

CONFRONTING THE CIVIL WAR TRAP

THE EFFECT OF POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS ON REBEL
INTRA-GROUP DYNAMICS AND POST-WAR CONFLICT INITIATION



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1. INTRODUCTION

After two failed peace processes, the 15-year long civil war in Chad ended through a comprehensive peace agreement between the government and FAN, FAP, and FROLINAT opposition forces in March 1979.¹ The agreement included military power-sharing arrangements like the dissolution of rebel armies and the creation of a new national army (rebel-military integration) as well as political power-sharing. However, despite these arrangements, fighting resumed when in 1982 Habré's Armed Forces of the North (FAN) attacked the capital N'djamena. President Goukouni Oueddi, Habré's former FROLINAT ally, was ousted, instigating renewed civil war in the country.² This example is only one of many eruptions of rebel group initiated inter-ally armed conflicts after power-sharing arrangements concluding a prior civil war.

Countries that have experienced civil war face a greater risk of new conflict than countries with no prior history of civil war. The percentage of civil war recurrence was 67 percent in the 1990s, and even as high as 90 percent in post-war countries since 2000.³ Consequently, many countries are trapped in a cycle of recurring conflict. This empirical finding is called the *civil war trap*, where the effects of a previous war lead to renewed fighting.⁴ Initiating conflict is irrational and costly, especially after a prior war. Yet, states, as well as non-state actors, initiate civil war. The available explanations for this *civil war trap* focus on unsolved issues, indecisive outcomes, destruction, and grievances.⁵ However, since these elements are commonly present in post-conflict environments, they do not fully explain why some civil wars start again, while others do not.

In response to the spike in civil wars after the end of the Cold War, peace agreements with power-sharing arrangements have long been argued to be the best civil war resolution

¹ Högladh 2012; Harbom et. al. 2006.

² Atlas and Licklider 1999: 43-44.

³ Call 2012: 2; Walter 2015: 1242.

⁴ Kreutz 2012: 13.

⁵ Collier et.al. 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003.

because of the correspondence between civil war recurrence and exclusion from power.⁶ The more dimensions of power-sharing among former combatants are specified in a peace agreement, the higher the likelihood of enduring peace, because of the security guarantees it provides among former enemies.⁷ As a result, these negotiated settlements with power-sharing arrangements have become default in civil war resolution. However, an examination of conflicts terminated by peace agreements shows 55% conflict recurrence. When these settlements contain power-sharing terms 70% show conflict recurrence. Moreover, in all but two cases conflict was initiated by the (former) rebel group.⁸ For the countries and their populations stuck in this cycle of near-constant conflict, as well as third parties involved in peacekeeping and stabilization missions, it is important that lasting peace is established. But to do that, one needs to know first why peace fails. Why do armed non-state actors initiate conflict after being part of a power-sharing arrangement ending a prior civil war?

Empirical research shows that power-sharing is indeed successful in stabilizing peace among former adversaries. However, the answer as to why civil wars terminated by negotiated settlements with power-sharing start again is likely to be found *within* the groups included in the settlement. The problem is not so much the resolution of hostilities between (former) foes, but rather the rise of hostilities among former allies.⁹ Though power-sharing might (temporarily) establish a balance of power between former adversaries, at the same time it negatively affects the balance of power *within* the groups. This causes intra-group security dilemmas and rivalry leading to remobilization and initiation of conflict. Focussing specifically on those civil wars that were terminated by means of a peace agreement with power-sharing arrangement, how are rebel group internal relations affected? How does rebel group fractionalization affect conflict dynamics? And, what are the long-term effects of the continuous cycle of failed power-sharing arrangements?

⁶ Hartzell and Hoodie 2003; Mattes and Savun 2009.

⁷ Hartzell and Hoodie 2003.

⁸ See figure 1.

⁹ Atlas and Licklider 1999.

Recent scholarship is increasingly critical about the use of power-sharing to conclude a civil war, arguing that the very success of power-sharing arrangements can cause a return to violence.¹⁰ Power-sharing has a disruptive effect on the internal politics of the rebel group, where dissatisfaction, opportunity, and security concerns are incentives for remobilization and conflict initiation.¹¹ Moreover, it is argued that power-sharing is linked to an increased risk of splintering as well as religious extremism.¹² These pathways make containing civil wars increasingly difficult. The current civil war in South Sudan, for instance, is fought between government forces and the SPLM In Opposition (SPLM-IO). After independence of South Sudan in 2011, the SPLM/A became the governmental party, and after a failed power-sharing arrangement the SPLM-IO split off and continued anti-government activities.¹³ Furthermore, the effect of splintering on religious extremism is clear by how the Islamic State gained foothold in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, and Nigeria, all suffering from a continuous cycle of civil war.

Drawing on formal studies on civil war termination and recurrence, in this thesis I will develop a theory for rebel group conflict initiation, proposing that the causal mechanism for conflict initiation by rebel groups is based on intra-group rivalry following the group's inclusion in power-sharing arrangements as part of a peace agreement. Though resistance groups are organized differently, security concerns, personal survival, and in-group rivalry are especially present in post-war environments. Power-sharing arrangements consolidate the adversarial elite into a cooperative regime, which is then impeding the relationships between the elite and their (former) officers, as well as the rank-and-file members of the group.¹⁴ This could be seen as a shock in the group's power distribution leading to destabilization of intra-group dynamics, causes infighting and security dilemmas which escalates to conflict initiation.

¹⁰ Daly 2014: 334.

¹¹ Kreutz 2012: 29-30.

¹² Kreutz 2012: 29; Seymour 2014: 93-95.

¹³ UCDP actors in South Sudanese civil war: <http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/4226>.

¹⁴ Daly 2014: 334.

The study will add to the existing literature in two ways. First, it will test and develop theory for armed non-state group conflict initiation, based on an intra-group rivalry model following a ‘shock’ in power distribution after having been included in a power-sharing arrangement. Examining mechanisms that exist *within* these groups is in line with recent literature arguing that rebel groups are not unitary, albeit they are often regarded as such.¹⁵ Moreover, since all but one of the current wars are civil war recurrences,¹⁶ insights on rebel group internal politics could provide the tools for a more successful solution for civil wars.

Second, it will address the lack of historical research¹⁷ of civil war recurrence and rebel groups through the actual application of theories and empirical data to case studies. Large-scale political violence between a government and rebel groups has received a lot of scholarly attention over the past two decades and produced an array of empirical data and theoretical frameworks. However, the focus on governments as main actors and the prioritization of peace agreements as solution for civil war makes mechanisms underlying the continued fighting by armed non-state groups remain under-examined. This study contributes by providing newly collected descriptive data on the relationship between rebel groups, power-sharing, and civil war recurrence. Furthermore, it provides new insights on in-group processes as casual mechanisms of conflict initiation and recurrence.

The study will proceed as follows: in chapter two previous research will be discussed and the hypotheses of this study will be presented. In chapter three, the framework of analysis and research design is laid out. Herein the theory and method are being discussed and the body of cases is introduced. Subsequently, it will turn to the qualitative research of post-war intra-group dynamics of rebel groups and conflict initiation. This section includes a comparative analysis of power-sharing arrangements and civil war recurrence after negotiated settlements between 1945 and 2016. This is followed by case studies of Sudan and Tajikistan, questioning the effect of military integration on rebel in-group dynamics. Lastly, some conclusions will be made.

¹⁵ Cunningham 2013: 662-664.

¹⁶ Walter 2015: 1242-1243.

¹⁷ *inter alia* Sambanis 2004; Kreutz 2012.

2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Since the spike in civil wars during the 1990s,¹⁸ peace agreements have been the focus of civil war related research. The main consensus of these studies is that successful implementation depends on the character of the agreement, the degree of commitment among the parties, and on the implementation efforts, albeit with third party involvement.¹⁹ Studies on the probability of success in peace agreements and negotiated settlements often conclude that the most durable settlements are those that: (1) concern states in which the previous stable government was a democracy, (2) end civil conflicts of low intensity that lasted for extended periods of time, (3) include in the peace agreement provisions for territorial autonomy of threatened groups, and (4) have security assurances offered to the former combatants by third-party states, regional, or international organizations.²⁰

However, these conclusions seem to mainly correspond with the characteristics of politico-economic wars, which are often of low intensity, short, and are statistically more likely to develop a stable peace after a peace agreement.²¹ Whereas the majority of civil wars are identity-based, ideological, or territorial.²² These wars are often of high intensity and continue over a long time, which makes them most intractable and most likely to recur.²³ Post-colonial and newly independent states with weak, often authoritarian governments are more likely to experience these identity-based civil wars.²⁴ Moreover, the conclusions described above do not consider the high probability of civil war recurrence following these power-sharing agreements due to elite competition,²⁵ and destabilized post-war intra-organizational politics.²⁶

¹⁸ Gleditsch et.al. 2002: 624.

