which national unity and territorial integrity is adhered to. Monitoring and enforcement of the Accord's provisions is ensured by the UN, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), who are all signatories to the agreement.

This summarized description of the provisions in the Accord is relevant to this research as it sets forth the objectives of the peace process and explains the chosen indicators from the MPICE dataset for the DV of interest; whether or not the peace process progresses. As mentioned in paragraph 5.2.1., the peace process progresses when the conflict remains to be addressed through a viable peace process and political leaders and elites remain in acceptance with and in support of the peace process. And measuring the latter indicator is partly done through the number and severity of violations of the Ouagadougou Accord by faction (Agoglia et al, 2010: 22-23).

The cease fire objective of the Ouagadougou Accord is measured through the relative number of cases of compliance versus noncompliance. The preferred trend required for the DV to be assessed as progressing must be decreasing or negative (Ibid: xvii, 10). The redeployment of MDSF to the northern regions of Mali means that they gain control over territory. This is measured through the percentage of national territory that is under control of the MDSF, hence government. The preferred trend required for the DV to be assessed as progressing must be increasing or positive (Ibid: xvii; Ibid: 10).

The cantonment of combatants objective of the Ouagadougou Accord entails that combatants are removed from the conflict zone and restricted in their movements. This is

measured through the percentage of national territory controlled by external forces. The preferred trend required for the DV to be assessed as progressing must be decreasing or negative (Ibid: xvii; Ibid: 10). Finally, basic civil services are to return to northern Mali and this is measured through the percentage of territory receiving governmental services and utilities. The preferred trend required for the DV to be assessed as progressing must be increasing or positive (Ibid: xvii; Ibid: 24).

The objectives of each phase of the peace process are listed in Table 2 on page 35 and Table 3 on page 36 and are divided and converted into the appropriate indicators and measures for the DV of interest. The + symbol indicates a preferred trend of increasing or positive and the − symbol indicates a preferred trend of decreasing or negative.

TABLE 2: **OBJECTIVES OF THE PEACE PROCESS**

OBJECTIVES PEACE PROCESS	DV	INDICATORS	MEASURES	PREFERRED TREND	CODE FOR PREFERRED TREND MET / CODE FOR PREFERRED TREND NOT MET
INCLUSIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE **ADMINISTRATIVE STATUS OF NORTHERN MALI AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES ARE DEFINED** IN ADHERENCE WITH THE OVERACHING GOALS OF NATIONAL UNITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECULARITY	PEACE PROCESS PROGRESSES	The conflict remains to be addressed through a viable peace process.	Dispute resolution mechanisms exist in which the goal is to define the administrative status of northern Mali, define future development strategies and to clarify and resolve remaining vital issues among parties to the conflict.	+	1-Y / 1-N
		Political leaders and elites remain in acceptance with and in support of the peace process.	Political leaders' and elites' announcement to remain dedicated to the peace process and their renouncement and condemnation of the use of violence	+	2-Y / 2-N

The number and severity of violations of the Ouagadougou Accord*	-	(this trend is as depicted when the preferred trends of the separate provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord portrayed in Table 3 are as depicted)	3-Y / 3-N (3-Y is only met through the following equation: 3A-Y + 3B-Y + 3C-Y + 3D-Y)

TABLE 3: **PROVISIONS OF THE OUAGADOUGOU ACCORD** (EXCLUDING THE OBJECTIVE OF INCLUSIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS)

MEASURE*	PROVISIONS OF THE OUAGADOUGOU ACCORD	SUB-INDICATORS	SUB-MEASURES	PREFERRED TREND	CODE FOR PREFERRED TREND MET / CODE FOR PREFERRED TREND NOT MET
NUMBER AND SEVERITY OF VIOLATIONS OF THE OUAGADOUGOU ACCORD	CEASE FIRE	Cases of noncompliance with cease fire agreement are resolved	Relative number of cases of compliance versus noncompliance	+	3A-Y / 3A-N
	REDEPLOYMENT OF MDSF TO NORTHERN REGIONS	The security forces gain and maintain control over national territory	Percentage of national territory that is under control of the government.	+	3B-Y / 3B-N

CANTONMENT OF COMBATANTS	Former combatants and their support are removed from the conflict zone and restricted in their movement	The percentage of national territory controlled by external forces.	-	3C-Y / 3C-N
BASIC CIVIL SERVICES RETURNED	Are the various levels of government capable of providing essential services, utilities, and functions	Percentage of population or percent of territory receiving essential government services and utilities (by level of government).	+	3D-Y / 3D-N

It is important to note that there are immediate or short term effects and long term effects of spoiling behavior that can differ in terms of productivity for the peace process.[9] In order for the peace process to be analyzed as progressing, the preferred trend of the indicators must be as depicted in Table 2 and 3. This means that even though certain effects of spoiling behavior are unproductive for the peace process in the short term, the overall trend could still be the preferred trend. In other words, there could be short term effects of spoiling behavior that are unproductive for the peace process while the overall and long term effects of spoiling behavior are considered productive for the peace process, hence the trend of indicators are the preferred ones. Through the method of process tracing, analysis will illustrate these short and long term effects and ultimately allow for an evaluation of the causality between spoiling behavior and the outcome of the peace process in terms of the peace process progressing or not.

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[9] An effect is considered immediate or short term when observed within days. An effect is considered long term when observed within weeks or months. As such, long term is a relative concept applicable to the timeframe of interest; 2013-2015.

6.4. SPOILING BEHAVIOR; ESTABLISHING CAUSAL PATHWAYS AND LOOKING FOR TRENDS

Before elaborating on acts of spoiling behavior and its effects, it is essential to note a complexity of this analysis that has to do with high instability, insecurity and tensions in northern Mali during the peace process. First, there were vast intercommunal and armed group clashes as many issues were not yet resolved between local communities and/or not yet addressed during peace negotiations. And second, criminal activity in northern Mali remained high as most people depend on illicit trafficking of goods and/or people in order to earn an income and safeguard their livelihood.[10]

The root causes for these intercommunal clashes and the necessity for criminal activities have to do with the root causes of the overall conflict. According to Chauzal and van Damme, these root causes date back to 1960 when Mali gained independence from France. These scholars argue that "as soon as Mali gained independence the new government had to assert its authority on a large territory, including desert regions where Tuareg and Arab communities directly challenged its authority" (2015: 8). The Malian government regarded the northern populations inadequate and marginalized them over time. Additionally, they favored certain groups over others and used counterinsurgency methods to divide the northern population and prevent them from gaining significant power. As a result, "the direct and long term consequences of this strategy were deep animosity between northern populations, fierce resentment by communities towards the central state and a very heterogeneous distribution of needs and demands" (Ibid).

For the purpose of this research, these insights mean that the ongoing intercommunal clashes, the high degree of fragmentation of key parties to the peace process and enduring criminal activity increases overall instability, insecurity and tensions in northern Mali which most likely negatively affect the peace process (Steenkamp, 2009: 1-2). Even though these violent acts are not the focus of this thesis, it is essential to consider acts of spoiling in this broader context. So, when analysis shows that spoiling behavior adds to overall instability, insecurity and tensions, it is expected that the peace process will be affected negatively.

However, the short and long term effects of spoiling behavior can differ in terms of productivity for the peace process. For example, analysis will show that acts of spoiling directly challenge the ability of the Malian government, its armed forces and the international community to implement provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord as overall insecurity and

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[10] As stated by N. Woudstra; *Contingents commandant* of the Dutch forces in Mali from January to November, 2015, in an interview conducted with the author on 27 May, 2016.

instability is increased. This is mostly unproductive for the peace process in the short term as progress is hindered.

Nonetheless, the implementation of provisions set forth by the Ouagadougou Accord is only part of the main interest of this analysis; whether or not the peace process progresses in terms of peace negotiations that remain ongoing and actors who remain dedicated towards the peace process. So, even though a critical analysis of the short term effects of spoiling behavior is vital to this research, the upcoming analysis is based upon a broader critical assessment of these short term effects and its causality, if any at all, with peace negotiations in the long term.

