



## The African Union's self-conception as a peace actor: a role theory approach





A research on how the AU developed its own role-conception as autonomous, primary peace actor in Africa, in spite of international and continental role-expectations and contestations.

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## I. Abstract

The African Union emerged in 2002, and presents itself to the world as Africa's peace actor. Its expressions contain Pan-African ideals, and the conviction that peace and security are main prerequisites for a prosperous future. Most AU-studies regard the question if AU's peacekeeping efforts in interventions are successful, or investigate how states harm the continental endeavour. They conclude that the PSC lacks structural and incidental capacity and political willingness of states. This approach and outcome fits to the dominant realist approach, assuming that the African Union consists of power-seeking states, looking after their interests.

This thesis contributes to this debate by utilizing another, constructivist approach. Role theory advances the understanding of this peace actor. The performance of the AU in peace policy, and the position of member states is investigated in the context of role-conception, role-contestation and role-expectations. In this thesis the AU's role-conception, and how it develops, is central. The definition of this role was not given yet in the CA, although some ingredients were in there. The contestation by states and AU-institutions shaped the self-conception of the AU, and stimulated the policy of prevention. The expectations of others, in particular international financial partners, have had significant influence on the AU. The UN requires IOs to take responsibility in building peace in their region, and pays for AU-led missions. The political and social contexts cause, by a process of socialization, a dynamic and continuously developing self-conception of the AU.

The current self-conception of the AU is being a comprehensive power. It deploys troops in African conflict areas as a military power. However, it performed also as a civil power by promoting and supporting CSOs; and even as normative power, by emphasizing the responsibilities for states to secure their people (policy of indifference).

## II. Abbreviations

A3	-	Three rotating African members of the UNSC
ACIRC	-	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
ALF	-	African Leaders Forum
ANC	-	African National Congress in South Africa
AU	-	African Union
APSA	-	African Peace and Security Architecture
CA	-	Constitutive Act of the African Union
CEWS	-	Continental Early Warning System
CSCPF	-	Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework
CSO	-	Civil Societal Organisation
CSSDCA	-	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
FemWise	-	Network of African women in conflict prevention and mediation
FPA	-	Foreign Policy Analysis
IO	-	International Organisation
IR	-	International Relation
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU	-	Organisation of African Unity
PanWise	-	Pan-African network around the PoW
PDP	-	People's Democratic Party in Nigeria
PoW	-	Panel of the Wise
PSC	-	Peace and Security Council of the African Union
R2P	-	Responsibility to Protect
REC	-	Regional Economic Community

- RM - Regional Mechanism
- UN - United Nations
- UNSC - United Nations Security Council
- WHO - World Health Organisation

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# 1. Introduction

If someone visits the website of the African Union (AU), they will come across the slogan “Towards a Peaceful, Prosperous and Integrated Africa.” This is a hopeful and promising goal. However, given recent African history and contemporary continental developments, it is also a challenging task. This motto expresses a better prospect for Africa’s people, and the role of the AU to accomplish this. The latter is the topic of this thesis. It considers the AU as a peace actor, both in terms of self-conception and other's expectations.

The AU considers conflicts and insecurity as the main obstacles for African prosperity and stability. It desires to be *Africa's solution for African problems*, but does not always succeed in effectuating this. In fact, the AU is a dynamic and equivocal actor, on account of being an organisation of very dissimilar states. Its stays dependent on its member states to execute its power. Nonetheless, is the AU indeed a rational based coalition of states? Or did it evolve into an autonomous peace actor? What are theoretical instruments to understand the AU, separately from its performance? The emergence of the AU, and its role in promoting peace and stability in and between sovereign states, calls for more research. This thesis investigates the academic debate, and utilizes the concept of role-conception to gain a better understanding of this international organisation (IO).

## 1.1. The AU as a peace actor

The African Union is a continental organisation, mandated to act in African peace issues. Although national interests seem to prevail over shared values and continental benefits, this research assumes that the AU is more than the sum of all member states. It has its own institutions, budget, policy and agreements, indicating a degree of independence. It was once founded by African state leaders, but followed its own path of development. On the one hand the AU is not able to command changes in African states’ peace and security policies, on the other hand its role cannot be disregarded anymore in African peace programs. This role-development is investigated in this research by employing role theory. This conceptual framework provides instruments to cover the complex of mutual influences between states and the AU.

The AU is approached here as Africa's peace actor, although the AU agenda includes multiple topics, like economy, agriculture and health care. The AU became the African voice in international talks on global issues, such as war against terrorism and climate change. The AU is dedicated to unite and advance African interests.

The Constitutive Act (CA) considers peace and stability as pillars of the continental project. Article 3 describes the objectives, among others "to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent" (African Union, 2000). Weak governance, violence and insecurity carry along a high risk of regional spill-overs, harming political and economic stability. The "scourge of conflicts in Africa" are the "major impediments to the socio-economic development." That being so makes AU's peace and security policy "prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration agenda" (African Union, 2000). This clear purpose is accompanied by legal law: political interferences, monitoring missions and military interventions are all at the AU's disposal. It was the first international actor adopting the R2P principle (Freire et al, 2016). For scholars and African leaders this decision indicated the change from a sphere of non-interference to non-indifference. Article 4.h was amended in 2003 to add further rights to intervene in case of "serious threats". However, it is not ratified by all members (Peen Rodt, 2012; Williams, 2009c). States feared PSC's meddling in domestic politics. A definite discontinuation of the non-interference tradition of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is not achieved yet.

The Union established a legal and institutional peace and security architecture to monitor and respond on threats, including the mandate for troop deployment at the territory of sovereign states (CA, article 4.j and 9.g). Freire et al (2016) argue that the existence of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the normative and legal framework, produces the AU's potential to become an autonomous actor independent from African member states. It emancipated and discovered new ways to influence attitudes of states, and effectuate African solidarity (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Williams calls the PSC an *embryonic* international institution: "even in its suboptimal state it has had a significant impact on security dynamics within Africa" (2009a, pp. 604). This development of the AU as a peace actor illustrates its role-conception: to perform as powerful peace actor. Being game changer in a region that is affected by conflicts and eruptions of violence. This self-conception and how it developed, is elaborated in this thesis.

## 1.2. Academic puzzle and relevance

There are several reasons of relevance why the AU is studied in this thesis. First of all, IOs of sovereign states are complex and often self-contradictory actors that even confuse IR-scholars. Realism approaches the AU as a project of rational state actors, seeking after their interests. Others respond that its ambition and developed peace structure demonstrate more than being a coalition of states. The utilized constructivist approach in this research contributes to this debate.

Secondly, the emergence of the AU as Africa's authorized peace actor, caused high expectations. The existence of a peace mechanism in this unstable region, justifies academic endeavours to achieve more understanding. What is its potential, and can it encourage sustainable peace? The academic consensus acknowledges the self-conception of the AU being a relevant peace actor. However, the execution of the AU as peace power in real conflicts, remains too often unsuccessful. The role of member states, lack of capacity, and financial dependency on international partners are usually blamed for it. This research recognizes and elaborates the ideals of the AU, and connects it to the dynamics of dealing with internal and external expectations.

Lastly, African states went through a turbulent history of building states, and sustaining security and peace. This heterogeneous continent seeks its way in global markets and politics, the AU as Pan-African institution became an important voice. Role theory as inductive method analyses the impact of African ideas, and other material and non-material incentives in international cooperation. Role and contexts make that all involved actors change and develop. Since role theory isn't applied before in approaching the African Union, this thesis explains and explores its contribution in this debate.

## 1.3. Research question

The role-conception of the AU as a peace actor is not a fixed position, since this IO is embedded in cultural, historical and political contexts. Its self-conception is result of a whole of contestations, expectations and (collective) experiences. Current academic approaches are unable to put forward a holistic framework of understanding. This research employs role theory to fill this gap, and explores how AU's role-conception is part of an ongoing dynamic process.

*How has the African Union developed an autonomous role-conception as Africa's primary peace actor, and how can role theory approach contribute to the understanding of the dynamic process of shaping AU's self-conception?*

The research question is divided into three sub questions. Sub question 1: How is the African Union as peace actor understood in the current academic debate? AU's peace and security policy is researched by many AU-scholars. How is the AU's role described and what approaches are used? This sub question aims to explore how the independence, effectiveness and character of the AU in peacebuilding is understood.

Sub question 2: How did the role-conception of the AU as autonomous peace actor develop since its founding? This section deals with the question regarding the character and self-conception of the AU in peace activities. If it became Africa's primary autonomous peace actor, what does that actually mean for the role-conception? And how did it develop?

Sub question 3: How does role theory help to understand the AU as independent peace actor, and how does it provide insight in the complex process of role-conception and performance? Role theory approach is utilized in for example EU-studies to understand its behaviour in peace promoting policy. How can it contribute to AU-studies?

#### 1.4. Methodology and concepts

This thesis travels through the academic state of the art, and tries to add a relevant path to the roadmap of theorising Africa's primary peace actor. With a particular focus on the collective self-conception of the AU, separated from member states' persuasions. The research is divided into three parts, with distinct academic praxes. It contains a literature review, content analysis, and finally the elaboration of role theory as new conceptual framework in AU-studies.

The literature review is employed in order to answer the first sub question; it reviews the academic field and identifies possible gaps in understanding the AU as a peace actor.

This thesis aims to identify the role-conception of the AU in peace policy, and how it developed over the years. How can the character of the AU be derived from its various expressions, and how does it portray the role-conception? This question can be best answered by a content analysis: a "study of the content with reference to the meanings, contexts and intentions contained in messages" (Prasad, 2008). The expressions of the AU unveil the role-conception as peace actor. Objects to be studied are about 100 official papers of the AU: press

statements, communiqués, declarations, formal agreements and acts. This sources cover all years of AU's existence (to perceive developments), and different kinds of peace issues. At first, the constitutive acts of the AU and the PSC are investigated. What was the role-conception of the AU in its earliest days? Was de AU found with a clear, Pan-African role-conception, and how did the expansion of the AU's peace and security architecture manifest the role-conception? Secondly, PSC's documents on specific peace and security policies are examined. Is the AU, as autonomous, primary peace actor able to overcome the paradigm of state security, and what does it say about the role-conception? Can a developing role-perception over the years been perceived? What is the position of other (international) actors' role-expectations of the AU? This analysis is limited to official and written documents, and does not include non-written and informal objects (speeches, interviews, blogs etc.) (Hermann, 2008; Krippendorff, 1993).

The outcome of this research contributes to AU-studies, and cannot be generalized or applied to other IOs due to its qualitative character. It aims to understand the formation of roles (in self-conception) by applying a new theory in AU-studies, and investigates if this new perspective contributes to the current debate. This study is a qualitative research on the unique actor African Union (single N) as international organisation, and not on specific cases of AU peace interferences or AU bodies. The time frame starts with the Constitutive Act (CA) in 2000, and contains period of the AU since 2002 (until March 2019).

## 1.5. Structure

At first, chapter 2 deals briefly with different academic approaches on IOs, which is a complex field. These actors are of growing importance in international politics and IR-studies, but difficult to theorize. That is when role theory, utilized in researching the EU and its peacekeeping operations, and the methodology for this thesis is introduced. The academic field is analysed in chapter 3. The contribution of AU-scholars needs to be examined in order to perceive gaps, to support the argument that understanding of the AU as peace actor cannot simply be based on the material success of peacekeeping operations. The content analysis is reported in chapter 4; the second last chapter returns to the theoretical framework of role theory. Does it make sense to utilize this in AU-studies, does it bridge the gap that was found in chapter 3? It is discussed that the assumption of the AU as autonomous actor, despite the influences of all stakeholders in constructing the role of the AU as a peace actor, is a relevant starting point.