¹⁹ Call 2012; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothschild 2012; Walter 2004.

²⁰ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothschild 2012: 202-203.

²¹ Call 2012.

²² For a categorization of civil wars 1945-2015, see Sambanis 2000: 447-449; Melander et. al. 2016.

²³ Walter 2004; Licklider 1995.

²⁴ Fearon and Laitin 2003; Roessler 2011.

²⁵ Roessler 2011.

²⁶ Kreutz 2012: 23-24.

2.1 CIVIL WAR TERMINATION AND RECURRENCE

Research on civil war termination and its effect on the probability of civil war recurrence tends to focus on two possible outcomes: (1) civil war termination through a negotiated peace agreement, and (2) decisive military victory.²⁷ Negotiated settlements with power-sharing arrangements have become increasingly common, since achieving military victory has become less likely. This is caused by changing conflict issues, international condemnation of genocide and ethnic cleansing, the end of the Cold War terminating major power support, as well as the establishment and prioritization of international and nongovernmental organizations dedicated to peacekeeping and the end of mass violence.²⁸

The focus on these two possible outcomes leads on the one hand to the argument that the probability of civil war recurrence is reduced when rival groups agree to share power at the end of a war. These measures are the means to stabilize expectations, reduce insecurity, and provide adversaries with a stake in the peace.²⁹ This can be established through political, territorial, military, and economic terms with political forms of power-sharing being electoral, administrative, and executive proportional representation. Territorial provisions are those where political division is based on regional autonomy. Military power-sharing involves the distribution of power in the state's coercive apparatus, and the economic dimension entails the distribution of economic resources over the groups.³⁰

On the other hand, it is argued that negotiated settlements of civil war are likely to break down because segments of power-sharing lets governments retain the capacity for resorting to civil war, while civil war victory leaves the losing party's organizational structure destroyed, making it hard to resume conflict.³¹ This causes security concerns among excluded rebel group members. Consequently, it is argued that war can lead to the resolve of political conflicts and peace when all parties involved become exhausted or there is decisive victory. But this can only happen after a culminating phase of violence before accommodation becomes more attractive.

²⁷ Hartzell 2009; Walter 2004; Licklider 1995.

²⁸ Licklider 2015: 53.

²⁹ Hartzell and Hoodie 2003; Hartzell 2009.

³⁰ Hartzell and Hoodie 2003: 320.

³¹ Licklider 1995: 684-685.

This process is often interrupted by third parties, preventing the warring parties from burning themselves out. This, in turn, leads to intensified fighting, because of the possibility to regroup and rearm.³²

Recent scholarship unsurprisingly finds that forms of power-sharing institutions and power-sharing arrangements do not affect real inclusiveness of policy-making, nor does it reduce the risk of civil war recurrence.³³ Granting autonomy to a rebellious region strengthens group identification and increases the risk of civil war recurrence.³⁴ Others argue that political power-sharing arrangements are only successful when offered by the government after a military victory.³⁵ Furthermore, both political and military power-sharing are negatively associated with peace endurance, albeit military integration is statistically less significant.³⁶

H1. Power-sharing arrangements increase the probability of civil war recurrence.

2.2 FOES UNITED, ALLIES DIVIDED

Post-civil war security concerns are a major issue for all echelons in an armed organization. It is thus that former combatants need assurance that after a civil war no group will be able to use state power to continue to pursue the prior war's military aims, or to threaten the survival of rivals. It is argued that power-sharing institutions address these security concerns and assures groups previously involved in war of political participation and decision making.³⁷ The political and legal institutions in place to constrain elites in post-civil war states is another measure often focussed on. These constraints involve greater post-conflict institutionalization and credible commitment to political reform through power-sharing. Leaders in weakly institutionalized environments will have greater difficulty working with former opponents, and unconstrained

³² Luttwak 1999: 36-40.

³³ Pospieszna and Schneider 2013; Daly 2014; Krebs and Licklider 2016; Baaz and Verweijen 2013.

³⁴ Pospieszna and Schneider 2013: 51.

³⁵ Mukherjee 2006.

³⁶ Mukherjee 2006: 479-480, 497-500.

³⁷ Hartzell and Hoodie 2003: 318-319.

leaders are unlikely to give up power. However, leaders facing a tough rebel group might have incentives to do so, and their commitment would lead to a decrease in civil war risk.³⁸

Power-sharing arrangements have become an almost standard part of negotiated settlements to civil war, and a growing number of these agreements contain clauses on military power-sharing.³⁹ However, all of these arrangements are particularly concerned with ensuring that former enemies are satisfied with the outcome so that they do not resume the prior civil war.⁴⁰ Power-sharing as part of a negotiated settlement between adversaries might corroborate with a higher probability of peace endurance. Yet, it does not take into account the possible destabilizing effects *within* the groups involved in these settlements.

“The problem is often a breakdown in relations among former allies, not former foes.”⁴¹ Civil war termination does not equal immediate resolve of the underlying political conflict. The dominant faction of both sides form a coalition, it is in their interest to settle. Such an arrangement inherently means exclusion of individuals and factions, mainly from the rebel group, which will be left out of the deal and are likely to continue to believe their interests are met by continuation of violence. Consequently, political tensions rise because of divisions between former allies.⁴² Thus, conflict is more likely to break out between former allies than former foes, because the mechanism of power-sharing threatens the interests and security of non-included factions or groups. The tensions continue to rise until either the former allies initiate violence to one another, or the settlement coalition is forced to change policy and violate the arrangement.⁴³

In sum, political power-sharing creates and consolidates credible, horizontal, elite commitments, brings together adversarial elite into a cooperative regime, and includes former rivals in the decision making process through in-bidding. Consequently, this is likely to cause a return to violence since these newly established relationships damage the vertical agreements

³⁸ Walter 2015: 1243-1244.

³⁹ Tull and Mehler 2005: 375-377; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008: 365-384.

⁴⁰ Atlas and Licklider 1999: 36.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Atlas and Licklider 1999: 36-37.

⁴³ Idem: 37.

that elites have within the group's organization.⁴⁴ There are many contributing factors to the decline of intra-group relationships after power-sharing. The elite might benefit from spoils, political participation, and security measures, the lower echelons of these political and military institutions do not benefit from these agreements. Personal security concerns, group dynamics, and dissatisfaction increase the probability of infighting, fractionalization, and extremism, leading to an increase in the probability of civil war.⁴⁵ In Sudan, the North and South reached an agreement, but conflict *within* northern factions —partly facilitated by the dominant southern faction, which on its turn led to conflict *within* southern factions— eventually led to the undermining of the agreement by the North. this caused splintering in Southern opposition and renewed civil war initiated by the South.⁴⁶

H2. *Power-sharing destabilizes power distribution within the group, the breakdown of agreements between elite and lower echelons (officers, and rank-and-file members) create rivalry, security concerns, and dissatisfaction which are incentives for remobilization and conflict initiation.*

Rebel-military integration

Scholars, international civil society, and international governmental organizations all believe that military integration reduces the risk of civil war recurrence, since "a professional, communally representative force could allay vulnerable group's security fears by serving as a credible signal of the government's commitment to power-sharing and by keeping communal or ideological compatriots under arms."⁴⁷ Military integration is a power-sharing term and is used as a way to reduce the number of ex-combatants that have to be disarmed and reintegrated in society. Most negotiated settlements include provisions for 'disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), but in reality, this is a long and expensive process that is often not feasible in post-war

⁴⁴ Daly 2014: 334.

⁴⁵ Kreutz 2012: 29-30.

⁴⁶ Okeny 2015: 40-46; Atlas and Licklider 1999: 37-40.

⁴⁷ Krebs and Licklider 2016: 94.

states.⁴⁸ Military power-sharing is mainly used in response to addresses the security dilemmas that arise following disarmament. The provision of security guarantees is one of the main reasons why rebel groups are interested, or insist on, rebel-military integration.⁴⁹ This suggests that rebel-military integration could decrease security concerns among rank-and-file members of rebel groups, and thus decrease their incentives for remobilization.

Conversely, deep military integration could transform intra-group dynamics by integrating pillars of support into military structure. Especially when all factions are included rebel-military integration is positively associated with peace.⁵⁰ Another positive association is found when military integration provides security guarantees.⁵¹ Moreover, following Atlas and Licklider's argument (1999), military integration brings together former foes which tends to create peaceful relationship, and it discourages collective violence through broad integration and unit formation of potential rivals —former allies.

