Figure 1. Pastoralists at Lake Turkana Wind Park (Vos, 2018).

Public-Private Partnerships and Sustainable Development in Kenya

A comparative case study analysis of the contributions of public-private partnerships in Kenya's health and wind energy sector for sustainable development outcomes.

MASTER OF ARTS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

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Abstract

Private Public Partnerships (PPP) are today considered an integral avenue for the pursuit of Kenya's sustainable development agenda. They are seen as a vehicle through which the government involves the private sector in its development agenda to assist in the provision of public goods and services. The international development community continues to promote PPPs as a model for sustainable development too. Nonetheless, our understanding of the contributions of PPPs for sustainable development is limited. The academic streams on the topic hold rival claims, which further impedes our understanding of the limits and contributions of PPPs for sustainable development. Therefore, it is essential to understand the theoretical implications of PPPs applied on a practical context. Through a case study comparison of two PPP projects in Kenya, this thesis finds that PPPs are not inherently effective or ineffective for sustainable development, but that bottom-up people-first objectives can significantly contribute to local sustainable development, to a national development agenda and the SDGs more broadly. This bottom-up approach, as opposed to the more generally used top-down approach, allows for a more effective and efficient PPP process due to political support and community engagement. Furthermore, the thesis finds that next to PPP design, the political economy of a country can significantly influence the overall effectiveness of PPPs. This means that that future PPPs should take into account the political economy context of the country and its sectors, as well as bottom-up approaches, to optimally contribute to sustainable development.

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List of acronyms

CLC	Community Life Center.
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoK	Government of Kenya
LTWP	Lake Turkana Wind Power
MDBs	Multilateral Development Banks
MTP	Medium Term Plan
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PPPs	Public-Private Partnerships
ROI	Return on Investment
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department on Economic and Social Affairs
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
VFM	Value for Money
WB	World Bank

Chapter 1. Introduction

In recent years, multilateral organizations, international financial institutions (IFIs), governments, and businesses around the world have promoted public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a strategy for mobilizing capital for sustainable development, especially amongst developing countries (Hall, 2015; Mohieldin, 2018; Yu, 2016; UNECE, 2016; World Bank, 2018). While PPPs have been the subject of intensive debate in both academic and development fields, our understanding of its contributions to sustainable development remain incomplete. For example, Jamali (2004), and Pattberg & Widerberg (2016), claim that PPP models, compared to regular public procurements or privatization, bring substantial benefits to the public and private sector and civil society. On the contrary, Jomo (2016), Powell (2016), and Leigland (2018), mention that PPPs are often too expensive, give too much power to the private sector, increase governments' fiscal liabilities and do not focus on sustainable developmental outcomes and socio-economic impact for all.

Uncertainties about the contributions and limitations of PPPs to sustainable development impede our ability to understand which sorts of PPPs may be more or less effective in which sectors and why. Indeed, in the context of PPPs there are questions about the meaning of effectiveness itself and how to measure it. Moreover, while PPPs are promoted as a strategy for sustainable development, they are not a one-size-fits-all model, raising questions about whether a specific country's political economy is facilitating or hindering the opportunities of PPPs for sustainable development. Exploring these questions is not merely an academic exercise: it has an immediate practical relevance to all stakeholders involved, and not least the citizenry of countries where PPPs are being undertaken, particularly in developing countries.

Among countries pursuing PPPs, Kenya represents a particularly interesting case. The Government of Kenya (GoK) strongly supports PPPs in its sustainable development blueprint, Vision 2030, which aims to *"transform Kenya into a middle-income country"* (Gov, 2018A). In 2013, Kenya adopted the Public Private Partnership Act which led to the establishment of a PPP Unit under the National Treasury. The PPP Unit aims to provide a transparent overview of PPPs in Kenya and functions as a resource center for best practices and as a guardian of the integrity of the PPP process in Kenya (Treasury, 2019). Moreover, the National Treasury's Cabinet Secretary mentioned in 2017 that the GoK's financing for development could not keep up with the required investments to achieve Vision 2030, for which PPPs would supposedly provide a solution (Kamau, 2015; PPP, 2019). Additionally, the Principal Secretary of the PPP Unit mentioned that recently PPPs have already played a significant role in Kenya's development, such as in improving the access to safe water, healthcare and electricity (PPP, 2019).

On an international level, the United Nations (UN) considers Kenya a top advocate for sustainable development and highlights the importance of PPPs in its development trajectory (UN, 2019E), and multilateral organizations increasingly partner with the GoK and the private sector to implement PPPs in the country (World Bank, 2018). Hence, it is clear that both the international development community and Kenya encourage PPPs for sustainable development outcomes. Although some scholars claim that states in low-income countries generally do not and should not support PPPs (Leigland, 2018), the Kenyan case thus stands in stark contrast with this assumption. As of yet, there is no clear understanding of the exact contributions of PPPs for Kenya's sustainable development, nor how Kenya's political economy affects the possible opportunities of PPPs for its sustainable development agenda.

This thesis contributes to the analysis of opportunities and risks of PPPs for sustainable development in Kenya's energy and health sectors. The core of this thesis is formed by a case comparison of an energy and health PPP in Kenya. In the energy sector, the Lake Turkana Wind Power Project (LTWP) proves a compelling case. The LTWP, powered in 2018 in Marsabit County, Kenya, is Africa's biggest wind farm and generates clean and affordable energy for Kenya's national grid and thereby expands the access to energy across the country. The LTWP supposedly brings other substantial development outcomes to Marsabit County, as well as benefit for the public and the private sectors and the sustainable development ambitions of Kenya (Petrova, 2018). In the health sector, the Community Life Centre (CLC) in Kiambu County, inaugurated in 2014, proves an interesting case. The CLC transformed a former rundown health facility in an area known for its high poverty rates, to a multifunctional community center which significantly improves the access to primary healthcare, but also functions as a hub for other educational, commercial and social activities (Wakoba, 2014). In both cases, claims are made that through the public-private partnership aspect of the project, sustainable development outcomes are achieved for all, while in fact that direct link remains ambiguous.

In addition to the case comparison, the thesis uses a problem-driven political economy analysis (PEA) drawn from the World Bank by Fritz, Levy & Ort (2013), to provide more context for the case comparison, as to not solely focus on PPP designs but also include political economy aspects that have played a role in probable differences of PPP effectiveness. Notwithstanding Kenya's and other stakeholders' extensive encouragement of the PPP model for sustainable development, the PEA provides a framework[1] that assists in mapping key structural factors, institutions and stakeholder interests which can in fact facilitating or hinder effective PPPs for Kenya's sustainable development ambitions (Fritz, Levy & Ort, 2013). In light of the above discussion, this thesis advances our understanding of whether PPPs in Kenya's health and energy sector contribute to sustainable development outcomes, by answering the research question:

What are the contributions and risks of public-private partnerships in Kenya's health and energy sectors for sustainable development outcomes?

The case comparison will assess whether rival academic claims of PPPs, set out in chapter 2, apply on a practical level for a health and energy PPP, set out in chapter 4, to identify key insights on whether the PPPs have or haven't been effective and why. Relevant differences and observed outcomes can then be set out. The problem-driven political economy analysis provides further context in terms of structural factors, institutions and stakeholder interests that could have played a role in the observed outcomes. Collectively, this allows for a better understanding of the risks and opportunities of PPPs for sustainable development outcomes.

By doing so, the thesis provides profoundly relevant insights for the academic field, especially considering the ongoing debate on whether or not PPPs are effective for sustainable development in general and in a developing country's context specifically. The thesis also serves the international development field, as multilateral organizations extensively promote PPPs for sustainable development (EC, 2019; Hall, 2015; UNECE, 2016; World Bank, 2019), despite the ongoing discussion on the effectiveness and the ambiguous link between the two. Thus, answering the research question allows for recommendations for future PPPs in Kenya and in a developing countries' context which serves both the academic and development fields alike.

For this framework, see chapter 3.

Chapter 2. Literature review: Sustainable development, the SDGs and debating public-private partnerships.

2.1 Sustainable Development

2.1.1 Sustainable development and the SDGs.

Whilst it is not the aim of this thesis to expand extensively on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it is necessary to understand the context of sustainable development when considering PPPs for sustainable development outcomes. In 2015, the international community adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development[2] at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York (Sachs, 2015; UN, 2019B). The Agenda 2030 contains 17 Sustainable Development Goals[3] that serve as a blueprint to achieve a more sustainable future by 2030 (Bowen et al., 2017; Sachs, 2015; Tebbutt et al., 2016). These goals, described in table 1, are to be achieved by 2030 and requires international cooperation between a variety of stakeholders (Cardoso et al., 2017; Fitzpatrick & Engels, 2016).

2.1.2 Measuring the SDGs

The UN drafted 169 targets with 232 indicators as the basis for monitoring and reporting on the SDGs (IAEG, 2016). However, as of yet there is not one universally accepted method to monitor progress towards the SDGs (Bowen, 2017). In part, this is because progress in one goal can negatively impact the progress of another goal (Allen et al., 2018). Yet, Randers et al., (2018), attempted to set out concrete halfway and end targets per SDG and their related indicators[4], as described in table 2. This assists us in understanding how progress towards SDGs can be measured, notwithstanding the persisting difficulties of fully capturing the integrated nature of the SDGs.

[2] For the full 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, see UN resolution: A/RES/70/1.
[3] The SDGs are the successors of the former Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For more information on their differences, see: ICLEI (2015).
[4] These indicators are based on: '*'Goal formulations in the UN resolution (of the SDGs), data availability […], the SDG Index and Dashboard Report 2016 and 2017 and further modifications by all involved authors".* Considering the extensive use of data, the table is useful to assist in understanding how progress to SDGs can be measured, although it certainly isn't a perfect representation.

SDG	Goal	Description
1	No poverty	End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
2	Zero hunger	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.
3	Good health and well-being	Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.
4	Quality education	Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
5	Gender equality	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
6	Clean water and sanitation	Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
7	Affordable and clean energy	Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
8	Decent work and economic growth	Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.
9	Industry, innovation and infrastructure	Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation.
10	Reduced inequalities	Reduce inequalities within and among countries.
11	Sustainable cities and communities	Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.
12	Responsible consumption and production	Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.
13	Climate action	Take urgent climate action to combat climate change and its impacts.
14	Life below water	Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.
15	Life on land	Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification and halt and reserve land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.
16	Peace, justice and strong institutions	Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
17	Partnerships for the goals	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

Table 1. The sustainable development goals (SDGs) and their descriptions (UN, 2019B).

