LESSONS IN UNLEARNING

Philosophy and Poetry in Wittgenstein and Pessoa

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis was born out of an intuition. I had just read quite a bit of Wittgenstein when I was leafing through a collection of poems (*In ons leven tallozen*) by Fernando Pessoa, beautifully translated into Dutch by August Willemsen. While reading Alberto Caeiro's poem "There's Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about Anything", for a moment I had the impression I was still reading Wittgenstein.[1] Especially the second and third verses, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 2, struck me as being utterly Wittgensteinian in nature:

[…]
What do I make of things?
What is my opinion of causes and effects?
What have I meditated in regards to God and the soul
And about the creation of the world?

I don't know. For me, thinking about it is closing my eyes
And not think. Drawing the shades
Of my window (that has no shades).[2]
[…]

For Caeiro, asking such abstract questions equates drawing the shades of a window that has none. With Wittgenstein, we often encounter a similar idea: asking the wrong question leads to seeing problems where there are not any. What Caeiro and Wittgenstein both hint at, is that language not only enables understanding, but can also impede it, by blurring that which "is always before one's eyes" (Wittgenstein 2009: 56). One of Caeiro's collections of poems, *The*

[1] Besides publishing little during his lifetime, most works belonging to the Pessoan corpus have to be attributed to one of Pessoa's heteronyms, such as Ricardo Reis, Bernardo Soares and Alberto Caeiro. What sets heteronyms apart from pseudonyms, is that both the content and style of the writing differ from one heteronym to another. Since heteronymity plays such a fundamental role within the Pessoan corpus, I will discuss it in more detail in chapter 2.

[2] For the English translation of Caeiro's poems, I have used a translation by Nuno Hipólito, available at http://www.umfernandopessoa.com/uploads/1/6/1/3/16136746/gr_eng.pdf (Accessed 31 May 2018). Where there were spelling errors, I have corrected them. For the original Portuguese ones, see https://www.luso-livros.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Poemas-de-Alberto-Caeiro.pdf (Accessed 30 Jun. 2018). (Que idéia tenho eu das cousas?/ Que opinião tenho sobre as causas e os efeitos?/ Que tenho eu meditado sobre Deus e a alma/ E sobre a criação do Mundo?, Não sei. Para mim pensar nisso é fechar os olhos/ E não pensar. É correr as cortinas/ Da minha janela (mas ela não tem cortinas).

Keeper of Sheep (*O Guardador de Rebanhos*), is full of admonishments to 'see through' vague concepts and to open our eyes. Given this striking similarity in their criticism of abstract questions and the way they impede us from seeing the world aright, I decided that I wanted to attempt to do a Wittgensteinian reading of Pessoa. Before doing so, however, I immediately had to make some important conceptual choices. Both Wittgenstein and Pessoa are notoriously hard to pin down and one has to be particularly careful when making generalizing statements about these authors. While Wittgenstein's output is usually divided into two phases, within Pessoa's heteronymic universe there is no obvious place to start. Or so it seemed, until I stumbled upon a book by Nuno Ribeiro entitled *Philosophical Essays*. In this book, Ribeiro has tried to collect all fragments within the Pessoan corpus that are straightforwardly philosophical. Given that I now had a philosopher with poetic qualities on the one hand, a poet with philosophical gifts on the other *and* an inkling of philosophical affinity between Wittgenstein and Caeiro in between, I decided to give it a go.

The central question of this thesis is the following: *Which are the philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein's poetic philosophy and Pessoa's philosophical poetry?* In the first chapter, I want to firmly establish Wittgenstein as a poetic philosopher. In order to do so, I will zoom in on the poetic imagery he employs. For my argument that Wittgenstein's imagery can indeed be said to be *poetic* in nature, I will employ Shklovsky's famous distinction between poetic and non-poetic imagery. On the basis of this analysis I will show that, from a poetic point of view, there is much greater continuity between the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the one of the *Philosophical Investigations* than is sometimes believed. I will moreover argue that Wittgenstein primarily uses poetic imagery to visualize his propositions and hence render them *visible* to the reader. In Chapter 2, Fernando Pessoa will be the focus of my attention. In order to get a grip on his 'philosophy'[3], I will start by discussing the aforementioned *Philosophical Essays*. However much of interest for analysing questions surrounding Pessoa's authorship, they offer little from a Wittgensteinian point of view. In the second part of this chapter I will therefore turn to Alberto Caeiro, Pessoa's "master"[4]. By close-reading a selection of his poems, I will try to show that they can be productively read from a Wittgensteinian perspective. We will see that for Caeiro, just as for Wittgenstein, seeing the

[3] Given that Pessoa is not usually considered a philosopher, nor that we can speak of a Pessoan philosophical system, we have to be careful in attributing a 'philosophy' to him. Moreover, the different authors within the Pessoan corpus hold different 'philosophies', as we will see in chapter 2.

[4] In a letter dated January 13 1935, Pessoa asserts that Caeiro 'appeared in him' as his master: "aparecera em mim o meu mestre. Foi essa a sensação que tive" (my master appeared in me. That was the sensation I had) (http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3007. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018).

world aright and using the right language are intimately related. Caeiro, however, explicitly denies being a philosopher (or a poet). In order to contextualize the philosophical activity that both Wittgenstein and Caeiro are engaged in, in Chapter 3 I will turn to Søren Kierkegaard. As the latter was greatly admired by Wittgenstein and employed "similar literary procedures" as Pessoa, I believe his concept of the 'subjective thinker' can serve as a model for thinking through the kind of philosophy practised by Wittgenstein and Caeiro (Bellaiche-Zacharie 2009: Abstract).

Although I am aware of the experimental character of this project, I do hope to convince my reader that reading Wittgenstein poetically and interpreting Caeiro from a language philosophical perspective sheds a new light on both. My argument ultimately hinges on the idea that for both Wittgenstein and Caeiro, despite their vastly different 'truths', writing philosophy and poetry are one. If philosophy is above all to convey a certain view of the world, it is the philosopher's task to render his view of the world *visible* to the reader. When Caeiro claims that he is neither a philosopher nor a poet, he distances himself from metaphysical system builders; his philosophical poetry, however, does invite its readers to change the way they understand the world by looking at things differently. Just as Kierkegaard's subjective thinker, however, he does not do so directly, but employs an indirect didactic approach. Instead of telling us what to do, Wittgenstein and Caeiro above all try to teach us how to look. By offering 'true' pictures of the world and dispelling false ones, they aspire to make us see our metaphysical assumptions and mistakes. Even if Wittgenstein and Caeiro do not share the same worldview, they agree on the importance of using the right language for seeing the world aright, whatever world that may be.

CHAPTER 1

A POETIC PHILOSOPHER: LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

When writing about Wittgenstein, one is required to specify *which* Wittgenstein one has in mind. It is still widely contested how the relation between the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the one of the *Philosophical Investigations* should be conceived.[5] What is certain, however, is that both works are characterized by a distinct literary style. While the former's rigidity seems to be illustrative of its logical picture theory of language, the latter's mini-dialogues and thought experiments can be seen as indicative of its espousal of language as a conglomeration of language games. It is nonetheless hard to establish exactly to what extent style and content can be said to coincide in either case.[6] In order to argue for Wittgenstein as a poetic philosopher, I will therefore specifically zoom in on Wittgenstein's *poetic imagery*. While this puts some limits to my argument, I believe it to have three major advantages over a more broadly conceived stylistic analysis. First, an analysis aspiring to give a more or less all-encompassing overview of Wittgenstein's style would lead to all kinds of philosophical discussions that fall outside of the scope of this thesis. Arguing for the unity of style and content of Wittgenstein's work merits a thesis in itself, given the enormous scope of such a project. Second, an analysis of his use of poetic imagery will be seen to suffice to qualify him as a poetic philosopher. Third, it is foremost through his poetic imagery that he puts forward the idea that seeing the world correctly hinges on language. This is also one of the most important affinities between Wittgenstein's philosophy and Caeiro's poetry, as we will see later on.

In *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein writes that "philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry" (Wittgenstein 1984: 483). I want to take this assertion to heart and argue that Wittgenstein's philosophy is of a poetic nature. I contend that by doing so, often overlooked aspects of his works will come to the fore. One of the most striking results of reading Wittgenstein through a poetic lens is that the continuity between the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* and that of the *Investigations* will become very much apparent. In both works, he

[5] In 'Mild Mono-Wittgensteinianism', James Conant expresses the difficulty of defining the character of Wittgenstein's philosophical work as follows: "The first half of the difficulty is to do full justice to the profound discontinuity in Wittgenstein's thinking without neglecting (as those who I will call "standard readers" do) the extent to which it is folded within a fundamental continuity in his philosophy. The second half of the difficulty is to do full justice to the profound continuity in his thinking without minimizing […] the extent to which it is folded within a fundamental discontinuity in his philosophy" (Conant 2007: 31/32).

[6] In "Philosophy as Poetry? Reflection's on Wittgenstein's Style", Edward Kanterian asserts that "Wittgenstein's unusual writing style poses a great challenge to the understanding of his philosophy. It is not even clear how to relate his style to his philosophy, especially as developed after 1929" (Kanterian 2012: 95). He further states that the most widespread approaches to treat Wittgenstein's style are either "to treat his style as a mere personal or cultural idiosyncrasy, or to believe that it makes up the essence of his philosophy" (Kanterian 2012: 95).

conjures up a plethora of idiosyncratic images in order to elucidate his philosophical arguments. In order to get a clear understanding of the fundamental role of poetic imagery for Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy, I will discuss the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the *Investigations* and the notebooks separately. The central question of this chapter is: what is the function of Wittgenstein's poetic imagery?

1.1 THE METAPHORS OF THE *TRACTATUS*

In "Wittgenstein's Language and Beckett: The Limits of Language and the Absurd", Marialena Avgerinou argues that "Wittgenstein's language *on* language indicates that philosophy and literary style are not separate, as the form mirrors the context and content" (Avgerinou 2017: 366). If Avgerinou is right, then we cannot properly discuss the contents of the *Tractatus* without heeding its style. To support this assertion, she writes that "the *Tractatus*, arguing for the impossibility of articulating anything meaningfully except for propositions on the natural sciences, is itself written in the most laconic, scientific way possible" (366). She is certainly not the only one to have remarked on Wittgenstein's sparse prose. In "Philosophy as Poetry? Reflections on Wittgenstein's Style", Edward Kanterian notes that "the [*Tractatus*'s] prose is condensed to a bare minimum, eliminating any redundancy, with many sentences exhibiting the character of definitive oracular pronouncements, ordered by means of intricate numeration" (Kanterian 2012: 96). At first glance this might indeed seem to be the case. Lacking a narrative and subdivided into seven propositions that are again subdivided into a long list of sub propositions, Wittgenstein's treatise offers itself as an attempt to write a logical argument of the most crystalline sort, or simply a full-blown "theory of logic", as Bertrand Russell wrote in his 1922 introduction to the work (Wittgenstein 2018: 8).

Yet, there are more than a few propositions that do not fit this logical picture. In *Wittgenstein's Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary*, Marjorie Perloff, for example, argues that the *Tractatus* could be read just as well as pertaining to the "literature of World War I" (Perloff 2012: 25). According to Perloff, "it was primarily Wittgenstein's war experience that transformed the *Tractatus* from logical, scientific treatise to something quite different – a book closer to the avant-garde poetic fictions of the teens and twenties than to the philosophical work that first brought Wittgenstein to the Cambridge of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore" (25). In order to argue for a more poetic, even 'mystical' Wittgenstein, scholars often allude to propositions such as §6.42, as Perloff herself does too:

> The first thought in setting up an ethical law of the form "thou shalt . . . "is: And what if I do not? But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. This question as to the *consequences* of an action must therefore be irrelevant . . . . There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself (Perloff 2012: 30/Wittgenstein 2018: 107).

While propositions like §6.42 indeed suggest that the *Tractatus* does not fit the mould of a strictly logical work, it is rarely acknowledged that even many of the propositions that purely have to do with Wittgenstein's picture theory of language are not just logical, but also literary, as they are full of poetic imagery.

In his seminal 1917 article "Art as Technique", Viktor Skhlovsky argues that we should distinguish between two kinds of images: poetic and non-poetic. While poetic imagery intends to defamiliarize our perception, non-poetic imagery tends to the economy of expression. In order to explain the difference between the two, Shklovsky gives the following example:

> I want to attract the attention of a young child who is eating bread and butter and getting the butter on her fingers. I call, "Hey, butterfingers!" This is a figure of speech, a clearly prosaic trope. Now a different example. The child is playing with my glasses and drops them. I call, "Hey, butterfingers!" This figure of speech is a poetic trope.

