GLOBAL IR(evolution)

Language, Political Economy, and Problems Going Forward for Global IR

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to problematize Amitav Acharya's Global International Relations framework, demonstrate problems with IR's reliance on the English language, as well as IR's political economy, and show how these three factors may impede the development and incorporation of Global IR in modern IR overall.

The first argument that this thesis presents is a problematization of the emphasis on English within IR, and it will do so over the first two chapters. The first chapter of the thesis tackles with the use of English in the contemporary international climate, where, as Bunce et al. and Kubota & Okuda demonstrate how English shapes and intervenes in international politics and developments. The second chapter, which will look at the state of the English language in IR theory, demonstrates that English is tied closely together with the legitimacy of IR as an academic discipline as well as in the imagining of globalisation, and how it has shaped the creation of the Us vs. Them dichotomy that encounters so much criticism within IR.

The second argument, which will be approached in Chapter 3, will turn to the political economy of IR, and how this has helped in the creation of the homogenous academic field we work in today. By looking at the development of the university as an institution for research through Kamola's argument, the presence of the publish or perish culture, and the problems that this, combined with the English-dominated Western IR, present for the globalising of IR - one of the mission statements of Global IR.

This thesis will conclude by suggesting a potential alternative approach that Global IR can look into to tackle the issues that are presented throughout the thesis.

Table of Content

Introduction

When beginning my Master's degree in IR[1] at Leiden University, the introductory days focused on painting a picture familiar to me from my days as a BA International Studies student. IR, according to Professor Andre Gerrits, was a field that was struggling, caught flat-footed in the whirlwind of change and globalisation that has come about following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The supremacy of the United States of America, which was supposed to have it's "unipolar moment", has increasingly been challenged, and as more and more global problems (such as global warming) have increasingly been coming to the fore, nation-states (the problematic 'building block' of the current global world order) have increasingly been looking inwards. IR, as a field of study, needed to not only play catch up, but push itself to the fore, find itself a renewed sense of (policy) purpose, and through that remain relevant as an academic field, one that was international in nature and not a constant source of fuel for the 'merits' of global capitalism and the nation state. By taking a more humanities-based approach, Gerrits concluded, we would be able to provide room for the approaches of the 'Rest' to take their place alongside those of the 'West', not only in IR but in policy decisions and similarly political matters[2].

The more that we studied the matter, however, the clearer it became that this day would be far off indeed. For while our attention was drawn to diverse alternative approaches that would be able to form a new core to IR's new (and truly 'global') structuring, there was almost always something missing: ideas in practice. Ideas such as Amitav Acharya's Global

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[1] This thesis distinguishes between *IR* and *international relations*. IR is the academic study of international relations, which is the interactions between states, non-state actors, and other players on an international arena.
[2] Andre Gerrits, lecture during the introduction days for the February intake of the MA International Relations, Leiden University, February 2018.

International Relations, while increasingly applied to the field of (non-Western) IR theory[3], fail to translate its contributions to practice. Furthermore, the very problems that we were told we would be solving only seem to be getting worse. Already the notion of "us vs. them", as of the time of writing, is leading to Brexit, the departure of one of the key architects of many of the European Union (henceforth the EU)'s central agreements[4], Great Britain, from the EU.

It was interesting, therefore, to find out that English will continue to play a role in many EU practices, despite the (probable) departure of it's single largest native English-speaking community.[5] While it's continued presence in the EU makes sense (since there are still member-states outside of the UK who use English as their official language), it's representation throughout international relations, particularly as working language in many regional organisations, is slightly confusing. The use of English is almost ubiquitous with this information age, with the internet and other digital means making global boundaries less and less important. Finding a common language to communicate in is, theoretically, only a boon.

As many scholars of linguistics have shown, however, this is far from the case. An oft-commented on reality is that, as Antonio de Nebrija pointed out to Queen Isabella of Spain, "language has always been the perfect tool of empire." Yet (as Liu asserts in 2004) "the relationship between international politics and the study of sign, however, is not patently

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[3] Amitav Acharya, "Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions," *International Studies Review*, 18 (2016)

[4] The bellicose stance Theresa May's government has historically taken against the EU and it's various institutions has been mocked by public figures and newspapers from both within the UK and outside. See the following Patrick Stewart sketch for an example.
"Patrick Stewart Sketch: What has the ECHR ever done for us?" The Guardian, accessed 22 December, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ptfmAY6M6aA

[5] "EU has no plans to downgrade use of English after Brexit," The Guardian, accessed 22 December, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/04/eu-has-no-plans-to-downgrade-use-of-english-after-brexit

obvious, nor are the disciplines of international law and linguistic science in the habit of speaking to each other in today's scholarship.[6]" The curiosity here lies in that, if IR is a field of study that has to observe and challenge the outcomes of imperialisms the world over, a rigorous study of language in IR has only been a phenomenon of the past decade. While it is being looked at as a player in the establishing and keeping of the 'West's' dominant position over the 'Rest', rarely until now has its role within IR itself been observed. The disentrenching of the role of language, noted as one of the challenges that modern IR (within the framework of Acharya's Global IR[7]) will have to face, carries further than merely being conscious of language as a source of what Peter Vale describes as "a powerful instrument of social control especially in fields like IR [...]"[8].

The work done for Amitav Acharya's "Global International Relations" project is important for IR, as it is a long and hard look at many of the problems that IR has faced in the past, many of the problems that IR is facing in the 21st century, and offers a framework for how we are going to try to tackle these problems. However, as this thesis will demonstrate, mere awareness of the role of language as a gatekeeping practice in IR will not help further the Global IR 'revolution' (the IRevolution, if you will)[9] - not for a lack of trying, but because the English language cannot be separated from the ideas and practices that it has embodied. English as a tool for communication embodies too many core assumptions of a Westphalian and European Renaissance nature, which may clash with the outlooks of different cultures and their fundamental understanding of how the world functions.

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[6] Lydia Liu, *The Clash of Empires - the Invention of China in Modern World Making*.

[7] See Acharya, "Advancing Global IR"

[8] Peter Vale, "Inclusion and Exclusion," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 18, no. 1 (2016): 161.

[9] Using the word 'revolution' in tandem with Global IR is ironic at first glance - Global IR aims to subsume, rather than supplant, existing IR theories and methods. However, as IR's history has long been a one-way 'West' looking at, and writing about, the 'Rest', the proposed objectives of Global IR sufficiently qualify, in my opinion, as a revolution within the IR of the information age - the IRevolution. Not all revolutions are violent, nor do they all inherently reject what they are revolting against.

Furthermore, IR's "publish-or-perish" culture means that young, ambitious scholars who wish to contribute to the development of Global IR have to abide by the power of the pre-eminent Western journals and the existing academic culture merely to be able to survive and maintain a career. Western IR institutions remain too powerful and important in career-building, and non-Western IR institutions remain too weak in wider IR for those young scholars to be able to dedicate their time to, as Tang suggests, "publish high-quality work not only in mainstream journals, but also in regional flagship and domestic journals"[10]. Many of the scholars working on the Global IR project are tenured professors, and the younger scholars who need to change (and work in this changing) IR find themselves in a position where they are still at the whims of the field's political economy for survival and career-building - meaning that writing in English for the big academic journals is still the best way to build a career. If Global IR wishes to address the issues that it does, it will have to have a good look at how it can prevent them from repeating themselves.

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[10] Shiping Tang, "Practical Concerns and Power Considerations," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 18, no. 1 (2016): 163.

Ch. 0.5   - Global IR(evolution)
Acharya's Global IR, and it's importance in modern IR

Due to its importance to this thesis, we first need to detail what exactly Acharya's Global International Relations project entails. The Global IR project is the umbrella term for all work done "as part of a broader challenge of reimagining IR as a global discipline [which] transcends the distinction between West and non-West - or any similar binary and mutually exclusive categories."[11] Global IR is built upon the assumption that "the main theories of IR are too deeply rooted in, and beholden to, the history, intellectual traditions, and agency claims of the West, [...] accord[ing] little more than a marginal place to those of the non-Western world."[12]

Global IR developed from the observation that IR, as it had existed up until that point, presumably failed to account for its own colonial[13] roots, particularly during the Cold War. IR, according to Acharya, had systematically ignored the problems of those countries that had come to be referred to as the Third World, despite the extent of conflict that happened in the supposed 'long peace' of the Cold War[14]. Especially in the developing of the 'Democratic Peace Theory', the Western meddling in the 'Third World' would challenge claims made about the pacifist nature of Western liberal democracy[15]. As Acharya asserts, Global IR is necessary because:

> "...despite its growing popularity, IR's dominant narratives, theories, and methods fail to correspond to the increasingly global distribution of its subjects. Distinctions between the "West" and the "Rest" blur in material terms, but not in the way that we study, publish, and discuss IR.