2.1.3 Working towards the SDGs

The achievability of the SDGs is cumbersome, as Randers et al (2018), accurately observe. The authors recommend that all UN Member States should make transformational policy changes as soon as possible, if we are to achieve the SDGs without pushing the planet through the limits of its environmental and ecological boundaries (Randers et al., 2018). Yet, such scenario seems highly unlikely[5]. Cardoso

[5] See Randers et al., (2018). Important to note is that only accelerating economic growth, or working towards individual SDGs, does not suffice. Rather, transformational policy changes in energy, food chains, development models, inequality reduction, education, health and family planning are necessary in the coming years.

et al., (2017), state that it's highly unlikely as the public and private sectors often lack willingness, political power and financial capacity to prioritize spending on sustainable development. Moreover, Beal et al., (2018), state that international financial institutions (IFIs) and multilateral development banks (MDBs) aren't mobilizing private capital effectively. Especially since the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) noted in 2017 that ''achieving the SDGs will take between US $5 to $7 trillion, with an investment gap in developing countries of about $2.5 trillion'' (UNDP, 2019A), financial issues need to be resolved if progress towards the SDGs is to be made.

SDG		Indicator	Target	Halfway-target
The 17 goals for humanity agreed by the UN in 2015		*Indicator for the achievement of each sustainable development goal*	*Threshold value for "green"*	*Threshold value for "yellow"*
1	No poverty	Fraction of population living below 1.90$ per day (%)	< 2 %	< 13 %
2	Zero hunger	Fraction of population undernourished (%)	< 7 %	< 15 %
3	Good health	Life expectancy at birth (years)	> 75 years	> 70 years
4	Quality education	School life expectancy (years)	> 12 years	> 10 years
5	Gender equality	Gender parity in schooling (1)	> 0.95	> 0.8
6	Safe water	Fraction of population with access to safe water (%)	> 98 %	> 80 %
7	Enough energy	Fraction of population with access to electricity (%)	> 98 %	> 80 %
8	Decent jobs	Job market growth (%/y)	> 1 % / year	> 0 % / year
9	Industrial output	GDP per person in manufacturing & construction (2011 PPP US$/p-y)	>6.000 2011 PPP $/p-y	>4.000 2011 PPP $/p-y
10	Reduced inequality	Share of national income to richest 10 % (%)	< 40 %	< 50 %
11	Clean cities	Urban aerosol concentration (µg 2.5M /m3)	< 10 µg 2.5M /m³	< 20 µg 2.5M /m³
12	Responsible consumption	Ecological footprint per person (gha/p)	< 1.4 gha/p	< 2 gha/p
13	Climate action	Temperature rise (deg C above 1850)	< 1 deg C	< 1.5 deg C
14	Life below water	Acidity of ocean surface water (pH)	> pH 8.15	> pH 8.1
15	Life on land	Old-growth forest area (Mkm2)	>25	>19
16	Good governance	Government spending per person (2011 PPP US$/p-y)	>3.000 2011 PPP $/p-y	>2.000 2011 PPP $/ p-y
17	More partnership	Exports as fraction of GDP (%)	> 15 %	> 10 %

Table 2. The 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals- Indicators, units, and threshold values (Randers et al., 2018).

See Allen et al., (2018), for an understanding of the integrated nature of SDGs and how work on one SDG can harm the progress of another, further problematizing the achievability of these goals.

2.1.4 Financing sustainable development[6] and PPPs

Considering the limited financial capabilities of low and middle income countries, Jack (2015), mentions that effective sustainable development plans should include the private sector. One of the greatest pitfalls of Agenda 2030 was that it limitedly acknowledged the possible role of the private sector in achieving the SDGs (Jack, 2015). To overcome financing issues and close the noted investment gap, multilateral organizations such as the European Union (EU), the UN and the World Bank consider public-private partnerships an integral avenue for mobilizing private capital for infrastructure and service projects that focus on sustainable development and the SDGs (EC, 2019; UNECE, 2016; World Bank, 2019A). The PPP model is considered effective as it connects the public sector, which lacks financial resources, with the private sector, which lacks a voice in development plans. Nonetheless, there are various pitfalls with PPPs too. The following section therefore addresses the academic debate on PPPs and the related academic streams.

2.2 Public-Private partnerships

2.2.1 Public-Private partnerships: definitions, stakeholders, risks and opportunities

Within the academic field there is no consensus on the exact definition of PPPs (Leigland, 2018; OECD, 2012; Romero, 2015), Jomo et al., (2016) define PPPs as *''a goal to exploit synergies in the joint innovative use of resources and in the application of management knowledge, with optimal attainment of the goals of all parties involved, where these goals could not be attained to the same extent without the other parties''*. Ho (2006) defines PPPs as *''long-term cooperative relationships between the public and private sectors for the purpose of planning, designing, financing, constructing and managing projects that are traditionally within the realm of the public sector''*. In brief, it's about relationships, synergies, joint use of resources, a focus on projects and beneficial goals for public and private parties[7]. The stakeholders involved in the partnership are commonly public authorities and private actors, and occasionally non-state actors. Their goal can be to establish transactions and contracts

[6] Evidently the 'financing sustainable development' topic entails considerably more than this paragraph provides, and a careful consideration on the related discussions is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, a cursory look can contribute to our understanding of PPPs as a model that full under the topic of 'financing sustainable development'.
[7] For an overview of various PPP definitions by international organizations, the private sector and academics, see Annex 1 in Jomo, (2016).

to foster the development of public infrastructures or services in the host country (Bovaird, 2004; Hodge & Greve, 2007; Pattberg et al., 2012)[8].

The roles of the involved parties are complementary, since the public authorities control the legal and regulatory power for a development project, whereas the private operators or non-state actors can contribute the required capital and technical expertise to implement such project (Yescombe, 2007). In this way, the 'partnership' implies that strengths of the public authorities, such as responsibility and accountability to society, and strengths of the private actors, such as competitiveness and economic efficiency, are mutually supportive in strengths, resources and expertise of the different sectors (Jamali, 2004). As such, PPPs are positioned between the continuum of complete privatization and complete public provision (Yang & Hou, 2013). A brief summary of differences between the three concepts can be found in the table 3.

	Privatization	**PPPs**	**Public provisioning**
Meaning	Any process aimed at shifting functions and responsibilities in whole or in part, from the government to the private sector, almost always involving the irrevocable transfer of public sector assets.	A contractual agreement between the public and private sectors for financing, developing, operation or managing of a public facility or service.	The acquisition and provision, under formal contract or not, of works, supplies and services by public bodies or state-owned enterprises.
Ownership	Private	Public	Public
Contract structure	Contract methods that result in private ownership.	Contract methods that results in varying levels of private participation	Contract methods that result in public ownership
Risk	Private sector has sole responsibility in general (except as retained in a regulatory role).	Shared responsibility between partners.	Public sector has sole responsibility in general

Table 3. Key differences between privatization and PPPs (CDIAC, 2007).

[8] For a comprehensive analysis of all the characteristics of a PPP, see Pattberg et al., (2012).

2.2.2 The emergence of PPPs and their positive and negative traits

While Hodge & Greve (2007), note that PPPs exist for more than a century but that widespread enthusiasm didn't emerge until the New Public Management movement in the 1970s, Pattberg et al., (2012), argue that it was the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 which led to unprecedented enthusiasm of governments for PPPs. Similar to its definition, there is no consensus on when PPPs precisely gained a foothold in public policy, but since it did the utilization of PPPs has been cyclical across the globe (Yescombe, 2007). Irrespective of when PPPs gained that foothold, one of the key reasons for states to consider PPPs, was that it allows for increased investments in the public realm, even when these states face fiscal problems.

By forming public-private partnerships, states can effectively mobilize capital for various policy goals, such as the provision of public infrastructures, (Yescombe, 2017), for improving and expanding the basic provision of public goods and services (Bovaird, 2004; Roehrich, Lewis & George, 2014) or for broader projects related to sustainable development such as food security and access to electricity (Yu, 2016). Especially when states lack governance capabilities, for example due to underdeveloped institutions, unstable macroeconomic environments and underdevelopment (Klein, 2018; Yang & Hou, 2013), the private sector can play a crucial role in effectively and competitively governing the key infrastructures and services to be provided through the PPP.

All the stakeholders involved in the PPP can gain substantial advantages from such partnerships. For example, the private party can expect government-supported strategies to obtain stable return on investments (ROI), whereas the public authorities can benefit from technical knowledge, efficient operation skills, cost-efficiency and capital from the private sector (Yang & Hou, 2013). It also allows the private sector to enter previously inaccessible state-run sectors or markets, depending on the country's 'place' in the continuum of privatization and public provisioning (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2015; Yang & Hou, 2013). These ideas are not only present in the academic field, but also in the international development field, as multilateral organizations such as the UN, World Bank and EU, have an extensive history of promoting PPPs to foster sustainable development[9] (EC, 2019; Hall, 2015; Mohieldin, 2018; Yu, 2016).

[9] For more in-depth information on the public promotion of PPPs by such organizations, see Hall, (2015), P. 13.

Nonetheless, there is an increasing amount of literature which indicates that a direct link between PPPs and sustainable development is uncertain (Hall; 2015; Leigland, 2018). The renowned PPP specialist from the World Bank, Klein (2015), used to actively promote PPPs for development, but has recently stated that the international enthusiasm was unwarranted. Accordingly, it would ultimately depend on the social, political and economic context of the host country, in which well-regulated sectors by well-run governments or completely private firms could perform equally well compared to PPPs in terms of the desired outcomes (Klein, 2015). Additionally, Leigland (2018), argues that for developing countries, technical assistance and capacity building is considerably more useful than encouraging private participation in the public realm through PPPs.

Others state that PPPs are overly expensive compared to regular public procurements (Powell, 2016). When this issue received increasing attention, value-for-money (VFM) analyses[10] to become an integral part in the planning process of PPPs (Yang & Hou, 2013). A VFM analysis estimates the costs and profits of the project (or PPP) for the private actors, measured against the project benefits for the public actors, such as service quality and prices for end users (Jomo et al., 2016; Leigland, 2018). The outcomes are then be compared to regular public procurement, in order to examine whether in the end the PPP would be justified in terms of achievability, end goals, costs, ROI, and value-for-money (Leigland, 2018).

However, VFM analyses do not assess the overall development impact of PPPs (Estache & Philippe, 2012). There are reasons why this impact is not taken into account in VFM analyses. For the private party, it would be too costly and does not generate profits, so it needs incentivization by the public authority to carry out such analyses, while for the public authority, occasionally a timely implementation of a project is preferred over well-considered long-term development outcomes (Estache & Rossi, 2004; Hall, 2015). This is an issue mostly apparent in low to middle-income countries, especially when they face issues such as underdevelopment, budgetary constraints or political deadlines on committed plans (Hall, 2015).

[10] For such an analysis, see: World Bank Institute and Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility. 2013. “Value-for-Money Analysis—Practices and Challenges: How Governments Choose When to Use PPP to Deliver Public Infrastructure and Services”.

Such issues can result in hasty negotiations by the public authorities with the private parties on regulations, contracts and agreements (Powell, 2016). Subsequently, this gives power to the private party, which can demand a higher ROI (Leigland, 2018). Additionally, PPP arrangements can create long-term liabilities for the state when it loses ownership of former public infrastructures and services, or when it is committed to a long-term payment scheme of annual fees to the private party for its financial and technical contributions (Jomo et al., 2016). Last, public authorities can move PPP expenditures off their balance sheets, which provides fiscal capacity in the short term, but generates worse fiscal problems in the long term due to unclear and unrepresentative fiscal statements (Roehrich, Lewis & George, 2014).