Wittgenstein's imagery seems to be a hybrid between the two. His images serve both to *defamiliarize* us from the way we envisaged the workings of language before and to *familiarize* us with his picture theory of language. Although Wittgenstein thus employs images in order to elucidate his propositions, the overall scope of the *Tractatus* is to alter our perception of language itself, making the defamiliarizing quality of his images dominant. By closely scrutinizing the *Tractatus*'s propositions, I will show that Wittgenstein uses a broad range of imagery to make us 'see' his picture theory of language. This will lead to an altogether different picture of the 'sparse' *Tractatus*: it will show that in order to argue for his picture theory of language, Wittgenstein constantly resorts to metaphors and poetic language. While his picture theory of language seems to relegate poetic language to a second plan, Wittgenstein actually continuously employs poetic language in order to elucidate his logical propositions.[7]

[7] In "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy", Derrida even argues that metaphors are ineradicably part of philosophical discourse. Referring to Aristotle's *Poetics*, Derrida writes that: "The appeal to criteria of clarity and obscurity would be enough to establish […] that this whole philosophical delimitation of metaphor is

Although there certainly cannot be said to have been a lack of scientific interest in the *Tractatus*, surprisingly little has been written on Wittgenstein's use of poetic imagery. One of the few articles that specifically deals with this topic is a 1979 article by Jerry H. Gill called "Wittgenstein and Metaphor". In this article, Gill sets out to analyse Wittgenstein's implicit views on the nature of metaphors, as propounded in *The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, *Investigations* and *On Certainty* (Gill 1979: 272). Regarding the *Tractatus*, Gill writes that "the root metaphor" upon which Wittgenstein bases linguistic meaning in this work is 'logical space' (272). In other words, the whole project of trying to ground linguistic meaning in "the formal, abstract structure of language" rests on a metaphor (272). He then goes on to spell out how we should understand the view of language Wittgenstein develops within the *Tractatus* in the light of this root metaphor. According to Gill, one of the most important consequences of this metaphor is that it carries with it "a visual perspective" (272):

> [*W*]*ithin* the view thereby espoused the relation between reality and thought (as well as language) is said to be one of "picturing". The latter pictures the former. […] Also *as* the view is espoused, the relation between it and the speaker (Wittgenstein), together with the hearer, is a visual one. We are asked to *see* the relation between language and reality in much the same way as we would a vast but finite, perhaps two-dimensional, space populated by points joined by lines, in a grid-like fashion (272)

Following Gill, the metaphor of logical space thus leads to the idea that language has an underlying structure that can be *seen*. Moreover, the explanation of this relation itself should be seen by the reader to be properly understood. He further argues that it is ultimately due to this metaphor of logical space and its correlates that Wittgenstein asserts that we are to "kick the ladder [the *Tractatus*] over after climbing up it" (272). While Wittgenstein needed the metaphor of logical space to espouse his view of language, it is this same logical space that allows "no room for the very metaphorical expressions upon which the view itself is based" (274).

However, in the *Tractatus* itself, metaphorical expressions abound. In order to elucidate his view of language as logical space, Wittgenstein resorts time and again to metaphors and similes. Joachim Schulte asserts that

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already constructed and worked upon by "metaphors" How could a piece of knowledge or a language be clear or obscure *properly speaking*? Now all the concepts which have played a part in the definition of metaphor always have an origin and a force which are themselves "metaphorical" […] (Derrida 1974: 54).

> In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein held that there was a favoured sense sense of "say" in which only a certain empirical, decidably true-or-false, type of statement could legitimately be said to be "said". All other sentences were declared to be nonsense or senseless. Still, at the time of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein thought it was possible to use senseless or nonsensical sentences in more or less indirect ways to convey insights which in his opinion could not be communicated by means of "saying" something; but nonsensical utterances could be used to "show" that which it was impossible to "say" (Schulte 1989: 146).

If Wittgenstein thus employs metaphorical, "nonsensical" language in the *Tractatus*, he does so in order to "show" what cannot be "said". Although this kind of language transcends the boundaries of the meaningful, it can offer insights that cannot be expressed within this domain.[8] His *view* of language as logical space does not lend itself to true-or-false declarations, but needs to be *seen* integrally. The argumentative structure of the *Tractatus* is hence circular, as Wittgenstein himself readily acknowledges: in the very first sentence of its foreword, he writes that "[T]his book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it – or similar thoughts" (Wittgenstein 2018: Preface). To be able to understand the sense *and* the nonsensicality of its propositions, we already need to have thought similar thoughts to those expressed in the *Tractatus*. The nonsensical metaphors of the *Tractatus* are meant to *show* these thoughts to those who have not.[9]

In order to appreciate the great variety of images Wittgenstein conjures up in order to explicate his view of language as logical space, I have compiled a list of all propositions that contain poetic imagery:

> 2.0232 In a manner of speaking, *objects are colourless*.[10]
>
> 2.03 In a state of affairs *objects fit into one another like the links of a chain*.

[8] Schulte notes an interesting similarity here between Wittgenstein's "doctrine of saying and showing" and Davidson's "account of metaphor", as put forward in "What Metaphors Mean" (1978): "Davidson does not call metaphors senseless or nonsensical but he observes that, according to his own conception of literal or primary meaning, most metaphors would have to count as straightforwardly false. A confused philosopher is not a fly: consequently Wittgenstein's statement that he wishes to help the fly out of the fly-bottle is literally false. But in spite of its falsehood it may be possible to use it to intimate or convey something. And that is the typical way metaphor works: That which is being "said" is false, but by saying it in a certain way and in a certain context one may nevertheless succeed in getting something across" (Schulte 1989: 146/147).

[9] In "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor", George Lakoff argues amongst other that ""Metaphor is the main mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract reasoning", and that "Metaphor allows us to understand a relatively abstract or inherently unstructured subject matter in terms of a more concrete, or at least a more highly structured subject matter" (Lakoff 1993: 40/41). Both assertions chime well with the way Wittgenstein uses metaphors to elucidate abstract thought.

[10] For the English translations of these propositions, I have used the Pears/McGuinness translation, available at https://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/tlp.pdf (Accessed 31 May. 2018).

2.1512 It is laid against reality *like a measure*.

4.002 […] Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because *the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body*, but for entirely different purposes. […]

4.014 *A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world.*

They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern.

(*Like the two youths in the fairy-tale, their two horses, and their lilies.* They are all in a certain sense one.)

4.1221 An internal property of a fact can also be called a feature of that fact (*in the sense in which we speak of facial features*, for example.)

4.461 Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.

A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition.

Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.

(*Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another*.)

(For example, *I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.*)

4.463 The truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open to the facts.

(*A proposition, a picture, or a model is, in the negative sense, like a solid body that restricts the freedom of movement of others, and, in the positive sense, like a space bounded by solid substance in which there is room for a body.*) […]

5.633 Where *in* the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?

You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do *not* see the eye.

And nothing *in the visual field* allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.

6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (*He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.*)

7 He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. […][11]

[11] 2.0232 Beiläufig gesprochen: Die Gegenstände sind farblos. 2.03 Im Sachverhalt hängen die Gegenstände ineinander, wie die Glieder einer Kette. 2.1512 Es ist wie ein Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit angelegt. 4.002 Die Sprache verkleidet den Gedanken. Und zwar so, dass man der äußeren Form des Kleides, nicht auf die Form des bekleideten Gedankens schließen kann; weil die äußere Form des Kleides nach ganz anderen Zwecken gebildet ist als danach, die Form des Körpers erkennen zu lassen. 4.014 Die Grammophonplatte, der musikalische Gedanke,

Wittgenstein's images are both idiosyncratic and defamiliarizing. If we look at 4.002 for example, we read that language disguises thought. In order to make us see how it does so, Wittgenstein compares language to the way clothing and the body relate to one another: just as clothes are not intended to reveal the shape of the body, language is not meant to reveal thought. Contrary to the common sense that thought is expressed in language, Wittgenstein thus maintains we have to peel off layers of language to arrive at thought. To make this unorthodox view of the relation between language and thought intelligible, he rephrases it in the poetic image of clothing and the body. The same goes for a proposition such as 4.014. Wanting to convey the depicting relation between language and the world, Wittgenstein compares it to the internal relation of depicting between a gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes and the sound waves. With this poetic image, he encourages us to *visualize* his picture theory of language. By employing ordinary words in these unusual ways, they become defamiliarizing tools for altering the way we perceive language.

As Wittgenstein states in the final proposition (7), the reader of the *Tractatus* ultimately has to transcend this work, so that he will see the world aright. He can only throw away the ladder that is the *Tractatus*, though, if he has understood the sense *and* the nonsensicality of its propositions. His poetic imagery help to make both understood by illuminating both the sense of his singular propositions and the overall nonsensicality of the work (the ladder eventually needs to be thrown away). It is thus by no means the case that Wittgenstein shuns poetic language. Quite the contrary: he continuously employs poetic language to clarify his philosophical propositions. Instead of a work written in the most philosophically condensed way possible, a different picture of the *Tractatus* emerges: rather than having to dispense with

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die Notenschrift, die Schallenwellen, stehen alle in jener abbildenden internen Beziehung zu einander, die zwischen Sprache und Welt besteht. Ihnen allen ist der logische Bau gemeinsam. (Wie im Märchen die zwei Jünglinge, ihre zwei Pferde und ihre Lilien. Sie sind alle in gewissem Sinne Eins.). 4.1221 Eine interne Eigenschaft einer Tatsache können wir auch einen Zug dieser Tatsache nennen. (In dem Sinn, in welchem wir etwa van Gesichtszügen sprechen). 4.461 (Der Satz zeigt was er sagt, die Tautologie und die Kontradiktion, dass sie nichts sagen. Die Tautologie hat keine Wahrheitsbedingen, denn sie ist bedingungslos wahr; und die Kontradiktion ist unter keiner Bedingung wahr. Tautologie und Kontradiktion sind sinnlos. (Wie der Punkt, von dem zwei Pfeile in entgegengesetzter Richtung auseinandergehen.) (Ich weiß z. B. nichts über das Wetter, wenn ich weiß, dass es regnet oder nicht regnet.) 4.463 Die Wahrheitsbedingungen bestimmen den Spielraum, der den Tatsachen durch den Satz gelassen wird. (Der Satz, das Bild, das Modell, sind im negativen Sinne wie ein fester Körper, der die Bewegungsfreiheit der anderen beschränkt; im positiven Sinne, wie der von fester Substanz begrenzte Raum, worin ein Körper Platz hat.) […] 5.123 Wenn ein Gott eine Welt erschafft, worin gewisse Sätze wahr sind, so schafft er damit auch schon eine Welt, in welcher alle ihre Folgesätze stimmen. Und ähnlich könnte er keine Welt schaffen, worin der Satz *„p"* wahr ist, ohne seine sämtlichen Gegenstände zu schaffen. 5.633 Wo in der Welt ist ein metaphysisches Subjekt zu merken? Du sagst, es verhält sich hier ganz wie mit Auge und Gesichtsfeld. Aber das Auge siehst du wirklich nicht. Und nichts am Gesichtsfeld lässt darauf schließen, dass es von einem Auge gesehen wird. 6.54 Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie – auf ihnen – über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muss sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) 7 Er muss diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig (Wittgenstein 2018: https://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/tlp.pdf. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018).

it, it constantly needs poetic imagery to elucidate philosophical propositions. Again, as was the case with the root metaphor of logical space, metaphors and similes serve to make the reader s*ee* the proposition and hence *see* the world aright. As Wittgenstein writes himself in §3.1431:

> The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
>
> Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.[12]

Although the propositions having to do with seeing are the most numerous, Wittgenstein's allusions to sensory sensations are not limited to the visual. In various places, he even talks about the way propositions *feel*:

> 2.151 *That* is how a picture is attached to reality; *it reaches right out* to it.
>
> 2.1515 These correlations are, as it were, *the feelers of the picture's elements*, with which the picture touches reality.
>
> 4.411 It immediately strikes one as probable that the introduction of elementary propositions provides the basis for understanding all other kinds of proposition. Indeed, the understanding of general propositions *palpably* depends on the understanding of elementary propositions.[13]

Considering the sheer quantity of poetic imagery Wittgenstein employs in the *Tractatus* and the vital role it plays in rendering its propositions perceptible, we can only conclude that Avgerinou's assertion that the *Tractatus* is written in "the most laconic, scientific way possible" must be false. Instead of limiting himself to scientific language, Wittgenstein continuously employs poetic language in order to make himself understood. If we succeed in "throwing the ladder away", it is precisely because of these poetic images that make us see, feel and hear language in a different way. When discussing the *Investigations*, I will argue that 'seeing' the world differently through poetic imagery remains an all-important aspect of Wittgenstein's method of doing philosophy.