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[11] Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 58 (2014): 649.

[12] Ibid.

[13] While it would be interesting to write a paper on the state of postcolonialism in contemporary IR scholarship, that is not what this paper is about.

[14] Amitav Acharya, "Global IR and Regional Worlds," (2014): 648.

[15] Ibid.

Centers of learning remain clustered in the developed West. Overcoming this disjuncture presents a central challenge for our discipline.[16]"

Global IR revolves around six primary dimensions, and while not all of these dimensions are of importance to this thesis all are mentioned to provide a more general idea on what Global IR entails. For a full explanation of each of these points, see Acharya, 2014.

1. It is founded upon a pluralistic universalism: not "applying to all," but recognising and respecting the diversity in us.
2. It is grounded in *world* history, not just Greco-Roman, European, or US history.
3. It subsumes, rather than supplants, existing IR theories and methods.
4. It integrates the study of regions, regionalisms, and area studies.
5. It eschews exceptionalism.
6. It recognises multiple forms of agency beyond material power, including resistance, normative action, and local constructions of global order.[17]

This thesis will engage with point three and point five of the six points of Global IR, beginning with an elaboration on these points, as well as a number of questions about them. The first point we are discussing, Global IR's subsuming, rather than supplanting of existing IR theories and methods, is based on the observation that IR theories are not monolithic or static when dealing with the non-North Atlantic world. Examples such as post-colonialism and feminism have been at the forefront of recognising the agency of those in the non-West, and aiming to draw theoretical insights from them for the enrichment of IR. However, as this thesis will problematise, if Global IR subsumes, rather than supplants, the existing IR method of predominantly writing in English, how are non-English terms (such as *tianxia*, *ba*, and *wang*), and non-English scholars going to be able to appropriately convey the importance of their arguments? The second point we are orienting this thesis around, the eschewing of exceptionalism, challenges the tendency to present the characteristics that are being discussed as homogenous, unique, or superior to others, justifying the dominance of the powerful states

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[16] Acharya, "Global IR and Regional Worlds," (2014): 649.
[17] Ibid.

over the weak. While Global IR may aim to eschew exceptionalism, the question is, will the academic world? Will the major IR publications and institutions be willing to give up their 'exceptional' position in the production of IR knowledge, or in the modern publish-or-perish culture in academia as a whole?

While this thesis will offer a critique based on both a linguistic and a political economy perspective, it is important to not understate the importance of Global IR in modern IR academia. Merely understanding the world as it has been done in IR in the past no longer correlates with the reality we face today, and Global IR is one of the most thought-out and engaged frameworks that IR academia has available to it. However, as this thesis will argue later, Global IR brings with it it's own problems; namely, a problematic relationship with language, and the political economy of IR, both of which favour scholars that are already established within IR. The framework risks being undermined by failing to address these problems, as (if Global IR aims to be a serious road for the future) the future generations that are to work into IR need to be able to work in the diversity that Global IR espouses *now* if Global IR aims to make serious progress in the field.

Ch. 1   - The Dragons of the Past
English as the mythological *hydra*, and its relationship to IR

Why dedicate a chapter to the problems that exist with English on the global scale when we are discussing Global IR? IR academics already see the important role that language plays on the framing of ideas - a conscience of the matter that has come about due to the Linguistic Turn[18] in IR. The problematic point in this regard is that, while academics are increasingly aware of how important language is in the globalised world order, they continue to write in English and the world continues to revolve around English as the global *lingua franca*. There is more to the use of English that has to be taken into consideration with the development of Global IR, not only inside academia (which will be discussed in Ch. 2), but also outside of the context of academia, and while many sources and articles point out the fact that language has a role in the creation of the global world, many who are not discussing language spare little more than an acknowledgement of the importance of language in their overall argument, or leave it out altogether[19]. Merely acknowledging that language plays a role in the formation of the globalised world risks undervaluing just how *big* a role it plays in the power dynamics in both international relations and IR, and thereby undervaluing the influences that language has on IR. This chapter will demonstrate how influential English is in our current world order - outside of the realm of IR academia. Within the realm of IR, the linguistic turn, as well as the onset of post-positivism and constructivism as important

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[18] We will be taking a closer look at the Linguistic Turn in Chapter 2 of the thesis.

[19] See Peter Vale, "If International Relations lives on the street, what is it doing in the classroom?" *International Relations*, Vol. 28, no. 2 (2014): 153 - 155 as an example of the former, and Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds - A New Agenda for International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 58 (2014) as an example where it is left out altogether despite its importance in (neo-) colonial relationships

theoretical considerations, have raised awareness of the role that language plays, and these will be discussed in Chapter 2.

If we are to look into the impacts of English on international relations outside of an academic context, it is first important to acknowledge how widespread the use of English is in international relations. English is the predominant language of many major regions that Global IR proposes we integrate more into IR[20]. Regional actors, such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), use English as their main working language[21], and it is one of the primary languages that is used in the EU[22]. As commented on before, the role of English within the EU will not be reduced despite it's single largest native-speaking population departing the Union, which could be seen as a sign of its central nature within the linguistically-diverse institution.

Couldn't the widespread nature of English function as an overall boon to IR, though? As D'aoust points out, the fact that there is a lingua franca for IR has resulted in the emerging of certain communities that might otherwise have remained closed off, such as the Spanish IR community.[23] Supposedly, it is better to adapt to the English-dominated nature of IR than to remain focused on one's own linguistic community, "since an effort in the opposite direction - coming from the English-speaking IR community - is not likely to happen."[24]

However, as D'aoust suggests, one has to write in English to be perceived and acknowledged as "doing IR"[25], a stance which ignores the complexities of the relationship

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[20] See point 4 of the six dimensions of Global IR

[21] "List of official languages by institution," Wikipedia, accessed 22 December, 2018. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_official_languages_by_institution; Bunce et al. *Why English? Confronting the Hydra* (New York: Multilingual Matters, 2016): 6

[22] Ibid.

[23] Anne-marie D'aoust, "Accounting for the politics of language in the sociology of IR," *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 15 (2012): 122.

[24] Garcia Segura, "Spain." In *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives, and Destinations*, eds. Knud Erik Jorgensen & Tonny Brems Knudsen (Milton Park and New York: Routledge, 2006), 111, 120. Cited in D'aoust, "Language in the sociology of IR": 122.

[25] D'aoust, "Language in the sociology of IR": 121.

between language and knowledge production that should be accounted for in sociological studies.[26] While this stance is oriented mostly at IR as a discipline, it does contain bearings on the position of English in this modern, globalising world. An observation of the role of English on international relations and development demonstrates the shortcomings and pitfalls that Global IR has to acknowledge and be wary of. We will turn to the work of Bunce et al. and their conceptualisation of English as a global *hydra*, as well as that of Watts and his *myths about English*, to elaborate.

As Bunce et al. demonstrate in *Why English? Confronting the Hydra*, there exists an "*uncritical acceptance* of English [and an] equally uncritical hostility to, and a devaluing of, other languages"[27] within many contemporary cultures in the modern 'global' era. This continues to "impact in negative ways on other languages and cultures. While English opens the doors of privilege and access to *some*, often the *few*, the way many countries organise education systems means that the English door is closed for the *many*."[28] The reputation that English now holds is as much a legacy of colonial times, with the British empire (and the USA) exporting their native language as a tool to consolidate it's budding (commercial) empires, as it is a decision on the domestic policy-maker's part to try to keep in touch with the global economy, the internet, global youth culture, and the increasingly global nature of the media[29]. According to Bunce et al., the problems lie in the linguicism that the British empire promoted: "the privileging of the English language over other, native, languages in the domains of state administration and education, structurally favouring English, and believing that this is justified and necessary, in a similar way to racism, sexism, and class

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[26] Ibid.
[27] Bunce et al. "Introduction," in *Why English? Confronting the Hydra*, ed. Bunce et al. (Bristol, New York, Ontario: Multilingual Matters, 2016): 3.
[28] Bunce et al. "Introduction," in *Why English? Confronting the Hydra*: 1.
[29] Ibid.

divisions"[30]. This privileging of the role of language, Bunce et al. assert, is more neocolonial than postcolonial, as many former colonies are "still connected with the former colonial powers through a wide range of economic, political, military and cultural links, as well as language. [They are] integrated into the capitalist world order [...] in a subordinate, *neocolonial* position."[31]

Why is it then, that the privileging of English is believed to be both justified and necessary? Even in the face of an increased regional awareness throughout the world today, the 'perceived' necessity of English only seems to be growing. According to Watts, English has been able to reach its position of prominence due to a series of *myths* that have been propagated through language policy, advertising, and stereotyping, among other reasons. While myths, according to Watts, are not outright lies, people tend to take them less seriously than statements of factual truths - indeed, the etymology of myth comes from the ancient Greek word for 'story'[32]. Despite being taken less seriously, however, myths form an integral part of the formation of culture, imparting upon those that learn these stories while acquiring the languages a "narrative cultural embedding of beliefs, and they help us to construct a foundation for performing acts of identity in emergent social practice[33]" Myths fulfil a "vital function in explaining, justifying and ratifying present behaviour by the narrated events of the past"[34].

