

**ON THE STRENGTH OF INTERNATIONAL
PARLIAMENTARY ORGANISATIONS (IPOs)**

The Relationship between Wealth and the strength of IPOs

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June 2016

Abstract

International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) could be valuable in adding legitimacy to global governance through countering the democratic deficit of supranational governance (Kraft-Kasach 2008: 553). The scope and capabilities of these organizations have increased but substantive studies that compare their role and scope are still lacking (Kissling 2014: 9). Although Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) find a wide range of strength levels of International Parliamentary Organs the literature does not provide adequate explanations to explain this variation. This thesis aims to contribute to the overview of the strength of International Parliamentary Organs (IPOs) and explanatory factors by looking at the influence of wealth of member states through statistical analysis. Research to wealth in relation to parliamentary strength has been conducted on the national parliamentary level but not yet on the level of international parliament. The statistical analysis reaffirms the strength findings by Cofelice & Stavridus and show that the difference in strength levels of IPOs cannot be attributed to the wealth of the member states. An additional small N- case study analysis finds that the intention of the parliamentary body and the mission of the main body provide a good explanation for the variance in strength levels.

In the last 70 years the number of International organizations and institutions increased, which shaped a global governance structure that changed the manner in which states have approached matters of shared interest. The rise of international organizations also included the development of International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs). This group of institutions mushroomed after the Second World War, with the most notable change in numbers visible post 1989/1991 (Cofelice & Stavridus 2014: 148). Currently there exist between 40 and 100 IPIs in the world, depending on the conceptualisation used (Cofelice & Stavridus 2014:145).

Global governance reduces legitimacy on the input side of politics because decisions are taken further away from the citizens, making it more difficult to hold policy-makers accountable and to participate in the political process (Kraft-Kasach 2008: 534). This reduced democratic legitimacy, which is often being described as the ‘democratic deficit’ of international governance, has led to criticism of the international governance system. An IPI may be needed in situations of supranational decision-making where the everyday lives of citizens are directly affected, to reduce this democratic deficit (Kraft Kasach 2008: 553). IPIs provide a structure for oversight of the executive based diplomacy and can furthermore create a middle ground for co-corporation between states through fostering lasting transnational relationships (Cutler 2001: 202). IPIs can therefore complement supranational governance.

These important functions and the increasing prominence of IPIs on the world stage make it valuable to analyse the role and place of these institutions in International Relations.

Considering this value, one would be tempted to believe that this is an area that has been subject of frequent scholarly attention. However, this is not the case. There is very limited interest in researching the role of IPIs (Cofelice & Stavridus 2014: 145). The academic literature is marginal, especially in providing empirical evidence, useable concepts and theories (Rocabert, Schimmelfennig & Winzel 2014: 2). The literature is mostly concerned with efforts to group different IPIs into distinguished categories using definitions and typologies and/or discussing the question of legitimacy of these types of organisation (Rocabert, Schimmelfennig & Winzel 2014: 3-4). Much beyond this point is therefore unknown including the factors that explain why certain IPOs possess more or less powers than others.

Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) do provide a first glimpse into the diversity of powers of various IPIs. The 23 mapped IPIs show a large difference of parliamentary powers, with only consultative powers being common to all IPIs. The findings show that the strength of these international parliaments is generally low but the the parliamentary functions such as budgetary functions, appointment functions, oversight and legislative functions all vary substantially in degree of possession by the different IPIs. The large difference of parliamentary powers between IPIs raises the question of what the factors are to which this difference can be attributed. Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) do not explain the factors that could account for a different position on the strength scale. In order to fully understand the IPI as a global political entity these factors need to be researched.

As an independent variable wealth shall be studied. Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) show that many blocs of countries that are not considered to be wealthy have set up IPIs. This gives rise to the question whether the difference of strength values could perhaps be attributed to relatively new IPIs consisting of groups of relatively poor states. While perhaps being an explanatory factor and predictor of the strength of an IPO studying this relation could also test whether worldwide economic differences affect political representation on an international scale and is therefore of importance.

The significance of researching the strength of international parliamentary institutions and the spread of IPOs over regions that are less wealthy has led me to develop the research question: To what extent can the wealth of participating member states to an IPO' explain its strength?'

This research shall investigate this matter using a comparative semi-experimental design with a mixed methods approach encompassing statistical research and case studies. Because of the focus of institutional strength this research can be seen as following recent movements in comparative political science of researching institutional strength over institutional design (Levitsky & Murillo 2009: 115). The project is part of a broader research project to the strength of an IPO conducted by me and my fellow students Sietse Paperborg, Armin Ademovic and Eef Van Der Werk. Together our efforts are directed towards finding the factors that determine the success of an IPO.

Theory

This segment sets out the theory that is of importance regarding this research to the influence of wealth on IPO strength. It starts with defining the core concepts IPO, IPO power and democracy which are crucial to the understanding and conducting of this research. It continues with an argument about the democratic nature of IPOs after which the body of academic literature that is relevant to this particular research shall be discussed .

