

# Ethnicity and Satisfaction with Democracy

## The Influence of Political Systems



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# **Ethnicity and Satisfaction with Democracy: The Influence of Political Systems**

## **Abstract**

Over the past few decades, the ethnic minority population in Western Europe has increased because of higher migration numbers. In this study, I try to assess the levels of satisfaction with democracy in these minority groups and the influence of the type of political system on these levels. I expect that migrant ethnic minority groups will be less satisfied with democracy than the majority, but that this is dependent on which generation an individual is part of. I also expect that migrant ethnic minority groups in systems with proportional representation are more satisfied with democracy than people in majoritarian systems. This does not prove to be the case: the first generation of migrant ethnic minorities is more satisfied with democracy than the majority and the second and later generations are as satisfied as the majority. Rather, it would seem that there is a negative correlation between perceived discrimination and satisfaction with democracy amongst migrant ethnic minorities. The effect of electoral systems goes against my expectations: the gap in levels of satisfaction with democracy between migrant ethnic minorities and the majority is bigger in majority systems than in systems with proportional representation, but the minorities are more satisfied with democracy, not less.

## **1. Introduction**

Since the start of the 1970's there has been a steady flow of immigrants, either as cheap workforce or as refugees of war, famine and political oppression. These immigrants came from Africa, the Middle-East and the rest of Asia to Europe. Later, during the Balkan wars and the integration of the Eastern European countries into the European Union, minority groups migrated from the former Soviet states and allies into Western Europe. These immigrants brought their own culture and customs with them, making European countries more diverse.

Since the start of the new millennium, right-wing parties have started to question the immigration-policy and its effect on society. This led to a ‘politicization’ of ethnicity: there is uncertainty in the public debate whether society can cope with this increasing cultural diversity and whether the democratic institutions can cope with this change (Bird, Saalfeld & Wüst, 2010). Additionally, most European countries have no party representing these ethnic minorities, but do have anti-Islam or anti-migrant parties, for example the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) in the Netherlands and the *Alternatieve für Deutschland* (AfD) in Germany. These parties have had a major impact on the national discourse on immigration and ethnic minorities. Not only by expressing their strong opinions, but also because mainstream parties have copied their rhetoric and sometimes even their policies (Mudde, 2004). One would expect that, in this increasingly hostile environment, which has worsened since the attacks of 9/11 (Allen & Nielsen, 2002), these migrant ethnic minorities have lost faith in the democratic institutions.

What affects our trust in the democracy and its institutions? Different scholars of political science have tried to explain this. Some argue that satisfaction with democracy is dependent on the representative function of government (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Blais, Morin-Chassé & Singh, 2017) or that the satisfaction with democracy is dependent on the institutional framework of a state (Lijphart, 2012; Ruiz-Rufino, 2013). Others argue that certain social changes, like a higher educated society or a more politically disillusioned youth, have influenced the levels of satisfaction (Dalton, 2005; Aarts & Thomassen, 2008). Most of the before mentioned studies take certain individual factors in consideration, like age, social class or education.

Ruben Ruiz-Rufino (2013) shows that the satisfaction with democracy amongst ethnic minorities is lower in countries with a majoritarian system compared with countries where the government is selected through proportional representation. However, in his study he looked at historic minorities in Eastern European countries, who had a deeply rooted connection to their

homes and were culturally very close to the ethnic majority. This a different situation from the one Western European countries find themselves in, where there are large ethnic minority groups who migrated recently (after the second world war) towards this region. Research shows that ethnic minorities, especially those who migrated to Europe, are less satisfied with life in general (Başlevent & Kirmanoğlu, 2014; Hooghe, Marien & de Vroome, 2013; Safi, 2010), which means that they might also be more specifically less satisfied with democracy.

With this study, I seek to give more clarity on the relation between migrant ethnic minorities and satisfaction with democracy. I try to do this by answering the question: To what extent does belonging to a migrant ethnic minority affect satisfaction with democracy and is this effect conditional on the type of democratic system?

## **2. Theory and Literature**

Within my research question, there are two important concepts: satisfaction with democracy and belonging to a migrant ethnic minority. I start with satisfaction with democracy, which is a difficult concept to use (Blais, Morin-Chasé & Singh, 2017; Ekman & Linde, 2003; Ruiz-Rufino, 2013). It has ‘different meanings, not only among individuals but also across nations’ (Ruiz Rufino, 2013, 103), which makes it difficult to do any comparative research on the subject. Still, there is an extensive body of literature on satisfaction with democracy. There simply are no better indicators to measure whether citizens believe that democracy is functioning as it should (Ekman & Linde, 2003; Ruiz-Rufino, 2013). Therefore, it still has value when satisfaction with democracy is used as a measure for the support for the democratic institutions and how they function in practice, as most of the literature does (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Blais, Morin-Chasé & Singh, 2017; Ekman & Linde, 2003; Hakhverdian & van der Meer, 2017; Ruiz-Rufino, 2013).