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[12] Sehr klar wird das Wesen des Satzzeichens, wenn wir es uns, statt aus Schriftzeichen, aus räumlichen Gegenständen (etwa Tischen, Stühlen, Büchern) zusammengesetzt denken. Die gegenseitige räumliche Lage dieser Dinge drückt dann den Sinn des Satzes aus (Wittgenstein 2018: 22)

[13] 2.151 Das Bild ist so mit der Wirklichkeit verknüpft – es reicht bis zu ihr. 2.1515 Diese Zuordnungen sind gleichsam die Fühler der Bildelemente, mit denen das Bild die Wirklichkeit berührt. 4.411 Es ist von vornherein wahrscheinlich, dass die Einführung der Elementarsätze für das Verständnis aller anderen Satzarten grundlegend ist. Ja, das Verständnis der allgemeinen Sätze hängt fühlbar von dem der Elementarsätze ab. (https://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/tlp.pdf. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018)

1.2 LANGUAGE GAMES

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein radically breaks with his picture theory of language. Instead of attempting to uncover the logical structure underlying our daily language, it is now daily language itself that becomes the focal point of his attention. Explaining this shift from logics to ordinary language, in §115 he famously exclaims that: "A *picture* held us captive. And we couldn't get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably" (Wittgenstein 2009: 53).[14] Wittgenstein thus again stresses the connection between language and seeing.[15] This time around, though, he will argue against the images he himself has helped to erect. In the *Investigations*, there is no room anymore for logical space and comparisons between the disguising qualities of daily language and clothing. In order to explain why he was initially led astray, Wittgenstein asserts that language's use simply had not occurred to him. In §129 we read:

> The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck them. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.[16]

The most important aspects of language were thus always right in front of us, for everyone to *see*. We did not notice them, however, as the problems arising "through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*" (Wittgenstein 2009: 53; §111). While the 'problems' he raised in the *Tractatus* appeared to be deep, he was thus fooled in thinking that they were problems at all. For this reason the Wittgenstein of the *Investigations* writes that "philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our

[14] [E]in *Bild* hielt uns gefangen. Und heraus konnten wir nicht, denn es lag in unsrer Sprache, und sie schien es uns nur unerbittlich zu wiederholen.

[15] In "Seeing the everyday otherwise: vision, ethics and utopia in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*", Ben Ware observes the following: "In the Preface to *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein describes his mode of philosophical composition as akin to that of the visual artist. 'The philosophical remarks in this book are', he writes, 'a number of sketches of landscapes […] made in the course of […] long and involved journeys.' The purpose of these sketches, as Wittgenstein suggests, is to teach 'a new style of thinking', which consists in an ability to see clearly (*PI* §§5, 51) the things that are always in front of our eyes, but which 'are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity' (*PI* §129). Here Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as an activity which involves relearning how to 'look' (*PI* §66) at the world, reflects an important concern, evident throughout his writings, with the categories of 'seeing' and 'vision'" (Ware 2014: 23).

[16] Die für uns wichtigsten Aspekte der Dinge sind durch ihre Einfachheit und Alltäglichkeit verborgen. (Man kann es nicht bemerken, - weil man es immer vor Augen hat.) Die eigentlichen Grundlagen seiner Forschung fallen dem Menschen gar nicht auf. Es sei denn, daß ihm *dies* einmal aufgefallen ist. – Und das heißt: das, was einmal gesehen, das Auffallendste und Stärkste ist, fällt uns nicht auf (Wittgenstein 2009: 56).

language" (Wittgenstein 2009: 52; §109).[17] Arguing against his former picture theory of language and those "deep disquietudes [the 'problems' of language]", that are "as deeply rooted in us as the forms of our language", he now sees language as a conglomerate of *language games* (Wittgenstein 2009: 52/53; §111). In the following, I will discuss how Wittgenstein conveys this new view of language within the *Investigations*. We will see that while differing in content, poetic imagery still plays a key role within his philosophical method.

The *Investigations*, just like the *Tractatus*, is built around a metaphor. While 'logical space' is the key metaphor of the *Tractatus*, the *Investigations* hinges on the notion of 'language games'. The first time Wittgenstein talks about language games is in §7. He does so in order to describe Augustine's depiction of the nature of language, which held that words in language name objects. Wittgenstein does not dispute the veracity of Augustine's account, but simply states that it gives us an incomplete picture of language. For him, it denotes just one language game among many (Wittgenstein 2009: 8). Taking Augustine's view of language as its point of departure, the *Investigations* constitutes an attempt to show how language consists of an incredible variety of games. 'Showing' should be taken quite literally here; just as in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein employs a great amount of examples and poetic imagery in order to make us see his philosophical argument. One of the most famous of these images is that of 'family resemblances'. Arguing for the non-essentialist character of our use of the word 'game', Wittgenstein writes that: "[…] the various resemblances between members of a family – build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth – overlap and criss-cross in the same way. – And I shall say: 'games' form a family. […] (Wittgenstein 2009: 36; §67).[18] Just as it is impossible to establish rules that bind all games together, the same goes for language. According to Wittgenstein, any attempt to capture language in an overarching theoretical framework is bound to fail: "[language games have] no one thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all – but there are many different kinds of *affinity* between them" (Wittgenstein 2009: 35; §65). He does not deny that we do require an overview, however, and that it is precisely this lack of an overview that makes us fail to see language as consisting of language games. In §122 we read that:

> […] – Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate* links.

[17] Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unseres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache.
[18] Denn so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang, Temperament, etc. etc. – Und ich werde sagen: die 'Spiele' bilden eine Familie.

> The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a 'Weltanschaaung'?)[19]

In order to get an overview of language as language games, Wittgenstein thus accords a central role to something he calls "surveyable representations", which determine the way we *look* at things. Wittgenstein's notion of language games and the language games he subsequently plays in the *Investigations* accordingly serve the purpose of being surveyable representations of the way language functions. When he asks us to think of language as a collection of "games", we should moreover take this quite literally. Within the *Investigations,* the peculiarity of metaphorical language no longer consists in "showing" that which cannot be "said", as was the case within the *Tractatus,* but in its "special use of language" (Schulte 1989: 144). This does not however imply that metaphors have "a special, or figurative, meaning we might wish to assign to it" (144).[20] Wittgenstein elucidates his view of metaphorical language by giving the following example: "If I say "For me the vowel *e* is yellow" I do not mean: 'yellow' in a metaphorical sense [*in übertragener Bedeutung*] , - for I could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means of the idea [*mittels des Begriffs*] 'yellow'" (Wittgenstein 2009: 228; §278). Hence, when Wittgenstein describes the workings of language in terms of "games" and the relationship between these games as "family resemblances", these words do not take up some special metaphorical sense, but stay firmly attached to their 'usual' meaning. It is precisely because we understand their 'usual' meaning that we can make sense of these metaphors: for Wittgenstein, there is no other way to explain "For me the vowel *e* is yellow" than by simply referring back to our 'usual' use of 'yellow'.[21] If the *Investigation*'s 'surveyable

[19] Unserer Grammatik fehlt es an Übersichtlichkeit. – Die übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das Verständnis, welches eben darin besteht, daß wir die 'Zusammenhänge sehen'. Daher die Wichtigkeit des Findens und des Erfindens von *Zwischengliedern*. Der Begriff der übersichtlichen Darstellung ist für uns von grundlegender Bedeutung. Er bezeichnet unsere Darstellungsform, die Art, wie wir die Dinge sehen. (Ist dies eine 'Weltanschauung?') (Wittgenstein 2009: 54/55. §122).

[20] The following is inspired by Schulte (1989).

[21] This account of metaphorical language is at odds with other prominent accounts of metaphor, most notably by Max Black, which revolves around the notions of "frame" and "focus": ""The chairman ploughed through the discussion." In calling this sentence a case of metaphor, we are implying that at least one word (here, the word "ploughed") is being used metaphorically in the sentence, and that at least one of the remaining words is being used literally. Let us call the word "ploughed" the *focus* of the metaphor, and the remainder of the sentence in which that word occurs the *frame*. (Are *we* now using metaphors – and mixed ones at that? Does it matter?) One notion that needs to be clarified is that of the "metaphorical use" of the focus of metaphor. Among other things, it would be good to understand how the presence of one frame can be result in metaphorical use of the complimentary word, while the presence of a different frame for the same word fails to result in metaphor" (Black 1955: 275/276). Whereas Wittgenstein believes that the "metaphorical use" of a word can only be explained by referring to its primary use, Black maintains that metaphors, being "a species of *catachresis*", put "new senses into old words" (280). See also Davidson (1978) and Black (1979).

representations' help us in understanding his view of language, it is hence because we understand the 'usual' use of the words they consist of.

In addition to the 'surveyable representation' of "games" and "family resemblances", the *Investigations* contains many more poetic images. In *Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language*, Sebastian Sunday Grève and Jakub Mácha give an extensive list of all its poetic imagery, including an analogy between "chess and language (§31; §108)" and the simile of "language as an ancient city: "a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extension from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses""(Grève and Macha 2016: 9; Wittgenstein §18). But Wittgenstein also compares primitive language to tools (§14), philosophy's resistance to details with assuming that mice come into being "by spontaneous generation out of grey rags and dust" (§52), and playing language games to "people amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball" (§83). Just as in the *Tractatus*, time and again he conjures up poetic images in order to make his philosophical remarks perceptible. This time, though, there is no ladder to be kicked away at the end. As everything we want to know about language is already plain to see, there is nothing to surmount. Instead, in the *Investigations* Wittgenstein asserts that it is philosophy's task to show "the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (Wittgenstein 2009: 110). In *Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing*, Judith Genova gives an extensive analysis of this analogy that highlights the intimate relation between language, philosophy and seeing within Wittgenstein's philosophical thought:

> Lured by the presence of some ideal form of sustenance, flies unwittingly trap themselves. Once caught, all their usual methods of dealing with the environment become ineffective; they have lost their way. Instead of seeking new methods to cope with their unusual circumstances, they stubbornly thrust themselves again and again against the glass, clinging to the illusion that freedom is only a matter of their persistence. Some make forays to the left or right of their battered position; others, the more stalwart of the species, manage to tour the whole bottle. […] One need only turn around - make an imaginative leap - to see the opening. For flies, however, this is impossible. Escape, when achieved, is always a matter of luck and determination. Their methods are instinctually rigid and their experiments random. Thus, most perish in what they thought would be the land of milk and honey.
>
> In similar fashion, philosophers pursuing an ideal form of explanation entrap themselves. Viewing philosophy as either a form of ultraphysics or secular theology, they inadvertently bottle themselves in theories and systems which have lost all contact with reality […]" (Genova 1995: 9).

Philosophers are those who have forgotten how to see because they employed the wrong conceptual apparatus. In this context Wittgenstein writes that "[T]here is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were" (Wittgenstein 2009: 57; §133). The right method of doing philosophy is not by senselessly looking for *the* method to solve philosophy's problems; instead, "a method is […] demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off. – Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a *single* problem" (57; §133). Examples are thus explicitly instrumental to Wittgenstein's philosophical method, as our enumeration of Wittgenstein's poetic imagery already made clear.

At this point, we can appreciate that both in the *Tractatus* and in the *Investigations*, poetic imagery appears as an integral part of Wittgenstein's method of doing philosophy. The imagery Wittgenstein conjures up indeed has become so much intertwined with his philosophy that it is impossible to understand his philosophical method without it. In several of his unpublished works he has explicitly expressed his views about the affinity between philosophy and poetry, none the more so than in *Culture and Value* (*Vermischte Bemerkungen*)

1.3 WITTGENSTEIN ON POETRY

While the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* already showed to be interspersed with poetic imagery, this is even more the case with his notebooks. Many of the thoughts Wittgenstein expresses in these works immediately contain a pictorial counterpart. What sets these notebooks apart from the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*, however, is that Wittgenstein specifically addresses the relation between philosophy and poetry in these works. His most straightforward account of their relation is to be found in *Culture and Value*, where a passage dated 1933-1934 reads as follows:

> I believe I summed up where I stand to philosophy when I said: really one should write philosophy only as one *writes a poem*. That, it seems to me, must reveal how far my thinking belongs to the present, the future, or the past. For I was acknowledging myself, with these words, to be someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do.[22]

[22] Ich glaube meine Stellung zur Philosophie dadurch zusammengefaßt zu haben, indem ich sagte: Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur *dichten*. Daraus muß sich, scheint mir, ergeben, wie weit mein Denken der Gegenwart, Zukunft, oder der Vergangenheit angehört. Denn ich habe mich damit auch als einen bekannt, der nicht ganz kann, was er zu können wünscht. (Wittgenstein 1979: 483). The English translations in this section stem from the electronic edition of the *Collected Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein*, published by Intelex Corp. and were accessed through the Leiden University Library.