Cutler (2001) offers a threefold conceptualisation of international parliamentary institutions, which shall be used as the starting point in defining the institutions of interest to this study. In this conceptualisation an IPI is regarded as an parliamentary institution, whether consultative or legislative, comprising of at least three member states (1). It is an institution with parliamentarians that are selected by the national legislatures or elected directly by the electorate of the member countries (2). Furthermore, it is a forum of multilateral discussions and deliberations on a regular basis, which is established, either as an independent organization or attached to an international institution (3). In this definition an IPI can be considered as an elected parliamentary institution comprising of at least three states meeting on a regular basis.

Šabič (2008: 258) offers a distinction between types of IPIs based on a difference of affiliation. Šabič splits IPIs in International Parliamentary Organs (IPOs) and International Parliamentary Associations (IPAs). IPOs are part of an governmental organization e.g. the European Parliament as part of the European Union and IPAs are a structure on their own behalf e.g. The Inter-Parliamentary Union. This research is interested in IPOs as IPIs since this concept includes the parliamentary dimension of supranational global governance. Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) have conducted an institutional mapping exercise using Šabič' typology to identify the amount of IPOs and IPIs. In this paper the researchers classify 23 parliamentary bodies as IPOs. A reexamination of this list reveals that there are currently 22

IPOs. The ‘Interparliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community does not exist anymore.

Strength in the way it is used in this thesis refers to power. A strong institution has a large set of powers. In this thesis the conceptualization schema provided by Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) shall be adopted. In this conceptualization the power of a IPO is split in a couple of components or sub-powers. Those are the Consultative, oversight, appointment, budgetary and legislative functions of those organizations. Consultative refers to the degree in which IPOs can deliver opinions to the main body and whether this is required by mandate of the main body. Oversight refers to the level of involvement of the IPO in overlooking the activities of other bodies of the main intergovernmental organization. The Appointment function makes reference to the extent of the right of the IPO to be consulted in the appointment or election of members for other institutions of the main intergovernmental organisation. The budgetary function concerns the influence of the IPO in approving budget proposals. The legislative function shows the level of legislative involvement of the IPO. The degree of sub-powers an IPO possesses determines its strength value.

Before proceeding with a conceptualisation of democracy it is important to acknowledge the defining characteristic of the IPO, which is the parliamentary aspect of conducting international affairs. The parliamentary dimension of politics is and has been the traditional method to provide modern democracies with democratic legitimation (Kraft-Kasack 2008: 535). With parliaments as the essential source of legitimation of democracies on the national level, it does make sense that in a globalized world with an increasingly complex and large supranational global governance system a source of democratic legitimation exists as well. Authors such as Cutler (2001) and Kraft-Kasich (2008) have set out the rise of IPIs as a process of democratization in global governance, which raises the question whether or not IPIs and specifically IPOs can be viewed as a form of democracy.

Democracy can be defined as an ‘institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for their chief executive and national legislature (Lipset & Lakin 2004: 19). Looking at this rather minimalist definition one can see that IPOs cannot be viewed as a part of a democracy because of the inherent focus on the national legislature in this definition. However, IPOs can fulfill democratic criteria and can so constitute a more or less democratic factor in supranational transnational politics. Kraft-Kasach (2008: 537) describes 9 criteria of democratic legitimation for parliamentary institutions: participation (1), information (2),

attributability of decisions (3), communication (4), decision-making (5), election (6), control (7), the revisability of policies (8) and the ability to further the common good (9).

Most indicators of those criteria would differ across different IPOs but Kraft-Kasach notes that IPOs, or what he calls 'Trans-Parliamentary Assemblies', can add democratic legitimation because these institutions can fulfill numerous of those criteria. Kraft-Kasach states that IPOs can provide a more direct representation in which opposition is included which contributes to the democratic ideal that those that are affected by the making of a policy should be included in the decision-making process (Kraft-Kasach 2008: 537). Furthermore, IPOs could also improve to quality and quantity of information available by members of parliament to function better and help in the areas of attributing decisions due to sharing information about cooperation.

Šabič (2008: 255) also notes that IPIs can contribute to a more transparent and democratic global governance because the members of these bodies largely consist of directly or indirectly 'democratically' elected parliamentarians which can be very critical regarding governments, influence inter-governmental decision-making and address issues of national concern. This ability stems from the purpose of the creation of those institutions. An increasing amount of international organizations have set up those assemblies to overcome the so-called democratic deficit in global decision as a result of globalization and the erosion of power from national governments (Finizio, Levi, Vallinoto 2011:4).

The rise of IPIs is an example of how democracy can succeed outside of the state (Finizio, Levi, Vallinoto 2011: 4). Even though the exact level of democracy can differ between various IPOs due to different scores on the indicators it is thus safe to say based on the above mentioned criteria and reasons for founding that IPOs in general do possess a democratic quality. This can be important regarding the theories of wealth and democracy. If IPOs possess a democratic quality it might be possible to partly revisit the theories of wealth and democracy regarding the nation state for those international institutions. In this globalized age it is important to build theories that explain the working of international institutions. State centric theories could provide a reference or start point to look deeper into the workings of international institutions.