When talking about the individual support for the political system, a distinction can be made between specific and diffuse support (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Easton, 1965; Easton,

1975). Specific support is a direct response to the authorities: an individual is aware of the perceived actions of the authorities and links them to his or her needs (Easton, 1975). Diffuse support on the other hand refers to the “evaluations of what an object is or represents – to the general meaning it has for a person – not of what it does” (Easton, 1975, 444). This means that a person will support the institution, without regard whether its output will harm or benefit the individual’s needs (Easton, 1975). Satisfaction with democracy falls somewhere in between the two, however, as it “taps a ‘middle level’ of support which is often difficult to gauge” (Norris, 1999, 11). Because of the multiple interpretations of democracy, it can be both a measure of the support of the government, which is more specific, and the support for the democratic values, which is more diffuse (Norris, 1999). However, the distinction between specific and diffuse support is mainly a conceptual one, as it is very difficult to distinguish between the two forms of support in practice (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Fuchs 1993).

Satisfaction with democracy is affected by macro-level or systemic indicators and micro-level or individual indicators, as Mark Bovens and Anchrit Wille (2008) showed when they looked at the possible explanations for the drop in political trust in The Netherlands. Still, most of the literature finds stronger relations between explanations at the micro-level and satisfaction with democracy and a mediating effect of systemic explanations (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Bowler & Karp, 2001; Dalton, 2005; Hakhverdian & van der Meer, 2017).

The second important concept, belonging to a migrant ethnic minority, is also complicated. Ethnicity on itself seems much easier to define as a concept, because it is widely used in the social sciences and in society. The Oxford dictionary defines it as “A group within a community which has different national or cultural traditions from the main population”, which is a straightforward definition. However, in the social sciences ethnicity is a difficult phenomenon, because there is not one universal definition of ethnicity (Fenton, 2003). Rather,

as Steve Fenton puts it in his overview of the concept, ethnicity is a broad phenomenon which cannot be captured in a general theory, but generally refers to one's descent and culture (2003, 3). By giving ethnicity such a broad definition though, it starts to resemble two other widely used concepts, namely race and nation (Fenton, 2003). That is why there are three specific additions to the typology of ethnicity: an ethnic group is a subset in a nation-state, the point of reference to the group is cultural rather than physical and the group is referred to as different from the majority; a majority which is not seen as 'ethnic' (Fenton, 2003, 23). Although this typology, as Fenton calls it, seems to cover the concept of ethnicity, the lack of a clear definition remains. Ethnicity seems to be a label that is either given to a minority group by the majority or used by a minority group to distinguish itself from the majority (Fenton, 2003). Most articles on ethnic minorities hence take this concept as a given and perceive belonging to an ethnic minority as something which needs no further clarification (Ruiz-Rufino, 2013; Fischer et. al, 2014; Mühlau and Röder, 2012). Still, to be able to theorize on ethnic minority groups, I utilize the general typology of Fenton (2003) when looking at the levels of satisfaction with democracy of ethnic minorities.

I am, however, not interested in all ethnic minorities, but only in migrant ethnic minority groups: minority populations who permanently moved from one physical location to another (Jackson, 1986). In this case all groups who migrated to Western Europe relatively recently, which means after the second world war. This latest wave of immigrants differs generally more from the native population, either in terms of their skin color, culture or in terms of beliefs (Giugni et. al., 2005). Of course, this is more the case for migrants from countries outside of the EU than from within the EU: a migrant from Poland is culturally or ethnically closer to a German than someone from Turkey. Yet, these are both immigrants and each new population that moves to a new country will cause social changes, however small they are (Jackson, 1986). This does not mean that each group of immigrants is seen as ethnic. When a migrant group is

culturally relatively close to the culture of the new country, for example Swedish immigrants in Finland, they might not see themselves as an ethnic minority. They are too similar to each other, which means they cannot be differentiated based on cultural differences. Resulting, one of the defining features of ethnicity, according to Fenton, disappears and these migrants do not see themselves as ethnic and are not seen by the majority as ethnic (Fenton, 2003).

Amongst these migrant ethnic minorities, research already found that they are less satisfied with life in general than the majority population. Mirna Safi (2010) showed that immigrants are less satisfied with life, especially because of perceived discrimination. Cem Başlevent and Hasan Kirmanoğlu (2014) found the same when they looked at ethnic minorities in Western Europe. These findings are further supported by the research of Thomas de Vroome, Marc Hooghe and Sofie Marien (2013), who looked at the generalized and political trust of immigrant minorities in the Netherlands, which resembles satisfaction with life and democracy. They also established that perceived discrimination as well as cultural explanations caused lower levels of general trust amongst migrant minorities (Hooghe, Marien & de Vroome, 2013).

It is not only a lower satisfaction with life in general, but also the recent policy changes on migrant integration in Europe that lead to my first hypothesis. Due to the increasing demand of stronger integration policies and the subsequent policy changes by the political elites, the European societies have less accessible citizenship for immigrants and a tarnished multicultural society (Bloemraad & Wright, 2012; Koopmans, Michalowski & Waibel, 2012). As Bloemraad and Wright show, a higher multicultural society with a more open citizenship leads to higher levels of trust in political institutions amongst immigrants (2012). Thus, my first hypothesis is:

H1: Those who belong to a migrant ethnic minority are less satisfied with democracy than the majority population.

