Thesis

Title: Two governments, one policy: A critical discourse analysis of government speeches regarding Prevent strategy.

Subtitle: Selection and salience: The British government framing of the Prevent strategy.

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Abstract:

This thesis focuses on the framing of the Prevent strategy by the Brown and Cameron government. The purpose is to examine whether the theory of framing can explain how Prevent was framed by the two governments. The theory of framing is partially predictive for the case study. The methodology that has been applied to reveal the framing of Prevent is the Critical Discourse Analysis. Four elements were analyzed. Firstly, the central words towards the discourse of the strategy were identified. Secondly, the assumption upon which the Prevent discourse is based. Thirdly, the framing of Prevent was analyzed in a thematic manner. Finally, the tone towards the strategy was identified. The results show that there was a significant change in the framing of Prevent between the two governments. Brown's strategy focused on Al Qaeda fear and violent extremism, while Cameron's had a wider aim. It focused on all forms of terrorism and all forms of extremism. Brown's Prevent had two strands: the integration and counterterrorism part, while Cameron's had only the counterterrorism part. Brown focused on the role of Muslims regarding Prevent and its impact on them, while Cameron focuses on all faith communities. Both frame Prevent as a 'dilemma between security versus liberties' strategy. Cameron frames Prevent as a 'shared effort strategy' and takes institutions as central. The tone of Brown ministry towards Prevent is mostly positive while Cameron's is mostly negative.

Introduction:

It is not the first time that United Kingdom faces terrorism. The first time that United Kingdom faced terrorism was with the Irish Republican Army and today they face the fear of Al-Qaeda. The fear of terrorism resulted in a series of Acts. Those Acts have been influenced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the following attacks in Madrid in 2004, the 7/7 London bombings, the Paris attacks; which prove once again that terrorism is one of the most serious threats to international security.

The thesis is based on the case study of Prevent strategy which is a British counterterrorism strategy that is a key part of a broader counterterrorism strategy called Contest. Prevent is the most significant part of the Contest strategy "where about $140m is being spent on Prevent programs" (Sliwinski, 2013, p. 293). Prevent launched in 2007 and was revised in 2009 during the Brown's government. In 2011 it got revised for a second time during the years of Cameron's administration. Prevent has been placed on a statutory footing with the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 "as it became increasingly discredited and was described as a "toxic brand" ("What is Prevent?", 2016).

As the name describes it, the strategy focuses on "responding to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat [people] face from those who promote it" (*Prevent strategy*, 2011). It also focuses on "preventing people from being drawn into terrorism and ensuring that they are given appropriate advice and support" (*Prevent strategy*, 2011). Cameron's government worked with many agencies and institutions to promote Prevent ("Profound - What is Prevent", 2016). It has as its focus to recognize changes in behavior that is related to extremism and report any change to the local authorities ("Profound - What is Prevent", 2016).

This strategy received a lot of criticism by many scholars (Awan, 2012; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; Ragazzi, 2014, 2016; Thomas, 2010). They either state that it has failed, is friendless or targets Muslims as the 'new suspect community'. This strategy has received negative criticism by the media as well (Gardner, 2015; "Muslim Council says Prevent anti-terror scheme has 'failed' - BBC News", 2016; Ramadan, 2016; Shabi, 2016; Versi, 2016 ;).

What this thesis tries to investigate is how the Prevent was framed by the two governments, if there was a change in the framing of the strategy and which ways it was framed so as to still be in power despite severe criticisms.

More specifically, the goal of the thesis is to examine whether the scope of the strategy was shifted by comparing the two-time periods of these two governments to see if there is a convergence or discrepancy in the framing of this strategy.

The research question of the thesis is "How did the Gordon Brown's and David Cameron's governments frame Prevent?"

The empirical gap that this thesis fills in is that it offers a systematic analysis of the framing of Prevent by making a comparison between the framing of the two governments. The reason why I chose the years from 2007-2016 and the reason why I chose Prevent as my case study is because I wanted to fill in the empirical gap in the academic literature as there is currently no such a research that compares the framing of Prevent by these two governments. The reason why I chose these two governments is because Prevent revised many times by them and although these revisions received many criticisms, it is still in effect.

What this thesis tries to examine is to what extent framing theory can predict the shifting of narratives and whether the use of specific words and saliency can change the framing of a governmental policy.

Literature review

The theory that this thesis is based on is the theory of framing. Framing theory "is related to the agenda setting but expands the research by focusing on the essence of the issues at hand" ("Framing Theory", 2016). As many authors state, framing is the way something "is located, perceived, identified and labeled" (Goffman, 1974, p.21). It is the selection, emphasis and salience on different aspects of a topic (Chong, Druckman, 2007; De Vreese ,2005; Gitlin 1980), the "construction of reality" (Tuchman 1978), the "promotion of particular definitions and interpretations of political issues" (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015; Semetko, Valkenburg, 2000; Shah et al. 2002, p.343) or the exclusion of others, is "a tool for political actors to define political issues and portray them in a certain light" (Pokalova, 2011, p.18) and it is a way that political power is produced (Entman, 1993). Frames have both "cognitive and affective elements" (McCombs & Ghanem 2001, p. 78). Elites use frames to create a level of justification of a policy (Callaghan & Schnell, 2005) and "win public support for their actions" (Edelman, 1993, p. 231). The most important aspect of framing for this thesis is that "framing essentially involves selection and salience in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation" (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

Goffman introduced framing theory and he divided the primary frameworks in natural and social ("Framing Theory", 2016). Framing can be divided into two broad categories: the sociological and psychological frame. The sociological frame serves as "a process facilitating constructions of social reality, it serves as a schema of interpretation allowing individuals to process information they receive; while the psychological treats framing to engender specific policy responses through various presentations of an issue" (Pokalova, 2011, p. 17). The focus of this thesis is not on the framing effect but merely on how the government framed and

communicated Prevent to the public. It is based on the sociological frame rather than the psychological one.

Frames and discourses are interrelated. Discourse "is located in the language domain, while frames involve broader means of social construction of reality, including stereotypes and symbolic devices" (Pokalova, 2011, p.23). Cromby and Nightingale argue that "discourse is both the carrier of the meanings and the medium of them" (1999, p. 4) while Johnstone focuses on the connection of thoughts and language as the way that people understand and interpret things (2002). Elder & Cobb state that language has the power to shape the perceived reality (1983) and Chilton points out that "language and politics are intimately linked at a fundamental level" (2004, p. 4).