In the past three decades democracy has spread faster and more thoroughly throughout the world than ever before in history (Lipset & Lakin 2004: 3). It has changed the way in which politics has been organized and has therefore been studied extensively. The academic attention to the relationship between wealth and democracy started with the work of Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) who famously argued that 'the more well-do a nation, the greater the

chances that it will sustain democracy' (p. 31). In this work Lipset noted that his indices of wealth; per capita income, thousands of persons per doctor, person per motor vehicle, telephones per 1000 persons, radios per 1000 persons and newspaper copies per 1000 persons all show a correlation between high scores on the economic development indices and high levels of democracy. Lipset argued that not just wealth, but economic development in general promotes democracy by strengthening the middle classes, expanding media access and schooling, facilitating intermediary organizations, reducing the extremes of poverty and promoting tolerance and legitimacy (Norris 2007: 80). A high level of wealth and development would thus strengthen the level of democracy and contribute to strong democratic institutions.

While the initial empirical work of Lipset may be dated with changes in inequality and wealth over the last 50 years, the claim that wealth sustains democracy has been continuously studied. Lipset laid the foundation for an empirical examination of the relationship between wealth and democracy, of the 'Lipset-theorem' has become one of the most widely recognized generalizations in the social sciences (Norris 2007: 81). In more recent extensive works to the causes of democracy and the role of wealth, Przeworski et al. (2000) have argued that there is a level of wealth, roughly 6000 dollar per capita or more, at which democracies can be expected to prevail. This research gives more body to the thought that a high level of wealth brings about a high level of freedom in the form of democracy.

Looking at the worldwide spectrum, even one that is not at home in the literature can make observations that endorse the so-called 'Lipset Theorem'. One can note that the wealthy western European states are or at least appear to be full democracies and that many African states tend to be poor or at least poorer and experience lower levels of democracy. While this does not say much from an academic theoretical point of view, it is interesting that most people would find this theory to be close to their experience of the world. However, research shows that this is not always the case. A glance at the indicators reveals important outliers to this theory (Norris 2007). There are wealthy states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Singapore, which do not entail a high level of democracy and could be called autocracies and there are states which are democracies to a certain extent such as Benin, Costa Rica, Ghana, Turkey, Hungary and India but do not have high levels of wealth. These examples show, that even though how feasible the link between wealth and democracy might seem to be, there are exceptions which raises doubts about whether or not a pure causal relationship or even strong correlation can be established. There have been concerns about the direction of this causal

relationship, which shall be addressed in a later section of the texts when discussing the choice of democracy as a control variable.

When looking at the empirical evidence it is however clear that most states that do possess a high level of wealth do have a remarkable degree of strong democratic governance. The literature suggest that wealth of states promotes strong democratic institutions on the state-level. While it is noted that this theory is confined to the realm of the state the logic of wealth leading to democratic governance could also be applicable to IPOs. As Lipset has noted, economic development in general entails a strengthening of the middle classes and more access to schooling. This could give rise to a higher desire of the public to be involved in politics including a call for involvement on the international level. In addition to this, if a state becomes more democratic the desire to be part of an international parliament could also rise. Therefore I have developed two hypotheses, which shall be tested in this thesis.

1. The higher the average wealth of member states the stronger the IPO.
2. The higher the average level of democracy of member states the stronger the IPO.

Methods

This research consists of a qualitative and a quantitative part, where the quantitative part shall consist of a statistical analysis and the qualitative part of a set of case studies. The statistical analysis shall first be deployed to map the variation in the dependent variable and test the hypotheses after which the case studies shall be conducted. A small N analysis, like limited case studies, can provide explanations for outliers and specific cases and test the plausibility of relationships between variables (Lieberman 2005: 435). In this regard, a small N analysis can provide an additional dimension to the mere statistical testing of the strength of a model and the hypotheses and so enhance its analytical quality. Due to this complementary aspect this analysis shall be added. This research strategy of combining both methods is called a 'nested analysis' and aims to improve the quality of measurement and confidence in the results of the study (Lieberman 2005: 436).

The nested analysis begins with the statistical analysis which will narrow the range of possible explanations and guide the selection of cases for the small N- analysis. This guidance is central to the concept of a nested analysis in that each step of the analysis provides direction in approaching the next step (Lieberman 2005: 436). The specific cases that are selected are dependent on whether it is necessary to follow a model testing or a model building approach. This will be determined following the results of the statistical analysis. If the statistical analysis finds a strong relationship the small N analysis leans towards theory

testing, whereas a weak relationship between the tested variables would suggest a theory building approach. The following part of the text will provide the operationalization necessary to conduct a statistical analysis.