However, not all respondents who belong to a migrant ethnic minority group are expected to be less satisfied with democracy. As Peter Mühlau and Antje Röder (2011, 2012) point out, the

first generation of migrants suffers from a so-called honeymoon effect: the democratic institutions in their new home countries are functioning better than the political institutions in the countries they came from and social positions matter less for the first generation (2012, 790). In the second generation, these feelings of gratitude towards the new host-country are non-existent and they are less satisfied with democracy than the majority (Peter Mührlau and Antje Röder, 2011). What contributes to this expectation is the notion that when we look at levels of general trust amongst immigrants, these will drop over time: first to the level of the native majority and maybe even below that. (Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010). The effect is even stronger for the second generation of migrants than for the first generation (Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010, 720). This leads to my second hypothesis:

H2: Those who belong to second or later generations of migrant ethnic minorities are less satisfied with democracy than those who belong to the first generation of migrant ethnic minorities.

Once I have established whether migrant ethnic minorities are less satisfied with democracy than the majority, I continue to the second part of my research question: the influence of political systems. Research has shown that, in general, people who live in a country with proportional electoral representation are more satisfied with democracy than people who live in a majority system (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008). For example, Klingemann (1999) found that satisfaction with democracy, when used as a measure of regime performance, is higher in countries with a political system based on consensus, rather than a majoritarian system. This typology of majority systems and consensus systems, with proportional representation, is based on Lijphart's (2012) work on political systems. According to Lijphart consensus democracies are better at representing minorities (2012, 281). Moreover, in a replication of a study done by Anderson and Guillory (1997), he found that people in consensus democracies are more satisfied with democracy than people in a majoritarian system: a difference of 16 percentage



points, with a highly significant correlation (Lijphart, 1999, 285). Lijphart's theory is the basis for the study done by Ruben Ruiz-Rufinho (2013), who found that a system of proportional representation has a positive effect on the satisfaction with democracy of ethnic minorities. However, this was only the case when there was no political party representing this ethnic minority in parliament (Ruiz-Rufinho, 2013). This leads to my third hypothesis:

H3: The level of satisfaction with democracy amongst those who belong to a migrant ethnic minority is lower in countries with a majoritarian system than in countries with proportional representation.

### **3. Research Design and Data**

#### *3.1 Research design*

To test these hypotheses, I use a large-N observational study design. This is better suited for my research question because it is easier to look for the explanations for a possible gap with a big sample. Also, it is easier to compare migrant ethnic minority groups in different countries with the majority and immediately check for certain control variables, like age, education or social class. In a qualitative small-N design the sample would be too small to check for all these variables. Lastly, with a large-N study it is possible to generalize my findings to the entire population. It is not perfect though, as I only look at the variables that I believe are relevant to explain a lower level of satisfaction with democracy amongst migrant ethnic minorities, possibly excluding variables that would have come up during face-to-face interviews with actual representatives of a minority group. The literature however gives a very good overview of possible explanations and I believe my research design and independent variables are adequate.

#### *3.2 Data Selection*

Because I look at different political systems, I am doing a cross-national comparison of the data from a range of countries. Therefore, I use the already existing datasets of the European Social Survey (ESS), specifically the round 7 dataset which took place in 2014 (ESS round 7, 2014). This dataset it is freely available and is more extensive than I would ever be able to achieve. This means that it is more likely to yield enough respondents belonging to a migrant ethnic minority to generalize my conclusions. Moreover, by using the data from the ESS it is easier to compare data from all the respondents, since they were all asked the same questions. The problems with this set-up are that, firstly, the questions and subsequent data of the survey are not specifically designed for my research. I need to process certain variables to make them more fit for my own research or make them easier to use in my analysis. Secondly questions and concepts can be interpreted differently in different countries. This lowers the validity of my measurements, which is a problem that cannot be prevented. In some countries, there are large historical ethnic groups, in which I am not interested. These countries are excluded from analysis. Furthermore, not everyone in an ethnic group sees him or herself as part of an ethnic minority. This means that the results of my research might have a further diminished validity. Unfortunately, there is not a more complete dataset readily available.

### *3.3 Case Selection*

There are 21 countries for which data is available in the round seven survey, but I do not look at all of them. For my analysis, I exclude the Eastern European countries and Israel. Most of the Eastern European countries are ethnically heterogeneous with considerable groups of historical ethnic minorities when compared to the Western European countries. This makes these countries less suitable for this study. Israel is excluded, not only because of the strong division between the Palestinians and the Jewish population, but also because it is not part of Europe. This means that of the 21 countries that were selected for the survey I include the respondents from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in my study. I exclude respondents from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. Of the included countries, Spain and Switzerland are difficult cases because both countries have very large, very prominent ethnic minority groups. In the Spanish case, these are the Catalans and Basques, two historic and national ethnic minorities who both strive for independence. Switzerland is divided in three main language groups, namely the German, French and Italian speaking parts of the country, with the latter two being the minorities. These cases might influence my results negatively, which means that I do one additional analysis without these two cases

### *3.4 Variables*

#### *3.4.1. Independent and Dependent variables*

To get the relevant data for the dependent and independent variables of the first part of my research, I connect each variable to the data from a certain question of the ESS research. The dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy, is measured by the data from question B23: “And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?”. This is an ordinal question with an answer scale from zero to ten, where zero means the least satisfaction and ten the most.

