



Does perceived (il)legitimacy have an influence on people's willingness to sanction?

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Abstract

People administer sanctions to enhance cooperative behavior and there is evidence for the effectiveness of administering sanctions. The current study is a common resource dilemma in which we wanted to find out whether participants perceived (il)legitimacy influences their sanctioning behavior. Previous research indicates that legitimacy influences people's behaviour, therefore we performed a legitimacy manipulation in the current study by giving participants fake feedback about their obtained leadership position. After that, they had the opportunity to costly increment (reward) or costly decrement (punishment) coins of other participants. We demonstrate that legitimacy has an effect on the sanction size of participants. Illegitimacy increases the rewards participants give, but there is no difference found between the illegitimate and legitimate condition when it comes to punishing.

Does perceived (il)legitimacy have an influence on people's willingness to sanction?

In everyday life we come across a lot of different situations in which we have to deal with some sort of authority. We have to listen to people with authority even if we might think they are wrong. In some situations we might even think; 'What has he or she done to deserve this position?' But what if you were the authority figure? Would you behave the same way if you would think your authority position is perceived as legitimate, compared to when you think your position is illegitimate? As an authority figure you very often have power over resources (van der Toorn et al., 2015), through this power you are in the position to sanction others. Sanctions are a much used source to improve the welfare of the group, but for individuals they can either be advantageous or disadvantageous. Sanctions can be used to influence people's behaviour, therefore it is important that the people implying these sanctions do this, because they want to benefit the collective and not because they like the sense of power that comes along with it. It might be that perceiving your authority position as legitimate or illegitimate influences your behaviour. In other words, if a decision has to be made, whether to sanction or not, do people with perceived legitimate authority act the same as people with perceived illegitimate authority? In this research we would like to find out whether a difference can be found in the sanctioning style of people with legitimate authority and illegitimate authority. We would like to look at two factors, whether people are willing to costly reward or to costly punish, just like in the research of Molenmaker, de Kwaadsteniet and van Dijk (2014) and if the manipulation of legitimacy has an influence on the willingness to costly sanction and the size of these sanctions.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy functions as an important foundation for social power (French and Raven, 1959; as mentioned in Haines & Jost, 2000). Legitimacy is 'the belief that authorities, institutions and social arrangements are appropriate, proper and just' (p. 376, Tyler, 2006). A position is perceived as legitimate when the person making the decision is perceived as accurate and acts for the common good (Tyler, 2006). A position is perceived as illegitimate when the person making the decision is not justified in terms of rules or expertise (Tyler, 2006). The belief of legitimacy make people obey rules set by

those who have legitimate authority (Tyler, 2006). Perceived legitimacy increases perceived referent, reward, coercive and expert power (Carson et al., 1993; as mentioned in Haines & Jost, 2000). People who have authority are usually seen by others as legitimate, why else would this person have the authority position? And because being seen as legitimate gives people a certain power it is important to see whether the person having this power acts in a proper and just way, even if he or she might not perceive their power position as legitimate. In line with this reasoning we would like to find out whether the person who is in the authority position has this own sense of legitimacy and if this influences the sanctioning behaviour of this person.

Power

To find out whether having legitimate power or authority has an effect on people's sanctioning behaviour, we first have to define what power is. Power is the control one has, in comparison to other people, over desired resources (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; van der Toorn et al., 2015). Having power would normally make people act in a way which makes them keep this power (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003, Kipnis, 1976, as mentioned in Van der Toorn et al., 2015). When trying to keep power people might overstep some boundaries, because they feel that they are no longer restricted to social norms and that they can behave the way they want to behave (Keltner et al., 2003; as mentioned in van der Toorn et al., 2015).

Power gives access to rewards and punishments (Magee, Galinsky & Gruenfeld, 2007, as mentioned in van der Toorn et al., 2015). These sanctions are used to increase cooperation (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965, as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014), but they can also be used to enhance the position of the powerholder (Yamagishi, 1986, 1988; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014). In the current research the powerholders will have the opportunity to sanction (punish or reward) 'other' participants. Perceived legitimacy can give powerholders the sense that they are entitled to make decisions over others (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1993, as mentioned in Haines & Jost, 2000). Proof has been found that people experiencing legitimate authority are more likely to challenge norms, because when norms are not in their advantage they will not follow them (Levine, 1989 as noted in Hayes & Goldstein, 2015). However, the

question remained unanswered is if this is the same for powerholders who perceive that their power is illegitimate?

