Rebel Recycling: Conditions for Successful Military Integration in Sierra Leone and Liberia

Master Thesis International Relations

Global Conflict in the Modern Era

Leiden University

Sebastiaan Wich

s1045474

Supervisor: Dr. E. van der Maat

Word Count – 14.652

Contents

1. Introduction

Re-joining society after civil conflict can be a difficult task for former combatants of rebel groups. In some cases, rebels were drafted into rebel armies as children and consequently did not learn a trade. In other cases, the former combatant committed atrocities, forced or voluntarily, and might therefore not be welcome home after the conflict. Military integration can help to turn around the negative reputation of former combatants in the professional setting of the national military.

A common method to demobilize former combatants is military integration (Wilén 2016). Post-conflict military integration, hereafter military integration, is the practice of absorbing members from formerly warring parties into the state military (Krebs & Licklider 2016, 99). It helps to reduce the number of (paramilitary) combatants and should also help former combatants to integrate into society (Vogel & Musamba 2016). It should also offer them a salary and creating a livelihood (Lamb et. al. 2012). These scholars, along with the International Labour Organisation (2010), argue that military integration reduces the need and willingness of former combatants to return to violence. The practice is used often, as Krebs & Licklider (2016, 93) found that it was part of a peace settlement after civil conflict in 40% of the cases between 1945 and 2006 and according to Hensell & Gerdes (2016) it is considered standard procedure in peacebuilding operations.

However, the successfulness of military integration is a matter of debate. According to Krebs & Licklider (2016), military integration also increases the probability of the reoccurrence of conflict because it falls short due to limitations of military integration projects. Issues regarding ownership of the project and policies, budget and participation can alter the expected outcome. According to Donais (2009, 3), ownership entails the way in which domestic actors are able to design and implement political processes. Krebs & Licklider (2016, 135-6) argue for example that the dedication and willingness of participating actors is decisive in the success of military integration. Wilén (2016, 85) argues that military integration is not sufficient to guarantee durable peace because it needs to be part of larger peacebuilding processes. In other words, it is deemed too limited to achieve durable peace by itself.

The debate mentioned above leads to the question *what conditions determine the success of military integration.* I will argue that three conditions together are a requisite for successful military integration. The conditions are a coherence of integration methods, the presence of peacekeepers and the incorporation of multiple provisions of integration. None of these conditions on its own will result in success. A measure of success is the achievement of peace, which can be either negative or positive. Negative peace entails the absence of violence. Positive peace entails integration and cooperation between human groups (Galtung 1967, 12).

The research question will be answered by looking at two example cases in Sierra Leone and Liberia. These countries are geographically similar and they both endured a civil war during the same period. However, military integration was implemented differently in both countries. In Sierra Leone, the old military was reformed, while integrating former combatants. In Liberia, the military was disbanded entirely and built up from scratch while integrating former combatants. Although both situations were successful, the case of Liberia included far more local actors than the case of Sierra Leone.

The contribution of this study to existing research on military integration is twofold. Firstly, the study identifies conditions based on previous literature that attribute to successful military integration. The frequent use of military integration makes it important to understand what conditions make it successful, as there currently is a lack of literature regarding the subject.

Secondly, this study will provide suggestions and recommendations, based on the conditions and factors identified, for future military uses of integration. The insights of the analysis of Sierra Leone and Liberia can point in directions that were not considered initially. The difference in approach between the two cases can help understand why certain aspects need to be included in the process. These insights can help assist future military integration projects or research as well.

2. Literature Review

While several scholars believe that military integration has a positive impact on negotiated peace or the duration of peace agreements (e.g., Hartzell & Hoddie 2003, DeRouen et. al. 2009 and Hall 2009), others believe that military integration does not contribute to more durable peace (e.g, Krebs & Licklider 2016 and Glassmeyer & Sambanis 2008). For example, Glassmeyer & Sambanis (2008, 381) found no significant effect of military integration on the duration of peace. Their argument is that it became a "catch-all phrase" for policies that each have their own outcomes. This chapter will discuss the concept of military integration first, after which the academic debate will be reviewed. The literature review includes the current theories on the success or failure of military integration along with an analysis of benefits and costs.

Glassmeyer & Sambanis (2008, 381) argue that integrating former combatants after civil conflict is a common practice in peacebuilding operations. Hartzell (2014, 13) found aspects of military integration in almost half of the civil wars fought after the Second World War. Military integration is also described as military power-sharing (e.g., Bussmann 2018). Bussmann (2018, 95) states that military power-sharing includes integration of conflict parties into the security sector institutions. While Bussmann includes the security sector, this thesis will predominantly look at military integration and related

power-sharing provisions. The thesis does not explicitly concern other security sector institutions, such as the police or the judicial system.

The following section discusses three common methods of military integration by Hartzell & Hoddie. After, it will discuss three perspectives of military integration by Krebs & Licklider. These scholars wrote substantively on the subject and together they form the basis of the first condition of successful military integration. Although they might seem similar, Krebs & Licklider's perspective is quantitative, whereas Hartzell and Hoddie's perspective is qualitative. Their perspectives complement rather than oppose each other. Combining the theory of Hartzell & Hoddie with Krebs & Licklider creates a broader approach for the cohesion of integration methods.

According to Hartzell & Hoddie (2014, 42), former combatants can be integrated proportionally, equally, or not at all but working side by side (i.e. separately). Hartzell & Hoddie (2014, 40) base their theory on Arend Lijphart's (1977, 25) consociational democracy, which provides mechanisms that prevent a government from becoming authoritarian by protecting minority groups from permanent exclusion.

The first method, proportional integration, integrates former combatants following the ethnic diversity of civil society. If one group, for example, represents 30% of the population, the group should represent 30% of the military as well (Hartzell & Hoddie 2014, 41). The flaw of proportional integration is that it can lead to overrepresentation of one group within the military, facilitating the opportunity to overshadow another ethnic group that is less represented within society. Rothchild & Roeder (2005, 3) state that proportional integration would be very hard in a multi-ethnical society. Thus, issues with proportional integration are more likely to occur in multi-ethnic societies like Sierra Leone and Liberia, and less in countries that have two or three ethnic groups.[1]

Equal integration, the second method of military integration, means that the entire number of military personnel is divided between the number of ethnic (or rebel) groups depending on the situation. This will prevent over-representation of one group over the other but can result in a skewed representation of the military with respect to civil society. In other words, a small ethnic group in civil society could become a relatively large ethnic group within the military. Burundi serves as an example of equal military integration. An equal distribution of Hutu and Tutsi were admitted to the military (Hartzell & Hoddie 2014, 42). Depending on the ethnic configuration of a country, a middle way

---

[1] Hartzell & Hoddie found that political and military power-sharing in Burundi occurred proportionally and equally respectively. The cabinet was staffed following a 60:40 Hutu and Tutsi ratio (Hartzell & Hoddie 2014, 41-42). The Burundi population consists of 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa. Retrieved from https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/burundi/bifacts.htm#page on 15-7-2019

between proportional and equal integration might be an option to prevent overrepresentation of one specific group.

The third method of military integration is separate integration. In this situation, a certain group can manage its own military. Although separate integration sounds contradictory, it helped to prevent conflict reoccurrence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and serves as the best example. After the conflict, the Dayton peace agreement ruled that each ethnic group had to withdraw into their own units. The peace agreement did not provide future military integration into a single armed force, resulting into three semi-autonomous entities with their own armed forces (Dudley 2016, 124). Separate integration does have three issues. Firstly, maintaining three separate militaries is inefficient and costly. Secondly, it stands in the way of actual integration and it maintains the probability of separatism. Thirdly, it can lead to mistrust between the militaries because one group has no certainty of what the other groups will do.

Krebs & Licklider (2016, 99-101) discuss three additional perspectives. These perspectives regard the magnitude of military integration and on whether military integration took place on a vertical or horizontal level. Firstly, the magnitude of integration regards the number of former combatants that are integrated into the military (Krebs & Licklider 2016, 99-100). Krebs & Licklider (2016, 115) provide an example of military integration in the Philippines, based on research by Rosalie Hall. Hall (2016, 99) found that 5,191 former combatants were successfully integrated into the national armed forces, but this number amounted to 4% of the entire armed forces. When the magnitude of integration is not balanced, a skew towards one group occurs (Krebs & Licklider 2016, 99). A skew towards one group can result in issues that proportional and equal integration tend to prevent; exclusion of minority groups within the military. Krebs & Licklider (2016, 100) also found that a misrepresentation on this level can cause insubordination when units deny orders from officers of a different ethnicity, causing an *us and them* sentiment. Considering quotas should prevent such issues (Krebs & Licklider ibid.), a finding that is consistent with Hartzell and Hoddie's methods of integration.