For the measurement of IPO strength Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) have designed 0-5 Guttman ordinal scales that provide the possibility to rank the consultative, oversight, appointments, budgetary and legislative functions of each IPO according to the extent of their powers in each area. The 23 IPOs were ranked on these scales based on information of the functions of the parliaments found treaties and rules of procedure. The scores of the IPOs on these 0-5 scales were coded into a parliamentary strength variable, the PPI or Parliamentary Power Index, using the formula below.

$$PP = \frac{\alpha C + \beta O + \gamma A + \delta B + \varepsilon L}{5(\alpha + \beta + \gamma + \delta + \varepsilon)} \quad \text{where} \quad \begin{array}{l} 0 \leq C \leq 5 \text{ weight } \alpha = 0.5 \\ 0 \leq O \leq 5 \text{ weight } \beta = 1 \\ 0 \leq A \leq 5 \text{ weight } \gamma = 1 \\ 0 \leq B \leq 5 \text{ weight } \delta = 1 \\ 0 \leq L \leq 5 \text{ weight } \varepsilon = 1 \end{array}$$

In this formula C stands for Consultative, O for Oversight, A for Appointments, B for budgetary and L for legislative. Each function has been given the weight of 1 except for the consultative function because this does not, contrary to the others, entail a binding power towards the main intergovernmental body at the highest value (Cofelice & Stavridus 2014: 157). I have, alongside my fellow students Sietse Paperborg, Armin Ademovic and Eef Van Der Werk, updated the scores provided by Cofelice & Stavridus, using these scales and this formula. Changes were found to the Cofelice & Stavridus scores for the Nordic council, the parliament of the ECOWAS and the Pan-African Parliament. In gathering the information treaties and rules of procedures were used. In cases where information was scarce academic articles were used in order to determine scores. The scores for each IPO can be found in appendix III.

To measure wealth, the figures of the Credit Suisse Research Institute are used. This institute, a part of the Credit Suisse bank, releases an annual report on global wealth alongside an extensive dataset. This report aims to provide the best global estimates of the wealth holdings of households (Credit Suisse Databook 2015: 3). These estimates are based on household surveys and regression analyses using variables that are likely correlated

depending on the country and availability of data. Components of those wealth variables include house price growth, market capitalization for financial assets and GDP per capita debt growth (Credit Suisse Databook 2015: 7). When there are no direct data sources available econometric techniques are used to make projections of wealth. Whether the Credit Suisse institute comes with the ‘best global estimates’ may be disputed, but due to the careful attention it gives to the measurements and clear methodology presented in an extensive databook it can be regarded reliable source . As one would expect is the strength of the data for the countries that are included in the analysis not equal due to availability. For each country the dataset provides an indication of the quality of the data. Next to its clear methodology the choice to use this particular data also stems from practical reasons. The dataset includes a large amount of recent and available data including the figures for GDP, Wealth per adult and total wealth for most countries. For the exact and extensive methodology used, I would suggest the reader to have a look at the Credit Suisse data book. To offer an extensive coverage of wealth in the statistical analysis I have chosen to work with two household wealth variables; wealth per adult and total wealth.

For the measurement of democracy the Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2014 dataset shall be used. This 2014 dataset offers various variables that describe patterns of authority and regime changes in the period 1800 to 2014 for 167 countries. The variable that is relevant for our research is institutional democracy. This variable takes in account the presence of institutions through which a citizen can express itself about leaders and policies, the amount of constrains on the executive by institutions and the amount of civil liberties citizens possess. In this variable countries are coded on a scale from 0-10 depending on their ‘competitiveness of political participation’ ‘competitiveness of executive recruitment’ and ‘constrains on the chief executive’ (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual v2013: 14). The exact coding and weights of the sub variables can be found in appendix I.

The usage of the wealth and institutional democracy variables result in an unavoidable post-treatment bias. This bias occurs when the direction of the relationship between both variables is ambiguous, making it possible for the resulting biases to go either way (king 2010). The degree of Institutional democracy could be both a consequence and a cause of level of wealth. Because of a likely correlation between democracy and wealth, democracy needs to be included in the statistical analysis as a control variable. Leaving out a variable which could be highly correlated would give a biased estimation of the causal relationship studied (Bakija 2013: 4). When measuring the effect of wealth on IPO strength this ‘post-

treatment' bias is unavoidable and should therefore be taken account when assessing the findings of this study.

Table 1: IPOs included in statistical analysis

Arab Parliament (ARAB)
The Benelux Inter-parliamentary Consultative Council (Benelux)
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Central European Initiative (CEIPA)
Community Parliament of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMACPA)
Inter parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)
East African Legislative Assembly (EALA)
Economic Community of West African States Parliament (ECOWASPA)
The European Free Trade Association Parliamentary Committee (EFTAPA)
The European Parliament (EP)
The Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union (MAGHREB)
The Nordic Council (Nordic)
Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty (OCST)
Parliamentary Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCEPA)
Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC)
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
The Andean Parliament (PARLANDINO)
Mercosur Parliament (PARLASUR)
Inter-parliamentary Committee of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOAPA)

The cases that will be included in the statistical analysis are the 20 IPOs presented in table I. In parenthesis are the names that will show in the statistical analysis. It is not possible to conduct an analysis using all 22 IPOs due to data limitations. Not all countries have wealth scores and democracy scores available which, if this is the case for various countries in a certain IPO, leads me to exclude those IPOs from analyses. I have excluded the Central

American Parliament (PARLACEN) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) due to significant gaps in data. For PARLACEN It is not possible to find scores for Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, 3 of the 6 members. For CARICOM it is not possible to find data for most of its 15 Caribbean member states due to their small scale. In these cases the gap in data is too large and could possibly scrutinize the validity of the findings. Most other IPOs have missing data from 1 or multiple member states, but their size and relative scope to the country group as a whole have allowed me to still proceed the analyses. The list of the IPO that have missing data for one or more member states is included in the appendix II.