## 2. Theorising international organisations

The international community changed after World War II. International organisations emerged as political actors, besides the sovereign states. State actors became interconnected in loose relations or in ever closer unions. There are numerous international partnerships for different purposes, in particular aiming structural peace between states. How are IOs approached in IR-theories, and what is the relation between sovereign states and expanding IOs?

### 2.1. Approaching IOs

Realism and liberalism are dominant schools in theorizing international organisations. For realists the anarchical world-order of power seeking state actors did not change dramatically with the appearance of IOs. It is considered as another field to promote national interests. Sovereign states join the AU to guarantee their interests, and balance international and regional powers (Pollack, 2001). Stronger states are tend to participate in IOs to advance their influence on developments in the region, despite the IO's ability to prohibit misuses of power. Weaker states qualify the IO as an instrument to level the playing field and reduce competition. Additionally, many African states cannot bear high security expenses. Combined efforts in security policy maximize benefits, and minimize costs.

For realists, states are willing to accept interdependence in order to gain national stability and prosperity. It proves the rational and power seeking character of states. According to Waltz (2000), the intentions to join an IO can be best explained by national security arguments and interests of politicians. Most realists acknowledge the more or less independent position that can be achieved by an IO. However, state leaders will always be decisive on its appearance and survival. In general, realism denies the IO's probable development towards an independent position, and its potential to become autonomous. In neo-realism the emphasis on anarchy and conflictual nature of international politics is less dominant (Pollack, 2001). Structures and context in the international order are of more importance to gain power than human nature. These new structures do not abolish the uncertainty that states face in international politics: states will not allow international actors to become too strong and autonomous, and thus neutralize state's power (Russet, 1993).

Institutionalism argues that once an IO exists, it will perpetuate its position. Though IOs are initiated (and utilized) by powerful states, they might develop towards autonomous

actors that do not serve only regional hegemons. IOs obtain legitimacy to influence state's behaviour, mediate and implement norms, and establish self-controlling and executing mechanisms. A strong (invented) tradition will lead to an effective and long life of the body. Neo-liberal institutionalists consider the state as central actor in IOs as well (Cho, 2014).

Though international institutions influence state's behaviour, they are not competent to serve the interests and identity of the collective. Moravcsik (1995) introduces *liberal inter-governmentalism*: state leaders aim their own interests, and advocate for this in IO-negotiations. IO policy will always represent the relative power of its members. Moravcsik argues that these interests are bargained in overarching institutions (without force or war) and produce a *vis-a-vis* situation for all involved actors. The IO itself has little causal influence, but stays an instrument.

## 2.2. Constructivist approach

In constructivism social constructed norms and identities are key for cooperation, more than rational choice. Constructivists oppose the materialist approach in realism, and emphasize the social and political context of international politics. IOs develop through a process of socialization towards formal and institutionalised actors (Kower, 2001). Approaching IOs require a theoretical framework that explains the institutional *life cycle* and ability to interact with its surroundings (Barnett & Coleman, 2005). IOs grow up like people do: undetermined, finding their own identity by interaction, crises and experience.

Some constructivist theories still treat states as main units of analysis. Although non-state actors take part of the socialization process, their behaviour in international politics is still subordinate in most constructivist conclusions. Some scholars argue that all behaviour of states and IOs are social constructions, while others claim that states' material interests are leading in international cooperation and interdependence (Smith, 2001). The school of constructivism is ambiguous about the inner motivation behind the formation of IOs. Theorizing IOs need to include structure, agency and context. Wendt (1987) argues that ontological primitive units in IR-theories are agency and structure. However, one cannot be prioritized above the other, but relevant IR-theories need to value both aspects: "where agents and structures as mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct entities. Each is in some sense an effect of the other; they are co-determined" (Wendt, 1987). The constructed reality is effected by structures and agencies. Many constructivist scholars utilize post-modern contributions, focusing on human

agency in constructed reality and structures. Bannet and Finnemore (2004) contribute to this constructivist debate. Their sociological institutional approach on IOs assume that states can constrain the international body, while the IO acts as independent mechanism as well. The first does not exclude the latter. International organisations will always try to execute their own policy, and do not necessarily serve their powerful member states.

The question remains how IOs make decisions and perform in growing independence from member states. Salem (2006) analyses the academic field in his dissertation, and names at least four constructivist explanations of how international bodies act independently. Firstly, there is a consensus on common interests and a feeling of cooperative responsibility in peace and security issues; shared peace identity and awareness of necessity of this togetherness. Secondly, IOs develop their own bureaucracy and institutions, and regional rules and norms are established (Weberian bureaucratic argument). This bureaucracy is not rigid, but contains the ability of interpreting and responding on political context and behaviour of member states. Supranational bodies create political and bureaucratic powers, sometimes represented by charismatic agents with informal or legitimate power. Thirdly, norms and principles are strong constructions in international cooperation. State support for collective peace policy is more likely in case of shared norms and peace identity (Cho, 2014). Lastly, any IO consists of a hierarchy of norms and member states. This order is socially constructed and subject of a dynamic process, manipulations and arbitrary use. Specific contexts determine which norm prevails over others, how states behave, and what the expected role of the IO includes. As elaborated later, role theory combines these four assumptions on how IOs are constructed.

### 2.3. Dependent or autonomous actor

It is an interesting question how IOs develop towards autonomous actors. Some scholars conclude that supranational bodies are busy maintaining their position and keeping members on board, which implies a high degree of dependence. When IOs become empowered actors, member states are more likely to keep it dependent. In the end, an IO cannot control states but is controlled by states. Any IO, according to these scholars, is unlikely to deploy peace activities without support of powerful members, that will mind at least their own interests. Supranational entities only exist if the international body stays powerless and doesn't interfere in sovereign states.

This thesis contribute to another movement in theorising IOs. Klabbers (2017) speaks about a *post-ontological phase*, where IOs are no longer state mechanisms, but autonomous actors that enter into relations with their own partners. Cho (2014) argues how this is underestimated due to the dominance of realism. Scholars focus on the inter-*national* character of organisations, and lack instruments to understand and explain an IO independently from states. Brexit and *Trumpism* (still) prove that states cannot, and will not simply withdraw from international organisations (EU and NATO). The IO's position grows by *formal transformations*: constitutions and founding agreements are extended by amendments and modifications. However, Klabbers (2017) denies that amended constitutive acts are the impelling factors. IOs develop mainly by sudden events and crises: *transformative moments*. Cho (2014) utilizes *identity theory* from human development psychology to understand the development and expansion of an IO in its daily, ordinary performance. Which is a social environment; a new president in one of the leading member states, or a court decision, can effectuate the course of events. Transformations do not take place because of negotiated amendments, but merely as “cumulative effects of everyday developments” (Klabbers, 2017). While managing crises, an IO will strengthen its position, and reframe its own role as neutral and effective actor. The developing IO correlates with the political and social context, and takes a long way of experience. There is no single route or determined path. An IO can achieve autonomy after a while, although it always will be a dynamic process of socialization.

This corresponds with the (structuralist) *organizational ecology theory*. The ability to develop depends on intrinsic features and responses on changing contexts. Intergovernmental organisations are mainly *slow-but-stable* types of IOs: results of long negotiations, with difficult voting procedures and financial capacity. It causes inability to overcome competition, and it will not achieve many of its objectives (Abott, Green and Keohane, 2016). The *capacity competition*, the ability of IOs to gain needed resources, requires new strategies. Causing that IOs expand institutionally (in tasks and domains) to prove their effectiveness and fulfilment of mandates.

The AU is approached in this research as independent peace actor. Actorness in IR refers to the ability to influence international politics and to impose values (Richard, 2013). It is still subject of academic debate to what extent international organisations like the AU are real actors in global politics. Their effectiveness, consistency and opportunity might be doubted. In this thesis the actorness of the AU is conceptualized as the ability to (re-)imagine

and realize its own role-conceptions (Klose, 2018). The actorness contains more than the actual performance, but includes the process of shaping its self-conception as autonomous peace actor.

Different frameworks are used to analyse Africa's peace actor. For realist scholars the success of the African Union equals to the political willingness of its member states. This thesis contributes to the constructivist approach of understanding the AU as IO. Assuming that political reality is constructed by social and cultural context. History, ideas and context have a decisive influence on how international politics unfolds. The process of socialization, interaction with other actors and stakeholders shape the development of the AU as autonomous actor.

#### 2.4. Conceptual framework of role theory in IR

Role-conception is the central concept in this thesis, which is an element of the constructivist conceptual framework of role theory. This framework approaches IOs as complex but autonomous actors, taking into account the context of internal and external stakeholders, driven by material and non-material motives. This thesis aims to put role theory on the agenda of AU-scholars. The main concepts of the theoretical framework are introduced here.

The analogy behind role theory is based on the theatre. It emphasizes how actors play a role, dependent on many variables. The performance of the self (*ego*) necessarily responds to other actors (*alter*). The surrounding (audience, set and script) shapes the roles and role-expectations. Role theory is used in psychology and social studies to understand how individuals behave, depending on contexts, expectations and self-conception. It is used in IR-studies as well to analyse state behaviour in different contexts. Some scholars formulated categories of roles that can be played by states. Other scholars (like Aggestam, 2008; Koenig, 2014) utilized role theory to gain more understanding of the EU, and focus on the dynamic process of socialization and developing roles.

Role theory is not a single theory, but rather an approach that centres the international actor's role in a socialized context. For Thies (2009) this *role* is a comprehensive concept, referring to the position of an actor *in* an organized group, and *to* any other actor. It has material and non-material origins: political reality, legal law, institutional order and identity. And is not determined by rational choice or liberal values, but constituted by social and political interactions and experiences (Koenig, 2014). Therefore not static and completed (which

challenges scholars to use universal theories), but is changing due to circumstances. From role theory perspective, the AU cannot be understood based on its performances only, or emphasizing the decisive role of member states. The AU is more than the sum of all member states, and more than the performance in military peace operations (Harnisch, Frank and Maull, 2011).




Figure 1 - Conceptual framework role theory approach (Koenig (2014); Aggestam (2006))

Figure 1 displays the conceptual framework of role theory, and demonstrates how actual behaviour is result of a dynamic process. The central concept in this thesis is the actor's *role-conception*, referring to the self-image of an actor. It comprises subjectively defined, normative and functional responsibilities and duties (Aggestam, 2006). Koenig (2014) adds that self-conception is rooted in history, memory and culture, and evolves by social learning. The role-conception of the AU as peace-actor refers then in particular to African tradition, culture and social and political context. This role-conception is influenced by many other actor, and by circumstances. The IO interacts with other international partners, member states and institutions. These actors have explicit and implicit expectations about the IO as peace actor, and about their own involvement. Their ideas on how the IO ought to behave are based on material self-interests, but also on context and ideas (Harnisch, 2012).

The role of the IO is not undisputed, and part of a dynamic process. Cantir & Karbo (2012) categorise the role-contestation into a vertical and horizontal contest. Vertical as disagreement between elite and masses, and the horizontal as contestation among elites. For IOs the *horizontal contestation* is understood as contestation between the IO and its own

institutions (Koenig, 2014). This happens since these bodies got their own bureaucracy, agents, expertise and perception on how the IO ought to act. *Vertical contestation* assumes that the role-conception of the IO is contested by member state's foreign policy elites (Koenig, 2014). These political leaders do not necessarily support the decision making and autonomous power the IO becomes.

In role theory approach, other actors constrain and enable the IO to operate. Member states and institutions keep and develop their own status within the IO, and are decisive for the actual success (Aggestam, 2006). The execution of power by IOs is not one-direction or top-down, but the actual role is merely result of dealing (or socialization) with others. The international body is a powerful institution because it initiates cooperation and builds a continental peace and security architecture, but it remains a social and political centre. Internal disagreement affects the IO, but turns out to be the power behind the developing role-conception.