Watts elaborates further on the various types of myths that exist within both historical and contemporary English, spread through the teaching of the language: the linguistic homogeneity myth and it's derivative legitimate language myth; the polite language myth, the

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[30] Bunce et al. "Introduction," in *Why English? Confronting the Hydra*: 5.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Watts. "1. Defining Myths," in *Language Myths and the History of English* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), accessed 30 Sept. 2018.
[33] Watts, "Defining Myth" in *Language Myths and the History of English*, ch. 1.
[34] Richard Watts, "Mythical strands in the ideology of prescriptivism" (2000), cited in Watts, 2011.

superiority of English myth and the superior language myth, the immutability myth, the perfect language myth, the pure language myth, the economic benefit myth, the academic language myth, and the global language myth. While many of these myths have applications when discussing linguistic policies and Bunce et al.'s Hydra, a select few of them are important when it comes to academic English.

Myths about the English language, at least according to Watts' definition, are pervasive throughout the world. According to him, English, as a global language, is characterised by English being an (a) easy-to-learn language, (b) a practical language, and that (c) the desire to learn English is instrumentally motivated.[35] As Watts argues, though, the focus on teaching, and the emphasis on using 'correct' (as in, grammatically correct) English has long been used as a tool to enforce a certain power dynamic within the Anglophone community.[36] This is reinforced in turn by English as an Additional Language (EAL/ ESL) teaching. Rather than developing communicative skills, EAL teaching focuses more on the achieving of a degree of grammatical proficiency, as this is 'proper English'[37]. EAL teaching and the assumptions that come along with it present a number of challenges, mostly associated with the realities that disprove a number of myths.

A practical demonstration of how English and its myths influence policy decisions, is the use of English in Japan, by studying Kubota and Okuda's chapter in Bunce et al. While Wattsian myths about English have permeated into Japanese society[38], it is interesting to preface this with the translation of English (the language) in Japanese. The characters used

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[35] Watts, "Commodifying English," in *Language Myths and the History of English*: 264.
[36] Watts, "Establishing a Linguistic Pedigree," in *Language Myths and the History of English*: 28 - 53.
[37] This is an example of the 'perfect language' myth - the belief that the goal of learning English is to be able to speak the language perfectly.
[38] Ryuko Kubota & Tomoyo Okuda, "Confronting Language Myths, Linguicism and Racism in English Language Teaching in Japan" in *Why English? Confronting the Hydra*, eds. Bunce et al. (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2016): 77 - 87.

for English in Japanese, *eigo* (英語) place English inherently in a privileged position; the first character, *ei* (英) translates to *excellent,* as well as English, according to the Genki series of Japanese language textbooks[39]. The use of non-alphabetic signs to create/enforce power relations will be encountered again in Chapter 2, but we make an initial mention of *eigo* (英語), as it does provide something to take into consideration when considering the arguments of Kubota and Okuda.

According to Kubota & Okuda, the selection of Tokyo as host for the 2020 Olympic Games has revealed two major myths about English in Japanese society: the *global language myth* and the *economic benefit myth*. The former suggests that "learning English will 'enable the learner to communicate with anybody in the world'", and the latter assumes "that learning English will 'guarantee better and financially more lucrative job opportunities' or bring individual and national economic success in the new global economy."[40]

The former, which posits that English is a universally useful language ('enabl[ing] the learner to communicate with anybody in the world'[41]) that "can readily connect speakers from diverse linguistic backgrounds"[42] is easily dismissed as inaccurate by Kubota and Okuda with the assertion that not everyone, even in the 'global' world, speaks English[43]. Their argument on this point is elaborated on by stating that easy access to the acquisition of English is not something that is universally present, and those who do have ready access to English acquisition have an economic edge - as those with an economic advantage will typically have an easier time in acquiring English if they are not born within the Anglophone world[44].

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[39] "英", *Genki: An Integrated Course in Elementary Japanese* (Toyko: The Japan Times, 2011): 283
[40] Watts, *Language Myths*: 285 - 286, cited in Kubota & Okuda, "Confronting Language Myths": 77.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Kubota & Okuda, "Confronting Language Myths" in *Why English?*: 78.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

Finally, English (or any other language) cannot possibly "fulfill all the demands of global and local communication", although it is "useful for many purposes"[45].

The latter myth, the economic benefit myth, ties in closely to the global neoliberal capitalist order[46], and neoliberal economics in general. The assumption is that the use and promotion of English will reduce structural barriers, increasing competition, mobility, flexibility, and the productivity of workers. The onus shifts from the company to provide job security and social safety nets to workers, who are expected to build up the human capital and communication skills to be able to increase personal employability[47]. The assumption with the economic benefit myth is that work and all business life is done in English, and while Japanese international businesses require some proficiency with English, the "percentage of people in Japan who actually require English competence is small"[48], and even with English as a competency, companies may not even necessarily consider English (or other language competencies in general) a necessity when making hiring decisions[49]. The notion that English is always connected to economic benefit, as the *economic benefit* myth implies, falls short according to Kubota when one observes that there is no statistical correlation between English proficiency and income[50].

Despite the flaws that English language teaching (and the overall state of the myths about English) possess, they remain quite ingrained in Japan, where both the general populace as well as members at a governmental level continue to ascribe to them[51]. With the hosting of the 2020 Olympic Games in Tokyo, the Japanese government has doubled down

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Kubota & Okuda, "Confronting Language Myths" in *Why English?*: 79.
[48] Kubota, 2011, cited in Kubota & Okuda, "Confronting Language Myths" in *Why English?*: 79.
[49] Kubota & Okuda, "Confronting Language Myths" in *Why English?*: 79.
[50] Ibid.; F. Grin, "Language planning and economics," *Current Issues in Language Planning*, Vol. 4 (2003).
[51] Ibid.

on its efforts to promote English as a Second Language in preparation for the foreign delegations that will descend on Tokyo when the games come[52]. The *global language myth* justifies both the training of additional English interpreters (despite not all visitors to the Olympics speaking English), and the sending of secondary education teachers to English-speaking countries to improve their English skills[53]. Kubota & Okuda further assert that the cultural obsession with test scores places an overemphasis on Tests of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) tests, with the emphasis on learning 'perfect' English directing the attention away from socio-economic, racial, gender, and "various other inequalities that affect people's social mobility"[54] in lieu of test scores and studying abroad[55].

Throughout this chapter, we have observed the position of English in the current global order, as well as its use as a tool in enforcing and reinforcing power dynamics and neocolonial relationships. As Bunce et al. suggest, the prestige that the English language has reached is beginning to form a threat to international linguistic diversity; the culture that the language is intrinsically tied together with threatens international cultural diversity[56]. This might bode ill to IR as a whole, for while it is struggling to expand its roots and become a truly global practice, the world that it is trying to come to terms with might cease to exist altogether. While English is already closely associated with the age of globalisation, the risk that it will become a part of it is all too real.

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Kubota & Okuda, "Confronting Myths": 80; Another myth comes to the fore here: that maximum exposure to a target language helps make one more proficient in it

[54] Kubota & Okuda, "Confronting Language Myths" in *Why English?*: 84.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Bunce et al. *Why English? Confronting the Hydra*.