6.4.1. SPOILING EVENTS; ANALYZING THE EFFECTS

Between the signing of the *Ouagadougou Accord* in June, 2013 and the signing of the *Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali* in June, 2015, seven acts of spoiling are derived in accordance with the operationalization criteria listed in paragraph 5.2.2. These spoiling events, in some cases multiple acts of spoiling that are considered as one event, are listed in Table 4 on pages 39 through 43 and given a code; A through G. In 2013, a suicide bombing took place in Timbuktu (spoiling event D) and a grenade attack in Kidal (spoiling event E). In 2014, five Red Cross employees and a MNLA senior political representative were abducted (spoiling event A and B), there were hostilities between the MNLA and MDSF (spoiling event C) and armed clashes between the MNLA, MAA and its factions (spoiling event F). Lastly, in 2015, all CAG's clashed with one and another (spoiling event G).

Analyses of these spoiling events are depicted through three themes: *Spoiling and Terrorism,* from spoiling events A and B. *Spoiling and Discontent* from spoiling events C, D and E. And *Spoiling and Factionalism* from spoiling events F and G. Furthermore, Tables 5 and 6 for spoiling event A and B, Tables 7 and 8 for spoiling event C, D and E and Table 9 for spoiling event G on the following pages illustrate the causal pathways between these spoiling events and the outcome of the peace process through the trend codes depicted in Tables 2 and 3 on pages 35 and 36. These themes simplify the complexity of the analysis rendered in Tables 5 through 10 and therefore aid in summarizing findings and drawing conclusions.

TABLE 4: **SPOILING EVENTS**

SPOILING EVENT	DATE	KEY PARTY RESPONSIBLE	SOURCES	CODE	REFERENCE TO PEACE PROCESS
ABDUCTION OF 5 RED CROSS EMPLOYEES BETWEEN KIDAL AND GAO	8 FEB 2014	MUJAO	ACLED event no: 814MLI / 49912. (Raleigh et al, 2010). United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6. The Guardian, 2014.	A	Terrorist organizations seek to induce fear, decrease stability and increase tensions in order to undermine the peace process as the peace process hinders their goal of establishing Sharia law in Mali (BBC NEWS, 2013; START, 2015).[11]
ABDUCTION OF MNLA SENIOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE IN TESSALIT WHO REPORTEDLY DIED OF ILLNESS ONE DAY LATER	13 January 2014	ANSAR DINE / AQIM	ACLED event no: 799MLI / 49896. (Raleigh et al, 2010).	B	See above. Also: ANSAR DINE has specifically declared war at MNLA for working with the international community, referred to as "crusaders" by Ansar Dine members, and being part of the peace process (Weiss, 2016).

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[11] Data confirmed through interviews with Colonel N. Woudstra; *Contingents commandant* of the Dutch Forces between January and November 2015 and Colonel. MPP. Timmermans; Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the MINUSMA force between February and December, 2015 conducted by the author in May, 2016.

SPOILING EVENT	DATE	KEY PARTY RESPONSIBLE	SOURCES	CODE	REFERENCE TO PEACE PROCESS
HOSTILITIES BETWEEN MDSF AND MNLA IN THE KIDAL REGION	16-21 May, 2014	MDSF and MNLA	ACLED event no: 868MLI / 49965. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 869MLI / 49966. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 871MLI / 49968. (Raleigh et al, 2010).	**C**	Discontent of both parties in terms of the slow implementation of the provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/403: 3).
SUICIDE BOMBING IN TIMBUKTU KILLING AND WOUNDING MALIAN SOLDIERS (MDSF)	28 Sep, 2013	AQIM	ACLED event no: 743MLI / 49840. (Raleigh et al, 2010). BBC NEWS, 2013b. Agence France Presse, 2013b.	**D**	MNLA and HCUA withdrew from the Monitoring and Eval. Committee (concerned with the implementation of the Ouagad. Acc.) and the peace process came to a halt. AQIM took advantage of the situation to incr. tensions (UN Security Council, S/2014/1; Al Jazeera, 2013).[12]

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[12] Colonel N. Woudstra; *Contingents commandant* of the Dutch Forces between January and November 2015, states in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016, that the terrorist organizations in Mali always sought opportunities in which they could increase further tensions, fear and instability in order to undermine the peace process. In many occasions, a halt in the peace process was such an opportunity.

SPOILING EVENT	DATE	KEY PARTY RESPONSIBLE	SOURCES	CODE	REFERENCE TO PEACE PROCESS
GRENADE ATTACK ON MDSF IN KIDAL	29 Sep, 2013	MNLA	ACLED event no: 744MLI / 49842. (Raleigh et al, 2010). Agence France Presse, 2013b; BBC NEWS, 2013b.	E	Due to the withdrawal of MNLA and HCUA from the Monitoring and Evaluating Committee that is concerned with the implementation of the Ouagadougou Accord provisions, the peace process came to a halt. Fighting renewed as parties inside of the peace process were dissatisfied with the progress made so far during peace negotiations (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/1; Agence France Presse, 2013b; Agence France Presse, 2013a).

SPOILING EVENT	DATE	KEY PARTY RESPONSIBLE	SOURCES	CODE	REFERENCE TO PEACE PROCESS
ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN THE MNLA, MAA AND IT FACTIONS THROUGHOUT THE NORTHERN REGIONS	11 – 27 July, 2014	MNLA / MAA	ACLED event no: 901MLI / 49998. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 902MLI / 49999. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 909MLI / 50006. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 911MLI / 50007. (Raleigh et al, 2010). United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 2.	F	The newly formed armed groups all sought to become a key player in peace negotiations in which they are able to bring additional players' interests to the negotiating table (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 2).

SPOILING EVENT	DATE	KEY PARTY RESPONSIBLE	SOURCES	CODE	REFERENCE TO PEACE PROCESS
ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN AND ATTACKS BY ALL COMPLIANT ARMED GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE NORTHERN REGIONS, MOST NOTABLY IN TIMBUKTU AND MENACA	April and May, 2015	CAG's	ACLED event no: 1035MLI / 50132. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 1036MLI / 50133. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 1037MLI / 50135. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 1039MLI / 50136. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 1041MLI / 50138. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 1045MLI / 50142. (Raleigh et al, 2010). ACLED event no: 1047MLI / 50144. (Raleigh et al, 2010). United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426: 4.	G	The frequency of attacks and clashes increased leading up to the ceremony for the signing of the peace agreement. All CAG's were seeking to assert influence and make territorial and political gains. Furthermore, internal divisions arose amongst the CAG's in response to the proposed peace agreement. (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426: 4).

6.4.1.1.   SPOILING AND TERRORISM

During the first months of 2014, parties inside the peace process, in particular the MNLA, increasingly fragmented during exploratory discussions and workshops aimed at establishing a roadmap for future negotiations between the Malian government and other armed groups. Divisions occurred as parties were "unable to overcome disagreements on the interpretation of the preliminary agreement and the inclusion of the adherent groups, MAA and CMPFR, in the process" (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6).[13] For example, the former head of MNLA's external relations section, seeking to be included in negotiations representing different interests, split from the MNLA and launched a new movement, the CPA (Jeune Afrique, 2014).

Amidst the fragmentation of armed groups and the ongoing workgroups between them, AQIM abducted five Red Cross employees (Spoiling event A). Furthermore, Ansar Dine abducted a MNLA senior political representative who later reportedly died of illness (Spoiling event B). The primary motive of these known terrorist groups was to induce fear and fuel further the tensions resulting from disagreements amongst and between parties in order to undermine the peace process and hinder peacebuilding operations.

Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the causal pathways derived from data analysis which subsequently will be elaborated on in the text.

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[13] The Ouagadougou Accord is within the literature and in open sources often referred to as the preliminary agreement as it represents the first step towards a comprehensive peace agreement, thus the start of the peace process and the road towards inclusionary peace negotiations.