The concept of *role-enactment* is less abstract and refers to the actual behaviour of the actor in decision making, implementations and its policy (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2012). Despite the impact of others on the role-conception, IO agents and civil servants will translate the (abstract) role-conception into real policy (Koenig, 2014). If the role-conception is not discussed, it will be more easy to execute the policy.

Many theories focus on only a part of the involved variables. Role theory tries to cover the comprehensive complex of being peace actor in a changing world, with developing circumstances and many international and continental stakeholders. What this actually means for the AU is explored further in chapter 4. The AU's role is not secluded and insensible for other's expectations or contestations.

### 3. The AU as a peace actor in current academic debate

There is an academic consensus on the ambition and potential of the AU as Pan-African solution for African problems. However, the result of its peace and security policy is criticized. This chapter presents a literature review. This is done to provide an overview of what is researched and concluded before. Many researches about AU's peace policy are case-studies, or focus on the impact of member states, and neglect a general conclusion or holistic understanding of the AU's complex role. Additionally, this review identifies gaps in current knowledge and theories. It focuses on the gap between self-conception of the AU, and its actual performance in peace building policy. Most scholars agree on the prospects of the AU, but emphasize the imperfect performance and how member states undermine the union. Role theory provides a framework to overcome this stalemate. It widens the scope of understanding on the position of the AU as Africa's primary peace actor. Generally, current research does not provide an approach on the AU in its role as peace actor, taking into account the developing role-conception and the internal process before execution of peace policy takes place.

#### 3.1. African Union: sum of states?

Nearly all AU-studies kick off with explaining the AU as successor of the OAU, which was above all an organisation to secure sovereignty for African states. This comparison is obvious and helpful, but puts the focus automatically on states as obstacles for the developing autonomous AU. The OAU was not provided with considerable budget, nor authorized to interfere in state's domestic areas. For many scholars the AU means a continuation of this past. Despite the fact that the new union got substantial mandate, and institutionalised its objectives in the APSA, states still decide how and when the AU acts (Williams, 2009b; Williams, 2018).

The AU is founded by the African states, signing the CA in 2000. By then the Union as peace actor was not completed, but started the process of becoming. Badmus (2017) and Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström (2008) introduced the framework of *triangular area of tensions* to explain AU's performance in peace operations. This framework provides insight in the dynamics between the collective ambition, and interests of member states. Although the potential of the AU is acknowledged by most stakeholders, internal tensions affect the real power to bring about peace policy. The AU as peace actor cannot simply overrule state security policies or convince political elites, but is dealing with areas of tension. The first area is the



ambition and potential of the AU: the APSA as “proactive security regime to address Africa's democratic and governance deficits” (Badmus, 2017). This framework is one of the few serious attempts recognizing the self-aware and more or less autonomous actorness of the AU. The second and third areas of tension concern the capacity of institutions, and the political unwillingness of member states. Divergent interests and lack of capacity constrain the ability of the AU to bring an African solution to African problems, and become an autonomous peace actor. These two areas of tension summarize the main arguments in AU-studies about the ineffectiveness of the PSC (elaborated later in this chapter). To state it with Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström (2008, pp. 44): “The AU will never be more effective than the sum of its members' will.” Despite the self-conception and will to become an independent peace actor.

The framework of triangular areas of tension can be discussed inasmuch it limits the scope to military interventions. These missions cause a dynamic and political pressure that doesn't necessarily apply to all AU peace activities (like mediation or prevention). In addition, though the framework approaches the AU as self-conscious peace actor, the role of member states predominate the framework. It does not provide insight in how these three areas develop in relation to each other. It is conceivable that the first area of AU's ambition becomes more dominant with respect to the other areas (unwillingness and incapability) by a process of learning and experience. The capacity to find its way in shaping its role-conception, is discussed later.

### 3.1.1. AU struggles with unwilling partners

The AU proclaims collective and joint effort to promote peace and human dignity. At first, many scholars observe that despite the new AU, state security remains the objective for African state leaders. States behave contra-productive, so that the AU will not easily achieve an autonomous position, since it necessarily implies concessions to state sovereignty. Salomon (2017) argues that most state leaders do not benefit from serving the “ideal of African solutions for African problems”. The non-African, but Westphalian state principle fits more to their intent to secure state's position and interests (Boas & Dunn, 2014). It is a post-colonial paradox: though the OAU aimed to remove colonialism and western interferences, and the AU emphasizes continental empowerment, African elites revert to western introduced state-centrism. Governments' defence and police forces are above all instruments to serve state's security, more than human security (Abatan and Spies, 2016). Analysing the apathetic reaction of the AU after the eruptions of violence during the elections in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010, Abatan

and Spies (2016) conclude that African states are not willing to mandate the AU to intervene in case of misuse of the monopoly of violence. Despite the awareness of duties and the ethical implications of sovereignty (article 4.h of the CA), the Union did not act in this severe crisis.

This restraint position is disadvantageous for AU's attempts to centre human security, and counteracts its authority as peace actor. It weakens the ability to overrule domestic agendas, and to regulate peace activities of international actors in Africa. Kasaija (2013) studied the Libya crisis and the Arab revolutions in northern Africa; the impact of AU-led solutions failed. Non-African actors (EU, USA and UN) took the lead in these conflicts. Even African non-permanent members of the UNSC voted for resolution 19733, mandating the UN intervention in Libya. It is suggested by Gelot, Gelot and De Coning (2012) that African states see the AU as forum to discuss inter-state conflicts, more than an empowered continental peace actor. Gelot, Gelot and De Coning conclude that it is unlikely that the AU will become a strong peace body if it cannot respond on abuses of human rights, and persuade member states.

Nevertheless, the AU did deploy multiple peace operations that were supported by member states. Many scholars argue that African states are willing to enable AU's peace activities in case it benefit their own position. Bellamy and Williams (2013) introduce a materialistic, state-centric framework to understand the rationales behind involvement of states in peacekeeping operations. Williams (2018) concludes in his research about the AU-mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that institutional motives for joining this mission are most often used. States join to enhance their national security forces. Other rationales are economic and political, to boost regional and international reputations. States take part in operations to prove the international community being a normative actor and trustful ally. Quite a few African states suffer from a bad reputation due to historical and recent incidents. Uganda, for example, was negatively involved in interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and during domestic elections. Participating in AU-missions is an opportunity to prove their correctitude.

What do scholars conclude about political willingness of member states? At one hand, states are seeking after power and interests, and not willing to provide the PSC with enough capacity. Gelot, Gelot and De Coning (2012) argue that due to financial and resource limitations, more African states are involved in UN-missions than in AU-missions. However, financial gain and rational choice are not the only motivations for states to join. Williams admits that in AMISOM the participating states were convinced by ideals and normative arguments too. This expensive and long lasting military operation requires a very long breath,

while the success is very uncertain. The decision to deploy this unsecure invention indicates a sphere of non-indifference and African ownership, and hardly financial or political gain for other states. Although most scholars doubt if the AU is able to have an answer on the Somalian problem.

The ambition of the AU to become Africa's independent peace actor depends according to most scholars on the political support of African states. Although the AU implemented peace policy and initiated many interventions, the success is not overwhelming. This lack of result is in many AU-studies the main obstruction for the actorness and independent position of the AU. It is desperate for success to be respected by international and continental actors. For most scholars member states rule this IO, despite all AU ambitions.

### 3.1.2. AU struggles with African capacity

A peace actor with ambitions, but without money will not stay for long. States need to contribute significantly to AU's capacity as peace actor, and to provide the PSC with enough resources to deliver on its ambitions. Promoting peace by diplomacy and mediation can be achieved without high costs. However, the AU fears to be a talking-house and endeavours the role of being actor with potential hard power. Nearly all studied AU interventions (military and monitoring missions) share the conclusion that the PSC deals with a crucial shortage of material capacity, despite its institutional and legal capacity to manage peace and security operations (Omorogbe, 2011).

The PSC is partly financed by a regular contribution from the AU-budget. The remaining budget is received from member states and international partners for specific peace operations. The PSC-budget itself is too limited to deploy interventions, so it needs to find additional funding for every single mission. The performance of the AU in peace operations is affected by uncertainty and financial constraints (De Coning, 2004). Although the PSC has a clear mandate, most peace activities don't accomplish the objectives. Only a few member states deployed the needed number of troops since the appearance of the AU in 2002. Despite promises of states, financial and material contributions are not delivered. (Williams, 2009a; Williams, 2013). It results in a negative spirit of the boots on the ground and disappointment in the staff of decision makers dealing with permanent shortage. Causing a higher risk of failure, and lower status of the Union towards its opponents (and partners).

The capacity problem resulted in a hierarchical state order, according to Nieuwkerk, 2011. AU's peace policy about when, where and how to interfere became a political consensus, and not a decision made by the AU as autonomous actor. Regional powers, like South Africa, have the ability to regulate the collective peace policy because of their capability to deliver budget and troops. Some states are more capable to pay the high costs of military interventions than others, and will therefore support AU-policy that benefit them most. The AU as continental peace actor will always tend to pay more attention to stronger states than to the weaker.

The PSC remained ill-equipped to manage conflicts and succeed in peacebuilding. Most financial support came from international partners like the EU and the USA, even to pay for the contribution of African states. Non-financial resources of the PSC (for instance logistic and training) are delivered by international allies too. Many vacancies in the preparation phase and the actual deployment of AMISOM were drawn from the EU, UN and USA. In managing conflicts the AU remained dependent on international partners. And new international powers emerge as suppliers of funding: the Chinese contribution in peacekeeping Africa increased (Zhengyu & Taylor, 2011). Chinese troops served in Liberia, Darfur and the DRC. It illustrates how lack of resources, and the ambiguity of Africa's own deliveries limit the power and potential of the AU as independent peace actor.

Gelot, Gelot and De Coning (2012) are not surprised that the AU as “home to the bulk of the world's least developed countries” needs external support to finance costly peace operations. In particular since states should pay two months in advance for deploying troops in peacekeeping operations. It decreased the willingness and ability of states to join expensive interventions. Ultimately, it resulted in western actors financing African forces (Peen Rodt, 2012). The same authors suggest that African states are satisfied with this external donor system. Most AU-scholars conclude that the PSC should invest in the relations with the UN, NATO and the EU, to maintain sustainable cooperation (Omorogbe, 2011). African states benefit since they can improve their security forces and control the region. The international community takes advantage too, if African states deploy troops, use and gain knowledge, and experience in advancing African peace, paid by the UN and managed by the African rooted PSC. These scholars see a bright future for AU-UN hybrid missions (e.g. De Coning, 2004). For pragmatic reasons the AU can stay dependent on African and international actors.

### 3.2. Aspiration versus performance of the AU

Realism assumes that only when state interests are at stake, states are willing to interfere in other state's affairs. Humanitarian issues will not move countries to deploy troops or finance reconciliation programs. The adoption of the non-indifference principle by the AU implies that normative arguments matter, besides state's rationales about costs and benefits. The current AU facilitates and stimulates civil society movements and promotion of building rule of law.

While investigating the AU, its Pan-African ideals cannot be ignored. It is shared by African leaders, state institutions, non-state actors and societal organisations (Dzimiri and Spies, 2011). Some studies consider the AU as a collective of diverse but African societies, more than a cooperation of state security seeking elites. In this narrative the AU is assumed to be more than a governmental organisation, referring to cultural and historical context of African people. Producing and legitimating the existence of this Pan-African institution. Apparently, this Africanism provided a language around this IO. What is this Pan-Africanism, and how does it shape the self-conception of the AU?