Ch. 2   - Lost in Translation
Imagined Meaning Through Embedded Assumption

While English continues to create itself a larger and larger role in the contemporary world, academia, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, has already had a long look at the role of language as a tool for shaping the world and how the people inside it act amongst one another. Works like Bunce et al. and Watts' demonstrate that IR and academia as a whole is aware and engaging with language. The field of IR, however, has to contend with more than how English influences globalisation - and as a framework that aims to incorporate the 'Rest' more into IR, Global IR needs to look beyond how English has influenced international relations and IR theorising, but also how it continues to do so. With English established as the academic *lingua franca*, it is assumed that all members of the academic community are at a native-speaker level of proficiency. While language has been acknowledged as a form of suppression that Global IR will have to face for its role in the gatekeeping in IR[57], the problems that it presents as the 'main' academic language receive less attention. The idolisation of English as the 'main' academic language leads to the very real possibility that other, 'less important' languages are phased out in favour of the more prestigious English language, or do not even get the chance to develop themselves into languages for scientific communication.[58] If Global IR is to subsume, rather than supplant, the practices and methodologies of IR as it has existed up until this point, it is most likely that the field's use of, and dependence on, English will continue to maintain its central role in IR academia - as D'aoust has claimed, you need to be writing in English to be seen as 'doing IR'. This

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[57] Acharya, "Advancing Global IR," *International Studies Review* (2016): 10.
[58] Bunce et al. "Introduction," in *Why English? Confronting the Hydra*: 12.

dependence on English, furthermore, entails power relations of its own. As D'aoust points

out, the mindset of

'Just learn/publish/work' in English, as many would have it, is seldom 'just' about
'learning/publishing/ working' in English. For many non-native speakers, it often entails
negotiating political stances and identities, intellectual credit and recognition, as well as emotional
dimensions in their own work.[59]

Global IR, however, while it does acknowledge the state of language and the

emphasis on the English language within IR[60], offers little in the way of solutions that involve

a critical look at English; proposed solutions merely focus on the inclusion of non-Western

authors in IR's ongoing debates[61].

This is problematic, for more reasons than those that have been laid out in Chapter 1.

The English language structures the world in numerous ways, as has been shown by the

linguistic turn in philosophy and its impacts on IR. Furthermore, because of this emphasis on

English, Western notions and concepts are imposed on non-Western terms, theories, and

approaches, or construct them in ways that were never originally intended; the problematic

history and current relationship between the 'West' and China, as it is argued by Liu and

Nordin, is one of the results of this mismatching of Western intentions and non-Western

notions. Finally, as Kamola demonstrates, English (through American academic institutions)

creates the concept of globalisation, not by observing and acknowledging it, but by

understanding diverse elements of the modern world as part of an *imagined* phenomenon

called globalisation[62]. The English language has defined much of both how IR has formed,

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[59] D'aoust, "Accounting for the politics of language in the sociology of IR," (2012): 121.
[60] Acharya, "Advancing Global IR," *International Studies Review* (2016): 10; Peter Vale, "Inclusion and Exclusion," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 18, no. 1 (2016): 161 - 162.
[61] Acharya, "Advancing Global IR," *International Studies Review* (2016): 10.
[62] Isaac Kamola, "US Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 16 (2014).

and how international relations have occurred, both in how history has occurred, and how we are understanding our current world.

Awareness of how language has shaped the creation of IR has been a facet of the field ever since the 80's when a linguistic turn entered the field through the work of Nicholas Onuf. Despite the lack of a full-on theoretical definition of a linguistic turn within IR[63], the linguistic turn has been an aspect of philosophy since the early 20th Century[64], and the linguistic turn and its sub-set, discourse analysis, has been an aspect of constructivism "for a generation."[65] For a term that is this central to this chapter's argument, we need to provide a working definition for the conclusions of the linguistic turn[66]. The linguistic turn can be perceived as homonymical, as it is used to refer to the moment that linguistic analysis and constructivism became accepted within the field of IR in the 1980's[67], as well as one of the aspects of constructivist schools of thought focusing on the role of language in the construction of international events. As a result of the homonymous nature of the term 'linguistic turn', it's uses as a term differ from scholar to scholar - hence, the necessity of a working definition of what the linguistic turn means as a scholarly term.

Philosophers like Wittgenstein, de Saussure, and Derrida have pointed out that the world - or our perception of it - are inherently bound together with language. It is through language that we conceptualise a series of walls, a door, and a roof as a building, even if these linguistic 'signs' are arbitrarily related to reality at best[68]. Within IR, the linguistic turn

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[63] The analysis of language within the field of IR is, rather, seen as an aspect of either constructivism or critical theory.

[64] "Linguistic turn," *Wikipedia*. Accessed 31 December, 2018.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn

[65] Iver B. Neumann, "Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2002): 627.

[66] Whatever definition we create here is incomplete at best, as the term has seen so many different uses and iterations throughout IR's history that there are numerous differences and important factors between definitions. Clarifying the linguistic turn would be an interesting project for further research.

[67] This particular homonymous meaning of the 'linguistic turn' is also referred to as the *third debate*.

[68] "Deconstruction", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, accessed online 1 January, 2019.

has shown that language is an essential transmitter of knowledge, as without language we cannot communicate ideas to one another. This means that, as a result, there are always at least two parties involved in the use of any language; the speaker (who may not be able to properly convey his idea), and the receiver (who may not understand the intentions of the speaker). The linguistic turn draws attention to the fact that these two *agents* (the speaker and the receiver) are fundamentally different (although similarities between the two may exist), and that we need to differentiate between the two, and acknowledge that, as Kessler points out, we should "treat 'you' (the receiver) not just like another 'I' (the speaker)."[69] As language shapes how we perceive the world around us, so too do our innate assumptions shape how we perceive and use language.

The linguistic turn, as a result, is the orientation of an IR academic's study around the role of language on how IR and international relations is performed specifically. Scholarship on this linguistic turn has demonstrated, as is shown in Chapter 1, the problems that the use of English have presented to the development of our 'globalised' world, the flaws, and the foundations that this is underpinned by. If language is a series of propositions on how we see the world, and the linguistic turn a framing of scholarship with a certain lens, it might be worth turning this lens inwards, and acknowledging a number of the core notions that the linguistic turn, particularly as it pertains to English and Global IR, bring to the fore.

A core notion of English - particularly academic English and academia - is it's continued adherence to Western 'logocentrism'. As Derrida points out, Western schools of thought contends that there is a realm of 'truth' that exists prior to, and independent from, it's

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https://www.britannica.com/topic/deconstruction#ref222928

[69] Oliver Kessler, "Two wrongs don't make a right: on constructivism, practices and the linguistic turn," *International Studies Quarterly Online*, posted 3 April, 2017. Accessed 31 December, 2018.

representation by linguistic signs[70] and scholarly analysis. This encourages us to see the language that we use to describe concepts as two entirely separate phenomena, despite the fact that, according to Derrida, the two are inherently connected. Derrida characterises logocentrism as a derivative of a particular 'metaphysics of presence' - which is "the tendency to conceive fundamental philosophical concepts such as truth, reality, and being in terms of ideas such as presence, essence, identity, and origin - and in the process to ignore the crucial role of absence and difference."[71]

For instance, if we discuss globalisation, the assumption is that there is a single, unified whole of a 'globalised world', rather than numerous connected but different worlds the world over - and that there is a single point of 'modernity' we want to work towards, whereas this may be seen differently in other places in the world. Later on in this chapter, we will be turning to Isaac Kamola, and his problematization of logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence (although he does not refer to it as such).

The linguistic turn presents a number of problems that can impact the development of Global IR. The two that we will be discussing here are language itself, manifesting in the realm of translation, and a closer look at how the 'metaphysics of presence' helps in the creation of the global imaginary[72]. Translation poses a problem, as not all terms can be translated into English, and it may impose ideas or frameworks over what is translated that were never intended to be used. Words like the Dutch word *gezellig*, which some people argue is a core aspect of Dutch culture[73], are notoriously impossible to translate. Google Translate offers the main translation of 'cozy', it also offers 'sociable', 'intimate', 'homey',

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[70] "Deconstruction," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*
[71] Ibid.
[72] It would be an interesting topic for further research to detail the various impacts that the linguistic turn has on Global IR. This thesis, however, focuses on just these two.
[73] "Gezellig," DutchAmsterdam.com. Accessed 26 December, 2018.
http://www.dutchamsterdam.nl/155-gezellig

'neighbourly', and 'snug' as translations[74], while still failing to incorporate everything that the term entails. According to some, it is a prime example of the untranslatability of certain terms[75] - and it functions as a reminder that notion that IR can only be done in English risks the loss of a term or the original meaning of a concept. The construction of the world, particularly the imaginary of the contemporary 'global' world, has long been tied together to language and the Western 'metaphysics of presence'.