There is a significant literature that examine frames and the framing effects (Andrade, 2013; Entman, 1991; Gamson, 1992; Goffman, 1974; Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Neuman, Just & Crigler, 1992; Price, Tewksbury & Powers, 1997; Zaller, 1992).

Apart from the focus of this research on counterterrorism policies, McDonald & Smith-Rowsey conducted a research on the framing of NETFLIX in Obama's speeches (2016). They revealed that three frames were used towards NETFLIX: the disparagement frame, the futurist frame and the dramatic to justify future policy regulations over the media (2016).

There are those (Reese & Lewis, 2009; Brinson & Stohl, 2009, 2012; Norris, Kern & Just, 2003) who have examined the issue of the power of framing of terrorism on influencing the audience and serving as a justification of counter-terrorism policies.

According to the literature on how governments frame policies, the war on terror is a common example of "a language construct" (Pokalova, 2011, p. 25), which serves as "a justification and normalization of the global campaign of counterterrorism" (Jackson, 2005,

acknowledgement, p. 1). Jackson focused on the US administration and he found out that the assumption upon which the counterterrorism policies were justified is the threat, danger and emergency to the American values (2005). He focused also on the role of the discourse as a justification of the "practice of torture by US forces" (2007, p. 368). He stated that that these practices were justified because of the "widely disseminated and continuously reproduced narratives, combined with pre-existing institutional practices and historical experiences" (2007, p. 368). These practices had a negative effect "on the practice of torture on the human rights regime, the reputation and identity of US as a Great Power and as a promoter of liberal values" (2007, p. 369). The Bush government invoked the emotions of the American citizens by using "a hyperbolic in the extreme discourse by stating that terrorism posed a threat to civilization, to the very essence of what you do, to our way of life, to the peace of the world" (2007, p. 358).

Pilecki et al. conducted a comparative study of the Bush and Obama speeches to reveal if there is a convergence in their discourse towards the justification of post 9/11 counterterrorism policies. They found that the counterterrorism strategies were justified as "a necessary and rational solution to the scope and severity of the terrorist threat" (Pilecki et al., 2014, p. 285). Lazar and Lazar (2004) and Sowinska (2013) focused on the obligation towards defending universal moral values as a justification for counterterrorism policies.

De Castella & McGarty conducted a comparative study of the political rhetoric of George W. Bush and Tony Blair during 2001-2003. They revealed that "fear content may have helped to legitimize foreign policy positions; but they state that is even possible that fear rhetoric may have undermined popular support in the lead-up to War in Iraq" (2011, p. 197). Fear content was also revealed in the Australian Prime Minister John Howard's discourse which was "selectively deployed" (De Castella et al., 2009, p.1) to support counterterrorism

policies. They found that fear varied significantly during the years under examination (De Castella et. al, 2009, p. 1).

Drawing from the pilot research it became clear that Prevent was associated with the balance of the security vs. liberty. The assumption of this thesis is that the strategy was justified as necessary for the security of the United Kingdom at the expense of civil liberties. For this reason, securitization as a concept needs to be examined. The Copenhagen school made an important contribution to the securization theory. According this school "security is ultimately an outcome of a special social process or a speech act rather than an objective condition" (Sethi, 2015, n.p.). The School stated that "something becomes a security issue when it is labelled as posing an existential threat to some object – a threat that needs to be dealt with immediately and with extraordinary measures" (Diskaya, 2013, n.p.). This theory sees security "as existential threat to someone's survival" (Diskaya, 2013, n.p). Security is a situation that can be created by discourse, framing of a situation as emergency, threat or danger.

Summarizing the literature, what most scholars focused on is the case of the threat and danger that terrorism creates and uses as arguments by many governments to justify counterterrorism policies. Most of the studies focus on the case of US discourse and there is less literature for the case of the United Kingdom. Most of the studies focus on the analysis of the discourse on the war on terrorism and not on the discourse on counterterrorism policies. All of them focus on the role of discourse and the theory framing as an explanation of the justification of a policy. Most of them concluded that framing theory is essential to their cases as it proved that the selection and emphasis on specific words can create or reorient the way that a policy is framed.

The attempt of this thesis is to examine whether only the two mechanisms of framing

theory, saliency and selection, are enough to explain how a policy is framed. If not, the thesis wishes to suggest that other conditions (i.e. the ideology of a political party, a social crisis) might influence the framing of a policy.

Methodology:

The thesis is based on the case study of the Prevent strategy. The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the framing of Prevent "as a means to organize a story line (sociological perspective)" (Pokalova, 2011, p. 34). The thesis allows for future investigation into the psychological perspective of the framing. It is a comparative study of the framing of Prevent by the two governments. The time frame is from 26 of June 2007 until 11 May 2010, the years that Gordon Brown was in office and from 11 of May 2010 until 13 July 2016, the years that David Cameron was in office.

The corpus of the research includes 20 ministerial speeches. The parliamentary speeches were retrieved via the website https://www.theyworkforyou.com/ and https://hansard.parliament.uk/ and the data was retrieved by typing the words "Prevent strategy".

The methodology that is used to reveal the framing of Prevent is the critical discourse analysis (CDA).

CDA, focuses on the analysis of the discourse as a form of social practice (Fairclough 2001). It "argues that all linguistic usage encodes ideological positions and studies how language mediates and represents the world" (Rashidi & Souzandehfar, 2010, p. 56). CDA has become a "well established field in the social sciences" (Van Dijk, 2011, p. 357). It focuses on "the analysis of social problems" (Beall, 2009, p. 193). It "implies a relationship between a discursive event and the [actor] that frames it" (Wodak, 1996, p. 15).

CDA is a suitable method for analyzing the speeches because it can explain "the construction of a series of meta-narratives that reconstructs preventative counterterrorism policy through an implicit fear of the 'other' as a source of insecurity and uncertainty." (Beall, 2009, p. 193).

It is a good analytical tool for this research as it "is concerned with how language and discourse play a role in the maintenance of power" (Beall, 2009, p. 194). It is "seeing words as having meaning in a particular historical, social and political condition" (Mogashoa, 2014, p. 10).

On the other hand, there are some limitations regarding CDA. "Some accuse it of operating somewhat randomly, moved by personal whim rather than well-grounded scholarly principle". (Breeze, 2011, p.498). This limitation is balanced by the argument that discourse is subjective and serves a purpose which in the case of Prevent is political.