Despite the fact that rebel-military integration corroborates with peace endurance in empirical research, the rebel-military integration clause is not a substitute for politics. By itself, it cannot prevent a renewed civil war, but successfully completed it could serve as a transitional process leading to peace.⁵² Studies that researched various levels of military integration and civil war recurrence over a broad scope of case studies suggest that this does not independently cause post-civil war peace.⁵³ Military integration is often flawed,⁵⁴ and in a power-sharing arrangement, it does not make renewed civil war less likely.⁵⁵ Rather they point to a significant role for underlying political mechanisms and conditions. However, not all possible causal mechanisms for civil war recurrence after (military) power-sharing have been thoroughly examined.⁵⁶

⁴⁸ Licklider 2015: 54.

⁴⁹ Krebs and Licklider 2016: 132.

⁵⁰ Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008: 367-376.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Licklider 2015: 57; Krebs and Licklider 2016: 98.

⁵³ Krebs and Licklider 2016; Themnér 2013.

⁵⁴ Krebs and Licklider 2016: 98.

⁵⁵ Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008: 381-382.

⁵⁶ Krebs and Licklider 2016: 133-134.

H3. *Deep military integration stabilizes in-group dynamics and rivalry, and disincentivizes remobilization and conflict initiation.*

2.3 REBEL ATTRIBUTES AND CONFLICT INITIATION

Over the past couple of years, more studies on insurgent groups as a driving factor in the recurrence of civil war have become available. What drives rebels to initiate conflict again? Just as governments experience power struggles and elite competition, especially after a civil war,⁵⁷ rebel group organization and their internal politics too are affected by armed conflict. The literature on rebel group organization argues that personal survival, security dilemmas, and elite rivalry influence rebel group leaders' strategic decision making during and after war. Especially after political power-sharing arrangements, these provide incentives for remobilization, since the continuation of fighting is often a means to avoid punishment. As the likelihood of victory decreases, security issues increase. Leaders will be more prone to continue fighting in order to increase the chances of victory.⁵⁸

Moreover, intra-group variation affects the probability of infighting, but also the group's bargaining capabilities relative to the state.⁵⁹ United rebel groups are most successful in achieving their strategic objective, centralized command is linked to fewer internal disputes, common strategy, and less infighting.⁶⁰ Others argue, however, that factionalized groups generate flexible coalitions in favor establishing a support base and offer incentives for the state to make concessions.⁶¹ Once a division in the group arises, it is common for former fighters of the same faction to continue to fraternize long after leaving their armed units, and when these fighters rearm they tend to do so with their former group members rather than fighters from other factions or units.⁶²

⁵⁷ Roessler 2011.

⁵⁸ Prorok 2016: 70-71. Chiozza and Goemans call this mechanism 'Gambling for Survival', 2011: 18-32.

⁵⁹ Bakke et.al. 2012; Cunningham 2013.

⁶⁰ Krause 2013: 72-73.

⁶¹ Driscoll 2012; Nilsson 2008.

⁶² Thémner 2013: 297

The logic of conflict initiation

Then what is the logic behind post-war conflict initiation? The struggle for power and large scale political violence are argued to be related by a causal process through which bargaining for power leads to civil war. This is caused by the commitment problem that arises between elites with joint access to the state's coercive apparatus.⁶³ Each side maneuvers to protect its share and bargaining power, however this triggers an internal security dilemma, escalating an internal conflict. For the elite the main object is to eliminate one's rival, where for the leader it is to neutralize the threat in order to protect its personal wellbeing.⁶⁴

I argue that a similar mechanism explains conflict initiation when the elite or dominant faction of a rebel group is included in positions of power. Vertical arrangements *within* the group are damaged, consequently commitment problems and security concerns rise among the excluded middle ranking officers and rank-and-file members. Conflict initiation creates opportunities for self preservation. Furthermore, the element of dissatisfaction is an important amplifier of hostilities especially in rebel groups.

The relationship between in-group dynamics and conflict initiation (out-group fighting), is also explained as follows: "When between group conflict generates within group security benefits that outweigh the cost of conflict, violence is no longer inefficient."⁶⁵ Thus, violence or conflict initiation becomes rational in search of self preservation. Given that conflict initiation increases the chances of victory,⁶⁶ they favor conflict over loss of power (mostly officers) or death (mostly rank-and-file). This mechanism is mainly employed in explanations of elite rivalry and regime conflict initiation. However, given that the most important post-war concern is security and self preservation regardless of rank, it suggests that this mechanism is valuable in researching rebel groups and conflict initiation.

⁶³ Roessler 2011: 301-303.

⁶⁴ Roessler 2011: 301-303; ; Chiozza and Goemans 2011: 18-19.

⁶⁵ Van der Maat 2015: 3.

⁶⁶ Chiozza and Goemans 2011: 19.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 THEORY AND METHOD

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the study of causal patterns that explain conflict initiation after a previous civil war. Building upon the theoretical argument that conflict is more likely to break out because of hostilities between former allies rather than foes,⁶⁷ this thesis will use qualitative analysis to test the proposition that power-sharing arrangements to end a prior civil war destabilizes rebel intra-group dynamics and relations by a ‘shock’ in power distribution, leading to conflict initiation. What follows are commitment problems, security dilemmas, and rivalry, which in particular give middle-ranking officers and rank-and-file members an incentive for remobilization and conflict initiation. The theory suggests that the elite of the (former) rebel group are more likely to stick to the agreement since power-sharing tends to successfully resolve incompatibilities between former enemies. Furthermore, literature suggests that political power-sharing arrangements have a greater destabilizing effect than military power-sharing and that rebel-military integration can successfully stabilize in-group rivalry [when both terms are included].

This mechanism will be tested in two ways. The first test consists of a comparative analysis of all civil wars that were terminated by a peace agreement, and examines the relationship between powers-sharing arrangements and civil war recurrence. The second test focusses on the second part of the theory —the premise that military integration could stabilize in-group dynamics— and will consist of two case studies. These cases are selected based on differences in military integration, but show similar political power-sharing terms. The selected cases will be analyzed and compared, both meeting the conditions under which we expect the armed non-state group to initiate conflict. The focus will be on intra-group dynamics and decision making within the rebel group, therefore it is mainly the side of the rebel group that is being discussed. One limitation of this study is capturing personal motivation of rebel group members. Nonetheless, through recent case-specific studies based on fieldwork and interviews with group members, insights on group’s internal politics have become available.

⁶⁷ Atlas and Licklider 1999.

3.2 DATA AND IMPLICATIONS

The selection of cases is based on the UCDP/PRIO ‘peace agreements dataset’, which provides an overview of all peace agreements between 1975 and 2004.⁶⁸ Additionally, it uses the ‘UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset’ and ‘UCDP/PRIO Dyadic dataset’ to complete the data up to 2016.⁶⁹ The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies ‘Peace Accords Matrix’ is used to complete data on peace agreement provisions and implementation monitoring. Initial research resulted in a small N descriptive dataset (see Appendix I), of which the table in figure one is a summary of this data. The total of potential cases consists of those civil wars ending in a negotiated peace agreement, with the following additional scope conditions:

1. Power-sharing: the negotiated peace agreement includes power-sharing arrangements in which the rebel group was included. This can be both political or military power-sharing or a combination.
2. Rebel group start: only cases in which an armed non-state group initiates conflict, or is expected to initiate will be selected. The onset of the prior war, under which the non-state actor was formed and armed, can be both state or non-state initiated.
3. Level of military integration: In order to test the effect of military power-sharing on conflict recurrence case selection is also based on the level of military integration. Therefore, one case will represent deep military integration, and the other minor military integration.

Case Selection

The table in figure 1 includes all potential cases based on the primary scope condition ‘prior war ended in peace agreement’.⁷⁰ Potential positive and negative cases can be recognized as such under ‘recurrence’, where in positive cases new conflict is initiated and in negative cases not, coded yes or no for recurrence respectively. The next column shows which side of the previous war initiated conflict after the negotiated settlement. Furthermore, power-sharing terms are coded ‘deep’ when all factions are included, and detailed agreements are made about quotas of co-

⁶⁸ Högbladh 2012; Harbom et. al. 2006.

⁶⁹ Gleditsch et. al. 2002; Melander et.al. 2016.

⁷⁰ For full circumstances of the peace agreements, rebel groups, power-sharing terms and subsequent recurrences see compiled dataset in Appendix I.

optation, unit formation, and functions in government and the military. It is coded as ‘intermediate’ when power-sharing arrangements are the main part of the settlement, but rebel group incorporation is less than 40%. Lastly, power-sharing is considered ‘minor’ when the agreement included power-sharing elements but only the elite or dominant faction is included. The inclusion of provisions such as fair elections, recognition of ethnicities and minorities, are not considered power-sharing arrangements in this study.