TABLE 5: **SPOILING EVENT A**

SPOILING CODE	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	DEPENDENT VARIABLE AS PER CODES TABLE 2 AND 3	PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME: YES / NO
A	RED CROSS SUSPENDS OPERATIONS IN RURAL AREAS OF NORTHERN REGIONS (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2014a).	DETERIORATION OF HUMAN WELL-BEING IN RURAL AREAS OF NORTHERN REGIONS AS WATER SUPPLY AND OTHER AID WAS SUSPENDED (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2014a).			**3D-N**	NO
	DETERIORATION OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHERN REGIONS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 4)	TRANSPORTATION ROUTES INSECURE (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6)	LACK OF RESOUR-CES (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6)		**3-N**	NO
			RE-ESTABLISH-MENT OF STATE AUTHORITY HINDERED. (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6)		**3D-N**	NO
			NO MEETINGS COULD TAKE PLACE ON CANTONMENT PROGRESS (Human Rights Watch, 2014: 6).	CANTONMENT OF COMBATANTS HINDERED (Human Rights Watch, 2014: 6).	**3C-N**	NO

			INCREASE IN MINUSMA PATROLS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6-12)	DECREASE IN HINDERED OPERATIONS IN TERMS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THE OUAGADOUGOU ACCORD.[14]	**UNCLEAR** **Even though data suggests 3-Y, no specific sources are available verifying the indicators and measures of interest.**	UNCLEAR
	DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON ACTOR'S MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES	AN INCREASE IN REQUESTS MADE BY MINUSMA TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR AN INCREASE IN RESOURCES (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6-12)			**UNCLEAR** **As the MINUSMA mission was not yet operating at 100%, it is not clear whether or not an increase in resources occurred on top of the resources agreed upon in the original mission mandate.**	UNCLEAR

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[14] Colonel N. Woudstra; *Contingents commandant* of the Dutch Armed Forces between January and November, 2015, states in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016, that a boost in MINUSMA presence in violent prone areas, in most cases resulted in a return to normalcy in which the implementation of provisions set forth in the Ouagadougou Accord could move forward.

TABLE 6: **SPOILING EVENT B**

SPOILING CODE	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	DEPENDENT VARIABLE AS PER CODES TABLE 2 AND 3	PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME: YES / NO
B	INCREASE IN CLASHES BETWEEN MNLA AND ANSAR DINE AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 3-5; ACLED event no. 811MLI / 49908; ACLED event no. 816MLI / 49913)	INCREASE IN FRAGMENTATION OF MNLA (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 4)	UNCLEAR		**UNCLEAR**	UN-CLEAR
		DETERIORATION OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHERN REGIONS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 4)	LACK OF RESOURCES (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6)		**3-N**	NO
			RE-ESTABLISH-MENT OF STATE AUTHORITY HINDERED. (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6)		**3D-N**	NO
			INCREASE IN MINUSMA PATROLS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6-12)	DECREASE IN HINDERED OPERATIONS IN TERMS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THE OUAGADOUGOU ACCORD[15]	**UNCLEAR** Even though data suggests 3-Y, no specific sources are available verifying the indicators and measures of interest	UN-CLEAR

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[15] Colonel N. Woudstra; *Contingents commandant* of the Dutch Armed Forces between January and November, 2015, states in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016, that a boost in MINUSMA presence in violent prone areas, in most cases resulted in a return to normalcy in which the implementation of provisions set forth in the Ouagadougou Accord could move forward.

		AN INCREASE IN REQUESTS MADE BY MINUSMA TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR AN INCREASE IN RESOURCES (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6-12)		**UNCLEAR** **As the MINUSMA mission was not yet operating at 100%, it is not clear whether or not an increase in resources occurred on top of the resources agreed upon in the original mission mandate.**	UN-CLEAR
		MINUSMA MISSION MANDATE RENEWAL WHICH ALLOWS FOR AN INCREASE IN MINUSMA PRESENCE IN THE NORTH (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/403: 15-19)	A GREATER CONCENTRATION OF MINUSMA PERSONNEL WAS DEPLOYED TO THE NORTHERN REGIONS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/403)	**UNCLEAR**	UN-CLEAR
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON ACTOR'S MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES	AN INCREASE IN REQUESTS MADE BY MINUSMA TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR AN INCREASE IN RESOURCES (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6-12)	MINUSMA MISSION MANDATE RENEWAL WHICH ALLOWS FOR AN INCREASE IN MINUSMA PRESENCE IN THE NORTH (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/403: 15-19)	A GREATER CONCENTRATION OF MINUSMA PERSONNEL WAS DEPLOYED TO THE NORTHERN REGIONS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/403)	**UNCLEAR**	UN-CLEAR

SPOILING AND TERRORISM: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION HYPOTHESES

It can be argued that these spoiling events have not disclosed new information on terrorist groups' motives to hinder peacebuilding operations. It has however disclosed information on their strong fighting capabilities. Official UN reports and other sources argue that these actors are hard to beat militarily (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229; United Nations Security Council, S/2014/403; United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692; The Atlantic, 2013; Pezard and Shurkin, 2015). Information on actors' military strength is often uncertain and these acts of spoiling disclosed information on their capabilities and persistence. Consequently and in line with the literature on spoiling, these terrorist groups should be considered relevant to the peace process as they have the ability to undermine and derail the peace process.

In terms of the proposed hypotheses, these actors should be included in negotiations when willing to negotiate or they should be weakened and eliminated as a threat when unwilling to negotiate (as per IVV2C1 and 2C2). Be that as it may, the Malian peace process cannot or has difficulties in accommodating these actors. First of all, regardless of these terrorist groups' willingness to negotiate, they are blacklisted in the peace process, thus excluded from all peace negotiations. Additionally, their demands and interests are mostly concerned with establishing a place for Islam in politics, hence are directly in opposition with the principles of the peace process and the "red line" of a secular state set forth by the Malian government (Agence France-Presse, 2014c). As such, their interests are unrealizable, thus irrelevant.

The disclosure of information on these actors' strength and military capabilities, whether or not they can be included in the peace process, should alarm peace makers that these actors need to be weakened and eliminated as being a threat to the peace process. Or, they need to become engaged in the peace process based upon realizable interests. For the purposes of this research, these findings mean that despite the disclosure on information on these actors' military strength and capability, these acts of spoiling cannot confirm or disconfirm the proposed hypotheses. Nonetheless, analysis shows in Table 5 and 6 there are alternative causal pathways and trends that need to be considered that mostly have to do with the implementation of provisions of the preliminary agreement.

SPOILING AND TERRORISM: TRENDS

The main short term effect of spoiling events A and B is perpetrating a climate of fear and increasing tensions throughout northern Mali. There have not only been abductions and assassinations directly connected to the peace process, but also a vast amount of other violent

acts without a clear reference to the peace process. These mostly terrorist acts include ambushes with improvised explosive devices (IED's) and suicide bombings killing many civilians, government officials, armed rebels and international peace enforcers and/or keepers (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

From existing data and expert knowledge it has become clear that the increase in fear and tensions resulting from these acts of spoiling and terror affect the progress of the peace process in terms of the implementation of provisions set forth in the Ouagadougou Accord. As stated by Colonel Timmermans, "implementation cannot come up to speed due to terrorist activity".[16] For example, there was no progress on the cantonment and disarmament of armed groups as disagreement and tensions between and amongst responsible parties obstructed necessary meetings to take place that address the cantonment procedures (Human Rights Watch, 2014: 6). Furthermore, humanitarian assistance is hampered due to security concerns as well as the re-deployment of representatives of the judiciary, as part of the provision concerned with the return of basic civil services to the northern regions (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 6).

Through analysis it has become evident that these acts of spoiling, accompanied by and similar to the vast amount of terrorist attacks, are highly likely to exacerbate an already precarious and challenging peace process which in general cannot be considered productive for the peace process, at least not in the short term. The trend for the implementation of provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord, such as the cantonment of combatants, the redeployment of MDSF and the return of basic civil services is not the preferred trend for the peace process to be assessed as progressing.

On the other hand though, it is interesting to note that despite these acts of spoiling and terror and the lack of progress within the peace process in terms of the implementation of provisions of the preliminary agreement, the workgroups and exploratory discussions between warring parties continued and recommendations were made for future inclusive peace talks, including confidence-building measures, cantonment plans and the return of basic civil services (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 17). As such, the preferred trend for the peace process to be assessed as progressing is met through the ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms and the announcement of key parties that they remain dedicated to the peace process. This finding however is unrelated to spoiling events A and B and therefore cannot confirm or disconfirm the proposed hypotheses.

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[16] Interview of Colonel MPP. Timmermans; Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the MINUSMA Force between February and December 2015, conducted by author on April 10, 2016.