Being Wittgenstein's most explicit statement on philosophy and poetry, this passage merits close scrutiny. It is important to note Wittgenstein is talking about his *attitude* towards philosophy (*Stellung zur Philosophie*), not about philosophy itself. This is followed by the assertion that philosophy ought to be written as one writes a poem. While Wittgenstein is being prescriptive here about the way philosophy should be done, he immediately acknowledges that he does not wholly succeed by his own standards. He believes that the extent to which he *has* succeeded in writing philosophy as poetry though, will ultimately determine its legacy. The question mark hovering over this entry is what Wittgenstein considers writing philosophy "as one writes a poem" to be, which is a question of translation too. While in the original text the verb *dichten* aligns itself well with Wittgenstein's assertion that he is talking about his attitude towards philosophy, the intimate connection between stance and verb is lost in the English translation. In English, the weight lies on the technicalities of writing philosophy as poetry, whereas the German original is more in sync with his assertion that he is describing an attitude.

In addition to this key remark on the relation between Wittgenstein's views on the way of doing philosophy and poetry, there are two other entries in *Culture and Value* that deal (in)directly with this subject. The first of these, an entry dated 1939-1940, addresses the way people conceive of the difference between scientists and artists: "People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians etc. to entertain them. *That the latter have something to teach* them; that never occurs to them".[23] Against the idea that only science yields knowledge, Wittgenstein thus defends the view that poets and musicians also have things to teach us. Accordingly, the philosopher and the poet are not far removed from one another. If philosophy ought to be written as a form of poetry and poets are teachers, it seems that those who are teaching philosophy the right way can be deemed to be poets too. This does not mean that these philosophers necessarily write good poetry Another remark, dated 1947, elaborates a little bit more on this point:

> Just as I cannot write verse, so too I can write prose only *up to a certain point*, & no further. There is a quite definite limit to my prose, & I can no more overstep *it*, than I would be able to write a poem. *This* is how my equipment is constituted; it is the only equipment available to me. It is like someone's saying: In this game I can attain only *this* level of perfection, & not *that*.[24]

[23] Die Menschen heute glauben, die Wissenschaftler seien da, sie zu belehren, die Dichter und Musiker etc. sie zu erfreuen. *Daß diese sie etwas zu lehren haben*; kommt ihnen nicht in den Sinn (501).

[24] So wie ich keine Verse schreiben kann, so kann ich auch Prosa nur *soweit*, und nicht weiter, schreiben. Meiner Prosa ist eine Ganz bestimmte Grenze gesetzt, und ich kann ebenso wenig über *sie* hinaus, als ich es vermöchte, ein Gedicht zu schreiben. Mein Apparat ist *so* beschaffen; nur dieser Apparat steht mir zur Verfügung. Es ist, wenn wie Einer sagte: Ich kann in diesem Spiel nur *diesen* Grad der Vollkommenheit erreichen, und nicht *jenen* (533).

The fact that philosophy should be done like *dichten* does not imply that one should be good at writing verse, prose or poetry, as Wittgenstein readily acknowledges. This remark hints again at the difficulty of translating *dichten* as 'writing [philosophy] as one writes a poem', as observed before. Writing philosophy like *dichten* does not amount to writing poems.[25] Rather, while bound by the 'shackles' of his philosophical prose, the philosopher should aspire to be a poet.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have argued what it means to understand Wittgenstein as a poetic philosopher. While there remains a lot more to be said on the relation between content and style, I have shown that an enumeration of all the places where Wittgenstein uses poetic imagery already firmly establishes him as a poet. We further noted that a lot of Wittgenstein's poetic imagery has to do with *seeing*. I have argued that the main reason why he employs all these analogies, metaphors and similes, is that they make us see the relation between language and the world differently. From the *Tractatus* to *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein tries to show how language, understanding and seeing are intertwined. The fly in the bottle is the philosopher who, by using the wrong language, cannot properly see and hence does not understand. In the next chapter, I will turn my attention to Fernando Pessoa, and to his heteronym Alberto Caeiro in particular. While this chapter revolved around the poetic dimension of Wittgenstein's philosophy, I will discuss the philosophical side to Pessoa's poetry in the next. Notwithstanding the fact that the one gained fame as a philosopher and the other as a poet, we will see that they express similar views on the relation between language, understanding and seeing.

[25] Wittgenstein's distinction between *dichten* as a stance and the act of writing poems finds an interesting parallel in Augustine's discussion of 'reading'. For Augustine, "reading it constitutes on the one hand an imperfect way of acquiring knowledge (as it is inseparable from our flawed sense perceptions), but on the other it enables the reader to "approach a higher understanding" if the text is only "sufficiently authorative" (Stock 1996: 1).

CHAPTER 2

A PHILOSOPHICAL POET: FERNANDO PESSOA

It is both easy and difficult to write about philosophy within the Pessoan corpus. The fact that Pessoa wrote comparatively little under his own name and even left us the manuscript of an unpublished philosophical work makes it relatively easy to gain an understanding of the way he himself envisaged the relation between poetry and philosophy. What makes it at the same time very hard, however, is that his name is forever bound up with the names of Alvaro de Campos, Bernardo Soares and Alberto Caeiro, to name only a few. It is estimated that more than seventy heteronyms sprang from Pessoa's pen, of which about four figure prominently within 'his' bibliography (Gibbs 1999: 226). As has been argued by various critics, it would be a mistake to attribute the writings of these authors to Pessoa himself.[26] Throughout his life, Pessoa treated them as proper heteronyms, including their dates of birth and death. My discussion of the 'philosophical' Pessoa will hence consist of two parts.[27] In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss those writings within the Pessoan corpus that are explicitly philosophical, and that have been collected within the *Philosophical Essays*. While by no means constituting a full-fledged philosophical system, they do give an interesting insight in what is considered to be 'philosophy' within Pessoa's universe. Moreover, they are indicative of the difficulty of attributing philosophical positions to Pessoa, as many of them were 'written' by one of his heteronyms. In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss the works of the philosophical anti-philosopher within the Pessoan corpus: Alberto Caeiro, Pessoa's 'master'. While explicitly anti-philosophical, his *The Keeper of Sheep* (*O Guardador de Rebanhos*) ironically constitutes the clearest espousal of philosophical thought within the Pessoan corpus.

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[26] The relation between Pessoa and his heteronyms is a thorny issue. The view that we have to accept the likes of Caeiro and Reis (among many others) as heteronyms as opposed to pseudonyms is mainly based on a letter Pessoa wrote in 1935, in which he addresses the "génese" (birth) of his heteronyms. One has to conduct only a brief search in a university library, however, to find that there are many books and articles making claims about Pessoa's metaphysics, romanticism, or philosophy. In this thesis, I want to fully respect Pessoa's heteronomity, by not extrapolating philosophical points of view from one his heteronyms to Pessoa himself. As Simon Critchley writes in "Surfaciality: Some Poems by Fernando Pessoa, one by Wallace Stevens, and the brief Sketch of a Poetic Ontology": "what is important to grasp with the idea of heteronymic authorship is that this galaxy does not orbit around one creative God-like authorial sun, but is a vast, shifting and interconnected energy field with numerous and conflicting centres that form into distinct personages" (Critchley 2015: 278). Or, as Pessoa put it clearly himself: "não penso nada do Caeiro, do Ricardo Reis ou do Álvaro de Campos" (I don't think anything about Caeiro, Ricardo Reis or Alvaro de Campos) (http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3007. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018).

[27] The Pessoan corpus lends itself to many different kinds of philosophical analysis. For reasons of conciseness and clarity, I will stick to those aspects that fall within the scope of this thesis, i.e. that touch upon the relation between seeing, language and understanding. For a thorough exploration of the affinities between Pessoa's heteronomy with Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatics, see Morris (2014). For discussions of Pessoa and Heidegger, see my footnote 29.

As neither Pessoa nor his heteronyms ever produced a fully worked out philosophical system, it is by no means my intention to uncover something like Pessoa's philosophy. Instead, my investigation is meant to lay bare philosophical threads within Pessoa's corpus that are strikingly similar to the ones we encountered within Wittgenstein's. When the Pessoan corpus gets associated with that of a philosopher, it is usually compared to Heidegger's philosophy of being.[29] In this chapter, I will argue that a comparison between Pessoa's writings and the works of Wittgenstein is just as fruitful. More specifically, I will try to show that Alberto Caeiro and Wittgenstein expound similar views on the relation between language, seeing and understanding. Lost in their dreams and concepts, Caeiro insists, the poets and philosophers either do not know how to see the world, or else they have learned to look at it in a distorted manner. Caeiro aspires to show them in their own language that they are mistaken, just as Wittgenstein does. However, the poet and the philosopher do differ in their analysis of the reason why, as I will discuss at the end of this chapter.

To argue that Caeiro's work shows striking affinities with that of Wittgenstein does not imply that this is the case for the Pessoan corpus as a whole. The view that we should take Pessoa's claims of the heteronymous character of his corpus seriously is confirmed by the existence of a vast gap between the philosophical preoccupations of Charles Robert Anon and Alexander Search (*Philosophical Essays*) and Alberto Caeiro, for example. While Caeiro's poetry expresses a disdain for philosophical system building, this is exactly what Anon and Search do. The fragments that make up the *Philosophical Essays* are in their heavy-handedness and rigour more reminiscent of Kant than Wittgenstein. By juxtaposing the works of Anon and

[29] See Jan Slaby's "Living in the Moment: Boredom and the Meaning of Existence in Heidegger and Pessoa" (2017) or Michael Marder's "Phenomenology of Distraction, or Attention in the Fissuring of Time and Space" (2011) for example. One of the very few authors that have explored philosophical affinities between the Pessoan corpus and Wittgenstein's philosophy is Nuno Ribeiro. His *A Filosofia Como Poetar: Escritos sobre Wittgenstein e Fernando Pessoa* is the most sustained analysis of these two thinkers that I have come across. Ribeiro maintains that Wittgenstein's notion of language games can help us understand Pessoa's heteronymic literary procedures and that, vice versa, studying these literary procedures enables us to better comprehend the way in which Wittgenstein's language games come about (Ribeiro 2016: 26/27). In doing so, Ribeiro however misinterprets Wittgenstein's concept of language games. He writes that "A criação do pequeno drama que constitui cada personalidade literária corresponde ao establicemento de um determinado jogo de linguagem. O "drama em gente" que todós os heterónimos formam corresponde a um outro jogo de linguagem. Criar uma determinada personalidade heteronímica significa servir-nos da linguagem e fazer da gramática e das regras que a compõem um instrumento" (The creation of the little play that constitutes each literary character corresponds to the establishment of a certain language game. The "drama em gente" that the heteronyms constitute corresponds to a different language game. Creating a heteronymic character means using language to invent a grammar and rules to render it an instrument) (37). Ribeiro's suggestion that we would be able to create our own language games through the creation of heteronymic characters sits uneasy with Wittgenstein's assertion that language games are always part of a social practice. For Wittgenstein, language games do not get invented, but are firmly rooted in our form of life. Although my lecture of Ribeiro helped me in establishing Wittgenstein as a poetic philosopher, I hence will not take up his argument in this thesis. Instead, I argue that Caeiro, Pessoa's master heteronym, practices philosophy in a way similar to Wittgenstein.

Search with that of Caeiro, I hope to convey an understanding of the enormous width of themes and styles within the Pessoan corpus and the unicity of Caeiro's voice within it. The central question of this chapter is: How does Pessoa's 'philosophy' relate to that of Wittgenstein?