To measure if someone belongs to a migrant ethnic minority group, my independent variable, I use question C24: “Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]?”. This is a dichotomous question and can be answered with yes or no, which means I have two groups: those who belong to a migrant ethnic minority group and those who belong to the majority.

For the independent variable of my second hypothesis, I combine the data from question C24 on ethnicity with question C20: “Were you born in [country]?”, which is also a dichotomous question that can be answered with yes or no. This gives me a new variable that indicates whether someone is a first-generation member of a migrant ethnic minority group, a

second or later generation member of a migrant ethnic minority group or a member of the majority. The newly established division allows me to not only show the gap in satisfaction between the different generations, but also to determine what the influence of generation is on the gap in satisfaction with democracy between different generations of migrant ethnic minorities in general and the majority.

### *3.4.2. Control Variables*

Aside from my independent and dependent variables, I also use some control variables on the individual level. These all have a certain effect on the satisfaction with democracy amongst migrant ethnic minorities. The control variables are gender, household's net income, education, interest in politics, religiosity, perceived discrimination and citizenship.

For gender I use the data from interviewer code E9, which indicates if the respondent is male or female. This is a dichotomous variable, with two answers.

For household's net income I use question F41: "Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate". In the interview the responses were categorized differently for each country, because the income levels and currencies are different. However, because each country uses a ten-point scale, I can use the data from this question as an interval variable.

For education I use question F15: "What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?". The answers to this question were categorized into 27 possible levels of education, which is impractical to use. In the analysis, I have reduced this to only four categories: lower education (1), secondary education (2), practical higher education (3) and academical higher education (4).

For interest in politics I use question B1: "How interested would you say you are in politics?". To this question there are four possible answers, where a one means that the

respondent is very interested in politics and a four that the respondent is not at all interested. This means that the scale is the wrong way around, as for all other variables a higher score is a more positive result. For this reason, I have reversed the scale.

For religiosity I use question C13: “Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?”. This is an ordinal question with an answer scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all religious and ten means very religious.

Perceived discrimination is measured differently than the other control variables, as there is a clear influence of perceived discrimination on satisfaction of life amongst migrant ethnic minorities (Safi, 2010; Hooghe, Marien & de Vroome, 2013). Therefore, I combine the data from question C16: “Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?” with the response from question C24: “Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]?” This gives me three groups for my first hypothesis, namely the majority, migrant ethnic minorities who do feel discriminated and migrant ethnic minorities who do not feel discriminated.

For the second hypothesis, the two migrant ethnic minority groups that are described above are divided into first generation and second or later generation groups.

The last variable, citizenship, is measured the same as perceived discrimination. I combine the data from the independent variable ethnicity with the data from question C18: “Are you a citizen of [country]?”. This leaves me with a new variable that differs between migrant ethnic minorities with citizenship, migrant ethnic minorities without citizenship and the majority, which is a combination of the majority with and without citizenship. Later I also add the data on the generations to this variable.

### *3.4.3. Index of Disproportionality*

For the second part of my research question, I need to divide my cases into two categories: proportional systems and majoritarian systems. My case selection is thus based on a most-

similar-systems design. Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden are systems of proportional representation and France and the United Kingdom are majority systems (Lijphart, 2012, 133). However, not all proportional systems are the same; they all have a certain degree in disproportionality. The same goes for majority systems, where the disproportionality is generally even higher (Lijphart, 2012). Consequently Lijphart uses Michael Gallagher's scale of disproportionality, which can be found in his work *Patterns of Democracy* (Lijphart, 2012, 150-152), to determine the overall disproportionality of the different electoral systems. On this list, The Netherlands scores a 1.21, which makes it the country with the least amount of disproportionality. France on the other hand scores a 20.88, which makes it one of the countries with the most amount of disproportionality. I use Gallagher's index for a linear regression by connecting the scores to the gaps between the migrant ethnic minority and majority of each country.

Electoral system	Country	Gallagher's index
Proportional representation	Netherlands	1.21
	Denmark	1.71
	Sweden	2.04
	Austria	2.51
	Switzerland	2.55
	Germany	2.67
	Finland	2.96
	Belgium	3.35
	Ireland	3.93
	Portugal	4.43
	Norway	4.53
	Spain	7.28
	Majoritarian system	United Kingdom
France		20.88

### 3.5. Methods

The analysis of the data is done through the linear regression method, which best fits my dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy. This is a scale variable from 0 to 10, but I use it as an interval variable.

However, if we look back at the variables that I want to use for my analysis, a problem surfaces: most of my other variables are nominal, which makes them unfit for linear regression.

For these nominal variables, for example “Belonging to a migrant ethnic minority group” or “Perceived discrimination”, I have created dummy variables to incorporate them into the linear regression.

Another problem might be the clustering of respondents from the same country, which might influence my outcomes. It is very possible that respondents from the Netherlands are on average less positive than respondents from Switzerland, because of country specific factors. Therefore I have performed a stratified bootstrap, with a confidence interval of 95%, when doing the linear regression. Bootstrapping means that smaller samples are taken from my larger sample, which are then used to estimate the values of the sample distribution (Field, 2013). The bootstrapping is stratified along country to ensure that the clustering effect of the responses from individuals of the same country does not affect the results. In other words, through the stratified bootstrap I have ensured that country-specific features do not affect my results and that my data, which might favor some countries more than others, resembles a normal distribution.