The case of China throughout the modern world demonstrates the confusion that arises from the differentiations between the speaker and the receiver, the problematic crossing of inter-linguistic boundaries, and the issues of losses in translation. As Liu pointed out, historically

The proliferation of international treaties and agreements among sovereign states has left a profound mark on our thinking about language, international politics, national histories, and modernity in general. The relationship between international politics and the study of sign, however, is not patently obvious, nor are the disciplines of international law and linguistic science [historically] in the habit of speaking to each other in [...] scholarship.[76]

The Chinese super-sign *yi/barbarian* and the misunderstandings that have come about due to incomplete translations in the case of the Chinese sign *ba* (霸) shows the power of language in the flow of international relations. When it comes to the establishing of an 'other', language and translation helps in perceiving and altering perceptions in inter-lingual relationships.

One way in which language has constructed history and international affairs is through the creation of the super-sign. According to Liu, a super-sign is

"not a word, but a hetero-cultural signifying chain that crisscrosses the semantic fields of two or more languages simultaneously and makes an impact on the meaning of recognisable verbal units, whether they be indigenous words, loanwords, or any other discrete verbal phenomena that linguists can

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[74] "Gezellig," *Google Translate*, accessed 29 November, 2018.
[75] "Gezellig," *Wikipedia*, accessed 25 December, 2018.
[76] Lydia Liu, *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004): 7.

identify within particular languages or among them. The super-sign emerges out of the interstices of existing languages across the abyss of phonetic and ideographic differences. As a hetero-cultural signifying chain, it always requires more than one linguistic system to complete the process of signification for any given verbal phenomenon. The supersign can thus be figured as a manner of metonymical thinking that induces, compels, and orders the migration and dispersion of prior signs across different languages and different semiotic media. For that reason, it offers ample insight into the workings of intellectual catachresis…"[77]

Super-signs, as complicated as Liu's definition may be, are simply words 'borrowed' from other languages, upon which a different meaning is placed than was originally intended. This was the case in 1832, when protests were levied against the use of the character yi when referring to members of the British East India Company (henceforth BEIC), a word which had been translated before as simply "foreigner" but had been translated by an interpreter on a mission on the behalf of the BEIC as "barbarian" instead. Initially the protests against the use of the word started out as merely "object[ions] to this epithet and to shew from its use in Chinese writings that the term conveyed reproach."[78] While the BEIC had numerous translations before this occurring stating that yi was merely used to describe foreigners, a journey in 1832 made the character out to refer to foreigners as barbarians. The issue further came to prominence in 1834, when the charter of the BEIC expired and the British crown tried to take over trading with the Chinese. Lord Napier, the first official representative of the British government to deal with the Qing empire, sailed into Guangzhou without the proper credentials and identifiers, and was subsequently turned away and told to send messages to the governor-general of Guangzhou via intermediaries. When he discovered that he had been referred to as yimu, which his interpreter had translated as "the barbarian eye", his irritation turned to indignation, and vowed to punish the governor-general in the name of the British Crown. The subsequent military action taken was the first taken by the British government on Chinese soil, and it did not even start due to opium or trade but a curious (mis-) translation

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[77] Lydia Liu, *The Clash of Empires*: 13
[78] Lydia Liu, *The Clash of Empires*: 41.

insulting the honour of the British government.[79] When the first Opium War broke out, the super-sign yi/barbarian was written into the Treaty of Nanking, forbidding the use of *yi* to refer to any delegates of the British government.

While it was originally a catachrestic translation (whether intentional or no), the yi/barbarian translation paved the way for the colonial civilised vs. uncivilised dichotomy for the 'scramble' for China. Political wills and imperial pride, prominent in both the UK and in Qing China, meant that Chinese expectations, such as koutou (kowtow) and other forms of prostration before the Emperor, collided with an indoctrinated sense of British pride, privilege, and faith in British superiority. This clash of identity had certainly not been unprecedented - the BEIC had been referring to the Chinese as "barbarians" as early as 1721, and according to British decision makers, the fact that they themselves were being referred to as barbarians (again, whether it was intentional or not is not clear) was nothing but absurd.[80] Despite the fact that the Qing dynasty held an incredible position of strength in the world of the time, the perception of it as a barbarian and it's supposed 'fall' into barbarism defined China over it's past century and it's re-entering into the fold of 'civilised' states.[81]

The importance of language translation continues to persist to this day, especially in China-'West' relations. One of the main criticisms that are levied against the hegemony of the English language, and it's cultural undertones, is that it "fail[s] to respect the difference of others, and expects others [...] to simply become like the imagined American/Western self."[82] This almost unconscious insistence that the Western models and approaches to how the world is shaped has resulted in a rather crucial misunderstanding of modern Chinese stances on

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[79] Lydia Liu, *Clash of Empires*: 46 - 47
[80] Lydia Liu, *Clash of Empires*: 61
[81] Lydia Liu, *Clash of Empires*.
[82] Astrid Nordin, "Hegemony in Chinese? *Ba* in Chinese international relations," in *Politics of the 'other' in India and China: western concepts in non-western contexts*, eds. Konig and Chaudhuri (London: Routledge, 2016): 9.

their international relations and their relationship vis-a-vis the USA. The primary character that is used in Chinese literature to talk about hegemony in this sense is the character *ba* (霸). While it is most commonly translated or used to refer to "the leadership of one state [...] over other states in the system", it maintains a strong moral undertone due to it's combination with other characters into words such as *baju, baqi*, or *bashu*; to take over by force, aggressiveness, and despotic conduct, respectively. The Chinese understanding of *ba*, rather than just referring to leadership as a whole, refers to a "despotic and aggressive leadership that operates through force and coercion."[83]

Due to the erroneous (or literal) translation of the term, when the Chinese government claims it will not become a *ba* power, they mean that they will not become an immoral or despotic power, and not that they don't aim to become a hegemon in the English sense of the word. When the Chinese government refers to the United States as a hegemon, as Cunningham-Cross and Callahan point out, English speakers "probably think that it is big and powerful, while Chinese speakers definitely think that it is immoral and evil."[84] This loss of meaning due to translation leads to a lot of unnecessary tension in international affairs and many missed scholarly opportunities, as observers, pundits, and scholars divide themselves into the (acknowledged as) Orientalist "China as a threat" vs "China as an opportunity" camps.[85]

The interactions between China and the English language, particularly when placed in a Global IR context, not only show how language is used as a tool of empire[86], but also how it continues to shape and misinterpret the actions of other actors in the global stage. Where

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[83] Nordin, "Hegemony in Chinese?": 8-9

[84] Linsay Cunningham-Cross and William A. Callahan, "Ancient Chinese Power, Modern Chinese Thought," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 4, no. 4 (2011): 367. Cited in Nordin, "Hegemony in Chinese?": 12.

[85] Nordin, "Hegemony in Chinese?" 3.

[86] Lydia H. Liu, "The Thug, the Barbarian, and the Work of Injury in Imperial Warfare," *PMLA*, Vol. 124, no. 5, Special Topic: War (Oct., 2009): 1860.

China is trying to challenge the position of the West, it's actions are translated into English in a way that conveniently implies that it does not. While this thesis will not tackle the impacts of these framing methods, they do expose an issue that Global IR has to be conscious of when referring to language - translation simultaneously reflects the interests of the translator as it does the words of the translated. As Acharya strongly advocates that Global IR incorporates translation and translation services into its proposed methodology to achieve it's agenda[87], it needs to be aware of how merely 'translating' into English may result in the original meaning of the text being lost in translation. To rely on the Wattsian myth of English being the academic language risks continued alienation of the non-Western contribution - D'aoust's quote of problematizing 'just publish in English' comes to mind here.

Another problematization that the linguistic turn has helped show is the term Globalisation - and more specifically, howabouts it is produced. Globalisation is a difficult term to define. As Kamola argues, the confusion surrounding the term of globalisation does not come from it's inherent conflicting ideological and discursive practices, but instead from the fact that the "prevailing academic concept of globalisation depends upon a particular *global imaginary* produced within contemporary institutions of higher education."[88] Kamola's argument takes two central approaches - the conceptualisation of a *global imaginary*, and the role of Western academic institutions and their political economies in the creation of this imaginary. The latter will be discussed in the next chapter.