To approach or to inhibit?

People come across a lot of situations in which they have to decide whether they want to take action (approach) or do nothing (inhibit). For example, when disagreeing with your boss, do you say that you do not agree with him or her, with the risk of getting into an argument, or will you avoid this risk by not taking any action? Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp (2009; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014) say that morality influences the decision making process. Prescriptive morality is activation based and is about doing what is right. Proscriptive morality is inhibition based and tells us sometimes it is better to do nothing, these are the things we should not do. In this theory the activation-based system is about doing what is good for other people and the inhibition-based system is about not doing harm to others.

When people have power they approach more and take more risks (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Smith & Bargh, in press; as mentioned in Lammers et al., 2008). The so called Behavioural Approach System gets activated (BAS; Keltner, Grunefeld & Anderson, 2003 as mentioned in Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn & Otten, 2008). If BAS gets activated, chances are that people act according to prescriptive morality, this is in line with the reasoning of Janoff-Bulman, Shekh and Hepp (2009; as mentioned in Molendmaker et al., 2014). Sanctions are mostly implemented to benefit the collective welfare. That's why we expect that an activation of BAS will lead to more sanctioning behaviour, because sanctioning is actively implementing something.

But does BAS always gets activated when someone experiences power? Lammers and colleagues (2008) found that BAS indeed gets activated when people perceive their authority to be legitimate. People experiencing legitimate power might thus sanction to benefit the group outcomes. Lammers and colleagues (2008) also mention some situations in which people had power but did not take any action, which would not make any sense according earlier research of Anderson and Berdahl (2002); Smith and Bargh, (2008) both mentioned in Lammers and colleagues (2008), because power makes people approach. That is why Lammers and colleagues (2008) researched if legitimacy had an influence on people's behaviour. They found that illegitimate power did not activate

BAS, but the behavioural inhibition system (BIS; Carver and White, 1994). If different systems get activated because of perceived (il)legitimacy we would expect that there will be found a difference in sanctioning behaviour between participants in the legitimate condition and participants in the illegitimate condition. We would expect that perceived legitimacy would lead to the activation of BAS which would lead to more sanctioning behaviour and because illegitimacy according to Lammers and colleagues (2008) leads to BIS we would expect that people in the illegitimate condition sanction less. We also expect people in the legitimate condition to sanction more than people in the illegitimate condition based on another statement of Lammers and colleagues (2008). They propose that people in the illegitimate condition might take less action because they might not feel that they are entitled to take any action, action taking might risk their position and this is what they would like to prevent from happening.

Willingness to punish or reward

According to the research of Molenmaker, de Kwaadsteniet and Van Dijk (2014), people are more willing to reward cooperation than to punish non-cooperation. In their research when people had to make a decision whether they were going to punish or do nothing, they were more likely to do nothing. Secondly when having the choice between rewarding or punishing participants, people choose rewarding a lot more than punishing. This reluctance to punish could be caused by the do-no-harm principle (Molenmaker et al., 2014). This principle tells that even though the overall wins are higher than the losses imposed by punishment, people are still reticent to cause other people harm (Baron, 1993, 1995; Baron & Jurney, 1993; Baron & Ritov, 94; Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al, 2014). Molenmaker and colleagues (2016) argue that this reluctance to punish might not be because people do not want to inflict harm to others, but because people do not want to be responsible for the harm done. In this case people might not punish as much as they would like to, because they might have to justify why they inflict this harm (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Schlenker et al, 1994 as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2016). Based on to these studies there is a large possibility that in the current research differences will be found between the sanctioning conditions. It is likely that overall people will reward more than they will punish. In the current study we expect that even though there is an overall reluctance to punish, people

in the legitimate authority condition will punish more than people in the illegitimate authority condition. We would expect this because according to Semin & Manstead (1983; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2016) people's willingness to punish gets hold back by their expectancy that they have to justify their actions. People in the illegitimate authority condition might experience a greater fear for having to justify their decisions and would therefore punish less than people in the legitimate authority condition do. Secondly we would not expect to see a difference between legitimate and illegitimate in the reward condition, because overall people prefer to rewards over punishments (Molenmaker et al., 2014) and therefore we expect that legitimacy will have no influence on this factor.