Secondly, horizontal integration, or individual integration along the rank and file, contributes to deeper integration. In horizontal integration, persons are integrated separate from their old units, further preventing old rebel configurations within the military. Licklider (2015) found in a study of eleven cases of military integration that individual integration is more beneficial to peace than collective integration. In two cases, collective integration, or group integration, was applied and resulted in failure. However, Licklider found no empirical evidence that suggest that individual integration in these two cases would have a successful result (Licklider 2015, 150). A pitfall of horizontal integration is that it can disregard individual qualifications and skills (Krebs & Licklider 2016,

100), which can decrease the potential of the individual. Thus, a consideration of the individual's skillset is beneficial for the contribution of horizontal integration.

Finally, vertical integration follows the chain of command. In multi-ethnic societies, it is not uncommon for one ethnic group to represent the rank and file, while another group represents the chain of command. In the Rwandan military, there are little Hutu officers (Krebs & Licklider 2016, 101), although the Hutu are the largest ethnic group in Rwanda.[2] Weak vertical integration allows the consolidation of power in the chain of command, while claiming that military integration was applied (Krebs & Licklider ibid.)

3. Benefit and Cost Analysis

Apart from the presumption that military integration reduces the risk of conflict reoccurrence, it has several specific benefits. Firstly, military integration complements disarmament, demobilization and civil reintegration (DDR[3]) processes (Licklider 2015). Second, it increases social cohesion and inclusion within ranks and within society (Hall 2009). Thirdly, military integration supplements political integration or the rebel-to-party transition (Olonisakin 2008, Söderberg Kovacs & Hatz 2016). Finally, military integration can help share military knowledge (Tucker & Sayedi 2016).

Of course, there are also costs involved. These costs entail both economic costs and political effort or power that is lost in the process. Firstly, military integration increases the size of the military, and thus the expenditure (Bussmann 2018). Secondly, hurrying the integration and training process can reduce its effectiveness (Rashid 2018). Finally, issues revolving around operationality and responsibility can occur when multiple parties are involved. This was the case in Sierra Leone, where rebels took advantage of the transition between two peacekeeping forces and launched attacks, delaying peacebuilding efforts with one year.

3.1 Benefits

Licklider (2015, 54) found that a high number of former fighters is one of several common problems after civil war. Military integration can complement the efforts of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs and decrease the number of armed belligerents. Hall (2009, 2) makes a similar argument in saying that military integration can be used to reduce the number of belligerents, as well as providing opportunities alongside existing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

---

[2] Ethnicity in Rwanda is comprised of 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa, like Burundi, retrieved from
https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/rwanda/rwfacts.htm#page on 15-7-2019
[3] DDR regards the following three steps; disarmament collects and disposes of weapons, disarmament reduces the number of active combatants and reintegration is the social and economic process that leads to civilian status (UN 2006abc).

programs. When looking at the absolute numbers of military integration and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Sierra Leone, the impact of military integration seems meagre. In Sierra Leone, 2,349 former combatants were integrated into the military (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 57), while between 45,000 and 75,000 rebels were demobilized in total (Zack-Williams 2010, 26). However, former rebels that underwent military integration were ensure of employment, while those who just demobilized where not.

Krebs & Licklider (2016) argue that distrust within society against the security sector (for example as a result of power abuse during civil conflict) and ethnically based distrust could be reduced via military integration. An inclusive military should help nurture public trust and provide security. Secondly, Krebs & Licklider (2016, 102) state that the military could be used to 'school the nation', restoring the sense shared identity and political unity. Hall (2009, 3-4) argues that military integration can help address identity-driven problems, by eliminating obstacles such as ethnicity, religion or ideals. The representation of minority groups within the military should boost confidence regarding the inclusiveness of the military.

The first argument, which states that distrust can be reduced through military integration, is corroborated by Zirker et. al. (2008), who found that behavioural patterns that are associated with ethnicity relate directly to problems of military establishments in upcoming or developing countries. They state that the military identity is pervasive and concrete and that the military is encouraged to correspond their interests with that of the state (Zirker et. al. 2008, 316).

The second argument, that the military can school the nation and reinstate their reputation as security providers, cannot be accepted so easily. In several instances, the military has been the perpetrator of atrocities and crimes against humanity. Human Rights Watch (1999) found that Sierra Leone government forces, alongside Nigerian peacekeepers, committed several atrocities against civilians. If the public opinion is negative towards the military, it can question the legitimacy of the military. However, the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia show that it is possible to rebuild the reputation of the military.

Further, the transition from a rebel group to a political party, or rebel-to-party transitions, can be complemented via military integration by increasing the inclusion of former rebel groups that become political groups. Rebel-to-party transition is not uncommon in post-conflict situations. For example, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone became a political party as a part of the Lomé peace agreement (Olonisakin 2008, 138), and Söderberg Kovacs & Hatz (2016, 1001) found 33 instances rebel-to-party transitions after intrastate peace agreements between 1975 and 2011. Inclusion of relevant elites into military (and other relevant) functions is seen as an important factor towards peace

by Krebs & Licklider (2016, 98). The desired result is that rivals or opponents feel included and therefore do not need to renege on agreements, which strengthens the credible commitment all included parties have towards each other.

Military integration can also help share military knowledge. Tucker & Sayedi (2016, 23) found that in train-and-equip missions, recruits severely lacked combat experience and knowledge of vehicle operation. Train-and-equip missions can be part of military integration, although its use is disputed by McFate (2016, 103), as it does not contribute to better security institutions, rather it leads to "better dressed soldiers that shoot straighter" (McFate 2016, 11). Train-and-equip missions entail the provision of arms and expertise to another military, as opposed to fighting alongside it. However, train-and-equip mission do play an important role, as many militaries after civil conflict lack adequate equipment. A newly integrated military needs adequate training as well, which in the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia was provided by British military advisors and American private military advisors respectively. This will be elaborated on in chapters 6.5 and 6.6. Rebels can have detailed military knowledge, for example regarding specific surroundings. Rebel groups in Sierra Leone and Burundi received training from South African military trainers of the African National Congress (Krebs & Licklider 2016, 101) and were able to organize well staged attacks against government forces.

3.2 Costs

Integrating former combatants into the military can directly result in a larger military (Bussmann 2018, 95), depending on whether integration is applied to an existing military. This was the case in Sierra Leone and resulted in a major decrease in the number of armed forces through lay-offs and early retirement just one year after the integration was complete (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 57). The increased size of the military results in higher military expenditure, but also in a broader program that needs more monitoring. In other words, increasing the size of the military increases the difficulty of training and monitoring as well as the costs of salaries, materiel and upkeep. Post-conflict peacebuilding operations often have a tight budget, thus managing limited funds is important.

Hurried training, or increasing the speed of integration, can lead to dysfunctional integration. Ismail Rashid (2018, 421) found that hurried training of former combatants led to discharge due to insubordination. The example of Rashid shows that hurried training can lead to a lack of professionalism. Hurried training interfaces with 'quick fixes' thinking of donor organisation. Although there is evidence that quick fixes on a short term can result in a more stable situation for peacebuilding, quick fixes are not final. As a result of rebel attacks by the Revolutionary United Front during the transition from the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group peacekeeping force to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone peacekeepers, short-term goals

were instated in order to achieve quick results of integration. However, this led to partial implementation of integration and a lack of oversight and staff (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 54).

It is not uncommon to have multiple peacekeeping operations of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations present in a post-conflict situation. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the British and finally the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone were present in Sierra Leone simultaneously or in succession. The transition towards another peacekeeping mission needs careful planning, as it can result in a security vacuum, allowing a new coup d'état or a reoccurrence of violence. Violence reoccurred when the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group forces withdrew and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone peacekeepers took over in Sierra Leone and delayed military integration (Olonisakin 2008, 138). Coordination of activities between different organizations is necessary to prevent such pitfalls.

Apart from providing a stable peacebuilding setting, peacekeepers play an important role in ensuring that the provisions discussed in a peace agreement are maintained (DeRouen & Chowdhury 2018, 133) by playing the role of a surrogate government or act as a referee if the actual state is not yet capable to provide the necessary security (DeRouen & Chowdhury 2018, 138). In doing so, peacekeepers can alleviate the lack of trust in the government by rebels while maintaining the rule of law, thus preventing a state of anarchy in which the commitment problem thrives.

4. Current explanations for the success or failure of military integration.

This section discusses current explanations about what conditions attribute to the success or failure of military integration together with its benefits and disadvantages. The most important explanation is the coherence of military integration. However, additional conditions are important too, and these will be discussed in the following section. The other conditions entail the presence of peacekeepers to prevent commitment problems and the implementation of multiple provisions integration.

Finally, the most common critique of military integration is that it cannot be successful because it is not able to function as a stand-alone peacebuilding tool and should thus not be addressed as such (e.g. Krebs & Licklider 2016, Wilén 2016). This will be addressed in the final sub-chapter.