The ministerial speeches were analyzed according to the following steps:

Firstly, "each text was coded to determine the key words, terms, phrases and labels that are central" (Baker-Beall, 2009, p. 65) to the framing of the strategy. Secondly, "the ministerial speeches were analyzed to identify the different assumptions upon which the Prevent discourse is based" (Baker-Beall, 2009, p. 65). Thirdly, the discourse was "categorized in a thematic manner" (Baker-Beall, 2009, p. 65). Finally, the texts were analyzed according to their tone (positive, negative, not clear) regarding the strategy.

This four-step analysis provides a unique and comprehensive way of exploring the framing of the strategy by the ministers of the two governments.

Empirical part:

Regarding the data, twenty ministerial speeches of Brown and Cameron ministry were analyzed; ten for each government. The debates can be found in the appendix (Table 4). For the analysis of the debates, the quotes that were used, have the number of the debate that they belong to.

Table 1: Central Frames of Prevent:

Gordon Brown ministry	David Cameron ministry
Definition:	Definition:
Preventing radicalization	Preventing radicalization
Preventing terrorism (Al Qaeda and its affiliates)	Preventing all forms of terrorism (Al Qaeda and its affiliates and the right wing)
Preventing violent extremism	Preventing all forms of extremism violent and nonviolent extremism
Integration and counterterrorism are both strands of the strategy	Structural reform plan: separation of counterterrorism and integration. Integration is considered as a prerequisite
Focus mostly on Muslims	Focus on all faith communities not only on Muslims
Concern about the impact on Muslims but does not admit that the impact is negative	The government admits that the previous Brown's Prevent had a negative impact on Muslims, that is why Prevent was reviewed and that is why integration is not a part of Prevent anymore
Prevent as a 'dilemma of balance between security versus civil liberties' strategy	Prevent as a 'dilemma of balance between security versus civil liberties' strategy

Only in three debates there is a reference in the engagement of institutions Not been set on a statutory footing	The engagement of institutions is central In 2015 Prevent was introduced on a statutory footing→more power to institutions to report radicalization, terrorism→Role of institutions is central
No reference to explicit control of Prevent funding	Explicit control of Prevent funding
Prevent as 'a national and international' level strategy	Prevent as 'a national and international' level strategy
No reference to proportionality of Prevent	The proportionality of Prevent strategy to the threat is central
Clearer positive tone towards Prevent	Clearer negative tone towards Prevent

Table 2: Central words, assumptions, themes and tonality towards Prevent by the Brown and Cameron ministry:

The speeches of the Brown administration are indicated with the color brown and those of Cameron's with blue.

Year	Speech	Words central to Prevent	Assumption upon which Prevent is based	Theme of Prevent discourse	Tone towards Prevent
2007	1, 2 a,b	1,2a,b:**prevent radicalization and terrorism** 1:**inclusive and safe society for all** 2b:Prevent work is to…map out the diversity of different cultures and communities, to support and address that (**integration**) 2b:involving **Muslims**…to work out Prevent	terrorist threat	1: rejection of stigma towards the Muslims 2a,b: security versus liberties	1: Negative 2: a, b Negative
2008	3,4,5,6	3,4,5,6:**prevent**, restrict and disrupt terrorism **radicalization** and **violent extremism** 5,6:engagement & consultation of **Muslim** communities& other faith groups	terrorist threat	3: 'new' wave of terrorism 4: security versus liberties 5: engagement of communities	3: Not clear 4: Negative 5: Positive 6: Positive

		4:**balance** the rights and **freedoms** with the ability to ensure **security**		6: engagement of communities	
2009	7,8:a,b, 9,10	7,8a,b,9,10:prevent**violent extremism** 8b: **integrate** communities 8a,b:**International &local** strategy 7,8a:DCLG, police, schools, universities, **institutions**, prisons 8a,9:**balance security versus liberties** 8a:**balance** of academic freedom with the protection against radicalization 8a,b:engagement of **Muslims**	terrorist threat	7: engagement of communities 8:a,b: engagement of communities 9: security versus liberties 10: rejection of stigma	7: Positive 8a,b:Mixted 9: Positive 10: Mixed
2010	11,12	11:**Structural reformation: separation** of counterterrorism and integration part 11,12:Prevention of terrorism, 12: Prevention of radicalization 12:**not securitize** the **integration** strategy 12:a successful Prevent strategy **depends on an integrated society** 12:Prevent be **proportionate** to the [terrorist] challenge	terrorist threat	11: security versus liberties 12: security versus liberties	11: negative 12: negative
2011	13,14	13:Prevent to **do just that: prevent** people become terrorists, we do not want to use counterterrorism money to promote integration. Integration will be addressed by the DCLG 13:support **institutions** where radicalization is most prevalent 13:Our response will be…**proportionate** to the threat 14:stop people being drawn into terrorism 14:tackle radicalization in **this country and overseas** 14:tackle **both violent and nonviolent extremism** 14:**all forms of terrorism (incl. right wing)** 14:Prevent **depends on a successful integration** strategy; integration will do separately and differently from Prevent 14:work with **institutions**: education, health care providers, universities	terrorist threat	13: security versus liberty 14: rejection of stigma	13: negative 14: mixed

		faith groups, charities ,prisons, criminal justice system, police 14:a strand of Prevent **work takes place overseas**			
2012	15	Extreme right wing threats as well as Islamist-related **(all forms of terrorism)** Change of emphasis (**separation** of counterterrorism and integration)	terrorist threat	Engagement of communities	Not clear
2013	16	Prevent radicalization &terrorism	terrorist threat	Security versus liberties	negative
2014	17	**Nonviolent extremism** as well as violent extremism (all forms) clear **demarcation** between counter-terrorism work and integration work Prevent introduced **explicit controls to public money** **Separate** the two strands of work of the Prevent strategy: the counterterrorism work and the integration work Prevent people who want to undertake…terrorist acts The Home Office sets the Prevent strategy and it is up to the rest of Whitehall …the public sector and civil society to deliver it (**shared effort**) To reach out and work with people in Muslim communities in the United Kingdom to ensure that we address the real issues of potential radicalization **Cross-government approach** to deal with extremism **Prevent funding** should be focusing not according to the number of Muslims living in a community but according to the risk of radicalization **Universities**…to try to stop the sort of radicalization	terrorist threat	Rejection of the stigma	mixed
2015	18,19	18,19: **statutory basis** into the statutory bodies…including nurseries, schools and universities 18,19:Stop people becoming terrorists or supporting extremism 18:**all forms of terrorism** (incl. right wing) 18:prevent **both violent and**	terrorist threat	Security versus liberties	mixed