2.1 THE *PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS*

In his introduction to the *Philosophical Essays*, Nuno Ribeiro cites the following assertion by Pessoa about himself: "I was a poet animated by philosophy, not a philosopher with poetic faculties. I loved to admire the beauty of things, to trace in the imperceptible through the minute the poetic soul of the universe" (Ribeiro 2012: XII).[30] Given that the Pessoan corpus consists of a whole series of heteronyms and considering the sheer amount of autobiographical statements Pessoa made, it is not easy to interpret this claim. Does it only hold for the works published under his own name, for example, or for his heteronyms as well? Moreover, as Ribeiro notes, "it was *not* only through poetic, literary, and fictional creations – that is to say, as "a poet" – that Pessoa expressed his interest in philosophy" (Ribeiro 2012: XIII). Edited by Ribeiro himself, the *Philosophical Essays* publication was intended to collect those fragments within the Pessoa archive that could be said to be "straightforwardly *philosophical* prose" (XIII). Things are, however, rarely straightforward within Pessoa's universe. Instead of signing these fragments with his own name, most of them are either unsigned or attributed to Charles Robert Anon and Alexander Search, "two English literary personalities that Pessoa had invented in South Africa" (XVI). In order to shed some light on how we should understand the relation between Pessoa and his heteronyms in general, Ribeiro cites Pessoa extensively when the latter claims that

> You should approach these books as if you hadn't read this explanation but had simply read the books, buying them one by one at a bookstore, where you saw them on display. You shouldn't read them in any other spirit. […] That doesn't mean you have the right to believe in my explanation. As soon as you read it, you should suppose that I've lied – that you're going to read books by different poets, or different writers, and that through those books you'll receive emotions and learn lessons from those writers, with whom I have nothing to do except as their publisher (XVII).

[30] For the letter, see http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/2207 (Accessed 29 Jun. 2018).

Following other indications by Pessoa, we should moreover distinguish between different kinds of heteronyms within the Pessoan corpus. Alberto Caeiro and Ricardo Reis are to be considered full heteronyms for example, while Bernardo Soares has to be regarded as a semi-heteronym.[31] Based on statements by Pessoa on the matter, Ribeiro explains the difference between the two as follows: "a heteronym differs from its author, not only in its way of thinking and feeling, but also in its style of writing; a semi-heteronym only differs from its author in its way of thinking and feeling, not in its style" (XIX). Again, we have to be careful not to take Pessoa at face value. Is it for example possible to completely separate feeling and understanding on the one hand, and style on the other, as Pessoa is suggesting?

Given that substantial parts of the *Philosophical Essays* are attributed to Anon and Search, there is no way in which we can distil something like Pessoa's philosophy from these fragments. However, both the "pre-heteronyms" of Anon and Search and the themes elaborated within these fragments are indicative of the heteronyms and themes Pessoa will later develop in his career, as Ribeiro argues. He writes that

> In the fabrication of these two pre-heteronyms and the texts written in their names, Pessoa begins to develop subjects that clearly influence his later heteronyms and heteronymic works. At the same time, a poetry "animated by philosophy" will be a poetry alive with the highly varied impulse of Pessoa's early philosophical texts (XXI).

In order to grasp the extent to which these heteronyms can truly be said to be heteronymous to Pessoa, we just have to take a look at the biographical backgrounds he provides for these heteronyms. Of Charles Robert Anon, for example, Pessoa gives us the following 'auto-biography':

I. Charles Robert Anon,
Being, animal, mammal, tetrapod,
primate, placental, ape, catar-
rhyna, man;
eighteen years of age, not
married (except at odd
moments) megalomaniac,

[31] In the aforementioned 1935 letter to Adolfo Casais Monteiro, Pessoa writes about Soares that he is "um semi-heterónimo porque, não sendo a personalidade a minha, é, não diferente da minha, mas uma simples mutilação dela. Sou eu menos o raciocínio e a afetividade. A prosa, salvo o que o raciocínio dá de tenue à minha, é igual a esta, e o português perfeitamente igual (a semi-heteronym because, although not being me, his character does not differ from mine, but is a simple mutation. It is me without reasoning and affection. The prose, except for the reasoning, is equal to mine, and his Portuguese perfectly the same) […]" (See http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3007. Accessed 30 Jun. 2018).

with touches of dipsomania,
dégénéré superior, poet, with
pretensions to written humour, citizen
of the world, idealistic philo-
sopher, etc. etc. (to spare
the reader further pains).
[…] (XXII)

Notwithstanding the non-conventional nature of Anon's autobiography, the fact that there is such an autobiography at all indicates that we should indeed think of him as a character truly distinct from Pessoa. Given that the *Philosophical Essays* are either unsigned or attributed to Anon or Search, this autobiography compounds the difficulty of establishing Pessoa's philosophy, in addition to the fragmented character of these essays. Despite all of these complications, a simple look at the contents of the *Philosophical Essays* does give us an idea of what is considered to be 'philosophy' within the Pessoan corpus. While the second part of the *Philosophical Essays* consists of addenda, the first part is "reconstructed according to various indications left by Pessoa" (XXXII). Its table of contents reads as follows:

PART I. PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

I – Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism
(Unsigned)

II – Essay on Free-Will (Charles Robert Anon)
A) Projects
B) Fragments

III – On the Idea of Responsibility (Unsigned)

IV – Essay on the Idea of Cause (Alexander Search)

V – On Error (Unsigned)

VI – On Sensation (Unsigned)

VII – Essay on Heraclitus (Unsigned)

VIII – On Thomas Aquinas (Unsigned)

IX – Essay on Pascal (Unsigned)

X – On the Limits of Science (Charles Robert Anon)

As we may infer from the above, philosophy takes on a rather traditional guise within the Pessoan corpus. This can be perhaps best be explained by considering with which philosophers these different fragments try to establish a dialogue. Ribeiro notes that the 'Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism' was inspired by Kant, while Anon's 'Essay on Free-Will' was informed by Schopenhauer's *Essay on Free-Will* and Fouilée's *La Liberté et le déterminisme* (XXXV). Considering that the *Philosophical Essays* date back to 1906-1907, it seems that neither Pessoa nor his heteronyms directly engaged with the philosophical ideas of their era, such as American Pragmatism, Fregean logic and Husserlian phenomenology. The writing style of these essays feels moreover rather pompous and forced, especially compared to the poems of Caeiro and Reis and the philosophical observations by Soares. The opening paragraph of the 'Essay on the Nature and Meaning of Rationalism', for example, reads as follows:

> Rationalism holds that the only things that can be affirmed as facts are those which reduce experience by reason to the coordination called science. Rationalism holds that all things outside this are simply unknown, or as yet unknown; but it does not affirm either that they are unknowable or still less that they are false. For what cannot be proved cannot also be disproved. The affirmation that Christ is God, for example, cannot be rejected by a Rationalist because it cannot be affirmed by him. It may be an error; it may be the vision of a higher sight – the Rationalist cannot determine which it is, because he does not know a thing to be wrong unless he can subject it to reason, and he cannot affirm a sense to be non-existent simply because he himself has not got it (2).

With its traditional tone and structure, the *Philosophical Essays* is far removed from Wittgenstein's poetic philosophy in the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. Judging only from the writings of Anon and Search, relating Wittgenstein's philosophy to that of Pessoa would be a futile undertaking. Much more striking, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, are the affinities with the work of Pessoa's master, Alberto Caeiro, contained in *The Keeper of Sheep*.

2.2 ALBERTO CAEIRO'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTI-PHILOSOPHY

According to Ricardo Reis (one of Pessoa's other principle heteronyms), Alberto Caeiro was born in Lisbon in 1889, but lived almost his whole life with a great-aunt in the countryside.[32] Despite his lack of a formal education, he is the great thinker within the Pessoan corpus.

[32] For the letter in which Reis gives a biography of Caeiro, see http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3072 (Accessed 29 Jun. 2018).

Caeiro's 'philosophy' does not consist in building a philosophical system. Rather, he admonishes the philosophers and poets to stop thinking and start seeing, two injunctions which go hand in hand with one another for Caeiro.[33] His most prominent collection of poetry is *The Keeper of* Sheep, written in 1911-1912. In the following, I will give a close-reading of some of the poems within this volume, in order to highlight the philosophical character of these works. I will argue that, like Wittgenstein, Caeiro continuously stresses the intimate relation between words, seeing and understanding.

The Keeper of Sheep is a collection of forty-nine poems allegedly all written on the same day (March 8th 1914), which Pessoa himself called "o dia triunfal da minha vida" (the triumphal day of my life).[34] One of the most famous poems in this volume is called "There's Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about Anything" (Há Metafisica Bastante em Não Pensar em Nada). I quote the poem, which I will put into dialogue with Wittgenstein, in full:

V – There's Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about Anything

There's metaphysics enough in not thinking about anything
What do I think about the world?
I don't know what I think about the world!
If I became sick I would think about it.

What do I make of things?
What is my opinion of causes and effects?
What have I meditated in regards to God and the soul
And about the creation of the world?

I don't know. For me, thinking about it is closing my eyes
And not think. Drawing the shades
Of my window (that has no shades).

The mystery of things? I don't know what a mystery is!
The only mystery is having people who think about it.
Whoever is in the sun and closes his eyes,
Begins ignoring what the sun is
And thinking many things filled with heat.

[33] In "*O Guardador de Rebanhos* e a Contradição de Alberto Caeiro em Relaçao ao Conhecimento", Sandra Regina Tornquist argues that Caeiro's poetry is characterized by a tension between his pagan worldview (which relinquishes reflection for harmony) and the act of writing poetry itself, which is necessarily abstract (Tornquist 2009: 282). She describes Caeiro as someone "que busca não refletir sobre o que sente, no desejo de ser o mais naturel possível, mas que não consegue se desfazer do pensamento em seu dia a dia e na produção da poesia" (who tries not to reflect on what he feels, desiring to be as natural as possible, but does not succeed in relinquishing thought in his daily life and poetry) (282). Another philosophical contextualization of Caeiro's poetry is offered by James Corby in "Fernando Pessoa's Post-Romantic Sense of the World", in which he retraces the pedigree of Caeiro's belief that thinking obscures seeing to early German Romanticism (Corby 2011: 166).

[34] For the letter, see http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/3007 (Accessed 30 Jun. 2018).

But opens his eyes and sees the sun,
And cannot think about anything,
Because the sunlight is worth more than the thoughts
Of all philosophers and poets.
The sunlight doesn't know what it does
And because of that it doesn't make mistakes and is common and good.

Metaphysics? What metaphysics do those trees have?
The one that makes them green and bodied with branches
Giving fruit when it's time, which doesn't make us think,
Us, that don't know they're there.
But what better metaphysics than the one they have,
Which is not knowing for what they live
Nor knowing that they do not know it?

"Intimate constitution of things"…
"Intimate meaning of the Universe"…
All this is false, all of this doesn't mean anything.
It's incredible that we can think about these things.
It's like thinking about reasons and ends
When the morning rises, and on the side of the trees
A vague and lustrous gold loses itself to the darkness.

Thinking about the intimate meaning of things
Is added, like thinking about health
Or taking a glass to the water of springs.

The only intimate meaning of things
Is that they don't have any intimate meaning.
I don't believe in God because I never saw him.
If he wanted me to believe in him,
I have no doubt he would come talk to me
And would walk through my door
Telling me, Here I am!

(This is maybe ridiculous to the ears
Of someone, for not knowing what it is looking at things,
Does not understand one who talks about them
With the way of talking that noticing them teaches.)

But if God is the flowers and the trees
And the hills, and the sun and the moonlight,
Then I believe in him,
Then I believe in him all the time,
And my life is all of it but a prayer and a mass,
And a communion with the eyes and by the ears.