4.1 Coherence of integration methods

Ensuring the coherence of methods of integration that were identified by Hartzell & Hoddie and Krebs & Licklider will result in stronger and deeper military integration. It prevents groups from overshadowing other groups because their actual size in numbers is larger than the other group. Krebs & Licklider (2016, 115) provide an example in which military integration was applied to meagrely, and

thus not resulting in the desired effect. In the Philippines, former Moro Nationalistic Liberation Front combatants were integrated in such small numbers (only 4% of the entire military consisted of integrated soldier according to Hall (2016, 99)) that Moro within the military were a minority, making it impossible to provide adequate security to the Moro people. Their argument can be understood as follows: a minority group within the military can help to provide security over other members of that minority group outside the military. This increases the legitimacy of the military in turn. Krebs & Licklider (2016, 101) provide another example of meagre integration in Rwanda, where integration was applied in such a way that it facilitated majority groups to overshadow the minority groups.

The two examples above show that coherence of integration methods is important for military integration to succeed. Although Krebs & Licklider's views on military integration are negative, the theory can be applied the other way around: Krebs & Licklider (2016, 115) state for example that durable peace in the Philippines was achieved more so because the Moro Nationalistic Liberation Front was in decline (due to economic and social struggles internally), than because of military integration. Their argument is that military integration was weak along ethnic lines and in numbers. Although this might prove that military integration does not entail durable peace from this perspective, but it also shows that deeper integration along ethnic lines and numbers, or a representation of ethnic and geographical background, thus makes military integration successful. The case of the Moro Nationalistic Liberation Front proves that there was a lack of proportional integration which could have been addressed easily. Although peace was achieved regardless of military integration according to Krebs & Licklider, consideration of integration methods can increase coherence within the units and in turn better result in deeper military integration.

4.2 Peacekeepers and the prevention of commitment problems

Dealing with commitment problems will lead to successful military integration and a more durable peace. The commitment problem can be explained as follows: opposing groups benefit from committing to a peace agreement. But because the opposing parties do not trust each other to stay committed to the peace agreement, they can renege on the agreement. Walter (2010, 5) explains that commitment problems are an important driver of the reoccurrence of civil conflict.

In order to prevent a state of anarchy and an absence of rule of law after civil conflict, Walter (2010, 23) argues that peacekeepers can act as a security provider. Apart from providing security, peacekeepers can act as a surrogate government or support a transitional government until an elected government is inaugurated. DeRouen & Chowdhury (2018, 134) also argue that the deployment of peacekeepers prevents conflict reoccurrence because they instate a state of security that prevents

conflict resumption (DeRouen & Chowdhury 2018, 134). The presence of peacekeepers thus forms an important condition for military integration to succeed.

Page & Whitt (2018) studied the effect of peacekeepers in multi-ethnic societies. More specifically, they studied ethnocentric views in the case of NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia. Outcomes of this case are relevant because of the multi-ethnic nature of Sierra Leonean and Liberian society.

Firstly, Page & Whitt (2018, 2) found that ethnocentrism causes security dilemmas which lead to conflict between ethnic groups. Their research found that areas with peacekeepers experienced less ethnocentrism than areas without peacekeepers. Secondly, Page & Whitt (2018, 4) state that inter-group contact is the main mechanism to reduce the fear and prejudice that cause ethnocentrism, and that peacekeepers can facilitate inter-group contact. Finally, Page & Whitt (2018, 21) found that peacekeepers have a positive effect on positive peace even when the peacekeepers are not welcomed or wanted by the local population.

The findings of Page & Whitt show that deployment of peacekeepers can reduce ethnocentrism, as well as mechanisms that induce ethnocentrism. The deployment of peacekeepers thus can result in a more stable situation in which peacebuilding efforts can unfold. The second positive aspect of peacekeeper deployment is that it helps to create a situation that increases inter-group contact. Inter-group contact, combined with reduced prejudice, helps to build trust between the different ethnic groups that will need to work together in order to become a more coherent whole.

The issue with commitment problems as stated by Walter and Kocher, in combination with the effect peacekeepers have on post-conflict societies as stated by DeRouen & Chowdhury and Page & Whitt, allow for the conclusion that the presence of peacekeepers is a condition for successful military integration. Peacekeeper presence creates a setting in which military integration can succeed, because it helps to prevent the resurgence of conflict and elimination spoilers of peace.

4.3 Multiple provisions of integration

The implementation of multiple provisions of military integration will result in a higher chance of successful military integration. Hoddie & Hartzell (2003, 318) state that implementing multiple provisions of power sharing shows a credible commitment to peace by the parties involved. Ian Spears (2002, 133) supports this argument by stating that efforts to install opposition members in key positions shows that a government is willing to commit to reform and build peace. Consequently, this should reduce mutual fear in each group's intentions. According to Spears (2002, 128), power sharing has short-term advantages for both parties. The party formerly in power can prevent absolute loss of

control, and the party gaining power can prevent the party formerly in power from starting a military campaign.

Multiple provisions of military integration also provide a safety net. Hartzell & Hoddie (2014, 51) state that when one provision fails, other provisions should still be in place. Thus, multiple provisions of integration will result in a larger chance of success. Following the arguments of Hartzell and Hoddie and Spears, it becomes clear that more provisions of power sharing, preferably along different landscapes of the military, or political or territorial, show a larger intent of both parties towards peace. When this is the case, more credible commitment towards peace is shown by the included parties, and chances are bigger that the peace agreement will last.

4.4 Criticism: Reliance of military integration on other peacebuilding processes

The most common theory of failure of military integration states that military integration is not able to function on itself. Another is that the successes of military integration are obscured by other measures of peacebuilding, so the success of durable peace cannot be attributed to military integration (e.g. Krebs & Licklider and Glassmeyer & Sambanis).

Wilén (2016) stated that military integration is too limited as a peacebuilding tool on itself. Consequently, other protagonists of military integration also admit or imply that military integration should be part of a larger peacebuilding operation (e.g. Hartzell & Hoddie). Thus, scholars agree that military integration is too limited to function as a peacebuilding provision on its own, but it complements other peacebuilding efforts. Henceforth, the thesis will not discuss whether military integration in itself is successful or not. The essence of this study is to identify and analyse *conditions* that result in successful military integration.

5. Research Design, Hypothesis and Methodology

The observable implications are that the three conditions stated in chapter 4 are found in both cases. Importantly, both cases were instances of successful military integration. This leads to the hypothesis that that *the three conditions together will attribute to successful military integration*. The analysis of the case studies will show how these conditions were in place, whether they were implemented successfully and whether each condition by itself could have resulted in successful military integration separate from the other conditions. If this is true, the theories of Hartzell and Hoddie, Walter and DeRouen and Chowdury will be validated. However, if the conclusion is not in favour of these scholars, the criticism of Krebs & Licklider is validated.

A multi-method research will be conducted to find out what conditions result in successful military integration. A qualitative comparative analysis, consisting of a within-case analysis and a between-

case analysis, will explain how the conditions identified in the previous chapter (coherence of integration methods, the presence of peacekeepers to prevent commitment problems and the implementation of multiple provisions of military integration) attributed to the outcome of military integration. The within-case analysis will look at both cases individually, while the between-case analysis will look at potential connections between both cases.

Glassmeyer & Sambanis (2008, 381) criticize military integration by saying that it is not structured and implemented well enough to be functional. In order to address this critique, the within-case analysis will test if and how the three conditions are present. Furthermore, it will analyse whether the conditions were structured in a manner that could result in successful or functional military integration.

The between-case analysis will focus on comparing the conditions between the two cases. As the circumstances in both cases are different, the outcomes of each condition are expected to be different. The between-case comparison will provide insight in whether these differences were in place and then draw conclusions on the consequences for the success of military integration.

Process tracing will help to find out whether the three conditions were implemented in military integration. It will also allow me to analyse certain situations that might seem similar at first but have distinct differences when looked at closer. Process tracing, according to Bennett (2008, 3), tries to provide an historical explanation of an individual case which might or might not provide an explanation to the phenomenon the case is part of. In this case I will look for notions of integration and in what context integration took place and was applied. Certain phenomena need important to be considered, such as the public opinion regarding the military and the peacekeeping forces, the willingness of the involved actors to participate and whether violence reoccurred during the process and how, if applicable, this influenced the outcome of the military integration program. I will look for differences in admittance procedures, vetting, training and follow up activities in order to find out whether one program was more successful over the other.

In order to do this, a timeline is provided for each case in the following chapter, discussing the civil war and the military integration in Sierra Leone and Liberia. According to Collier (2011, 828), a timeline helps to provide oversight during process tracing. The timeline provides an understanding of the conflict as well as how military integration was achieved. After the timelines are discussed, the conditions for military integration found in each case will be analysed. To test the hypothesis, I will analyse if and how the three conditions have been implemented in both cases.