In order to confirm the proposed theory, the results should show that: (1) When power-sharing terms are not part of a negotiated settlement, civil war should not recur (hypothesis 1). (2) Political power-sharing always fails, because the new power distribution destabilized in-group dynamics. Disruption in vertical arrangements within the group —between leader and officers— makes the latter two more likely to initiate conflict again. Conflict initiation is motivated by dissatisfaction, security concerns and self preservation (hypothesis 2). (3) The combination of political power-sharing with minor or intermediate military integration should always fail. Deep military integration, however, should lead to non-recurrence of civil war (hypothesis 3).

The following cases are selected for the second test:

1. Sudan: The Addis Ababa peace agreement involved both political and military power-sharing. The political elite gained political participation but abandoned former vertical agreements increasing security concerns as well as dissatisfaction among officers and rank-and-file members. Additionally, multiple power-sharing arrangements have led to a continuous outbreak of violence, and former allies fighting each other is at the heart of the current civil war in post-independent South Sudan.
2. Tajikistan: Despite the presence of all mechanisms through which we expect conflict initiation, civil war did not recur. Why did power-sharing here not lead to a breakdown in the intra-group politics of the UTO? Or did it, but other circumstances led to non-recurrence? According to theory, the probability of the UTO initiating conflict is high, yet it does not get to this point. Failed political-power-sharing was accompanied by deep and broad military integration, how did this affect the rebel in-group dynamics?

CIVIL WARS TERMINATED BY PEACE AGREEMENTS 1945-2016

The relationship between power-sharing and civil war recurrence.

Country	Rebel group	Year	Power-sharing terms	Recurrence	Initiation
Afghanistan	Mujahideen factions	1978-1992	Political: intermediate	yes, 1992-1996, 1996-ongoing	Rebel
Angola	UNITA FNLA, FLEC	1975-1994	Political: deep Military: minor	yes, 1998-2002	Government
Bangladesh	PCJSS Chittagong Hill	1977-1997	Political: minor	no	-
Burundi	Hutu and Tutsi militias	1993-2006	Political: intermediate Military: deep	no	-
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, KPNFL	1978-1991	Political: intermediate	yes: 1993-1998	Rebel
Central African Republic	UFDR, rebel groups	2003-2007	Military: intermediate	yes, 2012-ongoing	Rebel
Chad	FRONINAT, FAN, FAP	1965-1979	Political: deep Military: intermediate	yes, 1980-2994, 2005-2010	Rebel
Colombia	Liberals, Communist	1948-1958	Political: deep	yes, 1964-ongoing	Rebel
Republic of the Congo/Brazzaville	FADR.	1993-1994	Political: minor Military: minor	yes, 1997-1999	Government
Djibouti	FRUD	1991-1994	Political: deep Military: deep	no	-
D.R. Congo	RCD, MLC, RCD-ML, RCD-N, Mai Mai	1998-2003	Political: intermediate Military: minor	yes, 2006-2009 2012-2013	Rebel
El Salvador	FMLN left-wing guerrilla	1979-1992	none	no	-
Georgia	Abkhaz	1992-1994	none	no	-
Guatemala	URNG, Leftist rebel groups	1968-1996	Military: minor	no	-
Guinea Bissau	Military rebels	1998-1999	Political: intermediate	yes, 1999	Rebel
Haïti	Military rebels	1991-1995	Political: minor	yes, 2004.	Rebel
Indonesia	Aceh separatists	1976-2005	none	no	-
Ivory Coast	Northern rebels	2002-2004	Political: deep	yes, 2010-2011	Rebel
Lebanon	PLO, with LNM, Jamoul	1975- 1989	Political: deep Military: minor	yes, 1990	Rebel

Country	Rebel group	Year	Power-sharing terms	Recurrence	Initiation
Liberia	NPFL, INPFL, ULIMO	1989-1996	Political: deep Military: minor	yes, 1999-2003	Rebel
Macedonia	NLA	2001	none	no	-
Malaysia	NKCP, MCP, MNLA communist forces	1968-1990	none	no	-
Mali	MFUA, FIAA	1990-1994	Political: intermediate Military: minor	yes, 2007-ongoing	Rebel
Mexico	EZLN	1994-1996	none	no	-
Mozambique	RENAMO	1976-1992	Political: minor Military: deep	no	-
Nepal	Communist Party Nepal	1997-2006	none	no	-
Niger	CRA, FLAA, ORA	1993-1995	Political: minor Military: deep	no	-
Papua New Guinea	BRA	1988-1998	none	no	-
Philippines	MNLF	1972-1996	Political: intermediate Military: intermediate	yes, 2000-2014	Rebel
Rwanda	FPR	1990-1993	Political: intermediate Military: intermediate	yes, 1994	Rebel
Senegal	Casamance separatists, MFDC	1982-2004	Political: minor Military: minor	yes, 2005-2014	Rebel
Sierra Leone	RUF, Kamajors	1991-2000	Political: deep Military: deep	no	-
Somalia	SSDF, SNM, SPM, USC	1981-2002	Political: minor	yes, 2006-ongoing	Rebel
South Africa	ANC, various other parties	1983-1994	Political: minor Military: deep	no	-
Sudan	Anya'nya, SSLM, SPLA	1963-1972	Political: intermediate Military: minor	yes, 1983-2005 ongoing	Rebel
Tajikistan	UTO	1992-1997	Political: intermediate Military: deep	no	-
Uganda	NRA	1981-1986	Political: deep Military: intermediate	yes, 1987-2008	Rebel
Zimbabwe	ZANLA/ZANU, ZAPU	1972-1979	Political: intermediate Military: intermediate	yes, 1983-1987	Rebel

Figure 1: Potential cases studies based on conflict termination by peace agreement, determination of power-sharing and recurrence. (UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Dataset, Högbladh 2012; and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Allansson et.al. 2017.)

4. RESULTS

4.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POWER-SHARING AND CIVIL WAR RECURRENCE

Figure 1 summarizes the examination of all civil wars that were terminated by negotiated settlements between 1945 and 2016, and the relationship between power-sharing arrangements and civil war recurrence. Comparative analysis shows that: (1) States where negotiated settlements did not include power-sharing arrangements did not experience civil war recurrence. (2) Governments are unlikely to initiate conflict after a peace agreement, only 2 out of 38 cases shows government initiation. (3) In 70% of the cases in which power-sharing was part of the settlement, conflict was initiated again. (4) In 8 out of 9 cases where only political-power-sharing is part of the settlement civil war recurs, only the Chittagong Hill conflict in Bangladesh remains solved.⁷¹ (5) There is a 100% conflict recurrence when political power-sharing is combined with minor or intermediate military power-sharing terms. (5) Deep military power-sharing seems to have a stabilizing effect on political power-sharing, 100% of cases where all rebel factions were integrated in the military show no conflict recurrence, regardless of political power-sharing.

The results of this test suggest that governments are not likely to initiate conflict after a negotiated settlement. The settlement usually upholds between the signatories, the excluded remainder of the rebel group is more likely to initiate conflict. Political power-sharing always fails when only the elite or dominant faction is included in positions of power. The same goes for military integration. This corroborates with the argument that narrow incorporation increases the probability of civil war due to infighting. The study shows that military integration of all factions has a stabilizing effect, when employed alone or even in combination with political power-sharing. This means that security concerns among middle ranking officers and rank-and-file members need to be addressed in order to disincentivize remobilization and conflict initiation. Furthermore, the data confirms the theory that power-sharing and civil war recurrence are related; when settlements do not include power-sharing arrangements civil war does not recur.

⁷¹ Högladh 2012; Harbom et. al. 2006. Political power-sharing entailed the creation of a regional council, no rebels were actually included in the central government. Furthermore, JSS rebels and families were completely disarmed and given funds to integrate back to civilian life. Such agreements further impede the possibility to remobilize.

Power-sharing term	Level	Civil war recurrence	Outcome
Political	Any	70%	Fail
Military	Any		
Political	Any	89%	Fail
Political	Any	100%	Fail
Military	Minor/intermediate		
Political	Any	11%	Success
Military	Deep		

Figure 2: Types of powersharing arrangements and civil war recurrence.