Adler (1997) analyses the rise of security communities in the post-Cold War period, and categorizes them as “constructed cognitive regions.” Collective ideas prove to be strong enough to gather states in security issues, despite the fact that societies and political leaders never met (or cooperated) before. The pluralistic character of the region does not hinder the strong suggestion of shared identity, norms and culture. Pan-Africanism implies that a secure and prosperous Africa can only be achieved in cooperation and acknowledgement of African common identity. Facing globalization, civil agitation and tensed continental developments, African states cannot isolate themselves and be safe.

Some scholars interpret Pan-Africanism as rational choice, or invented feeling of togetherness based on shared history of colonialism and slavery (Williams, 2007). Western domination in the past shaped the context, and is used now by state leaders to find support for cooperation in contemporary global politics. The AU guarantees withholding of western interferences in African politics, and advocates African interests in the international community. In particular in peace and security issues African states are hesitant of being object of western peace policy (Souaré, 2014). This feeling is explained by shared historical experience. Still, for many scholars the Pan-African movement is more than rational choice. It touches African ideals and assumes deep awareness and belief that African states cannot (don't ought to) flee in isolation. Pan-Africanism gives opportunity to introduce African norms and

values in peace and security policy. It assumes that African culture, history and thought contribute to the becoming of the strong collective of African states, and is an emancipated answer on conflicts and tensions in African societies.

Most African societies share a fundamental worldview: the human centric *ubuntu*. The individualist based western society is alien to African conception. African societies, including the international African community, ought to be based on solidarity, compassion and non-indifference. Territorial borders do not create societies, nor can state institutions nurture communities (Winks, 2011). The Westphalian nation state, based on civilians that belong to the state versus others that don't, is strange to African conception. And the liberal individualist conception of human rights does not fit to traditional African approach of human (political) life. Human rights, as how it exists in African mind, implies duties more than claims of ego rights (Mnyaka and Motlhabi, 2005). Pan-Africanism is not a rational based turn to African thought, or invention of tradition, but a momentum for African states to *re-turn* to the roots of African unity (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

African thought in AU-studies has two implications. Firstly, a non-Westphalian approach on state sovereignty. Geldenhuys (2014) observes how African states move away from the idea of state sovereignty as territorial authority, towards state sovereignty as responsibility to improve lives of the people. It is discussed to what extent this “ideational journey” is indeed taking place, but African thought gives reason to redefine state sovereignty. Tieku (2012) advocates an African approach on sovereignty. The AU should adopt peace policy based on human communities and human life, instead of cooperation of African states. In addition, Salomon (2017) writes that African states are not capable to secure their people. The PSC, if based on African ideas and African capacity, should emphasize African tribal and societal organisations and structures, to overcome failure of states. African solutions for African peace and security issues are beyond the Westphalian state; the AU's role is more than being a cooperation of state actors.

This notion is elaborated in the second implication of Pan-Africanism for the AU's role-conception. The AU as Pan-African institution unites African societies and traditions. It implies a feeling of brotherhood and mutual responsibility between African people, more than between African regimes (Dembinski and Schott, 2014). The AU should be based on solidarity and non-indifference, which is not yet in mind of state agents and governments. Where *ubuntu* teaches that “a village is needed to raise one child”, mutual involvement of African actors fits in the

sphere of ubuntu's non-indifference. Kofi Annan used the ubuntu wisdom to underscore how African tradition gives reason to interfere proactively in case of abuses against humanity (Kioko, 2003). This tradition is based on compassion, solidarity and non-indifference, and abolishes the fear of interventions, violating state security and the misuse of article 4.h for “military adventurism” (Murithi, 2009). The AU as African peace and security body is provided with classical African norms and values that legitimate the autonomy of the AU to perform effectively in case of human crises, and to unite African communities. Not based on state actors, but on shared ideas. African tradition provides a language that is understood in African societies.

It is questioned by some scholars to what extent the Pan-African Union as peace actor can cover the non-homogeneous continent. Firstly, because some regional organisations developed into regional security complexes (like ECOWAS). These organisations become more experienced, and more successful in peacekeeping and interferences (Williams, 2007). These regional mechanisms are more capable to respond quickly, and received formal and informal authority to overrule state's interests or unwilling state leaders. Within these smaller security regions people, ideas and interests transfer easily. Shared interests and tradition are stronger, shaping the ability to act pro-actively. Common ideas in the continental AU institutions manifest to be too weak.

Secondly, the implementation of AU's peace policy is highly dependent on member states. Do they carry Pan-African ideals even in the battle fields? Yidego (2007) uses the case of AMISOM to illustrate how Ethiopian forces in Somalia did not execute AU-policy. South Africa is another example of an African state dominating peace interferences. Regional (relative) powers are more able to pay for the APSA, and achieve a leading role in the region. Their voice is stronger to set the peace and security agenda. Despite Pan-African norms and ideals in the AU, some member states are more willing to perform according to these non-indifference agreement. The Pan-African ideal is carried by some African states (Grant and Hamilton, 2016).

### 3.3. Conclusion

The AU's endeavour to promote peace and security in Africa, and its performance in conflicts is researched a lot in the recent past. Its dynamic and ambiguous appearance challenges AU-scholars to come to a general understanding. Most scholars acknowledge that

the AU develops towards more autonomy and a self-aware position in relation to member states. However, the main conclusion is that African states still undermine the effectiveness and successfulness of the AU's role in Africa. Stronger African states pay the costs of the APSA, and decide on AU's policy. It's the realist approach that dominates AU-studies, emphasizing the decisive position of rational state actors, looking after power and interests. Even more: where many scholars doubt if member states share the AU's ambition, others argue that the continental union is unable to become Africa's solution for African problems. It is still dependent on international partners, like the UN and EU, that pay for African states to fulfil their promises of delivering troops and budget. African states cannot bear the costs of providing a strong African solution. The AU desires to push African states and non-state actors to join the Pan-African effort to achieve peace and prosperity, but still unable to execute its peace policy without other actors. This doesn't necessarily mean that the AU renounces its task, but it has impact on the conception and development of the AU's role.

The performance of the AU as peace-actor has not always been successful. However, it deployed and executed over the years a growing number of interferences to respond on threats. Some scholars perceive that African states and the AU are to some extent sensitive for human-centred security policy. There is an awareness among some of Africa's leaders and societies, being an African collective. Return to African thought and ideals is a serious phenomenon. These African norms and values cannot always withstand resistance by member states. However, ideas and non-indifference is not included in most studies.

Overall, the African IO needs a comprehensive approach. Its role-conception is more than a cooperation of African states. It deals with role-expectations by member states, international partners and non-state actors. Where most scholars focus on the result of the AU in peace keeping operations, this research tries to understand how this dynamic process results in the role-conception of the AU. State actors, non-state actors, international partners, AU institutions and African ambitions are all part of this process.



## 4. The self-conception of AU as peace actor

The AU is more than the sum of its members: the collective peace policy transcends the cumulative interests of states. Role theory assumes that the AU as peace actor develops (slowly but steadily) its own, autonomous role-conception. It evolves by interaction with other actors, causing a learning path. This dynamic should be observable in AU's documents and statements.

This chapter starts with the investigation of the origination of the AU as peace actor. It is argued that the current self-conception is not equal to the founding, original incentives. Secondly, the enlarging peace structure of the AU represent the developing role-conception, and illustrates how it adapted to circumstances. Lastly, the content of official AU-papers is analysed in order to derive its role-conception. What does it imply to be the primary African peace actor, and how is this related to role-contestations and expectations? This chapter concludes that AU's role-conception as primary peace actor on the African continent evolved by experience, and social and political contexts, and can be best described as being a comprehensive power.

### 4.1. Founding an African peace body

The AU was founded to overcome the ineffectiveness of the OAU. To facilitate and achieve a Pan-African, peaceful and prosperous continent. The AU emerged in a context of global awareness that regional IOs are useful actors in promoting local peace and stability. The post-Cold War global order was open for bonds in non-western regions. The UN supported the efforts of regional bodies to create new peace structures (Nathan, 2013). These regional peace actors gave rise to prevention and resolution of conflicts. The new constituted AU presented itself as holistic, Pan-African power, based on shared norms and history. Its instruments, legitimacy and institutions would embody the African solution for African problems. Can the AU realize these norms, and become Africa's self-aware peace actor?

The African leaders agreed in 2000 on the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The preamble of the CA (African Union, 2000) confirms that this new union is “inspired by the noble ideas (...) of Pan Africanists (...) to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African states.” The African leaders acknowledged that the

AU is a product of solidarity and togetherness, but should even be the “affirmation of a common identity,” and facilitating the “process of attainment of the unity.” Article 3.a stipulates the Union's role in uniting the continent. The unity is not a fact yet, but needs to be arranged (a first role-conception of the AU).

The role-conception in the very beginning of the AU adhered to African principles and tradition. The AU as Pan-African body was advocated by its pioneers. One of these actors was South Africa's *foreign policy President* Thabo Mbeki. The South African scholar Nathan (2004) analysed his foreign policy, and concludes that Mbeki is a clear *Africanist*; strongly opposing western interferences in Africa, and often speaking about an *African Renaissance*. Nathan uses phrases like “championing the challenges” and “recovery of Africa” to describe the policy and ideals of Mbeki. It emphasizes the intrinsic power of African societies to achieve prosperity, and ability to secure human rights. This new IO should perform as African peace actor.

The feeling of African unity and uniqueness was already confirmed in the *Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa* (CSSDCA). In this document, with a main contribution of Mbeki and the Nigerian President Obasanjo, states agreed on African unity in (economic) development and security issues. It emphasizes the importance of an “African capacity for regional peace-support operations” and “conflict resolution”, and the awareness that the “the security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole” and *vice versa*. The efforts of Pan-African promoting agents like Mbeki and Obasanjo, got institutionalized in the AU. It marked a shift from state security to a more comprehensive and holistic focus – a first step to what is observed later. Africanism is no political philosophy, but it utilized as common belief that African institutionalized unity benefits all states and societies. In founding the AU, African states redefined the principles of sovereignty and security, and created a new standards of solidarity and indifference to achieve continental prosperity and human security.

The initial role-conception of the AU was to be an African peace actor, to create unity, and serve continental interests. However, AU's founding act is a more or less *regular* constitutive document of a *regular* union of states, and is not explicitly based on a Pan-African paradigm. The PSC protocol (2002) lacks also clear references to Pan-Africanism. It aims cooperation in peace issues and harmonization of security politics, to develop in Africa “strong

democratic institutions and culture, human rights” as “essential for the promotion of collective security” (African Union, 2002). The role of the AU is to emancipate the continent and African actors “to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment” (article 3.a), and to “coordinate and harmonize continental efforts” (article 3.b). The CA and PSC protocol aim to qualify and capacitate African states and societies to withstand peace and security challenges, more than providing an African idealistic answer on these issues.

How does the essential documents call for African norms and values? Article 25 of the CA determines that the working language should be, if possible, an African language. More awareness to African culture and tradition cannot be found. The PSC protocol doesn't speak either about African history in peacekeeping, nor African experience in mediation. However, close reading discloses a few phrases that touch on an African world-view. The PSC protocol speaks about “sanctity of human life” (article 3.f), which makes reference to a perspective on human life that is shared by many African traditions. In the handbook of Continental Early Warning System (African Union, 2008) the Commissioner Peace and Security Saïd Djinnit writes down that “at the root of the AU's vision is the notion of comprehensive human security.” This phrases illustrate at most how human security and non-indifference is revitalized (e.g. article 4.d), and that the AU pursues the development of civil societies, non-governmental organisations and grassroot movements (art. 20).