5.1 Case selection and justification

Several factors determine the case selection of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Firstly, both countries experienced civil war during the same period between the years of 1999 and 2004 (Dowd and Raleigh 2012, 17). Secondly, in both countries a military integration process with the aid of international peacekeepers took place. Peacekeepers provided by the Economic Community of West African States member states and peacekeepers deployed by the United Nations were present in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Martin 2017, 176).

Thirdly, rebels attempted to overthrow the government in both Sierra Leone and Liberia (Martin, ibid.). Both conflicts are categorized as intrastate civil wars. Although there are reports of cross-border violence between the Liberian rebel-group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and Sierra Leonian Revolutionary United Front, this violence was never significantly heavier than the intrastate violence in Sierra Leone or Liberia (Dowd & Raleigh 2012, 15-16). In both conflicts, no governmental or other legitimized militaries were found fighting each other.

The comparison between Sierra Leone and Liberia will look at general forms of military integration. Although military integration studies can consider a broad spectrum of topics such as homosexual integration (Kier 1998), multi-ethnic integration (Peled 1998), gender integration (Titunik 2000), group cohesion (Siebold 2007) and female integration (Carreiras & Kümmel 2008), this thesis will not look specifically for answers in these areas. These studies are mainly focused on a Western setting or integration issues in Western militaries.

Nilsson & Kovacs (2013, 5) suggest that the departure points for military integration are after the signing of the major peace agreements. This is suitable for Liberia, but fighting did not cease in Sierra Leone after the peace agreement was signed in 1993, but on 18 August 2002 when President Kabbah declared the civil war over. As a result, the latter is the starting point of military integration in Sierra Leone.

6. Case Comparison of Sierra Leone and Liberia

This chapter discusses the timeline of the civil war and military integration in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Next, the hypothesis will be tested on both cases by analysing each condition individually regarding the case.

6.1 Civil war in Sierra Leone

The civil war in Sierra Leone started in March 1991. Liberian rebels supported by Charles Taylor together with Sierra Leonean dissidents invaded from Liberia. It is believed that Foday Sankoh, leader

of the Sierra Leonean rebel group Revolutionary United Front, was behind the invasion. In response to the invasion, the Economic Community of West African States deployed a peace force to oppose the attackers (Olonisakin 2008, 135).

The Revolutionary United Front gained a large following quickly. The educational system became non-existent around 1991 as a result of the governance breakdown, leading to a large group of unemployed and uneducated youth. These youths were easily mobilized against the state and rounded up by the Revolutionary United Front, providing an 'alternative' to the life they were living. The youth were considered the voice against the corruption and the failure of the state to provide for the people (Olonisakin 2008, 12-13).

The following years were full of coups and corruption. However, the peaceful takeover of a military junta in January 1996 led to the organisation of elections, which were held in March the same year and won by Ahmad Kabbah. The month before the elections was filled with cruel violence against civilians. The act of cutting of hands or arms became a symbol to literally prevent people from voting (Olonisakin 2008, 136).

In 1997, several incidents increased the intensity of the conflict. Firstly, the United Nations became involved under the new Secretary-General Kofi Anan in January. Secondly, private military contractor Executive Outcomes left Sierra Leone because the government could not meet the costs, leading to a security vacuum. In March, Sankoh went to Nigeria for weapons and is captured. In May, part of the military joined a rebel group trying to oust President Kabbah. Major Johnny Paul, leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council subsequently took control while Kabbah and his government fled to Guinea. A Nigerian-led effort to reverse the coup was unsuccessful in June and talks about oil and arms embargoes in August went into effect in September (Olonisakin, ibid).

Now there were two rebel groups fighting for power in Sierra Leone. The Revolutionary United Front was in control of the rural parts near Liberia and de Mano river area, while the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was in control in and around Freetown. There was, however, a difference between the two: the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council tried to commit to peace agreements multiple times, while the Revolutionary United Front never genuinely committed to peace and was motivated to keep the conflict going. Charles Taylor's influence was paramount in this, because he was interested in the diamonds and timber that were now under control by the Revolutionary United Front. Without the conflict, Taylor would not have access to these resources.

The following years onward to 2003 were filled with most of the violence and the fighting. In 1998, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group forces took over Freetown,

causing the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the Revolutionary United Front to flee Freetown and head to the countryside. President Kabbah was reinstated and the Civil Defense Forces, consisting of militia groups, became a formal military institute while the first United Nations observer mission started.

Nearly one year after the liberation of Freetown, the rebel groups launched a surprise attack on the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group forces in January 1999, which led to many casualties and displaced civilians. In May, the blueprints for a new peace agreement between Kabbah, Sankoh and Paul was made. In July, the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, which included power sharing measures and amnesty for Revolutionary United Front and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council members (Olonisakin 2008, 137-138).

Sankoh became chairman for the commission for mineral resources, and eight cabinet posts were acquired by the Revolutionary United Front. In return, the Revolutionary United Front promised to release civilian captives and undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures, including military integration into the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces. The observer role of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone as part of the Lomé Agreement (Olonisakin 2008, 138). The path to peace seemed to be paved, but when the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group completed its withdrawal on May 2, 2000, Revolutionary United Front forces attacked Freetown and almost 500 United Nations troops were kidnapped (Olonisakin, ibid).

As a result of the attacks, Paul called Sierra Leoneans to fight the Revolutionary United Front. Paul was inclined towards peace and needed the Revolutionary United Front and Sankoh gone. Demonstrations in front of Sankoh's house in Freetown were met with violence and the killing of demonstrators. This action led to an anti-United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone sentiment as the peacekeepers were not able to guarantee the safety. Sankoh was apprehended after the shootings (Olonisakin 2008, 60).

The United Nation Mission in Sierra Leone was bound to rules of engagement and could thus not intervene as adequately as necessary. The British, however, could and actively fought the Revolutionary United Front, while the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was not allowed to engage as per the mandate (Olonisakin 2008, 66-67).

In November 2000, a new agreement was signed between the Revolutionary United Front and the Sierra Leonean government, which included disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures (Olonisakin 2008, 139). A faction of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council split off and became known as the West Side Boys. They attacked and captured eleven British soldiers in August,

demanding supplies and the release of prisoners. The British responded with a raid on the West Side Boys and completely overpowered them. Hundreds of West Side Boys then reported for demobilization and Johnny Paul declared that was finished (Olonisakin 2008, 100).

At this point the violence diminished. There was some violence prior to the May 2002 elections between the Revolutionary United Front Party (the political branch of the Revolutionary United Front) and the Sierra Leone's People, but this was condemned by both parties (Olonisakin 2008, 112). Kabbah won the elections by a large margin and was subsequently inaugurated. He declared the end of the war on 18 January 2002. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone stayed until December 2005 to help with logistical and peacekeeping operations. The mission was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone which had the task to help with rebuilding the state.

6.2 Civil war in Liberia

Ethnic violence fueled the First Liberian Civil War when Samuel Doe attacked the Nimba county. Doe, an ethnic Krahn, targeted Mano and Gio soldiers and civilians as reprisal for an attempted coup (HRW 1990). Subsequently, Samuel Doe replaced the governmental military with his own security forces (McFate 2013, 86) which were mainly Krahn and allied Mandingo (Käihkö 2018, 781). Polarization continued along political lines as well, as Doe became increasingly hostile against Gio politicians (Käihkö ibid.).

The Second Liberian Civil War's factions were polarized as well. The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy consisted predominantly of Mandingo and Krahn (Brabazon 2003, 2). Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh (2009 609) found that the Movement for Democracy in Liberia consisted mainly of Krahn.

Taylor became president in July 1997 via elections that are deemed "largely free of violence and tempering" (WPF 2017, 3). Although Taylor was responsible for many deaths, he still received support from the Liberian public, as is known from the famous quote: "he killed my ma, he killed my pa, I'll vote for him". The reasons for this were twofold: Firstly, Taylor was believed to be the only person to achieve peace. In other words, more violence was expected without Taylor. Secondly, it became clear that Taylor was not going to stop his violence until he became President (WPF ibid.).

Taylor's involvement in the Sierra Leonean conflict backfired when the United Nations Panel of Experts placed sanctions on Liberia in the form of diamond, timber and arms embargoes (WPF 2017, 4). The sanctions resulted in opportunities for rebel groups to oppose Taylor, insofar that on 3 May 2003, two rebel groups seized control of over two thirds of the country. Liberians United for Reconciliation and Development, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and Charles Taylor sat down in Accra, Ghana, for negotiations in June 2003. The negotiations resulted in nothing, so the Economic Community of

West African States started an intervention and peacekeeping force as planned by the United Nations (WPF, ibid).

The Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia started as a small group of commandos on 4 August, but soon expanded to 3,500 units. The intervention was swift and successful, and Charles Taylor was exiled on 11 August 2003 under both domestic and international political pressure. Immediately thereafter, efforts towards a peace agreement between the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and the government were made. On 18 August 2003, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Accra (WPF 2017, 5).