Year	Speech	Excerpt			
		nonviolent extremism 18:Prevent relies on the **co-operation** of many organizations to be effective…schools, health sector, prisons, the police 18:Challenging and tackling extremism is a **shared effort** 18:Prevent has changed to being one of safeguarding and protecting people's liberties 19: **Schools**, **universities** and colleges are in a unique position to…challenge extremist ideology; we all have to play our part; Schools and colleges have a vital role to play			
2016	20	Prevent is about radicalization, safeguarding Unique model of **partnership** between government, civil society and industry **all forms of terrorism** (incl. right wing) Prevent means working **at home and abroad** to respond…to the threat (national and international level)	terrorist threat	Engagement of communities	positive

In the analysis of the debates, the following quotes were central to the framing of the Prevent strategy:

Table 3: Basic excerpts on the framing of Prevent

Year	Speech	Excerpt-Framing of Prevent
2007	1	*…we must and shall continue to work with the Muslim communities to increase their sense of inclusion…preventing radicalization is a key issue for our "prevent" strategy…* *…preventing radicalization is a key issue for our "prevent" strategy…* *…concerns about the impact that this debate will have on the Muslim community…* *…not aim at a particular race or religion or any other group…*
2007	2a,b	*…prevent people from falling prey to terrorist influences in this country…* *…one of the elements of Prevent is to look at and try to map out more the diversity of different cultures and communities to support and address that…* *…challenge posed by the terrorist threat…*

		...where judged necessary, improved security ...[while]...protecting the civil liberties ... *...prisons, universities, colleges or schools... mosques and ...imams... root out terrorist influences that would undermine our society...* *...young people, schools, madrassahs & mosques...to root out those who are extremists...* *...the current legislation makes it difficult for us to take preventive action...*
2008	3	*...preventing individuals from engaging in terrorism-related activities as well as with restricting and disrupting them...* *...the threat is clearly genuine, serious, and unparalleled in the country's history...*
2008	4	*...prevent restrict and the disrupt individuals engaging in terrorism related activity...* *...how important it is that we balance our rights and our freedoms—all the things we hold dear within the nation—with the ability to ensure security...* *...there is no doubt that the rights of our people are absolutely paramount. Our liberty... [is] so important to us, but we have to weigh all these things up...* *...the danger of being counterproductive is absolutely right...*
2008	5	*...preventing radicalization and violent extremism...* *...it is important to realize that we are talking and engaging with the Muslim...communities... the vast majority of them do not like terrorism...* *...we have to engage, talk, debate, and make sure that we involve Muslims fully as part of our community, which they are...* *...the most comprehensive and all pervasive strategy of any nation in the world; We are world leaders on that...*
2008	6	*...extensive consultation...from Muslim communities and other faith and community groups...* *... we are proud of the advances that they have made in the past 15 months with the 'prevent' strand of the counterterrorist strategy; We have done a great deal in that area...*
2009	7	*...We work hard with the DCLG on the Prevent strategy. We also work hard with the police to ensure that the groups we fund in local areas are the ones which can help us to tackle radical extremism. The Prevent strategy is an important part of our anti-terrorist strategy...this is an extremely important area. It involves taking difficult decisions about who to fund in a particular local area...We sometimes have to get involved with groups that we might not wish to, but the Prevent strategy, is successful and it is making a real difference in many communities throughout the country by preventing the radicalization of vulnerable young people...* *...Prevent strategy, is successful and it is making a real difference in many communities...*
2009	8a,b	*...working with communities to prevent the spread of violent extremism...* *...Prevent...to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism... understanding of the causes of radicalization and includes new programs and new partnerships with communities here and overseas...* *...the right balance between measures to protect security and the right to life and the impact on the other rights...* *...prisons, schools, universities and internationally to prevent people from turning to violent extremism...* *...while academic freedom and the right of discussion is absolutely fundamentally part of university life, so is the protection of young people from potential radicalization...* *...goes from the community level... right through every layer to the international level-to Pakistan and elsewhere...* *...I am reassured by the fact that the vast majority of our Muslim population are absolutely on side with us on this. They absolutely abhor the violent extremists, and they do not like people who tend to lead people towards that route...* *...Prevent...is an important part of and the correct long term approach to keep this country safer...it is a ground-breaking document...*

2009	9	*...in countering of extremism and in stopping of radicalization...*
		...... the aim is to keep the nation safe... but crucially, sometimes we do things that are not the things we love to do...
		...I am very proud of what we have achieved over the past two years in our Prevent strategy; We have probably the most comprehensive strategy in the world...
2009	10	*...to stop people becoming or supporting violent extremists as a long term goal...*
		...Prevent...does not foster division, mistrust or alienation...
		...Prevent is...an essential element of...Contest...
2010	11	*...structural reform plan...*
		...separate out the part of PREVENT strategy that is about integration from the part about counterterrorism...
		.... one problem with Prevent is that those two aspects have become intertwined...which has, sadly, led to some of the Prevent work being rejected by those whom it was intended to help...
		... the review of counter-terrorism powers...are based on a respect for our ancient civil liberties and individual freedom...
		... there is nothing we take more seriously than our duty to protect the public, but in doing so we will not, as the previous Government did, forget to defend our way of life...
2010	12	*... prevent people being drawn into terrorism... preventing radicalization...*
		...but we will not securitize our integration strategy...
		...where it is necessary we will enhance our protective security measures and we will strike a better balance between our liberties and our security...
		...a successful strategy for stopping radicalization depends on an integrated society...
		...this government wants everyone to participate in...
		...Prevent...must be proportionate to the specific challenge we face...
		...the last government's Prevent muddled up work on counterterrorism with the normal work that needs to be done to promote community cohesion and participation...[it]...was wrong and no wonder it alienated so many...
2011	13	*...we want Prevent to do just that: preventing people becoming terrorists. We do not want to use counter terrorism money to promote integration...Integration will be addressed...by the DCLG...*
		...while the two strategies are distinct, there are linkages...
		...our response will be firm but proportionate and targeted to the threat...
		...we do not want Prevent to...stigmatize communities...
		... they must strike a balance between the requirement for government intervention in the interests of security and the need to guard the civil liberties and restore public confidence in the counter terrorism powers...
2011	14	*...stop people being drawn into terrorism...fight against extremism...to tackle radicalization in this country and overseas...*
		...we are looking at all forms of terrorism... including the extreme right wing...
		...Prevent must also recognize & tackle the insidious impact of non-violent extremism...
		... recognizes and tackles...non-violent extremism; unlike the old strategy the new strategy addresses all forms of extremism...
		...In the past Prevent was muddled up with integration...
		...public funding for Prevent must be rigorously prioritized and comprehensively audited...
		...deal with violent extremism...need to be separated from the...community cohesion...

