

Passenger Pasar

Chinese junk trade and passenger transport

Batavia 1825-1875

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Batavia 1825-1875

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History of European Expansion and Globalisation
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

Figure 1: Regional overview of Southeast Asia during the mid 19th century.

1. Introduction

The 19th century was vibrant era where many of the old traditional components of society, economy and technology changed at an incredible pace. This transformation started out in the north-west of Europe and the north-east of the United States but soon had repercussions for societies all over the globe. This expanding wave reached China and Southeast Asia (or Nanyang as the Chinese call the region[1]) mid 19th century and had profound effects on the region.

Technological advances made by the European powers made it possible to further advance into the east Asian region. Steam powered ships made it possible to sail outside the monsoon season and steadily became faster and faster. Advances in weaponry gave Europeans the edge when military conflicts occurred. The Spanish and Dutch had held trade settlements in the region for some centuries yet now started to actively expand the territories they controlled. The British obtained the Straits Settlements and later also Hong Kong. After years of encroachment the French finally landed in Indo-China and directly controlled the former kingdoms of Annam and Tonkin.[2]

The trade networks in Southeast Asia of the merchant families in south Fujian was heavily disrupted by these incursions. European colonial ports had a tendency to prefer ships sailing under their own flag. Even after these mercantilistic policies died out during the 19th century, a preference was given to European merchants over their Asian counterparts. A phenomenon a Chinese merchant could only lament as he, opposed to his European colleague, could not count on the support of his enterprise by his government. Where in the past European and Chinese merchants supplemented each other in the international trade, Chinese junks were now increasingly pushed out of the market by Europeans.

One of the factors that contributed to the decline of the former position of the Chinese merchant was the rise of the opium trade. Before the rise of opium, Europeans came to the Chinese in search of silk, tea and other exotics. They were the asking party whilst Chinese merchants could set the prices, most of which were paid in bullion. This position was reversed as an increasing demand for opium was felt in the Chinese economy. The repercussions were felt in terms of a shifting trade balance, but far more reaching were the two wars fought that bear the name of the substance.

A fleet of British ships went to war when the Qing bureaucracy started to take measures against

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1 Literally speaking the Chinese call the waters where the islands of Southeast Asia lie the Nanyang, a term which translates roughly to southern ocean. It is commonly used to refer to the region and in this thesis it will used as an equivalent of Southeast Asia.
Murray, Dian. 'Piracy and China's Maritime Transition, 1750-1850', in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong (eds.). *Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850,* (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.55

2 Lockard, Craig A. *Southeast Asia in World History,* (New York NY, 2009), p.102-104

the expanding opium abuse and loss of bullion caused by the abuse. This restrictive action was taken as an excuse to open hostilities and open up the Chinese Empire for western trade. Instead of the single port of Canton (current Guangzhou) where western merchants were allowed before 1842, the Treaty of Nanking issued the opening of four more ports to western entrepreneurs and the cession of the island of Hong Kong. The second war was fought by a coalition of nations versus China and ended with the Treaty of Tianjin that formally legalised the opium trade and opened even more of the hinterland for European commercial incursion in 1860.[3]

The economic woes of China and the string of rebellions that occurred in China in the two decades after 1850, severely disrupted the stability of the Chinese Empire. At the same time the abolition of slave trade made the demand for cheap labour worldwide skyrocket. Emigration, while formally forbidden for a period over three years in length, took flight, as the lands of the Qing dynasty were forcefully integrated into a globalization economy.[4]

The Chinese that already settled in the Nanyang had to cope with these new arrivals. They brought with them a different view on the world and different notion of what it meant to be Chinese. At the same time European nationalism and the derogatory views of exotic cultures that accompanied it, reshuffled relations in the European colonies in Southeast Asia. It became necessary to develop an identity that was inherently linked to ethnicity and clearly positioned the community into colonial society.[5]

In these turbulent times I want to look at two major processes that were occurring in the region. One; the decline of the strong position of the traditional Chinese trading network and two; the start of major migrant streams originating from the Chinese mainland. Both of these processes made use of a similar infrastructure that was laid out over the seas. But was there a connection between the these two phenomena other than time?

To examine this possibility I propose the use of an hypothesis. The hypothesis: The Chinese trading network in Southeast Asia, under competition of European trade, switched to alternative commercial endeavours, primarily the transport of migrants. To narrow down the research I want to check the validity of this hypothesis by examining one point in the network namely the port city of Batavia (current Jakarta).

In Batavia, the seat of the colonial government of the Netherlands Indies, these major

3 Wong, John Yue-wo. *Deadly dreams: opium, imperialism and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China,* (Cambridge, 1998)

4 Pan, Lynn (ed.). *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, (Richmond, 1999), p.54-55

5 Suryadinata, Leo. *Understanding the Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia,* (Singapore, 2007), p.118-119, Wang, Gungwu. *The Chinese Overseas – From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy*, (Cambridge MA, 2000), p.64, Taylor, Jean Gelman. *The Social World of Batavia – European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia,* (Madison, 1983), p.115-116, McKeown, Adam. 'Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949', in: *The Journal of Asian Studies Vol.58 no.2* (Ann Arbor, 1999), p.326

transformations, the decline of the Chinese trading position and migration of Chinese people overseas, came together. The port city was a trade centre that lost its former importance and wealth. An expanding Dutch presence through Java and local society left less room for cosmopolitan ideas, yet Batavia had long history of Chinese settlement in and around the city. Furthermore as the Dutch implemented the *cultivation system,* the former local economy was thoroughly changed.

While examining one node within a network by no means paints a complete picture of the transformation occurring in entire web, looking at only one segment provides a starting piece of mapping such network transformations. Batavia provides us with a great opportunity as all international connections of the Dutch colony were concentrated in its harbour as part of measures coinciding with the cultivation system. Furthermore, examining this segment will hopefully give a new perspective to look at the Chinese role in regional history between 1820 and 1870 and an incentive to broaden the scope of conventional national oriented histories.

To fully examine the potential correlation between the decline of conventional Chinese trade and the rise of Chinese overseas migration, I make a distinction between macro and local developments in following chapters. Large regional developments had the potential to influence the situation in Batavia. By dealing with these separately from the local conditions, a structured and clear understanding of the entire situation hopefully can be obtained.

To begin this thesis I will start with a chapter examining the concepts used in historiography to describe, analyse and depict the Chinese overseas. The debates surrounding these analytical tools are useful to mention because, besides giving a better understanding of the past intellectual contributions, they also give insight in the current perspectives on Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia. Furthermore this methodology is essential in creating the necessary framework to pose my hypothesis in. As networks and infrastructure are an integral part of this hypothesis a clear understanding of the theoretic model used to examine the problem is necessary.

The chapter that follows deals with the economic developments in east Asia and examines the decline of traditional trade possibilities for Chinese junk captains.[6] A number of commercial endeavours will be summarily reviewed that potentially could have provided alternatives to traditional marine trade. This provides us a broad sketch of economic climate for Chinese junk merchants in mid 19th century where naturally an emphasis is given to the situation in the Dutch entrepôt of Batavia.

The next part of the thesis will examine the surge of migrant flows out of the Chinese Empire and in particular the stream that went to Southeast Asia. The potential reasons for emigration will be

6 The *junk* was the regular sailing vessel used in Qing China. See the photograph on the cover for an early 20th century example of two junks.

briefly covered, as will the organisations making these migrant flows possible. The legal situation as codified by the Dutch, for Chinese migrants reaching Java and Batavia will get specific attention. Furthermore any conclusions are connected with those of the previous chapter on the economic situation on Java and Madura.[7]

The final chapter I will combine the outcomes of these two perspectives on Batavia into one overarching analysis. Will this hypothesis hold, after been scrutinized by findings in the available sources, or will the sources hold no clues that point toward such claims? Hopefully the examination alone will provide larger insight in the workings of a marine economy that does rarely get the full attention it deserves. Lets see if passengers transport was a viable market, or *pasar* as bazaars are known in the Indonesian and Malay language.

2. Concepts and Terms

When examining the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia a multitude of concepts are used by historians to clarify their analyses and conclusions. The use of the concepts involved, nevertheless still ensues debate as the meaning they hold is not uniformly accepted amongst scholars. The political implications of writings by historians causes the debate not only to be held on a descriptive historic level but also on a present day political level. The place a minority as the ethnic Chinese would and could take in host societies is directly or indirectly influenced by these writings. Especially in the new nation states in Southeast Asia emerging from the remains of former European colonies, the Chinese living within their borders were met with a certain amount of suspicion.[8]

These sensitivities surrounding the concepts used as terminology are not only confined to the intellectual and political level, but change shape in regards to the rudimentary size of the territory involved in the analysis. A global perspective on overseas Chinese will have less to qualms to describe and depict migrant streams in terms of settlers, whilst in Southeast Asia this term has a more heavy meaning. It implies some form of colonisation, possibly taking land and opportunities that would otherwise be solely preserved for local population. Such conclusions could lead to negative sentiments towards the current Chinese minority living in Southeast Asia. This writing

7 The choice for Java and Madura is one dictated by the sources, as these territories in the Netherlands Indies are the only ones in constant Dutch control in the examined period and thus have a stable amount of statistical data available.

8 Wang, Gungwu. *China and Chinese Overseas*, (Singapore, 1991), p.176-178, Wang, Gungwu. 'Sojourning: the Chinese experience in Southeast Asia', in: Anthony Reid & Kristine Aliluna-Rodgers (eds.). *Sojourners and Settlers – Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, (St. Leonards, 1996), p.2, 11, McKeown, Adam. 'From Opium Farmer to Astronaut: A Global History of Diasporic Chinese Business', in: *Diaspora – A Journal of Transnational Studies Vol.9 no.3* (New York, 2000), p.347

environment should be taken into consideration when researching the overseas Chinese.[9]

A first step to define these concepts can be done by describing what and whom are designated by the adjective “Chinese”. A seemingly simple definition: someone or something from China. Yet such a straightforward definition does not encompass all the diversity within this group of people, nor does it the emphasize the variety of views Chinese were perceived by others. Whether those views were created by personal experiences inside China, in one of the towns in the Nanyang or just based on hearsay from others, all these details are lost to the beholder by just using the term Chinese.

To put in abstract form: in this essay I will be focussing on the connection between China and Java. In these two nodes of an overseas connection, a diverse variety of meanings of the identity “Chinese” existed. The sheer difference between those two nodes; an Imperial Realm and a colony of an awakening nation state, only increased friction what it meant for travellers to be Chinese. In the following paragraphs I shortly emphasize the multitude of identities Chinese wore themselves or were cloaked in when travelling to the Nanyang. Views that originated in the node of departure in China, or in the other node of the connection, the society where the travellers arrived in.

Within the group labelled as Chinese, there exists a large amount of different ethnicities living in their separate home regions within the territories of imperial China. For this essay I will limit myself to the groups that were active in the Southeast Asia in the 19th century. This means I will refrain myself mainly to those Chinese ethnicities that lived on or near the southern shores of China in the current provinces of Fujian and Guangdong.[10]

starting with the Hokkien Chinese, originating from the area around Amoy (current Xiamen). They were traditionally involved in the trade to Southeast Asia and particularly prominent in the European colonial cities of both Batavia and Manila. Secondly there were the Cantonese, originating from the bay of Canton who were primarily involved in organising the trade of Europeans in the bay area and port of Canton, which was prior to the Treaty of Nanking. the only port European traders could dock at when entering Chinese waters. Another noteworthy ethnic group from China active in the Nanyang were the Hakka, mostly working in loosely organised enterprises at frontier regions of the archipelago in tin mines or woodcutter colonies. The Hakka Chinese were also in great numbers amongst the indentured labourers, or coolies as they are known in the west, than the former mentioned ethnicities. When Chinese are mentioned further along in this essay they will be predominantly of Hokkien origin unless clearly stated otherwise. The Chinese with a connection to the island of Java were mostly of Hokkien origin.[11]

9 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p. 307
10 See figure 1 (page 5) for a map with names of places in the region, referred to in this thesis.
11 Hoetink, B. 'Chineesche officieren te Batavia onder de Compagnie', in: *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en*

Of course the summary above is just a rough sketch illustrating the diversity on Chinese side. It by no means provides an absolute order of Chinese ethnicities and their professions abroad, some mixing between groups undoubtedly must have taken place. However, the organisational structure Chinese merchants used tended to be in close relation to familial structure, resulting in relatively homogeneously ethnic groups operating in particular branches of business.[12]

A more difficult task consists of mapping the actual ethnicities of settlers in Southeast Asia. Acculturation with the local population took place over many of years clouding the image to reconstruct. Some painstaking work towards unravelling this question has been done by Salmon & Lombard by mapping deities worshipped abroad and connecting those with the same deities worshipped in certain regions of China. Still the situation remains muddled since Chinese assimilation took place at different rates according to variables such as; the size of the settlement, level of sophistication of the local culture, numbers of settlers and the frequency of contact with overseas traders. According to William Skinner Chinese settler groups would, if they were of sufficient size, have a higher chance retaining their heritage if there was no profit in social status to be made by changing their cultural behaviour.[13]

This were some distinctions that Chinese people also made amongst themselves. But how were Chinese perceived in the harbours and settlements of Southeast Asia? To compare these Chinese communities overseas a useful methodology has been been explored. There existed differences in relations with the local native population, ruling class and specific commercial enterprises throughout these scattered settlements in Southeast Asia. Yet despite these major differences one main distinction between Chinese was made in all larger settlements in the Nanyang. There were Chinese that lived there for some generations and there were those that were just arriving from China. A rough division indeed but essential in terms of social behaviour. Many fine publications exist covering this topic and therefore I will only elaborate on the situation in region under research, the island of Java.[14]

Java, which was the central island of the Netherlands Indies, had a long history with Chinese immigrants. Even before the Dutch arrived and settled in Batavia, Chinese were active in and around Java. Under Dutch governance their numbers quickly rose. Whilst Dutch bureaucracy

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Volkenkunde van Nederlandsche-Indië Vol.78, ('s-Gravenhage, 1922), p.1, Skinner, G. William. 'Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia', in: Anthony Reid & Kristine Aliluna-Rodgers (eds.). *Sojourners and Settlers – Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, (St. Leonards, 1996), p.50, McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.329

12 Gardella, Robert. 'Enterprises, Contracts and Partnerships: A Case for Chinese Customary Tradition Bridging the Nanyang', in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong (eds.). *Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850,* (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.290, Kuhn, Philip A. *Chinese Amongst Others: emigration in modern times,* (Lanham MD, 2008), p.184

13 Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese', p.66, Salmon, C. & Lombard, D. *Les Chinois de Jakarta - Temples et vie collective,* (Paris, 1980)

14 Examples of fine comparing studies are: Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese', Suryadinata, *Ethnic Chinese*.

officially only recognized them as part of the category Foreign Asiatics (*vreemde oosterlingen*), in practice the Chinese stood out as distinct group because of their economic success. Amongst the native population a distinction was made in the 19th century between *peranakan* and *totok* Chinese. Two designations of Chinese that are best summarized as a combination of ethnic, cultural and religious components.[15]

Peranakan Chinese is a term used to describe ethnic Chinese that had lived for several generations on Java and therefore became part of local society. Initial Chinese settlers had taken local wives but subsequent generations intermarried whenever possible. They remained a distinct group within society with their own customs and cultural heritage yet their priorities were decisively local. Forming a middle class between the Dutch colonizer and the local Javanese, their position was contested but essential. Traditionally a respectable individual, prominent within the entire minority, was granted some legal authority over them by the Dutch Indies government. To this institution I will return in greater detail later on in this thesis.[16]

Totok Chinese became prominent during the beginning of the 20th century but started to become noticeable during the latter part of 19th century. Born in mainland China, they were prone to preserve their Chineseness and often set up groups and schools to re-sinicize overseas Chinese. Being born in the nationalist era they became acutely aware of their identity and were suspicious of anyone 'loitering' their precious heritage. Ideologically speaking they were more inclined to the Chinese Empire and a form of pan-Chineseness than to the local societies in the Indonesian archipelago. These *totok* Chinese had no bond with the prominent local Chinese figures as the *peranakan* Chinese did, and therefore were less susceptible by colonial state institutions that operated through these respectable elders.[17]

Temporary migrants from China, whether indentured labourer or free labourer, also belonged to this category. Sojourning back to their home village after the job abroad was finished these migrant purely came seeking personal profit. The society or environment they stayed in was of secondary concern. On Java these migrants had gotten the name *sinkeh*[18] and were regarded even by the Chinese community as people from the lowest class. Often the people were completely dependent on their employer as they themselves did not speak local language(s) or had much, if any, knowledge about local society.[19]

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15 Chen, Menghong. *De Chinese gemeenschap van Batavia, 1843-1865; een onderzoek naar het Kong Koan-Archief,* (Leiden, 2009)*,* p.144, Lohanda, Mona. *The Kapitan Cina of Batavia 1837-1942*, (Jakarta, 1996), p.2-10, Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese'*,* p.53, Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.56,