SPOILING AND TERRORISM: OTHER EFFECTS AND CAUSAL PATHWAYS

Other, more long term, effects of these acts of spoiling behavior are also visible. One of the main effects of the disclosure of information on the terrorist groups' military strength and capabilities entails the appeal of the international community for more MINUSMA troops and key force enablers (United Nations Security Council, S/2013/582; Keesing's Record of World Events, 2013). As such, it can be argued that spoiling behavior has resulted in an increase in international resources, which in turn is considered necessary to achieve the following objective: "Armed opposition groups responsible for political violence have largely been defeated, subordinated to legitimate government authority, or disarmed and reintegrated into society. National security forces, increasingly operating lawfully under legitimate government authority, provide a safe and secure environment for citizens, assisted by a sustainable level of involvement by international forces" (Agoglia et al, 2010: 1).[17] So, from this analysis a new hypothesis and new causal pathways arise that has to do with third party involvement which will be elaborated on in the final part of this chapter.

6.4.1.2.   SPOILING AND DISCONTENT

There are three significant events in the peace process that have to do with acts of spoiling behavior and armed groups' discontent in terms of the implementation of the provisions set forth by the Ouagadougou Accord (Spoiling events C, D and E as portrayed in Tables 7 and 8).

First two spoiling events (D and E) have to do with the withdrawal of the MNLA and HCUA from the Monitoring and Evaluating Committee that is concerned with the implementation of the Ouagadougou Accord provisions in September, 2013 (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/1: 1). A joint statement was made explaining their decision to withdraw: "Following multiple difficulties in implementing the Ouagadougou Accord, caused notably by the Mali government's failure to respect its commitments, the CMA parties decide to suspend participation in the structures created by the Accord" (Agence-France-Press, 2013b). As a result of this announcement and the halt in the peace process, fighting renewed between all parties involved and acts of spoiling occurred, such as a suicide bombing in Timbuktu (Spoiling event D) and a grenade attack in Kidal (Spoiling event E) in which the

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[17] The United States Institute of Peace has designed the MPICE dataset for policymakers, analysts, planners, and program and project implementers in order to measure progress in conflict areas around the world. The primary objective of the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE, pronounced M-Peace) project is to provide a comprehensive capability for measuring progress during stabilization and reconstruction operations for subsequent integrated interagency and intergovernmental use. As such, MPICE data is inherently linked to third party involvement in conflict areas and an increase in third party resources should therefore increase their ability to achieve the objectives and measure progress accordingly.

rebels responsible expressed their dissatisfaction with the peace process (Ibid).

The second significant event in the peace process that has to do with armed groups' discontent in terms of the implementation of the provisions set forth by the Ouagadougou Accord occurred between 16 and 21 May, 2014 in the city of Kidal. Substantial spoiling acts occurred when hostilities broke out between the signatories of the Ouagadougou Accord, namely the MDSF and the MNLA. The latter group had expressed concern prior to the clash about the "slow pace of implementation of the preliminary agreement" (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/403: 3). Furthermore, both parties accused each other of hindering the implementation of provisions.

Tables 7 and 8 render the causal pathways derived from data analysis which subsequently will be elaborated on in the text.

DAFNA DEMPSEY

MASTER THESIS FIRST DRAFT

THE COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECTS OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR. TRACING THE PEACE PROCESS OF MALI, AFRICA; 2013-2015.

TABLE 7: **SPOILING EVENT C**

SPOILING CODE	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	DEPENDENT VARIABLE AS PER CODES TABLE 2 AND 3	PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME: YES / NO
C	DISCLO-SURE OF INFORMA-TION ON MNLA'S MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILI-TIES (ICG, 2014: 3; Agence France Presse, 2014b)	BALANCE OF POWER CHANGED IN FAVOR OF MNLA (ICG, 2014: 3; Agence France Presse, 2014b)	RENEWED DIALOGUE IN WHICH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE PRELIMINARY ACCORD WERE ALTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEMANDS SET FORTH BY THE MNLA AND A NEW CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED (Agence France Presse, 2014a; ACLED event no. 877MLI / 49974).	IMPLEMENTA-TION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE OUAGADOUGOU ACCORD GAINED BACK MOMENTUM (United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 2014).	**1-Y / 2-Y** **No data is available that verifies 3A through 3D.**	YES
	HINDERING OF OPERATIONS BY PEACEKEE E-PERS AND MDSF (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 5).	ARMED GROUPS CONTROL OF TERRITORY IN STALEMATE IN SOME AREAS AND INCREASED IN AGUELHOK, ANEFIS, ANSONGO, LERE, TESSALIT AND ANDERAMBOUKAN E (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 5; ACLED event no. 880MLI / 49977; ACLED event no. 881MLI / 49978; ACLED event no. 882MLI / 49979; ACLED event no. 883MLI / 49980; ACLED event no. 884MLI / 49981).			**3B-N / 3C-N**	NO

		PROGRESSIVE DEPLOYMENT OF MDSF IN KIDAL REGION DERAILED (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 5).	RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE AUTHORITY HINDERED. (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 6)		**3B-N**	NO
		ACCESS TO BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES DECREASED AS SEVEN SCHOOLS WERE FORCED TO CLOSE (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 5).	STUDENTS COULD NOT COMPLETE THE ACADEMIC CURRICULUM (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 5).		**3D-N**	NO
		MORE CIVILIANS BECAME DISPLACED (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 5).	INCREASE IN HUMAN SUFFERING (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2014b)		**UN-CLEAR (in terms of proposed hypotheses)**	NO
		RE-GROUPING OF OTHER SMALLER ARMED GROUPS SUCH AS THE CMPFR AND MAA (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 6).	GAIN LEVERAGE IN PEACE PROCESS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 6).		**UN-CLEAR (no data can be verified on altered peace negotiations in favor of these groups)**	UN-CLEAR
		INCREASE IN ACTIVITIES OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. [18]	DETERIORA-TION OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHERN REGIONS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/229: 4)		**3-N** **As per the traced process of spoiling act A and B**	NO

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[18] Colonel N. Woudstra; *Contingents commandant* of the Dutch Armed Forces between January and November, 2015, states in an interview conducted by the author on May 20, 2016, that this spoiling event resulted in an overall deterioration of security in Kidal, most notably through the increase in activities of terrorist organization.

TABLE 8: **SPOILING EVENTS D AND E**

SPOILING CODE	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	DEPENDENT VARIABLE AS PER CODES TABLE 2 AND 3	PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME: YES / NO
D + E	DISCLOSURE OF INFORMA-TION ON RELEVANT INTERESTS SUCH AS THE DEGREE OF AUTONO-MY FOR AZAWAD (Agence-France-Presse, 2013c).	NON-OFFICIAL CLARIFY-ING TALKS WERE HELD BETWEEN THE ARMED GROUPS AND THE MEDIATOR (Agence-France-Presse, 2013c).	RENEWED DIALOGUE BETWEEN PARTIES INVOLVED BASED UPON RELEVANT INTERESTS DISCLOSED AND RENEWED COMMITMENT OF THE MALIAN GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT MEASURES NECESSARY FOR ACHIEVING INCLUSIVE AND GENUINE DECENTRALIZATION (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/1: 2).	WORK OF THE MONITORING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE RESUMED (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/1: 2).	**1-Y / 2-Y** **Due to a lack of data, it remains unclear what effect the resumed work of the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee had on the implementation of the Ouagadougou Accord provisions)**	YES
			RELEASE OF 11 MNLA AND HCUA PRISONERS IN RETURN FOR CONTROL OVER A GOVERNORATE BUILDING AND RADIO STATION SEIZED DURING RENEWED FIGHTING (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/1: 2).		**UNCLEAR**	UNCLEAR

SPOILING AND DISCONTENT: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION HYPOTHESES

It is argued that spoiling event D clarified information on certain interests relevant to the peace process (Agence-France-Presse, 2013b). These interests mostly have to do with how much autonomy the rebel groups are to gain from the Malian government for Azawad during peace talks. According to the rebels themselves, "the decision to temporarily suspend our participation allowed us to hold an internal dialogue among our movements and have fruitful clarifying exchanges with the mediator" (Ibid). This statement was released after they decided to resume peace talks several days later.