		...government [is] willing to work with groups from all faiths...
		...we aim to work with universities...prison governors...to ensure that...they take radicalization seriously and act accordingly...
		...challenging the ideology of extremism and terrorism and not of Islam...
		...far too lax in spending in this [Prevent funding] area...
		... Prevent is not about spying on communities, as some have alleged...
		...the previous Prevent was flawed; it confused government policy to promote integration with government policy to counterterrorism; it failed to tackle the extremism...
		... a progress has been made in working with the sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization...the progress has been patchy and must be improved...
2012	15	*...a change of emphasis where the extreme right-wing threats as well as Islamist-related threats need to be balanced equally within the Prevent strategy...*
		...communities play an essential role....
		...government have recognized that extreme right wing threats as well as Islamist related threats need to be balanced equally within the Prevent...
		...change of emphasis...
		...DCLG will produce [their strategy on integration]...
2013	16	*... to prevent potential recruits from being radicalized...*
		...preventing people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism...
		...in standing up for freedom, human rights and the rule of law ourselves, we must never use methods that undermine these things...
		... resisting the efforts of those who actively seek to stoke tensions with Muslims in Britain...
2014	17	*...unlike the old strategy the Government's Prevent strategy recognizes and tackles the danger of non-violent extremism as well as violent extremism; unlike the old strategy the new strategy addresses all forms of extremism...*
		...unlike the old strategy there is a clear demarcation between counterterrorism work, which is run out of the Home Office and the Government's wider counterterrorism and integration work, which is coordinated by the Department for Communities and Local Government...
		...unlike the old strategy, the new strategy introduced explicit controls to make sure that public money must not be provided to extremist organizations...
		...if organizations do not support the values of democracy, human rights, equality before the law and participation in society, the government should not work with them and should not fund them...
		...The Home Office sets the Prevent strategy and it is up to the rest of Whitehall...the...public sector and civil society to deliver it...
		...we need to reach out to and work with people in Muslim communities...
		...this is genuinely a cross-Government approach to deal with extremism in all its forms...
		...Prevent funding...should be focusing the money not according to the number of Muslims living in a community but according to the risk of radicalization...
		...we are constantly working with universities to ensure that action can be taken on their campuses to try to stop the sort of radicalization and the extremist preachers that have been on some campuses in the past...
		...[Brown's Prevent] was deeply flawed [while the current version] is looked with respect around the world...
2015	18	*... it is necessary to introduce Prevent on a statutory basis into the various statutory bodies such as nurseries, schools and universities...*

		... to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and deals with all kinds of terrorism...
		...targets not just violent extremism but non-violent extremism...
		...schools, including governors, should make sure that they have training, to give them the knowledge and confidence to identify children at risk of radicalization...the health sector...prisons...the police...
		...is a shared effort...a cross government approach...
		...Prevent program has changed to being one of safeguarding and protecting people's liberties...
		... there have been concerns about the Prevent and counter-radicalization program for a number of years; there has been a view that it is being done badly, and reports from 2009 onwards, have consistently argued that the quality of Prevent work is questionable; Indeed, in some cases it has been said that the Prevent work itself has further alienated communities rather than deradicalize them...
2015	19	*...while respecting the importance of freedom of speech and academic freedom at universities, it is also important that the sector acts as a partner of government in rooting out and challenging extremism...*
		...schools, universities and colleges are in a unique position to give young people the confidence and ability to challenge extremist ideology... have a vital role to play...
		...prevent people from being drawn into terrorism...
		...balance the Prevent duty with the need to secure freedom of speech and promote academic freedom...striking this balance is clearly not easy...
		...Prevent on a statutory footing...
		...Prevent...ensures that universities act as partners with other public institutions in combating radicalization and the rise of extremism...
		...Prevent is not about oppressing freedom of speech or stifling academic freedom and debate it is about protecting people from poisonous and pernicious influence of extremist ideas used to legitimize terrorism.
2016	20	*...Prevent is about radicalization... is about safeguarding...covers all forms of such activity...*
		...unique model of partnership between Government, civil society and industry...
		...tackling the problem at source means working with communities and speaking out against those who would divide us...
		... means working at home and abroad-in Europe and beyond...

The analysis of the framing of both governments, first Brown's and secondly Cameron's will follow. Specifically, for each government, first the frames will be mentioned, then the assumption, upon which the Prevent discourse is based, will be analyzed and finally the themes and the tone of the debates will referred.

During ***Brown ministry***, Prevent was framed as the 'strategy that prevents radicalization, violent extremism and violent terrorism' (table1&2). As it is made clear in the debates, the focus is to "prevent people from falling prey to terrorist influences" (2) and

"prevent radicalization and violent extremism" (5), (table 3). In other words, it focused, only, on the violent side of both extremism and terrorism. What the government refers by violent terrorism, is the Al Qaeda threat and its affiliated groups.

Prevent, during Brown ministry, was framed as the 'strategy of counterterrorism and integration' (table1&2). In other words, Prevent has two parts, the counterterrorism and the integration of communities part. The aim of the strategy is not only to prevent terrorism but also to increase the sense of inclusion. Both parts are central in the strategy. As it is apparent in the debates, the strategy focuses on "preventing people from falling prey to terrorist influences and mapping out the diversity of different cultures and communities" (2), (table3).