While Kamola draws on the works of Charles Taylor, Manfred Steger, and Louis Althusser, he predominantly focuses on grounding the concept of a *global imaginary* by

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[87] Acharya, "Advancing Global IR," *International Studies Review* (2016): 13; as Acharya points out, the International Studies Perspectives journal already accepts non-English submissions, but then translates them into English. D'aoust's point of needing to be writing in English to be seen as 'doing IR' seemingly rings true here.
[88] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary," *BJPIR*, (2014): 515.

rigorously theorising about the concept. By defining how it is produced, rather than merely acknowledging that it exists, Kamola defines the *global imaginary* as "a set of commonly shared understandings and practices that render the great diversity of social life as already constituting a single, coherent 'global' whole."[89] By presenting globalisation as an empirical reality, other potential theorisations or approaches to the concept are disabled - the Western metaphysics of presence, mentioned before, manifests itself in this regard as well. Kamola breaks down the recurring metaphor of globalisation as a "proverbial elephant, described by its blind observers in so many ways."[90] The core assumptions of the metaphor are that the studying of globalisation depends on the assumption that globalisation is a present and active metaphysical force, even with it's many odd and confusing components, and it merely needs a fully trained, interdisciplinary social scientist to be able to see this 'elephant' for what it truly is.

These sentiments echo what can be perceived as an assumption within the philosophical core of Global IR; that there exists an indisputably present body of knowledge on, and approaches to, international relations that do not originate from the Western traditions of IR, and that an increased degree of awareness and training on the matter will help incorporate them into IR. In this notion, it can be argued that Acharya's "Global IR" project is built around the existence of a proverbial elephant that has been ignored by traditional IR scholarship, which brings with it it's own problems. Drawing from Kamola's argument in this vein, Global IR may not actually contain any meaning other than "serving as a useful and timely hook around which to amass different, incoherent phenomena that nonetheless become

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[89] Ibid.

[90] Jameson (1998): xi, and Steger (2003): 14, cited in Kamola, (2014): 517.

imagined as all parts of the same phenomenon" of a single, global academic whole.[91]

Kamola's own metaphor on the matter may help demonstrate this point further:

> "...a handful of social scientists share a typical academic office through which steady streams of students, colleagues, books, office furniture, and administrative memos constantly circulate. One scholar declares: 'I'm checking my email. This is globalisation!' Another says, 'I'm going to Hong Kong for field research. This is globalisation!' Another, refilling the coffee pot, says 'This coffee is from Kenya. This is globalisation!' Another chimes in: 'I'm currently reading about water conservation in Liberia. This is globalisation!' One impudent graduate student asks, 'If all this is globalisation, then what is it?' After deliberation they conclude that the Internet, foreign travel, Kenyan coffee and Liberian water conservation are all essentially parts of the same creature. While no elephant exists, this does not prevent every aspect of the room from becoming understood as an ear, leg or tail that together constitute a whole. These scholars give meaning to their shared world as if an elephant stood at its center - they are, in other words, *producing* an elephant at the level of the imaginary."[92]

Kamola's point on how the concept of Globalisation is an imaginary echoes the main argument that Liu made about the construction of the *yi/barbarian* supersign - that the origin of both lies in a 'Western' conceptualisation. Both are imagined concepts that nonetheless have (had) a profound impact on the way that the world order is perceived by others. The *yi/barbarian* supersign provided the British Empire with a reason to interfere in Chinese state affairs, as well as (formally) creating the familiar us/them dynamic of the colonial times. Similarly, the lack of context in the case of *ba* only confuses the intentions of the Chinese government, whose assertions of wanting to become a different type of hegemon falls on deaf ears due to the absence of context in the translations.

While this part of Kamola's argument does paint a pessimistic picture of Global IR's nature (if the notion of non-Western IR is but the product of an imagined *presence* of potential non-Western IR theories, are they worth studying?), it is important to not mistake this as an invitation to ignore major, genuinely global problems. However, it does raise some considerations that Global IR will have to keep in mind as it continues to develop. If the idea

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[91] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 518.
[92] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 519.

of globalisation (and, to a degree, Global IR) is about how the idea of a globalised world is imagined, the question becomes about who is the one that is doing the imagining about the topic, and how does this impact the development of Global IR? This thesis now turns IR's political economy, and the risks that it may have on the development of Global IR.

Ch. 3   - Counter-(I)Revolutionary

The Political Economy of IR, its Relationship with Language, and the IRevolution

As has been established in the previous chapter, language does not exist separately from various power dynamics that have existed throughout history. The homogenous nature of English and, as can be conferred from the second half of Kamola's argument, the increasing homogeneity of the university as a institution of research rather than an institution of education highly impacts the production of knowledge throughout IR academia. Both within the 'West' as within the 'Rest', the role of the university in producing the global imaginary and in producing ideas about the global imaginary will be tackled in this chapter. By combining the remainder of Kamola's argument - the role of the university in producing the global imaginary - with wider observations about the role of language in IR and IR's political economy that can be made from the previous chapters, this chapter will demonstrate some of the issues that Global IR has to take into account going forward.

Kamola initially argues that globalisation, as we know it, is imaginary in nature; rather than there being an objectively present 'elephant' of a concept of globalisation, the term is imagined by the combining of various different observations that, despite being almost completely unrelated and at times contradictory to one another, are still perceived to be a part of a single whole. If globalisation is supposed to be an imagined product of the modern day and age, why is it then that it has reached such a position of prominence in the collective thoughts of many in this day and age? As Kamola argues, the fact that the origins of this global imaginary are produced in fundamentally different ways doesn't matter - drawing from Althusserian arguments, Kamola argues that "one's imaginary relation to the world is not single or static but constantly changing as contradictory material apparatuses

create the conditions for competing, and often fragmented, imaginar*ies*."[93] Rather than there

being a collective global imaginary, every individual has their own imaginary, produced

when "different subjects immersed within various apparatuses [...] engage in particular yet

structured material practices through which they come to imagine their particular relation to

the world."[94] According to Kamola, if we apply this conceptualisation to the field of IR, we

can conceptualise "how the knowledge we produce is already shaped by material changes,

including struggles and resistances, taking place within the university [*sic*]."[95] According to

Althusser, the school had become "the 'dominant' ideological apparatus through which

people come to imagine their relation to the world"[96] by the '70s, and with the high numbers

of people in the 'West' with university degrees[97], the turn to look at these institutions makes

sense for his argument. Kamola argues that, "in recent decades, a series of structural

transformations in higher education have remade American universities from apparatuses for

producing national imaginaries into ones highly productive of global imaginaries."[98]

The orientation around American universities makes sense, as all major institutions

and courses of IR comes from the West, as do all of the big journals in IR. Even a cursory

glance at Top 10 ranking lists, such as that found on topuniversities.com, displays this trend -

the top ten consists of five schools located in the United States (Harvard, Yale, Princeton,

Berkeley, Columbia), three are found in the United Kingdom (Oxford, LSE, and Cambridge),

one in France, and one in Australia. The first listing not within the Anglophone world is the

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[93] Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970): 233-4, cited in Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginaries": 523.

[94] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 523.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Louis Althusser, "Ideology and ideological state apparatus (notes towards an investigation)," in his *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. B. Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001): 106. Cited in Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary," *BJPIR*, Vol. 16 (2014): 523.

[97] "Percentage of adults who have earned a university degree, by country 2007," *Statista.com.* Accessed online 1 January, 2019. https://www.statista.com/statistics/232951/university-degree-attainment-by-country/

[98] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 524.

National University of Singapore on position 15, and the first university from a country that does not align with the 'West' is Peking University on position 28.[99] Furthermore, as Kamola points out, "the American-style research university 'is being replicated around the world' as various countries come to realise 'that the road to economic success runs through college campuses'."[100]

How is it, then, that the academy helps produce the global imaginary? As Kamola argues, up until "a few decades ago, the US university primarily produced a national imaginary."[101] With the perception of the world revolving around nation-states in conflict, American universities found "a growing sense of national obligation - combined with lucrative funding opportunities - encouraging many universities to cultivate closer relationships with the federal government."[102] With the growing need for useful information about colonial and post-colonial states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (that didn't reduce these states to 'tribal' or 'primitive' peoples and societies), a heavy amount of funding went into the social sciences, which adapted itself to developing regional specialisations to meet these demands.[103] Similarly, this period helped in the development of the imaginary of the world as "composed of a series of nation-states"[104], producing the prominence of realism in the field.