4.2 THE EFFECT OF REBEL-MILITARY INTEGRATION: CASE STUDIES

4.2.1 Sudan: minor military integration and dual in-group rivalry.

Until 1946, North and South Sudan were governed separately under a British-Egyptian condominium, after which they were merged together without consultation of the southern leaders. After the agreement on self-determination, the division of power and positions held in government have always been in favor of northerners. In response, the southern Equatorial Corps started a rebellion in 1955 igniting the Sudanese civil war.⁷² In 1956, Sudan was granted independence upon which tensions rose fast due to the cultural and ideological divide between North and South —the North is Muslim and considers itself culturally Arabic, while the South is predominantly Christian and culturally sub-Saharan.⁷³ Both civilian and military regimes aimed to Islamize and Arabize the South. A process that was strongly resisted by the southerners, because of its incompatibility with Sudan’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious demographic.⁷⁴ The institutionalization of sharia law made it so that Muslims cannot be ruled by non-Muslims, which caused southerners to be excluded from political power.⁷⁵ The rebellion developed and spread, forming the Anya Nya guerrilla army in 1963 and as a southern Sudanese separatist army waged war against the government.⁷⁶

⁷² Okeny 2015: 43-47; Rolandsen 2011: 108-111.

⁷³ D’Agoût 2013: 60-61.

⁷⁴ Okeny 2015: 40-46.

⁷⁵ Idem: 40.

⁷⁶ D’Agoût 2013: 62-63.

The Anya Nya movement's intra-group dynamics were characterized by ethnic division, and among the elites frustrations grew over the lack of internal cohesion. In 1969 Anya Nya's military chief of staff Joseph Lagu took over as leader. Under Lagu, the Anya Nya movement was renamed the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and strengthened their position as military opposition.⁷⁷ The SSLM and the Sudanese government under president Nimeiri signed the Addis Ababa peace agreement in 1972. The terms included a single national socialist government, but with the establishment of regional autonomy of the South, and partial integration of rebel forces in the military and police force.⁷⁸

The agreement seemed successful for over a decade, but increasing dissatisfaction on both sides started to grow. Nimeiri's role in the settlement gained him support from the South, but in the North, a group of Islamists attempted to stage a coup in 1976. His political support weakened, and in response, he provided the Muslim coup leaders with government positions and increasingly supported making Sudan an Islamic state.⁷⁹ At the same time, Lagu's concessions towards secession and his support for the central government to strengthen his own position, and made intra-group tensions rise in the South.⁸⁰

In response to the Islamists coup attempt followed by Nimeiri's reinstatement of sharia and abolition of southern autonomy, former rebels started to reorganize into the Anya Nya II insurgency.⁸¹ The tensions eventually led to the Bor mutiny, where southern units of the army rebelled against the government, culminating in the creation of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 1983. Under leadership of John Garang, who was a former Anya Nya soldier and officer while integrated into the national army, the SPLM/A aimed at the establishment of a "New Sudan", freed from the dominance Islamic sectarian politics and the creation of a secular democratic government for the whole country.⁸²

⁷⁷ Dorsey 1972: 17-19.

⁷⁸ Addis Ababa Agreement.

⁷⁹ Atlas and Licklider 1999: 38-39.

⁸⁰ *Idem*: 40.

⁸¹ D'Agoot 2013: 63.

⁸² Okeny 2015: 47-50.

Interaction between political and military power-sharing

The Addis Ababa accords thus called for elements of political and military power-sharing. This entailed the establishment of regional autonomy of the South. However, the Regional South was not granted legislative or executive powers in the defense and economic departments, elements that provide important security guarantees. Rebel-military integration involved the creation of units along distinct regional affiliation and these were assigned to their home regions, which should have helped reduce security dilemmas among Southerners.⁸³

The failure to integrate the Anya Nya fighters in the Sudanese military is argued to be the main contributing factor to the failure of peace.⁸⁴ Especially lower ranking officers and rank-and-file members grew frustrated and concerned about their security over the outcome of the attempted integration. The few Anya Nya that had integrated remained in one unit, and none had ever been incorporated in national police, military academies, or civil service posts.⁸⁵ The security concerns among the faction integrated in the armed forces was strengthened by the in-group rivalry in the political body overseeing the integration. Southern fighters to be integrated into national forces had expected to remain together, which was negotiated by Lagu in light of southern separatist goals.⁸⁶ However, as in-group rivalry grew between Lagu and Alier in the political arena of the southern resistance,⁸⁷ concessions were made to the southern rebel's goal of independence.⁸⁸

Motivated by self-preservation Lagu increasingly supported the Khartoum government, and southern troops were moved North.⁸⁹ This means that vertical arrangements between leader and lower echelons were undermined, when units were moved to Northern —enemy— territory. This led to dissatisfaction and increased security concerns, and facilitated by narrow integration

⁸³ Atlas and Licklider 1999: 37-40.

⁸⁴ Le Riche 2014: 31.

⁸⁵ *Idem*: 32.

⁸⁶ *Idem*: 31-32.

⁸⁷ CIA, report on Sudan's South: 3-7.

⁸⁸ LeRiche 2014: 31-32.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*.

where dominant factions stayed together it eventually led to the Bor mutiny sparking civil war recurrence.

Civil war recurrence in Sudan is a difficult case because we are dealing with the breakdown of relations *within* groups on both sides of the civil war. The breakdown of internal relations in the North made Nimeiri undermine the peace agreement motivated by personal survival. However, consistent support for the northern-dominated government by Lagu and privileged southern political elite ‘abandoning’ the main motive for the rebellion, led to dissatisfaction and rivalry in the South. When the government crossed the line by dividing the South and imposing sharia law, conflict was initiated by (former) rebels, under a new name but for the same cause. Nonetheless, civil war recurrence was not caused by failure of the North and South to reconcile; it was the inability of southern groups to unite and coalesce,⁹⁰ due to in-group rivalry.

Overall, this case shows conflict initiation after destabilization of internal dynamics for both government and rebel group, and follows the rivalry model where elite decision-making is based on personal survival and a preference of civil war risk over the risk of losing office. Furthermore, the SPLM/A was formed by a group of former Anya Nya officers and soldiers from South who were integrated into the national army following the previous peace accord, dissatisfied with how the former leader addressed their cause. Military power-sharing enhanced divisions between North and South and increased security concerns. Furthermore, right after signing of the agreement Lagu was named Major General of the national armed forces, and was in charge of rebel-military integration in the national armed forces. This led to only the dominant faction, mainly based on tribal ethnicity and support for Lagu, to be incorporated in the armed forces. The minor (low number) and narrow (dominant faction) integration reinforces rivalry and facilitates remobilization.

⁹⁰ LeRiche 2014: 32.

4.2 Tajikistan: deep military integration and non-recurrence

In September 1991, a large demonstration had gathered on the Lenin Square in Dushanbe calling for the Communist Party to be banned, and the establishment of a new political order and guarantees of Tajikistan's independence from Moscow.⁹¹ The newly appointed moderate president Aslonov declared that the Communist Party would be banned from Tajikistan. However, within days Aslonov was removed from power, the Communist Party was re-established, and the political struggle would become even more poignant given the upcoming presidential elections in November 1991.⁹² The political struggle and failed political order escalated into the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997), which is considered one of the most violent episodes in post-Soviet Central Asia.⁹³

The General Peace Agreement of 1997 was supposed to give the opposition groups a share in government positions, but both sides never fully complied with the agreement, nor accepted the idea of power-sharing.⁹⁴ Furthermore, within the factions of the winning parties, some benefit more than others, and some former allies of the victors have been maneuvered out of power.⁹⁵ Political activities that might question the elite's hold on power, any opposition or expression of discontent, is thwarted by the government —keeping the fear of renewed conflict very much alive. Still, despite the obvious presence of the very conditions that according to the theory would predict civil war recurrence, large-scale conflict did not reignite.⁹⁶

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan gained independence in 1991. Ethnic heterogeneity is an important element in the power struggle leading to the civil war. Of the approximately 5 million people, 60 percent was Tajik, 25 percent Uzbek, and around 8 percent Russian. The proximity to Uzbekistan added to the importance of the Uzbek minority, and despite its low number Russians occupied most important positions in industry, politics, police,

⁹¹ Scarborough 2016: 439.

⁹² *Idem*: 439-440.

⁹³ Kevlihan 2016; Atkin 1997.

⁹⁴ Smith 1999: 243.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*.

⁹⁶ Atkin 1997: 336-338

and military.⁹⁷ Thus, the Russians held a foothold in the state's coercive apparatus. Though monopoly of centralized Communist power disappeared upon independence, much of its substance survived: those who held privileged positions of power did not give them up, so many remained in office.