16 Lohanda, *Kapitan Cina*, p.188, Wang, *Chinese Overseas,* p.56-57

17 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.153, Lohanda, *Kapitan Cina,* p.9-10, McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.324

18 Multiple spellings of the term exist, "*sinkeh*" has been gaining ground as a standard in English literature.

19 Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.137, Dobbin, Christine. *Asian Entrepreneural Minorities – Conjoints Communities in the Making of the World-Economy 1570-1940,* (Richmond, 1996), p.187, Somers Heidhues, Mary F. *Bangka Tin*

The meaning of these terms cannot entirely be conveyed by stagnant variables as the subject they try to describe was also a changing group of people. Characteristics of the group changed over time, differed per region examined and even the terms used to label groups in society changed over the years. Especially the term *peranakan* has transformed over time. Prior to the 19th century this term was specifically used for Chinese settlers that had converted to the Islamic faith. Until 1828 they were granted the same autonomous rights as their non Islamic Chinese counterparts but were separately organised entirely. As Islamic doctrine went against many of the traditional customs originating from Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism what were practised by other Chinese, a definite divergence between the groups ensued. Ultimately the Islamic converts were assimilated by the local population while the 'regular' Chinese became known as *peranakan*. The arrival of newcomers from China that became known as *totok* Chinese, as mentioned above, only increased the pace of this process. *Peranakan* increasingly became known as a term to describe Java born Chinese while *totok* designated those who were born in China. This transformation of the concept *peranakan* took place during the latter half of the 19th century as differences between local Chinese and new arrivals became apparent. By the second quarter of the 20th century the old designation as Islamic convert was almost forgotten.[20]

Besides the transformation of certain labels over time as those listed above, there also continues to exist miscommunication about naming groups. Especially the term “coolie” remains bearing a perspective of semi-slavery in the west. Yet this view of a Chinese coolie as a semi-slave has its inconsistencies. The abdominal conditions of some Chinese migrants has been taken as a showcase for all Chinese migration to stress the point of free labour migration across the Atlantic Ocean to non free migration in the east. Literature will not go as far as labelling the complete Chinese migration as coolie migration yet dearly overstresses the importance of its share. Secondly the significance of debt of these labourers is poorly understood and excesses concerning these debts are taken as a standard for all. In recent years some revisions has been made to this image by scholars to better understand coolie labour and clarify the part debt truly played in the labour migration from China.[21]

A categorisation of labourers that was in practice then and survived the ravages of time is the distinction between *laukehs* and *sinkehs*. *Sinkeh* was known on Java to be used in a rather negative sense, as mentioned earlier. Purely semantically speaking though, the term just meant “newcomer”.

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and Mentok Pepper – Chinese Settlement on an Indonesian Island, (Singapore, 1992), p.42-43, 58

20 Lohanda, *Kapitan Cina*, p.6, Suryadinata, *Ethnic Chinese*, p.112-113

21 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.114-115, McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.317, Somers Heidhues, *Banka Tin*, p. 59-60, Wang, *China*, p.6-7

In relation to *laukeh* the term was used to describe an inexperienced indentured labourer while a *laukeh* had previous experience working in Southeast Asia. It depended on the individual how fast he would lose the designation of *sinkeh* amongst his peers at work. Furthermore were *laukehs* more often employed in the organisational structure of the enterprise. They took on jobs as recruiters and travelled back to rural China to find and convince new labourers to come to the Nanyang. Other *laukehs* stayed in Southeast Asia after paying of their debt and made up a flexible experienced workforce in the archipelago. And finally there were those that would independently start a new enterprise, on Borneo for example. These options were often interchangeable as not everyone succeeded in their plans, some even had to go back in debt. Nevertheless as he did not need to learn the ropes once more, he would not be considered a *sinkeh* upon return.[22]

It is less clear who the term coolie includes and who it excludes as it initially seems. While labour migrants from China during the second half of the 19th and early decade of the 20th century could be called coolies, migrant streams originating in China after the Second World War could hardly apply for this label. Nevertheless consisted both migrant streams of labourers that usually had agreed to some sort of debt construction to afford the journey out of China. In effect they paid for the fare in labour by arrival in the host country. Many Europeans crossing the Atlantic during the mass migration of the late 19th and begin 20th century used the same method.[23]

Similarly the Chinese labourers that tried their luck in the gold rushes of the late 19th century made use of the same infrastructure and institutional context to travel to their destination as coolies. The journey to the gold fields was being financed by a third party in a credit-for-ticket construction that was remarkably akin to the contracts coolie labourers going to the plantations signed. Furthermore the debt made by travel was not tied to one employer, they could and would be exchanged as any other form of debt. Because of the potential transferability of their debt technically both groups were not comprised entirely of labourers imprisoned in debt. Nonetheless are the latter seen as coolies because of their work while the former are seen as plain fortune seekers.[24]

Thus simply the view that most migrants from China would be coolies slaving away on plantations and mines is incorrect. This does not mean there existed no excesses within the Chinese labourers overseas and that the working conditions were hard. Only that this view was not the

22 Breman, Jan. *Koelies, Planters en Koloniale Politiek – Het arbeidsregime op de grootlandbouwondernemingen aan Sumatra's Oostkust in het begin van de twintigste eeuw*, (Leiden, 1992), p.111-112, Somers Heidhues, *Banka Tin*, p.41, Sugihara, Kaoru. 'Patterns of Chinese Emigration to Southeast Asia, 1869-1939', in: Sugihara, Kaoru (ed.). *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949,* (New York NY, 2005), p.254-258

23 McKeown, Adam, 'Chinese Emigration in Global Context, 1850-1940.' in: *Journal of Global History Vol.5* (Cambridge, 2010), p.96, 101-103, Kuhn,*Chinese Amongst Others*, p.211-213

24 McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.102, Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.124, 222, Wang, *China*, p.6

general standard for people labelled as coolie in the 19th century. Coolies were simply temporary migrant labourers taking risks to seek profit abroad when their home nation could not give it to them. Striking is the example of a construction order issued by the general government of the Dutch Indies wherein was spoken in terms of attracting some coolies to repair the bridge in Surabaya rather than just ordering them. Coolie in this regard was used as an synonym for day labourer.[25]

As coolie went from a neutral term to normative concept in modern times, the term "indentured labourer" has been winning ground to emphasize the difference. While coolie has a remaining connotation of semi-slavery, "indentured labourer" has a more neutral tone accompanying it. Both terms have in essence the same definition, yet the difference lies in how they are perceived. Indentured labour was based on an old Chinese tradition of financing overseas travel. While citing Count of Hogendorp's *Coup d'oeil sur Java,* the governor-general of the Dutch Indies mentions for instance that most of the travel expenses of new Chinese immigrants were paid by Chinese residents of Batavia. The new arrival would pay off their benefactor during their stay and in the meantime get accustomed to life on Java. Coolies however were part of the new migrants streams of the late 19th century of temporary labourers, and could therefore be set apart as one of the troubles of modernity. This method of using the terminology bypasses the problem of the normative perception whilst at the same time emphasises the difference between traditional and modern (in this case 19th century modern) migration. One major problem of this approach however is that it is meant to clarify the problem yet prolongs the misconception about coolie labour in general. Nevertheless using these two terms in this way in relation to each other, offers the best tools to draw a clear picture of the situation.[26]

Initially only a hypothesis from the 1950's about the Chinese migration to the U.S. in the early 20th century, the concept of "sojourning" has shed new light on migration. Sojourning is temporary migration yet for period longer than season migration entails. The migrant can be living abroad earning money for several years before returning to his home nation. This is precisely where the crux lies of the concept of sojourning, it is hard to determine if a migrant *intended* to go back after several years or had different reasons for returning after wilfully settling permanently abroad. Because intention is central in determining the category of the migrant, rather than his actual action, it remains difficult for the historian to reconstruct sojourner behaviour.[27]

In 1991 Wang Gungwu proposed to categorise overseas Chinese in a variety of migratory patterns. These patterns could coexist next to each other in one particular period of time, as they

25 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën, 1850-1900, nummer toegang 2.10.02, no. 7115, fol.383
26 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën, 1814-1849, nummer toegang 2.10.01, no. 3042, fol.13-14
27 McKeown, Adam. *Melancholy Order – Asian migration and the globalization at borders,* (New York NY, 2008), Wang, 'Sojourning', p.7-9

represented a portion out of the total overseas Chinese migration during that period. Therefore the total Chinese migration in different time periods, would consist out of variable percentages of each migratory pattern treated in this model. The categorisation of actors over time would clarify changes and disruptions in the flow of Chinese migration overseas. Sojourners were one category of migrant in this thesis and decisively unique for the Chinese according to Wang Gungwu.[28]

Since his research was primarily aimed at Southeast Asia and the Chinese presence there, the model proposed by Wang Gungwu functions best is this region. Besides the trader, the coolie and the re-migrant patterns, he claims the sojourning pattern is essential in understanding Chinese migratory practices. Familial piety to the family unit in China was central in this form of migration. Sons would go overseas to make a living while sending remittances back to their familial house in China. After several years overseas they would return home as they had accumulated enough wealth to support a family unit in China themselves. Since emigration of women was formally forbidden in Qing China until 1893, this model fits with the temporary labour force in the Nanyang.[29]

Even so the assumption that all migration of Chinese to the Nanyang was initially temporary, is solely based on intent. The civil ideal in China indeed consisted of a man who would pay respect to his elders and honour them by returning to his familial house during their old days. In practice however, this not always happened. While Wang Gungwu admits that there were Chinese men who remained in Southeast Asia, he poses them as unable to return to China for whichever reason, not unwilling. Wrongly so I presume, as ideals are not universally carried by all in society.[30]

In the western migratory history, scholars tend to go approach the subject in terms of action rather than intent. This often leads to misunderstandings with scholars like Wang Gungwu, as both make use of the same vocabulary yet have a different notion of approaching terms as sojourning. For instance while a migrant for the 'intentional' school is sojourner by departure, the 'action' school only categorizes the migrant by his actions on arrival at his destination. According to them, not until the same migrant returns can he be labelled as a sojourner. While those who focus on intent rather than action, will only change the label if the migrants intentions change on arrival. When emphasizing 'action' the entire travel history of the migrant is taken into account to label him. When 'intent' is the central theme, one movement is the preferred mode of analysis to label the migrant.

These different methodologies make it difficult to compare migratory histories and the position Chinese take in them. Adam McKeown tries to compare migrations in the modern era on a global scale. He states that return rates for other large scale migrations, such as transatlantic European labour migration in the 19th century, has similar return rates as Chinese migration during the same

28 Wang, *China*, p.4-7
29 Wang, *China*, p.185, Wang, *Chinese Overseas,* p.4
30 Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.44

period and thus concludes that sojourning is not unique for the Chinese case. Technological innovation, making transport faster and cheaper, provided migrants with more possibilities to return, for instance during a decline in economic growth in particular region. The cultural dimension played just minor role in the choice made concerning migration.[31]

Networks and Connections

Overseas Chinese have been subject to a political discussion in most of the Southeast Asian nations since their independence. Fears for a potential communist influence and purely nationalistic concerns were the primary causes of this. During the Cold War people in Southeast Asian governments were extra suspicious as the Chinese minority might turn out to be a communist a fifth column. In Indonesia president Suharto in 1967 even went as far as prohibiting Chinese cultural expressions and 'encouraging' dropping Chinese sounding surnames within the population. Although at that time these policies were more rhetorical measures than a solutions, the actions coming from government, clearly shows the widespread mistrust towards the Chinese as community.[32]

Although the Chinese as a minority have been made into a political problem for a period of time, decent scientific research on the overseas Chinese has been lacking. It was not until the 1990's that a comparison between the multitude of Chinese communities living in the Nanyang was made. The primary cause of this lay with the vast territory the region covers. A region with different governments, cultures, languages and an uneven distribution of the Chinese minority amongst the lands. With the advent of digital technology such research questions became now possible to examine.[33]

Technological progress was not the only reason for the renewed interest in the overseas Chinese. With the new economic path China had chosen after the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and the definite collapse communism with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the primary hesitation of overseas Chinese to profile themselves as such was gone. The economic success of China after the long years under Mao also made many Chinese living in Southeast Asia rejuvenate their cultural heritage.[34]

Nonetheless the concepts used to describe the spread of Chinese throughout the region are not generally accepted. The term to describe the current situation of dispersed overseas Chinese throughout the Nanyang and the the process how this situation came to be, even is subject to debate.

31 McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.105-108
32 Lockard, *Southeast Asia,* p.162-163, McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p. 335-348
33 Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese', Wang, *China,* p.15
34 Pan (ed.), *Encyclopedia*, p.58, McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.349

“Diaspora” covers the whole movement yet the term has its drawbacks. The moral connotation in the west concerning the Jewish diaspora and the dramatic consequences of of the Nazi regime in the 1940's is the primary one. Since the 1990's the term has been normalized in scholarly circles to entail simply the dispersal of a people with a shared origin. Nevertheless the distinction between a moralistic approach and a technical approach of this term is imminent to consider when using it.[35]

If the term will be used in a strictly technical sense a more detailed definition is necessary. As diaspora also has moral connotations it is essential to narrow down the concept to its core and leave little to the beholder to fill in. For instance the term implies that the nation or peoples do not have a territorial home or state to live, a characteristic that the Chinese of course do not share with most other diasporas. Secondly the term suggest some connections between these dispersed communities and a possible common aim. While Chinese emigrants only share a similar cultural heritage on a very elementary level. It suggests an unity were there is none. Therein lies the essence of the debate about the use of diaspora as a term to describe the Chinese spread in Southeast Asia.[36]

The before mentioned Wang Gungwu specialises in the field of Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia but prefers the term “overseas Chinese” to describe the movement. He argues that the term diaspora also implies an interconnectedness between settlements at different places. It were these accusations that made life in the 20th century for the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, quite hard. To be perceived as being unified with some extra-territorial community can easily turn to a position completely outside local society. An unwanted and vulnerable position as the anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta in 1998 testified.[37]

Nevertheless Adam McKeown has advocated the continued the use of diaspora as a term as it highlights transnational connections. The settlement of Chinese overseas and their communities cannot be fully understood if you leave out the connections oversea, he argues. The fact that these communities still showed the characteristics of being Chinese several centuries after founding is proof enough of that. There exist a high probability that the cause of this preservation of cultural heritage was made possible by a frequent connection to the cultural source, in this case China.[38]

Between these two perspectives on the use of the term diaspora lies again a different starting point of reasoning. While Wang Gungwu uses a diaspora as a descriptive term that could have implications on the current social outlook of Chinese minorities, McKeown uses diaspora as approach to display the transnational element existing in these communities. Wang Gungwu uses the traditional way of the concept of diaspora while Adam McKeown argues for a neutral,

35 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.308-309
36 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.308-309, Wang, 'Sojourning', p.2, 11
37 McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p. 347, Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.64
38 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.307

methodological form of the term. For both discourses arguments can be given a historical point of view.

Ironically the use of diaspora to designate the spread of Chinese across Southeast Asia has a longer history than the actual study of the phenomenon. In 1914 the Thai king Vajiravudh already labelled the Chinese as "The Jews of the East". The same characteristics used to slander the Jews in the west often were also applied on the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Their commercial success was envied by those who were less successful yet were native to the region. And not only those who were indigenous, Europeans were often also suspicious of Chinese practices within their colonial territories.[39]

Yet the use of diaspora as a way to analyse connections between communities across the sea and examine their influence on cultural backgrounds, is not an entirely new approach. It bears striking resemblances with Braudels work on the Mediterranean World and the connections that were forged over the sea lanes. Not only interaction with people of the surrounding lands built a community but also the connections across the waves were integral to establishing community values and practise. That this perspective on trading communities as the Chinese was somewhat understood, how poorly and pragmatic it may have been, by persons throughout history can be noticed many times in the chronicles of Batavia. The importance of the Chinese living there and the overseas trade they brought was mentioned repeatedly and proved to be essential to the economic prosperity of Batavia, as Leonard Blussé convincingly argued in his leading work on Chinese in Batavia during VOC times: *Strange Company.*[40]

For this thesis I will mainly use diaspora in the methodological sense, as I will be focussing on a transnational network in an era where political boundaries in the archipelago were vague at best. Diaspora will only be used to signify the dispersal of people with a similar cultural heritage, not to assume any interconnectedness between communities beforehand. The political connections referred to only began to organise during the early 20th century when pan-Chinese movement gained ground, a period outside the scope oft his thesis. The diasporic approach fits the emphasis of this thesis on marine connections and has gained recognition in recent years in literature as an useful analytical tool. However I will be fully aware of the historic usage of the term diaspora and any connotations that come with the term.