In the next section the statistical analysis shall be conducted. First, the descriptive statistics of the four variables are presented in order to get a feel of the results of the used variables. The highly skewed distribution of values of both wealth variables make it necessary for those variables to be included as logarithms to control for this skew and keep a linear model. In the following analyses the wealth variables are thus included as logarithms. After the descriptive analysis scatterplots are presented to give an impression of how the various IPOs score on the two wealth variables and the democracy variable. After this linear regression analysis shall be conducted to allow for testing of the effect of wealth on IPO strength.

Statistical Analysis

In the table 2 the general descriptives of the four variables are presented. Looking at the descriptives of the IPO Strength variable it can be noted that, there is a wide spread of values for the 20 IPOs ranging from very low (0,067) to very high (,899). With an average-

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics.

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Units/Scale
IPO strength	20	,280	,231	,067	,899	scale 0-1, 1= strongest
Average adult wealth	20	4,337	,760	2,960	5,620	logarithmic scale
Total wealth	20	12,438	,888	10,900	14,230	logarithmic scale
Institutional democracy	20	6,336	2,767	1,941	10,000	scale 0-10, 10= most democratic

score of .29074 it can be stated that IPOs in general appear score low in terms of Strength. The Scores for democracy are also widespread, from a average democracy score of (1.941) to IPOs with the highest possible value (10). This large range also applies for the wealth variables where the standard deviation is high.

The spread of values calls for a graphic representation to enhance the understanding of the data. The scatterplot, presented in figure 1.1, shows the spread of values of the 20 IPOs for the relation between average wealth per adult and IPO strength. It shows a wide spread of the IPOs which shows, on first sight, that there is not much of a correlation between average wealth per adult of the participating countries and the IPO strength. There are IPOs, which consist of countries with a relatively low wealth that are remarkably strong. This is visible in the top left part of the scatterplot with the African regional parliaments ECOWASPA, CEMACPA, UEMOAPA and the EALA. On the opposite side of the spectrum it is also clear that there are also IPOs consisting of ‘rich’ member states that have poor strength levels. This can be seen in the bottom right corner with the EFTAPA and BENELUX PA. It is striking that the bottom left corner is completely empty. countries that score lowest in terms of wealth do not have weak IPO representation. It seems to be that weak levels of strength are generally the case for the IPOs consisting of countries that score in the middle in terms of wealth. Very few of those IPOs exceed the average IPO strength score.

Figure 1.1: Scatterplot of the relation between IPO strength and average adult wealth





Figure 1.2: Scatterplot of the relation between IPO strength and total wealth

In the scatterplot with the logarithm of the total wealth of participating states of an IPO we see a lot of similarities with the other variable. The African regional parliaments stay in the top left corner and there are still collectives of rich countries with poor IPO strength. The regression line shows little correlation between the variables. The almost horizontal regression lines in both scatterplot shows that not much of the variance in the dependent variable IPO strength is explained by the two independent wealth variables. A closer look at the data through linear regression analysis can test whether this is really the case.

Table 2.1 : Linear regression model of the average adult wealth of IPO member states

	Model 1.
(Constant)	0.600 (0.348)
Wealth adult	-0.126 (0.106)
Institutional Democracy	0,036 (0,029)
R	0.299
R ²	0.089
Adj. R ²	- 0.018
N	20

Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses
 ***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05

The R square shows that the strength of the association which is with 0,000 almost not existent. This is furthermore explained by the significance of .963 which is way higher than the $p < 0,05$ that is required to speak of significance. Table 2.2 shows the same tendencies. Here the R square is also low and the scores under significance (, 906) are similar to that of the other wealth variable (, 963). With this we can state that both variables of wealth do not adequately explain the variance in the strength of IPOs. The inclusion of the institutional democracy variable does furthermore not lead to a significant model. Therefore, both hypotheses are rejected.

Table 2.2: Linear regression model of Total wealth IPO states

	Model 3.
(Constant)	0.517 (0.918)
Wealth adult	-0.027 (0.082)
Institutional democracy	0.015 (0.026)
R	0.014
R ²	0.000
Adj. R ²	- 0.055
N	20

Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses
 ***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05

Small N- Case studies

When theory is rejected by Large N- analysis, further analysis using a nested approach must be directed towards model-building instead of model-testing (Lieberman 2005) In this so-called ‘model-building Small N-Analysis’ (Mb-SNA) various case sources are used to develop theoretical accounts on the variation of the outcomes of the study. This model building analysis is directed towards finding the factors that explain why relatively poor states can have strong IPOs and relatively wealthy states can have weak IPOs, which is remarkable regarding the theory of wealth and democracy relationship. The scatterplots show that while most IPOs appear to be of relatively weak strength some cases stand out in the scatterplots. These cases contradict the general tendencies in the findings in terms of their respective

strength levels and therefore require explanation. The four African parliaments ECOWASPA, CEMACPA, UEMOAPA and EALA score, with strength values of respectively .667, .578, .378 and .333, considerably higher than the average IPO strength of .291. Due to time and space constraints those four cases shall not all be examined in-depth. The ECOWASPA is selected for case study because it, as the setting out of the particularities of this case in the next part shows, can be treated as an example of a certain trend that applies to these three other African IPOs. These explanatory factors of the strength of the ECOWASPA are applied to the CEMACPA, EALA and UEMOAPA to investigate whether these factors can explain the relative strength of these IPOs.