Social dilemma's: The common resource dilemma

A social dilemma is a situation in which people have to choose between what is good for their own interest and what is good for the collective interest (de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, de Cremer, de Rooij, 2007). In the current research we will make use of a common resource dilemma. In this kind of dilemma there is a collective ownership over the resources, people get to make the choice whether to utilize from the common resource or not (Molenmaker et al., 2014). The resources in the common resource dilemma are believed to be collective (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1997; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014). Another much used social dilemma is a public good dilemma, in which people own resources themselves and they can make a decision to contribute these resources for the public good (Molenmaker et al., 2014). But, because a common resource dilemma is about the collective, people think it is more wrong to take something from this collective pool than when the pool is more seen as private (like in the public good dilemma) and are therefore more willing to punish people in this kind of dilemma (Molenmaker et al., 2014). This is why we will make use of the common resource dilemma in this research.

According to these studies we would expect that there will be a difference in the way people with legitimate and illegitimate authority sanction. This leads to the following hypothesis: Participants will sanction more in the reward condition than in the punishment condition. Secondly we would expect that participants in the legitimate condition will sanction more than participants in the illegitimate condition. The third hypothesis is: Participants in the legitimate authority condition will give higher sanctions

in the punishment condition than people in the illegitimate authority condition do, but legitimacy will have no effect in the reward condition.

Method

Participants. Participants were 165 students at Leiden University (117 women, M= 20,91 years old and 48 men, M=20,52 age old).

Design. The design is a 2 (Authority type: legitimate authority versus illegitimate authority) x 2(Sanction type: Reward versus Punishment) design.

Procedure. The participants were recruited at Leiden University. They were asked to participate in leadership task in the laboratory. First the participant had to sign the informed consent. After they did this participants were set in separate cabins each provided with a computer. In this study there were four conditions, the legitimate/ reward condition, the illegitimate reward condition, the legitimate punishment condition and the illegitimate reward condition. The computer randomly assigned the participant to one of these four conditions. The layout of this study is inspired by the study of Molenmaker and colleagues (2014).

After some short instructions, which explained that they had to work to get together with other participants, the participants started with a bogus leadership task. After this task they were told what their role would be in the next part of the study. They were instructed that the leadership role they got assigned was either random, but that other participants scored better on the leadership task, or because they had scored best on the bogus leadership task. This was the legitimacy manipulation.

All participants were appointed as the leader. They were instructed that the leader had to make a choice to increment coins (reward condition) or to decrement coins (punishment condition) or do nothing. The leadership role gave them the final say about how at the end, the earned money was divided.

The participants were told that the other participants (these were fake) could maximally gather 100 coins, each from the joint resources of 200 coins. All coins were worth €0,10. The coins gathered by each participant was for their private gains, the coins

left would be multiplied by 1,5 and get divided over the two participants (Molenmaker et al., 2014). To make sure that the participants understood what was told, we asked them questions after the explanation and after that we gave them the correct answers to questions. After these questions, the task started.

Participants had to wait until the ‘other’ participants were finished, this took about two minutes and then they saw the decisions the ‘other’ participants had made. The feedback showed that there was one participant who took 20 coins from the shared pool and there was one participant who took 80 coins from the shared pool (Molenmaker et al., 2014). After this the participants were given a choice to either take coins from one of the two other participants (punishment condition), or to give coins to one of the two other participants (reward condition). When they decided to reward or to punish (we never mentioned the word punishment or reward) they made a choice how many decrement or increment coins they were going to use, the range from these coins was from 0 to 200 (Molenmaker et al., 2014). The participants were told, that the choices they made determined how much extra money they would receive.

At the end the participants got a small questionnaire about whether they felt that they had ‘earned their position’ and if they were ‘the best candidate to make the decision’. After this the participants got debriefed and got their monetary reward or creditpoint (Molenmaker et al., 2014).