The Brown government, also framed Prevent as a 'community strategy'. The role of Muslims is central to the discourse of Prevent. The government does not focus on the role of all faith groups but emphasizes the role of Muslims in the implementation of the strategy (table1&2). To illustrate this point, since the first debate, the government argues that "we must and shall continue to work with Muslims" (1), (table3). It is important for the government to "talk and engage with the Muslim communities" (5), (table3). Regarding the impact of Prevent on Muslims, the government admits that there are concerns about the impact of the strategy on them and they do not admit that Prevent "fosters division, mistrust, alienation (10), (table3).

Prevent is also framed as the 'strategy of dilemma' between security versus liberties. In other words, it focused on finding the balance between the protection of security or the protection of liberties (table 1&2). For example, the Brown ministry states that "the challenge that all of us…face is striking the right balance between measures to protect security and the right to life and the impact on other rights" (8), (table3).

Only in three debates, there is a clear reference to the role of institutions towards the implementation of the strategy (table1&2). As is mentioned in the debates, "…prisons, schools [and] universities [can] prevent people from turning to violent extremism" (8), (table3).

The discourse on Prevent funding is not central in the debates (table1). There is only one reference to the funding of organizations that prevent terrorism and radicalization. The government states that they "work hard with the DCLG…to ensure that the groups they fund…are the ones which can help tackle radical extremism… [but Prevent funding] sometimes involves taking difficult decisions about who to fund [which leads the government] to get involved with groups that they might not wish to" get involve with (7), (table 3).

Prevent is framed as 'a two level strategy' (table1&2). It has two levels of action – national and international. To illustrate this point the government admits that Prevent "goes from the community level…through every layer to the international level – to Pakistan and elsewhere"(8b).

Regarding the proportionality of the strategy to the terrorist threat, there is only one reference in the debates to the Contest but not a specific reference to the Prevent strategy (table1).

The **assumption** upon which the Prevent discourse is based during the Brown administration is "the challenge posed by the terrorist threat" (2), (table 3). This assumption serves as the reason why Prevent needs to be implemented. The assumption creates the linkage between the problem (terrorism) and the solution (Prevent). The assumption remained the same for all the debates during the Brown ministry.

Four **themes** regarding the Prevent discourse are dominant: the security versus liberties theme, the 'new' wave of terrorism, the rejection of stigma towards the Muslim communities and the engagement of communities for the better implementation of the Prevent (table 2).

Most of the debates fall into the engagement of communities theme (table 2). As stated earlier, the role of faith communities and mostly of Muslims is central to the implementation of the strategy. To illustrate this point, the government states that "it is important to realize that we are talking and engaging with the Muslim community" (5) and has "undertaken extensive consultation…from Muslims" (6), (table3).

Only the first and tenth debate fall into the rejection of stigma theme. The reason why these debates fall into this theme is because the government states that the Prevent does "not aim at a particular race or religion or any other group" (1) and it does not "foster division, mistrust or alienation" (10), (table3).

Three debates fall into the security versus liberties theme (table 2). Specifically, in the second, fourth and ninth debate, the government makes it clear that the goal is not only "to improve and strengthen security [but also] to protect the civil liberties" (2), (table 3).

Only the third debate falls into the 'new' wave of terrorism theme as the government states that "the threat is clearly genuine, serious, and unparalleled in the country's history" (3)

The overall **tone** of this ministry regarding Prevent is mostly positive (table2). In many debates, it is mentioned that Prevent is "the most comprehensive and all pervasive strategy of any nation in the world; United Kingdom is a world leader on this" (5), (table3) and the government "is proud of" (6), (table 3) this strategy.

Three debates have a clear negative tone towards Prevent (table2). The government is worried about the impact that this strategy will have on Muslims (1,2) and admits that there is a "the danger of being counterproductive" (4), (table3).

Two debates have both positive and negative comments towards Prevent (table 2). Although the government argues that Prevent is "a ground-breaking document" (8b), on the other hand, there is the assumption that it "fosters division, mistrust or alienation" (10), (table3). Only the third debate does not have a clear tone regarding the strategy.

During **Cameron's ministry**, Prevent was framed as the strategy that focuses 'on preventing radicalization, all forms of terrorism and all forms of extremism' (table 1,2,3). In other words, Cameron's Prevent has a wider focus. It covers all forms of terrorism including the extreme right wing and all other forms of extremism (violent and nonviolent) (12,14), (table3).

Under this ministry, Prevent was framed as a 'strategy of counterterrorism' only. Cameron launched a structural reform plan (11,17), (table3) and changed the focus of the strategy. It aims only at preventing counterterrorism (table1). There is a clear separation between the previous government's counterterrorism and integration part. The integration of the communities belongs to the DCLG. The reason why the government separated these two strands is because "these two aspects have become intertwined…which has, sadly, led to some of the Prevent work being rejected by those whom it was intended to help" (11), (table3). The government makes it clear that the intention is "not to securitize the integration strategy" (12), (table3). What the government expects from Prevent is "to do just that: prevent people becoming terrorists;… and not use counterterrorism money to promote integration" (13), (table3). Although integration is not a part of the Prevent strategy, it is considered as a

prerequisite of a successful Prevent strategy (table1,2). As the government states "a successful strategy for stopping radicalization depends on an integrated society" (12), (table3).

Prevent is also framed as a 'community strategy' (table1&2). During Cameron, there is a change of focus in Prevent as it focuses on communities of all faiths and not only Muslims towards the implementation of the strategy (table1). To illustrate this point the government argues that "communities play an essential role" (15), (table3) for the implementation of Prevent. Cameron "wants everyone to participate in and have an equal opportunity to…stand up against the extremists" (12), (table3). The government negatively criticizes Brown's Prevent because of the damaging impact it had on Muslims (table1). The Cameron administration clarifies that one problem with the previous Prevent was that the two aspects of counterterrorism and integration "were intertwined and led to some of the Prevent work being rejected by those whom it was intended to help" (11), (table3).

Prevent was also framed as a 'dilemma strategy between security versus liberties' (table1&2). Although, Cameron's ministry makes a clear statement that "Prevent program has changed to being one of safeguarding and protecting people's liberties" (18), (table3), in most of the debates the dilemma between security versus liberties is apparent (11,12,13,19), (table3).

Prevent is also framed as a "shared effort" (18), (table3) and a "cross-government approach" (17), (table3). The strategy takes the role of institutions as central (table 1&2). It is "a unique model of partnership between government, civil society and industry" (20), (table3). According to the government, everyone has a role to play towards the implementation of the strategy. Prevent is based on cooperation. The importance of institutions becomes even clearer when the strategy is "introduced on a statutory basis into the various statutory bodies, including nurseries, schools and universities" (18), (table3). The

statutory footing gives even more power to the institutions to report radicalization and extremism.