To explain the strength values on the other end of the spectrum, the Benelux PA and the EFTA PA are selected. The Benelux PA and EFTA PA score respectively a .089 and .067 which is remarkably lower than average. The case selection is thus based on an outlier approach, selecting cases that have not been predicted well by the statistical model. The case study starts by providing general information about the history and goals of the organisation and a look at the set of powers the specific IPO possesses. After this general description, a possible explanation that arises shall be examined.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 and consists of group of 15 west African countries. It aims to contribute to the development of the African continent through the creation of an economic union to promote co-operation and integration among its member states (ECOWAS 1993: art. 3). Its structure consists of the ECOWAS Commission, the Community Court of Justice, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, various specialized agencies and the Community Parliament. This Community Parliament was formally established in 1993 with the signing of the revised ECOWAS treaty (art. 13). At that time it became clear that those type of organisations required a certain political understanding, a certain transparency and accountability (Karuombe 2008: 3). The first legislature of the parliament was inaugurated in 2000 and during its term of 5 years possessed only a limited consultative power where other Community institutions could decide for themselves whether or not to follow the recommendations provided by the parliament (Boré & Hekel 2015: 2). It took the parliament until end 2014, while being in its third legislature, to obtain additional powers through the so-called Supplementary Act. This act provided the parliament with appointment, oversight, budgetary and legislative functions. It now has a binding consultative role in certain areas including the appointment of employees of some of the organisations of the community,

oversight and co-decision rights in matters of economic policy including the budget and an ability to make legislation in cooperation with the council of ministers (Boré & Hekel 2015: 4-5). The Guttman scale measurements conducted affirm this and show that the ECOWAS Parliament as of now possesses a wide range of powers, scoring a 4 for consultative, 2 for oversight, 3 for appointment, 4 for budgetary and a 4 for legislative.

In factors that could explain why this specific parliament now scores among the highest IPOs the determination of the state leaders to enhance the powers of the ECOWAS Parliament stands out. In 2005, the leaders of the 15 member countries expressed hope in an parliament with a broader set of powers and demanded proposals from the Parliament and the ECOWAS Commission on how this greater set of powers could be achieved and structured (Boré & Hekel 2015: 2). Following this, the second and later the third legislature set up the the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Enhancement of Powers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to work on this proposal leading to the draft Supplementary Act, which was approved by the state leaders end 2014 (Boré & Hekel 2015: 2). This determinacy to increase the parliamentary powers can be explained by the ECOWAS vision. This vision is ‘‘to create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous recourses through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation’’ (ECOWAS 2010). This vision for the period 2010-2020 aims to guide the ECOWAS towards a self-proclaimed ‘democratic and prosperous community’. These notion of democracy and principles of good governance in its vision, explain the ECOWAS efforts to enhance the powers of its parliament. Internationally, having a democratic integration process with a parliament that has legislative and oversight powers is regarded as a best practice (ECOWAS Business Law Handbook 2015: 292). The efforts of enhancing parliamentary powers are therefore conform its vision.

The particular focus on good governance and democracy that guide efforts to increase the strength of its parliament can also be seen in the African IPOs of CEMACPA, UEMOA and EALA. The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) states in its vision report that it strives for an safe, more integrated economic union based on principles of good governance to promote human development (2009: 18). The East African Community, the main body of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) states in its report that good governance and democracy are and must be principles that guide its conduct of regional policy making and lists good democratic governance to be of crucial importance to sustainable human development and the reduction of poverty (EAC 2015: 93). This is being

regarded a necessity for the development of the region. The African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) consists of the members of the ECOWAS that use the West African Franc. All of the ECOWAS members expressed the need for more parliamentary powers. In this regard, the notion of good governance also applies to the UEMOA member countries. While the exact definition of good governance may differ between the organisations, the concept here contains elements of institutional improvement while paying attention to democratic principles. It can be stated that those four parliaments are all on a mission to develop their region through a particular focus on practices of good governance.

The Benelux Economic Union is a regional group of three countries, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, founded in 1958. Its aims are to coordinate the financial, economic and social policy in an economic union to conduct a common policy in the economic affairs with other countries (Benelux 1958, art. 1). The previously, in 1955, set up Interparliamentary Consultative Council is the parliamentary body of the organisation. While being a consultative council it does possess the power to make non-binding recommendations about the budget, which is classified as a budgetary function under the Cofelice & Stravidus conceptualisation. The tasks of the council is to make recommendations to the governments of the member states on the issues of regional cooperation (Beneluxparliament n.d.). It was, as the name suggests, specifically set up with the intention of it being a consultative council. The revision of the treaty, which enhanced the Benelux cooperation to issues of justice and internal affairs and issues of integration outside of the EU domain, did not include for an enhanced set of powers for the Benelux parliament. Therefore this remains a mere consultative IPO. The fact that the BENELUX PA is a weak institution in terms of powers and continues to be so can be related back to its intention. It was not imagined to be a parliament with a broad scope of powers, like the four African IPOs discussed above. In addition to this it can specifically be noted that the Benelux Economic Union lacks a clear mission due to the parallel European Integration processes and the wide range of policies it deals with (Rood 2010: 189). The European Integration processes go beyond the original aims of the organisation and the new tasks the organisation acquired after the 2008 revision fall part to a lack of coherence between the various policy domains.