My third hypothesis requires a splitting of my data per country to measure the gap between the migrant ethnic minorities and the majority. These results are then correlated to Gallagher’s index scores (see table 1) of each country, which allows me to create a scatterplot with all the cases and again use a linear regression to see if the political system impacts the width of the gap between the two groups.

## **4. Results**

### *4.1. Satisfaction with democracy and Ethnicity*

Figure 1 (next page) shows the mean levels of satisfaction with democracy amongst those belonging to the majority and those belonging to a migrant ethnic minority. What can be spotted immediately is that those who do belong to a migrant ethnic minority group are in fact generally

more satisfied with democracy than the majority. The mean satisfaction for the majority is 5.58 and the mean satisfaction for the migrant ethnic minority group is 6.19. A simple t-test, to measure the difference between the groups, results in a t-score of 8.30 with a probability factor of 0.07, which means that there is a significant difference between the two groups. This seems to contradict the expectations of my first hypothesis, as I expected that the minority groups would have been less satisfied with democracy.

However, through the before mentioned research of Peter Mühlau and Antje Röder (2011) this outcome can be explained. Because first-generation immigrants are influenced by the so-called ‘honeymoon-effect’, they are often more satisfied with democracy than the majority population, but also more satisfied with democracy than second or later generation migrant ethnic minorities from the same group. When we take a look at the data from the ESS survey and split the group of those belonging to a migrant ethnic minority in first and later generations, it shows that there are actually more first-generation migrant ethnic minority respondents, than later generation respondents. This might explain why the outcome is not as expected; the first generation of migrant ethnic minorities is overrepresented in the analysis of my first hypothesis.

Figure 1: the mean satisfaction with democracy of those who belong to the majority and those who belong to a migrant ethnic minority





Figure 2: the mean satisfaction with democracy, with those who belong to a migrant ethnic minority split in two groups based on generation





This leads my analysis to my second hypothesis, which, as can be seen in figure 2, presents a somewhat different outcome to the question whether migrant ethnic minority groups are less satisfied with democracy. Again, the first generation of migrant ethnic minorities is more satisfied with democracy than the majority, but the second or later generation migrant ethnic minority has the same frequency distribution as the majority. The mean satisfaction with democracy for the first generation is higher than that of the entire minority population, namely 6.46. The mean satisfaction with democracy of the later generations is with 5.61 similar to that of the majority, although it is still not lower. The difference between the two generations groups is also significant, as the t-test score is -5.55 with a p-value of 0.00. Further t-tests show that there is a big difference between the majority and the first-generation migrant ethnic minorities, with a t-score of -10.01 and a probability of 0.00, and a very small difference between the majority and the second or later generation of migrant ethnic minorities, with a t-score of -0.22 and a probability of 0.83.

In the end, these findings do support my second hypothesis, as there is a gap between the first and later generations. This gap could also explain why those belonging to a migrant ethnic minority group in my first analysis are more satisfied with democracy than the majority, as this gap exists mostly due to the first-generation migrant ethnic minorities.

#### *4.2. Satisfaction with democracy and Control Variables*

To check the robustness of my findings, I add all the selected individual cultural and socioeconomic control variables to the model. Table 2 and table 3 show a linear regression with satisfaction with democracy, belonging to a migrant ethnic minority and the added control variables. In table 2 the migrant ethnic minority group is divided into two groups: one who does feel discriminated and one who does not. Table 3 shows a similar division, but here the migrant ethnic minority group is divided along citizenship. The majority score, which is the top one, is the reference point for both regression analyses.

Majority	5.05*** (.01)
Minorities who feel discriminated	-.32 (.19)
Minorities who do not feel discriminated	.93*** (.10)
Male	.01 (.04)
Household's total net income	.10*** (.01)
Secondary Education	.64*** (.06)
Practical Higher Education	.70*** (.07)
Academic Higher Education	.93*** (.07)
Interest in Politics	.40*** (.02)
Religiosity	.07*** (.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	.075
N	26405

Note: \* $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Bootstrap: 1000 stratified samples, 95% Confidence Interval

Majority	5.04*** (.01)
Minorities who hold citizenship	.22* (.12)
Minorities who do not hold citizenship	1.13*** (.16)
Male	.01 (.04)
Household's total net income	.10*** (.01)
Secondary Education	.64*** (.06)
Practical Higher Education	.70*** (.07)
Academic Higher Education	.93*** (.07)
Interest in Politics	.40*** (.02)
Religiosity	.07*** (.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	.074
N	26405

Note: \* $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Bootstrap: 1000 stratified samples, 95% Confidence Interval

If we look at table 2 it shows that perceived discrimination has a strong effect on the satisfaction with democracy of the migrant ethnic minority group. There is a negative, although insignificant difference of -0.32 between the majority and migrant ethnic minorities who feel discriminated against. Those who do not feel discriminated against are even more satisfied (0.93) with democracy than in the earlier model.