During the Perestroika, the movement for reformation in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, political and economic change in Tajikistan was openly discussed and tensions between reformers and defenders of the Soviet system grew.⁹⁸ Perestroika and glasnost instigated suppressed and unfulfilled national aspirations. The Tajik majority, frustrated with limitations on its economic and social development within the USSR, started nationalist expressions of political anger about and towards the minority-dominated Soviet Order.⁹⁹

By the beginning of the 1990s new political parties organized in an attempt to transform Tajikistan's political system: the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT); the nationalist coalition Rastokhez ("Resurrection"); the Islamic Rebirth Party (IRP); and a regional party for southern interests, Lali Badakhshon ("Ruby of Badakhshan").¹⁰⁰ These parties formed a coalition in early 1992 and are known as the Opposition, or United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The opposition advocated the reforms called for during the Soviet era, along with nationalism and patriotism to gain support of Tajik and non-Tajik inhabitants. Furthermore, they wanted freedom of religion for Muslims.¹⁰¹

However, nationalism proved to be a divisive model, sparking the civil war. Moreover, nationalism splintered as the war continued intensifying ethnic and tribal conflicts between Tajik regional groups.¹⁰² Rebel fragmentation was a central part of the Tajik civil war, consisting of

⁹⁷ Atkin 1997: 338.

⁹⁸ Smith 1999.

⁹⁹ Scarborough 2016: 441; Atkin 1997; Collins 2006.

¹⁰⁰ Atkin 1997: 337

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Scarborough 2016: 441.

decentralized battles among militias and remnants of state authority.¹⁰³ Some of these militias worked together as the Popular Front, backing the rise of the civilian leader Rakhmon, who bargained with these militias where they would back the civilian government in return for control over state ministries.¹⁰⁴ This sparked a competition between Popular Front militias and the rebels outside this deal, the UTO, which intensified the war —and the following peace process.

Political exclusion and deep military integration

The General Peace Agreement called for the incorporation of representatives of the United Tajik Opposition into the structures of the executive branch on the basis of a quota. Representatives of the UTO were to make up for 30% of posts in executive power structures and 25% of seats in the Central Electoral Commission.¹⁰⁵ The first step towards implementation was taken in 1998 when five UTO members were appointed to cabinet positions. In 2000, 54 UTO members were appointed to the government, but the majority of the executive positions were removed as Rakhmon consolidated his power.¹⁰⁶

The agreement also called for the integration of the UTO armed forces; according to article 5c the entire UTO force of 5000 troops were to be integrated in the national army. As opposed to the political integration, this process started as agreed upon in the settlement, within one month of signing. Upon completion of the assembling of the fighters, the UTO units were made into corresponding units of the regular armed forces of Tajikistan. After taking the military oath, these units were assigned to corresponding governmental power structures, subsequently they were taken into separate units and subordinated to the chain of command.¹⁰⁷

After this process rebel fighters were given a choice to continue service, and measures were provided for disarmament and reintegration in case of discontinuation of the service. Furthermore, there were opportunities for command positions and a choice of service branch.¹⁰⁸ The

¹⁰³ Driscoll 2012: 140.

¹⁰⁴ Idem: 140-141.

¹⁰⁵ Peace Accords Matrix, Tajikistan: Powersharing Transitional Government.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Peace Accords Matrix, Tajikistan: Protocol on Military Issues.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

first unit of UTO fighters took the oath in December 1997, and by 1999 2375 fighters were assigned to their regular military units. In 2000 military integration was fully implemented, and 4498 out of the 5000 rebel fighters had been integrated in the armed forces.¹⁰⁹ Thus, almost all rebel fighters were included over the entire structure of the national army. This situation illustrates deep military integration, the rebel units were mustered in their original form and were then separated to be completely merged with units from the national army. This measure effectively brings together former foes, and creates new pillars of support in the military structure.

Thus far, the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan has been recognized as fully implemented by the international community, despite it being unofficially abandoned by 2006.¹¹⁰ Just before the parliamentary elections in 2015, the Tajik political elite officially abandoned the agreement of 1997 by excluding the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) from government—the last remaining opposition party. The IRPT has distinguished itself as a credible oppositional party, especially committed to democratic principles, and almost imperceptible religious agenda.¹¹¹ Nonetheless, it adheres to the informal political arrangements of post-conflict Tajikistan, conforming the dominant position of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan.

In sum, failed political power-sharing and exclusion of the political body of the UTO made civil war recurrence more likely. However, deep military integration provided security guarantees and stabilized intra-group dynamics, specially among middle ranking officers and rank-and-file members. Consequently, no post-war conflict initiation took place. Still, given the recent political developments where the opposition was further excluded, peace is still at risk in Tajikistan.

¹⁰⁹ Peace Accords Matrix, Tajikistan: Protocol on Military Issues.

¹¹⁰ Peace accords matrix, Tajikistan: Powersharing Transitional Government.

¹¹¹ Epkenhans 2015: 321.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Why do rebel groups initiate conflict after being part of a negotiated settlement of the previous civil war? The analyses of the case studies confirm the argument in the literature that power-sharing arrangements successfully establishes peace between former enemies. However, the high rate of civil war recurrence as seen in figure 1 also suggests that these settlements are not likely to establish enduring peace. Conflict is more likely to break out between former allies, as a result of the effects power-sharing arrangements have on in-group dynamics. Moreover, the resulting new power distribution *within* an organized rebel group affects the echelons of the group differently. This leads to specific types of incentives for remobilization and renewed conflict.

The examination of post-civil war Sudan has shown that personal survival and opportunity are driving decision making towards conflict. Both leaders ‘preferred’ the risk of civil war over the risk of losing their position. Nonetheless, the recurrence of the previous conflict eventually took place because of the breakdown of relations *within* groups on both sides. Overall, dissatisfaction was especially high given the long history of marginalization. Power-sharing had a negative effect on the vertical relationships between leader and lower echelons. Military integration has the potential to stabilize political in-group rivalry, however minor integration in Sudan only strengthened internal destabilization. Inclusion and separation of only part of the rebel group made the fighters security concerns rise. The feud between southerners Lagu and Alier, and the decision to abandon the rebel side’s cause led both officers and rank-and-file members to remobilized and formed a (splinter) rebel group to continue fighting the government.

After signing the General Peace Agreement the government of Tajikistan stated that they won the civil war and were thus not obliged to share power with the UTO. Years after signing the accord, UTO members were reluctantly given positions in the central government, only to remove the executive positions again after Rakhmon consolidated his power. Political power-sharing was part of the negotiated settlement but thus not fully implemented. Military integration, however, was done thoroughly and rapidly. 90% of UTO fighters were integrated in the national army. Subsequently, fighters were decentralized and spread over different units,

strengthening relationships with former enemies and establishing pillars of support in the military system. The results from both case studies corroborate with the theory central to this thesis, power-sharing leads to destabilization of intra-group dynamics which causes conflict initiation. When power-sharing terms are not or not fully implemented the internal shock is expected to be minor or non-existent and does not lead to destabilization of internal politics. Political power-sharing leads to civil war recurrence, and all power-sharing terms negatively affect in-group dynamics when only the dominant faction or elite is incorporated. They also confirm that deep military integration can end civil war recurrence, through addressing middle ranking officer and rank-and file member's security concerns and creating new pillars of support.

As for the typology of power-sharing arrangement, rebel-military integration seems more successful than political power-sharing, given the importance of the underlying political motivations for the previous war. In a political power-sharing arrangement only the leaders or elite of a rebel organization are provided with stake in government. Most of the group is being 'excluded', which is one of the main incentives for conflict initiation or at least relationship breakdown. In the examination of all peace agreements between 1946 and 2016, military power-sharing seems to have a stabilizing effect on group dynamics.

Both tests show that deep rebel-military integration corroborates with successful peace. This measure includes the incorporation of all factions of the rebel group and broad unit formation, thus with fighters from both the rebel group and the state army. The success of deep military integration can be explained by equal opportunities for power positions and the establishment of new pillars of support in the military structure and the provision of security guarantees. Further research should give more insight on the interaction between types of power-sharing terms, as well as the individual effect on civil war recurrence.

Implications of this study are mostly concerned with the promotion of power-sharing in negotiated settlements to resolve civil war. It has become clear that there is a causal relationship between power-sharing and civil war recurrence. Political power-sharing is almost always followed by conflict initiation, mostly by the rebel group side. Research has also shown that a thoroughly carried out rebel-military integration is positively associated with enduring peace. I argue that this ‘broad military integration’ contributes to the stabilization of in-group dynamics, after the initial ‘shock’ in power distributing following the power-sharing arrangement in which the elite or main faction is incorporated in positions of power. Military integration has the potential to benefit excluded group members, officers and rank-and-file, through the provision of security guarantees and consolidation of pillars of support in the military structure. Furthermore, following the theory, incorporation of all factions—who are potential rivals—decreases rivalry and disincentivizes collective violence.