This consultative intention and limited mission can also be found in the EFTAPA, The parliament committee of the European Free Trade Association consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It is a forum where the relations of the EFTA countries with the European Union and external trade relations are being discussed and upheld for democratic review (EFTA 2014). It was set up in 1977 to act as a consultative

actor between the members of the national parliaments of the member states and the Association (Schiavone 2008 : 124). It was intended in its institutional framework to be a parliamentary body of discussion, of consultation rather than a parliament possessing a wide range of oversight, appointments, budgetary and legislative functions. It aims to promote the economic relations between the EFTA countries, to liberalize trade and the free movement of persons and to protect intellectual property rights (EFTA 2013 art. 2). This is substantially different from the four African IPOs that, as their visions suggest, aim to achieve broader integration.

The differences that could explain the relative strengths of the examined four African parliaments contrary to the relative weakness of the BENELUX PA and EFTAPA can be listed as differences in intention and mission. The African cases all have a desire to develop their regions to eradicate poverty, pursue economic development and strive for sustainable development. Good governance, of which having an IPO with a broad set of powers is a good example, is seen as fundamental to achieving this goal. The BENELUX PA and EFTAPA, do not have the intention to set up community parliaments with a wide set of powers but intended these IPOs as forums of democratic consultation. Its mission is less ambitious in the goals of regional integration. Therefore the examined four African IPOs are relatively strong and the BENELUX PA and EFTAPA relatively weak.

Intention and mission as determinants for the strength of an IPO could be applied to explain the positions of other cases, for example the European Union. The European Parliament began as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, a parliamentary institution possessing only consultative powers (CVCE 2014: 3). The European Parliament is now the strongest IPO scoring a .889 on the Cofelice & Stravridus scale. This change in powers can be explained by the enlarged scope of its mission of European integration because parliamentary powers increased as European Integration continued forward (CVCE 2014: 4). This shows that while the peoples representation in the union was originally not thought of as to be of a parliament with a wide scope of powers, the enlargement of its mission in European integration shaped a stronger parliament.

The mission of the organisation and the intention in what form to set up parliamentary bodies can therefore be regarded as a plausible explanation to explaining why certain IPOs possess more powers than others. The case studies show that the highest scoring IPOs all have a mission that encompasses broad integration in the region on numerous policy fields and regard having a parliament with a broad set of powers as important for their organisation. Low scoring IPOs such as the BENELUX PA and EFTA PA have a different intention with

the IPOs created and strive in their mission for regional integration that is less extensive. This theory here thus presented sets out the plausible idea that the extent of intention and mission explain the positions of the IPO on the strength scale. While this applies to a wide set of cases, it does require further analysis to determine the extent of the influence of these factors.

Conclusion

This research followed the trend in political sciences of studying institutional strength by looking at a relatively unknown International Parliamentary Organs. These IPOs that are important actors of study due to their ability to mitigate the democratic deficit in supranational governance show a remarkable difference of strength. IPO strength values ranged from 0,067 to 0,889 on the PPI 0-1 scale. Investigated is whether wealth of member states could account for this gap. Lipset (1959) and others including Przeworski, (2000) and Norris (2007) have investigated the effects of wealth on state democracy. The statistical analysis shows that the relationship between a wealth and democracy does not hold for the realm of democracy that is confined outside of the state. Therefore the hypotheses ‘The higher the average wealth of member states the stronger the IPO’ and ‘the higher the average level of democracy of member states the stronger the IPO’ are rejected. Although wealth of the member states is not significant, a pursuit of economic development/wealth could drive a broad mission of regional integration as the examined four African parliaments show. The Small N-analysis finds that the strength of an IPO can, at least partly be explained by the intention of the parliament and the scope mission of the organization. The case studies shows that these factors provide a plausible explanation for the difference in strength levels for the investigated cases and these could possibly be generalized outside of these cases to other IPOs. Therefore these factors should be taken serious in further studies to the determinants of IPO strength. This model needs further testing to determine the extent of the influence of these factors and the possibility of generalizing to all cases. The large spread of values that confirm the findings of Cofelice & Stravridus (2014), need further attention in order to fully grasp the presence of IPOs on the world stage.