Results

Comprehension checks

To check the comprehension of type of sanction we asked the participants four control questions. Question 1 ‘Is taking coins from the common pool good for the group outcomes or for the outcomes from the individual taking the coins?’ was answered correctly by 97,0% of the participants, question 2 ‘What happens with the coins that remain in the common pool?’ was answered correctly by 98,8% of the participants, question 3 ‘How many coins do you as a leader have to turn in to imply a penalty or a bonus of three coins?’ was answered correctly by 92,1 % of the participants and question 4 ‘How many coins did you as the leader have in your personal account to imply a

sanction?’ was answered correctly by 97,6% of the participants. This indicates that participants had a good understanding of the sanctioning choices.

We have checked whether participants understood why they were given the leadership position. They had to answer two questions. The two questions asked were: ‘Did you score above average on the leadership task or did you score below average on the leadership task?’ (93,9% answered correctly) and ‘Were you assigned the leadership position randomly or did you become the leader because scored above average?’ (89,1% answered correctly). This indicated that participants had an understanding of why they were assigned the leadership position, which was part of the legitimacy manipulation.

Manipulation checks

To check whether our manipulation of legitimacy was successful, participants had to judge five statements on a 1-7 Likert scale, in which 1 was to a small extent and 7 was to a large extent. We have tested if there was a difference in answers between participants in the legitimate and in the illegitimate condition. We executed an independent samples t-test, the grouping variable hereby was legitimacy and the independent variables were the five statements. In Table 1. the means and standard deviations of these statements are displayed, in Table 2. the results of the t-tests are displayed.

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations Legitimacy Statements.

Statement	Legitimacy	Mean	SD
‘I was the leader, because I deserved it.’	Legitimate	3,07	1,47
	Illegitimate	2,37	1,50
‘I was the right person for the leadership role’.	Legitimate	4,13	1,48
	Illegitimate	4,30	1,62
‘I was appointed the leader because of an honest procedure’.	Legitimate	4,33	1,70
	Illegitimate	3,67	2,06
‘I had the right to sanction’.	Legitimate	5,21	1,50
	Illegitimate	5,50	1,47
‘I think I deserved to be the leader’.	Legitimate	3,22	1,59
	Illegitimate	3,00	1,71

Table 2. Independent Samples T-Test Legitimacy Statements.

	t	Df	Sign.
Statement			
‘I was the leader, because I deserved it.’	-3,05	163	,003**
‘I was the right person for the leadership role’.	,72	163	,476
‘I was appointed the leader because of an honest procedure’.	-2,27	163	,024*
‘I had the right to sanction’.	1,22	163	,223
‘I think I deserved to be the leader’.	-,84	163	,400

*= $p < .05$. **= $p < .01$

These results indicate that people in the illegitimate condition were aware of the fact that they deserved their role less than people in the legitimate condition. Secondly, people in the illegitimate condition found the selection procedure less fair than people in the legitimate condition. The three statements that were not found significant indicate that although people were aware of the fact that they had deserved or had not deserved the leadership role, they did not feel like they were more or less deserving or that they were the right person for the job. Secondly they did not differ in their feelings whether they had the right to sanction or not. This indicates that the legitimacy manipulation was partly successful.

Testing the hypotheses

Next we tested the first hypothesis: ‘Participants are more likely to imply rewards than to imply punishments’ and the second hypothesis: ‘Participants with legitimate authority are more likely to sanction than participants with illegitimate authority’. To test whether participants were more likely to reward than punish and to test whether people with legitimate authority sanctioned more than people with illegitimate authority, we performed a binary logistic regression in which Sanction Dichotomous was the dependent variable and where Sanction Type (punish or reward) and Legitimacy (Legitimate or illegitimate) were the independent variables. The binary logistic regression indicated that there was no significant main effect for both sanction type ($B = .69$, $SE = .43$, Wald ($df=1$) = 2.57, $p = .109$) and legitimacy ($B = .33$, $SE = .43$, Wald ($df=1$) = .62, $p = .430$). This means that participants did not significantly reward more than they punished and that participants in the legitimate authority condition did not apply more sanctions than participants in the illegitimate condition. The first two hypotheses can therefore be rejected.