But if God is the trees and the flowers
And the hills and the moonlight and the sun,
Why do I call it God?
I call it flowers and trees and hills and sun and moonlight;
Because, if he made himself, for me to see him
Sun and moonlight and flowers and hills,
If he appears to me as being trees and hills
And moonlight and sun and flowers,
It's because he wants me to know him
As trees and hills and flowers and moonlight and sun.
And for that I obey him,
(What do I know more about God than God himself?),
I obey him by living, spontaneously,
Like someone who opens his eyes and sees,
And I call it moonlight and sun and flowers and trees and hills,
And I love him without thinking about him,
And think about him by seeing him and hearing him,
And I walk with him all the time.[35]

Like so many of Caeiro's poems, "There's Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about Anything" does not have a proper title. The opening verse of the poem simply doubles as such. In the first line, the poet asserts that there is enough metaphysics in thinking nothing, a statement that is immediately followed by a self-interrogation. The way Caeiro dismisses the question of

[35] V – Há Metafisica Bastante em Não Pensar em Nada/ Há metafisica bastante em não pensar em nada./O que penso eu do mundo? /Sei lá o que penso do mundo!/Se eu adoecesse pensaria nisso. Que idéia tenho eu das cousas?/ Que opinião tenho sobre as causas e os efeitos?/ Que tenho eu meditado sobre Deus e a alma/ E sobre a criação do Mundo? Não sei. Para mim pensar nisso é fechar os olhos/ E não pensar. É correr as cortinas/ Da minha janela (mas ela não tem cortinas). O mistério das cousas? Sei lá o que é mistério!/ O único mistério é haver quem pense no mistério./ Quem está ao sol e fecha os olhos,/ Começa a não saber o que é o sol/ E a pensar muitas cousas cheias de calor. Mas abre os olhos e vê o sol,/ E já não pode pensar em nada,/ Porque a luz do sol vale mais que os pensamentos/ De todos os filósofos e de todos os poetas./ A luz do sol não sabe o que faz/ E por isso não erra e é comum e boa. Metafisica? Que metafísica têm aquelas árvores?/ A de serem verdes e copadas e de terem ramos/ E a de dar fruta na sua hora, o que não nos faz pensar,/ A nós, que não sabemos dar por elas. Mas que melhor metafísica que a delas,/ Que é de não saber para que vivem/ Nem saber que o não sabem? "Constituição íntima das cousas"…/"Sentido íntimo do Universo"…/ Tudo isto é falso, tudo isto não quer dizer nada./ É incrível que se possa pensar em cousas dessas./ É como pensar em razões e fins/ Quando o começo da manhã está raiando, e pelos lados das árvores/ Um vago ouro lustroso vai perdendo a escuridão. Pensar no sentido íntimo das cousas/ É acrescentado, como pensar na saúde/ Ou levar um copo à água das fonts. O único sentido íntimo das cousas/ É elas não terem sentido íntimo nenhum./ Não acredito em Deus porque nunca o vi./ Se ele quisesse que eu acreditasse nele,/ Sem dúvida que viria falar comigo/ E entraria pela minha porta dentro/ Dizendo-me, Aqui estou! (Isto é talvez ridículo aos ouvidos/ De quem, por não saber o que é olhar para as cousas,/ Não compreende quem fala delas/ Com o modo de falar que reparar para elas ensina.) Mas se Deus é as flores e as árvores/ E os montes e sol e o luar,/ Então acredito nele,/ Então acredito nele a toda a hora,/ E a minha vida é toda uma oraçao e uma missa,/ E uma comunhão com os olhos e pelos ouvidos. Mas se Deus é as árvores e as flores/ E as montes e o luar e o sol,/ Para que lhe chamo eu Deus?/ Chamo-lhe flores e árvores e montes e sol e luar;/ Porque, se ele se fez, para eu o ver,/ Sol e luar e flores e árvores e montes,/ Se ele me aparece como sendo árvores e montes/ E luar e sol e flores,/ É que ele quer que eu o conheça/ Como árvores e montes e flores e luar e sol. E por isso eu obedeço-lhe,/ (Que mais sei eu de Deus que Deus de si próprio?)/ Obedeço-lhe a viver, espontaneamente,/ Como quem abre os olhos e vê,/ E chamo-lhe luar e sol e flores e árvores e montes,/ E amo-o sem pensar nele,/ E penso-o vendo e ouvindo,/ E ando com ele a toda a hora.

what he thinks of the world is reminiscent of Wittgenstein in both style and content. Caeiro immediately establishes a dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor, just as Wittgenstein does time and again in his notebooks and the *Investigations*. In addition, by dismissing the question as nonsensical and by affirming that only were he to fall ill would he think of his thoughts about the world, he shows himself to be in agreement with two *leitmotifs* within the Wittgensteinian corpus: the nonsensicality of metaphysical questions (*Tractatus*) and the comparison of mistaken ways of doing philosophy with sickness that needs therapy (*Investigations*).

Perhaps even more strikingly in line with Wittgenstein's philosophy are the lines of the third verse, where Caeiro writes that having an opinion about things in general or cause and effects is equivalent to closing one's eyes. He even claims that thinking these thoughts does not amount to thinking it all, comparing it to closing the curtains of a window that does not have any. These lines are reminiscent of Wittgenstein's ambition to show the fly out of the fly bottle: the philosopher is so lost in his conceptual confusion that he does not see a way out, however plain to see it is for everyone else. A bit further down, Caeiro employs the platonic trope of closing one's eyes while looking at the sun: with our eyes closed, we start to think many things that have to do with heat, but as soon as we open them, we are engulfed by the self-evidence of the sun's light and our thoughts disperse.[36] Compare these lines to the following by Wittgenstein in *On Certainty*: "I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again 'I know that that's a tree', pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: 'This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy'".[37] The philosopher is he who either forgets to open his eyes (Caeiro) or has learnt to look at things in an awkward way (Wittgenstein).[38] Caeiro's criticism of philosophers does not stop there. In verses 6-9 he rails against philosophical concepts that confuse instead of enlighten. According to Caeiro, contemplating the inner constitution of things or the inner meaning of the universe is only done by those who have not learnt what it means to see. The last verses of the poem centre

[36] Ironically, though, it is impossible to look directly at the sun, as Derrida observes in "White Mythology". While discussing Plato's *The Republic*, one of the cornerstones of Western philosophy, he writes that "([...] the sun is there, but as the invisible source of light, in a kind of insistent eclipse. It is more than essential: it produces essence, being and appearing: the essence of that which is. One may not look upon it, on pain of blindness and death. Beyond that which is, it portends the Good, of which the sensible sun is the offspring: source of life and visibility, seed and light.)" (Derrida 1974: 43).

[37] "Ich sitze mit einem Philosophen im Garten; er sagt zu wiederholten Malen "Ich weiß, daß das ein Baum ist", wobei er auf einen Baum in unsrer Nähe zeigt. Ein Dritter kommt daher und hört das, und ich sage ihm: "Dieser Mensch ist nicht verrückt: Wir philosophieren nur" (Wittgenstein 1984: 213).

[38] In his aforementioned "Art as Technique", Skhlovsky states that "[…] art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known" (Skhlovsky 1917: 2). Likewise, Caeiro and Wittgenstein try dispel our mistaken conceptualizations and lead us back to our 'senses'.

on language and belief, in a manner reminiscent of Spinoza. If God wants to be known as the flowers and the trees, Caeiro asks himself, why would one call them anything other than flowers and trees?[39] The reason why philosophers get carried away by constructing metaphysical systems is that they do not *see*; they simply have to open their eyes and look to *know* that trees are trees and flowers are flowers. Caeiro's poetry is presented as a remedy for the poet's and philosopher's intellectual confusion, just as Wittgenstein's philosophy is a therapy.

"There's Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about Anything" is by no means the only poem in which Caeiro emphasizes the intimate relation between language, seeing and understanding. His affinity with Wittgenstein's thought is also apparent in the poem "What We See of Things" ("O que Nós Vemos"), which reads as follows:

XXIV – What We See of Things

What we see of things are things themselves.
Why should we see one thing if another existed?
Why would seeing and hearing be illusions
If seeing and listening are seeing and listening?

The essential thing is to be able to see,
To know how to see without thought,
To know how to see when we're seeing,
And not even think about it
Nor see when we think.

But that (poor us that display our clothed soul!),
That demands profound learning,
A learning to unlearn
And a sequestering of freedom from that convent
In which the poets say that the stars are eternal nuns
And the flowers convicted one-day penitents,
But where, in the end, the stars are nothing but stars
And the flowers but flowers,
Being that the reason we call them stars and flowers.[40]

[39] In the preface of part IV of his *Ethics*, Spinoza writes "[…] that Nature does not work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works" (Spinoza 2009: Part IV, Preface)

[40] XXIV – O que Nós Vemos. O que nós vemos das cousas são as cousas./ Por que veríamos nós uma cousa se houvesse outra?/ Por que é que ver e ouvir seria iludirmo-nos/ Se ver e ouvir são ver e ouvir? O essencial é saber ver,/ Saber ver sem estar a pensar,/ Saber ver quando se vê,/ E nem pensar quando se vê/ Nem ver quando se pensa. Mas isso (tristes de nós que trazemos a alma vestida!),/ Isso exige um estudo profundo,/ Uma aprendizagem de desaprender/ E uma seqüestração na liberdade daquele convento/ De que os poetas dizem que as estrelas são as freiras eternas/ E as flores as penitents convictas de um só dia,/ Mas onde afinal as estrelas não são senão estrelas/ Nem as flores senão flores./ Sendo por isso que lhes chamamos estrelas e flores.

In the opening line of this poem, Caeiro dryly asserts that what we see of things is things. This seemingly trivial assertion is followed by the question why we should see one thing as another. These two lines introduce Caeiro's insistence on seeing the world aright again, as becomes clear in the second verse, in which he writes that the main thing is *knowing how* to see and not to see when one thinks, and vice versa. Obvious as this all seems, Caeiro claims in the third verse that this skill requires a 'learning to unlearn'. In terms recalling Wittgenstein's description of his philosophy as therapy, Caeiro believes that seeing the world aright requires us to see through flawed concepts. The reason we call stars 'stars' and flowers 'flowers' is simply that they are stars and flowers respectively, nothing else. Caeiro thus shares the early Wittgenstein's disdain for conceptual sophistry and metaphysical speculation. While discussing this poem in his article "Surfaciality: Some Poems by Fernando Pessoa, one by Wallace Stevens, and the brief Sketch of a Poetic Ontology", Simon Critchley, in words strikingly reminiscent of Wittgenstein, summarizes Caeiro's reasoning as follows:

> The scandal of philosophy […] is that *we bewitch ourselves* with thinking rather than seeing and delude ourselves that such is both the properly philosophical attitude and the true comportment towards things. The scandal is philosophy itself, if by that word we denote the activity of thinking and the cultivation of the theoretical attitude towards things (Critchley 2015: 282. Emphasis added).

Things do not become 'deeper' whatsoever by invoking abstract concepts when everything there is, is out there already, plain to see for all. Poets and philosophers, however, simply do not seem to understand this. "The Mystery of Things" (O Mistério das Cousas) contains Caeiro's most straightforward criticism of their 'dreams' and 'ideas':

XXXIX - The Mystery of Things

The mystery of things, where is it?
Where is it that it doesn't show itself
At least showing us that it is mystery?
What does the river know of this and what does the tree?
And I, who am nothing more than them, what do I know of this?
Every time I look at things and think about what men think of them,
I laugh as a stream that sounds fresh in a rock.

Because the only hidden meaning of things
Is that they don't have any hidden meaning,
It is stranger than all that is strange
And all the dreams of all the poets
And the thoughts of all the philosophers,

That things are really what they appear to be
And that there is nothing to understand.

Yes, this is what my senses learned by themselves:
Things have no meaning: they exist.
Things are the only hidden meaning of things.[41]

In the context of this poem, I recall a remark made by Wittgenstein in §89 of the *Investigations*: "[…] the essence of our investigation [is] that we do not seek to learn anything *new* by it. We want to *understand* something that is already in plain view. For *this* is what we seem in some sense not to understand".[42] When Caeiro reminds us again and again of not falling into the habit of seeking hidden meaning in the outside world, he seems to have a similar idea in mind. Apparently we constantly need to be reminded that what we want to understand is already in plain view and that we are only deceiving ourselves by erecting philosophical frameworks that impede rather than enhance understanding. As in the other two poems thus far discussed, this poem starts with a question that is so general as to show the nonsensicality of it. This time Caeiro ostensibly wonders where we have to locate 'the mystery of things', but then immediately dismisses this question altogether. In the second verse, he explains that the only hidden meaning of things is that they do not have a hidden meaning at all, which is "stranger than all the poets' dreams and the philosophers' thoughts". Like Wittgenstein, Caeiro, locates meaning in the ordinary, not in the elaborate schemes and deceiving images of poets and philosophers. Hence he can all but laugh when he thinks about the explanations people have come up with when contemplating the mystery of things or their hidden meaning.

In "If I Sometimes Say that Flowers Smile" (*Se às Vezes Digo que as Flores sorriem*), Caeiro elucidates why philosophers and poets commit metaphysical sins time and again: they perceive a language where there is none.

XXXI – If I Sometimes Say that Flowers Smile

If I sometimes say that flowers smile

[41] XXXIX – O Mistério das Cousas O mistério das cousas, onde está ele?/ Onde está ele que não aparace/ Pelo menos a mostrar-nos que é mistério?/ Que sabe o rio disso e que sabe a árvore?/ E eu, que não sou mais do que eles, que sei disso?/ Sempre que olho para as cousas e penso no que os homens pensam delas,/ Rio como um regato que soa fresco numa pedra. Porque o único sentido oculto das cousas/ É elas não terem sentido oculto nenhum,/ É mais estranho do que todas as estranhezas/ E do que os sonhos de todos os poetas/ E os pensamentos de todos os filósofos,/ Que as cousas sejam realmente o que parecem ser/ E não haja nada que compreender. Sim, eis o que os meus sentidos aprenderam sozinhos:/ As cousas não têm significação: têm existência./ As cousas são o único sentido oculto das cousas.