However, as Reaganism and Thatcherism "gave primary importance to capitalist markets as the provider of all social wealth,"[105] universities found themselves receiving

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[99] "Politics & International Studies". 2018. *Top Universities*.
[100] Ben Wildavsky, *The Great Brain Race: How Global Universities Are Reshaping the World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010): 41. Cited in Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 525.
[101] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 524.
[102] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 525.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Kamola, "US Universitites and Global Imaginary": 526.
[105] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), cited in Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 527.

funding from "private and corporate philanthropy, the marketisation of research, the privatisation of student services, and higher tuition" as funding from federal and state governments was withdrawn. These funders were "generally uninterested in developing a body of seemingly esoteric area studies knowledge, and instead preferred research relevant to the new economic trends."[106] With the ongoing growth of the global international market, this meant that universities focused more on putting the focus on 'global' issues to remain an attractive option for funding, and for students to go to receive their 'global' education. Those academics who had been trained in area studies before these structural shifts began reframing their work in terms of globalisation.[107] In sum, Kamola argues that the tendency to see the current world as various facets of a single phenomenon known as globalisation has only really come about because of an imaginary that has been produced by institutions adapting to changing social relations within which academic knowledge was created.

If the turn to globalisation is a part of a global imaginary, is Global IR a response to this? If there is an increasing amount of funding for universities coming from outside of the native community, could the concept of Global IR not simply be a academic attempt to attract more funding from these sources; a response to the desires of donors, sponsors, financers and funds to create an IR that is more inclusive in it's understanding of the acts of other states due to the failing dominance and diminishing significance of the 'West'? Or is it an attempt to make IR academia a more attractive option for funding from an increasingly economically powerful 'non-West'? If Global IR aims to be a more inclusive approach to IR, it will have to think about how it was shaped by the political economy it started out in, and how political economy will continue to impact it as it aims to grow.

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[106] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 527.
[107] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 528.

If Global IR aims to become a more valuable undertaking within IR as an academic field - one that challenges the core approaches and assumptions that IR has been working with for the past decades - it will have to pay closer attention to how it's political economy has shaped and continues to shape how Global IR scholarship is produced - both in how the underlying thought has come about, as well as how this underlying thought is constructed.

As mentioned before, this thesis is a problematization of the goals of Global IR - particularly it's subsuming, rather than supplanting of existing IR knowledge and theories, and it's eschewing of the exceptionalism that has existed up until this point in IR. If Global IR subsumes the existing methodologies of IR, how will non-Western understandings, particularly those that come about in other languages, be able to make their points clearly? The insistence of writing IR in English, while a useful tool to cross certain linguistic boundaries, risks jeopardising the integrity of certain terms because their translations in English do not do the full interests of the term justice. If Global IR aims to eschew the exceptionalism that has existed in IR scholarship to this point, will the predominant locations and institutions of knowledge production be willing to give up their position of exceptionalism and allow for the development of alternative methods of knowledge production? With the predominant locations of knowledge production within IR being in the 'West' and benefiting the 'West', Global IR will need to have a good look at how it can encourage the development of non-Western ideas in IR and the nurturing of non-Western talents beyond the confines of the Western academy.

The second half of Kamola's argument poses a series of questions that will require a long and hard look from within Global IR. Firstly, is Global IR a serious academic pushback against the dominance of the West, or a response to the desires of donors, sponsors, and

university administrators to adapt to an era where these individuals are no longer able to rely on the supremacy of the United States to justify the expenses? To what extent is it the one or the other? Is Global IR a genuine attempt to incorporate and enable non-Western scholars and (pre-)theories into the fold of IR, or is it a project of tenured professors and established names in IR academia who are looking for a chance to continue securing their jobs and funding?

IR is a field in crisis, which is why it remains important to ask these questions about the *availability* to engage with Global IR if it is to be seen as a way forward in the academic field. The world that IR is meant to be studying is continuing to adapt at a fast pace, and if (in vein with Kamola's argument) it is being looked into by financiers to develop relevant -knowledge for a 'global' future, preparing scholars to pick up the mantle when the current generation of scholars working on Global IR either retire or leave the concept behind. It is out of a heartfelt belief that Global IR has the potential to prepare future generations of scholars that this thesis asks Global IR to take its own political economy and the role that language may play therein seriously.

As has been pointed out before, Global IR is seeking ways to distance itself from its Western dominance, as well as move away from its reliance on the intellectual authority and agency claims of the West. The institutions through which it publishes IR are in the West[108], and the language in which IR is done is English[109]. In this vein, it is impossible to avoid the shadow of the West in IR. 'Proper' IR academia will always involve the West, be it through it's publishing institutions, or through the language in which IR is performed.

As was elaborated on earlier in this thesis, language plays a sizeable role in how ideas in IR are formed - but it also plays a role in how academia in IR is published. As English is

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[108] Acharya, "Global IR and Regional Worlds": 649.
[109] D'aoust, "Language in the Sociology of IR": 121.

the language in which IR is done, it is strongly expected of those who submit articles for publishing to have a native-level proficiency in English. This overemphasis on English as *the* language of IR ignores the complexities that exist between language and knowledge creation. With English as closely connected to the West as it is, it seals off and prevents other languages from developing into a language of science by structurally favouring English, and believing that this favouring is justified and necessary, as Bunce et al. have argued. This combines with Watts' concept of myths about English, presenting a risk that the idea that 'English is the language of academic knowledge production' is not only enforced from the top down, by the demanding of a high degree of proficiency in English by the gatekeepers of IR, but also from the bottom up, reinforced by these myths and creating expectations that IR has to be done in English to be seen as valid.

Furthermore, the solution of the ISA that is posited by Acharya - accepting submissions in non-English languages and then translating them into English before publishing - does not provide a solution to the problem in the first place. By translating and structuring the writing of a non-English language into English, the Western ideas and methods are again superimposed onto non-Western methods, structures, or approaches to thought; without the original author to correct on mistranslations it risks misrepresenting the argument entirely. Translation reflects the interests of the translator as well as the words of the translated. Western notions risk being imposed on top of non-Western terms, theories, and approaches (as is the case with the Chinese sign *ba*), or they are mistranslated entirely (such as the case of the *yi/barbarian* supersign). English, being as closely associated to the logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence inherent in Western philosophical thought as it is, risks warping the intended meaning by assuming a presence. The contextual meaning that can be attached to certain characters, as *ba* demonstrates, can similarly be lost in translation.

This leads us into the the first aspect that this thesis will suggest that Global IR considers doing differently: moving away from entirely 'doing IR' in English - whether this is through domestic, non-English journals, as Tang suggests, or a restructuring of how existing journals interact with non-English submissions would be a step that could produce a more generally applicable IR that is not as beholden to the West. It is important to be careful that we do not encourage the world to focus more on regionalism and regions while doing this.

While language is an aspect of the global economy of IR, it is only one part of the process that Global IR will need to address going forward. IR's political economy, particularly the role that American institutions have played in the forming of IR as a discipline, also warrants an investigation. While calling for the incorporation of non-Western ideas and theories, Global IR needs to watch out that it genuinely does incorporate and create an atmosphere in which non-Western IR can grow and blossom. For, as Eun points out, merely calling for a 'greater diversity' of scholars working in IR does not necessarily mean that this will lead to a greater diversity of ideas that circulate within IR.[110]

Eun, in his response to David Lake's "White Man's IR: An Intellectual Confession"[111] argues that, while it is an important step to developing a greater diversity of conduct in IR, merely calling for a greater diversity in terms of race/culture and gender in academia is a flawed endeavour, for those scholars of various other races, cultures, and genders than the 'white males' that David Lake works with are socialised into thinking in the ways that IR is established,[112] and this socialisation into the way that IR has been performed is severely

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[110] Yong-Soo Eun, "An Intellectual Confession from a Member of the "Non-White" IR Community: A Friendly Reply to David Lake's "White Man's IR"," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, Vol. 52, no. 1 (2019).
[111] See David Lake, "White Man's IR: An Intellectual Confession," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 14, no. 4 (2016)
[112] Eun, "An Intellectual Confession from a Member of the "Non-White" IR Community": 79.

limiting the development of "non-Western" IR. IR is done within the purview of three theoretical frameworks: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The goal of IR work is to produce work that fits into the positivist discipline,[113] and as we have established earlier in this paper, it has to be done in English to even be genuinely acknowledged as doing IR, with all the detriments of this. As Eun argues,

> "Lake confesses as follow: attempts to enhance diversity are "often resented by currently privileged groups … as a 'watering down' of standards in the discipline" (Lake 2016, 1117). The "mainstream" of the profession creates "a self-reinforcing community standard" by acting as "gatekeepers" regarding what is studied and how - although these gatekeepers are "rarely self-conscious in their biases and even less … intentional in their exclusionary practices" (Lake 2016, 1116) [*sic.*][114]

A mere "greater diversity of scholars", as a result, does not result in a "greater theoretical diversity", a "greater understanding of world politics", or a "greater diversity of conduct" in IR,[115] as this greater Because of the way that IR is practiced, IR scholars from all over the world "follow the research standard set by the mainstream rather than redefining how we theorise about world politics, what counts as a valid question, and what can count as valid forms of evidence and knowledge."[116] Eun concludes that the key to incorporating "marginalised" non- Western scholars, with their "different life experiences and intuitions", is a critical self-reflection, both by the scholars in the West, and (particularly) by these marginalised scholars, around who the Global IR project circulates.