The outcome suggest that perceived discrimination has a strong effect on my independent variable. This result was to be expected, as most literature already points towards a negative relation between discrimination and satisfaction with life in general. It would seem that an individual who belongs to a migrant ethnic minority group is also more dissatisfied with democracy, when this individual is addressed negatively or has a negative experience because he belongs to a migrant ethnic minority, not simply because he or she belongs to one

If we look at table 3 however, it shows an unexpected result. Citizenship has an effect on the relation between migrant ethnicity and satisfaction with democracy. Yet those who belong to a migrant ethnic minority group and do not hold citizenship of their country are more satisfied

with democracy than those who do hold citizenship, as the difference with the majority is 1.13 and 0.22 respectively. This seems counterintuitive, as citizenship is believed to be a strong incentive for migrants to feel more tied to their new country of residence and to provide stability and security. Moreover, they become more invested into the social and political life of their host-country as the memories of their country of birth slowly fade and become heritage (Giugi et al, 2005). This could mean that the influence of citizenship is also related to generation (see table 5).

What is also clear from both tables is the strong effect education has on satisfaction with democracy, which again was to be expected and is in line with the literature. Mayne and Hakhverdian (2017) found in their study on education, socialization and political trust that when there is little corruption in the political system the more educated population are more trusting of the political institutions than the lower educated (2017, 21). As most of our cases score very high on the corruption perception index of 2014 and have low levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2015), this could explain the outcome of the addition of the education control variable. Household's total net income has no effect on satisfaction with democracy, which is in accordance with earlier research into political trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001), nor does gender, which also yields the only strong insignificant result. The positive effect of interest in politics is also expected, because previous research shows that those with a higher interest in politics are actually more satisfied with democracy (Chang, 2017). However, because of the small scale of this variable (only four categories) it might be that people are more conservative with their opinion in a smaller scale compared to a larger scale. It has been proven that a smaller scale will result in a test that has a lower validity (Gehlbach, 2015)

The control variables certainly seem to have an effect on the migrant ethnic minority group as a whole. That is why I have also applied them to the two generational groups. The results of these linear regression analyses are presented in tables 4 and 5 (see next page).

<b>Table 4. First and second generation migrant ethnic minority groups, with control variables and perceived discrimination</b>		<b>Table 5. First and second generation migrant ethnic minority groups, with control variables and citizenship</b>	
Majority	5.01*** (.10)	Majority	5.05*** (.01)
First-generation minority who feels discriminated	.245 (.24)	First-generation minority who holds citizenship	.70*** (.16)
First-generation minority who does not feel discriminated	1.17*** (.13)	First-generation minority who does not hold citizenship	1.12*** (.16)
Second or later generation minority who feels discriminated	-1.13*** (.30)	Second or later generation minority who holds citizenship	-.28 (.18)
Second or later generation minority who does not feel discriminated	.34* (.20)	Second or later generation minority who does not hold citizenship	1.49*** (.52)
Male	.01 (.04)	Male	.01 (.04)
Household's total net income	.10*** (.01)	Household's total net income	.10*** (.01)
Secondary Education	.64*** (.06)	Secondary Education	.64*** (.06)
Practical Higher Education	.69*** (.08)	Practical Higher Education	.70*** (.08)
Academic Higher Education	.92*** (.07)	Academic Higher Education	.93*** (.07)
Interest in Politics	.40*** (.02)	Interest in Politics	.40*** (.02)
Religiosity	.07*** (.01)	Religiosity	.07*** (.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	.077	R <sup>2</sup>	.075
N	26405	N	26405
<i>Note: *p &lt; 0.10; **p &lt; 0.05; ***p &lt; 0.01</i>		<i>Note: *p &lt; 0.10; **p &lt; 0.05; ***p &lt; 0.01</i>	
Bootstrap: 1000 stratified samples, 95% Confidence Interval		Bootstrap: 1000 stratified samples, 95% Confidence Interval	

In table 4, the generational groups are divided in groups who feel discriminated and groups who do not. In table 5 the generational groups are divided into those who hold citizenship and those who do not. The majority score, which is the top score, is again the reference point for both regression analyses.

Even with the addition of the control variables, the difference in levels of satisfaction with democracy between the first-generation migrant ethnic minorities and the later generations remains. Regardless of perceived discrimination, the gap between the first and later generations is around 1 to 1.5 point, which is an increase from the first analysis in table 2. It would seem that this gap has enlarged with the inclusion of the control variables.

What can be concluded is that perceived discrimination has a strong effect on the migrant ethnic minority: the levels of satisfaction with democracy amongst second or later generations

of migrant ethnic minorities drops with 1,5 point and the relation becomes very negative (-1,1). Also, amongst the first-generation migrant ethnic minorities there is a drop in satisfaction, with roughly 0.9 point. Still, even those who do feel discriminated remain more positive than the majority, although this relationship is not significant. The analysis with the addition of perceived discrimination thus gives the expected results.

However, the same cannot be said when taking citizenship into account. If we look at table 5, the second or later generation migrant ethnic minorities who hold citizenship are less satisfied with democracy than their first-generation counterpart and the majority, although we do have to keep in mind that these findings are not significant. However, when we look at those migrant ethnic minorities who do not hold citizenship, we can see that the second or later generations are more satisfied with democracy than the first generation, by 0.4 point, and both of the results are significant, at least at the 0.05 level. This also means that among second or later generation migrant ethnic minority groups, citizenship has a far stronger effect on the relation between satisfaction with democracy and ethnicity than among the first-generation migrant ethnic minorities.