[42] […] Wir wollen etwas *verstehen*, was schon offen vor unsern Augen liegt. Denn *das* scheinen wir, in irgend einem Sinne, nicht zu verstehen (Wittgenstein 2009: 47).

And if I say that rivers sing,
It's not because I think there's smiles in flowers
Or singing in rivers running…
It's because this way I can better make men feel
The truly real existence of flowers and rivers.

Because I write in order for them to read me I sometimes sacrifice myself
To their stupidity of senses…
I don't agree with myself but I absolve myself,
Because I am only that serious thing, an interpreter of Nature,
Because there are men that do not understand its language,
For there is no language at all.[43]

Caeiro believes poets and philosophers are led astray either because they are blind and using the wrong words or because they see things the wrong way as a result of their conceptual confusion. If he sometimes employs the same kind of vocabulary as they do, it is only because he wants them to read him so as to help these people. Of Wittgenstein's philosophy the same could be said: while the rigid and logical structure of both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* invite the logician and the philosopher to read these works as logic or philosophy respectively, they actually criticize those very fields. Caeiro and Wittgenstein employ the language of poetry and philosophy against poetry and philosophy itself. They adopt the language of their readers in order to help them see the world differently. The poet and the philosopher, lost in their own worlds of words, can only be led to seeing the world aright by showing them in their own words that the images they conjure up and the concepts they employ are mistaken. By using the wrong words and asking the wrong questions, that which was 'in plain view' has slipped out of it. If Caeiro and Wittgenstein time and again scrutinize the poet's and philosopher's use of language, it is to teach them to see the world in a different light. As to the nature of this light, however, a considerable difference between the two reveals itself.

Caeiro ultimately rejects thinking at all and claims (while writing these philosophical poems) that he does not have a philosophy, but only senses. In "My Gaze" (O Meu Olhar), we read that:

[…]

[43] XXXI – Se às Vezes Digo que as Flores Sorriem Se às vezes digo que as flores sorriem/ E se eu disser que os rios cantam,/ Não é porque eu julgue que há sorrisos nas flores/ E cantos no correr dos rios…/ É porque assim faço mais sentir aos homens falso/ A existência verdadeiramente real das flores e dos rios.
Porque escrevo para eles me lerem sacrifice-me às vezes/ À sua estupidez de sentidos…/ Não concordo comigo mas absolvo-me,/ Porque só sou essa cousa séria, um intérprete da Natureza,/ Porque há homens que não percebem a sua linguagem,/ Por ela não ser linguagem nenhuma.

I believe in the world as I do in a sunflower
Because I see it. But I don't think about it.
Because thinking is not understanding…

The World was not made for us to think about it
(Thinking is being eye sick)
But for us to look at it and agree
I don't have a philosophy: I have senses…[44]

[…]

According to Caeiro, 'thinking' implies that one has eye problems. He thus exhorts us to relinquish thought and *see* nature in all its glory. While I have tried to show that Caeiro's anti-philosophy is comparable to Wittgenstein's in its insistence on seeing through wrong language use, their reasons for being so critical of language greatly differ. While Wittgenstein set out to expose the inner workings of language, Caeiro holds a realist worldview.[45] If he criticizes poets and philosophers for their language use and conceptual confusion, it is because they are blind to the reality of 'flowers', 'trees' and 'stars'. With a child-like innocence, he wants to do away with all 'false' signs, such as metaphors and speculative concepts. For Caeiro, the physical world truly consists of 'flowers', 'trees' etc., not just as concepts, but as the material truth. Philosopher and poets have however lost this all too apparent truth out of sight because of their speculative concepts and mistaken mysticism. For the later Wittgenstein, on the other hand, these words would simply be part of our language games and not refer to an objective reality. The fact that we distinguish between 'trees' and 'flowers' only tells us something about our form of life and the rules of the language game we play. In contrast to Caeiro, he does not view language as a conglomeration of signs and referents, but as an enormous variety of language games governed by porous, social rules. Wittgenstein hence does not take aim at metaphorical

[44][…] Creio no mundo como num malmequer/ Porque o vejo. Mas não penso nele/ Porque pensar é não compreender… O Mundo não se fez para pensarmos nele/ (Pensar é estar doente dos olhos)/ Mas para olharmos para ele e estarmos de acordo…/ Eu não tenho filosofia: tenho sentidos… […].

[45] In his introduction to *The Keeper of Sheep*, Ricardo Reis (one of Pessoa's other main heteronyms) maintains that Caeiro's work "represents the absolute essence of paganism, fully reconstructed. […] Caeiro's oeuvre and its paganism were never thought through, nor were they even felt. They came from something within us deeper than feeling or reason. To say any more would be to explain, which serves no end; to affirm any less would be to lie" (Daniels 2007: 7). In addition, Caeiro himself has vehemently refused any kind of philosophical definition of his work, just as he did not want people to consider his work to be 'poetry'. When Álvaro de Campos (another Pessoan heteronym) questions him as to whether his doctrine is akin to materialism (except for his poetry), Caeiro responds by saying that "Mas isso a que V. chama poesia é que é tudo. Nem é poesia: é ver. Essa gente materialista é cega. V. diz que eles dizem que o espaço é infinito. Onde é que eles viram isso no espaço?" (But that what you call poetry is everything. It is not poetry: it is seeing. Those materialists are blind. You say that they maintain that space is infinite. Where do they see that in space?) (http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/683. Accessed 30 Jun. 2018).

language (he employs it himself all the time, as we have seen), but at philosophers creating conceptual confusion by mixing up different language games.

While both Caeiro and Wittgenstein thus underscore the precedence of the ordinary over the abstract, they hold strongly different views of what seeing the world correctly implies: for Wittgenstein this entails understanding our use of language, whereas for Caeiro this amounts to nothing less than obtaining objective truth.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have tried to shed light on the 'philosophical' Pessoa. In order to do so, I first had to deal with the question of 'heteronomy'. I have argued that, given Pessoa's insistence that he did not share a way of thinking with his principal heteronyms, we should be extremely careful when attributing ideas expressed by these heteronyms to Pessoa himself. Having made this preliminary point, I looked at the most straightforward of the philosophical writings within the Pessoan corpus, the *Philosophical Essays*. While being of relatively minor interest to my discussion of the philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the Pessoan corpus, they did provide an insight into the functioning of Fernando Pessoa's "heteronymic machine", as Adam Morris calls it.[46] Moving on from these essays, I discussed Alberto Caeiro's most important collection of poems, *The Keeper of Sheep*. By close-reading some of the poems within this collection, I have tried to demonstrate some striking affinities between Caeiro's 'anti-philosophy' and Wittgenstein's philosophical method. Like Wittgenstein, Caeiro time and again stresses the connection between language and seeing. Poets and philosophers do not see the world correctly because they are blind to the materiality of things and lost in their conceptual jumble. Whereas Wittgenstein offers his philosophy as a kind of therapy, Caeiro presents his poetry as lessons in unlearning. Their remedies do not follow from the same diagnosis, however: whereas Wittgenstein aspires to make the inner workings of language transparent in order to battle our bewitchment, Caeiro tries to bring the philosophers and poets back from their confused concepts to a 'self-evident' sensuous reality.

While Wittgenstein and Caeiro may ultimately hold different motivations for their

[46] In "Fernando Pessoa's Heteronymic Machine" (2014), Morris posits Pessoa's heteronymic universe next to Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatics. Regarding Pessoa's claim that he too was one of Caeiro's disciples, Morris writes that "[t]he effect of this "effacement" is that the concept of authorship is uprooted by the heteronymic machine, deterritorialized from a creative "subject" or "author" and banished to the nebulous territory of heteronimity and its constantly re-individuating individuals" (Morris 2014: 135).

philosophical method, they do share a disdain for the philosophy of the kind practised by Anon and Search. Wittgenstein and Caeiro are, as it were, 'anti-philosophers'[47]: if they are practising philosophy at all, it cannot have anything to do with erecting metaphysical structures and abstract speculation. In the next chapter, I will define Wittgenstein's and Caeiro's poetic 'anti-philosophy' further by invoking Kierkegaard's notion of the 'subjective thinker'. Acclaimed by Wittgenstein as "the most profound thinker of the 19th century" and using similar literary procedures as Pessoa, Kierkegaard suggests that 'truth' is subjective and can only be communicated indirectly (Drury 1984: 87). What precisely this subjectivity entails I hope to make clear in the next chapter.

[47] Term coined by Badiou. See his *Wittgenstein's antiphilosophy* (2011).

CHAPTER 3

THE SUBJECTIVE THINKER: SØREN KIERKEGAARD

While Wittgenstein maintained that philosophy should be written poetically and Pessoa confessed himself to be a poet animated by philosophy, within Kierkegaard's works the line between philosophy and poetry itself becomes blurred. A poet, a philosopher as well as a theologian, Kierkegaard's oeuvre defies description. What makes Kierkegaard relevant to my discussion of Wittgenstein and Pessoa is that he is one of the few thinkers who have been associated with both authors, *and* that he offers a conceptual framework to think through the kind of poetic philosophy shared by Wittgenstein and Caeiro.[48] In this chapter, I will appropriate Kierkegaard's concepts of 'indirect communication' and the 'subjective thinker' in order to characterize the (anti-)philosophy of Wittgenstein and Caeiro. In contrast to the Hegelian philosopher, the subjective thinker does not content himself with changing people's ideas; instead, he tries to alter the way his audience experiences the world. He does not believe in constructing a systematic philosophy, but attempts to convey a different way of understanding. Instead of telling his audience what to do, the subjective thinker tries to show them how to *look*.

It is by no means my intention to argue that the philosophical activity of Wittgenstein and Caeiro can only be understood from the viewpoint of the subjective thinker. I do think, however, that Kierkegaard's subjective thinker offers a conceptual framework to render the interplay between poetry and philosophy within Wittgenstein and Caeiro's thinking more intelligible. In "Existentialism and Analytical Philosophy", Stanley Cavell writes that "[b]oth Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard see their worlds as laboring under illusion. Both see their function as authors to be the uncovering or diagnosing of this illusion, and freeing us from it. In both, the cure requires that we be brought back to our ordinary human existence" (Cavell 1964: 958). As I have argued in the last chapter, the same goes for Caeiro. Instead of erecting philosophical systems, the subjective thinker tries to dispel metaphysical nonsensicality and conceptual confusion by bringing us back to our ordinary human existence.[49] My central

[48] See Drury (1984) and Alain Bellache-Zacharie (2012).

[49] The philosophical project of the subject thinker shares some striking traits with Merleau-Ponty's physically based phenomenology. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, he writes that "the fundamental philosophical act would […] be to return to the lived world beneath the objective world (since in this lived world we will be able to understand the law as much as the limits of the objective world)" (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 57). Instead of wanting to understand 'objectivity' as objectivity, the focus of our research should be the way in which the world presents itself to the subject. Such an enterprise would not just be an intellectual affair, but strongly rooted within the 'senses': "Sensing is this living communication with the world that makes it present to us as the familiar place of our life. The perceived object and the perceiving subject owe their thickness to sensing" (53).

question in this chapter is: In what sense do Wittgenstein and Caeiro qualify as 'subjective thinkers'?

3.1 CLIMACUS'S INDIRECT COMMUNICAITON

Kierkegaard introduces the notion of the subjective thinker in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, a work attributed to Johannes Climacus.[50] In Part II, entitled "The subjective problem. The subject's relation to the truth of Christianity, or what it is to become a Christian", Climacus opposes objective truth to subjective truth. Contrary to most philosophers, he proclaims himself to be interested in the latter. Climacus describes the difference between the two kinds of truth as follows: "For objective reflection the truth becomes something objective, an object, and the thing is to disregard the subject. For subjective reflection the truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the thing is precisely, in existing, to deepen oneself in subjectivity" (Kierkegaard 2009: 161). While objective truth is detached, subjective truth revolves around existence. Given that we are always somewhere in space and time, Climacus maintains that the path of truth for a human being is necessarily that of subjective truth. Against the Hegelians, he argues that our thinking is ultimately always grounded in existence.[51] It is thus not by vaingloriously trying to erase our subjectivity that we arrive at truth, but by tapping into that very subjectivity. This has important consequences for the way we try to communicate the 'truth': since we cannot communicate our subjectivity (inwardness) directly, we necessarily have to do it indirectly.[52] Grasping what it is to exist and knowing what inwardness means imply for Kierkegaard that

> If I wanted to communicate anything on this point, the main thing was that my exposition be in the *indirect* form. For if inwardness is the truth, result is only junk that we should not trouble one another with, and wanting to impart the result an unnatural form of interpersonal association, in so far as every human being is spirit and truth is precisely the self-activity of appropriation, which a result hinders (Kierkegaard 2009: 203).