The third hypothesis we tested was: ‘People in the illegitimate condition punish less than people in the legitimate condition, but legitimacy will have no effect in the reward condition’. To test this hypothesis we performed a two-way ANOVA, in which sanction size was the dependent variable and sanction type and legitimacy were the independent variables. We found a marginally significant main effect for sanction type $F(1,161) = 3.83$, $p = .052$. The main effect of legitimacy also yielded a marginally significant effect $F(1,161) = 3.45$, $p = .065$. There was also a marginally significant

interaction effect for Sanction Type and Legitimacy $F(1,161)=2.886, p=.091$. Based on the marginal means sanctions in the reward condition ($M=6.34$) were higher than in the punishment condition ($M=4.89$). The estimated marginal means of legitimacy indicated that the participants in the illegitimate condition gave higher sanctions ($M=6.30, SD=5.08$), than participants in de legitimate condition ($M=4.93, SD=4.56$). The estimated marginal means indicated, that the outcomes where not in line with our hypothesis. In the reward condition it were the participants in the illegitimate condition who gave higher sanctions ($M=7.66, SD=5.30$), than the participants in the legitimate condition ($M=5.02, SD=4.86$). In the punishment condition the differences between participants in the illegitimate condition ($M= 4.95, SD=4,51$) and in the legitimate condition ($M=4.83, SD=4,30$) were very small, these results are demonstrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Interaction Legitimacy and Sanction Type

Discussion

Legitimacy functions as an important foundation for social power (French and Raven, 1959; as mentioned in Haines & Jost, 2000). People who are seen as legitimate are expected to act in a just and fair manner (Tyler, 2006) and therefore do what is right for the collective welfare. Sanctions are mostly used to make individuals act in a cooperative manner and by that improve the group outcomes (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965, both mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014). In line with this reasoning we expected that people who experience legitimate authority would sanction in order to improve what is good for the collective.

The study of Lammers and colleagues (2007) described that there is difference between the behaviour of leaders with legitimate power and illegitimate power. They proposed that it was because of illegitimacy that some power holders were not willing to take action. People experiencing illegitimate authority might fear that they would lose their position if they take action. This might have something to do with the fear of having to take responsibility for their actions. Early studies show that people are reluctant to punish others because they do not like doing harm to others (Baron, 1993; Baron & Jurney, 1993; both mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014). The study of Molenmaker and colleagues (2016) explained that it might not be that people don't want to do others harm, but that people are afraid to take responsibility for the harm done. Based on these studies we wanted to find out whether perceived (il)legitimacy would also have an influence on the sanctioning behaviour of power holders. We proposed three hypotheses and we found some interesting material for further research.

In line with the study of Molenmaker and colleagues (2014), we expected that people were more willing to sanction, when they could reward other participants than when they could punish other participants. In the current study, we did not find evidence for this effect, there was no difference found between the reward and the punishment condition in the frequency of administering sanctions.

People with legitimate power approach more (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Smith & Bargh, in press; as mentioned in Lammers et al., 2008) and take more risks than people without power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Maner Gailliot, Butz & Peruche, 2007, both mentioned in Lammers et al., 2008). Lammers and colleagues (2008) also explained that

the sense of illegitimacy might activate inhibition of action, therefore we expected that participants in the legitimate condition would sanction more than participants in the illegitimate condition. In the current study we found no prove for this expectation. People in the legitimacy condition did not administer more sanctions than people in de illegitimacy condition. As we will explain further we have found the opposite effect of what we expected.

In our third hypothesis we stated that participants in the legitimate condition administer higher punishments than participants in the illegitimate condition and that in the reward condition we would not find any differences between the two legitimacy conditions. We found an (marginally significant) interaction effect between legitimacy and sanction type on sanction size, but it was not the effect that we expected. What we found was that there were no differences between the legitimacy conditions in the punishment condition, but that illegitimacy made participants administer higher rewards than participants in the legitimacy condition. Earlier research stated that illegitimacy activates inhibition (Lammers et al., 2008), though after the results of this research we might think that this is not necessarily true. Inhibition may occur when the action that has to be taken could have a negative influence on the position of the leader, but it might be opposite for positive sanctions. Earlier research found that people who administer punishments are at risk of getting punished back, because the persons who got punished are willing to take revenge (Molenmaker et al., 2016). In the reward condition this might be the opposite, because when you administer a reward the only risk you get is getting rewarded back (Molenmaker at al., 2016) which is not a negative thing. People in the illegitimacy condition therefore could be overcompensating for their illegitimate position by giving away high rewards, with the only risk of getting rewarded for it by the other participants. In line with Molenmaker and colleagues (2016) fear of revenge might be one of the reason people do not punish as much as they reward.