After the peace agreement was signed, the United States stationed around 200 American soldiers in Liberia. This was a symbolic but relevant move. Although the soldiers never engaged in combat, their presence accompanied by helicopters and a Navy ship showed the Liberians that the war was over. Liberians would view Americans as a big brother or even a father figure (WPF 2017, 5). This helped to prevent new unrest, or at least install some sort of peace, because of the symbolic effect it had on the combatants (WPF, ibid).

6.3 Similarities and differences in the civil wars of Sierra Leone and Liberia

Unprovoked violence was visible in both civil wars. In Liberia, all parties involved committed atrocities such as rape and mutilation (HRW 2004). While in Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front was the main aggressor, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council did use violence against civilians as well. The most common notion of violence against civilians in Sierra Leone was mutilation, rape and killing.

Commitment to peace is seen in both cases, though in Sierra Leone this can only be observed with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. The Revolutionary United Front had broken several peace agreements and were always the first to renege on agreements or to attack. In Liberia, both the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia engaged in peace negotiations almost instantly after Charles Taylor was in exile.

In both cases, rebels wanted to oust the current government and build a new one. The parties involved were largely consisting of distinct ethnic groups, rather than integrated groups of several different ethnic backgrounds. Both countries were also suffering from embargoes which resulted in turning points in the war. The embargo on Sierra Leonean diamonds made it hard for Taylor to fuel the conflict in Sierra Leone, which reduced the power of the Revolutionary United Front. The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia controlled large parts of the country because Taylor could not control them any longer due to timber and rubber embargoes.

A final important similarity is that peacekeepers have been active in the conflict. Peacekeepers played an important role in maintaining a stable environment and in supporting civil activities such as elections. Both peacekeeping forces were assisted with foreign governmental forces as well, namely the British and the Americans respectively.

The Liberian civil war was more straightforward and simpler than the Sierra Leonean civil war. In Liberia, two groups fought Charles Taylor and not each other. They were, however, not strong enough to fight Taylor nor each other. Cooperation was mandatory in order to oust Taylor. When Taylor went into exile, peace talks started immediately, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. In Sierra Leone, rebel groups fought each other as well as the government, and peace talks happened more often and were reneged on more often.

6.4 Military integration in Sierra Leone

Military integration was included in the Lomé Peace Accord. Contrary to Liberia, where the existing the Armed Forces of Liberia was disbanded and an entirely new military was built, Sierra Leone integrated all warring parties into the existing military (Nilsson & Kovacs 2013, 2). The initial plan was to disband the Sierra Leone Army, but the fighting capacity of the Sierra Leone Army was needed to counter attacks by the Revolutionary United Front (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 51).

The first efforts of military integration started around March 2000, but it soon became clear that broader knowledge and more manpower was necessary for the mission. The British Military Advisory Training Team thus included other Commonwealth countries and became the International Military Advisory Training Team (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 48). The International Military Advisory Training Team remained predominantly British with some support from the United States, Canada, Nigeria and Ghana (Rashid 2018, 419).

Initially, the International Military Advisory Training Team aimed for long-term goals and projects because it anticipated a peaceful post-conflict setting without time pressure. However, the Revolutionary United Front staged attacks on peacekeepers and kidnapped civilians during the transition of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 51). Due to these attacks, the deployment of the International Military Advisory Training Team was hastened, short-term goals were instated in order to achieve quick results which led to partial implementation of policy and lack of oversight and staff (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 54). The rapid deployment also resulted in a lack of review and consultation of the effect of the programs (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 99).

This quick deployment of the International Military Advisory Training Team had two consequences. Firstly, the lack of consultation resulted in resentment of senior officers within the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces because policies introduced by the British were not always compatible with the situation in Sierra Leone. This left the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces feeling side-lined by the British (Rashid 2018, 420-421). Gbla (2007, 33) adds that parts of the program of the International Military Advisory Training Team did not match with Sierra Leone's socio-cultural identity.

Secondly, the quick deployment of the International Military Advisory Training Team led to hurried training (Rashid ibid.). According to Gbla (2007, 33), the military integration program was flawed because a large group of ex-combatants were integrated in a short time. The ex-combatants had limited training and did not understand their place in the military, which could have led to disagreements within the military. On the other hand, the hurried training resulted in a 'more or less' functioning group of recruits, whose efforts helped to prevent a security vacuum from emerging (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs 2013, 12).

Between 1999 and 2001, military integration efforts were halted because the Revolutionary United Front staged more attacks and managed to control areas rich in resources. Meanwhile, plans were made by the Ministry of Defense to defeat the Revolutionary United Front (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 55). However, the restructuring of the Ministry of Defense stumbled upon problems regarding ownership. Glba (2007, 33-34) states that the representation of British advisors in key positions in the Ministry of Defense slowed the inclusion of Sierra Leonean personnel. According to Albrecht & Jackson (2009, 59), the presence of the British military experts led to quicker decision-making, but it circumvented the Sierra Leone Army chain of command and the Ministry's civilian staff.

Military integration efforts resumed in May 2001 after a cease-fire agreement was signed. Initially, 3,000 vacancies were open to former Revolutionary United Front, the Civil Defense Forces and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council members, of which in total 2,349 passed training in August 2002 (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 64). The percentage of integrated soldiers was substantial; almost 15% of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces were integrated soldiers. With 2,349 soldiers integrated, the total size of the new military increased to nearly 15,000 (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 57), and this number includes 150 officers that were included in the military integration (Nelson-Williams 2010, 132). It is unknown what former rebel group these officers adhered to, but it shows some form of vertical integration.

Albrecht & Jackson (2009, 57) found that the increased size of the military as a result of integration was a drawback. Three years after the integration was completed, the number of personnel was brought down to 10,800. This was perceived an appropriate amount given the circumstances. Nilsson

& Söderberg Kovacs (2013, 11) found that the number was brought down further in 2013 to 8,600. They also found that if Sierra Leone desired to maintain its military without donor support, the number needed to decrease to 3,000. Although it would allow Sierra Leone to show it was capable of running the military itself, it would lead to security problems in the Mano river area. There is no notion whether integrated soldiers left the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces during the downsizing of the military. Subsequently, the military now consisted of a large group of former rebels who were still considered a security threat (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs ibid.).

The process of military integration between May 2001 and August 2002 consisted of six stages. Combatants were first disarmed and demobilized in a country-wide program. Then a screening process took place. Potential recruits were screened for their criminal records, but the International Military Advisory Training Team was very reluctant to screen for human rights violations. Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs (2013, 7) state that it was better to have human rights violators in the military, rather than on the streets, so that it was easier to monitor human rights violators.

After the screening, the recruits were assessed individually on their health, military expertise and education. Stage Four consisted basic training and creating platoons. The recruits also became soldiers in this stage, which meant that they received salary and had to adhere to military discipline. Stage Five provided the soldiers with uniforms and equipment together with actual infantry training. Finally, the soldiers would reinforce existing units (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 65). Joining existing units rather than instating new units was considered more cost-effective (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs 2013, 11).

There is no data on the number of integrated Armed Forces Revolutionary Council-members, but the ratio of integrated Revolutionary United Front to the Civil Defense Forces members was 65:35 (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 66). Subsequently, according to Krebs & Licklider, military integration in Sierra Leone scored a 0 on a scale of 0 to 3 on quotas (Krebs & Licklider 2016, 112). Since there is no mention of an intentional quota in Albrecht and Jackson, and Krebs & Licklider suggest the same in a different manner, it is safe to conclude that the ratio or quota is incidental rather than on purpose.

There is no information of dissension or conflict along ethnic lines during the military integration. Abdullah & Muana (1999, 191) found that the Revolutionary United Front did not adhere any ethnic ideology, which might explain the absence of information. Also, no specific former rebel group was represented in military units because soldiers were integrated individually (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 67). Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs also state that recruits were broken up and divided to prevent factionalism (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs 2013, 8), which explains that no incidents are known regarding internal disagreements. Subsequently, the recruitment procedure for new soldiers included

competitive provisions to ensure recruits from all regions and ethnicities (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacas 2013, 9).

In January 2002, the Sierra Leone Army was renamed Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces to signify the new beginning of the military. According to Rashid (2018, 420), the forces were split into two organizations, the Joint Force Command and the Joint Support Command, to prevent a single commander to consolidate control over the military. The Joint Force Command was led by a military commander and the Joint Support Command was led by a civil servant. Both forces were overseen and commanded by the International Military Advisory Training Team (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 97; Rashid ibid).

Preparations for the withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone peacekeepers started in 2003 with Operation Pebu. The main objective of the operation was to centralize the military and bring the number of headquarters down from 50 to nine battalion barracks and three platoon headquarters (Albrecht & Jackson 2014, 33). Soldiers would build their own barracks. The ideology was that it would increase social cohesion. Further, it was cheap labor as the budget was tight (Albrecht & Jackson 2009, 106).