The origination of the AU was boosted by some state leaders, with a clear purpose to increase African ownership and togetherness. This African Renaissance doesn't dominate the existential documents of the AU and PSC; the charter did not produce a prescribed script for the role of the AU. From constructivist perspective this is, to some extent, meaningless: it is the environment and context that will shape the role of the AU. A process of socialization, and dealing with social and political contexts create the role-conception. This role-development is complex and ambiguous: many stakeholders are involved and may modify their contestations or expectations to the circumstances, and material and non-material incentives are intertwined. Some African leaders utilized Africanism to promote continental policy that profit their own political position in domestic and international politics. Tiekou (2015) argues that African parties and leaders constitute a network of businessmen that are sensitive for political gain. It follows that reinvention of Pan-Africanism can be rational, aiming domestic and foreign interests of states. Initiating and supporting liberal norms and good governance in Africa,

produces prestige in the international community. Though some leaders promoted the AU as Pan-African institution, its significance depends on multiple elements.

It were not only the African economic powers that preferred an African mandated peacekeeping collective. Many African states and political leaders were in need to upgrade the image of their regime. The Libyan leader Gaddafi hosted a summit (in Sirte) to show his leading position in Africa, and bringing on stage his commitment to the *United States of Africa*. The adopted Sirte Declaration was claimed by Gaddafi in de media as victory for his efforts. It illustrates how the young AU found itself in a landscape of numerous interests and actors. The AU as peace actor should finds its own route of development, and deal with internal contestations and expectations.

It is discussed to what extent the AU was emanated from Pan-Africanism, or whether it was based on rational choice in an insecure post-Cold War period. It is argued that agents played a crucial role in initiating the ideal of the AU as Africa's primary peace actor. State and party interests definitely played a role, but couldn't prohibit that African politicians claimed and utilized Pan-African ideals. By introducing the idea of an African Renaissance, or the idea of the United States of Africa, the new founded African Union was surrounded by ideals and the abstract existence of Pan-African ownership. The remaining, more relevant question is how the AU developed its own role-conception and responded on political and social contexts.

#### 4.2. African Union's institutions

The development towards an autonomous, self-aware peace actor, is best perceivable in the expansion of the Union. Since its existence a growing number of institutions and networks entered the AU scene. The appearance and behaviour of these bodies unveil an advancing awareness of how to act as African peace actor. The PSC focuses more on mediation and monitoring of conflicts (de-escalation), and takes advantage of African identity and civil power. The developing AU expresses a role-conception of being a soft or civil power, more than becoming a hard or military peace actor.

At first, the AU monitors developments in African societies that might escalate into conflicts. The CEWS collects and analyses information from civil and community-based sources, to prevent societies for violent outbreaks. It emphasizes the need for a “greater use of African information sources, particularly in indigenous languages; and the strengthening of the existing system of internal country profiles through the introduction of subnational detail”

(African Union, 2018, pp. 18). It makes use of local press, African contribution in academic research and open sources, so that all regions and minorities are covered. Qualitative and quantitative researches are applied to gain a better understanding about risks within and between societies. This practise illustrates how conflicts and developments are approached comprehensively. The role-conception of the AU moved from primarily post-conflict policy to pre-conflict management. “Governments act in partnership with relevant civil society organisations” (African Union, 2008, pg. 36). “Who does what to/with whom, when, where, why and how” (African Union, 2008, pg. 51)? The role-conception of the AU is to be more than a cooperation of state actors in peacekeeping operations, which is evidenced by a change towards prevention policy, and utilizing grassroot sources and organisations.

The AU’s attempt to have indirect and soft influence on African states, is also evidenced in the Panel of the Wise (PoW), existing of five members “drawn from various segments of society in member states” (African Union, 2007, art. I). The AU utilizes their networks, integrity and personality for advice and mediation in worrying situations. The PoW brings parties together and arrange communications with the Council, even when parties are “not ready to engage in formal talks” (African Union, 2007, art. 8). The AU recognizes the usefulness of traditional mechanisms and charismatic influences to appease. The PoW is an unique addition for IOs, and rooted in African societies and tradition. The growing network around the Panel is formalised in the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise). Representatives of different segments of African societies assemble in this network, and it has close bonds with regional councils of the wise. Since 2017 FemWise-Africa became a powerful subsidiary body of the Panel. The PoW proves that the PSC found a way to create a network with a focus on community based impact, separated from the network of African state leaders.

Many scholars discuss to what extent the PoW is legitimated to mediate in conflicts. Its main task is to anticipate in probable threatening situations (e.g. elections). Overall, the PoW is very active in contacting and harmonizing civil organisations (employers and employees federations, religious and health organisations), and the network around this five people has increased. It has set in motion grass root organisations, local governments and African leaders in the AU. Where many scholars discuss the impact of African states on the effectiveness of the AU, the AU itself focused on its influence on non-state actors (with an indirect impact on state behaviour).

The CA and the PSC protocol were mainly conventional documents to found a union of states, and did not provide a clear definition of being an African actor. Over the years, a number of bodies emerged, indicating an increasing focus on African societies. In particular the Panel of the Wise illustrates the attempt to find a comprehensive way to promote peace, and prevent possible conflicts. The AU's role became being more than enabling African states to secure their people. The AU created a network beyond the network of member states to become more than being a cooperation of states.

#### 4.3. AU's role-conception in decisions and declarations

The expanding AU (and developing APSA), manifests a role-conception that is based on civil power, and attempts to stay less dependent on the state leaders network. What the self-conception is and how it developed, is examined from official published documents (declarations, decisions, communiqués and statements). These papers give more insight in the response of the AU and the PSC on specific conflict cases, and what the position of the AU entails, versus the expectations of African states.

It's remarkable how often Pan-Africanism is used, although it is not clarified where it refers to. It is merely related to the togetherness of African states, more than to typical African tradition and world view. An example is the Declaration on the situation in Mali (Assembly of the African Union, 2013), where the Assembly is "reaffirming Africa's deep solidarity with Mali (...) whose commitment to Pan-Africanism and the causes of the continent never wavered in half a century of independence, and our determination to pool our efforts together to help this sisterly country overcome the challenges currently facing it." Pan-Africanism expresses the feeling of brotherhood, being together in a changing international world. It is the "spirit of continental solidarity", according to Moussa Faki Mahamat in his statement on the peace agreement in the CAR (AU PSC, 2019b).

The notion of being the African part of the global world order is a dominant building stone of the AU's identity. This self-conception generates three distinguished assumptions: (1.) keeping in touch on African issues; (2.) advancing African cooperation in a multipolar international environment; (3.) bringing the African solution for African problems requires an holistic, subsidiary based approach.

#### 4.3.1. African problems and African ownership

Africa faces violent conflicts, but African states worry about “an increase in external interventions which compromises the efficacy of African-led solutions to violent conflicts” (AU Retreat, 2018). The policy of structural conflict prevention and rapid response by means of the CSCPF, CEWS, ACIRC are crucial for the AU to stay owner of African conflicts (AU Council, 2016). The Assembly and Council stress in different documents the need for these instruments, and are confident about the achieved results. The PSC is eager to demonstrate how interferences affect the ability to stay in charge as African body.

However, these bodies function well if all member states join and support the peace and security policy, which is definitely not the case. Ownership requires a preparedness for military intervention, but also the focus on (preventive) de-escalation of conflicts. In Somalia the PSC “encourages all efforts aimed at promoting national reconciliation and healing across all layers of the Somalia society, including youth and women” (AU PSC, 2018c). And in Burundi the PSC “requests the Commission to accompany Burundi in efforts towards the convening of an all-inclusive dialogue, strengthening of democracy and respecting human rights” (AU PSC, 2018d). The military missions AMISOM and AMIB aim an inclusive and peaceful solution, to build a sustainable democratic governance. Another example is the two-day field-mission in Guinea-Bissau to support the authorities in organizing peaceful elections. The mission included meetings with leaders of (religious) communities and civil society organisations. “During the meeting, the PSC Delegation supported the request of women and youth to be empowered to fully participate in the political activities in the country” (AU PSC, 2018f). African ownership means for the PSC an ownership in rebuilding African states and societies too, more than military capability to restore peace.

Continental sustainable prosperity and peace requires good governance by state leaders. A main assumption of the PSC is that national crises affect the whole continent. It concludes “that most of the violent conflicts and crises facing parts of the African continent are rooted in governance deficits, which include mismanagement of diversity, manipulation of constitutions, marginalization of the youth and mismanagement of natural resources” (AU PSC, 2018g). The PSC deploys pre-elections missions and response operations in member states. After the coup d'état in Gabon, the PSC “recalled the imperative” to respect the Gabon Constitution and strengthen the position of democracy (AU PSC, 2019d). More than once the PSC repeats the message that sustainable peace and stability can only be achieved if all African states ratify the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. When state institutions and

societies are connected with bonds of trust, it will reconcile and heal deeply divided African societies. The AU sees itself as the continental peace actor: African states can achieve a prosperous future. But it needs to take responsibility for weaknesses in just governance, that might end up in indifference and tensions. The AU's role is to uphold the agreed norms.

#### 4.3.2. African voice in global world

African states need to cooperate in today's global political order. In the 9th AU Retreat Declaration (2018) the Commission, heads of states and societal organisations underlined again (art. 5) the need to pull together in the UN. The Assembly (2018) “stresses the importance for the A3 to continue to work as a coherent and coordinated group, speaking with one voice and to further strengthen their consultations with other members of the UNSC and the Africa Group in New York, and to continue keeping the PSC regularly informed of the results of these efforts.” These three rotating African states being member of the UNSC, are expected to advocate African shared interests, and are more or less unofficially accountable to the PSC (AU Commission, 2014). It enhances the AU's position if all African states stay together (AU Retreat, 2017, article 8). In addition, the PSC needs the financial support of the UN to “to secure the predictable and sustainable funding for AU's peace support operations” (AU PSC, 2018b). It increases the prerequisite of harmonizing Africa states' positions and efforts in global politics. The role-conception of the AU was earlier described as civil power, aiming to strengthen the African societies. But states, leaders and policy are important elements to deal with. The AU's role is more than supporting African civil organisations; it remains an actor within the global state community.

The new global order does not only challenge African states, but brings along opportunities as well. During the retreat on *Emerging Global Order, Multilateralism and Africa* (2017) the participants stressed “Africa's potential for tackling its challenges, particularly in conflict prevention, conflict management and sustaining peace.” Africa and its RECs and RMs are experienced in dealing with conflicts, and thus promising strategic partners of the UN and EU. The AU's position in international politics is not only being victim of violence, but to become the primary contributor of stability. It is noteworthy that the AU Council and PSC react on other global incidents, like peace talks in other regions. The AU aims to be a global actor.



#### 4.3.3. African solution means a holistic approach

In a changing, multipolar world, African states are responsible to build their own prosperous future. In latter documents of the AU, there is a feeling of haste and urgency. “African leaders pledged not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans and undertook to end all wars in Africa by Year 2020” (AU Retreat, 2017, art. 5). If African states want sustainable economic growth, stable governance and a prosperous home for their people, they have to give up political unwillingness and lack of support. This caused a shift in the role-conception of the AU: from a harmonizing and uniting power, to an actor that demands collaboration and powerful (regional) institutions to prevent conflicts. The AU's role-conception developed to a comprehensive, non-state focused (but not state-denying), peace and stability actor.

The main development, perceptible in decisions, communiqués and declarations over the years, is the growing attention for conflict prevention instead of peacekeeping or managing post-conflict regions (AU Assembly, 2008b; AU, 2008). Despite the practise of peacekeeping operations in African conflict regions, traditional African solutions concentrate on mediation and prevention. Former PSC-meetings dealt with conflict areas and specific unstable states, today's meetings concern prevention programs and multi-disciplinary policies. *Silencing the Guns* program is an example of this (evolved) role-conception of the AU as peace actor. It is connected to African peace tradition: the 8th Retreat in Windhoek speaks about an African-specific narrative of prevention practices. Though these objectives are classified as typical African, the principles are universal: “non-indifference, respect of human rights, international humanitarian law, accountability, justice, rejection of unconstitutional change of government, national ownership, gender-sensitivity and women's participation” (AU Retreat, 2016). The AU claims to be African, but these norms are at the same time essential to stay in close relation with western partners, and stay a trusted ally.