As I mentioned before in my case selection, the outcomes of the Spanish and Swiss respondents might have a negative effect on my results. These two countries both have very prominent historic minorities. Therefore, I replicated my first analysis, but this time I have excluded the respondents of these two cases. If we look at the means of both groups again, it shows that the mean of the majority remains 5.58 and the mean for the migrant ethnic minority group drops from 6.19 to 6.11, which is a drop of 0.08. It would seem that these two cases do not have a great effect on the overall result.

#### *4.3. Influence of the political system*

Now that I have established that there is a gap between the migrant ethnic minority group and the majority in levels of satisfaction with democracy, it is time to look at the influence of the

political system on this gap. Admittedly, the relation is positive instead of negative, which is not what I expected. However, I still think it has enough merit to look for the influence of the political system, in this the elective system. Mostly because of possible wider implications on the research on political systems and satisfaction with democracy.

Table 6 presents the means of the majority, migrant ethnic minority, difference between the two and a t-test for each country. A few trends are immediately apparent. First, the only country where those belonging to a migrant ethnic minority are less satisfied with democracy than the majority is the Netherlands, with -0.05, which is a very small negative difference. Still, the Netherlands is also the country with the lowest disproportionality score on Gallagher's index (1.21), which seems counterintuitive. This result falls far outside the significance boundary of 0.10, though, and is thus insignificant. This brings us to the second visible trend: when the difference in levels of satisfaction with democracy between the migrant ethnic minority and the majority comes closer to zero, the result also becomes less significant. The only outcomes that have a lower significance level than 0.05 are those of Austria, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and Ireland. These five are also the countries with the biggest difference between the migrant ethnic minority group and the majority. The last general trend


**Table 6. The mean satisfaction with democracy of those who belong to the majority and those who belong to a migrant ethnic minority and the difference, per country**

Country	Majority	Minority	Difference	T-test
Austria	5.16	6.65	1.49	5.61***
Belgium	5.27	5.95	.68	2.85***
Denmark	7.11	7.42	.31	1.03
Germany	5.79	6.01	.22	1.03
Finland	5.89	6.50	.61	1.62
France	4.28	5.09	.81	3.02***
Ireland	4.79	5.83	1.04	4.12***
Netherlands	5.95	5.90	-.05	-.26
Norway	7.22	7.43	.21	.90
Portugal	3.73	3.90	.17	.36
Spain	4.23	4.43	.20	.46
Sweden	6.80	6.96	.16	.64
Switzerland	7.34	7.41	.07	.38
U.K.	5.10	5.82	.72	3.84***

Note: \* $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

T-test confidence interval: 95%

**Figure 3. The difference in satisfaction with democracy levels between the majority and migrant ethnic minority and the Gallagher index scores**



is that when the satisfaction with democracy of the majority is higher the difference with the migrant ethnic minority seems to be smaller.

Now that I have both the gap between the migrant ethnic minority and the majority as well as Gallagher's index scale score for each country, I can make a scatterplot with these outcomes. This is presented in figure 3 (previous page), along with a regression line through the points. The x-axis represents Gallagher's index and the y-axis the gap between the migrant ethnic minority group and the majority.

The scatter plot shows that there is a positive relationship between the degree of disproportionality and the gap between the migrant ethnic minority and the majority, as the regression line indicates. This goes against most of the literature (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Klingemann, 1999), as the expected result would have been a negative relation between the two concepts instead of a positive one. However, the number of cases is very small and the regression is very weak, only 0.02. Furthermore, the regression is not significant at the 0.1 level, 0.35, and the coefficient of determination is very small, 0.072. Thus, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this result.

In the scatterplot there are two interesting outliers, namely Austria and Ireland, that are deviating strongly from the other cases. One of the reasons for this might be the kind of proportional representation, as Ireland uses a system of single transferable votes (STV) instead of pure proportional representation (Lijphart, 2012). This means that, instead of voting for a party list, people rank multiple candidates in order of preference. When a candidate has the minimum votes needed for election, excess votes are redistributed. Because STV uses both proportional representation as well as voting for individuals, it is praised for its representativeness (Lijphart, 2012, 136). Another possible explanation for both countries could be an individual one: the region from which an ethnic minority originally migrated. For example, if the percentage of Eastern European migrants in Austria and Ireland is higher compared to

migrants from the Middle-East than in the other cases, this could explain the result. This means that I need to look at the country of origin of all those who have indicated that they belong to a migrant ethnic minority. The only problem that I have is that in the ESS data this information is only available for the first generation of migrant ethnic minorities, not the second or later generations. On the other hand, the majority of those who belong to a migrant ethnic minority group do belong to the first generation and it is the first generation that is the main cause of the gap between the migrant ethnic minorities and the majority. Accordingly, I have assigned all those who indicated that they were born in another country to three groups: Western (includes Western Europe, the U.S.A., Australia and New Zealand), Eastern European and rest of the world. The data for this new variable was obtained from question C21 of the ESS (“In which country were you born?”), from which the answers were reduced to the three before mentioned categories (see appendix A. for the full categorization). Table 7 shows the composition of migrant groups per country.