[50] Kierkegaard, like Pessoa, employed a whole array of pseudonyms in his work. For a portrait of Johannes Climacus, see *Kierkegaard's 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript': a Critical Guide* (2010).

[51] The relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel is far too contentious and complex to describe in a few sentences. Regarding subjective truth, Kierkegaard reproaches Hegel among other things for the fact that his thinking is ungrounded in 'existence', which precisely complicates thinking so much: "[…] [T]he Hegelian philosophy puts existence into confusion through not defining its relation to someone existing, by ignoring the ethical" (259).

[52] On page 171, Climacus explains why subjectivity is truth. Given the religious grounding of his argument and the longevity of his exegesis, I have decided to leave it out here. It is not so much my intention here to show that subjectivity is indeed truth, as to discuss to what kind of communication subjective truth leads to.

Students do not learn by copying whatever the teacher throws at them, but by internalizing the teacher's truth through "*self*-activity" (203). They have to see the truth of what they are taught for themselves. For Kierkegaard, any *direct* communication of inwardness as such is a misunderstanding, as inwardness can only be communicated indirectly, through experience.[53]

In Chapter 3 of Part II entitled 'the subjective truth, inwardness; truth is subjectivity', Climacus expands on his notion of subjective truth by introducing 'the subjective thinker'. Here, he explains why abstract thought does not succeed in finding answers to the questions that are most important to us:

> The suspect nature of abstract thought becomes evident exactly in connection with all existence-questions, where the abstraction removes the difficulty by dropping it and then priding itself on having explained everything. It explains immortality in general and, what do you know?, everything goes excellently in as much as immortality becomes identical with eternity, the eternity that is essentially the medium of thought. But whether an existing individual human being is immortal, which is just the difficulty, this is something that abstract thought does not trouble itself with. It is disinterested. Yet the difficulty with existence is what interests one who exists […] (253).

In other words, abstract thought leads to general explanations that do not have any bearing on individual existence. The answers we get through abstract thinking hence do not provide us with answers to the questions most fundamental to us, i.e. the ones related to our existence. Kierkegaard does not qualify objective knowledge as nonsensical or unimportant, but highlights that the truths most important to us are necessarily subjective in character. The subjective thinker moreover practises what he preaches. The objective thinker, on the other hand, is easily caught out for his ingenuity: "[T]hat the thinker's own existence contradicts his thinking, shows that one is merely lecturing. That thinking is higher than feeling and imagination is taught by a thinker who has himself neither pathos nor passion" (254).

The subjective thinker does not put thinking on a pedestal, but equally acknowledges the importance of feeling and imagination. He cannot cut his thinking loose from existence, nor does he want to. He necessarily thinks from within existence, as he cannot do otherwise. Climacus even states that it is "the subjective thinker's task *to understand himself in existence*. […] [T]he subjective thinker is one who exists, and yet he is one who thinks. He does not

[53] In 'Kierkegaard's case for the irrelevance of philosophy', Aumann notes that Climacus faces the same problem as the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*: of having to make statements that are impermissible by the criteria of the work itself. Aumann writes that "Climacus discusses the person who wants to communicate the conviction that "truth is inwardness; objectively there is no truth, but the appropriation is the truth" (CUP, p. 77). The challenge facing this person is to communicate his conviction without turning it into something that is itself an objective truth" (Aumann 2009: 236).

abstract from existence […] but is in it, and yet he is to think. In all his thinking, then, he includes the thought that he is someone existing" (294). Without touching upon the intricacies of Kierkegaard's discussion of existence as a dialectic between possibility and actuality[54], we understand that for Kierkegaard (or better, Climacus) subjective thinking entails (at least) both indirect communication and a passionate engagement with a subjective truth. In the following, I will relate the concept of the subjective thinker to the teachings of Wittgenstein and Caeiro.

3.2 WITTGENSTEIN AND CAEIRO

In 6.52 of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein writes that "[W]e feel that even when *all possible* scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer".[55] These Wittgensteinian phrases chime with Climacus's observation that objective, detached knowledge does not bear at all on our existence. Even if we were to solve all scientific riddles, questions surrounding the meaning of life would persist. Although (the later) Wittgenstein does not claim to solve these *Lebensprobleme*, his philosophy is an attempt to at least render them transparent, by showing that they often prove to be linguistic problems at close inspection. And so does Caeiro. Neither Wittgenstein nor Caeiro make philosophical arguments that want to be judged to be true or false; above all, they offer a *view* of the world. They suggest that if we learn to look at the world in the way they propose, we will see that many of our assumptions prove to be metaphysical falsities. Heeding their own subjectivity, Wittgenstein and Caeiro do not disdain the ordinary for the abstract. Quite the contrary. In *The Keeper of Sheep*, Caeiro repeatedly scorns vague, abstract questions, none the more so than in "There's Metaphysics Enough in not Thinking about Anything":

[…]

What do I think about the world?

[54] Kierkegaard's subjective thinker contains far more (dialectic) intricacies than I can possibly convey here. Within Kierkegaard's argument, faith plays a fundamental role, upholding subjectivity's truth. In this chapter, my focus lies more with the *type* of thinker the subjective thinker represents, than with Kierkegaard's conceptual grounding for its veracity. For more detailed discussions of indirect communication and the subjective thinker, see for example Kellenberger (1984) or Turnbull (2009).

[55] Wir fühlen, dass, selbst wenn alle möglichen wissenschaftlichen Fragen beantwortet sind, unsere Lebensprobleme noch gar nicht berührt sind. Freilich bleibt dann eben keine Frage mehr; und eben dies ist die Antwort (Wittgenstein 2018).

I don’t know what I think about the world!

[…]

What do I make of things?

What is my opinion of causes and effects?

[…]

The mystery of things? I don’t know what a mystery is!

By asking the wrong questions, we end up with the wrong answers. It is for this reason that we read in the *Tractatus* that “most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical” (4.003). In order to counter these falsities, Wittgenstein and Caeiro do not resort to more metaphysics. Instead, they try to teach their audience to dismiss metaphysics entirely. Instead of making other metaphysical claims to critique metaphysics, they teach us to look at the world differently. Wittgenstein and Caeiro do not aspire to add to our knowledge, but to rearrange our perception. As good (Kierkegaardian) teachers, they realize that they have to communicate indirectly: they can only give us the tools so that we can learn to see for ourselves. If Wittgenstein asks us to think of language as a city with old and new neighbourhoods or when Caeiro encourages us to look at the trees and think about their ‘metaphysics’, we should not take these exhortations as mere embellishment of some ‘deeper’ thought. In order for them to make us understand how they themselves see the world, poetic imagery is instrumental. There is no other way to convey these thoughts; the message is intrinsically poetic. Instead of proffering abstract thoughts that do not relate to existence whatsoever, their philosophy is thoroughly subjective: our correct or incorrect understanding of the world is determined by our perspective, which hinges on the language we use. Whether we agree with what we see ultimately depends on whether we find the ‘truth’ they want us to see convincing, not on a particular argument.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have attempted to characterize the kind of philosophical activity Wittgenstein and Pessoa are engaged in. Having established that they are not philosophers in the orthodox sense of the word, I have used Kierkegaard’s notion of the ‘subjective thinker’ as a conceptual framework to frame their way of philosophizing. Although Kierkegaard’s subjective thinker is a much more complex figure than I could possibly convey in these pages, he distinguishes

himself among other things by his use of indirect communication and his passionate engagement with his subjective truth. I have argued that the subjective thinker can serve as a conceptual framework for understanding how philosophy and poetry are one within Wittgenstein and Caeiro's works. By foregrounding seemingly trivial observations over abstract ideas and by teaching a perspective instead of a system, Wittgenstein and Caeiro share some fundamental traits with him. The truth they teach is lived and can only be conveyed indirectly, i.e. existentially and poetically. Their philosophy is necessary poetic and vice versa.

CONCLUSION

Which are the philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein's poetic philosophy and Pessoa's philosophical poetry?

In this thesis, I have argued for the existence of some profound philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein's poetic philosophy and Caeiro's philosophical poetry. In the first chapter, I argued that poetic imagery is essential to Wittgenstein's method of doing philosophy. Insisting on the intimate relationship between language and seeing (correctly), Wittgenstein employs many idiosyncratic images to make us see his perspective on the nature of language. His poetic imagery serves to enable us to see through conceptual confusion as well as to render his alternative view perceptible. In the second chapter, I discussed Pessoa's 'philosophy'. Starting from the most 'purely' philosophical of his works, the *Philosophical Essays*, I have argued for the importance of taking the heteronymous character of Pessoa's work seriously, hence precluding the very possibility of establishing a Pessoan philosophy. While the *Philosophical Essays* were seen to differ substantially from Wittgenstein's poetic philosophy, Alberto Caeiro's *The Keeper of Sheep* proved to contain various philosophical thoughts akin to those of Wittgenstein. I noted Caeiro's insistence that by learning to see the right way, we become able to see through abstract concepts that only confuse instead of enlighten. His poetry consists of lessons in unlearning, similar to the way in which Wittgenstein considered his (later) philosophy to be a remedy against language's bewitchment. In order to frame this kind of philosophy, which is firmly rooted in existence and emphasizes the intimate relationship between using the right language and seeing aright over abstract system building, I introduced the Kierkegaardian notion of the subjective thinker. More specifically, in my third chapter I have argued that Kierkegaard's 'subjective thinker' offers a conceptual framework for thinking through Wittgenstein's and Caeiro's methods of philosophizing that is deeply rooted in subjectivity and very critical of philosophy itself.

While I believe the philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein's and Caeiro's 'anti-philosophy' to be apparent, this is much less clear for the Pessoan corpus as a whole. As heteronymity is such a fundamental trait of the Pessoan corpus, the central question of this thesis is perhaps unanswerable. Moreover, the corpus as a whole raises many philosophical questions that I have not been able to address within the confines of this thesis and of which I believe we still have only scratched the surface. Just as the poetic quality of Wittgenstein's work has rarely been the focus of the philosopher's attention, Pessoa's 'philosophy' has been

overlooked by literary scholars.[56] One of my reasons for wanting to write this thesis has been to bridge this gap. Having been trained in both philosophy and literary studies, I have been surprised by the lack of overlap between these two fields of study. The works of Wittgenstein and Caeiro, in any case, provoke us to rethink the boundaries between them. Is Caeiro for example less of philosophical interest because he writes poetry? Conversely, are not literary forms essential to Wittgenstein's philosophy? From the perspective of the subjective thinker, it does not matter whether one writes philosophy or poetry: it is the subjective truth one tries to communicate. In this thesis, I have tried to show that approaching Wittgenstein from a literary point of view and reading Caeiro as a philosopher sheds new light on both. For future research, I recommend analysing Wittgenstein's writing style in more detail, beyond his poetic imagery, with a special focus on his figures of speech. In addition, I propose studying the nature of his metaphors in much greater depth, by analysing them through the lens of Lakoff's "contemporary theory of metaphor" for example. Regarding Pessoa, I suggest a juxtaposition of the philosophical strands corresponding to his various heteronyms. Such an overview would give us both a better understanding of the 'philosophical' Pessoa and would render the wealth of philosophical ideas present within the corpus more conspicuous. I think both these research project would prove highly rewarding.

By setting out to analyse the philosophical affinities between Wittgenstein and Pessoa, I may have fallen into the trap that Wittgenstein and Caeiro warn us against time and again: that the wrong conceptual distinctions lead us to asking the wrong questions. However, if I have succeeded in opening up a new perspective on the relationship between poetry and philosophy by pointing out some essential affinities between Wittgenstein and Caeiro, I consider my mission completed, if only from the point of view of our 'subjective thinkers'.

[56] The Universade Nova de Lisboa has recently set up a research group on 'literature and philosophy' to fill this lacuna. They maintain that "The relationship between philosophy and the poetic thinking of Pessoa is still a massively overlooked aspect in both philosophical research and Pessoan Studies" (http://www.aelab.ifilnova.pt/pages/research-group-on-pessoa-and-philosophy. Accessed 29 Jun. 2018).

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