The PSC acknowledges that most conflicts are caused by non-state actors, like criminal gangs, criminality in border regions and religious extremists. The paradigm of AU as coalition of sovereign states is insufficient to develop prevention policy and practises. Part of the solution is to an increasing extent the involvement of communities and civil societal organisations. It is noticed before how these stakeholders got involved in the Panel of the Wise and (regional) networks. “Full participation of civil society organisations, including women and youth in efforts to promote peace and security” is a clear phrase from the Retreat in 2017. And is repeated many times by the PSC in its speaking about anti-terrorism, violence during elections

and outbreaks of conflicts. In the Retreat of 2016 participants “emphasized the importance of understanding the combination of structural causes and aggravating factors underlying current manifestations of violence” (art. 7). The PSC hosts workshops “to enhance the capacity of CSOs to participate more meaningfully in the formulation and implementation of security and justice sector reform policies and programs and to foster people-centred security governance across Africa” (AU PSC, 2018e). Non-state actors are important partners in conflict prevention.

There is a emancipation movement of women and youth in peace and security policy of the AU. “Council and participants, noting that only when women are allowed to meaningfully participate in shaping comprehensive counter-violent extremism strategies will societies be in a position to more effectively address all conditions conducive to violent extremism, underlined the importance of harnessing and further strengthening women’s national platforms and regional networks on peace and security” (AU PSC, 2017b). Which is noteworthy if it is realized how the OAU and the founding fathers of the AU were male leaders. It proves how the role of the AU developed by socialization.

The role-conception of the AU developed towards being a comprehensive peace actor, very aware of African society contributions. Marginalisation of groups, unequal distribution of resources, poor governance, law and order: all of these topics are covered by the AU peace agenda. The counter-strategy of the AU requires comprehensiveness, according to the 8th Retreat: “an approach that should be premised on proper contextualisation and in-depth understanding of the challenges at hand” (AU Retreat, 2015, art. 15). This approach was mentioned quite early in the PSC process, but got more attention during the years (compared to for example AU Assembly, 2008).

#### 4.4. AU's role contested

The role-conception of the AU as peace actor is exposed to the role-expectation and contestation of others. What can be derived from the official papers about the attitude of member states? It's argued before that most scholars blame states for the unsuccessful performance of the AU. First of all, the paper that are analysed here, are published on behalf of the AU and the PSC. It can be doubted to what extent the real position of member states and interests of African leaders are in there. Secondly, the analysis unveils the tense relationship between member states and the PSC. It is remarkable how, in particular in the early years of

the AU, African states and state leaders were (abundantly) praised for their efforts. The PSC “expresses its appreciation to His Excellency Professor Faustin Archange Touadera, President of the CAR, for his leadership and vision, as well as to the leaders of the armed groups for their patriotism and commitment” (AU PSC, 2019). After the coerced abdication of Mugabe, which caused instability in Zimbabwe, the Chairperson of the Council stated that he will be “remembered as a fearless Pan-Africanist liberation fighter”, and his withdrawal “was an act of statesmanship” (AU PSC, 2017). It illustrates how the legacy of African leaders, their position in the network, cannot be denied by the AU. Noteworthy is that older PSC-decisions mentioned African leaders by name (e.g. AU Assembly, 2008). It supports the argument that the success of the AU in its earliest years was determined more by the willingness of states and support of African leaders than today.

States support the role of the AU as primary peace actor. In particular due to cross-border criminality, and international and global developments that affect African states. Sahelo-Saharan states (in the Nouakchott Declaration, 2014), “reiterate the imperative need for the continuation of the capacity building” of the PSC and “encourage the Commission to intensify its efforts to mobilize the necessary resources for this purpose.” And in the Declaration on the 10th Anniversary of the PSC, the Heads of States stress the importance to stay close to their promises in creating the APSA, and that “the Council should make greater use of its mandate, as defined in its Protocol” (art. 4). The analysed declarations of the Assembly on activities of the PSC display how state leaders urge and stress the importance of providing the PSC with enough resources, and notes with satisfaction the achieved peace and stability by the AU (for example AU Assembly, 2013c).

Urging question is how the AU deals with the sovereignty of states (where the OAU was blamed for). Direct political interventions are infrequent, but when it happens, the PSC “reiterates its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and the territorial integrity” of the member state (AU PSC, 2007; AU PSC, 2008; AU PSC, 2019). The AU is engaged in many African societies and tries to interfere above all by supporting grass-root movements and community leaders. Its peace policy starts with collection of information and brainstorming with local leaders, before the AU opens the possibility of using diverse (or military) means. “To this end, the Council underlined the importance of popularizing the work of the AU particularly as it relates to the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Continent” (AU PSC, 2019c). The PSC organizes therefore campaigns to celebrate the anniversary of human rights, asks member states to implement the Africa Amnesty Month (every November), and support

awareness promoting initiatives like the Africa Refugee Day. The relation between the AU and African states is very dynamic. The PSC don't want to infringe state's sovereignty and feeling of autonomy, and interferes in civil societies and bottom-up peace progressions. The AU utilizes its soft power to increase influence on the development of African states and national peace policy. To avoid that states undermine and resist the AU peace efforts.

Despite the supportive rhetoric of states, the AU stays dependent on the material contribution of states. A repeating complaint is the lack of support and political will of states to construct the APSA, and to capacitate the PSC. Examples are the declarations on military (supportive) interventions in Mali (AFISMA) and Somalia (AMISOM). The PSC urges “to generously contribute, in a spirit of Pan-African solidarity and shared responsibility, financial, logistical and other in-kind support to AFISMA and the MDSF” (AU Assembly, 2013b). The text of the AU Assembly Decision on the PSC (2009) evidences how the role of member states in military interventions stayed problematic:

*“URGES AU Member States to provide the necessary military and police personnel to enable AMISOM to reach its authorized strength, PAYS TRIBUTE to AMISOM and the Troop Contributing Countries, namely: Burundi and Uganda; REQUESTS Member States which have promised to provide troops for AMISOM to honour these promises as soon as possible and EXPRESSES GRATITUDE to all the Member States and partners providing support to AMISOM.”*

The PSC acknowledges that lack of deployable troops is not only a matter of willingness. Military capacity and skilled troops demands high financial investments of members states (AU PSC, 2019c). The AU advocates the enlargement of this budget, and change of defence policy of member states – it emphasizes the mutual influence between this IO and states. Again: the AU's role-conception is not being a talking house or facilitating civil society organisations only, but to be a potential military power. However, the lack of support of member states shaped the AU's role-conception. It nevertheless wants to achieve its objective being Africa's primary peace actor.

#### 4.5. Regional Mechanisms and subsidiarity

The role-conception of the AU develops by a process of socialization in political and social environments. The AU's role-expansion and the influence it wants to have on local communities is in contrast with the image of an overarching, continental body. PSC

declarations and decisions approach African societies as sources of conflicts, and being partner in solutions. The AU strives for a “people centred Union” (AU Retreat, 2018) which implies subsidiarity. The impact of regional mechanisms in searching for regional initiatives and ownership is of growing significance.

The complementary position and principle of subsidiarity of the PSC is mentioned often in recent PSC papers (e.g. AU Retreat, 2012). States demand from the PSC a coordinating role, making use of regional organisations. These regional economic communities and regional mechanisms are familiar to states and the PSC, and got experienced in peace interferences in recent years. The PSC considers them as partners in the Pan-African ideal, and takes advantage of their local position for execution of AU peace policy. The PSC requires from the REC and RM's a same comprehensive position in stabilization efforts; with a focus on African ownership, partnership with non-state actors, inclusive solutions, promotion of good governance and gender main streaming (AU PSC, 2018). The AU as collective of African states in peace activities cannot deny the smaller peace actors that are less complex and trusted by states. Regional organisations are promising instruments or executing powers of AU's comprehensive agenda, but has consequences for the role development of the AU.

#### 4.6. Conclusion

The central question in this chapter is how the role-conception of the AU as peace actor developed, and how it can be best defined. At first, the AU was founded by African state leaders. Their references to Pan-African ideals can be interpreted as invention of tradition, creating a non-existing collective. However, since then the AU is surrounded by Africanism, collective feelings and ambition. The founding acts of the AU and PSC do not provide a fixed role-conception of the AU as peace actor, besides some references to the urgency of joint efforts.

The expanding AU unveils how the role of AU's role as Africa's primary peace actor evolved. The AU did not develop towards a hard power, utilizing its legitimacy and military instruments to intervene in states and restore peace. The AU prioritized non-military instruments and policy to implement and promote good governance and peace. It adopted a soft power approach on managing conflicts, with renewed attention for prevention, non-state actors and local initiatives. It could be argued that this evidences the dominance of state sovereignty, and the inability of the AU to overrule state interests. However, the AU did

constitute institutions that are mandated to intervene rapidly, and the PSC deployed several military missions too. The AU did not lose its military potential. Approaching the AU as just civil power, denies the efforts of the AU to strengthen defence capabilities of states and the decision-making regarding (hybrid) interventions. The comprehensive approach of AU policy proves that international relations and the effectiveness of peace building activities include non-material variables and non-state actors.

The implication of being Africa's first peace actor can be best explained in three principles. The AU unites African voice in international politics, and tries to enlarge trust in African peace attempts and promote international support. Secondly, it wants to enable African actors to stay owner of their conflicts. States, civil societies and regional organisations need to take responsibility in achieving sustainable development. The AU's ambition to be the Africa's primary peace actor does not imply that the continental organisation could not delegate its role; RECs become partners. Lastly, African non-state actors became more important to respond on and prevent conflicts. Prevention policy was not on the agenda in 2002, but cannot be ignored anymore in 2019.

## 5. Role theory approach in AU-studies

The AU developed its own role-conception, despite (or thanks to) the environment of state actors, international partners and civil societal organisations. The AU interfered in Africa's conflicts, and became an important player in promoting peace and stability. It is helpful to analyse this IO with an holistic approach, not only based on actual success in peace operations, or the direct influence of member states. The AU created powerful institutions authorized to operate, and built a network of non-state actors. At the other hand, despite the growing independent role of the AU, it still needs to deal with external and internal others. Role theory contributes to this by conceptualising all these factors.

The role-conception of the AU can be best subscribed as comprehensive peace power, but it cannot always act according to this role. It challenges scholars to approach this ambivalent performance. The role-performance of the AU as peace-actor is result of material and non-material interests of many stakeholders. A theoretical framework needs to include the ambition and ideas of unity, and material impact of other actors. For this reason role theory is introduced in AU-studies here. As said before, this thesis focusses on how AU's role-conception is influenced by many variables. The elaboration of other concepts, for example how role-conception shapes the role-contestation of member states, requires more research.

### 5.1. Conceptual framework of role theory in AU-studies

Figure 2 displays the adapted conceptual framework for role-theory in AU-studies. The framework displays the dynamic AU, and the involved actors that influence the self-conception (central positioned in the framework), and the actual performance. Additionally, the concept of *role-realization* to role-contestations, as two sides of the same coin. Role-performance is put at the bottom of the framework – emphasizing that this performance is what politicians, African people and scholars mainly perceive.

#### 5.1.1. Role-conception of the AU

The main element in role theory is the self-image of the international actor. This *role-conception* is rooted in history, culture and recent memory. In chapter 4 is argued from the content analyses that this self-conception exists for the AU. Even more: there is a growing

awareness of being Africa’s primary actor. This role-conception develops and becomes more clear, but is dynamic.