Global IR does need to watch out that it does not fall into the same pitfalls as those that Lake and Eun detailed above. Many of the contributors to the project - names like Acharya, Bilgin, Buzan, Qin, Tang, Vale - are in the very position that Lake states are the very people who may end up unintentionally gatekeeping the contributions that other scholars

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[113] Eun, "An Intellectual Confession from a Member of the "Non-White" IR Community": 78 - 80.
[114] Eun, "An Intellectual Confession from a Member of the "Non-White" IR Community": 81.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.

try to make to the Global IR project - and it is only the more established names in their respective fields that have enough stability in their careers to be able to turn to non-Western 'pre-theories'.

Younger scholars, due to the political economy in IR, would be taking a risk in trying to further the agenda of Global IR - not merely because of the risk that it is gate-kept, but also because of the reality of IR's political economy. The prevalent publish or perish culture throughout academia can be considered a major cause for the homogeneity of IR thought throughout the various IR communities throughout the world, especially if one considers the fact that so many of IR's current major publications can find their origins in the West.

Considering the shift from the state-led production of the national imaginary to the market-led production of the global imaginary as was detailed by Kamola, the focus on publishing as a form of career building in IR comes with a number of observations.

Firstly, the fact that so many of the prominent institutions in IR are in the West, and so many of the major journals in IR are written in English, means that writing in IR, if not about the 'West', is at all times still beholden to the West to be taken seriously[117]. As one has to publish often to be able to build a career for themselves, the best bets that many beginning scholars have to build themselves a career is to submit to these numerous Western journals. Due to the bulk of writing that they have to do to be able to create a career, the simplest thing that young scholars can do to build a career is to write within the confines of the gatekeeping practices of IR - which means, the frameworks of realism, liberalism, and constructivism are adhered to, and the statements are positivist in nature. As translation into English to be able to

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[117] Eun also points out that many of the IR schools and journals that exist in East Asia remain set in the methodology of the West, remaining ascribed to the three main methods of IR thought production (realism, liberalism, constructivism), and are almost all predominantly positivists in nature. See: Eun, "An Intellectual Confession from a member of the "Non-White" IR Community": 79 - 80.

submit to these journals costs money, which younger scholars do not all have, it is easier to simply write in English; after all, it is the "global language", and you keep agency over what you write. Before young scholars can spend time thinking and developing contributions to notions like Global IR, they need to build a career for themselves; and, perhaps more importantly, survive. Up until this point, non-Western scholars and non-Western ideas do not have the time, nor the place, to develop contributions to Global IR.

Secondly, due to the emphasis on writing and publishing, these young scholars do not have the time to perform the critical self-reflection that Eun suggests is necessary, nor do they have the time to develop a critical thought or observations that could contribute to Global IR. If Global IR aims to provide an avenue for serious contributions from and about non-Western approaches to IR, it needs to take a good look at how it can take a step beyond the contradictions that have existed throughout IR up until this point. If IR's political economy and the importance of English is what is holding back this desired diversification of IR, then Global IR should dedicate serious effort into looking at how this diversification, considering the arguments made throughout this paper, can be worked into practice by tweaking IR's practice.

While many suggestions for a new focus in what is studied in IR have been provided [118], this thesis would like to offer another suggestion that tackles the problems that have been brought to the fore in the thesis. An interesting possible solution would be to collaborate with domestic, non-English journals and publish the same articles in multiple languages simultaneously. While dismissed earlier in the thesis as "unlikely to happen"[119], this process

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[118] See Einar Wigen, "Two level language games: International relations as inter-lingual relations," *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 21, no. 2 (2015), or Iver B. Neumann, "Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2002) for two examples of how an orientation around language might provide alternative methods of studying IR.
[119] See: pg. 9

should not be a one-way street, to avoid the centralising of all knowledge production around a single region as it is being done right now. This way, the stigma around having to be writing in English to be seen as "doing IR" would be problematised, it would open the avenues for additional dialogue about the roles and interplays that language brings with it within the academic discipline,[120] and we would be focusing on the interplay between regions and the more global aspects of IR - the incorporation of regions and regionalisms, while eschewing the exceptionalism of the English language by elevating other languages to a similar status.

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[120] Again, an interesting topic for another research paper.

Conclusion
Fighting for the IRevolution's future

This thesis focused on two of the six points that Global IR espouses - the subsuming, rather than supplanting, existing IR theories and methods, and the eschewing of exceptionalism - and while it didn't set out to initially, many of the points that are made throughout the thesis can be applied to another point; the integration of the study of regions, regionalisms, and area studies. However, Global IR as it initially was posited overlooked the importance of language[121], and only made a brief mention of it after incorporating feedback[122] . Language, however, should not be left to the wayside in Global IR's agenda, as language has shaped, and continues to shape and confuse the interactions of states in the current global world. What is more, the use of English in particular presents a problem to the development of Global IR, as it stifles the development of other schools of thought and only reinforces the position of strength that the 'West' has, as core concepts that are embedded within the use of English distort and warp the meaning of particular interactions on the global stage, as translation simultaneously reflects the interests of the translator as well as the words of the translated. Furthermore, due to the logocentrism that is so deeply entrenched in the English language, we have *constructed* the modern world of globalisation, by imagining many "different, incoherent phenomena"[123] as part of a single elephant called globalisation.

The question that this raised is, "who is it that does this imagining?" Particularly within the realm of IR the answer has already been established as the 'West'. The notion of globalisation, and the impact that the scholarly world had on the bringing of the term into mainstream thought, furthermore, appears to be a response to a shift within the political

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[121] Acharya, "Global IR and Regional Worlds."
[122] Acharya, "Advancing Global IR": 12 - 13.
[123] Kamola, "US Universities and Global Imaginary": 518.

economies of universities. With the emphasis shifted to publishing articles and attracting financers through this, the academic culture of today means that the developing of rigorously thought through and critical research that would be able to contribute to the Global IR agenda takes a back seat in terms of the developing of a career within IR - within which, young scholars will have to ascribe to the pre-existing methodologies and worldviews before they can contribute to the development of Global IR. This, in turn, has the potential to severely limit the possibilities of growth that Global IR has, remaining a project of those whose careers have already been established.

It is both fitting and ironic, perhaps, that this thesis is titled Global IR(evolution). Much of the criticism that has been levied at Global IR in this thesis finds its roots in French philosophical thought, through the contributions that have been brought to the scholarly field via the linguistic turn and the influences of constructivism. The orientation around political economy as an influencing factor - while coincidental in origin - found its general origins in the works of French Marxist philosophers. Furthermore, as IR's history has long been a one-way observing of the 'Rest' by scholars of both the 'West' and the 'Rest', the changes that Global IR is calling for can be sufficiently cast as a revolution in how IR is practiced. However, while revolutions might not necessarily be a violent affair, Global IR does need to remain focused on seeing that it's revolution comes to fruition.

Global IR is a step in the direction of a more egalitarian IR that matches more with how the modern world works - especially with the increasing strength of more nationalist and regional organisations and powers. Merely continuing the way that IR has done until this point will mean that IR risks remaining flat-footed in a time where changes come hard and fast. However, this does not mean that it is without it's problems. If Global IR genuinely desires to show a way forward for IR, it needs to be more inclusive to the younger

generations - the future torchbearers for the field - and provide them the room to genuinely tackle world problems, as well as a place and the ability to develop approaches to IR that are not predicated on the American method. The process will be hard, but by remaining open to approaches from African IR, by giving Chinese IR the room to think and develop, or by engaging in serious dialogue with Latin American IR, Global IR will help the field find itself it's sense of policy purpose once more.

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