Future research should try to find out more about why people in the illegitimacy condition sanctioned more in the reward condition. A possible thing to look at might be fear of retaliation and for the reward condition positive reciprocity. Molenmaker and colleagues (2016) already did some research on jointly versus individually sanctioning, it might be interesting to see whether legitimacy has an influence on the decision making

process of a group. When a group has illegitimate power is there also a willingness to reward to a greater extent than to punish?

Out of curiosity, we looked at the gender differences in this study. There were too few male participants to draw conclusions out of these results, but they indicate a difference in sanctioning style between male and female participants. This could be something to look into for future research as well.

Finally, the results we found in the current study were found within a social dilemma, not cooperating in a social dilemma has consequences for the group (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2007). We have used a common resource dilemma, this because within a common resource dilemma the resources are believed to be collective (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1997; as mentioned in Molenmaker et al., 2014). Molenmaker and colleagues (2014) already described their was a difference between the sanctioning behaviour within a common resource dilemma en within a public good dilemma. It might be interesting to research if legitimacy also has an influence on the sanctioning behaviour within a public good dilemma. That would be an extension of this research and would make the results more generalizable for real life.

Implications and limitations

The current research provides evidence that legitimacy has an influence on people's sanctioning behaviour. Although the results have to be further explored in future research, these results could be interesting for every situation in which sanctions can be used. For instance companies and governments should take into account that people who are seen as the authority figure do not always perceive their own position as legitimate. These people might use rewards to keep their social position or they might want to use rewards to climb the social ladder. Even though it is a bit early to draw such dramatic statements, the perceived illegitimacy of authority figures might contribute to governmental problems such as corruption. Overall the main purpose of sanctions is enhancing the collective welfare (Molenmaker et al., 2014), excessive rewarding may cost a company more than necessary which is not beneficial for the group. This is one more reason why further research on this topic is necessary.

We did not find evidence that people administer more rewards than punishments. This could be caused by the layout of the current study. Participants only had the option to either punish or do nothing or reward or do nothing. If you only have the option to sanction or not to sanction you might be more inclined to administer the sanction, even if it is punishing. Therefore, participants in the punishment condition might have administered these punishments, because they felt that they had to do so, because the other option was doing nothing. According to Molenmaker and colleagues (2014) when participants get the opportunity to either choose between punishing non-co-operators or rewarding co-operators they were more likely to reward. That is why in future research we could give participants the opportunity to reward, punish or do nothing. If participants are given this choice we could really compare the sanctioning choices.

We have to be careful with generalizing the results of this study, because participants were all students at Leiden University. To see whether these results are the same for the population we should draw a more mixed sample, considering age, education and gender.

Three out of five manipulation checks were not successful; this might indicate that the differences between the legitimacy and illegitimacy group were too small and that therefore the difference in choosing to sanction was not found. Future research should try to extend the differences between the legitimacy condition and the illegitimacy condition to check whether there is really no difference in their choice to apply sanctions.

Since our manipulation of legitimacy was only partly successful, we have to be cautious with drawing conclusions out of the results of this study. Though it is remarkable that even though the manipulation was only partly successful we have found a (marginally) difference between the legitimate and the illegitimate condition. This emphasizes the importance for future research to intensify the legitimacy manipulation, to further investigate the influence of legitimacy.

Conclusions

The current research has provided some insights in people's sanctioning behaviour. It tells us that legitimacy might influence the size in which these sanctions are implemented. These results are important to look into, because it might have a lot of

consequences for organizations and governments, because it tells us that even though you are the powerholder this does not mean that you will always do what for the collective.

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