However, Pebu means 'shelter' in Mende (Albrecht & Jackson ibid). Although the significance of the choice of language might seem small, the decision to choose Mende specifically could point to a lack of inclusion of other ethnicities into other departments within the military, in this case the Ministry of Defense. Only 32% of Sierra Leoneans speak Mende, while 95% speak Krio.[4] During Operation Pebu, Mende formed a political majority. The support of the Sierra Leone's People Party during the 1996 and 2002 elections consisted 90% of Mende followers (MCormack-Hale & Fridy 2011, 51).

However, inclusion and cooperation within the military greatly increased from 2002 and onwards. Soldiers began to understand their position with respect to other security institutions, the government and the public. Elections were held in 2007 and 2012 which functioned as testcases for military efficiency and neutrality. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces played its neutral role well and intervening only during the 2007 elections by request of the Sierra Leonean Police (Rashid 2018, 420).

6.4.1 Coherence

The coherence of integration was quite extensive with 15% of the military consisting of integrated rebels. Furthermore, rebels were integrated individually and into existing units to prevent

---

[4] Out of 6,038,000 inhabitants, 1,940,000 speak Mende, while 5,732,000 speak Krio, retrieved from https://www.ethnologue.com/country/SL, https://www.ethnologue.com/language/men and https://www.ethnologue.com/language/kri respectively on 18-7-2019.

factionalism. The integration of 150 officers proves that vertical integration was in place. No incidents along ethnic lines or group ideology were found. Quota for integration were applied, though presumably unintentional. Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs (2013, 9) found that provisions were installed to ensure open, competitive recruitment from all regions of Sierra Leone. Finally, social cohesion within the military increased after 2002, as displayed by the neutral role of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces during the elections and Rashid's notion on how soldiers better understood their place with respect to other security institutions and the democracy.

6.4.2 Peacekeepers

The presence of peacekeepers was decisive for the success of military integration in Sierra Leone. The Revolutionary United Front was not willing to negotiate peace, and when it did, it reneged on the agreements. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council did in fact show willingness multiple times. The most obvious example of willingness of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was when Johnny Paul Koroma disbanded the group entirely. As government forces were unable to counter the rebel attacks, the presence of peacekeepers prevented the conflict from perpetuating. Although the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone were not very popular, they did manage to expel the rebels from Freetown. The deployment of British soldiers resulted in a swift end of the conflict.

During military integration, both the British soldiers and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone peacekeepers provided a secure setting for the transitional government and for military integration. Apart from the interruption in 1997 due to Revolutionary United Front attacks, no interruption of military integration was reported until its end.

6.4.3 Provisions

International Military Advisory Training Team advisors were represented in key positions of the Ministry of Defense, which slowed the integration of Sierra Leoneans into the ministry. However, former rebels were granted key positions in the government, according to the Lomé agreement (eight cabinet positions where granted to former Revolutionary United Front rebels, and the Revolutionary United Front Party was represented within the government as well). The 2002 elections also facilitated the possibility for the former rebel leaders of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and Revolutionary United Front to run for president and for parliament, although they were not successful.[5] The 2007

---

[5] Neither of the two parties were serious contenders for presidency, although the Peace and Liberation Party managed to win two seats in parliament in the 2002 elections, while the Revolutionary United Front Party won zero seats. Retrieved from http://www.sierra-leone.org/election2002.html on 18-7-2019.

elections resulted in even less votes for both parties. Power-sharing provisions were in place on political and military levels.

One negative provision was found. Operation Pebu indicated a lack of inclusion. However, the consequences seem to have been small and no indications of dissatisfaction or other consequences were found.

6.5 Military integration in Liberia

According to Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs (2013, 5), the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on 18 August 2003 in Accra, Ghana, was more detailed regarding military integration and reform than the Lomé agreement. However, it has just three paragraphs more than the Lomé agreement. [7]

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement stated that all irregular forces would be disbanded and that the Government of Liberia would restructure the Armed Forces of Liberia. Former Government of Liberia forces, forces from the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and civilians willing and able were welcome to join the new Armed Forces of Liberia.

Contrary to military integration in Sierra Leone, military integration started slowly due to lack of trust between the donors and the government. Military integration started after a raid on a barrack in June 2005. The raid was inspired because the military salaries were not paid (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs ibid.). The first actual training started in August 2006, and training was overseen by the private company DynCorp, rather than by the United States military. According to ICG (2009, 9), DynCorp won a tender in 2004 to help with military integration and military reform in general. Although there was cooperation between the United States military and DynCorp, the use of a private company for military integration, and for security sector reform, was unprecedented at that time.

DynCorp disbanded the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Ministry of Defense to start anew, although at first demobilization of the Armed Forces of Liberia was regarded the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense (ICG 2009, 10). The recruitment process for the Armed Forces of Liberia was far more rigorous than in Sierra Leone and much attention was paid to human rights violatiors (Nilsson &

---

[6] For the complete text of military integration in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, see Article VII of the United Nations Security Council document S/2003/850 at
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LR_030818_Peace%20Agreement%20btwn%20Gov Liberia%2CLURD%2CMODEL%20and%20the%20Political%20Parties.pdf retrieved 19-7-2019

[7] For the complete text of military integration in the Lomé agreement, see Article XVII of the United Nations Security Council S/1999/777 at
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf retrieved 19-7-2019

Söderberg Kovacs 2013, 7-8). The new recruits were vetted, interviewed and their backgrounds were checked. DynCorp asked the West African Examination Counsil, a regional not-for-profit organization, to aid with this task (McFate 2010). The West African Examination Council would later also help create a literacy test (McFate 2013, 70). Researchers of the West African Examination Council, a regional NGO, would go to the home villages of recruits and ask relatives questions regarding the person. After initial vetting, a public inquiry took place. Posters were hung around public places with a telephone number for anonymous reports of human rights violations (ICG 2009, 12). It resulted in many fake calls regarding personal grudges, but some recruits were disqualified because of this extensive vetting (McFate, 2010), making the recruitment program 'self-selecting' regarding potential recruits that committed human rights violations (McFate 2013,79).

According to McFate (2010), who was the program manager of DynCorp in Liberia, many recruits had plenty fighting skills because of their activities in 14 years of conflict. Therefore, some weapons training sessions were redundant and replaced with educational training sessions. These sessions consisted of literacy and civics lessons in order to provide a sense of position of the recruits within the military and were provided by the West African Examination Council and Liberians for Liberians. The recruits would learn human rights codes, codes of military conduct, the role of a soldier within a democracy and Liberian history.

DynCorp's decision to incorporate classes helped to target illiteracy and teach federalism. Multi-ethnic post-conflict societies can endure identity related issues as a result of ethnic violence. Targeting such problems can help prevent distrust between ethnic groups in the military. Given the ethnic violence that fuelled the Liberian civil war, this was an important step towards stability.

Ethnic rivalry led to a sentiment that people identified with their own people first, and with their nation second. Combined with ethnicization of the military, the military was distrusted by the people. McFate (2013, 86) states that DynCorp spent a significant amount of time on topics regarding civil-military relations, rule of law, duty towards the state, Liberian history and its government. These lessons, combined with a balanced ethnic representation, allowed the military to rebuild its reputation. The new Armed Forces of Liberia was said to display a more professional attitude as perceived by the public (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs 2013, 10).

Disbanding the military and building it from scratch had advantages and drawbacks. On the one hand, it led to a better ethnic and geographical representation within the military (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs 2013, 9; McFate 2013, 86), which is an important aspect regarding the success of military integration. On the other hand, it led to a shortage of capable officers and thus to a lack of professionalism. Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs 2013, (8-10) found that officers from the Economic

Community of West African States member-states and former Armed Forces of Liberia officers were reinstated to fill the gap. There is no evidence that former rebels did or did not integrate as officers in military integration in Liberia, making it hard to conclude whether this gap could have been filled by former rebels and what result this would have had.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement allowed former rebel leaders key positions in the National Transitional Government of Liberia. The National Transitional Government of Liberia was instated as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and would rule until elections in October 2005 and installation of the new President in January 2006. Positions within the National Transitional Government of Liberia were desired because they gave access to political and economic resources. However, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement also included that ministers of the interim government were not eligible to run for president later in 2005. Abraham et. al. (2019, 7) state that this meant that former rebels eligible to become ministers had to consider whether to pursue these positions because it would deny them to run for President in the coming elections. The decision meant that former warlords were not able to consolidate power in Liberian politics, while still including them into the government.