Of course, the arguments presented here are based on a small number of cases. Besides, the present study does not include the potential effect of other contributing variables, such as grievances, low GDP, international assistance or oversight, and UN deployment. Nonetheless, it suggests that power-sharing arrangements without addressing the motives of the lower echelons of the rebel group are not likely to resolve the conflict. Security concerns of the lower ranking members should be addressed in future settlements that include power-sharing and thorough military integration could benefit these measures.

Further research could thus include a quantitative study comprised of all civil wars resolved through a negotiated settlement with power-sharing arrangements and control for the variables above. Disaggregation of the types of power-sharing should provide more knowledge about the individual effects of the different types of power-sharing, as well as the interaction between political and military power-sharing terms. Furthermore, the effect of the level of implementation of power-sharing terms on conflict initiation is a mechanism worth examining. Other elements, such as type of incompatibility and the effect of regime consolidation during the implementation process, like we have seen in Tajikistan, are worth researching in this context.

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APPENDIX I: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND CIVIL WAR RECURRENCE 1945-2016

Country / State	Insurgency/Rebel group	Year	Type	Peace agreement	Powersharing terms	Other terms and outcome	Recurrence	Initiation	Outcome	Ongoing/ recurrence
Afghanistan	Mujahideen: (factions)	1978-1992 1992-1996	Government, Religion, Ideology (identity)	yes, dyadic 1993: Jalalabad agreement between government and 7 Mujahideen factions	Political: intermediate	- Joint commission of all signatories was created to monitor ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.	yes, 1994-1996 Continued conflict between Hezb-i-Islami	Rebel Group	- 1996: Mahipar Agreement between Government and Hezb-i-Islami - Taliban captured Kabul later in 1996 and the coalition government was ousted. Former allies divided and civil war intensified.	yes
Angola	UNITA, FNLA, FLEC	1975-1994	Ethnic, Ideology (Identity)	yes, comprehensive 1994: The Lusaka Protocol, between Government and UNITA	Political: deep Military: minor	- multiparty political system, with participation of UNITA, FNLA - UN Monitoring	yes, 1998-2002	Government	Comprehensive peace agreement in 2002, addendum to Lusaka Protocol.	FLEC resistance (Cabinda) continued >2002. Dyadic peace agreement in 2006.
Bangladesh	Government - PCJSS / Chittagong Hill Tracts	1977-1997	Ethnic (Identity)	yes, comprehensive 1997: Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord.	Political: minor	- Recognition of tribal ethnicity. - Establishment of Regional Council	no	-	-	-
Burundi	Hutu militias - Tutsi militias	1993-2005	Ethnic (Identity) with genocide prior to civil war (1972-1993)	yes, dyadic 2000: Arusha Accords 2003: Pretoria Protocol between government and some factions.	Political: intermediate Military: deep	-Integration of all but one Hutu faction in the armed forces. - Parliamentary elections - Creation of diplomatic positions	no	-	Some hostilities from remaining rebel group FNL until 2008, when comprehensive peace agreement was met. Integration in armed forces.	-
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, KPNFL	1978-1991	Government, Ideology (Identity)	comprehensive 1991: Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict	Political: intermediate	- Withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodian territory and cessation of military support - Governmental elections - UN deployment	yes: 1993-1998	Rebel Group	Khmer Rouge activity remained until 1998	-

Country / State	Insurgency/Rebel group	Year	Type	Peace agreement	Powersharing terms	Other terms and outcome	Recurrence	Initiation	Outcome	Ongoing/ recurrence
Central African Republic	UFDR and small rebel groups (APRD, GAPLC, MLCJ, FDC, UFR)	2004-2007	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	comprehensive 2007: Birao Agreement between government and UFDR. 2008: Global Peace accord between UFDR and remaining rebel groups	Military: intermediate	-	yes, 2012-Séléka (united rebel factions) Captured the capital in 2012. Rise of anti-balaka.	Rebel Group	-Cease-fire signed in 2014 -De facto partition of de country -Fractionalization led to more rebel groups, fighting each other. Mainly religion based.	yes
Chad	FROLINAT, FAN, FAP	1965-1979	Government / Ideology	comprehensive 1979: Kano Accord	Political: deep Military: intermediate	- Deployment of neutral Nigerian forces. - Amnesty of political prisoners	yes, 1980-1994, 2005-2010	Rebel Group	Religious rebel violence, spillovers from neighing countries, extremism.	-
Colombia	Liberals, Communist	1948-1958	Government, Ideology (Identity)	under the name National Front	Political: deep	- Rotation system for Liberal and Conservative rule	yes, 1964-ongoing	Rebel Group	- Multiple failed Peace Agreement - Peace agreement between government and FARC in 2017	yes
Republic of the Congo/Brazzaville	FADR.	1993-1994	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	Power-sharing agreement between parties.	Political: minor Military: minor	-	yes, 1997-1999 Renewal of the Cocoye, Ninja, and Cobra militia conflict.	Government	- Full peace agreement in 1999	-
Djibouti	FRUD	1991-1994	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	dyadic 1994: Accord de paix et de la réconciliation nationale	Political: deep Military: deep	- Decentralization of authority - Extensive reintegration programs	no	-	-	-
DR Congo (Zaire)	RCD, MLC, RCD-ML, RCD-N, Mai Mai	1998-2003	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	comprehensive 2003: Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations (Confirmation of the Lusaka Agreement 1999)	Political: intermediate Military: minor	-	yes, 2006-2009 2012-2013	Rebel Group	military stalemate, March 2009 Agreement. These broke down again after army rebellion by former rebel fighters.	no, but hostilities have occurred since

Country / State	Insurgency/Rebel group	Year	Type	Peace agreement	Powersharing terms	Other terms and outcome	Recurrence	Initiation	Outcome	Ongoing/recurrence
El Salvador	FMLN left-wing guerrilla	1979-1992	Government	comprehensive 1992: Chapultepec Peace Agreement	None	- FMLN becomes political party - Restructuring of Armed Forces - Reform of election system and system of land ownership	no	-	-	-
Georgia	Abkhaz	1992-1994	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	comprehensive 1994: Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict	None	- UN deployment	no	-	-	-
Guatemala	URNG, Leftist rebel groups	1968-1996	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	comprehensive 1996: Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace (confirmation of previous peace agreements)	Military: minor	- Social integration of former rebel fighters - National Reconciliation Act addressing human rights violations	no	-	-	-
Guinea Bissau	Military rebels	1998-1999	Government	1998: Abuja Peace Agreement	Political: intermediate	- ECOMOG monitoring	yes, 1999 second coup	Rebel Group	-	-
Haiti	Military rebels	1991-1995	Government	dyadic 1993: Governor's Island Agreement	Political: minor Military: minor	- Amnesty and return of Aristide - UN monitoring	yes, 2004	Rebel Group	- Anti-Republican coup, Aristide ousted.	-
Indonesia	Aceh nationalist separatist movement	1976-2005	Government, Ethnic, Religion, Ideology (identity)	comprehensive 2005: Memorandum of Understanding between government and Free Aceh Movement	None	- Reinstatement of traditional institutions of Aceh - Establishment of Human Rights Court - Amnesty of political prisoners - EU and ASEAN monitoring	no	-	-	-
Ivory Coast	Northern rebels	2002-2004	Government, Religion, Ideology (identity)	2004: Accra III peace accord, following 2003 Marcoussis Peace Agreement and Accra I)	Political: deep	- Establishment of National Human Rights Commission - Tripartite monitoring mechanism - UN Deployment	yes, 2010-2011 Conflict recurred after disputed elections	Rebel Group	UN/French victory	-