Even though the Malian government would not discuss any demands that affect territorial integrity, they expressed their commitment to "implement the measures necessary for achieving inclusive and genuine decentralization" (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/1: 2). Furthermore, as a confidence building measure the Malian government released 11 MNLA and HCUA prisoners in return for control over a governorate building and radio station that were seized after renewed fighting broke out (Ibid).

In sum, these acts of spoiling disclosed information on new and relevant interests to the peace process. First it became evident the Malian government would not give in to any demands that would affect territorial integrity and the rebel groups were able to clarify their interests in light of this information. Peace negotiations resumed after including these interests as did the work of the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee by all key parties. The preferred trend for the peace process to be assessed as progressing were met through the ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms after the disclosure of information and the announcement of key parties to remain dedicated to the peace process. Nonetheless, even though a working Monitoring and Evaluation Committee was necessary for the implementation of provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord to continue, it is unclear from available data whether or not the implementation progressed as a result of the re-installment of the Committee. As such, these acts of spoiling only confirm the proposed hypothesis in terms of ongoing peace negotiations between all parties involved.

When analyzing spoiling event C, it can be argued that political armed groups' defeat of the Malian Army relaunched the peace process by changing the balance of power between the government and the armed groups (ICG, 2014: 3; Agence France Presse, 2014b). As such, information was disclosed on the military strength and capabilities of the MNLA and affiliated armed groups. These groups' relevance increased and made clear to the Malian government that their position had become vulnerable and that dialogue needed to be renewed. Subsequently, peace negotiations, mediated by Algiers, resumed and certain

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preconditions of the preliminary agreement were altered in accordance with the interests of the MNLA and affiliated armed groups. For example, among their demands were the release of prisoners, better conditions for refugees after the signage of a peace agreement and more inclusionary negotiations (Agence France Presse, 2014b). Furthermore, one of the main stipulations of the Ouagadougou Accord is the existence of cantonment sites for the armed groups as a precondition for dialogue (*Ouagadougou Accord,* 13 June 2013). This became to be an issue of interest instead of a precondition for dialogue, opening up room for other armed groups to engage in negotiations while preserving their military strength.

In this case, spoiling behavior disclosed information on relevant actors' military strength and capabilities. This information had been private or uncertain before and after disclosure the information was assessed as relevant for the peace process. In other words, the relevance of certain actors' interests became clear as the balance of power had changed. Shortly thereafter, a new cease-fire agreement was struck, peace negotiations gained back momentum and all actors reiterated their dedication to the peace process, the cease-fire agreement and the implementation of provisions set forth in the preliminary and subsequent agreements.

The preferred trend for the peace process to be assessed as progressing were met through the ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms and the announcement of key parties to remain dedicated to the peace process. Furthermore, a new cease-fire agreement was struck, thus the disclosure of information on relevant actors' military strength and interests ultimately resulted in a bargain to be struck which is in line with the theoretical framework of bargaining theory. As such, the causal pathways between spoiling event C and the outcome of the peace process confirm the proposed hypotheses, at least in terms of the peace process remaining viable and the support and acceptance of the peace process by the key parties involved.

It is of interest to mention that these spoiling events were conducted by those parties inside the peace process and that they were motivated to spoil by the slow implementation of the provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord and a stalemate in peace negotiations. It is expected then that after the revival of peace negotiations, the implementation of provisions will start to progress as well, adding to the overall assessment of the preferred trend for a peace process progressing. In order to analyze this claim it is necessary to examine in detail overall trends in regard of other short and long term effects of these spoiling events.

SPOILING AND DISCONTENT: TRENDS

The other, mostly short term effects, of these spoiling events are as fivefold. First there was a hindering of operations within the pre-cantonment sites resulting in the armed groups' control of territory to be in a stalemate. So, the preferred trend of a decrease in control of territory by armed groups was not met. Second, the progressive deployment of the MDSF in the Kidal region was derailed by the increase in violence, hence increase in insecurity and instability (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 5). Third, the access to basic social services in the Kidal area decreased as seven schools were forced to close preventing hundreds of children from finishing the academic year and more civilians became displaced instead of being able to return to their homes (Ibid: 6). Even though these latter indicators are not directly relevant for this analysis, they are generic indicators of negative progress, as proposed by the MPICE Framework (Agoglia et. al., 2010)

The two remaining effects to be observed from the political armed groups' defeat after spoiling event C include the ability of other smaller armed groups, such as the CMPFR and MAA, to re-group and recruit in the hope to become included in future disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. In other words, the opportunity arisen from the changed balance of power allowed them to increase strength and gain leverage in the peace process as a means to secure the dividends of the peace process (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 6). Furthermore, the large scale resumption of hostilities gave way to an increase of activities of extremist terrorist groups which resulted in increased tensions, fear and distrust as per findings illustrated in paragraph 6.4.1.1. *Spoiling and Terrorism.* So, what trend is there to be observed taking into account these five effects of spoiling behavior?

In terms of the cantonment of combatants' provision of the Ouagadougou Accord, the armed groups' control of territory did not decrease. Even though it is not clear from available data whether or not the control of territory by armed groups increased as a result of these spoiling events, it is clear that in the short term no progress was made. All of these effects, that mostly have to do with a delayed implementation of provisions of the preliminary agreement, are argued to be short term effects. As such, it is expected that as soon as hostilities end and dialogue continues, the implementation of provisions should resume. Analysis shows that this indeed was the case. Within days of the hostilities in the Kidal region, a ceasefire agreement was signed and within a few weeks several agreements on a cessation of hostilities between other groups in other regions, namely the Gao and Timbuktu region, were signed. These agreements entail ending the attempts to occupy new positions, a general consensus on the cessation of hostilities and a renewed commitment to the peace

process. Consequently, implementation of the Ouagadougou Accord provisions has supposedly resumed (United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 2014). Ultimately it can be argued that all parties were reminded of the costs of fighting, incentivizing them to recommit towards the road to peace. There is however no data available confirming this claim. As such, the preferred trends for a peace process to be assessed as progressing cannot be verified.

6.4.1.3.   SPOILING AND FACTIONALISM

From 14 to 24 July, 2014, after months of informal meetings, the formal peace negotiations commenced as called for by the preliminary agreement between the Malian government, the CMA and the Platform armed groups movements (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/403). Four additional rounds of talks were held in the following months and in between these formal negotiation sessions, bilateral consultations were held between several parties and international mediators. The majority of key players mentioned before have had a role to play during these talks. It must be noted though that those groups labelled terrorist organizations by the Malian government and the international community were excluded from the peace process. Furthermore, civil society organizations and most traditional chiefs who are considered important local power holders, yet have no official role within the armed groups' movements, were excluded from the peace process as well (Pezard and Shurkin, 2015; ICG, 2015).

Several scholars and policy makers argue that a complication of mediation efforts has been the lack of agreement on who should be party to the negotiations, how negotiations should be conducted and what exactly should be discussed. Overall, these issues made peace talks arduous and some argue that the exclusion of all labelled terrorist organizations and other influential parties, such as traditional chiefs and civil society organizations, from the peace process "casts a shadow over the negotiations" and "it will be difficult to reach a peace agreement if mediators ignore individuals who are disreputable in the eyes of the international community, but influential in northern Mali" (ICG, 2015: 10).

At the beginning of this chapter it is argued that instability, insecurity and tensions in northern Mali remained high during the peace process. There were vast intercommunal and armed group clashes as many issues were not yet resolved between local communities and not yet addressed during peace negotiations. Consequently, the degree of fragmentation is high and it is highly unlikely all key parties are to be content with the peace process at all times. As such, progress and a lack of progress, or the perception of one or the other, at the

negotiating table causes factionalism. New groups are created as a means to get their specific interests included in negotiations when there is disagreement on the substance or scope of talks.

So, the high degree of fragmentation of key parties explain the vast amount of intercommunal clashes as does it explain why many key parties to the peace process split into several parties over time. Distinguishing between groups inside the peace process, thus the compliant armed groups (CAGs), and those parties outside of the peace process, whether or not these outside parties are willing to comply with the peace process or not, has become increasingly difficult. Additionally, distinctions between key parties and their factions become even more blurry as certain individuals of parties outside of the peace process are influential in the groups that are inside of the peace process.