39 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.161, McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.328, Wang, 'Sojourning', p.11

40 Blussé, Leonard. *Strange Company – Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia, (Dordrecht, 1986)*, Braudel, Fernand. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 3rd edition*, (Berkeley CA, 1995)

The research done on Chinese minorities living in Southeast Asia can be roughly divided in three types of modes of analysis. A purely local or national perspective; an economical perspective that can have either a national or regional focus on Chinese entrepreneurs and business; and a social perspective that emphasizes the cultural and familial ties to China. Between these three groups some overlap evidently exists. However the emphasis of most essays or books in general, covers subjects within these categories without venturing much further outside this partition. Because of this division, slightly differing methods have been developed to perceive and analyse the Chinese minority.

First of the local or national perspective. This perspective covers research on the Chinese minorities within contemporary boundaries. They are either made part or excluded from local society yet when excluded, the foreign element is only mentioned in general terms. Often written after the decolonization period after the Second World War these historical narratives are primarily concerned with nationbuilding and legitimizing governmental power. In this approach legal boundaries divide the world and therefore limit the narrative being told. This form of historical narration is hardly uncommon as most states that exist on this globe have similar stories to form unity. However a much seen weakness of these national narratives concerns containing a teleological element and therefore oversimplifying historical reality. As a distinct group with a cultural heritage bound to a homeland elsewhere, a Chinese minority often posed a problem for these accounts. Fitting Chinese as a community within national society and these national narratives, usually depended on their integration and influence in the new governments that sprung up after European decolonisation.[41]

The second mode of analysis, an economical one, aims to map and describe the commercial success of the Chinese within Southeast Asia. It tries to understand why the Chinese as a group was and is, relatively successful compared to the indigenous people of Southeast Asia. The large amount of commercial traders within the group is deemed essential in this regard. How international trade interrelates to local Chinese trade and craftsmanship is one of the main discussion points of this economical approach. Commercial connections are mapped to examine if therein lay the secret to their success. These studies usually contain an all encompassing economic overview for the region that often tend to remain abstract or take a particular segment of the economy (whether in a territorial framework or one particular business) and examine that in greater detail.[42]

To achieve an overview of economic connections a model is created wherein some central points represent entrepôts or large transit markets. These mainhubs take care of the majority of trade

41 McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.323-324, 347, Suryadinata, *Ethnic Chinese*, p.125

42 McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.319-320, 347-349, for instance: Hodder, Rupert. *Merchant Princes of the East – Cultural Delusions, Economic Success and the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia*, (Chichester, 1996)

and represent the main trading lanes on regional and international scale. The mainhubs are connected to several final destinations of produce, as well as to secondary hubs that serve as a local commercial centres. Occasionally another subhub is formed to serve an even smaller or product specific market, to which producers as well as retailers are linked. From this fractal web of mainhubs, secondary hubs etc., intermediary connections are forged between points representing markets within this web. However most of the trade lanes these connections represent, usually are attracted to the major hubs within this economical web. To see which position Chinese entrepreneurs take within these numerous trade connections and marketplaces, is a difficult task and often stalls by lack of reliable information.

The last mode of analysis I want to treat concisely here, is the one that emphasizes the social element. The perseverance and survival of Chinese cultural heritage abroad and the connection that often remained with the familial village in China receive particular attention. Through these connections the early Chinese migrants used to travel to their destination in the Nanyang. When the number of these migratory flows increased during the 19th century, the organisations that made this increase possible were built upon years of expertise of transporting earlier migrants. That the overseas link with China was seldom severed, is a central theme in studies concerning the social built up of Chinese communities overseas.[43]

As the linkage to China and the familial village, is assumed to be essential in preserving Chinese cultural heritage for Chinese communities abroad, some models are created to give form to this idea. Philip Kuhn calls these personal linkages to China corridors through where family affairs, whether financial or private, could be handled. Through these lines contact was preserved and assimilation of the Chinese community abroad was naturally blocked. As these corridors were mostly personal certain institutions were made at transit points to bundle these individual straws. At sea harbours that often were one of these transit points, people and later specialised organisations, were created to retain overseas contact. These harbours were the departure and arrival ports through which migrants travelled and thus also served as a connecting node. From these harbours connections radiated outward to persons and communities further inland. The migrant harbours were central points in this model where the connections were bundled together. Through these corridors social contact remained possible despite distance.[44]

43 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.153-196, Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese', p.51-93
44 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.43



Figure 2: Examples of economic network model and social network model.

One major problem of these perspectives is their tendency to the limit scope of reasoning and remain within established boundaries. Albeit practical for analytical purposes these models must not transform into obstacles of research. To break through these theoretical walls so to speak, I propose merging these models. While the purely national approach is not preferable, it is the most practical way to research pieces of the network as information is primarily stored according to present day national boundaries. While I am proposing to research a particular segment of an overseas network of Chinese, i.e. the potential transformation of Chinese merchants enterprise from cargo to passengers transport, I unfortunately have to limit myself to Batavia.

Nevertheless the economic network model, aimed at traders, and social network model, aimed at migrant family ties, can be willingly combined. While the economic model in abstract form resembles a web, the model aimed at social ties is far more linear in abstract shape (see figure 2). This difference does not have to be an obstacle. The economic network model leaves room for intermediate connections between subhubs and the social network model acknowledges the existence of central transit points. As both models emphasize different elements of overseas connections for their respective analytical purposes these alternative options are somewhat neglected in their observations.

The main difference lies in extent of the network; while Chinese merchants potentially visited every settlement where a profit could be made, Chinese migrants tended to cluster together. Even small production colonies as tin mines and woodcutter camps in scarcely populated frontier regions, were started as mostly heterogeneously Chinese group endeavours. Primarily a practical decision concerning trust and safety issues when settling in a foreign environment.

However by looking at the differences between these two models made for analytical purposes one must not forget that the models are only tools for research, not a complete representation of historical realities. The Chinese migrants travelling to the Nanyang made use of the same marine infrastructure as Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia, therefore the division made by these models is purely a theoretical one. My hypothesis suggest to examine a combination of the two models in

regards to the last segment of the overseas connection, the destination port in Southeast Asia. Did Chinese merchants that transported passengers to Batavia instead of only cargo.

3. Transferral of Trade

The 19th century was a period of remarkable change for Southeast Asia and indeed, the world. Not only were the ramifications of the industrial revolution in Europe felt in the region, in the process that Pomeranz dubbed the "great divergence", massive changes took places in the social and economic positions of the traditional powers in Asia. Policies that lasted the centuries, with some minor variations, could not cope with the new situation that presented itself. Economy became the primary language of diplomatic affairs and the seas the new arena of confrontation.[45]

Southeast Asia and east Asia had contact with Europeans since times long gone. Small trade settlements or colonies were scattered across the islands. Chinese traders had long lasting trade connections to these settlements and the port city of Canton was opened as market place for European traders coming for Chinese wares. The Mandarin bureaucracy deemed that was enough contact between imperial China and the western barbarians. The economic contact that existed was on Chinese terms, both politically as economically.[46]

The relation China had with the outside world changed dramatically during the 19th century. I suggest three arbitrary categories to look at this transformation in this chapter and provide a glossary of the macro economic developments that influenced the relation China had with the world. By using these three angles an intermingled but hopefully clear picture will appear. First off an internal perspective, the domestic changes in Qing China concerning the economy; secondly the external influences on Chinese trade consisting mostly changes brought by Europeans incursions; and thirdly an intermediate obstacle for all traders alike, the massive surge of piracy in Southeast Asian waters along the major trade lanes.[47]

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45 Pomeranz, Kenneth. *The Great Divergence – China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy,* (Princeton NJ, 2000)

46 Guosheng, Huang. 'The Chinese Maritime Customs in Transition, 1750-1830', in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong (eds.). *Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850,* (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.170, Keller, Wolfgang, Ben Li and Shiue Carol H. 'China's Foreign Trade: Perpectives From the Past 150 Years', in: *The World Economy Vol.34 no.6,* (Oxford, 2011), p.858-859, Reid, Anthony. 'Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia', in: Anthony Reid & Kristine Aliluna-Rodgers (eds.). *Sojourners and Settlers – Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, (St. Leonards, 1996), p.45, Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.36

47 Brown, Ian. 'Imperialism, Trade and Investment in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries', in: John G. Butcher & Howard W. Dick (eds.). *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming – Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia,* (New York NY, 1993), p.80, Murray, 'Piracy', p.52

With the start of the 19th century China's trade balance remained positive as it had been for centuries. In China's domestic market only a small demand for imported products existed and thus Chinese wares remained craved after by foreign merchants in maritime trade. The internal Chinese market usually had only a small need for foreign goods, as most products were available domestically. Her imports consisted from small luxuries, pepper and spices, colouring agents such as indigo and delicacies as tropical fruits and edible birds-nests. And those products were usually imported by Chinese merchant junks. Foreign traders mostly were dependent on bullion to buy their supply of porcelain, silk and tea from China.[48]

During the late 18th and early 19th century the trade balance slowly shirted. The large population growth and already intensive agrarian land use in southern China made the demand for rice increase dramatically. Rice needed to be imported from elsewhere en masse to cope with the rising demand. Southeast Asia became one of China's main suppliers. The contents of the trade lane to the Nanyang tranformed from a diverse scope of imports to mainly bulk transport. Europeans however stayed out of this trade as they found a different product to trade with China besides bullion: opium.[49]

One position to consider concerning trade it the one of the ruling imperial bureaucracy took. In their education Mandarins were taught in the principles of what we now consider neo-confucianism. In this doctrine individuals in society were categorised in hierarchical order according to their worth to the community. Merchants and traders stood at the base of the pyramid, below even peasants on the land, as traders did not actually produce anything, only moved produce of others. It was deemed a profession of low esteem by many in the imperial court. Besides this low appreciation merchants were also considered a security risk because of the boundaries they crossed. As there was no way to track their activities overseas, their line of work was greeted with a certain degree of suspicion. Not entirely without reason as in the past precedents had occurred where merchant families turned against the government.[50]

There existed some leniency towards the merchants in south China that were trading with the Nanyang. Primarily because of the efforts of the provincial government of the southern provinces that understood the importance of the trade for their local economy. These had enough influence, partially because of the large tax payments to Beijing, to persuade the imperial bureaucracy to allow international trade to persist. The power to push their own policies through did not to the

48 *Verslag van den Handel, Scheepvaart en Inkomende en Uitgaande Regten op Java en Madura,* 1825 (Batavia, 1827), Keller, 'Foreign Trade', p.859

49 Tana, Li. 'Rice from Saigon: The Singapore Chinese and the Saigon Trade of the 19th Century', in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong (eds.). *Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850,* (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.261, Wang, *Chinese Overseas,* p.36-37

50 For instance Zheng Chenggong (in western sources referred to as Coxinga) who resisted the Manchu conquest for several years, came from merchant family,
Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.32, Murray, 'Piracy', p.44

extent the could completely govern themselves in the south, as some scholars assume. Yet it did simply mean that the influence of the southern coast provinces was higher than those of comparable sized inland provinces because of the sheer size of their tax contribution. Further autonomy came not until after the Opium Wars and the weakening of power of the imperial court during the latter half of the 19th century.[51]

However one major change concerning towards merchants took place before that. In 1825 the Hongze embankments at the Grand Canal collapsed. The capital city Being in the north where the imperial court was settled, was dependent on the flow of tribute rice through this canal. The disaster that struck the Grand Canal was of such magnitude that alternative options needed to be considered. A coastal route to transport the rice to the north was put into action. For this endeavour a multitude of ships were necessary, more than the Imperial fleet could miss. The Daoguang Emperor turned to the private sector on advice of his inner court advisor Yinghe. For now 1,5 to 1,6 million *shi* of rice[52] would be transported by sea. The coastal transport system proved to outlast the reconstruction works on the Grand Canal and became a regular secondary route.[53]

This experiment affected the merchant centres in south China in three ways. Initially only the merchants located in Shanghai profited from the assignment but soon transporters from the south understood that they could just as easy bypass Shanghai and transport the rice themselves to the northern shores. Secondly the assignment was given by government offices, that meant a partial reconciliation of the treatment for the position as merchant. Thirdly the work was highly profitable. Besides the fee the government paid for the rice transport traders could keep 20% of their cargo hold for their own trade, plus this cargo would not be taxed in the northern and intermediate harbours.[54]

This northern trading zone quickly expanded its market to other product groups as Manchuria became an area of Chinese immigration and development. The opening of Japan by commodore Perry in 1853 gave another impulse to the development of northern trade. Previous Chinese trade also was contained similarly as Dutch trade had been to Dejima. The new unrestricted trade provided many opportunities for entrepreneurs especially after the Meji restoration in 1868.

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51 Wang, *Chinese Overseas,* p.29, Wong, *Deadly Dreams,* p.430

52 A Qing-*shi* was about 72,49 kg, 1.5-1.6 million *shi* would account for 108.735 – 115.984 metric tons. Deng, Kent. 'The Nanking Treaty System, Institutional Changes, and Improved Economic Performance in Qing China', *Draft of lecture given at Asian-Pacific Economic and Business History Conference 12-14 February 2007, University of Sydney,* p.5, see note

53 Lai, Chi-Kong. 'The Transition of Steamship Business, 1826-1873', in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong (eds.). *Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850,* (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.300-301, Leonard, Jane Kate, 'Stretching the Bureaucracy: Ad Hoc Agencies and Recruitment in the 1826 Sea Transport Experiment', in: Thomas Hirzel & Nancy Kim (eds.). *Metals, monies, and markets in early modern societies: East Asian and global perspectives: monies, markets, and finance in China and East Asia,* (Berlin, 2008), p.260-262

54 Lai, 'Steamship Business', p.300-301

Following the stipulations of the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876, the zone was expanded with the 'hermit kingdom' Korea as it also opened its doors for other things than ceremonial diplomatic trade with the Chinese Empire.[55]



Figure 3: Model of trading zones of Chinese merchants mid 19th century.

By the start of the 19th century European interest in Asia was reinvigorated. In 1815 the final accord of the Napoleonic Wars had been played at Waterloo and finally the interest of European powers could focus once again on their overseas possessions. They provided a solution for internal European tribulations getting once more out of hand. Many Europeans powers started to expand the colonies they possessed, as well as the administrative grip they had on them. The United Kingdom returned the Dutch possessions in Asia but in return got hold of key harbours in the Strait of Malacca, which in turn became know as the Straits Settlement. The Dutch also began to expand their control over the Indonesian archipelago. Still the British managed to establish a protectorate over Sabah and Sarawak on the northern coast of Borneo mid 19th century. The Spanish moved southward from the island of Luzon to gain control over the entire territory of the Philippine islands. After years of supporting indigenous leaders the French finally took direct formal control

55 Furata, Kazuko, 'Kobe seen as part of the Shanghai Trading Network: The Role of Chinese Merchants in the Re-export of Cotton Manufactures to Japan', in: Sugihara, Kaoru (ed.). *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949,* (New York NY, 2005), p.23-25

over Indo-China (current Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) after a war won versus the Qing Empire in 1884.[56]

Beyond this territorial expansion in Southeast Asia also the commercial expansion of European powers struck the region. While in Europe itself the trade measures of mercantilism slowly died out in favour of those of the free trade doctrine, in Asia a different situation presented itself. European powers were reluctant to open up to free trade in their colonies as state power was not firmly founded in local society. When free trade was accepted in colonial possession it mostly consisted of bilateral treaties between allies and solely for other 'developed' nations. A group basically formed by Europe, their overseas possessions and the United States. An exception on this situation was British Singapore which was founded on the principle of being a free trade harbour.[57]

For the Chinese merchants operating from the southern shores of China this mercantilistic approach posed a problem. In the 18th century they lost their hegemonic position as traders in the region as European traders had gained a firmer ground. While both European and Chinese trade networks were symbiotic at first, a specialisation had come about that brought Chinese traders mostly serving the independent indigenous kingdoms and sultanates in the Nanyang, and the Europeans trading amongst themselves and as exception the city of Canton, China. With the expansion of territorial power of Europeans in the region Chinese merchants increasingly found themselves outmatched by either cheaper products or unfair tolls and import fees collected by European colonial governments.[58]

The introduction of steam powered ships in the region brought further havoc to the traditional trading practice of Chinese merchants. Albeit expensive, these ships could sail any time of the year and not just in the two annual monsoon periods the wind powered junks operated. The time consuming and risky hinging closely to coast the sail powered ships had as alternative was barely a viable option. As timely deliveries were the preferred mode of logistics in the industrial era, Chinese merchants saw their commercial opportunities in the Nanyang quickly diminish. However this only was true when operating from southern China. An increasing amount of Chinese merchants settled in Southeast Asia to operate their businesses creating a Chinese diaspora in the region. Shipbuilding and repair could easily be done in forest rich archipelago and trade information reached the right ears quicker when closer to the market.[59]