The setting in which military integration took place was considered peaceful. Although the rule of law was tainted after 14 years of civil conflict, Hoddie & Hartzell (2019, 11) found that combined measures of integration, i.e. military, economic and political, helped to create an independent functioning judiciary in Liberia. The transition from National Transitional Government of Liberia to the government of the first democratically elected president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf went smoothly and was possible because the power-sharing and integration provisions prevented political figures to use their position to threaten the position and interests of opponents. Hartzell & Hoddie (2019, 12) agree that peacekeepers played an important role in providing security and stability. McFate (2013, 36) supports this argument and states that the United Nations Mission in Liberia was the largest peacekeeping operation at that time, providing 15,000 military personnel and 1,115 police officers. Hartzell & Hoddie (2019, 12) are inconclusive on whether peacekeepers were used to influence former warlords to hold back on violence against opponents, allowing the conclusion that military integration provisions led to the prevention of commitment problems emerging in Liberia.

6.5.1 Coherence

By disbanding the former military, DynCorp could effectively tackle the coherence issue with military integration. Former rebels were welcome to join the military if proven capable, and ethnic and geographical representation was included in the recruitment process as well. This way, the Armed Forces of Liberia would have a balanced cohesion of ethnic groups within the military. There is no

notion whether equal or proportional integration was applied, thus a consideration between the two is expected.

A shortage of capable officers led to issues within the military. In order to fill the shortage, officers from the Economic Community of West African States and former Armed Forces of Liberia officers filled that gap. It is unknown how many former rebels were integrated as officers. No conclusion can be drawn on whether former rebels could have filled this gap and whether this would result in a desirable outcome. Thus, vertical integration was not applied successfully. More information on the magnitude of integration would be useful to conclude whether the cohesion of military integration resulted successful military integration in general.

6.5.2 Peacekeepers

After 14 years of civil conflict, the general attitude was that the warring factions were weary of conflict. The immediate signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement after Charles Taylor was exiled shows that the Liberians wanted to put the war behind and work towards the future. The deployment of American marines after the intervention by United Nations Mission in Liberia increased the public opinion that the war was over. Little to no violence after the conclusion of the peace agreement is mentioned, which can be explained by the large size of the United Nations Mission in Liberia peace corps.

One question remains unanswered; Hartzell & Hoddie (2019, 12) could not conclude whether peacekeepers were used to influence former warlords to refrain from violence against opponents to strengthen their positions. A conclusion can be former warlords refrained from restarting the conflict because military integration in combination with multiple provisions such as power sharing led to enough credible commitment towards each other.

6.5.3 Provisions

Apart from military training, Liberian military integration included literacy and civics classes. In doing so, the new Armed Forces of Liberia soldiers would have a better understanding of the soldier's place within a democracy. Efforts to increase the sense of federalism strengthened the cohesion between ethnic groups and towards the state.

Former rebels were included in the transitional government, which provided access to political and economic resources. In order to avoid former rebels from consolidating power, provisions were installed that prevented former rebels included in the transitional government to run for President in the coming election. Former rebels could however hold positions in the government, thus not completely excluding them from the new government after the elections.

The combination of measures of integration along military, political and economic lines led to and increased stable setting for military integration to commence. These measures resulted in a credible commitment that provided both security and inclusion. Security was the result of removing the urge to resume violence because of credible commitment, and inclusion could thus be further cemented.

6.6 Comparing military integration in Sierra Leone and Liberia

Military integration in Sierra Leone and Liberia is deemed successful. However, there were differences in the approach which need to be addressed. For example, ownership issues were managed more intensively in Liberia than in Sierra Leone. Liberia also showed far more extensive vetting processes during recruiting and disbanding the entire military allowed for a new beginning. A more detailed analysis of both approaches will follow hereafter.

6.6.1 Sierra Leone

Several indicators point towards the success of military integration in Sierra Leone. For example, the deployment of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces during the 2007 and 2012 elections showed that the new military successfully played its neutral role. Furthermore, Rashid (2018, 420) states that the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces contributed personnel to several African Union and United Nations peacekeeping operations, indicating a functioning and representable military.

Former Revolutionary United Front rebels that transitioned to the Revolutionary United Front Party acquired government positions and 150 officers were vertically integrated in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces. Preventive measures were installed after military integration was completed to restructure the military to the appropriate size and measures to ensure adequate representation along ethnic and geographical lines in the future were included as well. These actions indicate that multiple provisions for power sharing (on a political and military level) were applied in combination with horizontal and vertical integration. The magnitude of integration was also considerable, as 15% of the new military consisted of integrated rebels.

Peacekeepers played an active role to ensure a stable setting that facilitated military integration. Although this process was not smooth (the transition between the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone allowed for violence to reoccur), peacekeepers, aided by the British, were able to prevent major violence from reoccurring and facilitated a stable situation for military integration.

Two major drawbacks resulted from military integration in Sierra Leone. Firstly, the integration of former combatants led to an increase in size of the military, leading to downsizing measures almost immediately after military integration was complete. Secondly, there were issues with ownership due

to the approach of the International Military Advisory Training Team. Although it is argued that the approach prevented a security vacuum and resulted in quick fixes, it also led to disgruntled Sierra Leonean senior officers. However, it did not result in commitment problems. After the Revolutionary United Front was defeated definitively and the final cease-fire agreement was signed in 2001, military integration recommenced and was not interrupted, and none of the parties reneged on the peace agreement.

6.6.2. Liberia

In Liberia, military integration can be considered a success as well. DynCorp played an important role in the success of the operation. As a private organization, DynCorp was less subjected to diplomatic policy and could thus impose more drastic measures of reform and integration. The decision to disband the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Ministry of Defense was drastic but resulted in the possibility to completely vet new recruits. DynCorp was able to prevent human rights violators from entering the Armed Forces of Liberia and by starting anew, the Armed Forces of Liberia could rebuild its reputation as a security provider quickly.

By incorporating classes during military training, DynCorp could tackle issues of illiteracy and created a better sense of understanding what a soldier's place is in a democracy. Addressing the importance of federalism had a positive impact on social cohesion and decreased the chance of violence resuming. Measures of power-sharing were installed as well, providing the opportunity for former rebel leaders to take office in the cabinet. The transitional government also integrated former rebel leaders until the first free elections. Ownership issues were tactically addressed by DynCorp by using local institutions for vetting and for classes.

Peacekeepers were present, along with a small unit of American soldiers after the final battle to provide security. After the violence was quelled, military integration was started and not interrupted, and commitment problems did not occur.

7. Conclusion

The aim of the thesis was to answer the question *what conditions determine the success of military integration* with respect to Sierra Leone and Liberia. The hypothesis was that a combination of three conditions will result in successful military integration, and that consequently the absence of one of the conditions will not result in success. The three conditions are the coherence of integration methods, the presence of peacekeepers and the incorporation of multiple provisions of integration.

The research results that follow from both cases further show that a combination of the three conditions were decisive for the success of military integration. Firstly, peacekeepers maintained the

equilibrium by creating a stable situation. Secondly, the coherence of integration methods ensured a balanced military and increased internal cohesion within the military. Thirdly, including multiple provisions of integration strengthened the cohesion on a political and economic level, which prevented power-consolidation and increased the credible commitment.

However, if one of the conditions was to be left out, the other two conditions would not be strong enough to maintain the equilibrium and prevent violence from reoccurring. For example, if the inclusion along multiple provisions of integration was removed, the credible commitment would decrease and the threshold to return to violence would be lowered. The same result is expected when the cohesion of integration methods is skewed. Peacekeepers alone could potentially prevent violence from reoccurring, but all efforts towards inclusion and trust would have to restart. Reneging on a peace agreement violates trust and the willingness to cooperate in the future. Subsequently, if peacekeepers were absent, it would be hard to create a peaceful setting for military integration.

The conclusion that follows is that for military integration to be successful, a combination of the three conditions of military integration is necessary. This study also corroborates that, in accordance with the criticism of scholars such as Wilén (2016) and Krebs & Licklider (2016), military integration is not able to function as a peacebuilding method on its own and should be embedded in other peacebuilding activities.

Process tracing helped to understand the differences in approach of military integration in Sierra Leone and Liberia. For example, vetting procedures were far more extensive in Liberia, which decreased potential spoilers of the integration process by excluding these spoilers from the program. Liberian vetting excluded human rights violators from integrating, while in Sierra Leone they were allowed in order to control them. Process tracing provided important information on ownership issues and how they were addressed, as well as how DynCorp actively trained the new soldiers in civic duties. Even though the approaches differed, both cases had the three conditions in place and were successful.

One of the other findings is that military integration is often overshadowed by literature about military reform. For example, McFate's publication on military reform in Liberia is extensive but the focus lies on DynCorp's efforts in Liberia. In such cases, instances of military integration are pointed out by stating that it was in place or not. Scholars have not gone into detail on how military integration took place and what the outcome of each action was.