Figure 2: Conceptual framework role theory for AU-studies

The AU's aspiration is to be the primary African peace actor. This conception is not simply defined in the CA, but the Union needs to constitute its role within the context of ideals and interests of states. It resulted in a diffuse character: at one side it performs as normative power promoting fair governance. Peace and security cannot be achieved without maintenance of basic principles of good governance. The AU influences state's politics (sometimes indirectly) by monitoring elections and supporting grass root movements. It moved away from only managing (post-)conflicts, and adopted a comprehensive policy to meet the objectives of the AU as primary peace actor. Its programs focus on reconciliation, mediation and emancipation of marginalized people; to prevent further outbreaks of violence. This non-military role-conception can be understood as result of expectations from international partners, and contestation by continental states and institutions. However, the AU is not just a soft or civil power. It responds on conflicts with military interventions too, and other actors expect the PSC to employ this hard instruments. Overall, the AU's role-conception can be best subscribed as comprehensive power, which is caused by political and social contexts.

This role-conception of the AU encounters the realist approach; this IO shaped its own autonomous existence. The role-conception is not limited to what state actors allow the AU to



be. The process of socialization affects the IO, but also African states and institutions. The AU has clear influence on African states and societies too – this interaction causes a parallel development of state actors and the international actor. The role of the AU is not static and clear defined, but despite this ambiguity (caused by context and involved actors) it does not result in the AU being a powerless, (state-)dependent peace actor. This framework enables scholars to acknowledge the real impact of states, while the impact of non-material incentives and non-state actors is not disregarded.

### 5.1.2 Vertical role-contestation

The role-conception of the AU is contested by others. The AU cannot organise and feature its own peace power. It has been - and will always be contested by states and AU's institutions, causing a mutual development of roles and conceptions. At one hand this contestation undermines the effectiveness of the AU as primary peace actor, but it creates new compromises on the identity and mandate of the Union. It could be argued that the comprehensiveness of AU's peace policy is caused by this process. In many cases the AU needed other routes than persuading and coercing member states with military power. Lack of resources and willingness of states in peace operations necessarily resulted in new endeavours to reach the objectives of the AU.

The vertical contestation, which refers to the resistance by states, dominates AU-studies. Indeed, AU-decisions emphasize the sovereignty of states, and the position of African leaders matter: the AU cannot overrule states. Even more, although member states agreed on AU's mandate and objectives, not all agreements are ratified yet. The behaviour of African states disadvantage the success of the AU, but most AU-scholars pay no attention to the ability of the AU as IO to respond on (changing) circumstances. Other actors influence the role of the AU as peace actor, but the PSC will try to perform with respect to these contestations. It is evidenced in this thesis that African states, despite the contestation, did not hold back the expansion of the AU as Africa's primary peace actor, notwithstanding their effect on the role-development.

The contestation and influence is a mutual process: AU's role-conception changes the position and resistance of states. It does not use military or hard power to withstand African problems, nor coercion to member states to change peace and security policy. However, it utilizes (soft) means to promote good governance, social inclusiveness and rule of law. In this

process African states do not only shape the role of the AU, but became themselves part of the AU narrative.

### 5.1.3. Role-contestation and realization

Another contribution of role theory is the awareness of the position of the IO's own institutions. The AU became an international body with many institutions. They have their own objectives, bureaucracy and charismatic leaders, which may result in a critical role-perception. This thesis examined how AU institutions, in particular the PoW and the growing network around it, were decisive in the development of PSC-policy towards prevention, instead of only post-conflict management. The impact of internal organisations is considerable: they stay close to the decisionmakers, and are involved in early stages of peace and security policy and agenda-setting. A new concept is therefore added to the conceptual framework: *role-realization*. The role-conception is not only influenced by impossibilities and contestations, but even more by opportunities that were created by willing others. States, AU-institutions and regional organisations, stimulated the development of the role-conception. The feeling of Africanism and ownership was introduced by state leaders, and contributed to the realization of AU's role-conception. It could not have developed towards its comprehensive role-conception without the impact of the PoW. Additionally, in recent years the AU utilizes the REC's and RM's to perform as peace actor. Subsidiarity and complementarity became new principles in the role-conception of the AU.

### 5.1.4. Role-expectations

The existence of the AU is explained earlier in the context of a changing global order. The UN expected from states to look after their own neighbourhoods. The AU is an African answer on international expectations to promote sustainable peace and stability. The PSC-activities showed great effort, and proved that the African collective is capable to build unity and participate in continental security debates. The AU is a promising and (according to many scholars) a potential powerful peace actor, although it cannot pay the high costs of intense peace keeping. The PSC realizes the importance of international partners. The financial contributions of international partners (EU, USA and UN) are substantial, and will stay high in the future. The impact of international expectations is obvious and significant. Not at least in

the AU's role-development towards prevention and civil society based programs as inexpensive measures, demonstrating a normative and non-violent policy.

#### 5.1.5 Role-enactment and role-performance

The performance of the AU as peace actor is no straightforward translation of the role-conception. The AU will make great efforts to act according its role-conception, and to behave according shared ideals and ambitions. However, the context of a specific peace issues matters. Location, stakeholders and time are some variables that create the role-enactment.

The role-performance is the real outcome of peace policy. It is what most scholars, journalists and politicians observe to conclude on the success of the AU as peace actor. Role theory widens this scope, and incorporates the process behind the performance. Figure 2 illustrates clearly how even this performance is result of at least three sorts of influences. Firstly, the effectiveness of interferences (in particular military missions) relies on UN-support. More and more missions are hybrid interventions, necessarily supported and financed by western partners. Secondly, the actual performance depends on the support and resources of member states and AU bodies. This relation is subject of many researches, questioning to what extent the AU performance is based on state interests. A third variable is the specific context that makes how the AU's role-conception is translated into real practise. States, AU institutions and international organisations shape the AU's role-conception as primary peace actor, but constrain or enable the performance as well.

#### 5.1.6 Feedback loop

A relevant contribution of role theory is the stimulus of experience and learning on all involved actors. The AU's role-conception is evolving, but other actors develop also their behaviour and stance. The content analysis in chapter 4 showed that the AU emphasizes good results of cooperation in peace activities. The AU is very aware of the importance of positive experiences of states in AU's peace efforts to increase support. Further, the learning path enables scholars to interpret case studies as a single shot in a time-lapse. AU's peace policy is result of an ongoing dynamic learning process.

## 5.2 Relevance of role theory approach in AU-studies

Role theory helps AU-scholars to map the positions of all stakeholders and processes, and to incorporate material and non-material incentives. This IR approach is utilized to answer the question why international actors behave how they do, and why the performance is sometimes ambiguous. It provides insight in the dynamic, which is ignored in many state-centred approaches, and gives instruments to approach the AU comprehensively.

This research is a serious attempt to overcome the noticed gap in chapter 3. It moves away from interpreting the AU on based on state interests (AU as sum of states). It are not only material motivations that shape international politics, nor can the AU be understood by analysing how it succeeds in performances. Although it is a relevant question, the appearances in actual peace operations are no easy translation of ambitions. The role-conception of the AU is evolving, and many actors form the social and political environment in which the AU seeks to develop its actorness. Studying how others shape the role of the AU on a longer term, would contribute to have a better understanding of this peace actor.

## 6. Conclusion

The African Union entered the scene in 2002 as primary peace actor for Africa's numerous conflicts. It's a promising development of African ownership and responsibility, and is accompanied with a self-aware role-conception. The ambition is to provide an African solution for African problems, and to guide the continent towards a peaceful and prosperous future. However, the role-conception is more complex, and developed over the years.

AU-scholars trouble with understanding and researching the complexity of the AU. In general, international organisations are dynamic bodies (due to many involved actors and diverse partners) that are not able to perform in accordance to their own aspirations. Traditional approaches, like realism, cannot provide a theoretical framework that covers this complexity, and overestimate the role of states as one-direction influences. State interests played a role, but enabled also the AU to create its own role-conception. The current role-conception of the AU can hardly be found in the CA or in the early official papers, but developed over the years by experience, context and socialization.

Secondly, the AU is more than the sum or consensus of member states' interests. Ideas, socialization and ambitions of the AU as peace actors cannot be ignored. Although *African Renaissance* and Pan-Africanism do not provide a blueprint for the AU, it can raise an IO. African leaders utilized this Pan-African feeling to create the AU as continental peace actor, and raise awareness of African ownership (which became the basis if the role-conception). Even more: the AU-narrative aims human security more than state security, which opens the possibility to create a parallel network of African civil leaders, besides the political leaders. Although African ideals did not define the AU's role-conception, it provided in a narrative to develop civil peace policy.

The current AU can be best described as comprehensive power. The turn towards this holistic approach of peace building, can be explained and understood by role theory approach. In this framework IOs are seen as dynamic, evolving organisations that are learning by experience, and are continuously affected by other actor's expectations and contestations. While other theoretical frameworks focus on the performance, and the contribution (or lack of) by member states and conclude that the AU is still powerless, role theory approach enables to investigate the process of mutual influences that are underlying this outcome. The AU unites diverse forms of power that are all employed (context matters); it's normative in stressing the

importance of establishing good governance and human rights; it is a military power, with legal law, institutions and capacity to intervene in African states; it developed towards a civil power by creating a network of civil organisations and policy aiming empowering African societies. These set of means are all used, even in single operations. This diverse role-conception can be best subscribed as comprehensive. The Union invested in prevention programs, and acknowledges that sustainable peace and security demand support and development of state, and non-state stakeholders.

Role theory approach delivers a helpful framework to investigate how the AU as IO develops its role-conception, and how other actors might constrain and enable this role as peace actor. The AU is a unique continental organisation, and all African states are member. These states have influence on the self-conception and potential of the AU, and are united in regional (peace) mechanisms either. States, regional organisations and AU-institutions enabled the AU to shape its role as comprehensive power. In order to emphasize this role-realization, some adaptations are made in the conceptual framework. Role theory approach challenges scholars to re-elaborate the impact of the AU on member states, how states developed by experience and interaction with AU-bodies.

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## 8. Appendix

### 8.1. Founding acts, protocols etc.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Category and url</i>
11/07/2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union - <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf</a>
09/07/2002	Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union - <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf</a>
30/01/2007	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance - <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/african-charter-on-democracy-and-governance.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/african-charter-on-democracy-and-governance.pdf</a>
01/12/2015	APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 - <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf</a>

### 8.2. Decisions and declarations

<i>Date</i>	<i>Category and url</i>
26/10/2018	Declaration – 9th AU Retreat on promotion Peace, Security and Stability <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2018-1026-au-hlr-9-declaration-latest.pdf">www.peaceau.org/uploads/2018-1026-au-hlr-9-declaration-latest.pdf</a>
29/01/2018	Decision – on Roadmap for silencing the guns in 2020 <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/decision-678-eng.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/decision-678-eng.pdf</a>
29/01/2018	Decision – on report PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/decisions-psc-report-january-2018-1.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/decisions-psc-report-january-2018-1.pdf</a>
21/12/2017	Statement – of the Chair of the AU Commission on Revitalization in S-Sudan <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/statement-on-south-sudan-21-12-2017.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/statement-on-south-sudan-21-12-2017.pdf</a>
25/10/2017	Declaration – N'djamena on Emerging Global Order, Multilateralism and Africa <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/draft-declaration-rev-25-10-17-1.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/draft-declaration-rev-25-10-17-1.pdf</a>
09/11/2016	Declaration – African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (Summit) <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/acirc-summit-declaration-09-nov-16-final-eng.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/acirc-summit-declaration-09-nov-16-final-eng.pdf</a>
26/10/2016	Declaration – Mediation Practices and Contemporary Wars <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-2016-au-hl-retreat.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-2016-au-hl-retreat.pdf</a>
09/11/2015	Declaration – Windhoek / Silencing the Guns – Terrorism, Mediation and Arm <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-mediation-retreat-windhoek-declaration-22-10-2015.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-mediation-retreat-windhoek-declaration-22-10-2015.pdf</a>
14/10/2015	Decision – of the joint political security mechanism <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/decisions-of-the-joint-political-security-mechanism.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/decisions-of-the-joint-political-security-mechanism.pdf</a>