2.2.3 PPPs and sustainable development

While the PPP model is appreciated (Pattberg et al., 2012) or contested (Powell, 2016) for its outcomes, our understanding of how PPPs precisely contribute to sustainable development remains incomplete. For example, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) held an international PPP forum in 2016, to discuss whether PPPs did in fact contribute to sustainable development (Yu, 2016). The forum found that a direct link was missing and therefore encouraged all involved stakeholders to focus more on poverty alleviation and improving lives with future PPPs. In fact, that shows that PPPs pre-2016 lacked a direct contribution to those issues, while post-2016 they still hadn't developed a new approach in PPPs to guarantee such sustainable development outcomes, as they only acknowledged such outcomes as probable externalities, rather than an end goal by itself (Yu, 2016). Considering the various advantages and disadvantages of PPPs and the limited understanding of the contribution to sustainable development, the following section of this literature review sets out the academic streams on PPPs. This assists us in identifying and clarifying the various academic interpretations, which can then be applied to the practical context in the case of Kenya

2.3 Public-private partnerships, academic streams

2.3.1 Academic stream one: Critical Success Factors make PPPs inherently effective

The first academic stream that stands out when assessing literature on PPPs consists of scholars who consider PPPs inherently effective for sustainable development in case Critical Success Factors (CSFs) are considered throughout the PPP process. If so, the

PPP would create profound advantages for all the involved parties. This stream therefore addresses the literature on CSFs, which, if considered, supposedly make PPPs inherently effective for contributing to sustainable development outcomes .

Jamali (2004), attempted to gather key CSFs for the implementation of PPPs in the Lebanese telecommunication sector. In his research, he emphasizes trust in a legal and regulatory system for a transparent and fair operating environment and administrative structures as critical success factors for PPPs to succeed (Jamali, 2004). These recommendations are however too broad and don't only apply to PPPs. Van Dijk (2008) builds on this work and finds that the flexible nature of PPPs makes it difficult to identify CSFs that could be applicable in other contexts or countries. Ismail's (2013) research on CSFs for PPPs in Malaysia finds that ''good governance, commitment and responsibility of public and private parties, favorable legal framework, sound economic policy and an available financial market'' are five key CSFs in for PPPs to succeed in Malaysia. However, the author acknowledges that he couldn't capture all relevant CSFs due to the limited use of methods and again, that the findings are difficult to transpose to other contexts (Ismail, 2013).

Pattberg & Widerberg (2015) then aim to identify CFSs for PPPs for sustainable development through a literature assessment and come up with a comprehensive overview and analysis of nine CSFs to be considered through all stages of the PPP process. These assist in understanding important factors for PPPs in general, however, their results are rather descriptive than explanatory, which makes it unclear how governments could engage with those nine CSFs in order to create meaningful impact and foster sustainable development. Additionally, they note that it is uncertain whether certain CSFs are more important than others, and if they interact (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2015). In this regard, Yang & Hou's (2013), research provides a theoretical framework for PPP development with a core recommendation that *''governments in transitional economies should enhance capacity and credibility in managing PPPs and should build institutions and legal systems for a fairer and more transparent and efficient operating environment to inspire the confidence of private investors to participate''* (Yang & Hou, 2013). However, it remains unclear on why precisely PPPs should be the preferred model and what the supposed benefits would be.

The research by Osei-Kyei & Chan (2013), uses a systematic literature review on publications from 1990 to 2013 about CSFs of PPPs, and identifies five key CSFs from a total of 57 CSFs, irrespective of the country, jurisdiction, stage of the project, or the sector, for PPPs to succeed. Examining the available academic work on CSFs for PPPs, which should make PPPs inherently effective for sustainable development, it is Osei-Kyei & Chan's (2013), research which best tackles the limitations of the noted other work. In fact, they provide clear-defined, implementable CSFs ranked in order of importance and supposedly universally applicable, as summarized in the table 4.

Critical Success Factor	Description
1. *Appropriate risk allocation and sharing:*	This involves identifying and clearly defining all risks from all phases of the PPP process and sharing it among the public and private actor in such way that the party which has better mitigation techniques to manage that risk, will take on the risk. This, while remaining a clear and equal division of all the risks, so the burdens are shared. Governments should refrain from transferring all project risk to the private sector as that could affect future participation of the private sector in PPPs, whereas the public party must retain risks that go beyond the control of the private sector.
2. *Strong private consortium*	Due to the complex nature of PPPs, instead of one company, many companies should come together and form a consortium which must be equipped with strong technical, operational and managerial capacity to be able to undertake the PPP. In developing countries, governments should assist local companies financially and technically to be able to obtain a role in such a consortium.
3. *Political support*	Without political support, approval for public expenditure would not be granted. Moreover, the more support political leaders give, the more investors will be attracted and vice-versa, in jurisdictions where there is less political support, investors most likely will not tender.
4. *Public / community support*	Acceptance by the public community, whether the media, trade unions, civil societies and other NGOs is essential and helps minimize any sort of delays such as acquisition of lands for project development. It can also reduce the cost of production when local people are engaged as workers. Awareness creation and public education, as well as assurances of good quality and services and end user fees for the public or community in question, is an essential task for the government as well.
5.*Transparent procurement*	Transparency does not only apply to the tendering process but also throughout the delivery of the PPP. Constant and cordial communication among parties and external stakeholders can foster this. Parties should openly consult each other for any clarification necessary on anything related to the projects' delivery. Moreover, public and private must be transparent and open to external stakeholders or users, with information and reports on the projects be made publicly available. Last, the government should clear rumours or doubts within the public domain about the PPP, as negative public perception could impede successful implementation.

Table 4: Critical Success Factors, ranked in order of importance, for PPPs to be effective. (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2013).

In a practical sense, it remains difficult to assess in advance or in hindsight whether such CSFs are indeed taken into account throughout the PPP process. Although the UNECE drafted an extensive set of successful PPPs in 2016, CSFs weren't specifically noted as factors that led to the supposed successes of these PPPs. Key limitations of this stream are thus that practice shows limited evidence of whether stakeholders specifically considered one or several of these CSFs throughout the PPP process, or whether such consideration of CSFs makes PPP more effective for sustainable development purposes. Although the five CSFs by Osei-Kyei & Chan (2013), are certainly useful for governments to consider when debating PPPs for future projects, they do not provide sufficient reasons to pursue PPPs, nor show what the impact and development outcomes would be for the people involved. The following academic stream will therefore go into the critical claims on PPPs.

2.3.2 Academic stream two: PPPs do not contribute to sustainable development

Multiple scholars claim that PPPs are inherently bad, do not lead to sustainable development, are too expensive and give too much power to the private sector. Jomo et al., (2016), state that the ambiguity of PPPs and their definitions impedes the applicability of PPPs for sustainable development across the globe, especially since it hampers harmonization with all the involved actors when it remains unclear what a PPP in effect means for who, causing different goals and expectations for the parties involved. In their extensive report for the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), they find that it remains unclear what the developmental impact of PPPs in developing countries has been (Jomo et al., 2016).

Moreover, the recent devoted focus on PPPs by international and national actors alike, is considered misplaced. As only 15 to 20% of total infrastructure investment comes from private finance, Romero, (2015), claims it would be more useful to focus on more effective and efficient investments from the public sector, which provides almost 80% of total infrastructure investment. Hall (2015), reiterates Romero's (2015), arguments and additionally notes that the private sector will only focus on the most profitable projects when considering PPPs, rather than sustainable development or infrastructures and services that benefit people first, and so focus on profit second. According to Bowen et al., (2017), such misplaced devotion comes from the fact that rare success cases of PPPs around the 1990s were then framed as a silver bullet for development in developing countries. However, Bowen, (2017), claims that copying such 'success cases' to the developing world simply does not work, and that it has given too much power to the private sector in developing countries, hampering further development.

Leigland (2018), echoes this critique and adds that PPPs are often considered a success simply when the project process has been completed without significant opposition.

Yet, the private sector often neglects welfare distribution, while the public authorities often focus on a timely implementation of PPPs to meet certain political promises (Leigland, 2018). Both parties therefore neglect the actual end goal that PPPs should promote, namely sustainable development, in which a win-win for both parties and the people in the area would be created. Yu, (2016) has elaborated more on private participation, and finds that most PPPs in a developing countries' context focused more on high returns on investment (ROI) for the private sector, rather than sustainable development impacts. In other cases, PPPs were proven to be more expensive overall, compared to regular public provisioning (Jomo et al., 2016), or failed completely in achieving the desired end goal, such as expanding the provision of services and infrastructure for the public (Leigland, 2018).

Critical evidence of those issues is presented by Mariott's (2014) research on a hospital built in Lesotho through a PPP in collaboration with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Lesotho's Ministry of Health (MoH). Initially, the PPP was considered an exemplary case in which private participation in the public domain allowed for the development of the hospital and thereby the increase of access to primary healthcare for the public. However, the research shows that the PPP agreement locked the MoH in an 18-year contract with annual payments of 67 million US dollar to the private party, more than half of the MoH's annual budget. Contradictory, the annual ROI for the private party was over 25% (Mariott, 2014; Romero, 2015). Powell (2016), therefore notes that this case was the opposite of an exemplary case, as it in fact had a negative development impact in Lesotho's healthcare sector.

The most encompassing criticism on PPPs comes from Hall's (2015), extensive report which focuses on this unwarranted enthusiasm of international organizations for PPPs. Summarizing, it claims that: *''PPPs are expensive and inefficient way of financing infrastructure and divert government spending away from other public services, conceal public borrowing, while providing long-term state guarantees for profits to private companies. Private sector corporations must maximize profits if they are to survive. This is fundamentally incompatible with protecting the environment and ensuring universal access to quality public services. There are no public consultations, lots of false promises, and incredibly complex contracts, all designed to protect corporate profits. There is also a fair amount of bribery''* (Hall, 2015).

Thus, this academic stream trusts that PPPs are inherently ineffective and should not be considered for sustainable development purposes. However, a key limitation of this stream is that it predominantly addresses the limitations of PPPs, without providing lessons learned or alternative forms of PPPs and policy recommendations (except merely abandoning PPPs in general). Considering the extensive and persistent promotion of numerous international organizations of PPPs, it seems more beneficial to either provide recommendations for future PPPs, or to recommend a gradual reduction of the use of PPPs, instead of expecting international organizations to directly step away from PPP. Roehrich, Lewis & George, (2014), indeed argue that it is more useful to seek a middle ground, learn from failures and consider alternative approaches in PPPs with the goal to assist states in understanding why or why not to consider PPPs under which circumstances, for certain goals or ambitions. The third literature stream therefore addresses such middle ground.

2.3.3 Academic stream three: A middle ground and people-first PPPs

Scholars from this third stream do not believe that PPPs are always successful when CSFs are considered, nor do they believe that PPPs are invariably ineffective and inefficient. Rather, there are approaches that need to be taken into account when using PPPs, dependent on contexts and sectors, to ensure advantageous outcomes for all. Although this academic stream does not provide one clear-cut theme such as the first or second stream, the approaches presented here are of essential importance to take into consideration for the analysis in chapter 5.

First, Jomo et al., (2016), note that PPPs should be distinguished between economic PPPs and social PPPs. For example, they claim that in developing countries, economic PPPs are better suited than social PPPs, due to the former's return on investment (ROI) being easier to forecast[11], especially since the political and economic context in developing countries can present certain risks that are not as present in developed countries (Jomo et al., 2016). Therefore, Jomo et al., (2016) recommend an enabling institutional framework to create, manage, evaluate and monitor PPPs. What stands out in this framework, found in figure 2, is the focus on ''safeguarding citizens' welfare

[11] For example, forecasting demand in electricity use is more straightforward then forecasting student enrolment in a new school, especially since the latter also depends on the quality of teachers, education and other variables. When the host country has less developed institutions which problematises the speed of building the school, the risk is often considered 'too expensive', thus the economic PPP is often better suited than social PPPs in developing countries, according to Jomo et al., (2016).

and sustainable development through a legal, regulatory and monitoring framework", as this is rather unaddressed in the other academic streams.



Figure 2. Key components of an enabling institutional framework for PPPs. (Jomo et al., 2016).

Van Dijk (2008), found that stakeholder analyses and dialogue throughout the PPP process can significantly enhance its effectiveness. An example of such dialogue can be to encourage all involved stakeholders[12] to collectively form an action plan, define the desired impact and end goals, and together agree on a mutual commitment to long-term development outcomes and welfare distribution (Estache & Rossi, 2004). This can however create extra costs which occasionally neither the public nor private parties want to pay. According to Leigland, (2018), donors and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) should therefore inform public authorities that without such forms of dialogue, the effectiveness of PPPs can significantly be reduced. Especially since private parties predominantly focus on a high ROI rather than developmental

[12]Stakeholders can range from women's groups, local governments, NGOs and manufacturers to rural cooperatives, multilateral donors to members of civil society and consumers (Sovacool, 2012).

outcomes which is of greater importance for the public authorities, the latter should reconsider bearing the costs of stakeholder analyses and dialogue facilitation and so include them in future PPPs (Leigland, 2018).

Evidence has shown that a lack of transparency, no stakeholder analyses, limited dialogue and limited community engagement, could lead to community opposition, unrest, mass demonstrations and government repression (Romero, 2015). Hence, including multiple stakeholders throughout the PPP process, as recommended by this stream, allows for feedback, legitimacy of the project due to political support and acceptance of civil society, which can altogether improve the implementation process of the PPP. Romero, (2015), adds that if this is combined with contractual agreements on providing precise sustainable development outcomes, such as ensuring affordability, equitable access and limiting negative externalities, PPPs can bring substantial benefits to both the public and the private as well as the people involved. To do so, the UNECE advocates for PPPs in line sustainable development and with a focus on the needs of poor communities, (UNECE, 2016), often overlooked by traditional PPPs (Sovacool, 2012). Such PPPs are also coined as 'People-first PPPs', 'Pro-poor PPPs' or '5P' and defined as a PPP which *"increases access of the poor to basic services by promoting inclusive partnerships between local government, business, community groups, NGOs, faith Based Organizations and others"* (UNDP, 2011).

One of the limitations of this stream, however, is that even when sustainable development outcomes are included in all phases of the PPP, the enforcement of the private and public actor to achieve those outcomes can remain ineffective. For example, Romero (2015), finds that the World Bank's social and environmental safeguards weren't always completely implemented by the public authorities with PPP implementation. This stream therefore goes the right way in addressing the risks and advantages of PPPs by viewing it as dedicated model for specific outcomes, rather than a one-size fits all model, but limitedly addresses precise recommendations to ensure that all desirable aspirations are met and pro-poor goals are achieved after implementation of the PPP. Again, testing this on two practical cases in the wind and energy sector can significantly contribute to our understanding of PPP for sustainable development. Before doing so, the following section addresses the literature on PPPs for those sectors specifically.

2.4 PPPs per sector

2.4.1 PPPs for sustainable development in the wind energy sector

The research on PPPs for renewable energy or specifically wind energy in developing countries is limitedly available. Martins et al., (2011), focus on the economics of PPPs for wind energy in Portugal, whereas Dinica (2008), focuses on the diffusion of wind energy derived from a PPP, while both neglect issues of sustainable development, let alone a developing countries' context. Bridge et al., (2018), consider state-led versus market-led approaches for national development in the renewable energy sector abut does not substantively address PPPs. The status and policy framework review on wind energy in Kenya by Kazimierczuk (2019), acknowledges that international and private participation is critical in Africa and Kenya for the expansion of wind energy and notes that the Government of Kenya is actively pursuing PPPs in this sector, but then focuses more on the challenges of wind power specifically, rather than the role of PPPs for development outcomes.

Sovacool's (2012), research explores eight pro-poor PPPs for renewable energy, and finds that increasing the access to energy in developing countries for rural or poor communities is problematic, as such areas are considered too risky for the private sector to invest in and too insecure for the public sector to focus policies on. Additionally, international donors predominantly focus on sharing technologies and know-how, rather than creating or expanding energy networks. Together with an inactive private and public sector, this limits the opportunities of PPPs for sustainable development and further sustains the persistent inaccessibility to energy underdevelopment in such locations and for such communities (Sovacool, 2012). Additionally, Chirambo (2018), finds that developing countries most often require projects of rural electrification combined with agriculture development, rather than a general increase in power generation capacity, as the latter only increases the reliability of energy access in (predominantly urban) areas already connected to the energy grid. Kenya is illustrative for such inequality in energy access, as in 2016 Kenya's access to electricity was 39.3% in rural areas compared to 77.6% in urban areas (World Bank, 2019). Sovacool & Cooper's (2013), expand on the failures of energy megaprojects, and note that it is often the lacking public consultation, stakeholder engagement and issues of corruption that cause community opposition.'

2.4.2 PPPs for sustainable development in the health sector

The literature on PPPs in the health sector in developing countries is more available than for the wind energy sector. Richter (2004), discourages PPPs in the health sector, especially since PPPs: *"carry large risks that are neither highlighted nor addressed due to the positive connotation of the term"*. Such risks are found in the noted research on the PPP hospital in Lesotho, proven to have negatively impacted development outcomes (Mariott, 2014; Powell, 2016; Romero, 2015). An influential study by Reich (2002), found that although PPPs in the health sector can indeed offer benefits such as private capital and expertise, problems persist in terms of *"what accountability means to whom, how accountability can be implemented and assured with adequate transparency"*. Accountability and transparency is especially important in the health sector when various stakeholders are engaged with providing healthcare through the PPP.

A study by Banzon et al., (2014), on the feasibility of PPPs in the health sector in the Philippines provides more in-depth insights. The study found that utilizing PPPs generated improvements in access to healthcare in some areas, while in others such improvements weren't visible and pro-poor outcomes lacked. Hence, policies for PPPs should not be considered a silver bullet to tackle development issues in general or improve the access and quality of primary healthcare specifically, but rather be pursued on a case-to-case basis (Banzon et al., 2014). Similar conclusions are drawn by Roehrich et al., (2014), who found that PPPs can be beneficial in the health sector in developing countries in terms of employment opportunities and innovation, however improvements in the performance, quality and the expansion of access to healthcare throughout PPP life-cycles remained unclear, limiting the development opportunities (Roehrich et al., 2014).

2.4.3 Conclusion on PPPs per sector

Altogether, the literature on the contribution of PPPs for sustainable development in a developing country's context, especially the wind and health sectors, holds rival explanations similar to the academic streams presented. For the health sector, Reich, (2002), addresses CSFs for PPPs to succeed, whereas Mariott, (2014), Powell, (2016), and Romero, (2015), completely oppose PPPs for the health sector. A middle-ground is found by Banzon et al., (2014), who found that although PPPs can deliver their expected benefits, this does not guarantee that sustainable development outcomes are realized in every case. For the wind energy sector, the literature mostly aligns with the claims identified in the third academic stream, even though rival explanations remain in the limitedly available literature. Hence, this illustrates the importance and relevance of this thesis to connect the issues of sustainable development and PPPs in both sectors, especially in a developing countries' context such as Kenya.

2.5 Specification of the research question

Recent theoretical and policy literature on public-private partnerships and development suggests a constellation of factors bears on the prospective contributions and risks of PPPs generally and in the energy and health sectors in particular for (sustainable) development outcomes. Whereas PPP critics consider PPPs a way to strengthen the private sector in domains where it should not be present, with corruption, inefficiencies, high costs and no benefits for the public as negative outcomes, others find PPPs a successful method in mobilizing financial resources for the implementation and development of public services and infrastructures. Others believe that it depends on the context of the PPP and whether issues such as stakeholder analyses, community engagement, dialogue and people-first objectives are included and determined throughout the PPP process and after implementation by all involved stakeholders.

Besides, Fritz, Levy & Ort (2013), find in their problem driven political economy analysis that in terms of focusing on sustainable development outcomes, it's usually not a lack of financial resources or a lack of knowledge for technical solutions (which supposedly is one of the greatest advantages of a PPP) but more about how structural and institutional factors and stakeholder interests influence sustainable development outcomes. In this theory, it's not merely about how the PPP is designed with whom and for what purpose, but about how contextual incentives and constrains shape such outcomes (Fritz, Levy & Ort, 2013). Addressing the cases of the wind energy and health sectors in Kenya, this thesis asks whether, to what extent and how PPPs in these sectors are contributing to Kenya's development agenda specifically and sustainable development outcomes more broadly. It considers the implications of the Kenyan political economy with respect to the literature on effective PPPs, related to sustainable development outcomes. By doing so, this thesis addresses the gaps in the present literature. The following chapter further outlines the hypotheses, methods and analytical framework.

Chapter 3: Analytic framework and methods

3.1 Introduction of hypotheses

To ascertain features of PPPs in Kenya and the supposed contributions of PPPs to sustainable development, I develop an empirical investigation of specific PPP cases, exploring whether or not and to what extent they confirm to rival claims in the academic streams. Specifically, I explore features of PPP traits, Kenya's sustainable development agenda, Kenya's political economy and the way they interact with observed outcomes. Given the limited number of cases and practical limitations of a desk study, this thesis cannot and does not set out to establish definitive confirmatory support or refutation of the theoretical propositions. Nonetheless, it contributes to the advancement of analyses of PPPs in Kenya and the advancement of the literature discussion more broadly.

The advancement of analyses of PPPs in Kenya is especially relevant considering the endeavours of the international development community and Kenya to promote PPPs for sustainable development, while the relation between the two remains ambiguous. The advancement of the literature discussion is especially relevant considering the rival academic claims in the literature, which hampers consensus on the effectiveness of PPPs specifically as well as the possibility to provide meaningful policy recommendations for future PPPs that should serve sustainable development outcomes. This thesis therefore moves forward both the knowledge in the academic field concerning PPPs, as well as the knowledge for the international development community on effective PPPs for sustainable development in a developing countries' context, specifically in the wind energy and health sector. It does so by exploring three hypotheses in relation to two current cases, of which the latter are set out in chapter 4. The hypotheses are established in line with the rival academic streams presented in chapter 2.