Cameron makes it clear that there should be explicit controls regarding the Prevent funding of institutions (table1&2). The government negatively criticizes the previous government of being "far too lax in spending in this area" (14), (table3) and argues that "unlike the old strategy the new introduced explicit controls to make sure that public money must not be provided to extremist organizations" (17), (table3).

Prevent is also framed as 'a national and international strategy' (table1&2). It focuses on preventing terrorism and tackling radicalization in the United Kingdom and abroad (14,20), (table3).

Central to the discourse is the proportionality of the preventative response towards the terrorist threat (table1&2). The government states that the reviewed version of Prevent "must be proportionate to the specific challenge we face; it must only do what is necessary" (12), (table3).

The **assumption** upon which the Prevent discourse is based, is the threat that terrorism posed to the British society (table2).

The **themes** into which the framing of Prevent during Cameron ministry fall are the following three: the engagement of communities, the rejection of stigma and the security versus liberty dilemma (table2).

More than half of the debates fall into the security versus liberties theme (table2). In other words, central to the discourse of Prevent is how this strategy can weigh up and achieve "a better balance between the liberties and security" (12), (table3).

Two of the debates fall into the rejection of stigma theme (table2). The government rejects that the Prevent strategy is about spying on communities (14,17), (table3). On the other hand, it is obvious in the rest of the debates that Prevent takes the role of all faith groups as central (15,20),(table3) for the implementation of the strategy.

The overall **tone** of Cameron's ministry is mostly negative (table2). Almost half of the debates either have concerns about the current Prevent or criticize the previous government's strategy (11,12,13,16),(table3). For example, the government admits that there are concerns about the current Prevent by stating that they "do not want Prevent to stigmatize communities" (13,table3). But also the government criticizes Brown's ministry of "muddling up the work on counterterrorism with…the community cohesion and participation" (12), (table3).

Three of the debates have both positive and negative comments regarding Prevent (table2). Although the government admits that "progress has been made in working with the sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization…this progress has been patchy and must be improved" (14), (table3). The government argues that the previous Prevent "was deeply flawed" (17), (table3) while the current version "is looked upon with respect around the world" (17), (table3). Another negative comment is that "there have been concerns about the Prevent and counter-radicalization program for a number of years; indeed, in some cases it has been said that the Prevent work itself has further alienated communities rather than deradicalized them" (18), (table3).

Only the tone of one debate is not clear (table 2) and only the last debate is clearly positive. The government admits that Prevent is "a unique model of partnership between government, civil society and industry" (20), (table 3).

Conclusion:

Returning to the research question what I realized is that there are clear differences between the way that the Prevent strategy was framed during the years of the Brown and Cameron administration. Specifically, the Brown ministry, framed Prevent as the strategy that prevents radicalization, terrorism and violent extremism. In other words, Brown's ministry Prevent, focuses only on the Al Qaeda threat and its affiliated groups and only on violent extremism. On the other hand, Cameron's ministry framed Prevent as the strategy that prevents radicalization, all forms of terrorism and all forms of extremism. In other words, Prevent during Cameron's ministry had a wider focus; it covered all forms of terrorism including the extreme right wing and all other forms of extremism, violent and nonviolent.

During the years of the Brown ministry, Prevent framed as a 'strategy of counterterrorism and integration'. The Brown government, framed Prevent as the strategy that can prevent terrorism and improve the integration of the communities. It had two strands – the counterterrorism and the integration of communities strand. On the other hand, Cameron's ministry framed Prevent as the 'strategy of counterterrorism' only. There is a clear separation of these strands. Prevent had only one focus, the prevention of counterterrorism. Although integration is not a part of the Prevent strategy, as it belongs to the DCLG, it is considered as a prerequisite of a successful Prevent strategy.

Prevent is also framed as a 'community strategy'. Although both ministries take the role of communities as central to the discourse on Prevent, there are some clear differences between the two governments. The difference between the two governments regarding the engagement of the communities is that Brown's ministry focuses more on the Muslim communities, their role in the implementation of the strategy and the impact of the strategy on them. The government admits that there are concerns about the impact that the strategy will

have on Muslims without admitting that the strategy marginalizes them. In the years of the Cameron ministry, there is a change of focus to all faith communities and not only on Muslims. Also, Cameron negatively criticizes Brown's Prevent because of the negative impact it had towards Muslims. The cause behind this negative effect towards Muslims was the fact that Brown's Prevent confused the integration with counterterrorism and this was the reason why Cameron's ministry separated these two strands.

Prevent is also framed as the 'strategy of the dilemma' between security versus civil liberties. The Brown ministry states that it is important that "the government balances the rights and freedoms…with the ability to ensure security" (4); "the liberty and such things are so important, but they have to weigh all these things up" (4). Although Cameron's ministry makes a clear statement in one of the debates that there is a change of focus as the government admits that "Prevent program has changed to being one of safeguarding and protecting people's liberties in our society" (18), in most of the debates there is a clear dilemma between security versus liberties. Specifically, it is mentioned that Prevent "is about balancing the principle of freedom of speech at universities with the duty to address the danger of radicalization" (19).

Prevent is also framed as a 'cross government approach' (17) and a 'shared effort' (18). Specifically, during Cameron's ministry the role of institutions is central in the implementation of the strategy. According to the government, everyone (i.e. schools, universities, industry, police etc.) has a role to play towards the implementation of Prevent. The framing of Prevent as a shared effort becomes even clearer when the strategy is introduced on a statutory basis, where guidelines are sent to institutions, thus making institutions more empowered to report radicalization. During Brown ministry, only in three

debates there is a clear reference to the engagement of institutions in the implementation of the Prevent strategy.

Another difference in the discourse towards Prevent concerns the Prevent funding. Specifically, during Brown ministry there is a reference to the funding of organizations that prevent terrorism and radicalization. In Cameron's years, there is an extensive criticism against the previous government of being "far too lax in spending" (14) for the Prevent funding. The Cameron ministry makes it clear that there should be extensive control on where funds are spent. Cameron states that "unlike the old strategy the new introduced explicit controls to make sure that public money must not be provided to extremist organizations" (17).