Country / State	Insurgency/Rebel group	Year	Type	Peace agreement	Powersharing terms	Other terms and outcome	Recurrence	Initiation	Outcome	Ongoing/ recurrence
Lebanon	PLO, unified with LNM, Jamoul.	1975- 1989	Government, Religion, Ideology (identity)	1989: Taif Agreement	Political: deep Military: minor	- UN deployment (UNIFIL)	yes, 1990 intra-Maronite fighting	Rebel Group	- Militias were dissolved except for Hezbollah. Religious tensions remain.	-
Liberia	NPFL, INPFL, ULIMO	1989-1996	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	Comprehensive 1995: Abuja Peace Agreement (supplement to Cotonou and Akosombo Peace Agreements)	Political: deep Military: minor	- Amnesty and repatriation	yes, 1999-2003 Disarmament was impeded by in-group fighting	Rebel Group	LURD/MODEL victory followed by 2003: Accra Peace Agreement	-
Macedonia	NLA, Albanian National Liberation Army	2001	Ethnic (Identity)	2001: Ohrid Agreement	None	- Establishment of ethnic equality - Democratic rights for minorities - NATO deployment	no	-	-	-
Malaysia	NKCP, MCP, MMLA communist forces	1968-1990	Government, Ideology (Identity)	1973: Peace declaration of Sri Aman ??	None		no	-	remaining NKCP insurgents sign peace agreement later	-
Mali	MFUA, FIAA	1990-1994	Ethnic, territory (Identity)	dyadic 1992: Pacte National	Political: intermediate Military: minor	- Regional and sub-regional assemblies - Decentralization of authority	yes, 2007-ongoing	Rebel Group	Splinter groups performed the Second Tuareg Rebellion, since 2012 Islamic extremism; Al Qaida involvement, Boko Haram	yes
Mexico	EZLN	1994-1996	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	comprehensive 1996: San Andrés Accords	None	- Recognition of indigenous people - Increased democratic rights - Economic and cultural reform	no	-	-	-
Mozambique	RENAMO (Mozambique Resistance Movement)	1976-1992	Government, Ideology (Identity)	comprehensive 1992: Acordo Geral de Paz/ Rome General Peace Accords	Political: minor Military: deep	- Multiparty elections - UN/ONUMOZ deployment and supervision	no	-	-	RENAMO resurgence in 2013, ongoing hostilities
Nepal	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	1997-2006	Government, Ideology (Identity)	comprehensive 2006: Comprehensive Peace Agreement	None	- UN disarmament and oversight - Democratization	no	-	-	-

Country / State	Insurgency/Rebel group	Year	Type	Peace agreement	Powersharing terms	Other terms and outcome	Recurrence	Initiation	Outcome	Ongoing/ recurrence
Niger	CRA, FLAA, ORA	1993-1995	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	dyadic 1995: Peace accord confirming and broadening Paris Accord (1994)	Political: minor Military: deep	- Decentralization - Economic, social, and cultural development - Establishment of peace committee	no	-	-	-
Papua New Guinea	BRA	1988-1998	Government, Territory	comprehensive 2001: Bourgainville Peace Agreement	None	- Establishment of autonomous government - Long term settlement of political status per referendum	no	-	-	-
Philippines	MNLF	1972-1996	Government, Religious/ Ideology (Identity)	dyadic 1996: Mindanao Final Agreement/ Jakarta Accord	Political: intermediate Military: intermediate	- Social reintegration and economic development - Establishment of autonomous region	yes, 2000-2014	Rebel Group	2014 Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro, between government and MILF.	Continued Islamic extremism, splinter groups from MILF
Rwanda	FPR	1990-1993	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	comprehensive 1993: Arusha Accords	Political: intermediate Military: intermediate	- Establishment of a 'neutral corridor' separating the warring parties - Multiparty general elections	yes, 1994 Rwandan Genocide	Rebel Group	Rebel Group start, but genocide was inspired by government elite after death of Hutu president.	-
Senegal	Casamance separatists, MFDC	1982-2004	Ethnic, Territory (Identity)	comprehensive 2004: Accord General de Paix	Political: minor Military: minor	- Amnesty is granted to rebels - Red Cross supervised of disarmament	yes, 2005-2014	Rebel Group	-	-
Sierra Leone	RUF, Kamajors	1991-2000	Government, Grievances	comprehensive 1996: Abdijan Peace accord, between government and RUF	Political: deep Military: deep	- Demobilization of rebels and amnesty for fighters.	yes, 1997-2002 By former gov't SLA soldiers who formed the ARFC = rebel start??	Rebel Group	Powersharing arrangement where RUF leader Sankoh was granted position of Vice President, demobilization and disarmament of RUF rebels in return.	-

Country / State	Insurgency/Rebel group	Year	Type	Peace agreement	Powersharing terms	Other terms and outcome	Recurrence	Initiation	Outcome	Ongoing/ recurrence
Somalia	- SSDF, SNM, SPM, USC - USC	1986-1991 and 1992-1995	Ethnic, tribal (Identity)	dyadic partial peace agreement	Political: minor	- UN deployment, US Military Intervention - 2004: Establishment of Transitional National Gov't.	yes, 2006-2009 ICU, OLF, ARS, and splinter groups: Al-Shabaab, RKB, Jabhatul Islamiya, Muaskar Anole (all religious extremist groups)	Rebel Group	Powersharing arrangement between TFG and contingent from ICU: expansion of parliament and election of former ICU leader as President.	yes, splintering of rebel groups and surge in religious extremism: Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, and IS activity.
South Africa	ANC, various other parties	1983-1994	Government, Ethnic (Identity)	dyadic 1993: Interim Constitution, after CODESA failure	Political: minor Military: deep	- Equality between races and genders. - Amnesty for political crimes - New election processes	no	-	-	-
Sudan	Anya'nya rebels / SSLA/M (various small guerrilla forces)	(1955) 1963 -1972	Ethnic, Religious (Identity)	comprehensive 1972 Addis Ababa agreement between government and SSLM	Political: intermediate Military: minor	- Powersharing terms: yes, establishment of Southern Sudan Autonomous Region	yes, 1983-2005 SPLA Anya'nya II SSLM	Rebel Group	- Machakos process, ending in comprehensive peace agreement. - Stalemate. - South Sudanese autonomy for 6 years, independence in 2011.	yes, ongoing conflict in South Sudan,
Tajikistan	UTO (united opposition formed by: IRP, DTP, Rastokhez, Lali Badakshon)	1992-1997	Government, Religious/ Ideology (Identity)	comprehensive 1997: The Moscow Declaration between Government and United Tajik Opposition.	Political: intermediate Military: deep	Powersharing terms: yes, UTO was granted 30% of ministerial positions. Full integration in armed forces.	no some hostilities in Gorno-Badakshan, by one former resistance group leader pushed out of government.	-	-	-

Country / State	Insurgency/Rebel group	Year	Type	Peace agreement	Powersharing terms	Other terms and outcome	Recurrence	Initiation	Outcome	Ongoing/ recurrence
Uganda	NRA/NRM	1981-1986	Ethnic (Identity)	comprehensive 1995: Nairobi Peace Agreement between Government (UNLA) and NRA	Political: deep Military: intermediate	- Powersharing terms: yes, establishment of new National Army incl UNLA and NRM members. Military Council under Okello with equal members UNLA and NRM. - Preparations for interim gov't and elections.	yes, 1986-1988 UPDA (formed by former UNLA soldiers) also FEDEMU and LRA	Rebel Group	1988: Dyadic peace agreement between government and UPDA. The FEDEMU was incorporated in NRM. Violence continued by the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement until 2008: multiple partial peace agreements.	yes, the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency is active in multiple countries in Africa.
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	ZANLA/ZANU, ZPRA/ZAPU	1964-1979	Ethnic, Sectarian (Identity)	1979: Lancaster House Agreement, between all three parties.	Political: intermediate Military: intermediate	- Powersharing: no - Stalemate. - Independence of Republic of Zimbabwe, ZANU win elections. - Fractionalization/ Splintering of ZANU and ZAPU into FROLIZI	yes, 1983-1986 ZAPU, Ndebele population of Zimbabwe. The government under Mugabe targeted suspected dissidents, leading to massacres by elite Fifth Brigade.	Rebel Group	1987: Unity Accord, ZAPU dissolved in ZANU: ZANU-PF. Amnesty and pardon for dissidents.	-

ABSTRACT

Why do armed non-state groups initiate conflict after being part of a power-sharing arrangement ending a prior civil war? In response to the spike in civil wars after the end of the Cold War, peace agreements with power-sharing arrangements have long been argued to be the best civil war resolution, as a result, these have become a default tool in civil war resolution. However, in more than half of these cases, civil war did recur. Empirical research shows that power-sharing is indeed successful in stabilizing peace among former adversaries. The answer to why civil wars terminated by negotiated settlements with power-sharing start again is likely to be found *within* the groups included in the settlement. The problem is not so much the resolution of hostilities between (former) foes, but rather the rise of hostilities among former allies. This thesis argues that power-sharing might (temporarily) establish a balance of power between former adversaries, at the same time it negatively affects the balance of power *within* the groups, causing intra-group security dilemmas and rivalry leading to remobilization and initiation of conflict. This theoretical proposal is tested in a qualitative study of post-civil war Sudan and Tajikistan, by questioning how power-sharing affected the internal dynamics of the rebel groups. What made rebel groups initiate conflict again, or, why did they not?

Keywords: power-sharing, civil war recurrence, rebel groups, intra-group dynamics, rivalry.

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