Hypothesis 1: Public-private partnerships are an inherently effective model to promote sustainable development in Kenya.

Hypothesis 2: Public-private partnerships are an inherently ineffective model to promote sustainable development in Kenya.

Hypothesis 3: Public-private partnerships are not an inherently effective nor ineffective model to foster sustainable development in Kenya.

If H1 is identified at the cases, expected outcomes throughout the PPP process and after implementation include: a clear consideration of and engagement with critical success factors by the parties involved. This especially concerns an appropriate sharing of risk between the parties, the presence of a strong private consortium, political support from the Kenyan state, community support and a transparent procurement process and open information provision. In case these CSFs are considered, it is expected that PPPs are inherently successful and subsequently contribute to sustainable development.

If H2 is identified at the cases, expected outcomes throughout the PPP process and after implementation include: no harmonization between the public and private parties in terms of the expectations, goals and desired outcomes. Additionally, it is expected that the private party focuses solely on profits and a high ROI, without engaging in welfare distribution schemes, community engagement and public consultations. For the public party, it is expected that it rather focuses more on a timely implementation of the project than a careful consideration of its impact for developmental purposes. Issues of bribery, corruption, mass opposition and distrust from the people towards the projects can also be expected.

If H3 is identified at the cases, expected outcomes throughout the PPP process and after implementation include: a leading role by the public authorities on safeguarding citizens' welfare through an effective legal, regulatory and monitoring framework and by encouraging the private party to pursue stakeholder analyses, civil society and community engagement, political dialogue and welfare distribution. Further, it is expected that the private and public parties agree on well-defined long-term goals and people-first objectives, preferably through contractual agreements lasting long after implementation. Additionally, there should be no opposition nor demonstrations by the public, in case a people-first PPP is expected. Last, it is expected that issues as bribery and corruption do not prevail.

3.2 Methods

First, the case studies will be presented, after which they can be set against the literature streams in order to discover if, whether and why certain aspects and claims of the academic streams were or were not present in each context, and why or why not. In this way, the thesis uses two practical cases – The Lake Turkana Wind Power Project in Marsabit County and the Community Life Center in Kiambu County - to test the theories (George & Bennett, 2005). Subsequently, the case studies will be compared, as to find similarities and/or differences between the PPPs in the health and energy sector for sustainable development outcomes in Kenya.

To explore the hypothesis 1, 2 and 3, this thesis predominantly uses the extensive literature review on PPPs and the subsequent academic streams presented in chapter 2, in order to assess the two case studies in question. Additionally, documents of the Government of Kenya, next to media and internet sources, will be used for the case introduction and to clarify PPP traits. These insights can then be set against the academic streams on PPPs and test whether or which stream is most evident and why.

Based on these insights, the cases will be compared in order to understand whether and how outcomes of the PPPs differed. In this manner, additional insights can be gained on which traits of PPPs are essential for sustainable development outcomes. This will be combined with the problem driven political economy analysis (PEA) by Fritz, Levy & Ort (2013) to examine structural factors, institutions and stakeholders' interest and power in the PPP process and Kenya's context, which can further explain observed outcomes and identify solutions for Kenya's future engagement with PPPs for sustainable development.

3.3 Analytic framework

First, an analytic framework from the author, figure 3, provides a visualization of the proposed question. Kenya's sustainable development should be achieved through its sustainable development agenda, Vision 2030 (which incorporates Medium Term Plans, MTP III and the Big 4 Agenda) which collectively promote PPPs to foster sustainable development outcomes. Nonetheless, the relation between these PPPs in Kenya and its sustainable development outcomes remains ambiguous. To introduce Kenya's sustainable development agenda and affinity with PPPs in chapter 4, this thesis makes use of government policies, reports and webpages on Vision 2030, Medium Term Plans, the Big 4 Agenda and the PPP Unit.



Figure 3: A visualization of the issues in question. Sustainable development in Kenya is to be achieved through its government policies, in which one builds on the other, and while these policies put significant focus on PPPs to achieve sustainable development, such direct link remains incomplete both in the academic literature as well as in reports of the international development community (Bierkens, 2019).

Second, the analytic framework of the PEA, figure 4, provides a visualization of the integrated nature of relevant issues for Kenya's political economy context that can further explain observed outcomes. The applicability of the PEA is profound, as it has managed to map relevant issues for the health governance during the Ebola crisis (McCollum & Taegtmeyer, 2017), and energy subsidy in reform in Morocco (Fritz, Levy & Ort, 2013). In the analysis section, the topic fields are filled in with the relevant issues for that topic. Note that the topics sections are interrelated, as shown by the directions of the arrows.



Figure 4. The layers and key aspects of Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis. (Fritz, Levy & Ort, 2013).

Insights from this PEA can be considered complementary to the outcomes of the assessment of the first three hypotheses. In so doing, the combination of these approaches assists in elaborating on the hypotheses and answering the broader refined research question. This combination advances the discussion on PPPs in a developing countries' context, or specifically Kenya's health and wind energy sectors in terms of its sustainable development outcomes and is profoundly meaningful for the present discussions in academic and development fields alike. The following chapter introduces relevant issues of Kenya and sets out the cases in question.

Chapter 4. Introducing Kenya and the PPP cases

4.1 Introducing Kenya, its experience with PPPs and its sustainable development agenda

4.1.1 An introduction to Kenya

Kenya, or officially the Republic of Kenya, gained independence in 1963 and declared the Republic in 1964. Kenya is a presidential representative democratic republic and the country is considered the economic hub of East Africa[13]. The last few years have been dynamic. 2017 is known for its political instability during the presidential election, which led to protests across the country where over 100 people got killed (HRW, 2019). 2018 was relatively more stable, especially after the well-known ''handshake''[14] between the president Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga. This was a sing for political cooperation in times of divisiveness, improving Kenya's overall stability (Mosoku, 2019). So far in 2019, severe droughts have negatively affected agriculture and food supplies while private sector investment is slacking (World Bank, 2019C). The constant threat of terrorism affects Kenya's stability too, exemplified by the terrorist attack in Nairobi by al-Shabaab in January 2019 (Burke, 2019). Most recently, criticism is increasingly outed on the famous ''handshake'', stating that it in fact reduced the opposition to the president and that it was rather a form of tribal power consolidation well before the upcoming presidential election in 2022. Such political events harm confidence in politics, the investment climate and thus the progress of Kenya's development agenda (The Economist, 2019).

4.1.2 Kenya's Vision 2030 and the SDGs

Kenya's Vision 2030 was implemented in 2008 and *is ''a national long-term development blueprint to create a globally competitive and prosperous nation with a high quality of life by 2030, that aims to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens by 2030 in a clean and secure environment''* (Gov, 2018A). Vision 2030 focuses on local production, expansion in regional markets, a growing share in niche markets and developing a robust manufacturing sector. (Newman et al., 2016). Vision

[13] See appendix 1 for a map of East Africa and Kenya
[14] See for example: Okumu, (2019), or a Google search on ''Kenya handshake'' for the numerous articles on this event.

2030 contains an economic, social and political pillar, as well as macro enablers to achieve its stated mission. These pillars and enablers are further specified in figure 5.

Vision 2030 was created through an inclusive process with local, national and international stakeholders, where the GoK collaborated with the UN to mainstream sustainable development and the SDGs in its development agenda. For example, the GoK directs *"all Ministries, Department and Agencies to mainstream the SDGs into policy, planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation systems and processes"* (UN, 2019E). Although Kenya has made substantial progress in development related to the 17 SDGs[15], the progress has been uneven across the country. Hence, the UN calls for more focus on socio-economic equity of benefits to ensure that every Kenyan can benefit from the development initiatives currently, being implemented or planned (UN, 2019E).

4.1.3 Kenya's MTPs, MTP III and the Big 4 Agenda

Vision 2030 is implemented through successive five-year Medium Term Plans (MTPs). Similarly to Vision 2030, the MTPs contain an economic, social and political pillar. The MTPs also assist in monitoring progress towards Vision 2030 every five years and subsequently identifying new challenges for the following term (Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014). At the time of writing, MTP III[16] is in force, covering the years 2018 to 2022 and focuses mostly on advancing socio-economic development (Gov, 2018A). The SDGs are also mapped in the MTPs, to ensure that Kenya's development policies and projects positively contribute to both its national Vision 2030 as well as the UN's Agenda 2030 (UN, 2019E). Last, there is The Big 4 Agenda (Big 4), the action plan for MTP III. Kenya's president created this Big 4 to leave a legacy for his country when his presidential term ends in 2022, similar to MTP III (Keter, 2018). The Big 4 focuses on universal health coverage, food security, affordable housing and manufacturing. (Wambugu, 2018). It also acknowledges the importance of PPPs for achieving its ambitions, such as through major infrastructure projects or service expansion[17], which subsequently contributes to the goals in MTP III and Kenya's Vision 2030 (Bankelele, 2018).

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[15] For Kenya's voluntary national review, see https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=30022&nr=372&menu=3170
[16] For the complete Medium Term Plan III, see: http://vision2030.go.ke/inc/uploads/2019/01/THIRD-MEDIUM-TERM-PLAN-2018-2022.pdf.
[17] For more on the Big 4 Agenda, see: https://big4.president.go.ke.



Figure 5: Pillars and enablers as focus areas for Kenya's Vision 2030 and MTPs (MTP3, 2019).

4.1.4 Kenya's experience with PPPs

Public-private partnerships are considered an integral model for the pursuit of Kenya's development agenda. Although Leigland (2018), claims that usually low income countries do not support PPPs, Kenya's case does not fit this claim. In 2012 the World Bank provided a $40 million loan to assist Kenya in the establishment of a PPP law (World Bank, 2018), which illustrates the endeavors of multilateral organizations to promote developing countries' engagement with PPPs. In 2013, Kenya adopted the Public Private Partnership Act[18] under which it established a PPP Unit, formally within the National Treasury of the Government of Kenya. The PPP Unit functions as a resource center for best practices, a guardian of integrity of the PPP processes and it provides recommendations in terms of affordability, value for money and risk transfer of PPPs to the PPP committee, which then assesses and approves PPPs across Kenya (Treasury, 2019). The PPP Unit's Principal Secretary believes that to achieve the economic pillar of Vision 2030, there is more need for private sector investments through PPPs in infrastructure and services, complementary to traditional government support (PPP, 2019). A timeline of government initiatives for PPPs is summarized in table 5.

[18] For the full PPP Act 2013, see: http://www.treasury.go.ke/guideline.html.

Year	Title	Description
2011	PPP Policy Statement 2011	Articulated the government's commitment to PPPs, and formed the basis for the enactment of a PPP law.
2012	PPP Act	Enacted into law.
2013	PPP Act 2013	The PPP Act became effective as of 8 February 2013.
2014	National PPP Regulations	National regulations were gazetted.
2017	PPP Project Facilitation Fund	Regulations were gazetted.
2017	PPP Amendment Bill	Pending approval by Parliament.
2018	Government Support Measures Policy	Government's policy on support to implementers of public projects.

Table 5. Government initiatives for the PPP program in Kenya. (PPP, 2019).

4.2 Introducing the public-private partnership cases

4.2.1 Lake Turkana Wind Power Project, Marsabit County

The Lake Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) project, or 'the Project', is the largest wind power project in Africa. It is an infrastructure PPP, as the LTWP consortium has provided the 365 wind turbines, whereas the Kenyan government has constructed the transmission line through which the generated energy can be connected to the national grid (LTWP, 2019). The Project is located in Loiyangalani District, Marsabit County[19]. According to the consortium, the Project provides reliable, low cost energy to Kenya's national grid, about 17% of Kenya's total capacity (LTWP, 2019). This energy is then bought by a fixed price for a 20-year period by Kenya Power & Lighting Company (KPLC), partly owned by the GoK with 50.1% of its shares. The project was supposed to be completed in 2011, but its financial closure was in 2014 (Honan, 2014). The project was expected to be constructed and running in January 2017, but only since September 2018 does the Project provide energy to the national grid.

4.2.2 Community Life Center, Kiambu County

The Dutch multinational Royal Philips and the County Government of Kiambu collaborated to form a public-private partnership in health services, by setting up a Community Life Center (CLC)[20]. The CLC has transformed a rundown health facility into a community hub, which supposedly improves the access to primary healthcare and reduces infant and maternal mortality rates (Maltha, 2017). Additionally, it provides community members with the option to buy clean water and make use of its solar-powered lighting, while it has also fostered employment opportunities (Choksey,

[19] See appendix 2 for the location of the project and appendix 3 for images of the project.
[20] See appendix 4 for the location of the project and appendix 5 for images of the project.

2014). Philips takes a leading role by providing the infrastructure, medical equipment, energy supply and technical expertise and training to caregivers, while the County Government is responsible for policy, regulation, staffing, the supplies of necessary drugs and investment in infrastructural development (Lijfering, 2017). The CLC opened in June 2014, and has since supposedly improved access to primary healthcare significantly.

4.2.3 Factsheets

According to Yescombe (2018), it is critical to set out fact sheets when assessing PPPs for understanding the background of the cases, testing literature and gaining insights for the case study in general. The LTWP factsheet is found in table 6, and the CLC factsheet in table 7.

Fact sheet	**Lake Turkana Wind Power Park (LTWP)**
Main aim	To create 365 wind turbines with a capacity of 850kW for a total installed capacity of 310MW to provide reliable low cost energy to Kenya's national grid.
Public Authority	Government of Kenya, Marsabit County, Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KLPC), Kenya Electricity Transmission Company (KETRACO).
Project Company	LTWP Ltd.
PPP contract type / term	Build-own-operate contract, through the KLPC, which signed a purchase power agreement, the Government of Kenya is committed to buy the generated wind-power for a 20 year term.
Project cost	+/- $765 million.
Consortium	European Investment Bank (EIB), African Development Bank (AfDB), The Trade and Development Banks (TDB), East African Development Bank (EADB), PROPARCO, Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO), Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG), Eksport Kredit Fonden of Denmark (EKF), Standard Bank of South Africa, Nedbank of South Africa, EU Africa Infrastructure Fund (EU-AITF).
Ownership and shareholders	Aldwych Turkana Limited, KP&P Africa B.V., The Danish Climate Fund, KLP Norfund Investments of Norway, Vestas, Finnfund, Sandpiper.
Developers	Siemens, Civicon, SECO, RXPE.
Public-sector support	Payment Guarantees, construction of a 428km transmission line to transport the energy to a substation in Suswa

Table 6: Fact sheet on the Lake Turkana Wind Power Park. (Cormack & Kurewa, 2018; Honan, 2014; LTWP, 2019; Vestas, 2018; World Bank, 2019E).

Fact sheet	Community Life Center (CLC)
Main aim	Co-create a self-sustainable community health hub that improves primary health outcomes
Public Authority	Kiambu County, Kiambu County Community Health Strategy Unit
Project Company	Royal Philips N.V.
Former name	The Githurai-Langata health facility
PPP contract type / term	There is no set term for this PPP as it should become self-sustainable. Contract type most aligns with Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT)
Project cost	Unclear due to various roles of private and public parties. For example, Philips' Research & Innovation hub made expenses for the CLC model, which is not directly seen in annual reports.
Investors	None
Public-sector support	Policy, regulation, staffing, medicines, infrastructural investment and development, training of community health volunteers.
Stakeholder map	Community, health ecosystem, governance and administrative structures.

Table 7: Fact sheet on the Community Life Center. (Lijfering, 2017; Philips, 2016; Politzer, 2016; Subbaraman et al., 2016; Wakoba, 2014; World Bank, 2012).

Chapter 5. Analysis

5.1 Introduction

The following paragraphs will assess how the PPPs in question do or do not align completely or in part with either one or several of the presented academic streams. First, it assesses whether and how the five CSFs[21] by Osei-Kyei & Chan, (2015), as presented in table 4, were considered throughout the PPP process. This assessment also forms the basis for further analysis on whether the more negative aspects of the second literature stream, or the people-first aspects of the third literature stream, prevailed. Subsequently, the contributions of the PPPs to sustainable development will be assessed, in terms of the people, Kenya's Vision 2030 and the SDGs. After these findings are set out, the comparison assists in identifying lessons learned and differences in the outcomes of the two PPPs. Based on this, the PEA will identify further contextual issues such as structural factors, institutions and stakeholder interests that have played a role in the observed outcomes, and collectively this provides a holistic analysis for the research question.

5.2 Linking the academic streams on PPPs with the PPP cases and sustainable development outcomes

5.2.1.1 The Lake Turkana Wind Power project and the academic streams on PPPs

In terms of appropriate risk sharing, there have been some discrepancies. The construction of the transmission line was the key responsibility of the public authorities, but got delayed several times. The contractor got bankrupt three years after signing the contract, so eventually KETRACO was selected to take on the responsibility to construct this transmission line. The delays in this construction led to postponement of operations for the LTWP and a fine of about 52 million USD to be paid by the Government of Kenya. In part, the fine is going to be paid by higher electricity rates for the end-user (Olsen, 2018), i.e. Kenya's people. The delays also reduced the LTWP's funds for CSR investment, as its fund is dependent on the electricity output (Kamau, 2017B). The delays and fines might have been prevented when there was a better allocation and sharing of risks. Therefore, this CSF was partially considered for LTWP.

[21] For the table on the CSFs, see page 19.

As the fact sheet at table 6 shows, the LTWP has a strong private consortium of stakeholders and various MDBs that assist in providing technical, financial and managerial capacity for the local companies: KLPC and KETRACO. However, it took years of negotiations to establish such strong consortium, and financial closure was only reached after nine years. During the negotiation process, the World Bank withdrew support due to disagreements over the terms of the PPP, but the AfDB took over this financing role (Gordon, 2018). Still, this CSF is competently considered.

According to the founder of LTWP, Willem Dolleman, it took a long time to establish political support but once the Government of Kenya and the Marsabit County Government saw the opportunities and positive status of having Africa's biggest wind farm, political support improved and effectively contributed to the overall process of the PPP (Vos, 2018). According to Fazal, (2018), the fact that the financing structure of LTWP withstood the rigor of 17 international lenders and investors' due diligence also contributed to more political support. Although there were phases where political support fluctuated, especially when local tribes started to oppose the project, this CSF is adeptly considered.

It is public and community support where LTWP mostly failed, although it actively aims to make up for the problems since the project is operational. The extensive field work and research by Cormack & Kurewa (2018), addresses this expertly. Initially, few people opposed the project and instead sought to be included in the supposed developmental outcomes. However, once construction started, the consortium and public authorities were accused of land-grabbing[22], infringing indigenous land rights, failing to provide adequate relocation measures for local tribes[23]. Also, they were accused of neglecting local development by hiring mostly foreign workers[24] (Cormack & Kurewa, 2018). As Cormack & Kurewa (2018), state: *''Attempts to secure 'benefits' and be part of 'development' have created new forms of exclusion and raised questions over who is entitled to access wind-power resources among the different nomadic groups''.*

[22] Because LTWP leased 607 km2 of communal land from the County Government.
[23] More specifically, the Rendille, El-Molo, Samburu and Turkana people.
[24] All issues of public and community support are beyond the scope of this thesis, but to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of ''The changing nature of land in Northern Kenya'', See Cormack & Kurewa (2018).

NGOs as the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) have also acknowledged that community opposition was present, such as through roadblocks at construction (Sena, 2015). There have been some stakeholder analyses, community consultations and resettlement plans, but these were either not carried out effectively or sufficiently. This illustrates that even though this CSF is considered by the public and private parties, it does not mean that it therefore inherently provides sustainable development outcomes to all, as Romero, (2015) noted in academic stream three.

Last, transparent procurement. The tendering process was mostly transparent without ambiguities throughout the phases, even though it's been the largest investment ever in Kenya (Sena, 2015). However, in terms of PPP delivery, the public and private parties weren't fully transparent and the public authorities didn't directly tackle negative public perception in regards to the land lease issues. Through the Marsabit County Council, the communally owned land was turned into private land, without consultations with the communities involved (Cormack & Kurewa, 2018). So, although the tendering process was transparent, the complete delivery of the PPP and provision of relevant information to all involved stakeholders and communities was not. This fifth CSF is therefore partially considered.

Despite the issues that were present throughout the PPP process, the LTWP is not necessarily an example of an inherently ineffective PPP to foster sustainable development. The private party did not predominantly focus on profits, but rather on electricity generation (Vos, 2018). The public authorities were also careful throughout the process, especially when community opposition prevailed, illustrating that it didn't solely focus on a timely implementation of the project. Additionally, collective long term goals and desired outcomes in terms of electricity generation were set amongst all involved stakeholders (Cormack & Kurewa, 2018). Additionally, LTWP aimed to provide benefits such as employability, health services, education and water access to the community through its Winds of Change foundation (LTWP, 2019), however, such people-first objectives didn't fully succeed.

For example, the public authorities privatized the land without acknowledging the pastoralists as indigenous people, and unrightfully leased the communal land (Sena, 2015). This is in part illustrative for the land-grabbing that's going on in Kenya (Enns, 2019). As Cormack & Kurewa (2018), noted, involuntary resettlement persisted while LTWP concluded that no indigenous people were affected, as stated in their

Stakeholder Engagement Plan, which meant they weren't legally obliged to seek Free Prior Informed Consent. This lack of community consultation is reiterated by Carbon Africa (2009). Neither have the public authorities taken a leading role in safeguarding citizens' welfare, nor in encouraging LTWP to engage in civil society and community engagement before construction started. The opposition by those communities in the early stages shows that essential concepts weren't considered throughout the PPP process, which has therefore limited the overall effectiveness of this PPP to generate sustainable development outcomes for all.

5.2.1.2 The Lake Turkana Wind Power project and sustainable development outcomes

Despite the fact that LTWP's environmental credentials are of unprecedented value for Kenya's development, the problems related to land rights, indigenous rights, resettlements and lack of information, shows the discrepancy between this PPP's main goal of providing developmental benefits to all, and the actual perception of and outcome for the people in the surrounding area. As some interviews by Cormack & Kurewa (2018), show, the communities did not demand land titles, but rather felt excluded as they considered themselves the rightful recipient of developmental outcomes from the projects, considering their historical connection to the land. Such forms of exclusion also came with the LTWP's CSR program, Winds of Change. Disputes exist on whether the CSR program merely served LTWP instead of the people, as it first focused on road construction and extra police capacity, rather than healthcare and education (Cormack & Kurewa, 2018). Moreover, the wind energy from LTWP is supposed to benefit every Kenyan through clean and affordable energy access, however it is precisely the local people in Marsabit who didn't gain access to electricity. Since LTWP can only sell the generated energy to KPLC, while the Rural Electrifiction Authority is legally responsible for the delivery of energy to areas of their concern. This means that energy is sold to already connected areas, i.e. the national grid (Voller, 2019), rather than expanding the national grid to unconnected areas. At the time of writing, different perspectives remain, whether it is that the people in Marsabit were exploited and excluded of development benefits (Voller, 2016), or that is has brought development to an initially unstable, marginalized area that Marsabit County was (LTWP, 2019).

For Kenya's development agenda, the contributions are clear. Power generation is an essential factor in Kenya's development, as well as in the Big 4 Agenda, as clean and reliable energy is necessary for healthcare, manufacturing, housing and even food security. Moreover, Vision 2030 acknowledges LTWP as a 'flagship project', as it transforms the formerly neglected northern Kenya from a periphery into a core of economic productivity (Cormack & Kurewa, 2018). The LTWP also invested 30 million USD in road construction from Laisamis to Loyangalani, which provides numerous economic advantages for Kenya (Olsen, 2018). Most importantly, through its 365 turbines, LTWP generates 310 Megawatt per year, 17% of Kenya's electricity supply, which can power over 330.000 homes. Moreover, LTWP is registered as a carbon dioxide removal project, as it removes 736,615 metric tons CO2 equivalent per annum (IWGIA, 2016). For the UN SDGs, it predominantly serves SDG 7, 13, 16 and 17, while issues of inequality and life on land are negatively impacted, illustrating the interconnected relation of the SDGs as earlier described by Allen, (2018).

To conclude, not all CSFs were proficiently considered by the public and private parties throughout the PPP process. In part, this can explain the problematic issues that occurred. Additionally, even though the public and private parties planned on people-first objectives, they were not effectively or efficiently carried out, which resulted in community opposition, delays and unrest. Moreover, the risks taken by the public authorities led to delays of the project, a substantial fine increased the cost of the generated energy for a few years (which is in part paid by the Kenyan people (Kamau, 2017B)), and the surrounding area was very limitedly included in the developmental outcomes (Cormack & Kurewa, 2018). Although the LTWP is a megaproject which evidently entails numerous more issues, it's contribution to Kenya's development agenda and the SDGs is profound, whereas its people-first sustainable development outcome remain limited. Hence, this example shows that the PPP is not inherently effective nor ineffective to foster sustainable development.

5.2.2.1 The Community Life Center and the academic streams on PPPs

In terms of appropriate risk sharing, the burdens are well-shared between Philips and the Kiambu County government, which collectively set the goal to make the Community Life Center self-sustainable and have it run by the people for the people (Lijfering, 2017). The allocation of tasks, associated risks and sharing responsibilities have not given rise to any significant problems throughout the PPP process. However, one unprecedented risk was that the news of the well-run facility spread to people in surrounding areas, who then visited the CLC as well, while it didn't have the capacity to serve everyone. This resulted in high work pressure and long waiting hours, but was quickly resolved by the public and private parties (Lijfering, 2017). Altogether, this first CSF is adeptly considered.

The CLC doesn't resolve around a strong private consortium, as it's only Philips and the County Government who are involved in the PPP. Even though this CSF is thus not considered, there are no observed issues or problems related to this CSF, making this CSF obsolete in this case.

The CSF of political support has been and remains to be proficiently considered. This mostly comes from the fact that Philips assisted the County Government in renovating a run-down health facility and upgrading it in a way to tackle a variety of issues, such as access to water, sanitation, electricity and access to primary healthcare, which was a key goal of the County Government and led to political support throughout (Neumann, 2017). However, one issue was that Philips wanted to sell water to the local people, which the Department of Water from the County Government didn't allow. Another was that Philips wanted to make people pay a minor fee for an ultrasound, which the County Government didn't agree with (Mudde, 2016). However, these issues didn't result in political opposition, but was rather an effort by the public authorities to ensure equitable access to the developmental outcomes.

Similarly to political support, public and community support was widely present and considered throughout. The CLC directly serves the community but it is also ran by community staff, who are trained by Philips and the County Government (Lijfering, 2017). The CLC focuses on the specific needs of the community in Kiambu, so it does not apply a one-size-fits-all model of Philips' CLC to the county, but rather seeks to map the most essential health issues as well as other socio-economic problems, which it then tackles (Philips, 2016). Additionally, it is community driven and that makes it self-sustainable throughout the PPP lifecycle, which does not require external financing and cumbersome rules and regulations or earmarked budgets which might have diverted the CLC's focus from people to profits (Philips, 2016).

Last, transparent procurement was present as well[25]. Notwithstanding certain disagreements between the public and private party over certain outputs such as water access and the ultrasound, the delivery of the PPP went smooth, and reports and

[25] The tender document can still be found, see: http://www.kiambu.go.ke/images/docs/other/26032015-CLC-Tender-Document-Final.pdf.

information are made publicly available by the private party (Philips, 2016) as well as public authorities (UHC Kenya, 2018), which implies that this fifth CSF is thoroughly considered.

In terms of the second academic stream on PPPs as presented in section 2.3.2, in fact none of the negative aspects were present throughout the PPP process nor after implementation. Instead, it can be said that the CLC is eminently a people-first PPP. Philips has carried out extensive stakeholder analyses, engaged with the communities and made them run the CLC, held political dialogue and set clear goals with the County Government, enforced an effective legal framework and ensured that the developmental outcomes served the people in Kiambu first (Lijfering, 2017; Philips, 2016; UHC Kenya, 2018).

5.2.2.2 The Community Life Center and sustainable development outcomes

Subbaraman et al., (2016), find that there are significant improvements in the health facility since the Philips' engagement. The number of clients in the antenatal clinic grew by 14 times in one year after inauguration, and *''an average of 3,886 clients were seen monthly in 2018''* (Syovota, 2019). Additionally, in 18 months, the number of outpatients grew from 1000 to 4000 in and the number of children that could be treated quadrupled (Syovota, 2019). According to a report by UHC Kenya (2018), other results of the PPP include: green energy for outdoor lighting, increased access to clean drinking water, healthcare services during the night, more staff members with new, portable ultrasound devices, stethoscopes and other tools – also referred to as The CLC Kit (Philips, 2016). Still, some challenges remain, especially that the CLC doesn't improve Kenya's health system in general, rather solely focuses on the area in Kiambu (Subbaraman et al., 2016).

For Kenya's development agenda, the contribution of the CLC is profoundly evident. Part of the Big 4 Action plan is to ensure affordable healthcare for all. The CLC directly contributes to the Big 4 and the social pillar of Vision 2030 by setting up a sustainable community-driven life center which has significantly improved the access to primary healthcare for Kenyans in Kiambu County. Philips' efforts are welcomed in Kenya, as illustrated by the fact that in 2017, Philips collaborated with Mandera County and UNFPA to set up a new CLC in that county (UNFPA, 2017). In terms of the SDGs, next to a direct contribution to SDG 3, it also contributed to SDG 1, 6, 7, 8 and 17, without any other SDG being negatively impacted, as was the case with LTWP. This PPP has proactively engaged with people's first objectives, in which both the public and private authorities had clear defined goals throughout the process. Also, through community engagement, stakeholder analyses and training of local staff, the CLC has provided substantial benefits to the region. Therefore, it can be considered an exemplary case for a PPP for sustainable development in Kenya, or Kenya's health sector specifically. Additionally, the case study illustrates that even when certain CSFs are not considered, such as a strong consortium, the fact that people-first objectives laid at the forefront of the implementation of this PPP, shows that it can be an inherently effective model to foster sustainable development.

5.3 Case comparison

Despite the fact that the cases differ in terms of implementation time, costs, stakeholders and also in geographical aspect, they are both implemented through a PPP design and have taken PPP approaches into account, albeit differently. A key point that becomes clear is that the CSFs by Osei-Kyei & Chan (2013), which are considered essential in the literature as for PPPs to succeed, in practice can be considered less essential. While the CLC didn't have a strong private consortium for the PPP, the sustainable development outcomes of the CLC are still profound. On the other hand, the LTWP didn't sufficiently consider the CSFs of appropriate sharing of risks and of public/community support, which led to lengthy delays, higher costs and the noted opposition of the community. Therefore, although CSFs remain important, the literature on CSFs for PPPs should not be solely considered as the key determinant of making PPPs effective for fostering sustainable development, as set out in the first academic stream.

The outcomes of both cases have illustrated that they both contribute to sustainable development, albeit with different outcomes. This means that these PPPs in Kenya are not inherently ineffective to foster sustainable development, as set out in the second academic stream. However, as noted, they aren't inherently effective either. Rather, it depends on the approach taken in the PPP, as set out in the third academic stream. The greatest difference between the two cases, and an essential finding of this comparison, is that the LTWP aimed to provide sustainable development outcomes in a top-down manner, with its CSR initiative and with expected spillover effects of the project to the region, whereas Philips directly involved the community throughout the PPP process and ensured the CLC became self-sustainable, through a bottom-up approach. To elaborate, different communities in Marsabit expected certain developmental outcomes after LTWP would be powered, but these weren't realized and so they felt excluded in development processes. With the CLC, the developmental outcomes were directly observed, as the local people's needs were assessed throughout the project and then directly tackled. This makes the CLC have a bottom-up approach, by the people for the people, instead of top-down as with LTWP. Altogether, these findings are based on a comparison of PPP design, PPP implementation and outcomes related to the literature. In order to provide more context, the following PEA assists in mapping structural factors, institutions and stakeholder interests for LTWP that have played a role in the observed outcomes.

5.4 The problem-driven political economy analysis

It would be too simplistic to attribute the lacking bottom-up people-first approach in LTWP solely to its PPP traits. Rather, structural factors and institutions that are specific for Kenya's political economy have also played a substantive role in the observed outcomes. Since the CLC hasn't faced specific 'problems', but the comparison has identified 'problems' for LTWP, this problem-driven political economy analysis focuses on the latter. Considering Kenya's vast ambitions on improving and expanding the access to energy across the country, this PEA can assist in mapping and understanding important contextual issues for Kenya that influence the effectiveness of PPPs. The most prominent issues are explained per topic and then included in the PEA.