Prevent is also framed as a "national and international strategy". Specifically, both governments have preventative action that have both a domestic and also international effect.

Central to the Cameron government discourse regarding Prevent is the notion of proportionality. In other words, the government makes it clear that the Prevent response should be proportional to the threat that the United Kingdom faces (12).

The assumption upon which the Prevent discourse is based on remained the same, as both governments in their debates referred to the terrorist threat as the basic reason upon which Prevent is justified.

Regarding the themes into which the discourse on Prevent falls, the following four are dominant: the security versus liberties, the engagement of communities, the 'new' wave of terrorism and the rejection of stigma. In the Brown ministry, there is an emphasis on the engagement of communities and specifically of Muslims in the implementation of the strategy

while most of Cameron's ministry discourse falls into the theme of security versus liberties as half of the debates have a clear reference to the balance between security versus civil liberties.

Last but not least, there is a clear change in the tone towards Prevent. During the Brown ministry, almost half of the debates have a clearly positive tone towards Prevent. Specifically, Brown ministry states that the government "has got together the most comprehensive and all pervasive strategy of any nation in the world" (5). In another debate the government states that they are "proud of the advances they have made…in the 'prevent' strand" (6). Prevent is a "ground-breaking document" (8b). On the other hand, the tone of Cameron ministry towards Prevent is mostly negative. Almost half of the debates have a negative tone towards the previous government Prevent strategy. Specifically, it is stated that "the last government prevent muddled up work on counterterrorism with the…community cohesion" (12). Also, the government admits that "there have been concerns about the Prevent…for a number of years" (18).

The theory predicted well that the British government "promoted particular definitions and interpretations"(Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.106) regarding Prevent. Both governments tried to create a storyline of how Prevent should be interpreted and tried to influence a dominant view of Prevent. For example, the Brown ministry spoke about Prevent as a strategy that focuses on radicalization, violent terrorism and extremism. The Brown administration created the story that Prevent has both counterterrorism and integration sides, that it is a community policy, with national and international influence and that it is a "dilemma strategy" between security versus liberties. On the other hand, the Cameron ministry spoke about Prevent as the strategy that focuses on radicalization, on all forms of terrorism and all forms of extremism. Cameron ministry created the story that Prevent has only one strand which is the counterterrorism. It is a community policy that takes as central the role of

institutions with national and international influences and that it is a 'dilemma strategy between security versus liberties'. The saliency on specific definition and the selections of specific words to frame the strategy was central to both governments. CDA proved a good analytical tool as it identified the mechanisms, the central words, phrases and assumptions and tone that construct the Prevent discourse.

Discussion:

There should be more literature on the role of discourse as a justification of counterterrorism policies, as most scholars focus and analyze the discourse on terrorism. In a theoretical level there should be a convergence among scholars on how frames are defined and further research should be done on which are the reasons which lead an actor to use and put emphasis on specific words regarding a policy.

Limits:

What seems to be missing from the theory of framing is that the theory itself cannot predict and explain how rapidly or easily frames can change, which are the specific conditions (i.e. a specific event, the ideology of a political party, the media or a charismatic leader) that can lead to a change of frame. The theory does not explain or predict why an individual chooses to frame a strategy in a specific way and does not "allow us to anticipate which frames are likely to emerge" (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.117). Another limit is that the theory "lacks a clear conceptualization; researchers have to confront a great disparity in the definitions of the concept which sometimes result contradictory" (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015,p.425).

Regarding the limits of design the focus on the transcripts of ministerial speeches, gives a partial impression of how Prevent was framed by the two governments. Moreover, the discourse of the ministers is often diplomatic and tries to hide or mitigate the negative discussion regarding a policy. So, it takes a lot of time to understand what lies beneath the discourse.

Another limit is that there is not a great amount of literature that focuses on the way that governments frame counterterrorism policies. Most of them focus on the discourse of the war on terror. There is a limited literature on how the scholars applied CDA on the framing of counter-terrorism policies. Another limit of the method is that, sometimes, more than one theme is applicable to a debate.

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Appendix:

Table 4: Year-Name of debate/speech

The speeches of the Brown government are indicated with brown color and the Cameron's with blue.:

Year	Debate
2007	1) Debate on the Address– in the House of Lords at 2:57 pm on 12th November 2007
	2) a) National Security, Oral Answers to Questions — Prime Minister – in the House of Commons at 12:31 pm

	on 14th November 2007 b) National Security– in the House of Lords at 3:33 pm on 14th November 2007.
2008	3) Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Point of Order – in the House of Commons at 1:50 pm on 21st February 2008.
	4) Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in force of sections 1 to 9) Order 2008– in the House of Lords at 7:59 pm on 27th February 2008.
	5) Counter-Terrorism Bill– in the House of Lords at 3:10 pm on 8th July 2008.
	6) Counter-Terrorism Bill– in the House of Lords at 3:16 pm on 13th October 2008.
2009	7) Policing Policies Oral Answers to Questions — Home Department – in the House of Commons at 2:30 pm on 9th February 2009.
	8) a) International Terrorism Oral Answers to Questions — Health – in the House of Commons at 3:37 pm on 24th March 2009 b) Counterterrorism — Statement – in the House of Lords at 3:52 pm on 24th March 2009.
	9) Motion to Approve Terrorism Act 2006 (Disapplication of Section 25) Order 2009 – in the House of Lords at 7:30 pm on 23rd June 2009.
	10) Violent Extremism House of Lords written question – answered on 3rd November 2009.
2010	11) Prevention and suppression of terrorism on 14 July 2010
	12) Terrorism: Home Secretary's speech on the response to the terrorist threat 3 November 2010
2011	13) Pauline Neville Jones: speech on CONTEST to the City forum- 28 February 2011
	14) Prevent Strategy Oral Answers to Questions — Health – in the House of Commons at 5:08 pm on 7th June 2011.
2012	15) Topical Questions Oral Answers to Questions — Home Department – in the House of Commons at 2:30 pm on 6th February 2012.
2013	16)Countering terrorism overseas-speech by the Rt Hon William Hague- 14 February 2013.

2014	17) Extremism– in the House of Commons at 2:34 pm on 9th June 2014.	
2015	18) Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill- 28 January 2015 at 3.47 pm	
	19)Universities: Freedom of Speech 26 November 2015 at 1.07pm	
2016	20) What is real is reasonable-speech by the security minister John Hayes-25 February 2016	