In the trading zone to the south the traditional Chinese position started to crack. Chinese merchants settled their business in Southeast Asia for example Siam (current Thailand) or

56 Brown, 'Imperialism', p.80-82, Lockard, *Southeast Asia,* p.102-104, Taylor, *Social World*, p.130
57 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no. 3042, fol.72-76, Haan Psz., P. de. *Het Handelstelsel van Java met Koophandel, Scheepvaart en Fabrijkstaat van Nederland, in verband gebragt,* (Leyden, 1825), p.8-13
58 Lai, 'Steamship Business', p.299, Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others,* p.154, McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.337
59 Blussé, *Strange Company,* p.106, McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.328, Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.109

Singapore while their counterparts in south China went bankrupt or changed markets. Some of these Chinese businesses in the Nanyang focussed on the smaller second hand trade in the archipelago. Other specialised in gross sale of bulk goods to south China, while the other trade shifted to European merchants. Rice trade along the coast remained firmly in Chinese hands. This changed the southern trading zone as it shrank to encompass only this coastal bulk trade, while in Southeast Asia a new trading zone developed in which Chinese traders operated (see figure 3, page 26).[60]

A major reason why the direct trade of China collapsed was the intense competition of European traders. Although these European rivals were confined to the city of Canton it was attractive to do the same business there without the risks of venturing out. As the demand was high in Europe, prices were good. Secondly the risk of maritime travel in a tropical zone was carried by someone else. Thirdly remaining within imperial China both insured the merchant from getting banned from entering again by new regulation as happened occasionally in the past. But it also kept up higher social standing as they were perceived more as a loyal subject to the emperor and less as a 'despised' trader.[61]

This pleasant situation would not last as the Chinese Empire was introduced to massive amounts of opium. Already known in the Empire as highly addictive yet medical applicable, recreational use was made difficult by limiting imports and by the effect this regulation had on the price that had to be paid for illegal import. The usage of opium skyrocketed when the price dropped by deliveries of mainly British firms to Chinese smugglers. To an extent the positive trade balance and internal currency of China based on silver became at risk by the outflow of bullion and the imerial court decided to step in. In 1838 Lin Zexu was sent to Canton to stamp out both Chinese gangs of drug dealers as the foreign firms that provided them with merchandise. After the refusal of foreign firms to hand over their stock voluntarily he proceeded to the crude measure of stopping all trade and surrounding the refusing traders with armed men to forcefully let them abide to Chinese law. Eventually the foreigners surrendered but the incident had far reaching consequences.[62]

It is not entirely clear which information about the incident reached London exactly yet the report is suspected to have highly emphasized the blocked trade and the repossession of British goods by the Chinese government. The use of opium was still not banned in the United Kingdom itself at that time which might have induced more misunderstandings. In June 1840 the British fleet and army arrived in Canton and started their reprisal attacks. Aided by the technological superiority of their arms, British forces defeated Qing armies swiftly and occupied the region. By 1842 the

60 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no. 3042, fol.13b-14, Tana, 'Rice', p.261-263
61 Guosheng, 'Maritime Customs', p.184-187, Pan (ed.), *Encyclopedia*, p.49, Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.182-183
62 Keller, 'Foreign Trade', p.859, Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others,* p.108

Qing Emperor signed the Treaty of Nanking were he ceded Hong Kong, paid an indemnity to Britain and opened another four ports to foreign trade besides Canton. The treaty was later supplemented by an extraterritoriality clause that gave British citizens the right to be tried under British law when on Chinese soil. In 1844 France and the United States followed with similar treaties.[63]

An uneasy situation arose where foreign trade and economical incursions on Chinese territory were larger than ever before. However, the imperial bureaucracy was not completely brushed aside and actively worked against further degeneration of their legal position. As it were, there existed two legal systems besides each other in the treaty ports. Unfortunately this situation made for an ideal recipe for all sorts of clandestine operations making use of both legal systems.[64]

By 1856 another incident occurred when a Chinese ship that was suspected of piracy was renamed to "Arrow" and hoisted the British flag. What was a case for the Chinese authorities suddenly became a case in which they did not have any legal power because of the extraterritoriality clause in the earlier treaty. The crew nonetheless was incarcerated as the nationality permit of the ship had previously expired. An argument ensued between British and Chinese officials but eventually the crew was released by the Chinese guards. However as there was no apology given, governor of Hong Kong, John Bowring ordered bombarding of city of Canton and its defences. Even though the start of hostilities was not seen as legitimate by many, it was deemed that there was no way back. The French joined the British with the defense that they needed revenge for a murdered missionary in China. Faced with the Taiping revolt on one hand and the western military threat on the other the Qing court surrendered without much battle. The Treaties of Tientsin were ratified in 1860 with Britain, France, Russia and the U.S. In one clause opium trade became now permitted and the product became a symbol of the economic origins of the war. Ten more cities were opened to foreign trade, as well as the great rivers for foreign vessels. Subsequently foreign traders were allowed further inland. Custom duties were lowered once more and the collection of these duties now became a task of western agencies alone. A multitude of other demands were made that are less relevant to this thesis yet the few mentioned here make it clear that the Qing lost most of their power to wield an independent economic policy.[65]

For the Chinese merchants located on the southern China coast this meant they had suddenly to compete with Europeans or adjust to the new circumstances. Traditional junk trade powered by

63 Pan (ed.), *Encyclopedia*, p.55, Reid, 'Flows', p.48-49

64 Blussé, Leonard. 'Will, Widows and Witnesses: Executing Financial Dealings with the Nanyang – A Glimpse from the Notebook of the Dutch Vice-Consul at Amoy, Carolus Fransiscus Martinus de Grijs (1858-1862)', in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong (eds.). *Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850,* (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.317, Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others,* p.135

65 Wong, *Deadly Dreams,* p.43-65

wind was rapidly diminishing: in the period 1820 to 1850 there still existed over 3000 junks; between 1850 and 1860 this number declined to about in 2000; and by 1873 only about 400 junks remained in action. It was understood by Qing officials that western power came from a combination of technological advances and commercial nationalism. As changing economic policy to stimulate Chinese companies was not longer an option after 1860, the only way forward was creating a Chinese steamship business. Qing officials opted for a joint venture between government and the private sector. Private entrepreneurs however, were reluctant to invest in the endeavour out of fear of harming their business relations with western trading companies. Those relations had saved them from bankruptcy while this project still had to prove itself. The gradual progress of negotiating between private and public parties made Chinese steamship lines slow to develop to serve as an alternative to western shipping.[66]

There are revisionist scholars that contest this view as overly negative. They tend to emphasize the increase of available products on the Chinese market. Often they neglect to mention that these products mostly originated abroad and were imported under imposed and for those times unnaturally low custom duties. A more interesting perspective however comes from Man-houng Lin. He states that opium use proved to be an opportunity for the poorer inland provinces. By cultivating low grade opium and selling their harvest to the dense population centres on the coast, rural and commercial China were linked in a trade relation that would have otherwise not existed. This would form, until the renewed prohibition of opium during the 1910's, an interconnected and more evenly developing Chinese economy. A fascinating new perspective on the effects opium trade had on China.[67]

Nevertheless for the unemployed population living on the coast, this development brought little to improve their situation. Their other option was working with the new circumstances. Even as western companies had the capital and the technology to put Chinese merchants out of business, still some niches remained for the Chinese. While the logistical part was covered by westerns the actual signing of trade agreements in China remained difficult for westerners. Few of them had the experience and human capital already in their companies to operate on the extensive local markets or even speak the language(s). This was an opportunity for local Chinese traders, as *organising* trade not the actual transferring produce, became their business.

A major problem during the first half of the 19th century was the rise of piracy in the South

66 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.110-111, Lai, 'Steamship Business', p.305 see note, p.310

67 Lin, Man-houng, 'China's "Dual Economy" in International Trade Relations, 1842-1949', in: Sugihara, Kaoru (ed.). *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949,* (New York NY, 2005), p.179-197, Keller, 'Foreign Trade', p.853-892

China Sea. Before continuing on describing these problems there is one thing to consider, the completely different nature of piracy in Asia compared to the piracy committed in the Caribbean or that of Mediterranean corsairs. Piracy in Southeast Asia was often just a side business of 'seagoing' people. Often they provided themselves with the acts of piracy of extra income, while the rest of year they held themselves busy with more noble activities such as trading or fishing. For the ships they used it was therefore necessary to be capable to be quickly converted into regular ships. As these ships were usually small, fast and without many guns, blades were the weapon of choice. Crews of taken ships were usually overwhelmed by number of pirates.[68]

To give some insight in the different kinds of piracy in Southeast Asia it is practical to make a distinction between organised and disorganised piracy. This distinction is of course fairly theoretic as the level of organisation varied in time or even per raid. Nevertheless for analysing purposes, it is useful to pinpoint differences between the pirate centres spotted throughout the sea and how they operated.

Organised pirates would have large fleets to patrol trade lanes in search of potential victims. The loot was a vital component of income for the families back at their hideouts. A modus operandi that bears more resemblances to the nomad raids out of Central Asia than the methods of their Caribbean counterparts. The disorganised type usually were opportunists. Teams that were mostly formed on familial or village basis attacked only in small numbers when the odds were in their favour. The income they derived from loot was usually supplementary on their daily needs that were provided by their fishing activities.

The late 18th and early 19th century knew several sophisticated pirate fleets near Tonkin, the island of Hainan and the Chinese border on the mainland. As the seas were considered outside jurisdiction of the Chinese government, they initially did nothing versus these pirates. It was a private matter of merchants to arm themselves outside Chinese waters as in Chinese harbours they were safe as there were no weapons allowed. Anyone sailing the seas was primarily viewed as a security risk for the state, before he was Chinese national. Trade and piracy were closely linked according to the bureaucracy. This perspective did not help fight the increasing piracy in the southern seas. The opposite was true: the piracy networks and organisation became so extensive that it was easier to buy a pass of a pirate accomplice at shore or in Macao, to safeguard a passage through the area. As the waters were patrolled by seven major pirate fleets the chances to get through were almost nil. This extra payment drove the commercial viability of trade between southern China and Southeast Asia down. Consequently this gave birth to unemployed traders who

68 Murray, 'Piracy', p.45, Campo, J.N.F.M. à. 'Zeeroof – Bestuurlijke beeldvorming en beleid', in: G. Teitler, A.M.C. van Dissel, J.N.F.M. à Campo. *Zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in de Indische archipel (19de eeuw),* Amsterdam, 2005), p.39

turned to piracy to survive.[69]

Not until the pirate fleets got involved in the dynastic troubles in Tonkin and Annam, problems arose for these marauders. The Tayson brothers hired pirate fleets to serve as private navies. In the following struggles many pirate ships were scuttled. Under pressure of Qing China, the Taysons officially relinquished their ties to the pirates and vowed to act against them. Nonetheless not long after, the Taysons were defeated and a large portion of the pirate fleets were destroyed. Nevertheless this success the piracy presence in the region remained large, slowing down economic progress.[70]

A second organised pirate nest was located in the Sulu archipelago between the islands of Mindanao and Borneo. The Islamic sultanate reigning there had fought for years for their continued independence of the Catholic Spanish. When the Spanish started to get more interested in the Philippine islands, pirating activities originating from the sultanate started to increase. Initially the Spanish had left the sultanate alone because conquest would waste too many resources for a remote outpost of their Empire. Nevertheless, the situation had changed dramatically after the Spanish lost their American possessions. The lost prestige and expanding European presence in Southeast Asia looking for new territories to annex, made direct control of all the Philippine islands vital to the Spanish Crown. To keep up resistance, the Sulu sultanate needed more resources to defend against the renewed Spanish efforts. Resources that could be generated with more manpower. As such the Sulu sultanate began to be known as one of the more prominent body snatchers, kidnapping crews to work on their lands back home.[71]

For other trading nations the pirates originating from the Sulu sultanate posed a problem. Trading vessels could only defend themselves from them in direct combat. As their bases lay in areas the Spanish had claimed sovereignty over, acting against these pirate ports proved to be diplomatically impossible for foreign fleets. The pirates had the initiative, an unpleasant position to start any battle. By the 1840's however, the Spanish started to smoke out many of the settlements from which the pirates operated. This had an immediate effect as persisting pirates had to relocate their bases to smaller islands and were temporarily unable to raid. The disruption of the organisation of those remaining pirates proved to be enough to lower the threat from these pirates to an acceptable level.[72]

Another hotspot for pirates was the island of Borneo. European activities remained limited to certain coastal areas, mainly on the southern shores of the island. Inland territories were mostly

69 Murray, 'Piracy', p.46, 53-54.
He estimates that the combined fleets were as large as 2000 seafaring junks and the number of people involved in pirate organisations counted between 50.000 and 70.000 men.
70 Murray, 'Piracy', p.48-49
71 à Campo, 'Zeeroof', p.89
72 Ibidem

unknown and the northern and eastern shores were scattered with small clusters of local power such as sultanates, independent villages, chiefdoms and Chinese *kongsi* societies. About this last formations I will go into deeper detail about further in this thesis. The political situation there meant that there existed a lot of unknown small concentrations of people and potential places to hide piracy on Borneo.[73]

Besides the lack of exploration and overall knowledge about the area, another problem arose fighting piracy in these waters. The pirates operating here were of the 'disorganised' type meaning that there was not a core area or fleet to take out but lots of small decentralised cells scattered across the shoreline. Most of which were not full-time pirates but rather fishermen or shell divers. Only when a ship arrived in their waters they could potentially raid would they throw their tools aside and grab their weapons, often killing the crew in the process so that no witnesses of their deeds remained. These circumstances made it difficult to make the distinction between pirates and fishermen. A Dutch admiral named them “sea people” as they would live of whatever the seas could give to them, whether it was in the sea or floating on top of it.[74]

Operations versus these pirates took a lot of effort and offered few results. Dutch fleets had the technological advantage with steam powered ships yet this soon also proved to be a disadvantage. The smoke trails left by these ships could be seen from miles away. Ambushes were out of the question as the engines needed time to built up pressure during which the suspected pirates had been long gone or hidden themselves in one of the many bays. Taking out market places where stolen goods were traded only increased piracy as those traders had to look for another way to provide for their families. Lack of results let the marine top brass to duly note that their primarily duty was being a war fleet and certainly not acting as aqua police for the archipelago. They claimed that they were not equipped nor trained for such tasks. Therefore land based operations were made the primary method to combat piracy originating from Borneo.[75]

At the same time a British adventurer called James Brooke had made a deal with the sultan of Brunei on the northern coast of Borneo. In return for governorship of the neighbouring Sarawak he would crush a rebellion against the sultan. Succeeding in doing so and obtaining his reward, he started to act against piracy in his newly gained territories. Brooke's actions and successes were a major reason why the British managed to establish a protectorate over northern Borneo.[76]

A similar type of pirates were active from the eastern shore of Sumatra, especially around the

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73 Tagliacozzo, Eric. "“Borderline Legal”: Chinese Communities and “Illicit” Activity in Insular Southeast Asia, Mid- to Late 19th Century', in: Wang Gungwu & Ng Chin-keong (eds.). *Maritime China in Transition 1750-1850,* (Wiesbaden, 2004), p.65-69, à Campo, 'Zeeroof', p.51-52

74 à Campo, 'Zeeroof', p.39

75 Ibidem, p.44, 56-57, 97

76 Lockard, *Southeast Asia*, p.101-102, à Campo, 'Zeeroof', p.58

Riau and Lingga island groups. Located at the end of the Strait of Malacca, these islands were the ideal base to attack passing merchant ships. Because of their location however, they also quickly gained the attention of both Dutch and British colonial governments. Several operations against these pirates were conducted yet they had the same problems as the ones against piracy originating from Borneo. Nevertheless the pirate nests retreated from the islands to the eastern shores of Sumatra. The escape possibilities for pirates there were much more abundant than on the relatively small islands of the Riau and Lingga. Eventually piracy declined in favour of smuggling. The area was ideally located near the British and Dutch boundary separating their claimed territories and even more important near the growing emporium Singapore. Combined with the British open trade policy and the Dutch limited trade policy much more profit could be made illegally crossing these waters than could be with acts of piracy.[77]

What we see in the 19th century is a large transformation of the merchant landscape. A transfer of trading zones in which Chinese merchants originating from southern China operated. Either to the coastal transport to the north of China or resettlement in Southeast Asia in Siam or Singapore. Those in the Chinese diaspora that operated from the Nanyang focussed more on the region than the traditional connection to China. Bulk goods as rice, salt and sugar were still transported to China but the trade in luxury goods was in decline. Piracy was the largest factor contributing to that effect but European trade on Canton certainly had an accelerating effect on the transformation. The traditional junk trade from south China was in rapid decline as European competitors sometimes literally fought their way in. After two Opium Wars Chinese merchants still operating, inevitably had contact with western companies to secure their commercial survival. Secondary trade became a major employer for traders still in China.

Java and Madura

First thing to consider when looking at the Netherlands Indies in the early 19th century is its size. Often when the Dutch possessions are taken into account, the contours of modern Indonesia are followed. This approach is partly valid as the Dutch indeed claimed sovereignty over these areas in the years after the Napoleonic wars ended. Nonetheless claiming areas is not the same as controlling them. Even in Holland itself scholars had mainly Java in mind when talking about the Dutch possessions in Asia. The nearby island of Madura was also considered a stable possession plus the handful of scattered trade posts and settlements across the entire Indonesian archipelago.[78]

77 Somers Heidhues, *Banka Tin*, p.36, Tagliacozzo, 'Border-line Legal', p.74-76
78 Brown, 'Imperialism', p.81, de Haan Psz, *Handelstelsel*, p.4

Not surprising when taken into account that the VOC was a private trading company with little to no need for territories. Only after these Asian territories were returned by the United Kingdom after Waterloo, a colonial state started to be truly developed. The last remains of indigenous power were destroyed during the five years the Java War lasted until finally in 1830, entire Java was under nominal Dutch control. During the years that followed the Dutch colonial state expanded its administration and slowly added more territories under her direct control. A lasting memory is preserved in the name of the category used for these new acquisitions: the outer territories, a term still used to make (often pejorative) remarks of the islands further away from Sumatra and Java.[79]

Even the shipping laws and tariffs, implemented after Dutch repossession, regarded the lack of control over much of the territory Dutch sovereignty claimed, as a normal condition. The legal system acknowledged that the national boundaries did yet not necessarily mean legal boundaries in the archipelago. Tariffs on shipping were only legally applicable in places or areas where there was a permanent Dutch presence of some sort. If this was not the case the local indigenous powers could decide how much capital the wanted to extract from traders within their harbours.[80]

As the British had only returned some of the previously Dutch owned territories, there was some suspicion towards the motives of the British Empire amongst the Dutch. Her advocacy for a free trade policy was acknowledged in Europe but fervently held out of the colonial sphere. As the Dutch colonial possessions were not as developed in both administrative and economical sense compared to the nearby British Indies, free economic access of other European powers including the British, was seen as a threat to the colony. Loyalty could easily be swayed in areas were no Dutch control was apparent. Secondly the fear existed that letting a competitor on an undeveloped market could shatter the chances of own independent development. As the validity of these protective measures is still subject of fiery debate amongst current economists, it will suffice here to say that these fears existed, whether their bleak predictions were true or false.[81]

The choice in policy to separate the market of Netherlands Indies from the world market had profound effects. Two separated markets meant two different systems of tariffs, laws and other measures that were supposed to work besides one other. Surprisingly this dual system functioned remarkably well; it was far from being perfect but the output made the effort worthwhile nonetheless. International trade was fixed to one port while all other ports or marketplaces were off limits to foreign vessels or merchants. The internal Netherlands Indies market would be provided by

79 Diehl, F.W. 'Revenue Farming and Colonial Finances in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816-1925', in: John G. Butcher & Howard W. Dick (eds.). *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming – Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia,* (New York NY, 1993), p.197, Lohanda, *Kapitan Cina*, p.10

80 *Staatkundige Beschouwing Gegrond op de Statistiek van Neêrlands Handel, Nijverheid en Scheepvaart, in Neêrlands Indie, in verband tot het vraagstuk der Scheepvaartwetten,* ('s Gravenhage, 1850), p.3

81 de Haan Psz, *Handelstelsel*, p.8-9, 18-23, *Staatkundige Beschouwing,* p.7-8, 10

either local firms or European ones, yet those latter ones were required to enlist Dutch personnel for their vessels from 1834 onwards.[82]

As entry point for international trade Batavia was the central hub within the Dutch possessions. From the day of her establishment Jan Pietersz. Coen, the settlement had been planned as a entrepôt harbour for the entire region. He had envisioned the Chinese and their trade as central pieces in making his plan a success. On this founding thought the city had been built and expanded until it was the largest European settlement in the region. The choice to pick this harbour as portal for international trade was only natural.[83]

The Dutch came out of the Napoleonic Wars near a state of bankruptcy. Their homeland ahd been controlled by a French puppet king and their colonies were under custody of the British. Most of their national income was dependent on trade and during the war period that sector was particularly hit hard by the European hostilities. To increase the economic woes, the Belgian Revolt and the subsequent secession of the southern provinces of the Netherlands, brought an even heavier financial burden. The determination of king William I to subdue Belgium proved to be mere stubbornness. As the Dutch army remained in the field for years, the king was forced to admit his loss through diplomatic means.[84]

In the colonies in Asia, the Dutch blamed the interregnum of British statesman Raffles for the economic downturn that had hit them. He had been too focussed on reforming Dutch governance to British example that he overlooked the consequences of economic stagnation. The farms that produced export crops in the colony were in deplorable state, prices of consumer goods were high and the possibilities of investors to obtain credit were slim, C.J Elout reported to the Minister of Colonies in March 1825.[85]

In the light of both the domestic Dutch financial woes and the poor economic condition of the colonies, a radical new plan of action was deployed that became know as the cultivation system. This state organised mode of production would both develop the Netherlands Indies and provide a sufficient inflow of capital to the motherland. In short: instead of universal land based taxes, a certain amount of the land belonging to local villages had to be used to grow government crops and the harvest sold to the Dutch for a predetermined price. Work on these lands would be done by local villagers as a form of corvée duty. The Dutch trading corporation (NHM) would transport these export crops to Europe and sell them on markets located in the Netherlands. Profits of these

82 *Koloniaal Verslag: Verslag van het beheer en den staat der koloniën - 1847-1848* ('s-Gravenhage, 1850), p.13-14
83 Dobbin, *Entrepreneurial Minorities*, p.47
84 Thee, Kian Wie. 'The Introduction, Evolution, and End of Colonial Extractive Institutions in the Netherlands Indies and Its Long-Term Consequences in independent Indonesia', *Final revised draft (01-08-2011) of lecture given at University of Antwerp okt. 2011,* p.2
85 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3195

transactions would be used to supply a supplementary income for the state budget.[86]

To make this system function as planned, the trade laws of the Netherlands Indies had to be of a protective nature. If foreign competitors from Europe were allowed to ship produce that was included in the cultivation system the European market would be spoiled, explains P. de Haan Psz. Foreign competitors would supply their own national markets instead, causing a decrease in re-exports from Holland and decreasing Dutch profits. Because this kind of reasoning was based on the European markets, the long history of Chinese trade in the Netherlands Indies and the good relationship with the Chinese community, incoming Chinese junks had a privileged position economically wise compared to other foreign merchants.[87]

Tariffs of on incoming and outgoing cargoes of international trade were specified according to the transporting nation and its destination. For instance Dutch vessels going to the Netherlands paid fl.2,- per *pikol*[88] coffee they exported, a foreign vessel would pay fl.4,- for the same amount and a foreign vessel going to a foreign harbour would pay fl.5,- per *pikol* coffee they transported from the Netherlands Indies. For other products of the cultivation system such as sugar, spices or tin, tariffs of a similar nature existed. For products coming from Europe also a preference was given to Dutch production. Not all merchandise could come from Dutch sources so there existed trade outside government control despite the higher tariffs. Mainly the trade in completed (semi-)products was in private hands while the raw resources were transported by government contractors.[89]

For some export products existed exceptions. For the export of *arak*, a rice based liquor, the English vessels bore lower duties than other foreigners. This also was the case for Chinese merchants for most of the products their vessels exported to China. The duties on those exports were usually accounted as a percentage of estimated value of the the cargo. For instance exports of hides, pelts, tortoises, indigo and sappan wood would pay 2% of the total value. Edible birds nests, a delicacy in China, were exported at a higher rate of 6% but that was still less than the rate of 12% vessels sailing under different flags had to pay. The positive trade relation with Chinese and the ability to offer them something good value for their goods, was worth protecting.[90]

This approach of the Dutch colonial government is also noticeable from the measures taken to safeguard Chinese imports. As wind powered vessels the Chinese junk merchants often stopped at multiple harbours before mooring at Batavia. To avoid scaring traders from China away as they

86 Thee, *Colonial Extractive Institutions,* p. 2-7
87 de Haan Psz, *Handelstelsel*, p.31-33
88 About 125 pounds, or 62kg.
NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043, fol.142, John G. Butcher & Howard W. Dick (eds.), *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming – Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia,* (New York NY, 1993), p.xiv
89 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3042, fol.75b
90 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3042, fol.75b

would have to pay higher import tariffs because they visited these harbours, the decision was made to make any harbour between southern China and Java a valid direct trajectory in 1841. It would not matter if the Chinese merchant visited either Manila or Singapore beforehand, they would be considered coming directly from China tariff wise. This of course had to do with the First Opium War that made it difficult for Chinese merchants to return to their homeland whilst the war was still being fought. When Hong Kong was ceded to the British at the end of the war the settlement was put under the same exception clause as Macao, i.e. it would be considered as 'China' in Dutch customs.[91]

Most ship movements to Batavia however, were those of coastal shipping. Intra archipelago transport and thus intra Netherlands Indies transport, was the primary source of activity in Batavia harbour. During this period a stable average of 90% of the annual amount of ships in Batavia sailed under the Dutch flag, which included those registered in the Netherlands Indies. About 80% of all ship movements in Batavia was made by ships registered in the Netherlands Indies. In terms of *last*, the shipping unit for cargo[92], a more detailed picture appears. On average 75% of all cargo was handled by Dutch ships but only about 35% was registered as Netherlands Indies an can be considered intra archipelago.[93]

This internal Netherlands Indies trade was open to anyone living in the Dutch possessions. A majority of this trade was done by either *peranakan* Chinese or Arab merchants settled in the Netherlands Indies. The flag under which ship was sailing was duly noted in the administration as belong to the Netherlands Indies but unfortunately these flags do not tell us which ethnic group the crew and captain belonged to. The sailing permits granted by the Dutch colonial government, give some insight towards that goals but these do not tell us how long these grants stayed in business. This lack of reliable information makes it difficult to reconstruct the exact share of local Chinese in this business. However the colonial government did mention their concern about the lack of European, primarily Dutch, firms operating within the archipelago. Chinese and Arab sailors working these trade lanes would handle low minimum cargoes and maintained their vessels poorly, doing so pushed European vessels out of the market. To protect these Dutch firms a committee advised the government in 1848 to prefer European vessels for government cargoes larger than 75 *lasten*.[94]

We can assume from these measures that a large number of Chinese were active in coastal

91 *Verslag van den Handel 1841*, p.2, *Verslag van den Handel 1846,* p.1
92 A *last* would be about two metric tons, although it is known that in earlier VOC times, a *last* weighted less. NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043. fol.144
93 See appendix for several graphs showing the changing totals over the years 1825-1873. *Verslag van den Handel 1825-1837, 1839-1852, Koloniaal Verslag 1853-1875*
94 *Koloniaal Verslag 1847-1848*, p.12-14

shipping. However how many of them were recent immigrants remains unclear. Nevertheless it is safe to assume that a portion of those crews originated from China as international junk trade was in decline. This was also the case for the trade between the Netherlands Indies from southern China. During the turn of the century still some 7 junks visited Batavia annually. This number declined rapidly during the mid 19th century. Table 1 gives the number of vessels that sailed under the Chinese flag some 35 years later.[95]

Table 1: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1833-1837.[96]

	Incoming:			**Outgoing:**	
Year	Ships	Total *last*		Ships	Total *last*
1833	3	200		3	210
1834	2	110		1	80
1835	4	190		4	200
1836	3	290		2	140
1837	3	170		5	345

Besides the traditional products mentioned earlier in this thesis, the Chinese started to import large amounts of rice. Southern China had experienced a population boom and those many mouths needed to be fed. An increasing amount of rice was exported from Java, a product European traders had few uses for. This rice export started to decline as the population growth of Java started to accelerate and the rice was needed to feed the local population. This development meant one less incentive for Chinese merchants to continue visiting Java.[97]

Interestingly enough Chinese trade from southern China to Batavia did not seem to falter during both Opium Wars. In 1842 Chinese captains stayed a season in Batavia to wait out the war, yet in other years merchants continued to trade. It shows that the war zone was indeed relatively concentrated in the areas around Canton, Shanghai and the southern end of the Grand Canal. The Second Opium War however, was more extensive in scale of military actions yet the treaty ports were left alone. They could operate during the war although the duties that already were collected by western agencies did not flow towards the emperors coffers. European vessels also continued to

95 Blussé, Leonard. 'The Vicissitudes of Maritime Trade: Letters from the Ocean Hang Merchant, Li Kuhne, to the Dutch Authorities in Batavia (1803-1809)', in: Anthony Reid & Kristine Aliluna-Rodgers (eds.). *Sojourners and Settlers – Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, (St. Leonards, 1996), p.153

96 Uneven incoming and outgoing vessels in this and the following tables, can be explained by passing of the formal accounting year before departure. A late departure could be caused by either private choice of forced by necessary repairs. Excerpts of the full data are shown in the text, graphs showing the entire development during examined period can be found in the appendix.
Verslag van den Handel 1833-1837

97 Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.118, Tana, 'Rice', p.269

sail towards China during these wars. Ironically the wars had little effect on the volume of trade during the time they were fought.[98]

The years after the First Opium War provides us with some problems interpreting the data. I previously mentioned the cession of Hong Kong was incorporated in the Dutch trade tariffs; if a ship departed from Hong Kong it would be considered coming from China. However, the flag of ships registered there were British, not Chinese. Chinese ships operating under a British flag are therefore excluded in the following tables.

Table 2: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1850-1855.[99]

	Incoming:			**Outgoing:**	
Year	Ships	Total *last*		Ships	Total *last*
1850	4	114		3	69
1851	0	0		0	0
1852	1	50		2	70
1853	1	n.a.		1	n.a.
1854	2	88		0	0
1855	6	658		5	763

The sudden increase of activity in 1855 could be explained by the decision of the Dutch colonial government to apply the Dutch trading laws also on firms of local Chinese. They had been allowed to use their own trading laws incorporated in the Dutch legal codex as a form of common law. An inheritance of their prominent position during VOC times. A Mandarin drop-out visiting Java during these years mentions the lack of junks in the harbour during these times. The Chinese vessels he sees are smaller than he remembers. It is unclear if means all Chinese ships, including those of the *peranakan*, or just those from the Chinese Empire, when he makes this comment. Nonetheless from Dutch sources a decrease in average vessel size of ships that bore the Chinese flag is also noticeable.[100]

The primary reason why Chinese merchants even bothered to continue to visit Batavia lies with the Chinese community living there. The *peranakan* Chinese in Batavia urged the Dutch to improve trading conditions on multiple occasions. The local community depended on the Chinese junks to keep contact with family, receive information about events in southern China and elsewhere and

98 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3204, *Verslag van den Handel 1839-1842, Koloniaal Verslag 1856-1860*

99 *Verslag van den Handel 1850-1852, Koloniaal Verslag 1853-1855*

100 Ong, Tae-hae. *Chinesche Aanteekeningen omtrent Nederlands-Indië,* (’s Gravenhage, 1858), Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.131, Reid, 'Flows', p.18

have access to certain services. One of the specific exports for Chinese junks were the Chinese remittances in solid currency. Remittances of locally settled Chinese, whether permanent of temporary, made up an increasing amount of the total value of goods taken back to China. Much to the dismay of the Java Bank in 1845, when the condition came from the Netherlands forbidding them momentarily to issue "bank paper" or return the value of paper already issued. These notes would be issued for a certain amount of silver or copper by the bank, much like modern paper money only with an included fee to the bank, could temporarily not be cashed. Money circulation faltered because of the lack of available copper and silver money and by the continued outflow. Even worse this meant a loss of confidence in the bank as a reliable institution.[101]

During the 1860's doubts started to emerge within the colonial administration about the efficiency of the cultivation system. On the world market prices of the products brought forth by the cultivation system started to fall, decreasing the profit margin of the system. Nonetheless it still remained profitable for those in power; the colonial Dutch, businessmen in charge of mines and local chiefs that received the payments from the Dutch government for the products. However, the indications were there that the best days of the system lay in the past. Experiments with private investors developing tobacco farms on Java had showed that government led cultivation did not necessarily led to better results.[102]

In turn these conclusions led to questions about the development of the Netherlands Indies as a whole under the cultivation system. The duties indigenous people had to perform to benefit either the cultivation lands or local chiefs, fixed them to a specific spot and actually counteracted development because their mobility was removed. Financial exploitation of these people by either farm owners or businessmen was a too common sight to deny. Chinese *peranakan* had their travelling privileges already removed in the past for different reasons concerning security. Allowing them to travel and opening of more harbours for foreign trade were steps forward to counter the stagnation in the economic development of the colony. The decline of the cultivation system had imminent effects on trade as the following table shows.[103]

101 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Supplement, 1826-1952, nummer toegang 2.10.03, no.31, NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043, fol.140-141, Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.121

102 NL-HaNA, Koloniën suppl., 2.10.03, no.36

103 NL-HaNA, Koloniën suppl., 2.10.03, no.24, fol.589-594, Thee, *Colonial Extractive Institutions,* p.7

Table 3: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1866-1871.[104]

	Incoming:			**Outgoing:**	
Year	Ships	Total *last*		Ships	Total *last*
1866	7	521		8	752
1867	8	111		7	57
1868	7	240		8	160
1869	24	453		24	578
1870	35	716		32	571
1871	62	1197		62	1787

The Dutch cultivation system was primarily aimed at the raising revenue for the motherland. As it was a colony under royal control this goal could actually be accomplished. Development was a part of the initial plans and during the implementation of the system significant achievements in production were accomplished. Nevertheless for international trade and in particular Chinese trade, it proved to be a disaster. Dutch preference for national entreprise in most arenas of the economy prevailed, leaving little space for others. When the supply of export rice in Java diminished, so did the incentives for Chinese merchants to visit Batavia. By grace of the Chinese community living in Batavia some Chinese traders seem to have persisted trade to the city. Nonetheless, trade between Java and southern China by Chinese merchants was barely mentionable during most of the 19th century.[105]

4. Surge of Migration

In the 19th century the foundations were laid out for a period in the early 20th century that later would be recalled as the era of great modern migrations. Primarily people think of the massive transatlantic flow of migrants from Europe to the Americas concerning this era. That at the other side of the globe a migration wave of similar size rolled through the lands, is less well known in the western world. The majority of these migrants were former inhabitants of the Chinese Empire. A state that was in upheaval since her position in the world was successfully challenged by western powers and as a result, the faith in the rule by her imperial court was waning.

Technical innovations redrew the picture of migration both in the Atlantic as in Asia. Steam powered ships made regular long distance connections possible and decreased shipping prizes

104 *Koloniaal Verslag 1866-1872*
105 NL-HaNA, Koloniën suppl., 2.10.03, no.36

immensely. For migrants this seemed to mean less risks when embarking on a journey into the unknown. If one was unsuccessful return journeys were available, contact with family members remained possible and the journey itself knew less dangers. That reality was often harsher, did not slow down the massive increase of long distance migration flows.

Migration in the east is often associated with coolie labour. The abolition of slave trade rapidly increased the demand for free labour in the world. As these jobs were often under poor conditions and badly paid it was difficult to find people to fill all positions. Unaware individuals were contracted in Asia to solve the labour problems that had risen on the plantation of the west.

The 'regular' migration in Asia, however, was many times larger than this indentured labour stream. The rapid development of the world economy and the strategic position of Southeast Asia on the major trade lanes, made it a centre of new developments. Economic opportunities were available for both the wealthy and poor. For Chinese emigrants it was the ideal destination: relatively close by; Chinese communities already living there; and relatively thinly populated lands compared to southern China.

The total Chinese migration flow in the 19th century is difficult to reconstruct. Only after the Opium Wars and the administrative takeover in the treaty ports some statistics become available. Even of this available data is the historic significance still questioned. According to the imperial bureaucracy emigration simply did not happen before the era of treaty ports. People who did not return to China after being abroad were of no concern to the Chinese Emperor and frankly considered traitors. Unfortunately, this indifference makes it hard to gain hard data concerning migration.[106]

After the treaty ports system was in place passengers were dutifully noted by customs agencies in the harbours. Initially only those travelling through Hong Kong in the 1850's, but Amoy and some other major migration ports followed about two decades later in the 1870's. The large population streams matured during the turn of the century and peaked once more during the roaring twenties of the 20th century. The majority of Chinese migrants went to Southeast Asia and in turn the most of them went to the Southeast Asian mainland where the Malay States and Siam were located. According to calculations made by Adam McKeown some 6 to 7 million Chinese migrated to the Straits Settlement and the Malay States and 3,5 to 4 million to Siam, in the period between 1840 and 1940.[107]

Those who travelled to the Nanyang mostly originated from the southern provinces of China.

106 McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.98, Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.43
107 McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.98-102, Sugihara, 'Patterns', p.246

Not surprising considering not only the vicinity, the available infrastructure there and the population density of the region. Most arable land already was in use and production methods were advanced for a pre-industrial society. Crafts and agriculture had been producing commercially for local or international markets since the 18th century. The same was the case in the silk business. The population reached such heights that the region became a gross importer of rice, driving up local prices. When the local economy hit a slum in the early 1800's, problems quickly arose and emigration became a viable option for many.[108]

The long trading tradition of the southern provinces provided migrants with a suitable infrastructure over the seas. As merchants went abroad for their trade some remained in Southeast Asia for a variety of reasons, some purely economical, others more emotional such as marriage. At the beginning of the 19th century these overseas Chinese already had formed tight communities in the Nanyang. Families living overseas had family members from China come over on occasion to learn the trade or earn some money for a solid financial basis for marriage. Those who returned to China were sojourning in effect, migrating only temporarily for a number of years. This sojourner tradition had many benefits for future migrants. Captains and crews often had experience carrying at least some passengers and in Southeast Asia the Chinese community living there could teach the immigrant what he needed to know about his new life. It was not uncommon this meant learning the Malay language proficiently, to be useful in the trading business.[109]

The indifference of the Chinese emperor towards overseas 'subjects', or rather overseas Chinese, did not mean a lack of legislation in China. Au contraire, the Qing dynasty held a close eye on the coastal provinces and the population living there as they were to be considered a major security risk. Legislation concerning international travel or trade was strict, although in practice some creative interpretations of the legislation probably were in effect to smoothen operations concerning trade in the harbours. Officially a merchant had gotten permission to stay outside Qing territory for a period of three years before he was banned from re-entry. This period was already longer than was the case during the 18th century, when the duration was only one years and this extension was granted after pressure from southern provincial governors.[110]

One peculiar law that affected Chinese migration was the prohibition of female migration. Many cultures had superstitions about women on board of seafaring ships yet seldom such beliefs are codified in law. This of course was not the case in China either. By forbidding women to migrate some control over on their seagoing male counterparts was achieved. A married man would less

108 Rawski, Evelyn S. *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China,* (Cambridge MA, 1972)
109 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3042, fol.14b, Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.49-50, Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.44
110 Murray, 'Piracy', p.44, 52, Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.46

likely leave his entire family behind to settle elsewhere. The law therefore both contained the population within the empire, as that it cut connections for those who settled elsewhere. The Chinese men stuck overseas would either marry someone indigenous where they settled and would therefore likely have less interest in China's affairs, or they would 'die out' after a generation failing to reproduce. In either way, they would be less likely to pose a sustained threat to China.[111]

In the early 19th century this law still functioned properly. In 1833 Dutch sources quoted Count of Hogendorps work once again, who mentioned about the Chinese travelling or trading in the Nanyang the following: “Never is there a woman amongst them”. Officially this female migration prohibition would not be revoked by the Qing until 1893. However, after the Opiumwars, imperial control had declined substantially. When the number of emigrants from China swell over 100.000 persons a year during the 1870's it became possible to sneak women out. Female emigration was still illegal yet it became downright impossible for the Qing administration to uphold the law. It is safe to say by then legislation followed common practice.[112]

The cession of Hong Kong and opening of treaty ports in China to western influence made sure that China had little to no control over her international trade. However to an extent the same could be said about her political borders. Many of the migrants that left China during the latter part of the 19th century went through treaty ports or one of the close by western cities such as Hong Kong and Macao. As those settlements were not bound by Chinese law, the first specialised companies, both western and Chinese, had a least a branch office located in one of these cities. Hong Kong remained large passenger node throughout the 19th century but the stream of migrants travelling through Macao diminished rather fast. The port soon began to gain a bad name amongst Chinese because of the bad conditions her emigrants had to bear. Many of the migrants that ended up as the slave replacements in the Americas travelled through Macao. As such the conditions of the journey and the labour at destination, were often dreadful.[113]

Nonetheless these negative stories did not discourage Chinese migrants to keep coming to the shoreline to try their luck overseas. Many of them had kin abroad and knew that not in all destinations conditions were as dire as on the plantations and mines. By then not only economic motives drove the Chinese out of the homes but also disorder in society. The trust in the Mandate of Heaven of the Qing dynasty had been given an awful blow by the loss of the Opiumwars, and therefore the legitimacy of Qing's rule was questioned. Those defeats triggered a string of rebellions and revolts wreaking havoc in the Chinese Empire.[114]

111 Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.57-59, Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.144-147
112 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3042, fol.14, McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.99
113 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.110-115, Somers Heidhues, *Banka Tin*, p.56
114 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.127-130

The Taiping Rebellion was the largest and most well known of those rebellions. Between 1850 and 1864 armies of the rebels clashed repeatedly with the divisions put forth by the Qing dynasty. After the loss of the First Opium War, the poor conditions of living in the inland provinces and a general anti-Qing sentiment sprouted a revolt. Lead by a converted Chinese that claimed to be the younger brother of Christ, the rebellion called for broad social reforms that would replace the current hegemony of Confucianism, Buddhism and local religions. As the revolt spread the rebels established a new kingdom with the old city of Nanking as their capital. The prolonged hostilities destabilized much of the central areas in China and were devastating for her economy. Many harvests were lost which led to famine and disease spreadind rapidly through the lands. By 1864 imperial forces with the help of western officers, had conquered much of the rebel territories and finally captured Nanking. The remaining soldiers of the Taiping rebels continued to fight for the following years but the zenith of their power had passed after they lost their leaders in Nanking. Some 20 million people are estimated to have died in the clashes or as direct consequences of the devastation brought forth by the rebellion.[115]

Still, this was not the only insurrection in China. On the northern planes the Nien rebellion erupted roughly at the same time as the Taiping revolt, and lasted from 1851 to 1864. Recurring floods of the Yellow River and the lack of proficient countermeasures and aid for the struck regions from the Qing administration, made the local population and soldiers stationed in the regions, lose all fate in the Qing leadership. With their attacks the Nien rebels cut off the supply line between Beijing and the region where the Taiping rebellion raged, thus damaging vital support lines for Qing forces there. Because of the great amount of cavalrymen amongst Nien forces, they could strike fast and cover a large area. The Qing forces already thinly spread because of the efforts versus de Taiping armies had great difficulties pinning down the Nien rebels. This resulted in widespread damage and a decline of necessary tax income for the Qing government to cope with these threats. Nien forces attacked the sources of financial power of the Qing thus trying to deplete their coffers and consequently stop their possibilities to send out military campaigns. Nonetheless when Qing forces successfully decapitated the Taiping rebellion of their high command, the attention of the Qing shifted towards getting the same result by killing the Nien leadership. It was deemed the best method to counter the threat of the fast cavalry units of the Nien. However, when Qing forces succeeded in their plans the Nien armies remained organised unlike the Taiping rebels. Ultimately when one of of their major armies was defeated near Beijing with the use of western guns, resistance was finally broken. Remaining Nien sympathisers were pushed back and systematically

115 Schoppa, R. Keith. *The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History*, (New York, 2000), p.22-26

annihilated.[116]

Besides these two major destabilising revolts several smaller Muslim rebellions in the western territories of the Chinese Empire and one in the remote province of Yunnan tore through the land. It is no exaggeration to state that territories of the Qing were in chaos, as civil war was waged for supreme power in the empire. Apart from the destruction brought upon China by the armed conflict it also brought her internal economy down. The Qing had lost the possibility to create their own foreign economic policy, had no rights to act against western citizens that broke Chinese law and lost much of their tax base as consequence of the internal conflicts. China's inhabitants had to bear with a severely shaken economy, famine, disease and a situation of complete disorder in the majority of areas.[117]

It comes as no surprise that those who had the possibilities leave took almost any chance for a better life. Labour recruiters for enterprises abroad had few difficulties to find new workers. Whether the recruiters were honest about the jobs they offered or promised ones with unrealistic prospects, people were prone to believe whatever 'chance' was presented to them. In these conditions the first labour agencies started along the coastline. It is no wonder that there were organisations with a less noble working ethos amongst those.[118]

Hong Kong and Macao were the larger migration nodes on the Chinese coast but a new settlement in Southeast Asia turned out to be the central migration node for that region. Singapore quickly became central pivot of migration in the Nanyang. About half of all Chinese migrants travelling to a destination in Southeast Asia, first went through this port city. Besides the structural advantages an entrepôt offered, the port also could function as an intermediate for destinations that had gotten a bad name amongst Chinese migrants because of the poor working conditions, such as the tin mines on the island of Banka.[119]

The city of Singapore had rapidly grown from 1819 onward to become the commercial centre of the region. Entrepreneurs with a Chinese background flocked from stagnant cities such as Malacca to make use of the advantages of the free trade doctrine Singapore had to offer. This movement made for a city that was distinctly different from her surrounding area, as it became and stayed a predominantly Chinese city. An environment that was attractive for Chinese migrants as they did not disembark into an entirely strange society on arrival. These merchants bridgeheads as Philip Kuhn dubs them were made possible by the quickly developing trade around Singapore.[120]

We can also see here that the direct links from labour destinations in the Southeast Asia to the

116 Schoppa, *Chinese History*, p.26-27
117 Ibidem, p.27-28
118 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.314, Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.127-130
119 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.135, Sugihara, 'Patterns', p.252, Breman, *Koelies*, p.77
120 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.49, 159, Wang, *China*, 169

southern Chinese coast were diminishing in favour of the divided trading zone as displayed in figure 3 (on page 26). Passengers were transported to Singapore before they went on their second journey to the actual sites were their services were needed. Singapore had a pivotal role in all major marine endeavours in region, whether it was trade or the labour market and the passengers transport that came with it.

In the second chapter I considered the scale of free and non-free labour that existed in Southeast Asia. The distinction between those categories was not that clear as one might believe. Many migrants to Southeast Asia were indentured labourers as they had gone into debt to finance their journey. One particular feature of these debts I want to emphasise once again is the transferability of these debts. This meant that in Southeast Asia a flexible labour market could exist as the labourers were not necessarily tied to one employer. Within the Chinese diaspora apparently existed a framework of multiple organisations with a sufficient level of trust between them to exchange large debts. The initial capital for the journey of one labourer had to be invested by other organisations than the actual employer, he only took on the debt when the labourer arrived and started working for him. The exchange of capital involved in these debts accumulated to massive figures. Still, the individual debt taken on by the migrant was small enough that it became impossible for him to both pay off his debt and gain some personal profit. Given the intrinsic nature of these networks, a closer look at the sort of Chinese organisations functioning in Southeast Asia, concerning the multiple facets of migrant labour, will be useful.[121]

Chinese organisational form has been subject to much debate. It has been surrounded by a shroud of mystery as western colonial governments had trouble understanding and penetrating these organisational structures. They tried to fit Chinese organisations into a modern western model in which many peculiar Chinese details were lost. Because of this troubled perception changes within Chinese organisations and actions made by them were often not completely observed or fully understood. And, especially by the more shady businesses, there was made use the absence of accurate knowledge amongst colonial governments to increase profits, adding only more confusion. As such it is difficult to reconstruct these organisations and how they operated in the Nanyang.[122]

Scholars have looked at organisational forms used in China to provide a backbone of how Chinese organisations in Southeast Asia might have been set up. As Chinese companies, especially those operating in the overseas labour business soon adapted to function in relation to western companies in the treaty ports, this approach does not immediately give a clear answer. Both the cooperation with westerners and the change in environment, Southeast Asia instead of China, gave

121 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.124, Sugihara, 'Patterns', p.254

122 McKeown, 'Conceptualizing', p.321, Gie, Phoa Liong. 'De Economische Positie der Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië', in: *Koloniale Studiën, Jrg.20 no.5-6,* (Weltevreden, 1936), p.116, Gardella, 'Entreprises', p.290-295

rise to a number of deviations. Yet by reconstructing original Chinese organisational formats, one can assume that some characteristics of those formats must have been reproduced in the organisational structures of Chinese firms operating in the Nanyang.[123]

Philip Kuhn has formulated a categorisation of how Chinese formed groups, associations and other sorts of organisations. In his book he emphasizes the trust or bond that had to exist between people to form a functioning organisation. By examining how this 'bonding' was reproduced elsewhere outside China, we can understand how these groups functioned in daily life. According to Kuhn this mutual trust could be either based on real similarities or notional resemblances. The latter was primarily used abroad as bonding mechanism, while the former was more commonly used if there were any common grounds available to the migrants. Imagined similarities could be either based on experiences in China or completely reinvented in Southeast Asia to form groups.[124]

First of all Kuhn formautes a category for organisations that were based on a common origin. Shared native place bonds gave overseas Chinese a common background and often dialect. From such similarities trust could form in an otherwise foreign environment. In the second category a shared religious experience was a central theme. As Chinese folk religions had many different deities often blessing certain businesses, much like Catholic Saints, a common ground could be found when Chinese abroad visited the same temple or shrines. As these deities blessed specific (economic) endeavours these people usually had some similarities in work activities, which in turn could help to form larger organisations or networks between those individuals.[125]

The following categories that Kuhn describes were often more based on newly formed relations than a mutual background of the migrant took originating from China. Seemingly contradictory to the last sentence, one of these new groupings were surname associations. Identical surnames might suggest some family connection but often these surnames were created overseas to reproduce a familial network as was common in China. Of course some real family ties did exist and sometimes even real family ties came forth from relations made in these imagined surname associations, but seldom entire families emigrated from China during most of the 19th century. What often did happen was that second or third degree family members arrived later treading the same path as their predecessor and were introduced to these associations.[126]

The last category Kuhn elaborates on are the brotherhoods. Instead of the traditional multi-generational hierarchy these associations were commonly organised along one generation. Some of these, predominantly the criminal ones, went as far as sharing blood to form a bond. Persons in

123 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.110, McKeown, 'Opium Farmer , p.330
124 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.43-44
125 Ibidem, p.45, 161
126 Ibidem, p.44, 161

these organisations would be organised along merits valuable to the group. To invoke a form of familial hierarchy, higher respected individuals were addressed as “older brother” and the less important as “younger brother”. The Chinese associations that were addressed by the colonial governments as “secret societies” often knew this type or organisation.[127]

Kuhn also places many of the *kongsis* under this category because of they lacked other similarities between their group members. Often organisations that worked in what he designates as “frontier regions”, the groups had need for a bond that superseded normal trust in one other. For instance the independent Chinese tin mines that were located on Borneo were organised along *kongsi* lines. They tended to have characteristics of a commune as these groups of men worked the mines for economic profit, lived together as a group, had rules or laws amongst them and usually held some diplomatic relations with local chiefs. On Borneo these *kongsis* even went as far as having armed conflicts with other *kongsis* to settle disputes.[128]

In essence however, a *kongsi* was an organisation between Chinese men that decided to work for a common goal.[129] Often these goals were purely economic where participants provided capital, effort and their own labour to seek profit that would be impossible to reach when working on individual basis. This was how the *kongsis* usually were interpreted by the colonial governments; as a commercial organisation. However as we have seen these organisations could strive for goals other than purely economic profit, for instance political changes. Not seldom powerful businessmen had ties to these groups -although hidden from the public eye- to strengthen their own interests in exchange for investments.[130]

The unsystematic organisational structure posed problem in the long run. As *kongsis* outlasted many personal endeavours responsibilities within the organisation became unclear. The consequences of choices made in the *kongsi* were carried by those who did the labour but the participants who made that choices were only nominally involved. Earlier the distinction has been made between *laukehs* and *sinkehs,* experienced versus new labourers. On occasion a *kongsi* grew to a situation where the original participating labourers (*laukehs*) simply hired others (*sinkehs*) to fulfil their obligation in the *kongsi.* As personal ties became thin so did the check on ethical behaviour. If these *kongsis* started producing for other private companies or in a construction as the cultivation system in Netherlands Indies, responsibilities became even more stretched. In the cultivation system government officials would only held accountable if output was low and private

127 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.168, Diehl, 'Revenue Farming', p.210
128 Tagliacozzo, 'Border-line Legal',p.65-68, à Campo, 'Zeeroof', p.51-52, Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.169
129 *Kongsi* is a derivative of the Chines *gongsi* (albeit barely, as they sound almost identical) in which “gong” held the meaning “public”.
McKeown, 'Opium Farmer', p.330
130 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.160, Dobbin, *Entrepreneurial Minorities*, p.59

entrepreneurs only cared for a low price, an ideal recipe for unethical conditions. If the areas were the *kongsis* operated lay outside direct state control excesses could became policy. I would like to stress that this is by no means an excuse for these developments, only an explanation of the conditions in which such degeneration could occur.[131]

Singapore as central migrant node for Southeast Asia supplied many of the new labourers. As the business of migrant transportion began to massively increase in size it started to transform from the 1850's onward. In the business more shady companies started to operate that moved Chinese migrants under substandard conditions. Some of the Chinese brotherhoods that did help built up and retain control over Singapore and the Straits Settlement for the British colonial government, were involved with these exploitation rings. From 1869 onward the British cracked down on the worst abuses in the coolie trade within their borders. By 1877 a Chinese protection clause was announced by government that prohibited misdeeds against Chinese immigrants. By 1889 the British colonial government went as far as prohibiting all Chinese brotherhoods and secret societies all together. A crude measure that showed the difficulties European colonials had with incorporating and dealing with Chinese organisations within her territories.[132]

Java and Madura

The Chinese presence and connections to Java dated back to the centuries long before the Dutch arrived. Nonetheless the settlement of the Dutch on Java in 1619 gave a new impetus for development and led to permanent settlement of a Chinese community in Batavia. As the Dutch did not fully trust the local Javanese and considered the Chinese further developed as a culture, they were welcomed within the VOC walls. Batavia grew out to be a settlement were most of the small trade, crafts and manual labour were done by Chinese while being governed by a rather small Dutch elite.[133]

As the VOC was initially a relatively small player in Asia much of the intermediate trade was outsourced to non-European merchants. This marine trade over longer distances was done by certain specialised trading peoples non-indigenous to Java. Therefore a distinction was made in Batavian society between an indigenous group of Asians and a separate group that was not originally from Java, usually designated in English as Foreign Asiatics. Chinese settlers belonged to this group, as did their offspring, but also Arab, Japanese or Gujarati individuals were included in this category.[134]

131 Somers Heidhues, *Banka Tin*, p.40, 74
132 Kuhn, *Chinese Amongst Others*, p.159, Wang, *Chinese Overseas*, p.169
133 Dobbin, *Entrepreneurial Minorities*, p.47-53, Blussé, *Strange Company*, p.79
134 Lohanda, *Kapitan Cina*, p.2, Skinner, 'Creolized Chinese', p.56

The Chinese minority however, had a special position in Batavian society. Because of their economic importance to the settlement and their prominence as a community, the Chinese were granted quite some legal autonomy as long as Dutch supremacy was adhered. A typical method of governing trading settlements during those days. This autonomy grew out to be to a full fledged administrative unit independently functioning besides the VOC administration of Batavia. The individuals holding prominent positions within this framework, the “captain” and “lieutenants” China, were chosen by the Dutch after a selection done by the Chinese Counsel of Batavia.[135]

With the demise of the VOC and the integration of their Asian possessions into the Kingdom of the Netherlands, this pluralistic system became under scrutiny. Initially, when the Netherlands Indies were under direct royal control, just the Chinese influence in governmental matters declined. From 1848 onwards, as the Dutch strived for a uniform state system throughout their territories, this pluralist system of sovereignty did not fit the time any more. The remaining legal powers were stripped off the captains and lieutenants as their tasks shrank to being an advice committee for the colonial government, settling Chinese family matters and maintaining the Chinese religious grounds.[136]

Not only for Chinese inhabitants of the Netherlands Indies circumstances changed. After the British interregnum during the Napoleonic Wars the islands were given back to the Netherlands, which was now a kingdom instead of a republic. New policies were being developed for the colony as result of this political change. Policies such as the cultivation system as an economic accelerator but also the method of how the colony was run. Especially after the Java War of 1825 to 1830, in the Netherlands emerged the wish to have more influence on the daily governance of the colony. The war had seriously damaged the trust people in Holland had in the capabilities of the residents of the Netherlands Indies. While since 1825 a preference was given to Dutch born government personnel in the Indies, this was never formally codified. To achieve permanent influence in 1842 a law was passed that made it necessary to obtain a degree from Royal Academy in Delft to fit the requirements for the higher positions in the colonial government. In effect this meant that the majority of the colonial government became Dutchmen straight from the motherland, as few in the colony could pay for the journey to Delft in Holland and back.[137]

By 1848 a wave of revolutions swept through Europe and the Netherlands were not spared from the consequences. Thorbecke drafted a constitution which cuffed the majority of power of King

135 Hoetink, 'Chinese Officieren', p.2-4, Verboeket, K. 'De Geschiedenis van de Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië', in: *Koloniale Studiën, Jrg.20 no.5-6,* (Weltevreden, 1936), p.11, Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.45

136 Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.75-78, Lohanda, *Kapitan Cina*, p.198, Valk, M.H. van der. 'De Rechtspositie der Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië', in: *Koloniale Studiën, Jrg.20 no.5-6,* (Weltevreden, 1936), p.13

137 Taylor, *Social World*, p.118, Veth, P.J. *Bijdragen tot de Kennis van de Politieke Toestand van Nederlandsch Indië,* (Amsterdam, 1848)*,* p.16 see note

William II in favour of an elected parliament. This changed the Netherlands Indies from a colony in hands of the king, to a colonial state under scrutiny of the Dutch parliament. From then on an annual colonial report was written of the developments in the Dutch colonies for approval of parliament and in a slow process, regulation was made uniform throughout all territories.[138]

In the Netherlands Indies the political developments in Holland were welcomed and taken as an opportunity to regain more control over government policy in the colonies. They felt that the development of the Netherlands Indies was halted and that they were treated as second rate citizens. The lack of influence in the highest echelons of the colonial government was hated by colonial Dutch, Chinese and Javanese alike. Educational facilities in the colony were considered to be severely lacking to offer a proper upbringing and the prohibition of independent pamphlets and journals in the colony was considered insulting by its inhabitants.[139]

Nonetheless the process of governmental adjustments was slow. As mentioned earlier trade laws were made applicable to everyone in 1855, including the *peranakan* Chinese. In addition became slave ownership forbidden in the Netherlands Indies in that year. The "Delftse rule", as the Dutch academic requirement for higher colonial positions was known, took longer to be revoked. Until 1864 this condition remained firmly in place as it was an effective method for Holland to keep tight control over the colony. By then however, Jean Gelman Taylor ascertains, the colonial society of Java was transformed from a cosmopolitan to an ethnically separated society. Years of Dutch immigration had made for a distinct and distant Dutch elite.[140]

The Dutch parliament also had problems gaining influence in colonial governance. King William III and the cabinet tried to keep parliamentary influence in the colony to a minimum. As the king still had the right to appoint the governor-general of the Netherlands Indies and the leading policies came from the cabinet their combined influence was still high. Only by the years 1866-1867 with cases Mijers and Luxembourg, parliament refused to approve the annual budget of the cabinet rendering them powerless, their resistance was broken and parliament could reign supreme.[141]

It is interesting to note that after the requirement for an education at the Royal Academy in Delft was dropped and parliament gained more control, the cultivation system soon came under scrutiny. The novel *Max Havelaar* that showed the general public the excesses that happened under the system, is, of course, partially responsible for this renewed attention. Yet in the years after these

138 *Koloniaal Verslag 1847-1848*
139 Veth, *Politiek Toestand,* p.13-14
140 Taylor, *Social World*, p.118, 125, van der Valk, 'Rechtspositie', p.26-28
141 These cases did not include the Netherlands Indies as primary topics but made clear how the relation between cabinet and parliament was. As the king both appointed the governor-generals for the Netherlands Indies and agreed to the new formation of cabinets, his influence in the colony was still high compared to Holland. Diehl, 'Revenue Farming', p.200

institutional changes the deconstruction of the cultivation system went on at a astounding rate. Nevertheless, the position of the indentured labourer did not change much as that was considered primarily a private agreement between employer and employee. The very nature of indentured labour put the participating labourers in a vulnerable position.[142]

Did the position of individual labourers in the Netherlands Indies not have top priority in government policy, security and safety of the colony did. Groups in society were strictly divided along ethnic and cultural lines in government policy and were closely monitored for signs of trouble. Especially size and unrest within these groups was considered dangerous. During the year 1740 unrest and lack of supervision had lead to scuffles between Dutch and Chinese citizens in the surrounding area of Batavia. Eventually those incidents escalated in an all-out battle during which, Chinese citizens that had nothing to do with the unrest, fell victim to a pogrom within city walls. The repercussions of that tragic day were still noticeable in the policies of the Dutch colonial government of more than half a century later.[143]

As security measures there was a district system functioning where Chinese within the Dutch territory had to live together in a separate quarter and a pass system was in place limiting their free travel. The *peranakan* Chinese on Java had to first present a request to the colonial administration with the reason of the journey and estimated travel period, before a pass could be given allowing the recipient to travel through several Dutch administrative territories. While the district system was not tightly supervised because of the familiarity with the people involved, the pass system remained functioning strictly to the letter.[144]

In 1802 a law was passed limiting immigration of Chinese to the Netherlands Indies. In the city of Batavia the number of arrivals per incoming junk was limited at the same time. Making immigration laws more stringent meant a reverse of the ongoing trend of relaxation of measures towards Chinese. Nonetheless redirecting Chinese marine traffic to Batavia was later re-enforced when the cultivation system on the Netherlands Indies was implemented.[145]

The next obstacle for the Chinese passenger business appears during the Java War between 1825 and 1830. In the remote rural areas involvement of the Chinese minority in the conflict was suspected. By 1827 a complete ban on immigration was put into place. The effects that this ban had

142 Ergo, it solely removed government as participating and therefore responsible actor. Excesses created by private greed and/or low market prices for products, were not prevented as these were the results of proper market functions according to contemporary economists.
Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* (Amsterdan, 1860), Breman, *Koelies*, p.63

143 Blussé, *Strange Company*, p.81-84, Mijer, P. & Hoëvell, W.R. 'Chronologische geschiedenis van Batavia, geschreven door een Chinees.' in: *Tijdschrift voor Neêrland's Indië Vol.3 no.2* (Batavia, 1840)

144 NL-HaNA, Koloniën suppl., 2.10.03, no.24, fol.589-590, Lohanda, *Kapitan Cina*, p.16, Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.127

145 Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.75

on trade are difficult to reconstruct. The Dutch administration in these days put incoming and outgoing Chinese ships together with Siamese ships in the statistics. It is unclear why this happened but one could argue that the since the new king of Siam was of Chinese decent, the Dutch thought of them as part of the Chinese diaspora. Another possible explanation draws back to the governor mentioning that the Chinese were highly numerous in Siam, something that was also stated by Jennifer Cushman in her research concerning the junk trade to Siam. However, during the short years the immigration ban was functioning, the distinction suddenly was made between Chinese and Siamese ships. A clear picture showing the consequences of the ban that lasted until 1830 unfortunately cannot be given as Siamese trade with Batavia during those years also strongly fluctuated.[146]

Table 4: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1827-1831.[147]

	Incoming:			**Outgoing:**	
Year	Ships	Total *last*		Ships	Total *last*
1827	20*	1062*		8*	722*
1828	8	805		8	805
1829	8	582		5	587
1830	4	315		7*	495*
1831	9*	500*		9*	500*

The values with asterisks include Siamese vessels. The years the immigration ban was in place are highlighted with grey. N.B. as the scale of the table is annual, some spillover during the mentioned starting and ending years of the implemented measure should be taken into account.

From 1830 onwards Chinese immigration to the Netherlands Indies was once again possible. Nevertheless, a measure that limited Chinese arrivals to 200 per incoming junk was put into function. The maximum served both to improve conditions on the transporting ships, as limit the total of immigration without similar rises in trade. By 1833 immigration was once again shortly forbidden. In the trade statistics collected by the Dutch, it is interesting to see that from then onwards the Chinese and Siamese vessels remain divided as separate nations in the data. There is no convincing proof that suggests these two phenomena are connected as the cultivation system was implemented in the years thereafter, yet this sudden division is remarkable. Even more when considered that trade by Chinese vessels to and from Batavia between 1833 and 1836 shrank to an annual average of three junks in and out. However some relation between immigration measures

146 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3042, fol.13b-14, Cushman, Jennifer Wayne. *Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk trade with Siam during the late 18th and early 19th centuries,* (Ithaca NY, 1993), Tana, 'Rice', p.262

147 *Verslag van den Handel 1827-1830*

and the frequency of Chinese junks seems to appear, how slim this relation may be.[148]

Table 5: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1833-1836.[149]

	Incoming:			**Outgoing:**	
Year	Ships	Total *last*		Ships	Total *last*
1833	3	200		3	210
1834	2	110		1	80
1835	4	190		4	200
1836	3	290		2	140

The years during the immigration ban are highlighted in grey.