18/12/2014	Declaration – 1st Summit countries participating in Nouakchott process <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc.declarations.18.12.2014.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc.declarations.18.12.2014.pdf</a>
25/06/2014	Declaration – 10th Anniversary of PSC of the AU <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/444th-psc-declaration-e-2-.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/444th-psc-declaration-e-2-.pdf</a>
08/03/2013	Decision – Implementation Modalities for Security Arrangements Sudan <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/sudan-south-sudan-implementation-modalities-for-security-080313.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/sudan-south-sudan-implementation-modalities-for-security-080313.pdf</a>
28/01/2013	Declaration – on the Situation in Mali <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au.ahg.solemn-declaration.mali.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au.ahg.solemn-declaration.mali.pdf</a>
28/01/2013	Decision – Report of PSC and state of peace in Africa <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assemblyau-dec-472-xx-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assemblyau-dec-472-xx-e.pdf</a>
06/11/2012	Declaration – 3rd AU High-Level Retreat <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc.declaration.cairo.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc.declaration.cairo.pdf</a> 18/07/2012 Declaration – 19th Ordinary Session of Assembly of States on P&S in Africa <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-decl-mali-16-07-2012-eng.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-decl-mali-16-07-2012-eng.pdf</a>
16/07/2012	Decision – Report of PSC on its Activities <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-432-xix-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-432-xix-e.pdf</a>
16/07/2012	Decision – African Solidarity Initiative for Support PCRD <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-425-xix-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-425-xix-e.pdf</a>
13/07/2012	Decision – on election of Judges of the African Court on HR <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-dec-719-xxi-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-dec-719-xxi-e.pdf</a>
30/01/2012	Decision – Report of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-408-xviii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-408-xviii-e.pdf</a>
30/01/2012	Decision – on NEPAD <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-413-xviii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-413-xviii-e.pdf</a>
01/07/2011	Decision – Report of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-369-xvii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-369-xvii-e.pdf</a>
27/07/2010	Decision – Report of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-294-xv-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-294-xv-e.pdf</a>
03/07/2009	Decision – Report of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-252-xiii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-252-xiii-e.pdf</a>
03/07/2009	Decision – Report of PoW <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-254-xiii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-254-xiii-e.pdf</a>
01/07/2008	Decision – Report of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-193-xi-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-193-xi-e.pdf</a>
02/02/2008	Decision – Activities of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-177-x-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-177-x-e.pdf</a>
06/01/2008	Declaration – Brainstorming Retreat between AU and Regional Mech. For Prev. <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/algiers-declaration-jan-2008-en.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/algiers-declaration-jan-2008-en.pdf</a>
30/01/2007	Decision – Activities of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-145-viii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-145-viii-e.pdf</a>
26/01/2007	Decision – on outcome of Meeting Governmental Experts Early Prevention <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-dec-336-x-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-dec-336-x-e.pdf</a>
02/07/2006	Declaration – on situation in Somalia <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-decl-2-vii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-decl-2-vii-e.pdf</a>
02/07/2006	Decision – on Activities of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-120-vii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-120-vii-e.pdf</a>



29/06/2006	Decision – on AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-dec-302-ix-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-dec-302-ix-e.pdf</a>
24/01/2006	Declaration – on Activities of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-decl-3-vi-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-decl-3-vi-e.pdf</a>
02/07/2005	Decision – Report of Chair of Commission on Conflict Situations in Africa <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-dec-225-vii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ex-cl-dec-225-vii-e.pdf</a>
31/01/2005	Decision – on the Situation in Darfur <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-68-iv-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-68-iv-e.pdf</a>
31/05/2005	Decision – Draft Non-aggression and common defense <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-71-iv-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-71-iv-e.pdf</a>
08/07/2004	Decision – Operationalization of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-34-iii-e.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-34-iii-e.pdf</a>

### 8.3. Statements and press releases

<b>Date</b>	<b>Category and url</b>
10/02/2019	Communique – PSC 826th meeting on the situation in the CAR <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.826.meeting.comm.car.9.02.2019.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.826.meeting.comm.car.9.02.2019.pdf</a>
05/02/2019	Statement – of the Chairperson of the Commission on the CAR <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-dec-car-2-05-2019.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-dec-car-2-05-2019.pdf</a>
05/02/2019	Communique – PSC 824th meeting Open Session about Silencing the Guns <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.824.press.statement.silencing.the.guns.5.02.2019.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.824.press.statement.silencing.the.guns.5.02.2019.pdf</a>
09/01/2019	Communique – PSC 821th meeting on the attempted coup d'état in Gabon <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.821.press.statement.gabon.09.01.2019.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.821.press.statement.gabon.09.01.2019.pdf</a>
18/12/2018	Press Release – AU Consultative Dialogue <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-release-au-consultative-dialogue-on-rol-ssr-transitional-justice-and-governance.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-release-au-consultative-dialogue-on-rol-ssr-transitional-justice-and-governance.pdf</a>
17/12/2018	Press Statement – PSC 818th meeting International Regional Initiatives Sahel <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.818.press.statement.mali.sahel.17.12.2018.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.818.press.statement.mali.sahel.17.12.2018.pdf</a>
14/12/2018	Press Release – 6th High-Level Seminar on P&C in Africa <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pr-6th-high-level-seminar-on-peace-and-security-in-africa-12-14-2018-eng-.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pr-6th-high-level-seminar-on-peace-and-security-in-africa-12-14-2018-eng-.pdf</a>
11/12/2018	Communique – PSC 817th meeting Somalia (AMISOM) <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.817.comm.somalia.11.12.2018.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.817.comm.somalia.11.12.2018.pdf</a>
03/12/2018	Press Statement – PSC 814th meeting UN/regional actors/states <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.814.press.statement.sustainable.financing.3.12.2018.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.814.press.statement.sustainable.financing.3.12.2018.pdf</a>
19/09/2018	Statement – of the Chairperson on the attacks against Ethiopian civilians <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-statement-on-ethiopia-english-9-19-2018-.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-statement-on-ethiopia-english-9-19-2018-.pdf</a>

19/09/2018	Communique – PSC 794th meeting Burundi <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.794.comm.burundi.19.09.2018.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.794.comm.burundi.19.09.2018.pdf</a>
10/09/2018	Press Release – AU hosts workshops for Civil Society Organisations <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-assn-ssgm-workshop-press-release-4-.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-assn-ssgm-workshop-press-release-4-.pdf</a>
22/08/2018	Communique – PSC 791th meeting <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.791.press.statement.africa.charter.on.democracy.22.08.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.791.press.statement.africa.charter.on.democracy.22.08.pdf</a>
29/07/2018	Press Release – Conclusion PSC Two-day Field Mission Guinea Bissau <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/aupsc-guinea-bissau-field-mission-28-july-2018-eng.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/aupsc-guinea-bissau-field-mission-28-july-2018-eng.pdf</a>
20/06/2019	Statement – of the Chairperson on World Refugee Day <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/statement-auc-refugee-day-20-june-2018.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/statement-auc-refugee-day-20-june-2018.pdf</a>
13/06/2019	Statement – of the Chairperson on the Summit between DPRK and USA <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/statement-of-the-chairperson-of-the-commission-of-the-african-union-on-the-summit-between-the-democratic-people-aos-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states-of-america.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/statement-of-the-chairperson-of-the-commission-of-the-african-union-on-the-summit-between-the-democratic-people-aos-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states-of-america.pdf</a>
01/06/2018	Press Statement – African Border Day <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.777.press.statement.delimitation.of.borders.01.06.2018.pf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.777.press.statement.delimitation.of.borders.01.06.2018.pf</a>
24/04/2018	Press Statement – PSC 766th meeting on Security Landscape Africa <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc2.766.press.statement.open.session-on-africa-s-peace-and-security-landscape.24.04.2018.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc2.766.press.statement.open.session-on-africa-s-peace-and-security-landscape.24.04.2018.pdf</a>
19/04/2018	Press Release – Conclusion PSC 5Day Field Mission South Sudan <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-psc-pr-field-mission-to-south-sudan-4-19-2018.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-psc-pr-field-mission-to-south-sudan-4-19-2018.pdf</a>
15/03/2018	Press Release – AU Congratulates Sierra Leone for peaceful elections <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-chairperson-statement-after-general-election-in-sierra-leone.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-chairperson-statement-after-general-election-in-sierra-leone.pdf</a>
27/02/2018	Communique – PSC 749th meeting Comprehensive Approach <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.summit.749.com.ahg.terrorism.27.01.2018.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.summit.749.com.ahg.terrorism.27.01.2018.pdf</a>
31/12/2017	Press Release – New Year Message Chairperson <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2018-new-year-message.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2018-new-year-message.pdf</a>
19/12/2017	Communique – PSC 739th Meeting Mandate AMISOM <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-741-com-somalia-19-12-2017.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-741-com-somalia-19-12-2017.pdf</a>
10/12/2017	Statement – launch of Campaign 70th Anniversary HR <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/70th-anniv-udhr-eng.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/70th-anniv-udhr-eng.pdf</a>
21/11/2017	Statement – on the situation in Zimbabwe (Mugabe) <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-statement-zimbabwe-21nov2017english.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-statement-zimbabwe-21nov2017english.pdf</a>
14/11/2017	Press Statement – PSC 734th Meeting <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.734.press.statement.situation.in.guinea.bissau.14.11.2017.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.734.press.statement.situation.in.guinea.bissau.14.11.2017.pdf</a>
03/11/2017	Press Release – Workshop Civil Society <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-release-cso-meeting-2017.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-release-cso-meeting-2017.pdf</a>

01/11/2017	Press Release – EM <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-pr-harare-31-10-2017.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-pr-harare-31-10-2017.pdf</a>
31/10/2017	Communique – PSC 728th Meeting – role women in conflict prevention <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.728.womeninpreventingand-counteractingviolentextremism.31.10.2017.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.728.womeninpreventingand-counteractingviolentextremism.31.10.2017.pdf</a>
20/10/2017	Communique – PSC 726th Meeting about Peace and Reconciliation <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.726.psc.press.statement.justice.peace.and.reconciliation.africa.20.10.2017.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.726.psc.press.statement.justice.peace.and.reconciliation.africa.20.10.2017.pdf</a>
24/12/2008	Communique – PSC 165 Guinea <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng.pdf</a>
22/12/2008	Communique – PSC 163 Somalia <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquestomaliaeng.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquestomaliaeng.pdf</a>
08/08/2008	Press Statement PSC 146 Somalia <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/presstatementsomalia.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/presstatementsomalia.pdf</a>
29/06/2008	Communique – PSC 138 Conflict <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pscpostconflicten.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pscpostconflicten.pdf</a>
14/05/2008	Press Statement – PSC 126 Rapid Response <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/presstatementasfeng.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/presstatementasfeng.pdf</a>
23/10/2007	Press Statement – Hybrid Operation Darfur (UNAMID) <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/presstatementunamideng.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/presstatementunamideng.pdf</a>
08/08/2007	Communique – PSC 85 on functioning of PSC <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqy-eng-85th.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqy-eng-85th.pdf</a>
19/01/2007	Communique - PSC 69 AMISOM <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-69th.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-69th.pdf</a>
20/09/2006	Communique – PSC 62 Mission Somalia <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquestomaliaeng-62nd.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquestomaliaeng-62nd.pdf</a>
13/04/2006	Communique – PSC 49 Situation in Chad <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-49th.pdf">http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-49th.pdf</a>