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Appendix I: Institutional democracy coding

‘The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive using the following weights’:

Authority Coding	Scale/weight
<i>Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP)</i>	
(3) Election	+2
(2) Transitional	+1
 <i>Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN)</i>	
Only if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2)	
(3) Dual/election	+1
(4) Election	+1
 <i>Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST):</i>	
(7) Executive parity or subordination	+4
(6) Intermediate category	+3
(5) Substantial limitations	+2
(4) Intermediate category	+1
 <i>Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP):</i>	
(5) Competitive	+3
(4) Transitional	+2
(3) Factional	+1

Source: Polity IV project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013: Dataset users’ manual, pg. 14-15

Appendix II: States excluded from analysis

This is a list of the states in certain IPOs for which it was not possible to collect the necessary data and hence are excluded from research.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE): Andorra, Bosnia Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino

The European Parliament (EP): Malta

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Central European Initiative (CEIPA): Bosnia Herzegovina

The Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union (MAGHREB): Libya

Pan-African Parliament (PAP): Central African Republic, Libya, Saharawi Democratic Republic, Somalia

Community Parliament of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMACPA): Central African Republic, Sao Tome

Arab Parliament (ARAB): Palestine, Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, Libya

Parliamentary Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCEPA): Andorra, Bosnia Herzegovina, The Holy See (Vatican city), Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Uzbekistan

Inter parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Uzbekistan

Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP): Sao tome, Timor-Leste

Appendix III. IPO strength Scores and IPO strength conceptualization

IPO	CONS.	OVERSIGHT	APP.	BUDGET	LEG	<u>PPI</u>
ARAB	3	2	0	1	0	.200
ACCP	/	/	/	/	/	/
BENELUX	2	0	0	1	0	.089
CEIPA	3	0	0	0	0	.067
CEMACPA	4	4	0	4	3	.578
CIS	3	0	0	0	0	.067
CPLP	3	2	0	0	0	.156
EALA	3	3	0	1	2	.333
ECOWASPA	4	2	3	4	4	.667
EFTA	3	0	0	0	0	.067
EP	4	5	4	5	4	.889
EURASEC	/	/	/	/	/	/
MAGHREB	3	0	0	0	0	.067
NORDIC	4	3	0	1	2	.356
OCST	3	0	0	0	0	.067
OSCEPA	3	2	0	1	0	.200
PABSEC	3	0	0	0	0	.067
PACE	4	3	2	1	2	.444
PAP	3	2	0	1	2	.289
PARLACEN	/	/	/	/	/	.333
PARLANDINO	3	2	0	1	1	.244
PARLASUR	4	3	0	1	2	.356
UEMOAPA	3	2	2	1	2	.378

These scores are based on the ranking on cofelice & stavridus 0-5 gutmann scales that are presented on the next pages

<i>Functions</i>	<i>Powers</i>
Consultative	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. No consultative powers. 1. The IPO may deliver non-binding opinions only upon requests by the inter-governmental / supranational branch. 2. The IPO may deliver non-binding opinions on its own initiative, but only in some limited matters. 3. The IPO may deliver non-binding opinions on its own initiative, in all matters of interest for the regional organization. 4. In some specific areas, the regional organization decision-making bodies are compelled to consult the IPO before taking a decision; these bodies subsequently inform the IPO about the choice to accept or reject its opinion. 5. It is always compulsory for the regional organization decision-making bodies to consult the IPO before taking a decision; these bodies subsequently inform the IPO about the choice to accept or reject its opinion.
Oversight	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. No oversight powers. 1. The IPO may invite other institutions to submit reports on their activities for its consideration. 2. The IPO has the right to receive oral and written replies to its questions by other bodies of the organization. 3. Other bodies of the organization are compelled to prepare regular reports on their activities and submit them to the IPO for its consideration. 4. The IPO can adopt motions of censure on the activities of other institutions, and submit them to the main intergovernmental body of the organization: this latter can invite the concerned institution to resign. 5. The IPO can adopt motions of censure on the activities of other institutions that are compelled to resign.
Appointments	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. No appointment powers. 1. The IPO can be consulted on the appointment of administrative, judicial and/or control institutions. 2. The IPO can elect / appoint the administrative, judicial and/or control institutions. 3. The IPO can be consulted on the appointment of decision-making/supranational bodies of the organization. 4. The IPO has the right to approve the appointment of decision-making/supranational bodies of the organization, through a vote of confidence. 5. The IPO has the right to appoint/elect the decision-making/supranational bodies of the organization.

Budgetary	<ol style="list-style-type: none">0. No budgetary powers.1. The IPO can debate the budget proposal of the organization and express general non-binding recommendations.2. The IPO can propose modifications for some limited expenditure items (and within a rate of maximum increase).3. The IPO has the right to scrutinize the implementation of the budget by other institutions of the organization, and to grant, postpone or refuse discharge in respect of its implementation.4. The IPO can propose modifications for all expenditure items.5. The IPO can reject the budget proposal: a new draft has to be prepared by the decision-making bodies.
Legislative	<ol style="list-style-type: none">0. No legislative powers.1. The IPO may request the decision-making bodies to submit appropriate legislative proposals on any matter of interest for the organization.2. The IPO can prepare draft legislative acts and submit them to the decision-making bodies for their consideration; however, the parliamentary proposal may be finally overruled by these bodies.3. The IPO's assent is required in some specific matters.4. In some specific areas, the IPO has joint legislative powers along with the intergovernmental bodies of the organization: it may propose amendments during all the phases of the legislative process and veto the adoption of legislative proposals if its amendments are not accepted.5. The IPO has joint legislative powers in all the subject areas that are relevant for the organization, as well as the right to initiate the legislative procedure and to fix the agenda of the organization.