5.4.1 Kenya's political economy

Historically, Kenya is known for its liberal political economy with a strong role for the state in economic affairs, while the private sector maintains a privilege (Nwapi & Andrews, 2017). Kenya's economic model is market oriented with a relatively stable investment climate and a strong focus on private sector development. However, Kenya's political elite owns most of the biggest private companies, hence issues such as corruption, land grabbing and unfair competition are prominent and still widely considered as one of the most important factors that limit Kenya's development. Yet, due to Kenya's market orientation with a strong role for the state to pursue developmental outcomes it holds a statist political economy model, (List, 2016). Moreover, Kenya has experienced a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of about 5% annually since 2013 (World Bank, 2019D), which eventually transformed it to a low to middle-income country (World Bank, 2019A). This requires Kenya to limit its aid dependency and strengthen macroeconomic policies (UNDP, 2019). In part, this led to Kenya's expanding engagement with PPPs (Kamau, 2017A).

5.4.2 Political tribalism and indigenous rights

Tribes, culture and ethnicity are extremely important in Kenya, especially in its politics which are often forms of tribal disputes. The political instability in 2017 predominantly came from tribal differences, between the Kikuyu tribe and the Luo tribe (Kirwa, 2019). The future of tribalism and how it affects Kenya's socio-economic development, remains uncertain yet profound, but can be summarized as an *"unprincipled and divisive competition for state power by members of the political class who claim to speak for unified ethnic communities"* (Nwapi & Andrews, 2017). Political tribalism has certainly affected the PPP process of LTWP, as Cormack & Kurewa, (2018), note. They interviewed people on their expectations from LTWP, and found that each tribe complained on unequal employment opportunities, but also claimed to be the ancestral tribe of the land that was leased to LTWP and so should be the main beneficiary of development outcomes (Cormack & Kurewa, 2018). According to Vos (2018), local politicians have used these different perceptions and purposefully escalated such issues in order to keep their constituencies, based on tribal backgrounds.

5.4.3 Kenya's devolution

In 2010, Kenya promulgated its new constitution. One of the greatest transformational changes from this new constitution was that of devolution. The legislative and executive arms of the government were devolved to a total of 47 political and administrative counties[26]. Initially, capital for development issues was distributed solely from Kenya's capital, Nairobi, where public officials often failed to understand the risks and opportunities in Kenya's rural areas (Aglionby, 2018). The process of devolution has improved the implementation of national development plans across Kenya, through its county level approach (D'Arcy, 2018). According to Carrier & Kochore (2014), the devolution process has included the formerly often neglected Marsabit County into national politics. However, devolution also meant that the County Government, with its limited technical capacity and experience, was not as capable as the GoK to implement such a megaproject that LTWP was, let alone to

[26] See appendix 6 for a map of Kenya's counties

effectively consider all CSFs and bottom-up people-first goals in the PPP. Hence, for the PPP process, devolution has certainly influenced the observed outcomes, as echoed by Cormack & Kurewa, (2018).

By combining the issues of Kenya's political economy, political tribalism and devolution, an effective problem-driven political economy analysis can be made. The framework for this PEA, drawn from Fritz, Levy & Ort (2013), is modified for operational purposes. It adds to the issues of PPP design, process and objectives, by mapping other contextual factors that have played a role in the different observed outcomes between the LTWP and the CLC, especially in terms of political and community support. The PEA can be found in figure 6 on the following page.

5.5 Answering the research question

Altogether, public-private partnerships are not an inherently effective nor ineffective model to foster sustainable development in Kenya. PPPs in Kenya's health and energy sectors hold various risks that impede sustainable development outcomes, such as political and community opposition. On the contrary, sustainable development outcomes have been observed, such as increased access to primary healthcare, electricity, employment, and other socio-economic advantages. A key finding is that the discussion on PPPs for sustainable development should focus more on people-first PPPs, *with a bottom-up approach*. As the case comparison found, it is not necessarily about critical success factors, nor whether PPPs are inherently ineffective for a developing country. Rather, it is about the way how people-first objectives are considered, included and implemented throughout the PPP process with a bottom-up approach, to substantively increase the effectiveness of PPPs for sustainable development. This is an essential insight for the academic field and development field alike. Last, it is of vital importance to take in consideration a country's political economy context, as the PEA has shown. PPPs should not be considered a one-size-fits-all model, and the CLC's bottom-up approach has proven that PPPs need to be adaptive both to the community's needs as well as the overall political economy context, to ensure that the contributions to sustainable development are maximized.



Figure 6. The Problem Driven Political Economy Analysis from Fritz, Levy & Ort (2013), filled in.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

6.1. Conclusion

This thesis finds that PPPs put to the service of sustainable development are neither inherently ineffective nor effective, but rather that both the PPP design and management together with country or sector specific features considerably influence the opportunities and risks of PPPs for sustainable development. Through a case comparison of the Lake Turkana Wind Power PPP and the Community Life Center PPP, it's observed that, under certain conditions, bottom-up people-first approaches in PPPs appear to enhance the effectiveness of PPPs. The finding of the distinction between bottom-up or top-down approaches for fostering sustainable development through PPPs has, to the author's knowledge, not yet been set at the forefront of the PPP discussion but proves of significant importance to be considered in future PPPs for sustainable development.

For the CLC, the public and private parties effectively collaborated to assess the needs of the local people, included them in the development outcomes and ensured community engagement throughout the PPP lifecycle, not least by ensuring that the local people could run the CLC through technical and medical training. Hence, public and political support was widely present, positively influencing the effectiveness of this PPP to achieve its goals. The Community Life Center has therefore been effective in fostering sustainable development through its bottom-up people-first approach. To a lesser extent has LTWP achieved this. The fact that people-first objectives were more a desirable outcome through a top-down approach, rather than an integral bottom-up approach throughout the PPP process, made that the LTWP faced issues such as community opposition, varying political support, delays in implementation and unexpected costs.

Adding to that, contextual features have also played a role in the observed outcomes. Kenya's development trajectory has faced issues such as unequal development across its counties, unequal access to public services and infrastructures, issues of tribalism, land disputes, human rights issues and limited government capacity. Throughout the process of the LTWP, local tribes remained to be excluded from the development outcomes and this further upheld the persistent issues of unequal development and access to infrastructures and services. This thesis therefore found that Kenya's political economy has shaped the development, implementation, and outcomes of the PPPs.

This suggests that PPPs should be looked at on a case to case basis within a broader social and historical context, in which the PEA is a meaningful tool to assess contextual factors if future PPPs are to best contribute to sustainable development, and which the CLC has effectively done so.

Yet, challenges in Kenya's health sector persist too. The CLC has not improved Kenya's overall health system, but only addressed local demand for healthcare (Subbaraman et al., 2016). Even though it improves the access to primary healthcare in Kiambu, Kenya remains to have counties where its access to healthcare is severely low. However, the community and political support, as well as trust on the CLC, has ensured that another CLC could be set up in Mandera County, now in collaboration with the UNFPA to ensure a better training of people and more financial support, especially since Mandera County faces issues of instability, a lack of healthcare experience and remoteness to infrastructure (UNFPA, 2017). As Philips aims to set up more CLCs, it is essential that it remains to address issues of trust, and remains to train the Kenyan people to serve Kenya's healthcare ambitions overall. Furthermore, the GoK should actively pursue efforts to strengthen its national health system.

6.2 Contributions

This thesis' contributions on understanding PPPs is profound. First, it has identified that the academic stream on CSFs is not to be considered a sole explanatory factor for successful PPPs. Second, it has shown that PPPs are not inherently unsuccessful, so the critical academic stream should indeed consider more alternative approaches, rather than only focusing on abandoning the PPP model. Third, the third academic stream on distinct approaches of PPPs has proven to best match the practical cases in Kenya. Fourth, it is found that none of the academic streams have identified a distinction between bottom-up and top-down approaches to include people-first objectives, which has proven an essential feature for the contribution of sustainable development of the CLC and LTWP. Fifth, the thesis hasn't solely focused on the literature on PPP traits, but included a political economy analysis, which has proven useful in understanding Kenya's (sectoral) context for the PPPs. Especially for LTWP, Kenya's political economy has played a substantial role throughout the PPP process. Future PPPs must consider these contextual factors, whether sector or country specific, when aiming to pursue sustainable development outcomes. The CLC has done so, and indeed was more effective to achieve such outcomes.

The author therefore agrees with Roehrich, Lewis & George, (2014), that it is more useful to seek a middle ground, instead of abandoning PPPs. The international development community and countries can remain to pursue PPPs for sustainable development, however they must carefully consider the contextual factors and ways to include bottom-up people-first approaches when considering PPPs when they aim to maximize their effectiveness. The academics should learn from the rival claims and understand that such contextual factors, such as a distinct political economy of Kenya, in practice plays a significant role in the observed outcomes, next to the PPP traits as set out in the literature.

6.3 Limitations

There are various limitations of this thesis. First, the fact that this thesis has been a desk study limits the scope of the findings. A quantitative analysis through surveys or a qualitative analysis through interviews with the stakeholders involved in the PPPs could have provided substantive additional results. However, due to time and financial constraints, this has not been possible. Moreover, PPPs are not inherently a political economy and international relations domain, but also contain aspects of environmental policy, legal issues, governance and economics, business administration and human right practices. This means that there are various perspectives on PPPs, which could present alternative findings to the research question presented. Yet, this does not imply that this thesis' focus on political economy is not of value, as the results of the thesis have shown. Last, the thesis has used a limited number of cases, which means that variations in outcomes could occur when more cases would be included in the comparison. This would however impede the in-depth assessment of two cases, as this thesis has carried out.

6.4 Recommendations for future research

Considering the limitations of this thesis, future research is recommended especially in the quantitative and qualitive areas. Interviews with key stakeholders could improve the findings of this thesis. Similarly, surveys on CSFs could improve our understanding of whether and how these were considered throughout the PPP process. Also, comparing more PPPs in Kenya would better capture how the three academic streams align with the practical cases and can present alternative findings. Last, more research on the bottom-up people-first approach by the CLC, can provide policy recommendations as to how future PPPs could engage with such approaches most effectively. Considering the ongoing efforts of the international development community to pursue PPPs, future research will be profoundly meaningful and relevant for the topic addressed in this thesis, while this thesis has set an important step for such endeavors.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Map of East Africa and Kenya

Source: https://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kmapflaganthem.htm.

Appendix 2. Location of Lake Turkana Wind Power project in Marsabit County.



Source: Maps.google.nl.

Appendix 3. Two images of the Lake Turkana Wind Power project.

Source: https://ltwp.co.ke/photos/#!

Appendix 4. Location of the Community Life Center.

Source: Maps.google.nl.

Appendix 5. Two images of the Community Life Center.

Source: https://www.philips.co.ke/a-w/about/news/archive/healthcare/news/press/2016/2016-06-12_Philips-Community-Life-Center.html.

Appendix 6. Map of Kenya counties.



Source: https://maps-kenya-ke.com/map-of-kenya-showing-counties.