In 1837 immigration of Chinese individuals was once again forbidden by the colonial government. However this measure was almost immediately revoked in 1838. A shortage of craftsmen in Batavia was put forth as reason. The dependency of Batavia on the Chinese, whether *peranakan* or their newly arrived assistants, as a providing middle-class for the Netherlands Indies made rigorous immigration policies impractical. Unfortunately data concerning the year 1838 seems to be lost for and therefore a comparison with the previous year is impossible.[150]

That brings us to an important yet uncertain variable in this quotation. It remains unknown how fast information of these immigration measures travelled throughout the region and to China. We can assume that the rate of information transfer would not be the same in every occurrence. After some years however, we can surmise that the unclear situation in Batavia made merchants with passengers on board, more cautious to sail to Batavia. It is known that western merchants often envied the fast Chinese information networks on trading prices in the region. It is not strange to speculate that the information that spread through the Chinese communities in the diaspora may also included particular government policies that may affected trade. The Chinese community residing in Batavia could send out word in advance of the changed immigration environment. This community also lobbied at the colonial government to lighten the measures at times. The earlier mentioned debt construction where the Chinese community in Batavia paid for the transport of the incoming migrants, shows that there existed a relation between new arrivals, transporters and the *peranakan* in Batavia. The exact details of how these connections were established and maintained in the Chinese diaspora, unfortunately lie in the realm of speculation.[151]

148 *Verslag van den Handel 1833-1836*, Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.121
149 *Verslag van den Handel 1833-1836*
150 Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.121, Sandick, L.H.W. van. *Chineezen buiten China: hunne beteekenis voor de ontwikkeling van Zuid-Oost Azië, Speciaal van Nederlandsch-Indië,* ('s-Gravenhage, 1909), p.180
151 Furata, 'Shanghai Trading Network', p.25, Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.1

The annulment in 1838 of the immigration ban did not mean that the renewed immigration was not subject to strict rules. Therefore it was requested by the Chinese Counsel in Batavia to ease immigration laws and return to the 1830 model where junks could carry a maximum of 200 passengers for Batavia. The poor economic situation in China was a reason for many of the Chinese community to bring struggling family members to Batavia. The Dutch colonial government agreed and in 1845 no less than 923 immigrants arrived. Further relaxation of the immigrations measures was requested as there were shortages on Chinese personnel in higher educated jobs in fields such as accountancy, teaching and Chinese medicine. How effective these pleas towards that goal were is not visible in new legislation but by 1846 at least craftsmen were once again exempt from the immigration quota's.[152]

Table 6: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1844-1847.[153]

	Incoming:			**Outgoing:**	
Year	Ships	Total *last*		Ships	Total *last*
1844	12	608		2	140
1845	2	86		2	86
1846	2	109		3	149
1847	4	99,5		15	434,5

It is interesting to see is that the Chinese Counsel in Batavia used a economic argumentation in their plea to relax immigration laws. The column that gives the combined sizes of cargo of the Chinese vessels clearly show that the economic downturn in China was persisting in this period. That Chinese captains waited for a prolonged time in harbour as this table suggests, is remarkable and might be related to the unclear situation in China after the First Opium War. That the Batavian Chinese Counsel relates passenger transport directly to economic opportunities is clear when they calculate that if a junk captain hypothetically would ask 3 or 4 pieces silver for the journey to Batavia and carried 200 passengers, that he would break even towards his expenses for his trip. If Chinese junks could get the expenses of the fare covered through passenger transport, they surely would be more inclined to bring their trade to the port of Batavia.[154]

Additionally the Chinese Counsel warned against making legal immigration to hard. Illegal immigration was fairly easy to organise in such a large archipelago and would definitely rise if the legal immigration became near to impossible. The strict policies would drive future migrants into

152 Sandick, *Chineezen buiten China,* p.181, Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.121
153 *Verslag van den Handel 1844-1847*
154 Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.121

choosing the illegal alternative as that option would give them a bigger chance to enter the Netherlands Indies than entering legally. Especially since the migrants took on a large debt for the journey they would choose the option with the largest chance to success.[155]

In 1848 constitutional developments in the Netherlands triggered an hesitant response in the colonial government as they awaited the changes that would occur. The economic future of China was still bleak and so junk trade faltered. By 1851 the immigration measures that made it easier for Chinese craftsmen to enter the Netherlands Indies were revoked, dropping the number of Chinese vessels in Batavia even further. As few ships came and immigration criteria were strict the sojourning practice of Chinese families overseas became difficult to uphold. Sending apprentices from China to Batavia to learn a particular trade in a safe environment after which, when they mastered the necessary skills, would return to China became nearly impossible.[156] To stimulate the waning junk trade the Dutch colonial government, on initiation of the Chinese Counsel, invoked a new temporary measure in 1853. They would let Chinese traders stay a period of six months to do their business as long as the Counsel would take responsibility for them actually leaving after this period. In 1855 the exceptional legal position of the Chinese within the colony was finally scrapped due to the reforms. Only the Chinese marriages and inheritance matters were allowed to be dealt with autonomously. From then on trade and crafts of the Chinese minority would be held accountable to the same legal code as everyone else.[157]

In the 1860's significant changes followed each other rapidly. In 1864 the colonial government send a conceptual measure to Holland requesting a relaxation of the pass system that limited travel in the Netherlands Indies for the Chinese and other Foreign Asiatics. By 1866 an approval came from Holland to implement these new guidelines although in some areas the local governments already allowed some travel. In 1869 the protective measures of the cultivation system were abandoned, coincidentally the same year the Suez Canal was opened in Egypt. And by 1870 the immigration and investment restrictions that were imposed on European, and Dutch, citizens and businesses were lifted. At the same time the annual emigration of labourers out of China breached the 100.000 mark. The effects these developments had on trade in the closed off economy of the Netherlands Indies are evident, as the following table shows.[158]

155 Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.123

156 It is interesting to note that this practise had reversed trajectory compared to earlier times when overseas Chinese send their sons back to China to master their craft or trade.
Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.109

157 Chen, *Chinese Gemeenschap,* p.123-125, van der Valk, 'Rechtspositie', p.28

158 NL-HaNA, Koloniën suppl., 2.10.03, no.24, fol.590-592, Thee, *Colonial Extractive Institutions,* p.7, Taylor, *Social World*, p.128, McKeown, 'Chinese Emigration', p.99, Sugihara, 'Patterns', p.244

Table 7: Incoming and outgoing Chinese vessels in the port of Batavia 1866-1871.[159]

	Incoming:			**Outgoing:**	
Year	Ships	Total *last*		Ships	Total *last*
1866	7	521		8	752
1867	8	111		7	57
1868	7	240		8	160
1869	24	453		24	578
1870	35	716		32	571
1871	62	1197		62	1787

Years highlighted dark grey, signify a relaxation of the pass system; years highlighted light grey signify the abandonment of the cultivation system

One of the primary elements worth noticing is the vibrant and often ambiguous relation between the Dutch colonial government and the Chinese minority on Java. Sometimes the hard working attitude of the *peranakan* Chinese was praised and at other times their underhanded practices were cursed, often even by the same person. This schism in perspective of of government officials on the Chinese minority trickled down in the policies concerning immigration. Policy makers wanted to see the Chinese as one homogeneous group while experiences showed time and time again that this was not the case. Notwithstanding all these different opinions concerning the Chinese, the Dutch waited until 1858 to send out students to China to master the Chinese language fluently instead of being entirely dependent on freelance translators.[160]

Especially the relationship between indigenous people and the Chinese was often interpreted as problematic by the colonial government. As early as 1833 reports mention that the Chinese were indeed effective in commerce but by their success, left little room for the indigenous people to develop. An argument that was repeated in the report of F. Fokkens examining the situation of Foreign Asiatics on Java in 1894. However some distinctions between Chinese were made during latter part of the 19th century. The *peranakan* Chinese were now called loyal subjects yet the new temporary arrivals were blamed for their total disregard for local society. Especially Hakka Chinese were considered uncivilized even by *peranakan* Chinese that preferred Hokkien immigrants.[161]

In regard to Chinese immigration and the sojourning practice, it is obvious to look at the population growth of the entire Chinese population on Java. Unfortunately this poses a problem as complete censuses only were conducted in 20th century when the endeavour became possible to accomplish from an administrative point of view. From the early 19th century only estimates on

159 *Koloniaal Verslag 1866-1872*
160 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3042, Blussé, 'Wills', p.320-321
161 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043, fol.3, NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1850-1900, 2.10.02, no.5037, Lohanda, *Kapitan Cina*, p.102-103

population totals exist. Earlier records of the province of Batavia were even called “more an indication then factual information” by the officials reporting. Notwithstanding these analyses the vlaues provide us with a rough picture of population development on Java. What became clear is that most men with Chinese roots lived in Batavia or other cities. Even Batavia alone accounts for one thirds of the total Chinese population on Java in the late 1820's.[162]

In 1833 the governor-general of the Netherlands Indies estimates that there live about 100.000 Chinese on the islands of Java and Madura. He remarked that others had even lower estimates ranging around 85.000 souls. Nevertheless this amount seems like an underestimate based more on values derived from tax income rather than field work. In 1860 a figure of 221.438 Chinese inhabiting the entire Netherlands Indies is given. The territory in question by then had been enlarged with parts of Sumatra, Bali and Borneo, and a clear comparison thus cannot be given. By 1880, ten years after the abandonment on the cultivation system, a figure of 343.793 Chinese is given which would account to a 2,2% annual growth rate. However in the same period the indigenous population outgrew the Chinese minority by far. As a percentage of the total population the Chinese actually declined in share; losing 0,1% per decade. Nonetheless, immigration from China appears to be high, especially when considering the share of the immigrants that were just temporary residing on Java or elsewhere on the islands of the Netherlands Indies and left after their contracts were fulfilled.[163]

5. Conclusion

When returning to the hypothesis: Chinese junk traders could commercially survive after increased European competition during the mid 19th century by switching to passenger trade as a source of income, a mixed picture appears. Especially when examining the connection between Batavia and China, as a wide variety of factors affected this link. Many macro economic developments had profound influence on this overseas trade connection, yet some rather specific conditions for the Batavian case pertained.

The two dominant developments in the hypothesis, the decline of the Chinese junk trade and the subsequent increase in Chinese emigration, were in fact not as closely knitted together as I initially suspected. There indeed was an overlap noticeable between the time frames of the two developments, but the decline of the junk trade had set in years before any major emigration took place from China. Domestic economic growth in Qing China that did not keep up with population

162 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043, fol.19-20

163 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3043, fol.6, NL-HaNA, Koloniën suppl., 2.10.03, no.24, fol.569, *Koloniale Studiën, Jrg.20 no.5-6,* (Weltevreden, 1936), p.35

growth, combined with widespread piracy in the South China Sea, were the largest contributors to the decline of junk trade.

Chinese junk merchants had several options to escape the waning traditional trade. For instance the rise of a much enlarged northern coastal trading zone in which government transports played a key role. In the latter part of the 19th century this zone expanded when private trading with Japan and Korea became possible and Shanghai became a central pivot. The southern trading zone remained functioning but specialized in bulk goods, of which rice was the primary commodity. This shift was, besides piracy, partly caused by the advancing merchant fleets of European powers. Migrants leaving China were still too small in number to make their transport an full-time occupation. Familial chain migration still remained the norm.

The trade *with* the Nanyang became trade *within* the Nanyang as Chinese merchants settled in Southeast Asia. Initially to accommodate the growing rice trade. Yet these entrepreneurs also provided the cargo capabilities for intra regional trade in Southeast Asia, thus lowering commercial opportunities in the region even more for Chinese merchants operating from the southern shores of China. The British port of Singapore and its free trade policy became an attractive centre of operation and soon developed into the central market of the region.

The widespread destruction and death the simultaneous Taiping and Nien revolts brought upon China at first did not cause massive emigration. However, after the revolts were quelled by Qing forces, the economic devastation and slow recovery caused an increasing number of Chinese to migrate elsewhere. Southeast Asia was the largest foreign destination for these migrants. To facilitate the increasing stream of passengers existing trade connections were utilized, which let to a dominant position of Singapore in Southeast Asian in passenger transport as well.

As passenger transport followed in the footsteps of trade, a mixture between western and Chinese organisations developed the business in the treaty ports. The Chinese element is noteworthy as it remained dominant in Southeast Asia. Organisations at both departure and a destination ports were mainly Chinese run, only rarely as subsidiary of a western company. Most of the time only the actual transport over sea was a potential niche where western merchant companies could cut in. A development caused by language and trust issues migrants had with westerners but also the often necessary credit for the journey seems to have been easier obtained through Chinese networks. The enterprises that employed the indentured labourers could very well be in western hands though.

Batavia, the seat of colonial government of the Netherlands Indies, remained a remote port detached from the rising activity on these major trade and passenger lines. It was not fully integrated in the regional economy because of the implementation of the cultivation system. Besides

limiting international trade to Batavia the majority of the produced resources in the Netherlands Indies were reserved for the Dutch export market in Europe. As trade in finished products was still a undeveloped exchange in the region, the position of Batavia was of minor importance.

The hard division between the external and internal trade arena is essential in analysing the position of the connection between Batavia and China. The domestic market of the Netherlands Indies was reserved primarily for its residents. Most of the marine trade in archipelago was in the hands of merchants of either Arab or Chinese decent that had settled in the Netherlands Indies. International trade was severely limited by the customs measures serving the smooth operation of the cultivation system. By the grace of the close vicinity of the entrepôt Singapore, the Dutch colony rarely had problems in supplying her internal market with the necessary goods.

The trade connection from Batavia to the Chinese coast increasingly became in the hands of western trading companies. Furthermore had the linkage not the same importance as it used to have, the priorities of the colonial government lay with production of export crops under the cultivation system. As both trade and colonial interest were feeble, a different reason must have existed for the Chinese traders to take the journey to Batavia. Especially after the rice exports from Java faltered the trade connection on its own was barely lucrative any more for Chinese merchants. An explanation for its survival must be sought in the existence of the large Chinese community living on Java.

The tight immigration measures the Dutch took in the Netherlands Indies seems to put an even larger strain on the connection to China. Representatives of the local *peranakan* Chinese repeatedly requested relieving the immigration limitations or made pleas for lifting immigration bans. A correlation between incoming and outgoing junks and tighter immigration laws or even bans, could even be noticed by contemporaries. Remarkable to notice here is the choice of Chinese migrants for a direct journey to Batavia, instead of travelling through Singapore as was usual. That migrants with pre-existing relations to the Netherlands Indies went straight to Batavia while indentured labourers without previous connections in the Nanyang, went through Singapore indicate two things. One; some sort of class difference existed between these migrants and two; a difference between these particular migrant routes was apparent for the Chinese passengers on departure.

The transport of passengers made the journey to Batavia for the Chinese junk merchant commercially less risky. A profit margin would be assured as the costs of transport of passengers mostly were guaranteed by groups instead of individuals, lowering the risk on defaults. Passengers furthermore were a stable variable in the profit margin, while product prices fluctuated and the possibility to switch to other products was severely limited on the Netherlands Indies' market. Finally the supplementary income gave a further incentive to Chinese junk captains to carry

passengers.

For this research it is unfortunate that both the cultivation system as the immigration measures were relaxed at approximately the same time. It cloaks the precise relation between Chinese migration and Chinese trade in case of the city of Batavia. A correlation between trade and migration definitely appears to have existed. Yet if Chinese migration fuelled trade or Chinese trade fuelled migration is hard to say. For both perspectives valid arguments can be given. In the case of the Netherlands Indies it appears that during the restrictive cultivation system migration helped support Chinese trade, while after abandonment of the system trade actually fuelled migration.

The starting hypothesis therefore proved to be false in its inclination. On an macro economic level the decline in trade already had set in before European merchant power in the region became paramount. Secondly there existed a multitude of alternative ventures for Chinese junk traders to choose from besides migrant transport. The Batavian case furthermore cannot be called representative for the region because of her distinctive conditions in the economic and public domain. Yet even in this case a definite correlation appears to exist between Chinese migration and Chinese trade. The transport of passengers made poor performing trade lines such as those between Batavia and southern China, still lucrative for Chinese junk traders. To which extent a similar relation existed elsewhere in Southeast Asia requires further research.

Appendix



Figure 4: The years 1825-1827, 1831-1832 include Siamese vessels, 1838 value unknown.[164]



Figure 5: The years 1825-1827, 1830-1832 include Siamese vessels, 1838 value unknown .[165]

164 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3194, NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3204, *Verslag van den Handel 1825-1837, 1839-1852, Koloniaal Verslag 1847/1848-1875*

165 Ibidem



Figure 6: Values of 1838 and 1853 are unknown.[166]



Figure 7: Values of 1838 and 1853 are unknown.[167]

166 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3194, NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3204, *Verslag van den Handel 1825-1837, 1839-1852, Koloniaal Verslag 1847/1848-1875*

167 Ibidem



Figure 8: The blue line designates incoming ships and orange line outgoing ships.[168]



Figure 9: The blue line designates incoming cargo and orange line outgoing cargo.[169]

168 NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3194, NL-HaNA, Koloniën, 1814-1849, 2.10.01, no.3204, *Verslag van den Handel 1825-1837, 1839-1852, Koloniaal Verslag 1847/1848-1875*

169 Ibidem

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