This shows that Austria and Ireland are, in fact, the only two countries of the fourteen where the group of migrant ethnic minorities from outside of Europe is smaller than the group from Eastern Europe. Although this result is promising, I cannot be certain it is valid. First, the

**Table 7. Composition of the migrant ethnic minority group, per country**

Country	Western	Eastern European	Outside Europe
Austria	1	40	24
Belgium	10	15	36
Denmark	0	8	34
Germany	10	38	47
Finland	0	6	8
France	5	4	46
Ireland	7	36	35
Netherlands	2	7	69
Norway	3	6	11
Portugal	0	0	14
Spain	0	1	19
Sweden	7	7	34
Switzerland	23	20	38
U.K.	4	10	57

Numbers of migrants originating from region in the sample

**Table 8. Satisfaction with democracy and migrant ethnic minorities, per region**

Majority	5.58*** (.01)
Migrant Ethnic Minority from Western Regions	.51 (.32)
Migrant Ethnic Minority from Eastern Europe	.94*** (.17)
Migrant Ethnic Minority from non-European countries	.78*** (.11)
R <sup>2</sup>	.003
N	25886

Note: \* $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Bootstrap: 1000 stratified samples, 95% Confidence Interval



sample is very small and not all those belonging to a migrant ethnic minority are part of the analysis. Second, especially in the case of Ireland, the difference only consists of the slightest margin: a difference of only 1.

To be sure that it could indeed be the composition of the migrant ethnic minority group that explains the outliers, I have performed a linear regression with the first-generation migrants from the three separate regions and looked at their levels of satisfaction with democracy. As the results from table 8 show, migrant ethnic minorities from Eastern Europe are the most satisfied with democracy. They are 0.15 point more satisfied than migrant ethnic minorities from outside of Europe and both results are significant. This implicates that the gap between the majority and migrant ethnic minorities is bigger when there are more migrant ethnic minorities from Eastern Europe, relative to numbers of migrant ethnic minorities from other regions. Admitting there are of course a lot of other factors that influence this relationship, as the coefficient of determination is very low (only 0.003).

## **5. Conclusion and discussion**

To what extent does belonging to a migrant ethnic minority affect satisfaction with democracy and is this effect conditional on the type of democracy? Democracy, as a concept, can mean different things to different people: some see democracy as a system in which the people can choose their rulers, other see it is a collection of ideas about freedom, equality and human rights. That is why it can be difficult to determine when we are satisfied with it. There are many factors that can influence our satisfaction and I expected that ethnicity could be one of them.

With the ESS dataset from 2014, I have tried to clarify further the precise relation between ethnicity and satisfaction with democracy. I took fourteen Western European countries from this dataset and used the data of various questions on ethnicity, country of birth and certain individual factors for my analysis. I found that the migrant ethnic minority population in fact is

more satisfied with democracy than the majority, which contradicted my expectations. However, the positive attitude is conditional on the generation a specific individual is part of: the second and later generation migrant ethnic minorities are as satisfied with democracy as the majority, which is in accordance with the literature. The ‘honeymoon effect’, as described by Mühlau and Röder (2012), proves to be strong amongst first-generation migrant ethnic minorities. A factor that does negatively affect the level of satisfaction with democracy amongst migrant ethnic minorities is perceived discrimination, as my research shows. When a group feels discriminated, they are less satisfied with democracy than when they do not feel discriminated. There appears to be a negative correlation between perceived discrimination and satisfaction with democracy.

Although these results seem clear, the analysis is far from perfect. There are several problems with the dataset that I use, as the data does not always correspond with my concepts. Because most of these questions are self-identifying, some people who belong to a minority do not say they do. Furthermore, ethnic minorities have always been difficult to reach through these kinds of questionnaires, especially the individuals who live in the poorest conditions, which means that my sample might not be representative for the entire population.

More research is needed on the relationship between ethnicity, discrimination and satisfaction with democracy, with a focus on compiling more precise and complete datasets. In addition, as I mentioned before, I failed to get any significant results on my third hypothesis, although there were some interesting implications on the effect of the region a migrant come from and his or her satisfaction with democracy. Therefore, when more research is done on this topic the number of cases should be extended and the focus on type of migrant should remain.

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**Appendix A:**

The ESS data on country of origin recognizes 253 places of origin (some of which did not exist anymore in 2014), which have been narrowed down to just three general regions. What follows is an overview of all places of origin per region.

**Western:**

Andorra, Austria, Australia, Åland Islands, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Belgium, Bouvet Island, Canada, Cyprus, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Denmark, Eastern Germany, Germany, Svalbard and Jan Mayen, Sweden, Finland, Faroe Islands, France, Gibraltar, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Guernsey, Holy See (Vatican City State), Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco,

**Eastern European:**

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Russian Federation, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia

**Outside Europe:**

Afghanistan, Algeria, American Samoa, Territory, British Virgin Islands, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Angola, Anguilla, Antarctica, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bonaire, Chad, Chile, China, Christmas Island, Botswana, Brazil, British Indian Ocean Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Colombia,

Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte D'ivoire, Cuba, Curaçao, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Guiana, French Polynesia, French Southern Territories, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greenland, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guam, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Heard Island and Mcdonald Islands, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Macao, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Oman, Pakistan,

Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Réunion, Rwanda, Saba, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan Da Cunha, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sint Eustatius, Sint Maarten, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, State of Palestine, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, U.S. Virgin Islands, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Wallis and Futuna, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe