



FIGHTING THE SHADOW WITH THE LIGHT

The expulsion of the Society of Jesus from a transnational perspective
(1750-1773)



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Introduction

The Society of Jesus was founded by St. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), a Basque-Spanish nobleman (known as Ignazio Loiolakoa or Ignacio de Loyola) and a former soldier who congregated with six of his fellow students in 1534 at the University of Paris to dedicate their lives “for the greater glory of God” – incidentally their motto was also *Ad Maiorem Dei Gloriam*.¹ As an inspiration to their new life missions, they vowed to go on pilgrimage to the Holy Land, and, if this proved to be too dangerous or impossible – which it did – they would continue their providential mission in Italy, convincing the monarchs of Europe (including the pope) to make use of their services, in order to further the Christian faith. Some years later, in 1539, the seven founders congregated once more, this time in Rome “to seek papal authorization to form a new religious order whose members, unlike those in other orders, would vow to place themselves especially at the papacy’s disposition for missions.”² As such, the Jesuits managed to earn the reputation of ‘soldiers of God’ or ‘soldiers of the pope’, especially during the Counterreformation.³

Not much time had passed between the inception of the Society of Jesus in 1540 and its exportation to the rest of Catholic Europe and beyond. Already in 1541, the Portuguese court of king João III the Pious (r. 1521-1557) accepted that St. Francis Xavier (1506-1572) – another Basque founder of the Jesuits – would become a missionary on behalf of Portugal and the pope. After all, the Portuguese had co-founded the Jesuits, with Simão Rodrigues de Azevedo (1510-1579) as the first official Portuguese Jesuit.⁴ Within the next two centuries the Jesuits expanded their influence to large parts of the world and were able to secure important (government) positions in Catholic Europe. About the position of the French Jesuits, Gillain Thompson writes: “Securely entrenched, at mid-eighteenth century, within French society, from whose uppermost echelons some of them came, Jesuits were confessors to the king, the royal family, and the upper ranks of society, and they were much sought-after preachers and retreat masters. (...) In fact, Jesuits were a mainstay (...),

¹ T. Worcester, ‘Introduction’, in: Idem (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion of the Jesuits* (Cambridge 2008), 1-10, there 1-3.

² D.K. van Kley, *Reform Catholicism and the international suppression of the Jesuits in Enlightenment Europe* (New Haven (CT) and London 2018), 1.

³ J. Wright, *God’s Soldiers: Adventure, Politics, Intrigue, and Power. A History of the Jesuits* (London 2005).

⁴ Worcester, ‘Introduction’, 6 and B. Vivanco Díaz, ‘La expulsión de los jesuitas de Portugal en la ‘era pombalina’, in: *ARBOR. Ciencia, Pensamiento y Cultura*, vol. 190-776 (March-April 2014), 1-14, there 2.

with powerful friends at the king's court and in the ministry, throughout the episcopacy, in provincial estates, and in the sovereign courts.”⁵

The scholarly interest in the Society of Jesus has increased in recent years, most notably after Jorge Mario Bergoglio (1936-), of the Order of Jesuits, was elected pope as pope Francis in 2013. The following year, 2014, marked the bicentennial of the reinstatement of the Jesuits by pope Pius VII (p. 1800-1823). Historians have emphasized the symbolic transformation or transition the Order has made from its expulsion in 1773 until its restoration in 1814; an important transition from the early modern to the modern era. As a result, histories on the Society, for example by Thomas Worcester and by Jonathan Wright – to name just two – have been twofold in their nature, clearly delineating the Jesuits' history into a modern and an early modern phase, though attempts to approach this history thematically and find certain similarities and opposites have also been successful.⁶ Apart from the Anglophone historiography, which tends to look at both the expulsion and the reinstatement from an international perspective, French, Spanish and Portuguese historians have portrayed their works in a more national manner.⁷ In my opinion the result of the first perspective is a lack of depth, whereas a lack of width is the result of the latter. It is a fact that the international suppression of the Jesuits, whereby the pope – commonly considered the leader of the Jesuits – officially expelled the Order, came well after the Order had already been expelled in Portugal (in 1759), France (in 1764) and Spain (in 1767). In a way, perceiving the international suppression as the sum total of the respective national suppressions is logical, since the papacy lost more and more ground and support for the Jesuits every other year, and every national suppression of the Order only exacerbated that problem. Yet, one has to consider that the ‘internationality’ of this subject sounds somewhat hollow, as other countries, such as Austria, Venice and other Italian principalities did not expel their Jesuits – or did so at a later time. Moreover, the Jesuit Order was reinstated in 1814 in most countries, which puts in doubt the internationality and the effect of the suppression of the Jesuits. Furthermore, seeing the international suppression of the Jesuits as a separate development, which was the cause, not the consequence of the national expulsions –

⁵ D.G. Thompson, ‘French Jesuits 1756-1814’, in: J.D. Burson and J. Wright (eds.), *The Jesuit Suppression in global context: causes, events, and consequences* (New York (NY) 2015), 181-198, there 182; Vivanco Díaz, ‘La expulsión de los jesuitas’, 2.

⁶ T. Worcester (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Jesuits* (Cambridge 2008) and J. Wright, *God's Soldiers: Adventure, Politics, Intrigue, and Power. A History of the Jesuits* (London 2005).

⁷ Examples of this would be the works of: J.A. Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción de los jesuitas (1759-1773)* (Bilbao 2013); J. Eduardo Franco, *O Mito dos Jesuítas em Portugal, no Brasil e no Oriente (Séculos XVI a XX)* (São Paulo 2006); J. Andrés-Gallego, *Por qué los Jesuitas: Razón y simrazón de una decision capital* (Madrid 2005); E. Giménez López, *Expulsión y exilio de los jesuitas españoles* (Alicante 1997).

even though it came later – is another way of looking at the problem. This perspective is often related to (late) eighteenth-century developments of a larger scale, such as the Enlightenment. Studies on the Enlightenment however, suffer from the same dilemma as the history on the expulsion of the Jesuits. Historians have not come with a conclusive answer to the question whether the Enlightenment itself was the cause for enlightenments elsewhere and if it originated from one single place (e.g. France) or if the Enlightenment as a whole was the result of several different enlightenments – maybe because there is not a conclusive answer to this question. In short, the character of the suppression of the Jesuit Order, its ‘internationality’ and ‘uniqueness’, remain unclear.

Irrespective of the scale of the viewpoint (national or international), of the ‘true’ causes and consequences of the expulsion of the Jesuits, much attention has also been paid to the motives for such an expulsion. In many ways, the Enlightenment comes to mind once more, symbolizing the context of reforms that were taken by both the early modern states (and statesmen) as well as the Church. In fact, many of the reformers of the age, and especially those that concerned themselves with the suppression of the Jesuits, called themselves or their reforms ‘enlightened’, combatting an obscurantist force that was the Jesuit Order that threatened to block progress. Two different sorts of reform have been acknowledged, church reformism has been put opposite to state reformism: reforming the Church from within or reforming the Church and the state from the helm of government. Again, this has been linked to larger-scale developments such as *Reform Catholicism*⁸ or *Catholic Enlightenment* – though these two terms are not the same, they both discuss the many reforms taken by and in the Catholic Church – and *enlightened absolutism*.

It may be difficult or nigh impossible then, to put the expulsion of the Jesuits in a single, and ‘right’ perspective, simply because multiple perspectives may apply and there is no such thing as a ‘right’ perspective. The expulsions were not exclusive to one nation, nor to a year or a time-frame. However, the procedures taken by the ones that expelled the Order, do show remarkable similarities. It may therefore be interesting to put these procedures in a transnational context, searching for similarities and opposites, causes and consequences, influences and singularities, meanwhile taking into consideration the historical developments in state and church reformism, respectively. For example, an opposition to Jesuitism – simply called anti-Jesuitism – was present in both Iberia as well as France, albeit in different forms and for different reasons. For example, the Jansenists come to mind as the foremost combatants against the Jesuits in France, yet this group had less success in Iberia, where the opposition against the Order manifested itself more on

⁸ This term has been lent from Dale van Kley’s work *Reform Catholicism*, wherein he opposes, in a way, his term to the already ‘established’ term of *Catholic Enlightenment*.

a governmental level. Lastly, anticlericalism and secularism played a great part in the increasing mistrust against the Jesuits as well.

From the 1750's onwards, both parties – Jesuits and anti-Jesuits – debated furiously about the manifold transgressions their opposite party had supposedly committed. In this thesis, the accusations against the Jesuits, and the responses provided to the accusations, form the first two 'stages' of expulsion. This combat, mainly performed in words, is beautifully portrayed in state propaganda (even though the state initially chose the side of the Jesuits), pamphlets and news periodicals such as the *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* (1713-1802) – a Jansenist periodical that scrutinized every Jesuit move in Catholic Europe, mostly in France – and private correspondence of monarchs, clerics and philosophers. In France, this debate was being performed by the Jansenist movement, an illegal Catholic movement that combatted the 'cabal' that was the Jesuit Order. Besides the Jansenists, there was also the Gallican Church, which denounced the transnational power the pope possessed, most often through the Jesuit Order. In Spain and Portugal, the same anti-Jesuitical sentiment was being expressed. However, in Iberia it took different forms and has been labelled regalism.

The next two episodes in the Jesuitical expulsion were not as bloodless or harmless as the first two. Portugal, under the guidance of the prime-minister and de facto leader Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (1699-1782), was the first nation to replace the pen with the sword and actively take up arms against the Jesuits. In 1759, the Jesuits were officially expelled from the Lusitanian kingdom, after a Jesuitical conspiracy to assassinate the king was revealed and prevented. The third and fourth episodes, which will be discussed in the second chapter, discuss the stigmatization and the criminalization of the Jesuits in Portugal, France and Spain. In this chapter, documents that tried to legitimize these actions, and a veritable anti-Jesuitical propaganda campaign, will be discussed.

The final two stages can be considered as the aftermath of the expulsions, but are no less important than the preceding stages. In fact, when the Iberian kingdoms and France had all but expelled the Jesuits from their realms, increasing pressure was put on the papacy to do the same, since that would signify the final and definitive action to seal the fate of the Order. Without papal approval for an official, international expulsion of the Society of Jesus, the legitimization for expelling the Jesuits by the Catholic nations always seemed to feel inadequate. The suppression of the Jesuits must not be seen as a fight or a war against the Church or the Catholic religion, but as an attempt to remove the malign elements within the Church. The task at hand was to reform the Church, not to end it. Furthermore, in Iberia and France resurging Jesuitical sentiments were silenced and the legacy the Order had left behind (e.g. the doctrines that been taught at universities) were condemned to oblivion. Combatting the Jesuits' influence (personified by the

papal support of the Jesuits) and reforming the Jesuits' legacy form the last two stages then, discussed in the third and final chapter, wherein the diplomatic efforts to expel the Jesuits, by both French, Portuguese and Spanish officials, will also be discussed.

By focussing on the similar stages of expulsion the respective countries of Portugal, Spain and France took to expel the Jesuits, similarities and differences will be accentuated. Moreover, the transnational aspect of the expulsion of the Jesuit Order will be touched upon as well, especially by discussing the influences between the countries and the specific events that set certain things into motion. In this way, the historiographical stalemate between 'state reformism' and 'church reformism', and the poly- and monogenesis of the expulsions, will be bypassed. Therefore, this essay attempts to answer the question in what way the expulsion of the Jesuit Order can be seen as a transnational project, opposed to a national or international one, and in what way this project was legitimized.

Chapter 1: The defamation of the Jesuits (1750-1757)

This present chapter touches upon the pro- and anti-Jesuitical sentiments that were present in the second half of the eighteenth century, eventually leading to the expulsion of the Society of Jesus in 1759 in Portugal, in 1764 in France and in 1767 in Spain – which will be discussed in the next chapter – and the official expulsion of the Jesuit Order in 1773 (although some countries, for example Austria, expelled the Order only in 1782) – which will be discussed in the third chapter. These sentiments were not new to Europe, nor to the (latter half of the) eighteenth century. It is therefore good to shortly discuss the criticisms expressed by the rivals and enemies of the Jesuits prior to this period, and prior to the eventual expulsions. Moreover, the different sorts of anti-Jesuitism and its consequences will be discussed. Lastly, the propaganda campaign set up against the Jesuits, as a result of these accusations is also the subject of this chapter.

History of criticism

At the time of their founding in the sixteenth century, the Jesuits were already subjected to criticism. Especially the revered status of its founder, Ignatius of Loyola, and the overall air of mysteriousness and secretiveness surrounding the Order were points of critique the Jesuits endured for decades, if not centuries.⁹ Another criticism against the Jesuit Order was its supposed abuse of power. The Society earned this reputation and fame during the Counterreformation. As mentioned earlier, Jesuits had secured government positions very quickly; advising monarchs and other high-profile members of society. Although the Jesuits themselves were never explicitly implicated in decision-making processes, there was always the presumption that they found a way to manipulate them. Therefore, the suspicion of a ‘cabal’ or a (malevolent) ‘grey eminence’ – this may also refer to the black colour of the Jesuit robes – was never far away.

The accusers of the Jesuits were manifold, but were usually either member of the government or of the clergy. In that light, the historiographical debate between ‘state reformism’ and ‘church reformism’ is certainly a logical one, since it offers a good background to where the expulsion of the Jesuit Order is set. The debate is one wherein historians such as Dale van Kley,

⁹ J. Carlos Coupeau, ‘Five Personae of Ignatius of Loyola’, in: J.D. Burson and J. Wright (eds.), *The Jesuit Suppression in global context: causes, events, and consequences* (New York (NY) 2015), 32-51 and C. Vogel, *Der Untergang der Gesellschaft Jesu als europäisches Medienereignis* (Mainz 2006), 22-23.

Ulrich Lehner, Jonathan Wright and others attempt to find a genesis for the expulsion and a source of causality that explains the motives for the criticism against and expulsion of the Jesuit Order.¹⁰ Both sides of the debate have acknowledged the importance of the role taken by the state and the church in criticising the Jesuits, portraying the historical rivalry between Jesuitism and anti-Jesuitism merely as an intellectual one. It comes as no surprise then, that the aforementioned criticisms were mainly published in intellectuals' memoirs and correspondence, specialists' magazines – for example the Jansenist weekly *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* and the Jesuit *Journal de Trévoux* – and disseminated among members of state and clergy.

Initially, the criticism against the Jesuits was of a doctrinal nature. Especially in France and Spain, Jesuits were targeted for their support of the Catholic philosophy known as Molinism or Thomism, which proposed a different view of predestination, one that resembled Calvinism, according to critics. Other Catholics, most notably the Dominican Order, condemned the Jesuits for it; claiming their teachings were close to if not outright heresy. Eventually, pope Paul V (p. 1605-1621) ordered that both teachings should be tolerated and for a while, put an end to the matter. Yet, Pandora's box was opened once again during the reign of Louis XIV of France (r. 1642-1715), especially from 1685, following Louis' Edict of Fontainebleau, which effectively made Protestantism in France illegal. At the same time, there was also increasing resistance among some French Catholics against the Jansenist teachings of the Louvain scholar Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638) and the French Jansenist Pasquier Quesnel (1634-1719). This time however, there was no reconciliatory pope that ordered toleration and peace amongst (different sorts) of Catholics.¹¹ In 1713, pope Clement XI (p. 1700-1721) officially condemned the Jansenist teachings as heretical in the papal bull *Unigenitus*, and the Jansenist movement was deemed illegal.¹²

¹⁰ Van Kley, in his recent work *Reform Catholicism*, is a supporter of 'church reformism', giving the Jansenist movement an important role in the international expulsion of the Jesuits. Van Kley attempts to seek the genesis of enlightened reform – wherein the expulsion of the Jesuits fit – in the Church, giving cause to the political reforms taken in the eighteenth century. He thereby opposes himself against the 'established' opinion of enlightened absolutism, and the political reforms that have been the cause for church reforms (commonly seen within the framework of theological and Catholic Enlightenment). See D.K. van Kley, *Reform Catholicism and the international suppression of the Jesuits in Enlightenment Europe* (London and New York (NY) 2018); U.L. Lehner, *The Catholic Enlightenment: the forgotten history of a global movement* (New York (NY) 2016); J.D. Burson and U.L. Lehner, *Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe. A Transnational History* (Notre Dame (IN) 2015) and J.D. Burson, *The Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment: Jean-Martin de Prades and Ideological Polarization in Eighteenth-Century France* (Notre Dame (IN) 2010).

¹¹ C. Maire, *De la cause de Dieu à la cause de la Nation* (Éditions Gallimard 1998), 12-15.

¹² Maire, *De la cause de Dieu*, 10-11.

The mention of the Jansenists is important, as van Kley suggests, because this Catholic movement became one of the foremost critics of the Jesuits in France, eventually leading the Order to its demise.¹³ In the eyes of the Jansenists, Jesuits were responsible for their condemnation. However, it seems more likely that the condemnation of the Jansenist teachings was done following the advice of the French king Louis XIV. Jesuit complicity in this decision remains scarce at best. The Jansenists were also important for another reason, namely because they were ultimately responsible for turning the debate about and criticism against the Order from doctrinal to political in nature.¹⁴

This ‘political turn’ of anti-Jesuitism originated in the 1730’s, following the ‘Quietist controversy’. Quietism was a mystic, occultist and ascetic Catholic philosophy that was being combatted by French Jesuits. Jansenists picked up on this debate, however, and accused Jesuits of the same occultist and mystical elements. In 1731, a young woman, Catherine Cadière, had been accused of witchcraft and of seducing her confessional father, the *père* Jean-Baptiste Girard (1680-1733). Girard, on the other hand, had been accused of Quietism and of ‘spiritual incest’, abusing his power as confessional father over his ‘subject’ Cadière. That *père* Girard was a Jesuit was all the more apt for the Jansenists, who became increasingly convinced that the Jesuits were up to no good, were as occultist and mystic as the Quietists they themselves persecuted, and very soon Jesuit power (e.g. in government) equalled illegitimate power, operating out of the shadows.¹⁵ During the trial, which was highly publicized about in France, the advocate-general of the parlement of Aix-en-Provence, Jacques-Joseph de Gaufridy, by no means a supporter of the Jesuits, attempted to prove that:

“*Le Quiétisme a été, (...) , le principe de tous les crimes du P. Gir[ard]. Il en a rapproché la définition des Lettres & de la conduite de ce Jésuite. Il s’est servi des expressions de Molinos chef de cette Secte, & de feu M. de Fénelon, dont il a fait l’application à ce nouveau mystique (...).*”¹⁶

Following this Cadière-Girard-affair, the Jesuits were accused of ‘occult practices’, especially during the confessional. In the confessional, many Jesuits supposedly misbehaved, and abused their position as ‘spiritual director’ towards their penitents. Soon other ‘Jesuit culprits’ were also suspected of being guilty of sexual misconduct, of ‘carnal seduction’ and even of impregnating

¹³ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*.

¹⁴ Vogel, *Der Untergang der Gesellschaft Jesu*, 33-40.

¹⁵ M. Choudhury, ‘A betrayal of trust. The Jesuits and Quietism in Eighteenth-Century France’, in: *Common Knowledge*, vol. 15.2 (2009), 164-180, there 165-166.

¹⁶ Anonymous, *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques ou mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de la constitution* (n.p. 18-08-1731), 161. Note: François de Fénelon (1651-1715) was a known Quietist.

their female penitents. Because of the omnipresence of Jesuit confessors, most importantly at the royal court, the threat of corruption (of power as well as by money) was close at hand, according to Jansenists. The trial of Cadière, wherein she was initially sentenced to death for witchcraft and seduction of a clergyman, then later found innocent and released, ultimately became a symbol for the corruption and abuse of power within the Jesuit Order, but also as a threat towards the public (i.e. Cadière).¹⁷

Unlikely allies

According to Christine Vogel, there is no real consensus among historians about the effectiveness of the Jansenist movement, about its prominence and fame, and not least about its actual participation in bringing down the Jesuit Order. However, in the 1730's many Jesuit-aligned bishops still condemned the Jansenists and even saw it as their right to deny them the sacraments, since the followers of Jansen and Quesnel were not good Catholics in their eyes. The refusal of the sacraments was another moment in the 'political turn' of anti-Jesuitism, and it was seen as an incentive to intensify the Jansenist criticism against the Jesuits.¹⁸ In that fight, the Jansenists gained an unlikely ally, in the form of the Gallican Church; the 'French national church' in a way, that guarded its sovereignty and independence from the mother church in Rome. Gallicans, which were especially present in the courts and tribunals (*parlements*) in France, were not specifically hostile towards Jesuits, like the Jansenists were, but to the disproportionate power the clergy and by extension the papacy had over the church in France. In addition, Gallicans saw the sovereignty of the French Church, independent from Rome, as a constitution that had to be defended.¹⁹ They had failed to do so following the papal bull *Unigenitus* in 1713, which had condemned Jansenists. Gallican bishops, although some supported the Jansenists, had to condemn the Jansenist movement as heretical, as a result of a royal and papal order. In the 1730's, king Louis XV (r. 1715-1774) ordered the papal bull to be implemented in French law, effectively bypassing the 'independent' Gallican Church. A strict division between church law and French law, of the Roman Church and the 'national' Gallican Church was what Gallicans wanted, but were denied by the French king. Here too, Jesuit complicity in the decision-making process is scarce, yet Jesuits were blamed as being part of the system.²⁰ Defending the church of

¹⁷ Choudhury, 'A betrayal of trust', 172-178.

¹⁸ Vogel, *Der Untergang der Gesellschaft Jesu*, 36-39.

¹⁹ C. Maire, 'Gallicanisme et sécularisation au siècle des Lumières', in : *Droits*, vol. 58.2 (2013), 1-15, there 1-4.

²⁰ Maire, 'Gallicanisme et sécularisation', 7-9.

France, Gallicans condemned Jesuits, clergymen and all sorts of ecclesiastics that followed orders from Rome instead of Paris. Jansenists were equally opposed to the ultramontanist and privileged nature of the Jesuits, and often pointed out their ecclesiastical infallibility, as subjects of the pope.²¹ That is why Jansenists and Gallicans emphasized the fact that the power of the pope in France had been dwindling considerably in the last few centuries, and that the power (and privileges) of the clergy had eroded as well:

*“(…) c’est que du temps de Saint-Bernard quelques Prélats faisaient trop valoir vis-à-vis des Souverains Pontifes, les prérogatives de leurs Sièges, où lui refusaient peut-être les secours qu’ils ont prétendu si longtemps avoir droit d’exiger au besoin sur les Bénéfices du Royaume. La puissance des Papes est bien plus bornée en France qu’elle ne l’était au douzième siècle, & même au quatorzième.”*²²

Both Jansenists and Gallicans have been portrayed as fierce anti-Jesuits, and as a result also anti-Catholics. Certainly, this is the image Jesuits themselves, in response to criticism, used. By portraying their critics as dissidents to an orthodox Catholic state, which the French king Louis XIV had envisioned, Jansenists and later Gallicans were also depicted as anti-authoritarian, anti-hierarchical, and rebellious.²³ However, everything Jansenists and Gallicans wanted was a reformed Church, free of the corruption and of the power-mongering elite that was the papacy and the Jesuit Order. Catherine Maire summarizes:

*“A beaucoup d’égards, on peut considérer les deux phénomènes comme une recherche de compromis, d’équilibre qui explique leur caractère instable et versatile: tout à la fois Réforme et Contre-Réforme, tridentinisme à la française pour le premier [jansénisme], autonomie nationale dans le maintien de la subordination à Rome, « libertés de l’Église Gallicane » pour le second [Gallicanisme].”*²⁴

However, the Jansenist and Gallican fight against the corruption and iniquity within the Church was often overshadowed by a far greater fight against religion and Church in general, in terms that would legitimize it. Van Kley states that: “In a few words, reformist Catholics styled themselves

²¹ C. Maire, ‘Quelques mots piégés en histoire religieuse moderne: jansénisme, jésuitisme, Gallicanisme, ultramontanisme’, in: *Annales de l’Est. Association d’historiens de l’Est* (2007), 13-43, there 17-19.

²² Anonymous, *Ecrits pour & contre les immunités, prétendues par le clergé de France – VII: Qui contient l’Examen des Observations sur l’Extrait du Procès Verbal de l’Assemblée générale du Clergé de France tenue en l’année 1750 avec quelques Lettres de divers Prélats* (The Hague 1752), 15.

²³ Choudhury, ‘A betrayal of trust’, 168.

²⁴ Maire, ‘Quelques mots piégés’, 4.

as standing for liberty against despotism, candour against conspiracy, light against darkness – in sum, virtue against vice.”²⁵

An explanatory note to this battle, as well as to the ‘Gallican’, ‘Jansenist’ and ‘Jesuit’ parties fighting it, has to be given. When this supposed fight took place, since the beginning of the eighteenth century, there is no mention in the sources of such parties. An unequivocal and unified stance against the Jesuits, or any ecclesiastical order was not taken by either of the ‘combatting’ parties. Jesuits on the other hand, were as disparate in their views (of their critics), as the Jansenists or the Gallican bishops or advocates. In fact, the aforementioned criticisms against and by Jesuits have often been gathered and labelled ‘Jansenist’, ‘Gallican’ or ‘Jesuit’. Nevertheless, some sources, like the *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* – which was a wholly Jansenist publication – can rightly be called Jansenist and belonging to a ‘Jansenist party’, anachronistic as it may seem.²⁶

Anti-Jesuitism in this form, in combination with Jansenism and Gallicanism can only be mentioned when referring to France, since both movements were initially confined to the French kingdom and were only present in other Catholic countries, such as Portugal and Spain, much later. As van Kley suggests: “As in Portugal, a Jansenist ‘movement’ in Spain was more the result than the cause of the expulsion of the Jesuits.”²⁷ Gallicanism however, was an idea that enjoyed far more interest in the Iberian kingdoms. Especially the idea of a ‘national church’, under the auspices of the monarchy instead of the papacy gained a foothold in Spain and Portugal prior to the expulsion of the Jesuit Order. Historians have called this tendency to subdue the Church, among other things, to the state and monarchy ‘regalism’.²⁸ Regalism however, manifested itself in government and set out to consolidate state power at the expense of the Church. In France, Gallicanism defended the independence and sovereignty of the (French) Church as opposed to the papacy and in many ways also the state, which, according to Gallicans and Jansenists colluded with the pope.

In many ways this accusation was true and not just part of a conspiracy theory that led to the fall of the Society of Jesus. Especially in Spain and in Portugal, and to a lesser extent in France as well, Jesuits did fill important episcopal, educational and governmental positions. In

²⁵ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 57.

²⁶ M. Cottret, ‘Les *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* et l’histoire religieuse du XVIII^e siècle: un chantier en mouvement’, in: M. Cottret and V. Guitienne-Murger (eds.), *Les Nouvelles ecclésiastiques. Une aventure de presse clandestine au siècle des Lumières (1713-1803)* (Paris 2016), 11-50.

²⁷ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 195.

²⁸ G.B. Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-1808* (Cambridge 2008).

Spain, this originated from the break in diplomatic relations between the Spanish Bourbon monarchy and the Papal States in 1711, when pope Clement XI sided with the Habsburg pretender in the War of Spanish Succession (1700-1714), and not with the Bourbon pretender Felipe V (r. 1700-1723; 1723-1746). Many episcopacies had remained loyal to the pope and not the Spanish monarchy, and as a result had become vacant. The Bourbons therefore began a search of clergymen who would be loyal to the monarchy and as a result ended up with the Jesuits. Andrea Smidt states that Jesuits had the desire to fill these vacant seats, as it would also grant them more power in church and state politics. For the Spanish monarchy, on the other hand, this deal also proved fortuitous, as it generated more control over the Church proper (and less dependence from the Roman Curia) and also more financial means – as the Jesuit Order was known to be an affluent order.²⁹

When Fernando VI (r. 1746-1759) succeeded his father as king of Spain, many episcopal seats, along with ministerial seats, were filled by Jesuits or by ministers of higher nobility that had studied at Jesuit-led, elitist schools – so-called *colegios mayores* – and did not hide their support for the Order of St. Ignatius. In 1753, Spain's 'philo-Jesuit' government even succeeded at signing a Concordat which effectively gave the power to assign the episcopal seats in Spain to the Spanish monarchy. Additionally, the Bourbon monarchy also gained the right to hold benefices over some of these seats.³⁰ However, at the same time, the anti-Jesuitical cry was becoming increasingly powerful, especially by non-Jesuit clergymen and men of lower aristocratic birth, who had enjoyed their education at the so-called *colegios menores*, schools led by other religious orders, such as the Franciscans and the Dominicans. These men, called *manteístas*, did not hide their opposition to the Jesuit Order. Gradually, these lower-born Spanish aristocrats secured important government positions as well and within the next couple of years a lot of support for the Jesuits, on both a governmental as well as an ecclesiastical level, would disappear like snow melting in the sun.³¹

²⁹ A.J. Smidt, 'Bourbon Regalism and the Importation of Gallicanism: The Political Path for a State Religion in Eighteenth-Century Spain', in: *Anuario de Historia de la Iglesia*, vol. 19 (2010), 25-53, there 27-34.

³⁰ Smidt, 'Bourbon Regalism', 37.

³¹ E. Colombo and N. Guasti, 'The Expulsion and Suppression in Portugal and Spain. An Overview', in: J. Wright and J.D. Burson, *The Jesuit Suppression in global context: causes, events, and consequences* (New York (NY) 2015), 117-138, there 126-132.

Political and Intellectual anti-Jesuitism

In the middle of the eighteenth century the anti-Jesuitical sentiment was intensified, caused by some of the reasons stated above. Within anti-Jesuitism a clear distinction has to be made. Related to the historiographical debate between church reform and state reform respectively, anti-Jesuitism can also be divided into two clear forms; what I like to call political anti-Jesuitism and intellectual anti-Jesuitism. As Richard van Dülmen stated about anti-Jesuitism in Germany: “As diverse the respective Enlightenment currents were, so united were they in their opposition towards the Society of Jesus.”³² Therefore, both forms or ‘currents’ were opposed to the Jesuits, but this opposition took different forms and was constituted for different reasons.

Political anti-Jesuitism is the easiest to recognize, because it manifested itself on a governmental level. It was present in the Gallican parlements in France, where barristers, bishops and judges defended their ‘constitutional rights’ against the overarching and disproportionate power of the (royal) court and clergy. In its regalist form it was also present in Iberia, where Jesuits were targeted by ministers of the lower aristocracy, who felt singled out by the ‘Jesuit clique’ that constituted the ministries of the Iberian kings. In France as well, the Gallican parlements were usually composed of men of the lower aristocracy. From this perspective, the Jesuits formed a hindrance to the planned reforms of these enlightened ministers, especially because of their ‘transnational’ loyalty to the pope and their access to large sums of money. Political opportunism therefore seems to be the main motive against the Jesuits, but there are other reasons why the Jesuits formed a threat.

Intellectual anti-Jesuitism is more difficult to identify, as its attempts and effects to reform the church from within are not that well documented. One example has to be mentioned, however. In his work on *Reform Catholicism* Dale van Kley deservedly mentions the works of *abbé* Augustin-Jean-Charles Clément du Tremblay (1717-1804), a French Jansenist who made some important travels to Spain and Rome in order to support the suppression of the Jesuits and reform the Catholic Church.³³ Clément made use of his extensive contacts within the clergy of Rome to discuss a peaceful outcome to the troubles that were plaguing the Church from the 1750’s

³² R. van Dülmen, ‘Antijesuitismus und katholische Aufklärung in Deutschland’, in: *Historisches Jahrbuch*, vol. 89 (1969), 52-80, there 52. The official citation reads as follows: “So verschiedenartig die jeweiligen Aufklärungsströmungen oft ausgeformt waren, so einig waren sie sich in der Gegnerschaft zur Gesellschaft Jesu.”

³³ E. Lacam, ‘Au fondement d’une approche renouvelée de la presse janséniste: les *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* dans les réseaux méditerranéens de l’augustinisme: l’exemple de correspondance de l’abbé Jean-Charles Augustin Clément (1754-1771)’, in: Cottret and Guitienne-Murger, *Les Nouvelles ecclésiastiques*, 71-94, there 72.

onwards.³⁴ Clément's travels would serve the purpose of “*savoir, de solliciter le moyen par lequel la cour de France et les personnes instruites désiraient procurer l'extinction des divisions, et une paix stable dans l'église.*”³⁵ In these travels, he would meet like-minded ‘philo-Jansenists’ in Rome at the Palazzo Corsini; a group which came to be known as the *Archetto*, under the guidance of Giovanni Gaetano Bottari (1689-1775), librarian to the Corsini family – Bottari had been a close confidant of pope Clement XII (born Corsini; p. 1730-1740) and cardinal-nephew Neri Maria Corsini (1685-1770).³⁶

Other forms of anti-Jesuitism that have possibly influenced the events leading up to the expulsion of the Jesuits was the ‘participation’ of a third, somewhat neutral party, namely the French *philosophes*. According to Christine Vogel, the *philosophes* targeted Jesuits and anti-Jesuits alike, were mainly anti-clerical and helped push a secular agenda to the forefront, instead of being anti-Jesuitical pur sang. In fact, philosophers like d’Alembert, Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot also commented on Jansenists and other anti-Jesuits.³⁷

In the 1750's especially, political anti-Jesuitism, expressed by the Gallican parlements in France and the regalist ministers in Iberia, proved effective against the Jesuits. Indeed, from 1750's onwards the political opposition towards the Jesuits (both in government as in society at large) increased, centred around two main allegations. Firstly, the Jesuits were a political hindrance and corrupt in power. Secondly, the Jesuits were extremely wealthy, but only shared their riches with themselves and their allies.

Suspicious and accusations

The latter half of the eighteenth century would prove disastrous for the Society of Jesus, especially since the Order, after more than two centuries of existence, would be dissolved within two or three decades. The aforementioned history of criticism against the Jesuits accelerated the various national processes of expulsion. Around the 1750's anti-Jesuitism, in all its national forms and combinations, reached its pinnacle, but so too did the power of the Jesuit Order in the French, Spanish, and Portuguese society, respectively. Of course, these two facts were

³⁴ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 109-115.

³⁵ A-J-C. Clément du Tremblay, *Journal des correspondances et voyages d'Italie et d'Espagne, pour la paix de l'église, en 1758, 1768 et 1769 – I* (Paris 1802), x.

³⁶ R. Palozzi, ‘Mons. Giovanni Bottari e il circolo dei giansenisti romani’, in: *Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Lettere, Storia e Filosofia*, Series II, vol. 10.3 (1941), 199-220.

³⁷ C. Vogel, ‘The Suppression of the Society of Jesus, 1758-1773’, in: *European History Online (EGO)* (Rostock 2010), 21-22.

interconnected, since the more power the Jesuits were able to gather, the higher the mistrust and suspicion against them would be. Some of these suspicions have already been mentioned, but the two most commonly used ones will be discussed here below, since these accusations were not confined to national boundaries, but were made in multiple countries, truly commencing the first two 'stages' of expulsion, namely of accusing the Order and silencing its response.

A general mistrust of the Jesuits' intentions; their secretive nature, combined with their presence in places of power, like courts, episcopal seats, governmental and educational positions, etc. led to the Jesuits primarily being accused of corruption, both of power and of money. To find proof for their misdeeds, anti-Jesuits – regalists in Iberia, Gallicans and Jansenists in France – looked to the colonies, where the Jesuit Order was present in large numbers, but where the political and public support for the Jesuits was considerably smaller in size.

In the Iberian kingdoms these anti-Jesuitical sentiments and aforementioned accusations would reach a zenith following the treaty that had been signed between the two countries in 1750. In this year, Fernando VI of Spain and his father-in-law, the aging and ailing Portuguese king João V (r. 1706-1750) signed a treaty which attempted to define the borders between their respective colonial empires in South America.³⁸ This Treaty of Madrid was nothing too exceptional, as there had been more treaties in the past between Spain and Portugal, concerning their territories in South America, but this treaty also included the transfer of Jesuit missions from Portugal to Spain. Seven Jesuit missions, and around 30,000 Guaraní natives, who were part of the Spanish empire, had to leave their homes because under the new treaty lines, the territory wherein they lived now belonged to Portugal. Additionally, they were compensated one peso each for their troubles.³⁹ Naturally, this treaty received a lot of criticism in both Madrid and Lisbon. From a political and an economic stance, it would alter the status quo between the countries considerably. And logically, the morality of the treaty was put into question as well, by none other than the Jesuit Order, who were opposed to a transfer of the indigenous peoples. Spanish Jesuits even tried to plead with the Jesuit confessor of the king, Francisco de Rávago y Noriega (1685-1763), hoping he could convince Fernando VI otherwise, but it was all in vain.

The Spanish and Portuguese governments proceeded with the plans approved in the treaty of transferring territory and inhabitants, but it was not done without resistance from the native peoples. And even though Spanish Jesuits in South America complied with the authorities,

³⁸ This treaty has been named the Treaty of Limits, the Treaty of Madrid, the Spanish-Portuguese Treaty, and the Treaty of 1750, but for the purpose of this work, the Treaty of Madrid will be referred to. For more on this treaty and its repercussions, see G. Kratz, *El tratado hispano-portugués de Límites de 1750 y sus consecuencias* (Rome 1954).

³⁹ J. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808* (Oxford 1989), 180.

the ‘moral support’ they provided in favour of the indigenous peoples and against the decision of the Iberian states only raised suspicion on to whom the Jesuits were loyal. Considering the Jesuit Order had endured a history of criticism and had had several skirmishes with Portuguese and Spanish settler-colonists in the past, these suspicions were nothing out of the ordinary. In fact:

“their [Jesuit] predecessors had been destroyed by aggressive Portuguese slavers, or *bandeirantes*, whose attacks succeeded until the Jesuits gained papal permission to arm and train neophytes. In 1641, the *bandeirantes*, were shockingly defeated by newly equipped Guaraní warriors, (...), leaving behind a venerable tradition to Indian achievement and hatred to the Portuguese.”⁴⁰

Fed by anti-Jesuitical literature, and by the violent insurgencies of native peoples in South America that were supposedly led by Jesuit missionaries, or at the very least tolerated by them, Iberian public officials – from governors in the mainland to statesmen in the homeland – were concerned that this transfer of Jesuit missions would incite a new period of strife and quarrel, even of war.

These concerns were brought to light when in 1751, upon his accession as colonial governor of the Brazilian territory Maranhão and Grão-Pará, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado (1701-1769) made notice of the lack of power the Portuguese settler-colonists and by extension the Portuguese authorities had compared to the extensive power the Jesuits had in the province. Mendonça Furtado, brother to Portugal’s new Foreign Secretary and one of three Secretaries of State, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo – from 1770 known as the marquis of Pombal – under Portugal’s new king José I (r. 1750-1777), reported to his brother that the Jesuits were not in the colonies for their honest, missionary work:

“Finally, my brother, the missionaries have treated the Religion in a discontiguous manner, without conscience, without honour and without shame: there is no sign of Christianity here whatsoever, nor of the propagation of the faith, it all serves as a pretext.”⁴¹

⁴⁰ D. Alden, ‘The Gang of Four and the Campaign against the Jesuits in Eighteenth-Century Brazil’, in: J. O’Malley et al. (eds.), *The Jesuits – II: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773* (Toronto (ON) 2006), 707-724, there 707-709. Citation on page 709.

⁴¹ M. de Carneiro Mendonça, *A Amazônia na Era Pombalina. Correspondência do Governador e Capitão-General do Estado do Grão-Pará e Maranhão, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado 1751-1759 – I* (Brasília 2005; second edition), 204. The original reads: “*Finalmente, meu irmão, as Religiões neste Estado destratarem com a proximidade, com a consciência, com a honra e com a vergonha: aqui não há nem sinal de cristandade, neles a propagação da fê não lhes serve mais que do pretexto, (...), a Religião.*”

Without proper proof however, Mendonça Furtado speculated further that the Jesuits were conspiring with the natives and most importantly withholding trade and riches from the Portuguese state:

“This is [the fact that the Jesuits dominated the inland rivers of Brazil], to [keep the] trade for themselves, in violation of both the Crowns [Portugal and Spain] and without the great contraband that they have there resulting in anything good for the public, because all leather remains within the Society [‘s hands].”⁴²

Finally, the governor also noticed that the Jesuits were inciting a rebellion and had all but considered themselves independent and sovereign, thereby dismissing Portuguese authority:

“Your Excellency has already been informed about the great power of the clerics regular [e.g. the Jesuits] in this state, which has been ruined [/corrupted] by this power, so much so that the Jesuits⁴³ do not imagine it being halted or stopped, and they do not care about the King, Court, Governor of any branch of the Government, or Justice, they consider themselves sovereign and independent, and assure themselves that this is right, constant, known and obvious to all those that live in these areas.”⁴⁴

Undermining (state) authority, rebelliousness, corruption and the like became characteristics for the Jesuits, especially among the Carvalho e Melo clan. In fact, the Portuguese secretary would continuously attempt to convince the king of taking action against the Jesuits, and diminish the power of the Order. Ideally, this would be the solution for all anti-Jesuits in Portugal, Spain or France, but the Jesuits would not bow down so easily. Therefore, since the position of the Jesuits in Catholic Europe was still too robust to tear down, the Portuguese and Spanish authorities tried to consolidate state power at the cost of that of the Order’s. Carvalho e Melo, as many other anti-Jesuits, became convinced that the Society of Jesus was the main impediment to a centralization of power, and reports of illicit trade, disloyalty to the crown, and the alleged threat the Order seemingly posed only strengthened his belief that the Jesuits had to give way for state-authorized and state-led institutions – e.g. the Inquisition, government positions, mission posts in the colonies, and the like. In fact, regalist ministers such as Carvalho e Melo in Portugal, wanted full control of the colonial trade, and saw the wealthy, still mysterious Order of Jesuits as the

⁴² Carneiro de Mendonça, *Amazônia*, 205. The original reads: “*Isto é, para fazerem o negócio entre si, em fraude de ambas as Coroas, e sem que do grande contrabande que ali se há de fazer possa resultar bem algum ao público, porque todo o cabedal há de ficar dentro da Companhia.*”

⁴³ The word *religiosos* translates to the ‘religious ones’, but was another way of describing the members of the Society of Jesus.

⁴⁴ Carneiro Mendonça, *Amazônia*, 204. The original reads: “*Já V. Ex^a está informado do grande poder dos Regulares neste Estado, que o tal poder o tem arruinado, que os religiosos não imaginam senão o como o hão de acabar de precipitar, que não fazem caso de Rei, Tribunal, Governador ou casta alguma do Governo, ou Justiça, que se consideram soberanos e independentes, e que tudo isto é certo, constante, notório e evidente a todos os que vivem destas partes.*”

foremost hindrance that blocked or withheld trade (e.g. of diamonds and gems) flowing to metropolitan Lisbon, which could possibly rival other trade nodes of Antwerp and London.⁴⁵

Whether the Jesuits were guilty of this crime or not – as an ecclesiastical order, they were not allowed to gain profits – some defended their ‘control’, or at least monopoly of contact (possibly trade) with the natives, which only made their practices in the colonies more suspicious. In 1754, Fr. Pedro Lozano published the *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la Provincia de Paraguay* wherein he defended the “*acciones gloriosas de los Hijos de la Compañía en esta Provincia del Paraguay, desde que entraron à ella con título de Mission, (...), fuè creciendo à tal magnitud (...).*”⁴⁶ In their eyes, the Jesuits were naturally doing God’s work, which should not be impeded nor interfered with. Additionally, many who thought otherwise were silenced or condemned by the Jesuits, as had happened in for example 1747, when the Jesuit-led Spanish Inquisition condemned ‘dissident’ beliefs and works of Augustinians, Jansenists, and others.⁴⁷ In France, similarly, the Jesuit archbishop of Paris Christophe de Beaumont (1703-1781), condemned Jansenists by denying them and “any penitent who was unable to produce a signed note or *billet de confession* verifying that he had been confessed by an authorized priest” the sacraments. The parlements opposed this ‘sacramental policy’ and questioned the right of clergy to do this. In 1753, king Louis XV of France (r. 1715-1774) had even sided with the archbishop and had denied the parlements their *grands remonstrances*, which gave him the reputation that he was being controlled by the *dévo*t faction within his court – the most zealous supporters of the clerics and Jesuits – and by extension also by Jesuits.⁴⁸

From 1754 onwards however, the Jesuits endured a string of bad luck, to which they could not anticipate quickly enough and which meant the loss of much of the political support in Iberia and France – including support in court – they had so long enjoyed. In 1754, two influential ministers in Spain; the prime-minister José Carvajal y Lancáster (1698-1754) and Zenón de Somodevilla y Bengoechea (1702-1781), otherwise known as the marquis of La Ensenada, lost their positions at court, the first through a sudden death, the latter through a conspiracy. The next year, in 1755, the Spanish Jesuit court confessor Francisco de Rávago was ostracized. In Portugal, a similar purge of ‘philo-Jesuits’ happened, following the disastrous

⁴⁵ T. Vanneste, ‘Money Borrowing, Gold Smuggling and Diamond Mining: An Englishman in Pombaline Circles’, in: *e-JPH*, vol. 13.2. (December 2015), 80-94, there 87-90.

⁴⁶ Fr. P. Lozano, *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la Provincia del Paraguay, escrita por el Padre Pedro Lozano, de la misma Compañía* (Madrid 1754), xi.

⁴⁷ Smidt, ‘Bourbon Regalism’, 33.

⁴⁸ J. Swann, *Politics and the Parlement de Paris under Louis XV, 1754-1774* (Cambridge 1995), 90-91.

earthquake on the 1st of November 1755, wherein the prime-minister (and minister of Internal affairs) Pedro da Mota e Silva (1685-1755) died, and was subsequently replaced by Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo. Lastly, in France, king Louis XV of France had sent the parlement of Paris into exile in 1752 for fifteen months, for their continued attacks against the clergy. In 1754 however, the parlement of Paris returned from exile, now more adamant than ever to defend the rights of the Gallican church and attack those of the clergy. In 1756, the Jesuits came under close scrutiny from the parlements, which oversaw a case wherein the Jesuits were accused of financial mismanagement of one of their colonial missions on the island of Martinique. Their creditors, the Lioncys of Marseille, had gone bankrupt, and had set up a case against the Jesuits.⁴⁹ This gave the Jesuit Order in France unwanted attention, and only strengthened the belief that Jesuits were corrupt (in the financial sense).⁵⁰

Gallican-Regalist victory

Carvajal and Ensenada were known supporters of the Jesuits, and Rávago was one of the most influential Jesuits in Spain.⁵¹ They had been the main negotiators of the Treaty of Madrid and had possibly not anticipated the Jesuit criticism against and opposition to this treaty. In their eyes, the treaty effectively gave Spain more control over the colonial trade in modern-day Uruguay, including a stronger maritime position against Great-Britain. However, in clear violation with a previous treaty signed with Great Britain, Ensenada ordered the construction of ships to rival the Royal Navy, in preparation of a coming war.⁵² Ensenada's plans were secret, even to the king. In 1754, after the death of his ally, the prime-minister Carvajal, Ensenada became the victim of a plot against him. The influential duke of Huéscar⁵³, later duke of Alba, who acted briefly as prime-minister of Spain in 1754, together with the British ambassador in Madrid, Sir Benjamin Keene (1697-1757), both known to be opposed to the influence of the Jesuits at the Spanish court, informed Fernando VI of Ensenada's secret agenda. The king had Ensenada deposed and put him under house arrest and replaced him with the anti-Jesuitical

⁴⁹ John Penrose (ed.), *An attempt to prove the truth of Christianity from the wisdom displayed in its original establishment, and from the history of false and corrupted systems of religion: in a series of discourses preached before the University of Oxford (...) by the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A.* (London and Edinburgh 1808), appendix page 88.

⁵⁰ D.G. Thompson, 'French Jesuits 1756-1814', in: J.D. Burson and J. Wright (eds.), *The Jesuit Suppression in global context: causes, events, and consequences* (New York (NY) 2015), 181-198, there 182-183.

⁵¹ J.F. Alcaraz Gómez, *Jesuitas y Reformismo: El padre Francisco de Rávago (1747-1755)* (Valencia 1995).

⁵² J.L. Gómez Urdáñez, *El marqués de la Ensenada. El secretario de todo* (Logroño 2017), 212.

⁵³ The duchy of Huéscar was a ceremonial one, referring to the heirs-apparent of the duchy of Alba de Tormes.

Ricardo Wall, a French-Irish minister in service of Spain, and who had acted as Spanish ambassador to Great-Britain. Eventually, Ricardo Wall would succeed Alba as prime-minister of Spain. The Spanish monarchy, although supportive of the Jesuits since the accession of the Bourbons and even before, now had an anglophile, anti-Jesuitical and sometimes even anti-French minister at its head.⁵⁴ On Wall, Rávago reported that:

*“Don Ricardo Wall es un enemigo temible de la Compañía de Jesús, sea por sus fines particulares o por antiguos prejuicios que proceden de su educación, y sin escuchar razones, desearía si pudiese, expulsarlos de España.”*⁵⁵

Rávago was sent away from court the next year, likewise a victim of the new regalist regime.

This ‘purge of Jesuitism’, or at least of key figures who had supported Jesuits in the past and were replaced by anti-Jesuits or regalists, did not have immediate effects on the campaign against the Jesuits, but it did prove that some of the accusations were justified, e.g. that Jesuits had immense wealth that served no interests but their own. For example, upon his arrest in 1754, Ensenada’s house was filled with an abundance of gold and incredible wealth, exactly what was to be accepted from a ‘philo-Jesuit’ minister, according to his opponents.⁵⁶

In Portugal, Carvalho e Melo received similar reports of Jesuit wealth and of a Jesuit trading company that rivalled with the Portuguese in their colonies. Additionally, the bishop Bulhões of Belem do Pará (1706-1779) reported that the Jesuits were “arrogant, contumacious, despotic, obstinate, prideful, defiant, excessively ambitious, and disloyal.”⁵⁷ Carvalho e Melo therefore became increasingly convinced that he had to step up and stop the Jesuit Order, beginning an extensive propaganda campaign against them, accusing them of the suspicions many anti-Jesuits had against the Order, but could not prove. This all changed in October 1755, when his brother Mendonça Furtado expelled four Jesuits accused of revolting against the Portuguese authorities and of obstructing trade flowing to the metropolis.⁵⁸ A month later, Portugal was struck by an earthquake, and its effects put even more pressure on the Jesuits. This expulsion, although minor in scale compared to the international expulsions between 1759-1773, was important because it was the first of its kind and because a (propaganda) campaign targeting Jesuits had truly commenced. As mentioned before, criticism against the Jesuits was not new, but this

⁵⁴ D. Téllez Alarcia, *El ministerio Wall. La ‘España discreta’ del ‘ministro olvidado’* (Madrid 2012).

⁵⁵ Gómez Urdáñez, *El marqués de la Ensenada*, 223.

⁵⁶ Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, 183.

⁵⁷ Alden, ‘The Gang of Four’, 716.

⁵⁸ J.A. Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción de los jesuitas, 1759-1773* (Bilbao 2013), 16. For the report of the governor to bishop Bulhões and his brother Carvalho e Melo see: Carneiro Mendonça, *Amazônia – II*, 480-483 and 495-496.

transnational propaganda campaign, started under the auspices of the Portuguese chief minister, targeted the Jesuits with recent and traditional criticisms and was received, copied and translated in several countries, making it truly transnational and more effective than previous polemical treatises on the Jesuit Order. Moreover, suspicions and criticisms turned into accusations and trials.

The start of an anti-Jesuitical campaign

The last step of the Jesuits' demise in Portugal came after the disastrous earthquake that struck the country on the morning of the feast of All Saints (1st of November) 1755. The casualties amounted to 10,000 on the first day, leading up to 70,000 later. A catastrophe of this size had long-during effects and would have a sizeable impact. The earthquake did not only affect Portugal, but was also felt in other countries. Word travelled fast as well, as interpretations of and treatises on the earthquake, its causes and consequences soon followed. Philosophers like Voltaire, Rousseau and Kant became fascinated by it, and extensively wrote about the event. The *philosophes* contributed to an already ongoing debate about the clergy and its role in society. This debate centred around the doubt if God was truly a benevolent god, and if He would let a disastrous earthquake like the one on November 1st 1755 happen, only to punish the people for their sins. Voltaire, in his *Poèmes sur le désastre de Lisbonne et sur la Loi Naturelle*, was very clear in his opinion:

*“ Aux cris demi-formés de leurs voix expirantes
Au spectacle effrayant de leurs cendres fumantes,
Direz-vous, c'est l'effet des éternelles Loix,
Qui d'un Dieu libre & bon nécessitent le choix?
Direz-vous, en voyant cet amas de victimes,
Dieu s'est vengé, leur mort est le prix de leurs crimes?
Quel crime, quelle faute ont commis ces enfants,
Sur le sein maternel écrasés et sanglants?
Lisbonne qui n'est plus, eut-elle plus de vices
Que Londres, que Paris, plongés dans les délices?
Lisbonne est abimée, & l'on danse à Paris.
Tranquilles spectateurs, intrépides esprits.*

*De vos frères mourants contemplant les naufrages.
Vous recherchez en paix les causes des orages;
Mais du sort ennemi quand vous sentez les coups,
Devenus plus humains, vous pleurez comme nous.
Croyez-moi, quand la terre entrouvre ses abîmes,
Ma plainte est innocente, & mes cris légitimes.”*⁵⁹

For some in Lisbon however, it was clear who was at fault. The Italian Jesuit Gabriele Malagrida (1689-1761), an infamous figure in Lisbon at the time, and most importantly court confessor to king José I, was among the most vocal commentators on the earthquake, delivering the opposite interpretation, that the people, and especially the Portuguese government, under the leadership of Carvalho e Melo, were the ones that had brought about the disaster at Lisbon. In 1756, Malagrida even started a propaganda campaign of his own. In his publication, the *Juízo da verdadeira causa do terremoto, que padeceo a Corte de Lisboa, no primeiro de novembro de 1755* [The evaluation of the true cause of the earthquake which was suffered at the Court of Lisbon on the first of November 1755] Malagrida interpreted the earthquake as God’s wrath (*um braço divino ameaçava*), to punish the Portuguese people for their “intolerable sins” (*intoleraveis peccados*) and specifically its malevolent and wicked government, under the leadership of Carvalho e Melo.⁶⁰

The sudden explicit Jesuit attack or criticism vis-à-vis the Portuguese government – although Carvalho e Melo’s name is not explicitly mentioned in the *Juízo*, the authorities are – is not that strange. The aforementioned ‘purge of Jesuitism’ at the courts of Spain and France happened in Portugal as well. Carvalho e Melo had already elevated many of his associates – or ‘creatures’ as some historians have chosen to call them⁶¹ – and himself, to high places, by being a close confidant of the young king, but after the earthquake, and the death of his co-Secretary of State Pedro da Mota e Silva, Carvalho e Melo became the most powerful man in the kingdom and the *de facto* leader of Portugal.⁶² The campaign against the Jesuits, which had already started

⁵⁹ Voltaire, *Poèmes sur le désastre de Lisbonne et sur la Loi Naturelle avec des préfaces, des notes, & c.* (Genève 1756), 8-9.

⁶⁰ G. Malagrida, *Juízo da verdadeira causa do terremoto, que padeceo a corte de Lisboa, no primeiro de Novembro de 1755* (Lisbon 1756).

⁶¹ J. Eduardo Franco, ‘Os catecismos antijesuíticos pombalinos. As obras fundadoras do antijesuítismo do Marquês de Pombal’, in: *Revista Lusófona de Ciência das Religiões*, vol. 4.7-8 (2005), 247-268.

⁶² K. Maxwell, *Pombal: Paradox of the Enlightenment* (Cambridge 1995).

by appointing his like-minded anti-Jesuitical brother as colonial governor, who had sent Malagrida away from the Brazilian colony in 1753, and had expelled four other Jesuits a month before the earthquake in 1755, now began in earnest. The earthquake and its effects, although unrelated to the accusation against the Jesuits of corruption of power and vast quantities of wealth, has been considered a great opportunity for the new anti-Jesuitical Portuguese government led by Carvalho e Melo to accuse the Jesuits. With the subsequent attacks by Malagrida and Portuguese Jesuits as well, Carvalho e Melo now had a personal motive to deal with the Jesuit Order.

In the *Juízo*, Malagrida spoke of the authorities, and its leader – meaning Carvalho e Melo – as the ones who should be held accountable. He went further by personally attacking

“those that say that this suffering was purely the effect of natural causes [i.e. the Portuguese government], and not specifically what God intended for our sins [are] not Catholic, but heretics, Turks, or Jews.”⁶³

Accusing Carvalho e Melo of being Jewish, and not of ‘pure blood’ – meaning he descended from Jewry or from ‘New Christians’ – was not something new. According to Frêches, Malagrida was also reported of saying that “*Carvalho est juif tout de bon, descendant de père en fils sans la moindre interruption.*”⁶⁴ There is some evidence that Carvalho was at least familiar with some Jews, and lenient towards them, ‘distracting’ the Portuguese Inquisition towards new victims, namely the Jesuits, instead of Jews, New Christians or others of ‘impure blood’. However, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, both in Portugal and in Spain, *limp(i)eza de sang(r)ue* was not a serious enough accusation to proceed with and therefore had no real effect on the reputation of Carvalho e Melo.⁶⁵

Irrespective of the validity of the accusations against Carvalho e Melo and the Lisbon court, Carvalho e Melo had to reciprocate and make an end to the pro-Jesuit literature, under guidance of Malagrida, and to the ‘open-air’ sermons the Italian Jesuit had decided to give in Lisbon, in the months that followed the earthquake. According to José Eduardo Franco, this moment was crucial for the further rule of Carvalho e Melo, a moment of truth so to speak:

⁶³ Malagrida, *Juízo*, 15-16. The original reads: “(...) *haverá, não digo Catholico, mas Herege, Turco, ou Judeo, que possa dizer, que este tão grande açoute foi puro effeito das causas naturaes, e não fulminado especialmente por Deos pelos nossos peccados.*”

⁶⁴ C-H. Frêches, ‘Pombal et la Compagnie de Jésus: la campagne de pamphlets’, in: *Revista de História das Ideias*, vol. 4.1 (Coimbra 1982), 299-327, there 326.

⁶⁵ H. Kamen, *La Inquisición española. Una revisión histórica* (Barcelona 2004; second edition) and C. de Bethencourt, ‘The Jews in Portugal from 1773 to 1902’, in: *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, vol. 15.2 (January 1903), 251-274, there 252-254.

“The Society of Jesus, in criticizing the pombaline government, merged their interests with those of the higher nobility, who were discontent with the concentration of power of the state in the hands of a low-born nobleman [*fidalgo*]. If Carvalho e Melo did not tame the nobility and did not silence the Jesuits, the trajectory of pombaline absolutism would not have been the same, and perhaps this powerful minister would not have endured so long as he did at the helm of government.”⁶⁶

As shown hereabove, the Jesuits had close relations with the higher nobility, and attempted to end the reign of Carvalho e Melo, possibly by turning the people and the king against him. A similar thing happened in Spain, where Ensenada, a nobleman of the highest echelons had remained a staunch supporter of the Queen-Dowager Elisabetta Farnese (1692-1766), and still exerted some influence, attempted to end the reign of the lower-born prime-minister Ricardo Wall – whose ancestry was also shrouded in mystery and an ample source for suspicion.⁶⁷ However, the Jesuits’ attempts to remove these anti-Jesuitical, low-born ministers from office were not successful. In fact, in Portugal, Carvalho e Melo succeeded in removing Malagrida – for the second time, since he had already been sent away from Brazil by Mendonça Furtado – from office, and convinced the king to remove the threat that the 66-year-old Jesuit seemingly posed and sent him to Setúbal, where he was put under house arrest – much like Ensenada’s fate in 1754.⁶⁸ Jesuits abroad reacted very quickly to this (second) ‘minor expulsion’ from the Jesuits at the Portuguese court and called further allegations of treason and lese-majesty by the Portuguese state “*le venin des mensonges, dictés par Machiavel, et des principes opposés à l’Évangélie, aussi bien qu’hérétiques, impies et séditeux, détruisant la charité chrétienne, la société civile et la tranquillité des États.*”⁶⁹

The Portuguese government reacted in similar vein by publishing, on the feast day of St. Francis Xavier no less, the 3rd of December 1757, the *Relação abreviada*. In it the Portuguese authorities – although the publication was anonymous, Carvalho e Melo’s role in publishing and

⁶⁶ J. Eduardo Franco, ‘O “terramoto” pombalino e a campanha de “desjezuitização” de Portugal’, in: *Lusitania Sacra*, vol. 18.2 (2006), 147-218, there 159.

⁶⁷ Téllez-Alarcia, *El ministerio Wall*, 41-45.

⁶⁸ Vivanco Díaz, ‘La expulsión de los jesuitas’, 6-8.

⁶⁹ Frêches, ‘Pombal et la Compagnie de Jésus’, 311. As cited by Frêches. The reference to Machiavelli meaning anti-Catholic or anti-papal. For more on the ‘machiavellan influences in Carvalho e Melo’s reign, see: M. Pereira Lopes, ‘Leading by fear and by love: Niccolò Machiavelli and the enlightened despotism of the Marquis of Pombal in the eighteenth century Portugal, in: *Management & Organizational History*, vol. 12.4 (2017), 374-390.

disseminating it is obvious⁷⁰ – repeated the allegations against the Jesuits.⁷¹ What was new however, was its international dissemination and reception among likeminded enemies of the Jesuits. Within a year, the *Relação abreviada*, was translated into French, German, Spanish and Italian, exemplifying the reach the article and its content had. It is for example well known that Carvalho e Melo made use of French translators – since French at this time of period was the *lingua franca* in Europe – such as Pierre-Olivier Pinault, a Parisian barrister who was well known in Jansenist circles.⁷² Carvalho e Melo also made use of Niccolò Pagliarini, an associate of the *Archetto* group of Jansenists in Rome, who translated it into Italian and disseminated the *Relação abreviada* in Rome.⁷³ Vogel states that by giving the publication royal approval, the allegations – although still not proven – were perceived as more convincing. It attracted the attention of all sorts of anti-Jesuits and ‘regalists’, who – in their own respective ways – used the Portuguese propaganda to bolster their own fight against the Jesuits or the Jesuitical ideology.⁷⁴

This first article – for other articles would follow – was primarily published in other Catholic countries, where the Jesuits either held sway or were a sizeable force – Germany for example had one of the largest Jesuit congregations – but where the anticlerical and anti-Jesuitical sentiment – e.g. France – was also at its largest. It may also been the place where Carvalho e Melo had been influenced by to start a campaign that ultimately set out to accuse, silence, stigmatize, criminalize and expel the Jesuit Order.

The origin of Carvalho e Melo’s anti-Jesuitism is not clear: some think it came from his time as ambassador in Great-Britain, others suggest the origin lies in Austria, where the Portuguese secretary had also been ambassador.⁷⁵ Equally likely is the assumption that Carvalho e Melo had been influenced by Gallicans and Jansenists in France, who from 1752 onwards, had

⁷⁰ Eduardo Franco, ‘Os catecismos antijesuíticos pombalinos’, 247-248.

⁷¹ Anonymous, *Relação abreviada da Republica que os Religiosos Jesuitas das Provincias de Portugal, e Hespanha, estabelecerão nos Dominios Ultramarinos das duas Monarchias, e da Guerra, que neles tem movido, e sustentando contra os Exercitos Hespanhoes, e Portuguezes* (Lisbon 1757).

⁷² Vogel, ‘The Suppression of the Society of Jesus’, 10. For more information on Pinault and his other anti-Jesuitical works (many concerning Portugal) see his personal information at the Bibliothèque nationale de France: [www.data.bnf.fr]. However, many of the French translations were first published in Amsterdam.

⁷³ N. Guasti, ‘Niccolò Pagliarini, stampatore e traduttore al servizio del marchese di Pombal’, in: *Cromohs*, vol. 12 (2007), 1-12.

⁷⁴ Vogel, ‘Suppression of the Society of Jesus’, 4-6.

⁷⁵ S. Gatzhammer, ‘Politisch-diplomatische Beziehungen zwischen Portugal und Österreich im 18. Jahrhundert vor dem Hintergrund der Jesuitenfrage’, in: *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung (MIÖG)* (Potsdam 1994), 359-408, there 363-383.

been constantly combatting the clergy and the king for his support of the Jesuits. This ‘fight’ had been publicized about by Jansenists in the *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques*, and by its editor, Louis-Adrien Le Paige (1712-1802), who was also a member of the parlement de Paris and therefore often in the thick of the fight. Le Paige was an active opponent of the Jesuit Order and the French clergy, who were perceived of as a threat to the ‘fundamental laws’ of the kingdom – a feat he shared with Carvalho e Melo.⁷⁶ In 1752, he published the *Lettres adressées à messieurs les commissaires nommés par le Roi, pour délibérer sur l’affaire présente du Parlement au sujet du refus des sacrements* (Paris 1752) wherein he – much like Clément du Tremblay in his *Journal des correspondances* – set out to “pacifier les troubles de l’Église”, and wherein he explained that

“l’objet de ces Lettres est d’étudier l’esprit & la conduite de l’Église, dans les différents troubles qui l’ont agitée, & dans les moyens qu’elle a pris en chaque siècle pour rétablir la paix & l’unité entre ses enfants.”⁷⁷

This article against the clergy and the Roman Church was closely followed by possibly Le Paige’s most influential treatise, the *Lettres historiques*, wherein the role of the parlements, the king and the clergy are discussed.⁷⁸ Ultramontanism; the Jesuitical loyalty towards the pope, the infallibility of the clergy, the lack of accountability among the clergy, and other damaging notions come to pass in these articles, as it did in the *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques*, wherein an anonymous writer wondered:

“Si les Jésuites n’énoncent pas dans cette Thèse en termes formels que le Pape est infaillible, ils ne le donnent que trop à entendre. Après avoir dit que « le Pontife Romain a de droit divin dans toute l’Église une Primauté, non seulement d’honneur, mais encore de juridiction » la Thèse ajoute entr’autres conséquences de ce principe, que « toute l’Autorité de l’Église réside dans les Evêques unis au Pontife Romain; lesquels seuls composent l’Église enseignante. ”⁷⁹

In essence these were the same accusations posed against the Jesuits in Portugal, albeit that the narrative in the *Relação abreviada* was applicable to the Jesuits in the Portuguese realms. Carvalho e Melo hoped to convince other anti-Jesuits in Europe that the Jesuits posed a serious threat, especially because the Order was so widespread and evidently present throughout Europe and its courts. As the *Relação abreviada* suggested, the Jesuits were ‘rightfully’ accused for their obscure and occult practices – an accusation that had a precedent among anti-Jesuits in France – of the conspicuity of being inconspicuous, the vile (*abominavel*) education the Jesuits provided to

⁷⁶ Swann, *Politics and the Parlement of Paris*, 94.

⁷⁷ L-A. Le Paige, *Lettres adressées à messieurs les commissaires nommés par le Roi, pour délibérer sur l’affaire présente du Parlement au sujet du refus des sacrements* (Paris 1752), 3-4.

⁷⁸ Le Paige, *Lettres historiques sur les fonctions essentielles du parlement, sur le droit des pairs et sur les lois fondamentales du royaume* (Paris 1753).

⁷⁹ *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* (1754), 145.

the Guaraní in South America – which had made them rebellious towards the Portuguese – but also in Europe, where Jesuits led multiple centres of education, and also their overall anarchic nature towards their authorities – and their unjustifiable reliance on the papacy to legitimize it. These ‘crimes’ had come to light in South America, but the *Relação abreviada* – the first article of an anti-Jesuitical campaign – further suggested that the Jesuits in Europe also operated out of the shadows to procure a same anti-authoritarian and anti-Christian sentiment among Europeans. After all, the Jesuits dominated important offices in court and in universities in southern Europe – such as the University of Coimbra – a fact that did not make this conspiracy theory hard to believe.⁸⁰ However, in 1757-1758, a new string of accusations made clear the way for an eventual expulsion. In 1757, an assault on the life of king Louis XV of France was attempted, but with no success. The following year, a similar assault was attempted on the life of the Portuguese king José I. Both these assaults were wrongfully connected to the Jesuits, as part of a conspiracy theory that depicted the attackers as either Jesuits or in a way related to the Jesuit Order. Even

⁸⁰ *Relação abreviada*, 4-5, 7, 48.

The citation on page 4 suggests that the Jesuits had closed all the inroads to the heartlands of Brazil and that bishops, governors or even other ecclesiastical officials could not enter the ‘Jesuits’ territory, in order for the Jesuits to continue their occult and obscure practices. The original reads: “*Por huma parte prohibirão, (...) que naquelles Sertoens entrassem não só Bispos, Governadores, ou quaesquer outros Ministros, e Officiaes Ecclesiasticos, ou Seculares; mas nem ainda os mesmos particulares Hespanhões: Fazendo sempre de hum impenetravel segredo tudo o que passava dentro nos taes Sertoens, cujo governo, e interesses da Republica, que nelles se occultava, erão só revelados aos Religiosos da sua profissão, que se fazião necessarios para se sustentar aquella grande máquina.*”

Page 5 of the *Relação abreviada* further suggests that the Jesuits only spoke indigenous languages, causing further suspicion and that they educated and christianised the natives of Paraguay “in their own way”. The original reads: “*Para assim impossibilitarem toda a comunicação entre os Indios, e os Hespanhoes; e conservarem occulto ao conhecimento dos segundos, o que passavão os primeiros naquelles miseraveis Sertoens. (...) Por outra parte cathequizando os Indios a seu modo; e imprimindo na innocencia de todos, como hum dos mais inviolaveis principios da Religião Christã (...)*”

On page 7 the ‘white men [of Europe]’ are depicted as “lawless” (*gentes sem Ley*) and “without religion” (*gentes sem Religião*), “frugal” (*adoravam ouro como Deos*) and “demonic” (*trazião o demonio no Corpo*) by the Jesuits.

Lastly, page 48 suggests that the Jesuits were guilty of not only lese-majesty, but also of treason and of bypassing the laws common in the Portuguese empire, of making their own treaties and own arrangements, outside the state’s authority. The original reads: “*Ao mesmo tempo se descobrio, que os sobreditos Religiosos com outro crime atrás de Leza Majestade não só se tinham arrogado a autoridade de fazerem Tractados com as Naçoens Barbaras daquelles Sertoens dos Dominios da Coroa de Portugal, sem intervenção do Capitão General, e Ministros de Sua Magestade Fidelissima; mas tambem, que deste abominavel absurdo passarão ao outro ainda mais abominavel, de estipularem por Condiçoens dos mesmos Tractados o dominio supremo, e serviço dos Indios, exclusivos de Sua Magestade; a repugnancia, e odio á comunicação, e sujeição dos Brancos Seculares; e os desprezo das ordens do Governador, e das Pessoas dos moradores do Estado (...)*”

though the relation with the Jesuits remained sparse at best, the assassination attempts on “His Most Christian Majesty” (Louis XV) and “His Most Faithful Majesty” (José I), proved to be decisive events that preceded the national expulsions of the Jesuits in 1759 and 1761-1764, in Portugal and France, and in even in Spain.

Chapter 2: The expulsion of the Jesuits (1758-1767)

This chapter discusses the processes of stigmatization and effective expulsion of the Jesuit Order in the Gallo-Iberian kingdoms. Influenced by the anti-Jesuitical campaign mentioned in the previous chapter, and the events that meant a loss for the Jesuit Order, the many suspicions against the Society of Jesus had turned into accusations. The accusations against the Jesuits amounted to rebellion, treason, disloyalty to the country they worked and lived in, but a disproportionate loyalty to the pope and the Roman Curia. Jesuits and their allies at court had been present in the highest of echelons of society, most notably in government and had had a hold on church politics for a long time. In the 1750's they had experienced the stumble that would be their eventual downfall, but none could have foreseen that this situation would exacerbate in such a manner. Starting from 1757, however the Jesuits were systematically attacked by propaganda from the Portuguese state, which was copied and strengthened in France and Spain. The decisive events for this intensification of an anti-Jesuitical campaign was the suspected complicity of the Jesuit Order in the assassination attempts of king Louis XV of France and José I of Portugal. Moreover, the period 1758-1767 also saw the effective loss of any Jesuitical support at the courts of the three Catholic states, and the accession of Carlos III (r. 1759-1788) as king of Spain, who set out to expel and eradicate the Jesuit Order for good. The close succession of one assassination attempt (January 1757) to the other (September 1758) is probably mere coincidence, but it is not unimaginable that a possible relation between the two came to mind, and that embryonic thoughts of a conspiracy theory now came to full fruition. Conspiracy is a key term in this period and in the overall history of the expulsion of the Jesuits. It characterizes the feeling of a transnational threat the Jesuits posed or the image of a transnational threat the accusers depicted of the Jesuits. In this chapter the events and documents that facilitated this image of a transnational threat are also discussed.

A conspiracy unravelled

In September 1758, when king José I returned from a midnight escapade from his young mistress, he was assaulted and attacked by a group of apparent villains. The king was luckily not severely hurt and the assault on his life was ultimately a failure. The culprits were quickly apprehended, questioned and tortured, only to reveal they worked for the marquis of Távora and the duke of Aveiro, who apparently had worked together to dispose of both the Portuguese prime-minister and the king. The Távora clan, as it came to be known, was one such example of the affronted higher aristocracy, aligned with the Jesuits (as the royal houses initially were), who were

discontent with the rule of the secretary of state. Their involvement in the assault is not clear, but in the weeks that followed the entire family was outlawed, pursued and apprehended.⁸¹ The assassination attempt became a *cas célèbre*, especially among French Jansenists, who were now even more convinced of the malpractices of the Society of Jesus. The connection between the attempted assassination of king José I and the Jesuits was quickly made, and the culpability lay with the ecclesiastics, if not because there was a historical precedent of moral support of regicide and a recent precedent of a Jesuit-related assassination attempt elsewhere. About the event and about this too coincidental state of affairs Louis-Adrien Le Paige reported:

*“ Si l’Europe fut étonnée de l’attentat du 5 janvier de 1757, contre la Personne du Roi quel a dû être son étonnement en voyant la prompte répétition d’un pareil forfait sur la Personne de S.M. Portugaise? On vante notre siècle par la douceur & la politesse des mœurs, & le voilà souillé dans l’espace de vingt mois par deux crimes de même genre, & deux crimes les plus atroces aux yeux de l’humanité, eu égard à toutes les circonstances.”*⁸²

To know their enemy better, Le Paige stressed in the *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques*:

*“ Qu’on étudie sa police, les loix de son gouvernement, l’esprit de ces loix : qu’on observe ses progresses, qui ont été rapides, que le premier partage qu’elle fit de ses Provinces, n’est d’autres bornes que celles de l’Univers : qu’on la suive attentivement et dans les différentes époques de sa durée, et dans tous les pays où elle a fait des établissements, et d’où, comme par autant de ligues, elle répond à un centre commun, c’est-à-dire à un chef absolu, qui par de principaux ressorts donne le mouvement et l’activité à toute la circonférence.”*⁸³

Although there had been an assassination attempt on the life of Louis XV, Le Paige expressed his indignation about a lack of similar case against the Jesuits as was the case in Portugal. As a member of the parlement de Paris, he had guided the *parti janséniste* in the parlement to be relentless in their criticism against and scrutiny of the Jesuit Order. However, he was specifically affronted that the trial against the Jesuits in France did not put the malicious and evil acts of the Jesuits, in supporting regicide and actually being the conspirators of assassination attempts, in the forefront. In Le Paige’s eyes, the Jesuits could literally get away with murder. About the French assassination attempt and in relation with the Portuguese equivalent and Jesuit complicity, Le Paige reported:

“ Sa ressemblance avec celui de Lisbonne, qui occupe aujourd’hui tous les esprits, exige qu’on les rapproche. Lorsque l’infâme Damiens [the French assassin] porta son poignard parricide dans le sein du Roi, on eut dès ce moment de justes soupçons qu’il avait reçu de la main des Jésuites. Une foule de présomptions suggérait & confirmait cette pensée. On

⁸¹ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 154.

⁸² Le Paige, *Réflexions sur l’attentat commis le 3 Septembre 1758 contre la vie du Roi de Portugal* (Paris 1759), 1.

⁸³ *Nouvelles ecclésiastiques* – 1759, p.2.

*savait qu'il y avait parmi eux une tradition constante & universelle de doctrine, qui permet & qui fait même un mérite & un héroïsme de tuer les Rois, dès qu'ils deviennent des tyrans ; & que pour acquérir cette qualité, il suffise qu'un Prince blesse l'intérêt des passions, & le faux honneur de la Société. (...) Cependant, dans les Procès de ce parricide, qui a été donné au Public, on ne voit les Jésuites, ni convaincu de complicité, ni même mis en cause comme suspects. C'est ici un mystère. Si leur nom ne paraissait en aucune façon dans la procédure, on pourrait croire qu'ils avaient échappé aux recherches, soit de la Police, soit des Juges ; qu'ils avaient été assez habiles pour couper le fil conduisait de Damiens jusqu'à eux ; qu'ils ont dû ainsi être réputés innocents (...)."*⁸⁴

However, the thread that connected the assassin and the Jesuit conspirator was not cut in Portugal, where Carvalho e Melo decided to play the part of the *Moirai* of ancient mythology and decided the fate of the Jesuits. The quick apprehension and the consequences of the assault on the king's life show how much power Carvalho e Melo truly had, and how much of a grip he had on jurisdiction, and the propagation of news. For example, foreign newspapers only reported on the attempted assassination in 1759, and by that time the marquis of Távora, his wife and his heir, along with nine other culprits were apprehended and executed without due trial:

“The defense of the accused was delivered on the 11th of January of 1759, at four o'clock in the evening and that same day the Junta Suprema da Inconfidência, responsible for the inquiry and directed by the ministers of State, concluded the case and called for permission from the monarch to perform capital punishment, according to the law. Thus, on the 12th, the case was concluded, the sentence was cast, and the defendants were executed on the morning of the 13th.”⁸⁵

This so-called Távora trial gave the king and Carvalho e Melo – given the title of Count of Oeiras for the brave role he had taken on him in defending the country and the king – the opportunity to level the discontent and critical higher nobility, but through Gabriele Malagrida also the Jesuits. Malagrida was namely the confessor and advisor of the Távora family and the noble house had been one of the staunchest supporters during the Jesuit's routs of criticism in 1755-1756. Malagrida, still under house arrest, was incarcerated for his role in the assassination attempt – which remained dubious still – and executed publicly in 1761, at 72 years of age.

One can easily deduce the effect this event, and the subsequent anti-Jesuitical literature had abroad. In 1759, when the members of the house of Távora had already been maimed,

⁸⁴ Le Paige, *Réflexions*, 2-3.

⁸⁵ P.W. Cardoso Lins Alves, 'D. João de Almeida Portugal e a Revisão do Processo dos Távoras: conflitos, intrigas e linguagens políticas em Portugal nos finais do Antigo Regime (c. 1777-1802) (Rio de Janeiro 2011), 10. The original reads: : “(...) pois a defesa dos réus foi entregue no dia 11 de Janeiro de 1759, à quarto horas da tarde, e nesse mesmo dia a Junta Suprema da Inconfidência, responsável pelo inquérito e dirigida pelos ministros de Estado, concuiu as autos e requereu ao monarca permissão para agravar as penas previstas em lei. Assim, no dia 12, foi concluída a devassa, redigida a sentença, comunicada aos réus e executada na manhã do dia 13.

burned and their remains thrown in the Tagus river, and the immediate danger had therefore been done and dealt with, Oeiras instructed another issue of anti-Jesuitical propaganda to be printed and disseminated in France, Spain and Italy. With the publication of the *Erros impios e sediciosos* the Portuguese authorities made clear, what they thought was the true nature of the Jesuits public.⁸⁶ The accusation against the Jesuits had already been piled up in previous propaganda, but now there was (clear) proof. One of the clearest ‘new’ accusations against the Jesuits was the disturbance of the peace and order, of the ‘civil society and the Christian religion’ (*perturbação da sociedade Civil e a Religião Christã*), influenced by the ‘infamous’ sixteenth-century heretic and blasphemer, Niccolò Machiavelli, an aspect which made the event all the more reprehensible.⁸⁷ Further new accusations amounted to a rather blatant opposition to the rule of monarchs in general, the support of ‘homicide for the greater good’ (i.e. regicide), the use of lies; distorting evidence and truth alike, and the already known accusation of occultism and devil-worshipping.⁸⁸ The *Erros impios*, compared to the *Relação abreviada*, proposed far greater accusations of conspiracy and murder and depicted the Jesuit Order as a ‘sect’ and most of all as a ‘menace’ that threatened the country. As the document that attempted to legitimize the expulsion of the Jesuits in Portugal, the *Erros impios* had a great effect abroad. Le Paige and Spanish ministers, amongst others, would use the same accusations and stigmas that were manufactured in this article of propaganda, often even referring to the events in Portugal. Overall, this second article of the anti-Jesuitical campaign, or rather its translations and comments had a profound impact on the reputation of Jesuits worldwide.⁸⁹

The French exception

By 1761 the case of the parlement of Paris against the Jesuits came to a close. Initially, and regretfully according to Le Paige, the case was not that damaging to the Jesuits, and only discussed the financial malpractices of the Order on the island of Martinique. However, influenced by the Portuguese propaganda campaign, such as Jean-Pierre Viou’s *Nouvelles intéressantes, au sujet de l’attentat commis le 3 septembre de 1758, sur la Personne Sacrée de Sa Majesté*

⁸⁶ Anonymous, *Erros impios e sediciosos, que os religiosos da Companhia de Jesus ensinarão aos Reos, que forão justiçados, e pertenderão espalhar nos Póvos destes Reynos* (Lisbon 1759).

⁸⁷ Even though Oeiras has been accused of ‘machiavellan practices’ himself, he used the same accusation against the Jesuits, pointing to the fact that the Jesuits were not to be trusted and were considered ‘rogue agents’ within society. See: Eduardo Franco, ‘Os catecismos antijesuíticos’, 251-253.

⁸⁸ *Erros impios e sediciosos*, 71-81.

⁸⁹ Eduardo Franco, ‘Os catecismos antijesuíticos’, 253-255.

Très-fidèle, le Roi du Portugal (Paris 1759) who translated all sorts of *cartas regias* and edicts by king José I, the Jansenists in France began to write treaties and pamphlets, reflections and most importantly of all ‘complete histories’ that scrutinized the Jesuit’s every move in its history.⁹⁰ Examples of these Jansenist writings are Le Paige’s *Réponse au jésuite*, wherein he held the Jesuits accountable for the “*tous les crimes un des plus grands que les hommes puissent commettre*”, namely a conspiracy to kill monarchs.⁹¹ In fact, especially because of the case of Damiens – the assassin of Louis XV – being public, Le Paige thought it good that the acts of the Jesuits, both the assassination attempts as well as their malicious doctrines that supported the murdering of kings, as well as their attempts to cover up the affair, became known to the public, so that they would know what kind of ‘enemy’ the Jansenists had been dealing with all along.⁹² Compiling all the sins and crimes of the Jesuits throughout history had been a favourite tactic employed by the Jansenists, and proved successful in convincing the public (and others) of the need to expel the Jesuit Order in France, as had been done in Portugal in 1759.⁹³ At one point, Le Paige was confident that the Jesuits’ actions would haunt them and ultimately be the source of their downfall:

*“Mais tout le tissu de la Sentence de Lisbonne vous laisse au fond de l’âme, des craintes sur l’innocence réelle & sur le sort future de ceux qui sont en prison. C’est ce qui vous a déterminé à vous ménager une porte de derrière pour sauver le corps de la Société, en abandonnant comme membres pourris, ceux que tous vos efforts n’auraient pu soustraire au châtement.”*⁹⁴

Previously, before the assassination attempts, the accusations against the Jesuits amounted to the corruption within the Church, and the Jesuit Order was perceived as the great contributor of this malaise. The trial against the Jesuits initially only reported on the financial malpractices of the Order. Yet following the events in Portugal, and Oeiras’s anti-Jesuitical propaganda campaign, the new string of accusations amounted to the “nonreciprocal vows of the Society, the mysterious variability of its constitutions, its justifications of tyrannicide, and its independence from every authority, including the pope’s.”⁹⁵ Whereas Jansenists, such as Le Paige, focused on the justifications of tyrannicide – as is shown in Le Paige’s *Réflexions* and *Réponse au Jésuite* and also in

⁹⁰ Gillain Thompson, ‘French Jesuits’, 182-191.

⁹¹ L.A. Le Paige, *Réponse au Jésuite, Auteur de la Lettre au sujet de la découverte de la conjuration formée contre le Roi du Portugal* (Paris 1760), 2.

⁹² Le Paige, *Réponse au Jésuite*, 3.

⁹³ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 92.

⁹⁴ Le Paige, *Réponse au Jésuite*, 4-6.

⁹⁵ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 127-128.

his own complete history of the Jesuits, the *Histoire générale de la naissance et des progresses de la compagnie de Jésus et analyse de ses constructions et privilèges* – Gallicans focused on the Order's relation with the papacy, and its consequent disloyalty to the French kingdom and church.⁹⁶ It shows the change of perspective towards the Jesuits in a brief period of time. Although Jansenists and Gallicans had been critical of the Jesuits in the previous decades, it was their criticisms of and attacks on the Society in the second half of the eighteenth century – especially around the time of the expulsions between 1758-1767 – that were really effective. Strengthened by the events and the propaganda concerning the Jesuit Order elsewhere, especially in Portugal, and by the trial of the Jesuits in France, Jansenists intensified their opposition towards the Order. The Jesuit hindrance had quickly evolved in a national threat that had to be eradicated.

According to Julian Swann, however the parlement did not have sufficient power and support to expel the Order from France, because of the royal and papal support for the Society of Jesus. By 1759 the new pope Clement XIII (p. 1758-1769), known for his love of the Jesuits, along with his secretary Luigi Torregiani (1697-1777) and the Secretary-General of the Jesuit Order Lorenzo Ricci (1703-1775) did everything to impede the process of 'de-jesuitization' in Europe, as José Eduardo Franco called it.⁹⁷ The court of Louis XV, guided by the *parti dévot*, made its support for the Jesuits known as well. In fact, the defendants of the Order in the parlement's trial against the Jesuits, was led by none other than the *dauphin* of France. Furthermore, the king could send the parlement into exile, as he had done between 1752-1754, and halt the trial against the Jesuit Order, if he had wanted – or dared. However, this did not come to pass, because of the Seven Years' War.

During the war, the French state had indebted itself considerably and it needed parliamentary support to increase taxes to fund the war. At first the Parlement was not inclined to give it, but Louis XV's chief minister Étienne-François de Choiseul (1719-1785) saw a way out. In return for financial support, Choiseul – who had previously acted as ambassador to Rome between 1754-1757, where he had experienced the anti-Jesuitical sentiment at first hand during the papacy of pope Benedict XIV – appeared to be willing to reach a compromise, if he would in turn give the parlement de Paris the opportunity to actively pursue the Jesuit Order.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ L-A. Le Paige, *Histoire générale de la naissance et des progresses de la compagnie de Jésus et analyse de ses constitutions et privilèges* (Paris 1760).

⁹⁷ J. Eduardo Franco, 'O "terramoto" pombalino e a campanha de "desjezuitização" de Portugal', in: *Lusitania Sacra*, vol. 18.2 (2006), 147-218.

⁹⁸ M. Boutry (ed.), *Choiseul à Rome 1754-1757. Lettres et mémoires inédits* (Paris 1895) and Swann, *Politics and the Parlement de Paris*, 206-210.

The actual case against the Jesuits is not the subject of this essay, yet it sheds a light on how the accusations against the Jesuits meant the end of the Order in France, with addition to the loss of royal or governmental support. In the next three years, between 1758-1761, the Gallican-Jansenist parlements won major legal battles that brought the expulsion of the Society of Jesus ever closer. In 1761, the Order was deemed illegal, because in its constitution the Jesuits only swore allegiance to the pope and not the French kingdom, which made the Jesuits a foreign entity acting in French territory.⁹⁹ Moreover, the founding of the Order had never been ratified in the French kingdom according to the parlements. In the end, a lack of legal experience or ability and lack of public support for the ‘king’s men (the Jesuits’ defendants), including a lack of governmental support – as part of Choiseul’s compromise – proved to be enough to seriously harm the Order. The result of the legal battle of 1761 was the restriction to open new schools, colleges and seminaries, and the shutdown of lay associations and congregations. In addition, French Jesuits had to pledge allegiance to the Gallican Church and revoke their allegiance to the pope.¹⁰⁰ This allegiance practically secularized the priests and made them ‘French citizens’. Those who did not were considered in ‘state of civil death’. Many Jesuits fled to Italy or Spain, where their safety was still somewhat guarded. Others still cling on papal and royal support. In fact, there were still those that supported the Jesuits unconditionally and lauded its deeds and accomplishments of old. In their eyes, the Jansenist and the *philosophes*, who at times also supported the Gallican cause, were heretics that should be combatted. According to the archbishop of Auch, Jean-François de Montillet de Grenaud (1702-1776), the Jansenists and *philosophes* were the cause of many of the “*jours mauvais*” and for the hope for the “*temps de miséricorde*”.¹⁰¹

However, the situation had changed considerably between 1761-1764. Without proper royal support, and increasing anti-Jesuitism – propagated by Jansenists – increasing anticlericalism – propagated by the Gallicans – and even an increasing call for secularization – propagated by the *philosophes*, there was not much that the king and his *parti dévot* could do. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, answering the *lettre pastorale* of Auch’s archbishop said:

⁹⁹ Gillain Thompson, 182-191.

¹⁰⁰ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 134-135.

¹⁰¹ J-F. de Montillet de Grenaud, *Lettre pastorale de monseigneur d’Auch au clergé séculier & régulier de son Diocèse* (n.p. 1764). Montillet de Grenaud was a supporter of the Jesuits, but most commonly known as a vehement opposer of the *philosophes* and their influence on French society.

*“il ne faudrait que dix of douze Prélats comme M. de Beaumont [archbishop of Paris], & vous, Monseigneur, sauf le respect dû à vos éminentes qualités, pour mettre toute l’Europe en feu, & je sais bien que si j’étais Roi de France vous ne seriez pas longtemps l’édification de mes États.”*¹⁰²

Equally, Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (1717-1783), lauded, somewhat sarcastically, the

*“patriotisme vraiment philosophique que vous [the parlement] avez montré dans cette affaire. En excitant contre la société le zèle des magistrats, vous n’avez pas négligé de fixer leur attention éclairée sur tous les hommes qui auraient avec cette société ultramontaine certains traits de ressemblance, et qui, vêtus de noir, gris ou de blanc, reconnaîtraient comme elle au sein de la France une autre patrie et un autre souverain.”*¹⁰³

The case of the French Jesuits was both an anomaly to as an amalgam of the events elsewhere. The inspiration of Jansenists to attack the Jesuits on their illegal foundations, its (moral) support of tyrannicide and its participation in transnational conspiracies to kill monarchs was not unique to the French kingdom. In fact, the resemblance with the Portuguese anti-Jesuitical campaign, and at times its emulation to the Portuguese case is obvious. The interest Jansenists have taken in the Portuguese case of the Jesuits; the supposed assassination attempt of the Portuguese monarch, the dissemination of anti-Jesuitical propaganda, and in the eventual expulsion of the Society of Jesus in Portugal, led to similar French propaganda and an expulsion of French Jesuits. The process leading up to the result, and the events surrounding the case were different, however. The anomalies are found in the Gallican parlements and the royal support for the Jesuits. In both Portugal and Spain, the attack against the Jesuits came from a governmental level. Still, the process of accusing, silencing, framing – even sacrificing as Choiseul had done – stigmatizing and criminalizing the Jesuit Order was done similarly in all Gallo-Iberian kingdoms. Even the sort of person that constituted an anti-Jesuit was the same. Like Carvalho e Melo, the main aggressor, Le Paige and many Jansenists were men from the lower aristocracy, who often had had a judicial career and were able to either bend the laws to their will (as Oeiras had done during the trial of the Távara) or close enough mazes in the judicial system that ultimately criminalized the Jesuit Order.

The continuation of the conspiracy in Spain

In 1767 the Jesuit Order was expelled from the kingdom of Spain, and in 1768 the Spanish colonies and the Bourbon states of Parma and Naples & Sicily followed suit. Up until today the true reason for the expulsion of the Jesuits in Bourbon Spain has not been found. Carlos III had

¹⁰² J-J. Rousseau, *Lettre de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, citoyen de Genève à Jean-François Montillet* (Genève 1764), 6.

¹⁰³ J. Le Rond d’Alembert, *Sur la destruction des jésuites en France, par un sieur désintéressé* (Paris 1765), 3-4.

kept the secret hidden in his heart (*en su real pecho*) and no exhumation would reveal the true reasons for the expulsion of the Society of Jesus.¹⁰⁴ That the expulsion had been expected and that it happened in such a sudden fashion was no surprise given the anti-Jesuitical sentiment in Spain – and especially at the court in Madrid – since the accession of the king in 1759.¹⁰⁵ As king of Naples & Sicily, Carlos III (then as Carlo VII and V) had shown to be no friend of the Jesuits or an ally of the papacy. When he ascended to the throne of his late half-brother Fernando VI, he saw that the Jesuit Order still held considerable power, albeit not in government, but in society and as a large landowner of Spanish lands. The king could not tax the clergy, had no jurisdiction over the Inquisition and could not dispose of Church land.¹⁰⁶

The expulsion of the Order in Spain copied elements from both the respective Portuguese and French expulsions, and was nonetheless independent from both. Carlos III's reign has been characterized by a powerful show of force against the Jesuits, from a propagandistic as well as a military point of view:

“The expulsion of the Society of Jesus from Spain and its empire followed dynamics that were different to those operative in Portugal, notwithstanding certain similarities and apparent coincidences. As in Portugal, the Spanish expulsion was justified by a plot supposedly planned by the Jesuits against the rightful monarch and his government. It also involved a well-organized logistical operation that resulted in the arrest and deportation of Jesuits to Italy, including those settled in Spanish overseas possessions.”¹⁰⁷

The Spanish king luckily did not have to suffer an assault on his life like his Portuguese and French equivalent, but a revolt in 1766, colloquially known as the ‘Esquilache revolts’ or the ‘bread revolts’, gave Carlos III and his ministers the opportunity and the motive to push through the expulsion of the Jesuit Order. By connecting ministers and certain people of ‘high importance’ to the Jesuits’ demise – and above all supposed criminal activities – regalist ministers and *fiscales* of the Council of State like Manuel de Roda (1708-1782), Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes (1723-1802), Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, the count of Aranda (1719-1782) and José Moñino y Redondo, later known as the count of Floridablanca (1728-1808) also saw their opportunity to dispose of influential political rivals, such as Ensenada, a close confidant of the Queen-Mother (who was in turn a great supporter of the Jesuits).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsion y extinción*, 55-57.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, 69-70.

¹⁰⁶ Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance and Reform*, 68-69.

¹⁰⁷ Colombo and Guasti, ‘The Expulsion and Suppression in Portugal and Spain’, 137.

¹⁰⁸ J. Andrés-Gallego, *Por qué los Jesuitas: Razón y sinrazón de una decisión capital* (Madrid 2005), 36-39.

Following the Esquilache revolts during the Holy Week of 1766, Carlos III, at the advice of his ministers Campomanes and Roda, set up a secret council (*pesquisa secreta*) that attempted to gather information about the culprits of the revolt. Historians have generally pointed to the rising taxes and the unpopularity of the foreign ministers who imposed them – in 1762, prime-minister Ricardo Wall had been substituted by the Genoese duke of Grimaldi (1710-1789) and the minister of Finance, the count of Valparaíso had been replaced by the Sicilian marquis of Squillacce, the eponym of the revolts – and not to any Jesuit complicity in fomenting a revolt.¹⁰⁹ The culprits of the revolt were ultimately the masses, who actually revolted. Yet, the king had decreed that the rioters had been directed by others and that the people were not to be held accountable. Therefore, the *pesquisa secreta* turned its attention to any and all critics that had berated the kingdom and the new, enlightened way of ruling.¹¹⁰ Namely, in the preceding years the court of Carlos III had intensified its opposition towards the ‘traditional’ way of governance and had introduced radically new, and what some have termed ‘enlightened’, reform proposals that would primarily benefit the people, instead of a select few noblemen, etc.¹¹¹ One such proposal was the *Tratado de la regalia de amortización* (1765) by Carlos III’s minister Campomanes, *fiscal* of the Council of Castile and head of the *Real Academia de la Historia* who proposed to appropriate the many Church lands, and legitimized it by referring to previous Spanish, Castilian and even Visigoth kings that had done the same. Campomanes, in studying the Church from its ‘foundations’ and compiling the many ‘transgressions’ since its history, in fact made a ‘complete history’ as the Jansenists in France had made.¹¹² Other works include Campomanes’s *Tratado de la teoría política*, wherein the absolute power of the king over the Church was defended. Naturally, the Roman Church was not pleased about these new ideas and coincidentally, the greatest critics prior to the Esquilache revolts had been the Jesuits and the Roman Church.¹¹³ As a result the *pesquisa secreta* turned its attention to:

“*pasquines, manifiestos, ordenanzas, versos y otra especial de papales que salen de personas incógnitas, sembran máximas perniciosas, divulgan hechos alterados, zahieren a personas determinados, no traen utilidad al*

¹⁰⁹ Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, 250-253.

¹¹⁰ Andrés-Gallego, *Por qué los Jesuitas*, 34-36.

¹¹¹ Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance and Reform*, 57-58.

¹¹² P. Rodríguez de Campomanes, *Tratado de la Regalia de amortización, en el qual se demuestra por la série de la varias edades, desde el nacimiento de la Iglesia en todos los siglos y Países Católicos, el uso constante de la autoridad civil, para impedir las ilimitadas enagenaciones de bienes raíces en Iglesias, Comunidades, y otras Manos-Muertas; con una noticia de las leyes fundamentales de la Monarquía Española sobre esto punto, que empieza con los Godos, y se continua en los various Estados sucesivos, con aplicación a la exigencia actual del Reyno después de su reunión, y al beneficio comun de los Vasallos* (Madrid 1765).

¹¹³ F. Sánchez-Blanco, *El absolutismo y las Luces en el reinado de Carlos III* (Madrid 2002), 59-62.

*público, dan mal ejemplo, y pueden atraer malas consecuencias a sus autores y a sus expendedores. (...) Para que nadie escriba, publique, expenda ni traslade papeles anónimos manuscritos o impresos con motivo de los últimos acaecimientos de Madrid, ni de otra parte del Reino, ni que injurien a las personas constituidas en autoridad pública ni induzcan a falta de respeto de la autoridad legítima.”*¹¹⁴

The investigation of the *pesquisa secreta* was a farce, it had already listed culprits before the actual investigation started and it attempted to eradicate any dissident minds, much like the parlements in France had done with those that still attempted to support the Jesuits. In France, the *lettre pastorale* of Jean-François de Montillet had been condemned on the account of being ‘too fanatical’ and of misguiding his parishioners. According to the parlement of Bordeaux, which condemned the article, the archbishop’s role should have been to “*Ils doivent être, dans la personne de leurs successeurs [of the apostles], la lumière des Fidèles, leurs guides dans les voies du salut, les Ministres de la réconciliation que ce Dieu fait Homme a opérée par son sacrifice (...)*”, but instead Mons. de Montillet had been perceived of as arrogant, because he “*n’aura point de reproches à nous faire sur la censure que nous entreprenons d’une partie de son Ouvrage (...)*”¹¹⁵

Under Carlos III, and most importantly under the guidance of his *fiscales* and ministers, such as Campomanes and Moñino, the power of the Church was perceived as unconstitutional, in a way copying the accusations that the French parlements had used. Spain was seen as backward even by its own ministers, and the cause for this had been obscurantist forces of the Church and the Jesuits in Spain.¹¹⁶ They obstructed the *repos public*, enriched itself at the expense of the people, were immune to the most heinous of crimes and were a clear threat to the kingdom.¹¹⁷ A Spanish political commentator stated that:

“All men are debtors to the *patria* and to the State. To it, they owe their industry, strength and talents ... he who does not contribute to the public good and does not work to the benefit of society may earn the reputation for being a corrupted member of the community, deserving of amputation and extermination.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Andrés-Gallego, *Por qué los Jesuitas*, 38.

¹¹⁵ Anonymous, *Arrêt de la cour du Parlement de Bordeaux les chambres assemblées, qui ordonne que l’Imprimé ayant pour titre: Lettre Pastorale de Monseigneur l’Archevêque d’Auch, au Clergé séculier & régulier de son Diocèse, sera lacéré & brûlé par l’Exécuteur de la Haute-Justice, comme étant ladite Instructions Pastorale captieuse, calomnieuse envers les Magistrats, & tendante, sous prétexte d’instruction, à favoriser le Fanatisme, à troubler le repos public, & l’obéissance dûs à l’autorité du Roi & aux Arrêts de la Cour* (Bordeaux 1764), 2-3.

¹¹⁶ Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance and Reform*, 32.

¹¹⁷ Sánchez-Blanco, *El absolutismo y las Luces*, 87.

¹¹⁸ Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance and Reform*, 60. As cited by Paquette.

These Gallican-regalist articles may have been inspired by a Portuguese article that was published in the same year. In 1765, the third article of Oeiras's anti-Jesuitical campaign was published. The *Dedução chronologica*, as it was called, was the Portuguese 'total history' of the Order of Jesuits, which also compiled all the alleged crimes of the Order in a chronological fashion. This article was disseminated in many countries, including Spain, France and in Rome, and had a great influence in discrediting the Jesuit Order further.¹¹⁹

The same discrediting techniques had been used against the Jesuits in Spain as they were used in France and Portugal. In 1767, when the Jesuits were expelled and 'repatriated' to the Papal States – since they were not considered Spanish citizens – the Spanish king made preparations to expel the Jesuits further and work towards its 'total and absolute extinction', namely the papal expulsion of the Society of Jesus. In Portugal, the Jesuits had been expelled for the immediate threat the Order had posed after their supposed collaboration in and coordination of the attempt on the Portuguese monarch. In France, the Jesuits had been perceived of as an illegal and perennial threat to the sovereignty of the French kingdom and its (Gallican) Church. In Spain, although the life of Carlos III was never in acute danger, both tactics had been emulated and used to expel the Jesuits from the Iberian kingdom. After 1767, it was clear that the formation of a 'counter-conspiracy' against the Jesuits was in the making.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ J. de Seabra da Silva, *Dedução cronológica e analítica. Na qual se manifesta pela sucessiva serie de cada hum dos Reynados da Monarquia Portuguesa, que decorrerão o governo de Senhor Rey D. João III até o presente, os horrorosos estragos, que a 'Companhia' denominada de 'Jesus' fez em Portugal, e todos seus Domínios por hum Plano, e systema por ella inalteravelmente seguido desde que entrou neste Reyno, até que delle foi proscripta, e expulsa pela justa, sabia, e providente Ley de 3 de Setembro de 1759* (Lisbon 1765-1767).

¹²⁰ Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción*, 74-76.

Chapter 3: The extinction of the Jesuits (1759-1773)

By 1768 the Jesuit Order had been dissolved in Portugal, France, Spain, Naples & Sicily, Parma and Malta and in all the respective overseas colonies. The papacy, for all its supposed power over its subjects (i.e. the Jesuits) had failed to prevent the expulsion of the Order and stem the tide of anti-Jesuitism in Europe. At first, pope Clement XIII even denied the Jesuits sent to Italy a home, claiming he could not accommodate an influx of around 5,000 people in his Papal States. During 1768-1769 the now defrocked priests roamed around in the Western Mediterranean, searching for a place that might harbour them. Some of them found shelter on Corsica, but after the French conquest of the island and the Treaty of Versailles (1768), the Jesuits had to flee once more. Finally, in 1769, the pope welcomed them, though reluctantly, at Civitavecchia, north of Rome.¹²¹ The anecdote shows the diminished support for the Jesuit Order, and the urge of several countries, most notably under the House of Bourbon, to pressure the pope to expel the Order as well:

“No sooner had the Bourbon Family Pact added the papal abolition of the Company of Jesus to its agenda than action against the Jesuits abandoned the conspiratorial low road for the highway of formal diplomatic pressure on the papacy, culminating in Clement XIV’s surrender to Spanish impatience with his brief of dissolution in 1773.”¹²²

Between 1768 and the eventual expulsion of the Order by pope Clement XIV (p. 1769-1774) in 1773, the Bourbon monarchies, and to some extent Portugal as well, found ways to terminate the Order for good. They did this in multiple ways, some more effective than others.

Portugal had already attempted to bring this about in 1759, when the Order was expelled from the Lusitanian kingdom, but with no success, as the diplomatic relations between Lisbon and Rome were halted between 1760 and 1770. Even the Jansenist *abbé* Clément du Tremblay had travelled to Rome in 1758-1759, hoping to influence the conclave of 1758 and procure a pope amenable to the expulsion. The second part of this ‘diplomatic effort’, between 1768-1770 and 1772-1773 was more successful, but was not without strife and irritability either. Once more Clément travelled to Rome to achieve the same result as in his first voyage, this time with more success, as Bourbon diplomacy pressured the papacy to end the Society of Jesus.

¹²¹ Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción*, 71.

¹²² D.K. van Kley, ‘Plots and Rumours of Plots. The Role of Conspiracy in the International Campaign against the Society of Jesus, 1758-1768’, in: J. Wright and J.D. Burson (eds.), *The Jesuit Suppression in global context: causes, events, and consequences* (New York (NY) 2015), 13-39, there 36.

This present chapter discusses the diplomatic efforts taken between 1759 and 1773 by Portugal, Spain and France, but also focuses on the need for reforms against the Jesuit Order in the respective countries, the obsessive need to extinguish the fires of Jesuitism and some of the setbacks encountered in combatting the influence of the Jesuits and its supporters.

The first (and failed) attempts

Already in 1758 was there a will to end the Jesuits for good. The only way do this was to convince the pope to dissolve the Jesuit Order, so that it could not emerge someplace else. This pragmatic stance to cut off the head of the snake was not realistic though, as the pope was being counselled by those that were fierce supporters of the Jesuits, some even members of the Order. These *zelanti/zeloti*, as they were called, were aptly named, because they indeed showed a zeal in defending the Order that explains the longevity of the battle between Jesuits and anti-Jesuits among the courts of Europe. Indeed, the prime-minister Ricardo Wall of Spain, although no supporter of the Jesuit cause, reported that the Order's dissolution was preferable, but not immediately necessary and that the Catholic princes should be cautious with such a "rash project".¹²³

Still, for Carvalho e Melo and the 'pombaline government' persuasion and conviction of the pope seemed to be the sole solution to achieve an end to the Jesuit Order. Moreover, it legitimized their propaganda offensive and attack against the Jesuits. As mentioned earlier, the propaganda efforts had royal approval in the person of his Most Faithful Majesty king José I, but it was papal approval that the Portuguese government and later the French and Spanish expulsionists were after. The international dissemination of the propaganda also served a practical purpose. Since it was also disseminated in Rome, among like-minded anti-Jesuits – for example among the *Archetto*, which the Italian translator Pagliarini, who worked for Carvalho e Melo, was in contact with – it also caused some discord in Roman, and perhaps also in papal circles. It served as a source for distribution of state propaganda by the Portuguese envoy Francisco de Almeida e Mendonça – a cousin of Carvalho e Melo – but not without severe repercussions, as the Italian printer and translator Pagliarini was apprehended and incarcerated in 1759-1760.¹²⁴

¹²³ D. Téllez Alarcia, 'Richard Wall: Light and Shade of an Irish Minister in Spain (1694-1777)', in: *Irish Studies Review*, vol. 11.2 (2003), 123-136, there 130-132.

¹²⁴ Eduardo Franco, 'Os catecismos antijesuíticos pombalinos', 249-252 and Z. Osório de Castro, 'Jansenismo versus Jesuitismo. Niccolò Pagliarini e o projecto político pombalino', in: *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, vol. 52.1-4 (1996), 223-232, there 225.

This not deter Pombal and his cousin, however and they proceeded with their diplomatic effort of gaining Benedict XIV's support for a dissolution of the Jesuit Order. After two attempts in 1758, Almeida e Mendonça was granted an audience and handed over two royal letters (*cartas reais*) wherein king José I informed the pope about the deplorable situation the Jesuits had created in the Portuguese empire. In the first letter to the pope, king José pointed to the fact that the pope himself was not at fault, but that he had been misguided and blinded by those around them. Moreover, the king legitimized the choice of his government to take matters into its own hands and by doing that solving the 'Jesuit problem':

“Until now the true causes about the appalling effects [of the Jesuits] have not been revealed to His Holiness, because the incomparable clemency of His Highness [the king of Portugal] and the pious devotion that he has always professed towards the glorious St. Ignatius of Loyola, St. Francis Xavier and St. Francis of Borja, discontinued not only his unshaken feeling of justice [that of the pope], but also the natural defence of his anxious vassals, whilst he hopes for an amendment [by His Holiness] that remedies these many and extraordinary disorders, without demeaning the sons of such a holy and venerable mother as the Religion of the Company.”¹²⁵

Approaching the pope with respect to his holy person, and for the office of the papacy as well, is something that is clearly shown in the diplomatic sources between Rome and the Catholic kingdoms. The fault lay with those around him, the so-called *zeloti*; the pope's secretary Torregiani and the Jesuit General Ricci. They resembled the 'grey eminence' of the Jesuits in the courts of Catholic Europe, an eminence that cast a dark shadow over the policies of the pope. Still, without explicitly naming these persons, the pope was liable as well for the incapability of controlling the Order. The ideal of these 'reformist diplomats', was that the pope would effectively take matters into his own hands and subdue the Society of Jesus to a state-run ecclesiastical order. In that way the Catholic countries would follow suit and would not need any justification for their actions. In other words, the pope had to be 'enlightened', and be rid of the obscurantist shadow that the Jesuits cast.

After granting an audience to the Portuguese envoy and receiving the king's royal letters, Benedict XIV allowed an official investigation to be conducted by the Portuguese cardinal-patriarch of Lisbon, Francisco de Saldanha e Gama (1723-1776), who would investigate the

¹²⁵ J.F. Judice Biker (ed.), *Collecção dos Negocios de Roma no Reinado de El-Rey Dom José I – I: Ministerio do Marquez de Pombal e Pontificados de Benedicto XIV e Clemente XIII (1755-1760)* (Lisbon 1874), 41. The original reads: “Não foram porém até agora participadas à V.S^a as verdadeiras causas daquelles abominaveis effeitos, porque a incomparavel clemencia da Sua Magestade e a piissima devoção que o mesmo senhor professou sempre aos gloriosos Santo Ignacio de Loyola, S. Francisco Xavier e S. Francisco de Borja, suspenderam não só a sua indefectivel justiça, mas até a natural defeza dos seus expilados e afflictos vassallos, emquanto pôde caber na sua real esperança que consegueria a emenda de tantas e tão extraordinarios desordens, sem prostituir os filhos de huma tão santa e veneravel mãe como a Religião da Companhia.”

Jesuit Order in Portugal following the concerns of the king. The choice for Saldanha, however came after Carvalho e Melo had recommended him to the pope, whom had made Saldanha cardinal two years before. Saldanha was therefore nothing, if not biased.

Benedict XIV would die almost a month later, when the investigation was already running its full course. The late pope had given the cardinal-patriarch a *carte blanche* in the investigation. Saldanha now had both royal and papal approval to put the Jesuits under full scrutiny in Portugal and was even allowed to visit their “churches, colleges and missions” (*ecclesias, collegia quaeumque, hospitia, et missiones*) and investigate all Jesuits regardless of their “personal honour, superiority (or seniority), state or condition” (*eujuscumque dignitatis, superioritatis, status, gradus, et conditionis existentes*) and was authorized to look into their “lives, motives, customs, rites, disciplines and way of living” (*earumdem personarum status, vitam, ritus, disciplinam, aliamque vivendi rationem*).¹²⁶ In July that same year, Clement XIII was elected pope and his hostility towards those that expelled the Order has already been mentioned. He could not impede the investigation, neither could he influence the expulsion of the Order in that kingdom in 1759.

The election of a new pope meant that the diplomatic effort had to start anew, and the head of the Church had again to be convinced to dissolve the Jesuits and legitimize or approve the acts the Portuguese had taken against the Society of Jesus in 1759. Corresponding with the cardinal de Lances, Clément du Tremblay agreed that the pope had to criticize and condemn the Order, like the Portuguese government had done:

¹²⁶ Judice Baker, *Collecção dos Negocios de Roma*, 49-50. The original goes as follows: “*Motu itaque proprio, ac ex certa scientia, et matura deliberatione nostris, deque apostolicae potestatis plenitudine circumspectionem tuam, de cujus singulari fide, prudentia, integritate, dexteritate, vigilantia, ac religionis zelo plurimum in Domino condifimus, in Visitatorem Apostolicum, et Reformatiorem Clericum Regularium Societatis Jesu in regnis, ditionibus, et provinéis etiam Indiarum memorato Josepho Regi subjectis existentium tenore praesentium constituimus, et deputamus, ac circumspectioni tuae, ut eum assistentia unius, seu plurium personarum in ecclesiastica dignitate constitutarum, si Seculares fuerint, seu Regularium eujusvis Ordinis, seu Instituti a Sede Apostolica approbati a Te ad hujusmodi effectum pro tuo arbitrio eligendae, et assumendae, seu eligendarum, et assumendarum probatae vitae, et circa statute, et mores regulares versatarum provinciam, seu provincias Societatis Jesu praedictae in regnis, dominio, ditionibus, et provinciis etiam Indiarum praefatarum ediem Josepho Regi, ut praefertur subjectis existentis, illiusque, seu illarum domos professas, seu novitiatui destinatas, ecclesias, collegia quaeumque, hospitia, et missiones aliaque loca quoeumque nomine nuneupata a Societate praedicta dependentia, et ad illaun spectantia, pertinentia etiam exempta, et quocumque privilegio, ac indulto suffulta, necnon illorum Superiores, Rectores, Administratores, Clericos Regulares, caeterasque personas quaeumque eujuscumque dignitatis, superioritatis, status, gradus, et conditionis existentes tam in capita, quam in membris auctoritate nostra semel visites, et reformes, ac in earumdem personarum status, vitam, mores, ritus, disciplinam, aliamque vivendi rationem tam conjunctim, quam divisim diligentir inquiras.*”

*“Pour parvenir aux but projeté, il faut s’y préparer, par un cours de démarches instructives. Il est à désirer que le S. père commence par condamner la troisième partie du p. Berruyer [a Jesuit], de manière à faire connaître le système pernicieux de toute cette société sur la religion, et qu’eux-mêmes soient connus du S. père pour ce qu’ils sont, agents secrets des troubles de l’église: enfin, qu’ils ne lui paraissent plus appuyés, comme ils l’étaient par les cours les plus puissantes. Il ne reste plus pour cela que de les congédier du poste qu’ils occupent encore à la cour de France. Il n’y eu jamais de moment où une chose si désirable fut plus facile, étant fort naturel, au milieu de l’éclat du scandale public de cette société en Portugal, qui occupe toute l’Europe.”*¹²⁷

He acknowledged that this new pope was likely not going to listen, and that France (and also other Catholic kingdoms) needed a strong and wilful ambassador that could counter the equally headstrong, philo-Jesuit pope:

*“Alors on trouvera le S.-père disposé à tout faire à temps, plus hardi et plus généreux que son prédécesseur. Il faut envoyer son plan, si on en a, pour le conférer avec le cardinal Spinelli, qui seul est capable de le produire, jusqu’à sa réussite. Ensuite on écrirait au pape en droiture. L’ambassadeur sera toujours, à cet égard, un obstacle pénible et dangereux; mais il y a une solution naturelle, et qui peut être essentielle; c’est demander à Vienne que M. de Stainville, son prédécesseur, (il était alors en cette cour), et qui es si bien disposé, se transporte à Rome en ce moment-ci. Cela est facile; il serait homme à enlever promptement la conclusion d’une affaire, si bien préparée.”*¹²⁸

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, Choiseul (before 1760 known as the marquis of Stainville), who had been ambassador to Rome between 1754-1757 would not return as ambassador to the pope, but be elected chief minister of Louis XV and as minister he would have an important role in the eventual dissolution of the Order in France between 1761-1764.¹²⁹ Returning home in 1759, Clément du Tremblay concluded that

*“Le bon pape Rezzonico [Clement XIII], dans son élection, montra à quel point il connaissait les scandales de l’église et qu’il en était affecté sans mesure. Mais les hommes les plus éclairés fixèrent plus nettement à ses yeux le péril où se trouvait la partie de la doctrine.”*¹³⁰

The Portuguese ambassador was as successful as his French colleagues in convincing the pope of their good cause. Clement XIII indeed showed that he was not likely to distance himself from the Jesuits, and even increased his support of them. The relations between Portugal and Rome only worsened after that; the Jesuits in Rome calling the Portuguese investigation on and subsequent expulsion of the Jesuits a “Hebraic cruelty typical of the Portuguese who are all Jews” and

¹²⁷ Clément du Tremblay, *Journal des correspondances – I*, 199-200.

¹²⁸ Ibidem, 199-200.

¹²⁹ Van Kley, ‘Plots and Rumours of Plots’, 15-18.

¹³⁰ Clément du Tremblay, *Journal des correspondances, - I*, 310.

the Portuguese mistrust and hate of Jesuits only increasing. Almeida e Mendonça reported that “once a Jesuit, always a Jesuit, and therefore always equally corrupt.”¹³¹ Ironically, the Portuguese ambassador did try to bribe the “cardinals and persons of greater importance” in Rome with money and diamonds on instruction of his cousin the secretary, in order to make the Roman Curia more lenient towards Portugal and halt their ‘philo-Jesuitical agenda’, but it turned out to be all in vain.¹³² After the assassination attempt the Portuguese king repeatedly pleaded the pope for an official approval to put the Jesuits in Portugal on trial, but the pope held his ground. Through his papal nuncio in Portugal, Monseigneur Acciaiuoli, he sent his feelings of disgust and disapproval of the situation, condemning the despotic nature of Carvalho e Melo and the disloyal attitude of the cardinal-patriarch Saldanha – who had been appointed by the Holy See, but turned his back towards Rome and worked for the Portuguese, according to Rome – the rupture between Portugal and Rome only seemed imminent. In fact, after continuously ignoring the nuncio Acciaiuoli, and proceeding with the campaign against the Jesuits, His Holiness and his Most Faithful Majesty broke diplomatic contact in 1760.¹³³

Strategies and Solutions

In Spanish eyes, in 1768, the Portuguese breach of diplomatic relations in 1760 received admiration, for the count of Oeiras had shown that he could reform Portugal in an enlightened way, unhindered by the Roman Curia.¹³⁴ In fact, all the expulsions between 1759-1768 showed that the pope was powerless, and could not prevent an eventual dissolution of the Order. His papacy, however was characterized by his continuous support for the Jesuit Order and the breach between Portugal and Rome between 1760-1769 had shown that Clement XIII was not in the least amenable to reform of the Order. This unshaken attitude was reciprocated by a similar hard stance by the three Catholic kingdoms that expelled the Jesuits in their countries in this period, as described in the previous chapter. Still, the Catholic monarchs had wanted to reform the papacy in the first place and not end it, and in 1768-1769 a new opportunity presented itself with the death of pope Clement XIII.

¹³¹ S.J. Miller, *Portugal and Rome c. 1748-1830: An aspect of the Catholic Enlightenment* (Rome 1978), 73-74, as quoted by Miller.

¹³² Miller, *Portugal and Rome*, 80-81.

¹³³ *Ibidem*, 92-106.

¹³⁴ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 199.

Especially in the period from 1768 onwards, the transnationality of the (international) expulsion of the Order comes to light. As Van Kley suggests, the pressure put on the pope by the courts of France, Spain and Portugal, was very much a Spanish endeavour, but it could not be done without the ‘help’ and suggestions of the many ambassadors, diplomats, ministers and monarchs from the other countries.¹³⁵ Therefore, calling it a Bourbon endeavour, inspired and supported by the kingdom of Portugal – the only non-Bourbon kingdom that expelled the Jesuits in this period – would be more apt. Ferrer Benimeli rightly states and shows that the diplomatic correspondence between the ministers and ambassadors of France and Spain and even Naples and Sicily was crucial in finding a solution or a strategy to ‘finalize’ the Jesuit question and to achieve a papal suppression of the Order.¹³⁶ The anti-Jesuitism shown in the first chapter and the expulsion of the Order in the respective countries shown in the second chapter of this thesis can be seen as part of that prolonged process of finding a definitive solution to the Jesuitical problem.

The opinions of the respective ministers and monarchs, envoys and ambassadors do not show one, unequivocal stance concerning the suppression of the Jesuit Order, however. In 1768, during Clement XIII’s last years as pope, Carlos III wanted to proceed with a complete and total dissolution of the Order, on the advice of the Portuguese who even suggested taking military action to force the pope to end the Society. Others, like Manuel de Roda, Carlos III’s minister for Grace and Justice and himself former envoy to Rome between 1758-1765, suggested caution and prudence and wait for a new pontificate, free of a ‘Jesuit shadow’ that were Clement’s advisors. A second Portuguese suggestion was to arrange a council and pressure the cardinals to depose the *zeloti* at the court of Rome and dissolve the Order. The Spanish prime-minister Grimaldi simply suggested to wait for other Catholic nations, such as Austria and Venice, to expel their Jesuits.¹³⁷ The target was clear, namely an end to the Jesuits as a powerful order supported by the papacy, but the means to achieve it were still up for debate. Clément du Tremblay, in Spain in 1768, felt that at least a new wind was blowing, and facing the Jesuits. Irrespective of the solution the Gallo-Iberian monarchs would eventually find, he thought that “*Toutes les circonstances générales et*

¹³⁵ Van Kley, ‘Plots and Rumours of Plots’, 36.

¹³⁶ Ferrer Benimeli, *La expulsión y extinción de los jesuitas según la correspondencia diplomática – III: 1770-1773* (Zaragoza 1996).

¹³⁷ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 198-202 and Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción de los jesuitas, 1759-1773*, 228-232, 237.

*particulièrement rendaient intéressant l'aspect de cette partie de l'Europe, et paraissaient y faire espérer la révolution de lumière la plus heureuse dans les esprits, (...)*¹³⁸

When the pope died in early 1769, the solution chosen for the problem of the Jesuits was to influence the conclave so that it would elect a favourable pope. Between Choiseul, de Roda, and the French and Spanish ambassadors lists of favourable *papabile* were composed; candidates that would have to have certain 'cardinal' qualities, namely: the will to amend the faults that his predecessor had committed; prioritizing the tranquillity and the true interests of the principal catholic nations; and the ability to oversee the complete and total extinction of the Order.¹³⁹ In a conclave that lasted three months, Clement XIV was elected pope, by many 'Bourbon cardinals', or *nazionali*, possibly because he, out of all the other possible candidates, was the most malleable.

Reforms and Resolutions

The papacy of Clement XIV between 1769-1774 can be seen as the apotheosis of the transnational expulsion of the Jesuits; a period wherein the crux of the matter, to achieve a papal suppression of the Order through transnational means, is shown through correspondence and coordination between several ministers of state, multiple 'reform Catholics' that attempted to influence the papal reforms, and state reformers that implemented church reforms that changed the church-state relations considerably. It also a period wherein 'Reform Catholicism and 'Catholic Enlightenment' do not collide, but converge. Similarly, it is a period wherein the national expulsions converge with an international expulsion, and make it transnational in its own right.

When Clement XIV ascended the papal throne, Clément du Tremblay, the Augustinian Jansenist, became, as many of his contemporaries "*Occupé sérieusement dans la retraite de tout ce que pouvait de ma part servir à préparer les dispositions favorables du pape, et ce qu'on désirait de lui sur la doctrine ...*"¹⁴⁰ Being a 'Spanish choice', pope Clement thanked Carlos III personally for his pontificate, and promised that he would put everything into place to dissolve the Jesuits with haste, but that his reforms could not be too different to that of his predecessors, and too (radically) different to those

¹³⁸ A.-J.-C. Clément du Tremblay, *Journal des correspondances et voyages d'Italie et d'Espagne, pour la paix de l'église, en 1758, 1768 et 1769 – II* (Paris 1802), 7.

¹³⁹ Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción*, 257.

¹⁴⁰ A.-J.-C. Clément du Tremblay, *Journal des correspondances et voyages d'Italie et d'Espagne, pour la paix de l'église, en 1758, 1768 et 1769 – III* (Paris 1802), 27.

of the other Catholic monarchies of Europe, most notably Austria, Sardinia, Venice and Poland, which had not taken action against the Society of Jesus.¹⁴¹ The *abbé* Clément reported that

*“Pour l’extinction des jésuites, le saint-père y est très-déterminé, disait-on; mais il ne veut point, en le faisant, avoir à en craindre de mortification de la cour de Vienne; jusqu’ici elle ne veut ni accéder ni refuser. (...) La cour de Turin ne voulait que suivre celle de Vienne à cet égard.”*¹⁴²

And indeed, Clement XIV did not show any signs of fulfilling the promise he had made in mid-1769 to the Spanish king, as the Bourbon ambassador’s inquiries to the finalization of the Jesuit Order were only answered with silence and suspicion that the pope had been convinced of handling the case otherwise. And these suspicions may have been correct, because Clement XIV had expressed that he only wished to ‘reform the Jesuit Order’, and not dissolve it.¹⁴³ For the Bourbon ministers, and especially Carlos III there was no alternative anymore, especially not after the expulsions in Portugal, France and Spain. They wanted to see the Company “*sin nombre, sin instituto, sin general, sin provinciales, sin asistentes, sin rectores, sin hábito que los distinguiera, sin union, sin casas.*”¹⁴⁴ The Spanish believed that the recent reforms taken in their own country against the Order such as the appropriation of Church lands, the vows and pledges of bishops to the crown instead of the Roman Church, etc. had only one possible end, namely the dissolution of the Jesuits. Clément, when in Spain, reported that

*“Personne n’ignore le renouvellement qui s’opère en Espagne, en tout genre de bien. Les décrets royaux, les dispositions publiques, les événements les plus éclatants, annoncent au dehors l’émulations, qui pénètre dans tous les ordres du royaume, et les avances qui se font pour y rappeler la lumière, et en perfectionner la constitution.”*¹⁴⁵

The royal decrees that needed emulation were those that had practically put the Church under state control in Spain. Bishops were subordinated and made loyal to the Crown, instead of Rome, and former Jesuit clergymen were pardoned and ‘secularized’ as state agents. In fact, Portugal had done the very same in Brazil earlier, following their expulsion between 1754-1759, where Jesuits had been replaced by agents loyal to the crown. The period after the expulsions, coinciding with the diplomatic effort of 1768-1773, has been termed a period wherein Gallicanism was ‘unleashed’, says Andrea Smidt.¹⁴⁶ It is a period wherein many of the regalist

¹⁴¹ Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción*, 257-271.

¹⁴² Clément du Tremblay, *Journal des correspondances – III*, 32.

¹⁴³ Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción*, 283-288.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 320.

¹⁴⁵ Clément du Tremblay, *Journal des correspondances – II*, 159-160.

¹⁴⁶ Smidt, ‘Bourbon Regalism’, 40-46.

and Gallican ministers (or members of the *parlement* in the case of France) wanted to enlighten the government and the Church, and eliminate the bad reputation the Church, and more so the Jesuits, had given the state. Lynch states that:

“Reform went hand in hand with regalism. For religious renewal and material progress Catholic leaders looked to the state for support and in turn aligned themselves with the crown against the Jesuits and against Rome.”¹⁴⁷

Campomanes and Moñino, *fiscales* of Carlos III, believed that the Jesuits had polluted the Church with corruption and superstition, guiding the people away from public happiness (*felicidad pública*). The only way this could be corrected was to put the power in the hands of the king and his ministers, the only legitimate rulers of the people. Similarly, Carvalho e Melo, then known as the marquis of Pombal, published the *Compêndio histórico* (1771)¹⁴⁸ and the *Regimento do Santo Ofício da Inquisição* (1774)¹⁴⁹, wherein he (published by the *Junta de Providência Literária*)¹⁵⁰ set out to explain the reason and the source for the decadence that had befallen Portugal, and ultimately accused the Jesuits once more of their insatiable hunger to dominate the sciences, corrupt the religion and to dominate the world. More specifically, the *Regimento* accused the Jesuits of creating the image that Portugal was dominated by the Inquisition.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, 277.

¹⁴⁸ A. Pereira de Figueiredo, *Compêndio histórico do estado da universidade de Coimbra no tempo da invasão dos denominados jesuítas* (Lisbon 1771).

¹⁴⁹ J. Cosme da Cunha, *Regimento do Santo Ofício da Inquisição dos Reinos de Portugal, ordenando com o Real Beneplácito, e Regio auxílio* (Lisbon 1774).

¹⁵⁰ The *Junta de Providência Literária*, also known as the Pombaline Council, was created by king José I and the marquis of Pombal. It functioned, together with the *Real Meza Censoria*, as a special tribunal of censorship, which condemned works for their ‘Jesuitical inspiration’. It consisted of seven members: the Cardinal José Cosme da Cunha (1715-1783), archbishop of Évora and president of the *Real Meza Censoria*; José Ricalde Pereira de Castro (1715-1793?), royal advisor and (court) judge; Manuel de Vilas-Boas Anes de Carvalho (1724-1804), bishop of Beja and second president of the *Real Meza Censoria*; António de Pereira de Figueiredo (1725-1797), co-author of the *Compêndio histórico*; José de Seabra da Silva (1732-1813), Supreme Court Judge, Chancellor and Procurator and later prime-minister of Portugal from 1771-1777 (with Pombal) and under Queen Maria I between 1788-1801; Francisco Lemos de Faria Pereira Coutinho (1735-1822), deputy of the Portuguese Inquisition and rector of the University of Coimbra from 1770-1779 and 1799-1821 and finally Francisco António Marques Galdes de Andrade. See additional information on the site of the ‘Arquivo nacional Torre de Tombo’ at [<https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/details?id=4311313>] (consulted on 06 January 2019).

¹⁵¹ Eduardo Franco, ‘Os catecismos antijesuíticos pombalinos’, 260-267.

According to Clément du Tremblay, then, these actions were to be praised and emulated elsewhere, most notably in France. However, the French Jansenist thought that France was not fully committed to this cause, neither to the complete extinction of the Jesuit Order:

*“cette défection sensible, et presque générale, est le malheur actuel de la France: elle s’annonce hautement dans les discours publics; les brochures journalières le répètent; les efforts même qui s’y font en vain, de tant de plans d’amélioration, le font connaître, et l’expérience du défaut de succès, ne laisse presque plus d’espérance d’y remédier, que par l’impression salutaire des biens qui se font au dehors, et surtout en Espagne.”*¹⁵²

Between 1770-1771, France did not show any sign of ‘amelioration’ to the Jesuit cause. In late 1770 the chief minister Choiseul had been replaced by three ministers, in the so-called ‘Maupeou Coup’. René-Nicolas-Charles-Augustin de Maupeou (1714-1792), Joseph-Marie Terray (1715-1778) and Emmanuel-Armand de Richelieu, duke of Aiguillon (1720-1788) became the chief-ministers in Choiseul’s stead and were initially not as dedicated to the end of the Jesuits as Choiseul and the Spanish Bourbons had been.¹⁵³ Furthermore, Maupeou became known as the minister who officially exiled the Gallican Parlement (of which he himself had been president between 1763-1768).¹⁵⁴

Between 1770-1771, the pope did not show any rapprochement to the Bourbon cause of the dissolution of the Jesuits, either, and a feeling of irritability of and fear for the delays the papacy took in fulfilling the promises it had made to the Bourbon princes, most notably to Carlos III, took hold. It is in the following period then, between 1772-1773, that the transnational cooperation and coordination of the extinction of the Jesuits commenced again. When the Spanish ambassador, Tomás de Azpuru y Jiménez (1713-1772) suffered from a stroke in 1772, he was replaced by one of Carlos III’s *fiscales*, José Moñino, who was considered a great enemy of the Jesuits, and an excellent statesman as well. Together with the French ambassador, Cardinal de Bernis (1715-1794), he oversaw the eventual downfall of the Order in 1773, but not without its setbacks.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Clément du Tremblay, *Journal des correspondances – II*, 161.

¹⁵³ Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción*, 289-294. Louis Phélypeaux, duke of La Vrillère (1705-1777), briefly acted as Foreign minister between december 1770 and June 1771, until Emmanuel-Armand de Richelieu (his brother-in-law) took over this ministry. It is Richelieu that is recognized as part of the ‘triumvirate of ministers’, following the Maupeou coup in December 1770.

¹⁵⁴ Van Kley, *Reform Catholicism*, 227-228 and Swann, *Politics and the Parlement of Paris*, 314-351.

¹⁵⁵ E. Giménez López, *Misión en Roma. Floridablanca y la extinción de los Jesuitas* (Murcia 2008), 33 and Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción*, 313-318.

From the start of his ambassadorship, Moñino was aware that Rome, full of foreign ambassadors, Jesuit cardinals and other undesirables, was a harsh environment for a man trying to make the Jesuit Order non-existent. At the same time, he was also aware that if the Bourbon ambassadors and others such as Almeida e Mendonça – the Portuguese ambassador – and cardinal Orsini – the Neapolitan ambassador – were not cooperating together, they would fail in their mission. Moreover, in his first months as Spanish ambassador, he and Bernis also became aware that the pope, and some of his *zelanti* cardinals, had been trying to bring discord among them by spreading lies and starting a campaign of defamation against the ‘enemies of the Jesuits’. Out of caution Moñino

*“se conformó, que no me enviase [Bernis to Moñino] más billetes sobre lo que resultase de sus audiencias, pues para avisarnos y ponernos de acuerdo sin la publicidad que causen estos papeles en un país donde todo se espía y observa, podríamos avistarnos en cualquiera de la concurrencia o conversaciones de Roma que acostumbra frecuentar el Cardenal, pues juntándose allí tantas gentes, y entre ellas casi todos los Ministros extranjeros, no sería reparable que yo asistiese también, como uno de ellos.”*¹⁵⁶

In their first, separate audiences with the bishop of Rome it became very clear to Bernis and Moñino that the pope would not easily bend to the will of the Bourbon monarchs, even though he had made a promise to personally oversee the extinction of the Jesuits in a *motu proprio* (an act out of his own will, independent from the Curia). In a letter from Moñino to the Spanish prime-minister Grimaldi, Moñino expressed that the pope had said that:

“El Santo Padre se me abrió diciendo que las piezas del mosaico que habían consumido tanto tiempo para trabajarse y ajustarse se iban poniendo en buen estado (...).”

But also that

*“que no sabía qué hacerse con los jesuitas de Módena, Toscana, Venecia, algunos de Alemania y otras partes, donde tal vez resistirían desporjarlos de sus casas y colegios, y por consecuencia los efectos de la misma extinción.”*¹⁵⁷

Apart from a fear that other Catholic nations would react negatively to a suppression of the Jesuits, Clement XIV made clear through other means that he was not fully committed to this mission. Often excusing himself from audiences with the ambassadors, the pope went horse riding, to his summer retreat at Castel Gandolfo, or took a series of baths, the *acqua passare*, as part of a dermatological treatment. To Moñino and Bernis it became clear that this ‘case of

¹⁵⁶ Giménez López, *Misión en Roma*, 37-39, citation on 37.

¹⁵⁷ Idem (ed.), *Cartas desde Roma para la extinción de los jesuitas. Correspondencia inédita de julio 1772 – septiembre 1774* (Alicante 2009), 171-172.

hypochondria' would not cease if the ambassadors would use a different tactic and increase the pressure on the papacy.¹⁵⁸

That tactic was the same used by the Jesuits in Rome against the ambassadors, namely defamation and bribery. Bernis and Moñino turned their attention to the people around the pope, most notably his secretary, who controlled the pope's agenda, Fr. Buontempi.¹⁵⁹ Buontempi seemed quite susceptible to bribery and made more audiences with the pope possible. Moreover, Bernis also had found information about a certain Vittoria Bischi, married to one of the pope's confidants, Niccola Bischi. Vittoria was believed to be the pope's daughter, and the Bischis were possibly bought in return for their silence.¹⁶⁰ A secret of this size was an important tool for political pressure. Other bargaining tools were also used, such as the military occupation of the papal territories of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin by France and Benevento and Pontecorvo by Naples.

Eventually, six months after the new Spanish ambassador had arrived in Rome, in the beginning of 1773, real progress had been made as Clement XIV had finally come to see that by dissolving the Order, it would "*dar la paz a la Iglesia y a los Estados*". The pope and the ambassadors worked together in writing a brief that the pope would publish that same year, which effectively dissolved the Order in the Papal States and therefore 'internationally'. The pope warned that he would only do this if the papal territories would be returned to him, an act that did not receive positive reaction by both Louis XV and Tanucci, Naples's prime-minister. Nonetheless, the territories were eventually given back and the papal brief was sent to Carlos III and Louis XV to inform them the Order would cease to exist come the publication of the brief, in Latin and French, in August 1773.¹⁶¹

The initial, 'aggressive' diplomatic road had not been deemed effective enough, as it had failed in 1759, and it had took more than forty months to expel the Order between 1769-1773. The exact reason for Clement XIV's epiphany that resulted in the sudden cooperation with the Spanish and French ambassador is not fully known, but the relentless diplomatic pressure, and possible slander could have been the reasons that the papacy, after more than fifteen years (and

¹⁵⁸ Giménez López, *Misión en Roma*, 41-48.

¹⁵⁹ S.F. Smith and J.A. Munitz (ed.), *The Suppression of the Society of Jesus* (Gracewing 2004), 243-244.

¹⁶⁰ Giménez López, *Misión en Roma*, 43-44.

¹⁶¹ Giménez López, *Misión en Roma*, 113-124; Ferrer Benimeli, *Expulsión y extinción*, 327; and *Anonymous*, *Bulle du Pape Clément XIV, touchant la Suppression de la Société de Jesus, en latin & en français* (n.p. 1773).

three popes) succumbed to the (increasing) combined forces of the Bourbon monarchies and Portugal.

Conclusion

This essay set out to answer the question in what way the expulsion of the Jesuit Order could be seen as a transnational project – as opposed to a national or international one – and in what way this project was legitimized. The term ‘expulsion’ has been broadened here and also includes the various and diverse accusations against the Order prior to the actual expulsions and the diplomatic effort in Rome and against the papacy. The three chapters of this essay and the six ‘episodes’ of anti-Jesuitism clearly show how this project, or process, exceeded country borders but was not fully international. The kingdoms of Portugal, France and Spain (later joined by Naples & Sicily, Parma and Malta) did not officially join forces to suppress the Order up until 1768, when the Jesuits had all but been expelled in the respective countries.

Like-minded anti-Jesuits did emulate each other, however and repeated the same accusations of corruption and unwavering ultramontanism against the Jesuits. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, the unequivocal leader of Portugal, expressed the same anti-Jesuitical sentiments as Jansenists and Gallicans, who had been fighting a ‘constitutional’ war against the power of Rome and the Jesuits in France before. The Portuguese were the first to personally attack the Jesuit Order through several articles of propaganda, which they consciously disseminated not only in Portugal, but also in Rome (through its ambassador) and like-minded anti-Jesuit printers in France. In this transnational propaganda, the Jesuits were being depicted as a malicious cabal that operated out of the shadows and was the mastermind of many crimes. By discrediting the Society of Jesus in such a manner, it legitimized the many enlightened reforms that were pushed through, that can be considered both as part of state reform as well as church reform.

In fact, by equating the Jesuits with the ‘malpractices’ in the Church, the Gallo-Iberian monarchies were able to justify putting the church under the auspices of the state, and purge it from any false, Jesuitical elements. The only viable form of legitimization, however was to purify the Church of Rome as well, and ‘bring peace to the Church’. This anti-Jesuitical sentiment was not unique to these three countries alone, but it certainly was the place where it had its most decisive and desired effect. This in turn can be explained by the assassination attempts and revolts that happened, targeting the monarchs of the three countries. These three separate events, most likely unrelated, had a common denominator in the Jesuits being the (suspected) culprits. What resulted were thoughts of a transnational conspiracy – linking the nations of Portugal, Spain and France – that led to the Jesuits being perceived as an enemy, not only of the state, but also to the Church. And in a theatre of war (with the Church and with each other) – specifically the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) and the colonial wars in the 1750’s in South America – enemies were not hard to find.

To state that this was an international movement, however or solely three separate national movements, is a step too far either way. The coordination of the three (or four) countries in influencing the conclave of 1769 and putting pressure on the papacy to dissolve the Order shows this clearly. A thorough analysis of the diplomatic correspondence, of state edicts such as the Spanish *dictámenes* and the Gallican and Jansenist propaganda that coordinated and legitimized the expulsion of the Jesuits, brings to the surface an interesting and unique conspiracy consisting of both state- and clergymen that attempted to bring down alleged conspirators, i.e. the Jesuits. The subject finds itself in the middle of two historiographical extremes, between histories of state reform and church reform, enlightened absolutism and Catholic Enlightenment, etc. Extremes that are not as opposed as some historians have set them out to be. It lends aspects of both, that converge and do not collide. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment and Catholicism have often been portrayed as each others' enemies, but the transnational expulsion of the Jesuits shows that this needs not to be.

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