Ownership issues did not result in failure of military integration in both cases. One possible explanation is that the organizations responsible for military integration (The International Military

Advisory Training Team and DynCorp respectively) were too important and too powerful for ownership issues to endanger the operation. Therefore, individual actors could not provide enough leverage to address ownership issues or to overrule decisions by the International Military Advisory Training Team or DynCorp. Another explanation might be that ownership issues simply did not result in enough discontent by involved actors down the chain of command for policymakers to change the attitude or policy. Contrary to the International Military Advisory Training Team, DynCorp did actively try to prevent ownership issues by including as many local institutions and actors as possible.

Further research could strengthen the hypothesis that the three conditions result in successful military integration. In order to do so, other cases of military integration should be tested on the presences of the three conditions. In order to get the best results, both military integration failures and successes should be tested on the presence and implementation of the three conditions.

8. Bibliography

Abdullah, I. & P. Muana (1999) The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt Of The Lumpenproletariat, in Clapham, C. (ed.) African Guerrillas, James Currey Publishers, Oxford, United Kingdom

Abraham, F. & H. Persson & A. Themnér (2019) Yesterday Warlord, Today Presidential Candidate; Ex-military Leaders Running For Office in Post-Civil War Societies, *The Nordic Africa Institute,* No. 4, pp. 1-8

African Center for Strategic Studies (2018) Term Limits for African Leaders Linked to Stability, accessed 18-06-2019 at https://africacenter.org/spotlight/term-limits-for-african-leaders-linked-to-stability/

Albrecht, P. & P. Jackson (2009) Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2003, *The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)*, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom

Bennett, A. (2008) Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective, in Box-Steffensmeier, J, Brady, H. & Collier, D. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, Oxford University Press, New York, United States

Brabazon, J. (2003) Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, Briefing Paper No. 1

Bussmann, M. (2018) Military Integration, Demobilization, and the Recurrence of Civil War, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 95-111

Carreiras, H. & G. Kümmel (2008) Women in the Military and in Armed Conflict, Verlag Für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, Germany

Collier, D. (2011) Understanding Process Tracing, *Political Science and Politics,* Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 823-30

DeRouen, K. & I. Chowdhury (2018) Mediation, Peacekeeping and Civil War Peace Agreements, *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 130-146

DeRouen, K. & J. Lea & P. Wallensteen (2009) The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements, *Conflict Management and Peace Science,* Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 367-387

Donais, T. (2009) Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes, *Peace & Change*, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 3-26

Dowd, C. & C. Raleigh (2012) Mapping Conflict Across Liberia and Sierra Leone, Dowd C, *Accord,* No. 23

Dudley, D. (2016) Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: State Legitimacy and Defense Institutions, *Armed Forces & Society,* Vol. 42, No. 1, pp 119-144

Galtung, J. (1967) Theories of Peace; A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Sweden.

Gbla, O. (2007) Security sector reform in Sierra Leone, in Le Roux, L. & Y. Kidane (eds) Challenges to Security Sector Reform in the Horn of Africa, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa

Glassmeyer, K. & N. Sambanis (2008) Rebel – Military Integration and Civil War Termination, *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 365-384

Hall, A. (2009) From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine and East Timorese Policy Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front and Falintil Combatants into the Armed Forces. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1460315

Harkness, K. (2017) Military Loyalty and the Failure of Democratization in Africa: How Ethnic Armies Shape the Capacity of Presidents to Defy Term Limits, *Democratization*, Vol. 24, No. 5. pp. 801-818

Hartzell, C. & M. Hoddie (2003) Institutionalizing Peace: Power-sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management, *American Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 318-332

Hartzell, C. & M. Hoddie (2014) The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Democracy, *World Politics,* Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 37-71

Hartzell, C. & M. Hoddie (2019) Power Sharing and the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Civil War, *International Studies Quarterly*, pp 1-13

Hartzell, C. (2014) Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War's End, in Licklider, R (ed) New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars, Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., United States

Hegre, H. & Østby, G. & C. Raleigh (2009) Poverty and Civil War Events: A Disaggregated Study of Liberia, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No. 4

Hensell, S. & F. Gerdes (2016) Exit From War: The Transformation of Rebels into Post-War Power Elites, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 168-184

Hoddie, M. & C. Hartzell (2003) Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements, *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 303-320

Högblad, S. (2011) Peace Agreements 1975-2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

Human Rights Watch (1990) Liberia: Flight from Terror;Testimony of Abuses in Nimba County retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1990/liberia2/ on 8-7-2019

Human Rights Watch (1999) Shocking War Crimes in Sierra Leone, accessed on 18-06 at https://www.hrw.org/news/1999/06/24/shocking-war-crimes-sierra-leone

International Crisis Group (2009) Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, *Africa Report* No. 148

International Labour Office (2010) Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Guidelines, Geneva, Switzerland.

Jackson, A. (2010) The Impact of the Cold War and New Scrambles for Africa, *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 36, No. 1

Käihkö, I. (2018) The MODEL Social Structure of an Armed Group: From Liberian Refugees to Heroes of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberators of the Homeland, *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 776-800

Kier, E. (1998) Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness, *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 5-39

Kocher, M. A. (2013) Commitment Problems and Preventive War, *Political Violence at a Glance,* accessed on 22-06-2019 at https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2013/08/08/commitment-problems-and-preventive-war/

Krebs, R. & R. Licklider (2016) United They Fall, Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War, *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 93-138

Lamb, G. & N. Alusala & G. Mthembu-Salter & J-M. Gasana (2012) Rumours of Peace, Whispers of War. Assessment of the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri Democratic Republic of Congo, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington, United States

Licklider, R. (2015) Merging Competing Militaries after Civil Wars, *PRISM*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 53-61

Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press, New Haven, United States

Martin, M. (2017) Into the Fold: Security Fears and Power Sharing the Credible Commitment of Rebel Military Integration and Durable Peace, University of Illinois

McFate, S. (2010) I Built an African Army, *Foreign Policy,* retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/07/i-built-an-african-army-2/ on 5-7-2019

McFate, S. (2013) Building Better Armies: An Insider's Account Of Liberia, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press*,* Washington DC, United States

MCormack-Hale, F. & K. Fridy (2011) Sierra Leone's 2007 elections: Monumental and more of the Same, *African Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 39 - 57

Nelson-Williams, A. (2010) Restructuring the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, in Jackson, P. & P. Albrecht (eds) Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone 1997–2007: Views from the Front Line, LIT Verlag, Berlin, Germany

Nilsson, D. & M. Söderberg Kovacs (2013) Different Paths of Reconstruction: Military Reform in Post-War Sierra Leone and Liberia, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 2-16

Olonisakin, 'F. (2008) Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone; The Story of UNAMSIL, Lynne Riener Publishers, London, United Kingdom

Page, D. & S. Whitt (2018) Beyond Keeping the Peace: Can Peacekeepers Reduce Ethnic Divisions After Violence, *Political Behavior*, pp. 1-26

Peled A. (1998) A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, United States

Rashid, I. (2018) Britain's Role in Promoting Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone, in Karbo, T. & K. Virk (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa, Springer International Publishing, Cham, Switzerland

Rothchild, D. & P. Roeder (2005) Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies, in Rothchild, D. & P. Roeder (eds) Sustainable Peace; Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, Cornell University Press, London, United Kingdom

Siebold, G. (2007) The Essence of Military Group Cohesion*, Armed Forces & Society,* Vol. 33, No. 2

Söderberg Kovacs, M. & S. Hatz (2016) Rebel-to-party Transformations in Civil War Peace Processes 1975-2011, *Democratization,* Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 990-1008

Spears, I. (2002) Africa: The Limits of Power-sharing, *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 123-136

Subedi, D. (2014) Conflict, Combatants, and Cash: Economic Reintegration and Livelihoods of Ex-combatants in Nepal, *World Development*, Vol. 59, pp. 238-250

Titunik, R. (2000) The First Wave: Gender Integration and Military Culture, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 26, No. 2

Tucker, A. & A. P. Sayedi (2016) Advising the Afghan Air Force, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol 80, No. 1, pp. 17-24

United Nations (2006a) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards; chapter 4.10 "Disarmament"

United Nations (2006b) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards; chapter 4.20 "Demobilization"

United Nations (2006c) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards; chapter 4.30 "Reintegration"

Vogel, C. & J. Musamba (2016) Recycling Rebels? Demobilization in the Congo, *Political Settlements Research Programme,* Rift Valley institute, No. 11, pp. 1-6

Walter, B. (2010) Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace, Background Paper for the World Development Report 2011*,* World Bank, Washington D.C., United States

Wilén, N. (2016) From Foe to Friend? Army Integration after War in Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 79-106

World Peace Foundation (2017) Liberia Short Mission Brief, *African Politics, African Peace*

Zack-Williams, T. (2010) Sierra Leone beyond Lomé: Challenges and Failures, in Mustapha, M. & J. Bangura (eds) Sierra Leone beyond the Lomé Peace Accord, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, United States

Zirker, D. & C. Danopoulos & A. Simpson (2008) The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-Ethnic Identity in Developing Countries, *Armed Forces & Security*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 314-337