There are two examples illustrative of this point. First, the leader of the terrorist organization Ansar Dine has many supporters within the HCUA, a group part of the CMA. Colonel MPP Timmermans states in an interview with the author that "there is a well-known hidden relationship between HCUA and Ansar Dine".[19] As such, concessions to the leader of Ansar Dine are most likely necessary in order to keep HCUA on board. Second, a former officer of MUJAO joined the MAA in order to gain leverage during negotiations. Hence, his group membership is "fluid" (ICG, 2015: 13). The dynamics between and within groups, thus the frequent changes of allegiances increases distrust, obscures exact interests and leads to a resurge in spoiling behavior as they all seek to "prove themselves to each other" and gain bargaining leverage for their specific interests in the peace process (Ibid: 12).

Spoiling behavior that has to do with factionalism is illustrated by spoiling event F; clashes between the MNLA and MAA groups of the CMA and the MAA group of the Platform in the Gao region in July and August of 2014. The MAA had split and these newly formed groups all sought to become a key player in peace negotiations in which they are able to bring additional players' interests, such as the interests of the former officer of the MUJAO, to the table. According to the UN Secretary General, as a result of these acts of spoiling, the scope of peace negotiations was enlarged to include the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities agreement representative of all new interests (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 2). After these interests were included in peace talks, a declaration of cessation of hostilities was signed reaffirming the commitment of parties to the peace process as set forth by the preliminary agreement.

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[19] Interview with Colonel MPP. Timmermans; Deputy Chief of Staff Operations of the MINUSMA Force between February and December 2015, conducted by author on April 10, 2016.

A different and final spoiling event that has to do with factionalism, more specifically, the grave internal divisions between and amongst the Malian armed groups underlying factionalism, occurred in the weeks before the signing of the *Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali* on June 20, 2015. Throughout the northern regions, armed clashes between and attacks by all CAG's occurred leading up to the ceremony for the signing of the peace agreement (Spoiling event G). Internal divisions arose amongst the CAG's in response to the proposed peace agreement and they all sought to assert influence and make additional territorial and political gains (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426: 4).

Tables 9 and 10 portray the causal pathways derived from data analysis and will subsequently be elaborated on in the text.

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TABLE 9: **SPOILING EVENT F**

SPOILING CODE	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	DEPENDENT VARIABLE AS PER CODES TABLE 2 AND 3	PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME: YES / NO
F	DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON RELEVANT INTERESTS REPRESENTATIVE OF ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT SIZE OF THE NORTHERN MALIAN POPULATION	ENLARGEMENT OF THE SCOPE OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TO INCLUDE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL NEW RELEVANT INTERESTS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 2).	DECLARATION OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES SIGNED RE-AFFIRMING COMMITMENT OF PARTIES TO THE PEACE PROCESS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 2).		1-Y	YES
		THE FORMATION OF GATIA; A NEW MALIAN ARMED GROUP ALLEGEDLY CONNECTED TO THE MALIAN GOVERNMENT (ACLED event no: 916MLI / 50013. (Raleigh et al, 2010).	INCREASE IN CLASHES BETWEEN THE GATIA AND OTHER ARMED GROUPS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 9-14).	DETERIORATION OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTHERN REGIONS (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 9).	3-N **As per the traced process of spoiling act A and B**	NO
				INCREASE IN KEY FORCE ENABLERS OF THE FRENCH FORCES ACLED event no. 974MLI / 50071)	**UNCLEAR**	UNCLEAR

			GATIA TAKES CONTROL OF BAMBA AND OTHER AREAS ACLED event no. 960MLI / 50057)		**3B-N / 3C-N**	NO

TABLE 10: **SPOILING EVENT G**

SPOILING CODE	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	EFFECT	DEPENDENT VARIABLE AS PER CODES TABLE 2 AND 3	PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME: YES / NO
G	MINUSMA REINFORCED ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN ORDER TO DETER FURTHER VIOLENCE (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426: 4)				**UNCLEAR**	UNCLEAR
	INCREASE IN ATTACKS ON PERSONNEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426; Human Rights Watch, 2015: 10-12).	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE HAMPERED (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426: 10; Human Rights Watch, 2015: 10-12)			**3D-N**	NO
	INCREASE IN DISPLACED PERSONS (ACLED event no: 1061MLI / 50158. (Raleigh et al, 2010)				**UNCLEAR**	UNCLEAR
	ARMED GROUPS GAIN TERRITORY OVER MDSF (ACLED event no: 1033MLI / 50130. (Raleigh et al, 2010)				**3B-N / 3C-N**	NO

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		DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON RELEVANT INTERESTS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CMA (RFI, 2015; REUTERS, 2015)	INCREASE IN MEDIATION EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO KEEP ALL PARTIES, MOST NOTABLY THE CMA, ON BOARD (The Guardian, 2015; United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426: 1-4; RFI, 2015).	THE CMA GROUPS SIGN ON 20 JUNE, 2015, THE PROPOSED PEACE AGREEMENT ALREADY SIGNED ON 15 MAY, 2015, BY THE PLATFORM GROUPS AND THE MALIAN GOVERNMENT (ICG, 2015; The Guardian, 2015; United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426: 1; RFI, 2015).		1-Y / 2-Y **Even though the preferred trend for a peace process progressing was met, it was not met through the proposed hypotheses' causal pathways. As such, the proposed hypotheses cannot be verified.**	YES

SPOILING AND FACTIONALISM: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION HYPOTHESES

Due to these acts of spoiling resulting from factionalism it became clear there were new interests relevant to the peace process that had not been addressed before. These interests were assessed as relevant as they were representative of another significant size of the northern Malian population. It is problematic to assess the exact numbers of these factions in terms of who and how many they represent. Nonetheless, including as much factions as possible in peace negotiations increases the overall representativeness of the northern Malian population even though they only represent, when combined, fifteen percent of the overall population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).

The causal pathways between spoiling event F and the outcome of the peace process confirm the proposed hypotheses, at least in terms of the peace process remaining viable through ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms and the support and acceptance of the peace process by the key parties involved. Nonetheless, even though spoiling behavior resulting from factionalism discloses information on these factions' interests and their key players, it adds to overall instability and insecurity in line with findings on trends mentioned before.

When analyzing spoiling event G, hypotheses of information disclosure cannot be verified despite the fact that the peace process progressed in terms of the peace process remaining viable through ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms and the support and acceptance of the peace process by the key parties involved. Analysis has shown that the role of the international community has been essential for this outcome to occur. As such and in line with the findings from paragraph 6.4.1.1. *Spoiling and Terrorism*, a new hypothesis and causal pathway arises that has to do with third party involvement. In paragraph 6.4.2. these findings on third party involvement will be further elaborated on.

SPOILING AND FACTIONALISM: TRENDS

An effect of spoiling event F was the formation of GATIA; a new Malian armed group allegedly connected to the Malian government (Raleigh et al, 2010, ACLED event no: 916MLI / 50013). GATIA immediately clashed with other armed groups resulting in a deteriorating security situation in the northern regions and territorial take-overs (United Nations Security Council, S/2014/692: 9-14). Consequently, implementing the provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord was hindered and the peace process did not progress.

Analysis has shown in previously discussed spoiling events that the overall deterioration of the security situation led to multiple requests by MINUSMA to the international community for additional resources. In this case, French forces acknowledged these requests and sent additional fighter jets in order to deter further insecurity (Raleigh et

al, 2010, ACLED event no: 974MLI / 50071). In the case of spoiling event G, MINUSMA reinforced its military presence in order to deter further insecurity as well (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426: 4). Be that as it may, no data can be verified that these increases in resources resulted in an improved security situation, at least, not in the short term.

In the case of spoiling event G, there was also an increase in attacks on personnel of non-governmental organizations (NGO's), an increase in displaced persons and a gain in territory at the expense of the MDSF (United Nations Security Council, S/2015/426; Human Rights Watch, 2015: 10-12; Raleigh et al, 2010, ACLED event no: 1061MLI / 50158, ACLED event no: 1033MLI / 50130). Hence, the peace process did not progress in terms of the implementation of provisions of the preliminary agreement.

6.4.2. ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS OF THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT

Before concluding on the collected data on spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of the peace process, it is essential for the validity of the analysis and the establishment of causal relationships to consider an alternative explanation for the productivity and success of a peace process, namely third party involvement.

Throughout the civil war debate that has to do with civil war termination, a strong alternative explanation exists for the productivity and success of a peace process in which warring parties commit to laying down their arms through negotiated settlements, namely; third party involvement (Dixon, 2009). Third parties, such as the UN are posited as a solution to credible commitments problems because they can guarantee the security of those who give up arms (Walter, 2002). Additionally, they can be a mediator in negotiations and provide for resources aiding the peace process in general as I have shown with the example of El Salvador in chapter two and six.

Contemporary conflicts have often seen third parties offering their services in conflict resolution or peace processes. Prominent international organizations, non-governmental organizations and small-state and non-state actors play key roles in "bringing parties to the negotiating table and creating much needed forums for dialogue and negotiation" (Babbitt and Hampson, 2011: 47). The role of third parties can differ throughout the peace processes, yet in most cases and at some point their presence is to be observed.

In Mali there has been significant third party involvement since its independence in 1960 (Pezard and Shurkin, 2015: 12; Poulton and Youssouf, 1998: 14). Being a former French colony, the most important support for Mali's peace and development has come from

Algeria and France (Poulton and Youssouf, 1998: 135). During the most recent rebellion, there has also been significant involvement from the UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a pillar of the African Economic Community (AEC) which is part of the African Union (AU).

Analysis in previous paragraphs has shown that the disclosure of information by spoiling behavior is beneficial for the peace process irrespectively of the parties involved. These findings coincide with theories on third party involvement throughout the literature concerned with civil war termination. Third parties successfully promote and accommodate continued dialogue between key parties despite persistent insecurity. Most scholars agree that they are able to overcome credible commitment problems by guaranteeing that all parties hold up to their agreement (Walter, 2002).

In the case of spoiling event G though, third parties did not act upon the disclosure of information, yet peace negotiations still moved forward towards the actual signage of a peace agreement by all parties involved. So, in terms of the peace process progressing through ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms and the support and acceptance of the peace process by the key parties involved, a new hypothesis emerges narrowed in accordance with this scope. The peace process, in most spoiling events where data could be verified, did not progress in terms of implementing the provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord. As such, an alternative hypothesis of third party involvement arises.

H alternative: When third parties are involved during a peace process, peace negotiations will progress without acting upon the disclosure of information on new and relevant actors to the peace process by spoiling behavior.

FIGURE 6: **ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS OF THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT**

7. FROM CAUSAL PATHWAYS TO CAUSAL MECHANISMS

Establishing a causal mechanism between spoiling behavior and the outcome of a peace process means that causal relationships are made evident that not only explain the existence of the relationship, but also why and how this relationship comes into being. Throughout the analysis causal pathways were identified and it has become evident that an immediate effect of spoiling behavior is a disclosure of information on motives and military strength and capabilities. In general it can be argued that all violent acts disclose this type of information, however, in the case of spoiling when a violent act is committed with specific reference to the peace process, identifying motives, and subsequently interests, is most likely to occur as actors that spoil express why they spoil. So, the causal pathway between the IV spoiling behavior and the IVV's 1A and 2A, disclosure of information on new interests and new actors is confirmed.

When it comes to IVV 1B and 2B; the assessment of relevant interests and actors, several complexities arose throughout the analysis. First of all, interests changed with the fragmentation of key parties. Yet, the size of the population representative of these interests did not change as the majority of northern ethnic groups remained represented in either one of the compliant armed groups or its factions. Second, the interests unrealizable for the peace process were from those armed groups excluded from the peace process, e.g. all terrorist groups as they demanded Mali to become a theocratic state under Sharia law. The MNLA and HCUA initially demanded self-determination, which was unrealizable as well. However, they adjusted their demands accordingly during peace negotiations. So, the assessment of relevant interests has been an ongoing effort throughout the peace process. As such, IVV 1B overlaps with IVV 1C; the inclusion of relevant interests in peace negotiations. This means that IVV 1B and IVV 1C combined are the next causal step in terms of interests.

The third complexity in the analysis of IVV 1B and IVV2B has to do with the relevance of the willingness to negotiate of relevant actors. The actors that committed acts of spoiling were either already inside the peace process, thus part of one of the compliant armed groups or banned from the peace process, thus one of the terrorist groups. As such, assessing relevant actors based upon their willingness to negotiate seems futile. Nevertheless, the information on actors' military strength and capabilities and their willingness or unwillingness to negotiate is disclosed as a result of their acts of spoiling. What does this mean then for assessing IVV 2C1 and 2C2; the inclusion of relevant actors willing to negotiate in peace negotiations and the weakening of those relevant actors unwilling to negotiate?

Within the literature on spoiling behavior and as per proposed hypotheses, it is argued that those actors that are strong and willing to negotiate should be included in peace negotiations as they could pose a significant threat to the peace process when they are not engaged (Reiter, 2015). The peace process in Mali however does not accommodate this. And it does not need to as the majority of terrorist groups in Mali addressed throughout the analysis are unwilling to negotiate. However, some groups, most notably Ansar Dine, are frequently willing to negotiate. In line with proposed hypotheses this means that the peace process should not progress as IVV 2C1 is not met.

In terms of IVV 2C2, the peace process should also not progress, at least not significantly, as the Malian government, its armed forces and the international community through MINUSMA have not been able to significantly weaken these actors. This means that this specific causal pathway cannot be tested as such. However, as with IVV2C1, it is then expected that the peace process does not progress as IVV 2C2 is also not met.

Analysis has shown that acts of spoiling, after disclosing information on actors' motives, interests, military strength and capabilities and their (un)willingness to negotiate, caused the peace process to progress, yet only through one of two proposed indicators: The conflict remains to be addressed through a viable peace process measured by the existence of dispute resolution mechanisms and active communication between various parties in which the goal is to clarify and resolve remaining vital issues among parties to the conflict (Agoglia et al, 2010: 22).

The other indicator; political leaders' and elites' acceptance with and support of the peace process, is only met through measuring key parties' renouncement and condemnation of the use of violence. It has not been met through measuring the number and severity of violations of the Ouagadougou Accord by faction (Ibid: 22-23). Even though the violation of cease-fire agreements, the hindered re-deployment of MDSF, the delayed return of basic civil services and the ineffective cantonment of combatants, were often immediate effects of spoiling behavior, thus mostly short term effects, it is not possible to ignore these effects of spoiling behavior unproductive for the peace process.

In sum of above findings, only the following causal mechanism, illustrated in Figure 7, can be confirmed:

FIGURE 7: **CONFIRMED CAUSAL MEHANISM OF SPOILING BEHAVIOR**

8. CONCLUSION

Instability, insecurity and tensions remained high during the peace process in Mali between 2013 and 2015. The vast amount of violent acts, terrorism, factionalism and different immediate, short and long term effects increased the complexity of the analysis despite evident operationalization criteria for spoiling behavior and the indicators and measures for assessing whether or not a peace process progresses. These are not out of the ordinary circumstances though. Deeply rooted grievances between groups are often the cause for violent conflict and also the reason why violent conflicts endure (Collier and Sambanis, 2002: 4-5). Private information and credible commitment problems exacerbate the situation as does the weakening of state capacity or "degradation of the state apparatus" (Kalyvas, 2007:416).

The peace process in Mali is not yet at an end. Even though in 2015 the *Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali* was signed, implementing all provisions of the agreement and addressing and resolving grievances takes time. Achieving a durable peace is an immense challenge and managing violence throughout the peace process is a necessary evil. By conducting this research and answering the question: *Under what conditions can spoiling behavior be productive for a peace process?* my ultimate goal has been to assist policymakers in this task by providing for a deepened knowledge on spoiling behavior and its effects. Findings build on theories of spoiling behavior by making transparent the causal pathways between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of a peace process. So, what conclusions can be drawn and what recommendations can be made?

First, influential scholarship concerned with spoiling behavior assumes spoiling behavior has a detrimental effect on a peace process. And this is true. Analysis has shown that acts of spoiling increase instability, insecurity and tensions which hinders and delays the implementation of provisions of a peace agreement. Regardless of the continuation of the

implementation after measures have been taken, every delay or hindering is ineffective, hence must be considered unproductive.

Nonetheless, analysis has also shown that spoiling behavior discloses information on new actors, including their motives, interests and military strength and capabilities. The disclosure of this type of information is vital for a peace process, especially in terms of peace negotiations. So, a causal mechanism exists between spoiling behavior, its effects and the outcome of a peace process that is productive for the outcome of that peace process. The disclosure of information relevant to the peace process is the first necessary, hence not sufficient condition. The following necessary condition for spoiling behavior to be productive for the peace process is the condition that peacemakers appropriately deal with that information as best as circumstances allow them to while equipped with knowledge provided by scholars and experts in the field.

Spoilers inside the peace process in Mali have mostly been pragmatic. They have tried to safeguard their interests in the peace process by using violence. As such, spoiling has been a bargaining tool and the effects fall anywhere short of actually failing the peace process. Those spoilers outside the peace process in Mali have also been pragmatic in terms of safeguarding their income. Notwithstanding, they have also been idealistic as they seek to establish a theocracy in Mali based upon Sharia law. It seems that when scholars concerned with spoiling behavior assume detrimental effects they are mostly right, yet only when the research focus is on the implementation of peace agreements. And this is irrespective of specific spoiler typologies.

This means two things. First, even though successful implementation of a peace agreement is vital for achieving progress towards a durable peace, a peace process cannot be reduced to provisions set forth in a peace agreement. Scholars should define and explain what is to be considered a failed or successful peace process in order to acknowledge the complexity of conflict resolution and to avoid negative rhetoric when there are other areas within the peace process that are progressing. Second, categorizing spoilers only makes sense when peace-makers have the ability to actually manage these spoilers. The peace process in Mali disregards those actors labeled terrorist groups in terms of peace negotiations whether or not they are categorized as relevant. Spoiler typology remains in theory essential for the management of spoilers, but in practice not so much.

It has also become clear through this research that third party involvement is beneficial for the peace process. They are able to keep key parties on track and act as an efficient mediator in peace negotiations. These findings confirm existing data in the literature

that has to do with third party involvement and civil war termination. It cannot however be considered a well-suited alternative explanation for a peace process progressing within the context of this research. Acts of spoiling still disclose information whether or not third parties are involved. Subsequently, third party involvement is a part of the proposed causal mechanism as no distinction is made between the peace-makers that have to deal with the disclosed information. So, third party involvement is the condition that enhances the necessary condition of appropriately dealing with the information disclosed by spoiling behavior.

Finally, one must remain critical when assessing the overall progress of a peace process. Throughout this research several trends emerged indicative of a peace process progressing in terms of measuring a viable peace process through ongoing dispute resolution mechanisms. Other trends were also visible that were not the preferred trends for a peace process progressing and mostly had to do with the implementation of provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord. So, progress in peace negotiations does not automatically mean progress in, for example, returning basic civil services to the population or increasing security throughout the country. It is not clear though which trend outweighs other trends and despite the research challenge this brings about when interested in measuring overall progress, it re-affirms the complex nature of a peace process and it forces scholars and policy makers to be realistic in their expectations.

In Mali, peace negotiations became more effective after acts of spoiling had disclosed information on relevant interests and actors, resulting in a signed peace agreement. Peace makers should look for this information in order to turn a negative act of spoiling into a positive outcome as much as possible. Nevertheless, instability, insecurity and tensions remained high as a result of spoiling behavior and other violent acts and caused hindering and delays in implementation of the provisions of the preliminary agreement. As such, it can be argued that political progress does not meet with other, more humanitarian efforts. And this awareness is crucial for all peace makers who seek overall progress in the peace process while working towards achieving a durable peace.

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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The following questions are designed to gain in-depth knowledge of the situation on the ground in general during the peace process in Mali and to triangulate available data on specific spoiling events as a means to confirm or disconfirm the available data. The information obtained from these questions will also be used as background information on the peace process in Mali in order to enhance validity of this research.

This research starts temporally in June, 2013 after the signage of the Declaration of accession to the preliminary agreement for the presidential election and inclusive peace talks, also known as the Ouagadougou Accord, which marks the start of the peace process (as per operationalization criteria discussed in the research proposal) and ends when the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali was signed in June, 2015.

The research question I pursue to answer is: <u>Under what conditions can spoiling behavior be productive for a peace process?</u> As such, I am interested in the short and long term effects of spoiling behavior and the causality between these effects and the outcome of a peace process. Spoiling behavior is defined as: Violent actions taken to disrupt, undermine, hinder, or delay a peace process.

In order to distinguish spoiling behavior from the vast amount of violent acts conducted throughout the peace process, the focus of data collection has been on those violent acts in which reference has been made to the peace process, e.g. peace negotiations, implementation of provisions of the Ouagadougou Accord etc.[20]

The first three questions are concerned with the role of the interviewee during the peace process and are solely used for purposes off the record. The interviewees, when cited, will be referenced as an anonymous source, unless interviewees confirm their willingness to be cited by name and/or the role and duty they performed during the peace process. The remainder of questions is organized around three specific events or themes: spoiling and terrorism, spoiling and discontent and spoiling and factionalism.

1. What was your role and duty during the peace process in Mali?
2. From which locations did you exercise this role and when did your duty commence and end?
3. Do you want to remain anonymous? If not, please note how you want to be referenced.

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[20] The subjectivity of this focus as it is mostly dependent upon secondary sources has been noted as a limitation to this research

SPOILING AND TERRORISM

4. Throughout the peace process several Islamist groups, such as Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Signed in Blood Battalion and the Islamist Movement for Azawad (IMA) have conducted violent attacks on civilians and groups inside the peace process, hence part of the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), the Platform and/or the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF). These violent attacks include, yet are not limited to, bombings, assassinations and kidnappings and they are argued to pose a severe threat to the peace process and the implementation of the provisions set forth in the Ouagadougou Accord. Most of these Islamist groups have been labelled as terrorist organizations by the Malian government and international community and are excluded from peace negotiations.

   A short term effect of these acts of spoiling and terror is an increase in tensions and fear amongst and between political movements and the local population. The insecure and instable situation has caused difficulties and delays in the implementation of certain provisions of the preliminary agreement, such as the establishment of cantonment sites and the return of basic civil services. Accordingly, it can be argued that these acts of spoiling and terror hinder the peace process.

   A long term effect of these acts of spoiling and terror has to do with the response of the international community as they become increasingly aware of the military strength of these terrorist groups and the challenge they pose to the peace process. As such, it can be argued that these acts of spoiling and terror clarify the need for additional resources which in turn can be considered productive for the peace process.

   Do you agree with these statements? What effects have you observed in the short and long term after acts of spoiling and terror and how do these effects relate to the peace process? What has been the response of MINUSMA and the international community to these acts of spoiling and terror?

SPOILING AND DISCONTENT

5. Substantial spoiling acts occurred between 16 and 21 May, 2014 in the city of Kidal when hostilities broke out between the signatories of the Ouagadougou Accord, namely the MDSF and the MNLA. Several sources indicate that the latter group had expressed concern prior the clashes about the slow pace of implementation of the preliminary agreement and that both parties accused each other of hindering the implementation of provisions.

   According to a report published by International Crisis Group, the political armed groups' defeat of the Malian Army relaunched the peace process by changing the balance of power between the government and the armed groups. It is argued that the relevance of these groups increased and made clear to the Malian government that their position had become vulnerable and that dialogue needed to be renewed. Subsequently, peace negotiations, mediated by Algiers, resumed and certain preconditions of the preliminary agreement were altered in accordance with the interests of the MNLA and affiliated armed groups.

Do you agree with this statement or has the renewed dialogue resulted from other forces at play? What have been other short or long term effects of the defeat of the Malian Army in the city of Kidal?

SPOILING AND FACTIONALISM

6. Throughout the peace process, allegiances between and within groups frequently have changed. The high degree of factionalism is argued to increase distrust, obscure the exact interests of groups and lead to a resurge in spoiling behaviour as these newly formed groups seek to prove themselves to each other. An example of this kind of spoiling behaviour is illustrated by the clashes between the MNLA and MAA groups of the CMA and the MAA group of the Platform in the Gao region in July and August of 2014. The MAA had fractioned, thus additional players' interests became an issue. Several sources indicate that as a result of these clashes, the scope of peace negotiations was enlarged to include the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities agreement representative of all new interests.

Do you agree with this statement? What are the main reasons for factionalism during the peace process and how adaptable is the peace process to the ever changing dynamics between and amongst relevant parties?