Finding the uneasy balance

A case study into Community Policing in Mostar
Master of Arts (MA) Dissertation

Mr. T.C. Kievit, BBE
S 0635022
tkievit@gmail.com

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Faculty of Social Sciences
Cultural Anthropology and Development sociology
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Supervisor: Ms. Dr. M. Maeckelbergh
Scnd. Reader: Mr. Drs. I. Boog

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1   **INTRODUCTION**

"Mostar refracts in a concentrated microcosm practically (containing) all the problems Bosnia & Herzegovina faces in the aftermath of the apocalypse of 1992-5" and being *"the single most difficult local site for the international state-building and democratization project in post-war Bosnia"* (Bose 2002; 146).

1.1   General introduction research topic

Conflicts are of all times, and so is the resolution of conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War we see an increase in number of conflicts within nation states, in which the international community interferes to end the violence. But ending violence is not where interventions stopped. In most cases where the international community (IC), intervened, a process was started in which stabilization was the next phase (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall 2005; 199).

This thesis is based on the results of a 3 month field study in the city of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina; city that is well known for its dramatic war history. A war that implied the end of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), further referred to as Yugoslavia and that is considered to be the most violent war in Europe since the Second World War. Not only did the collapse of Yugoslavia lead to the creation of a new state, the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), it also caused enormous human suffering and led to a complete destruction, both physical and mental, of the social, economic and political structures of the country, and the relationship between its citizens and the state. The IC's intervention to end the war resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) being signed in Paris, on the 14th of December 1995. In this agreement the political structure of the country was agreed upon. Characteristic to this structure is the fact that BiH is divided into two 'entities', being the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). Both these entities have a large form of political autonomy and have their own constitution. During the negotiations the parties could not agree upon the division of the district of Brčko, which was therefore turned into a district administered by both entities. Furthermore the DPA set an agenda for the future of this country; creating a new state structure in which the warring parties would find a political way of working together on the future of their country. Providing this political structure would also make it possible for citizens of this new state to live together again and to develop a sense of citizenship, defining a new 'we' as Kuzio (2001; 170) describes it. Therefore it was important to restore trust between citizens, and between citizens and the state. Some of the key elements for restoring trust and rebuilding the country were the restoration of law and order, and to prevent conflict from recurring.

In order to achieve this, the IC got involved in and with the police service in BiH. To address the (Mostar) police of today in this thesis, I first used the term police 'force'. But due to what I observed and heard about the evolution the police went through, I feel confident to say that, in its core, the police in BiH should be called a police service instead of a police force now. After all, the term police force implies a body of police, acting as tool of the State, forcing their will upon the citizens, consistent with the historic image of the Yugoslav police. From my research I derived an image of the police that is more resembled by the term 'service'. Therefore I decided to use the term police 'force' to define the police in BiH before and during the war, while I will be using the term police 'service' for the police in BiH since the war ended.

The IC's involvement in the police in BiH, country wide, started in March 1996, with the United Nations

International Police Task Force (UNIPTF). In Mostar the IC was already involved in policing before March 1996, through the Western European Union (WEU) police force (Task Force Mostar). This taskforce was tasked with advising the mayor of Mostar, Mr. Koschnik who was assigned to this task by the IC, on the topic of public order.

Furthermore, the taskforce advised Bosniac and Croat police officers on their job performance (many of the officers had little expertise, they were merely soldiers in police uniforms), took care of VIP protection, and security of high-risk areas, patrolling the city and tracing missing persons (without having executive powers). But their main task was to unite the Croat and Bosniac police forces that were separated since the war (Defensie 2011).

Later, when UNIPTF came in and they were assigned to the task of observing and inspecting police and judiciary, later extended by monitoring and preservation of human rights. This meant that UNIPTF was also involved with the restructuring of the police service and judiciary, including training of police officers and personnel of the ministries of justice. This mission was succeeded by European Union Police Missions (EUPM I, II, III and IV), missions that tried to guide BiH's police services managements (each entity has one or more police services) towards more effective policing, based on Europe's best police practices, with local ownership at its base (Huiberts-van Dijk 2009; 1), one of these ´best police practices´ being the concept of 'community policing' (CP).

In this thesis I look at the way CP is being used as a way to improve the relationship between citizens and the police as a representative of the state, and the level of trust that exists between the two. To be able to do this I look at the way Mostar's citizens and police officers deal with each other. Therefore I have conducted interviews with both people representing (part of) the citizens of Mostar, police officers representing the Mostar police and EUPM police officers, giving an outside but expert view on things happening in BiH and observing all these groups in their respective environments. Environments that have gone through war, and post war international intervention, and that have developed their own political and social way of living with that historical background, and the current situation, including the involvement of the IC, in daily life. Due to the fact that as the focus shifted away from projects like CP in later missions, this thesis will focus on EUPM I (2003-2005) when it comes to the role of the IC in police reforms.

The Mostar Police service is being chosen as research subject as it operates in a city with its own specific history, considerably influenced by the war, challenged by the multi-ethnic character, and being a key city in the new state structure of Bosnia Herzegovina. As is stated by Sumantra Bose, Professor of International and Comparative Politics, and author on post war Mostar, in the opening quote of this chapter, Mostar contains all the problems that BiH faces in the aftermath of the war.

Many researchers have conducted research that focuses on the origins of war in the Balkan, the course of the war, the involvement of the IC to end the war. Others have focused on the social and political situation after the war and/or the peacekeeping and peace building efforts of the IC. Not many researchers have studied the current situation of the relationship (the necessary trust) between citizens and BiH's state, on ground level. In that way this thesis adds to the academic research that has been conducted on the situation in BiH. The social relevance of this topic is that this research will show the current state of the relationship between citizens and the state, on ground level, in Mostar.

But this research also relates closely to current political debates in the Netherlands; debates on how safety and security could be restored in post-war countries, with the ultimate goal to restore the

relationship and trust between citizens and the state. Debates like the most recent one in Dutch parliament on the police mission to the Afghan province of Kunduz; a debate where a clear preference for the introduction of policing based on 'best practices' (from the west) was displayed by the majority of the political parties.

Having introduced the topic of research in general terms, and sketched the history and development of the topic of research, I will now continue with defining the most important notions, used in this thesis. After that I explain my personal motivation to choose this topic of research, and how it fits in interests I developed during my time at the university. Next part is the methodology of the conducted research, explaining and justifying the way I conducted my research; finishing with the design of the thesis, giving the reader an insight in the composition of this document.

Central to this thesis is the concept of CP. When studying literature on CP I found out that there is not one definition for CP. For BiH definition for CP was put down in a document named 'Strategy for Community-Based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. This document was composed by a workgroup with members representing the police services in the different cantons of the FBiH, the police service in the Republika Srpska and the national police agencies in BiH and was created with the help of a foreign NGO. Together they defined CP and made plans on how to introduce Community-Based Policing in BiH. In the above mentioned document community-based policing (CBP) is defined as *"an organizational philosophy that promotes partnership between police and community."* (Ministry of Security of BiH 2007; 5) The document states that the strategy intends to *"improve the rights and freedoms of all citizens of BiH"*, therefore public administration standards and operational effectiveness of police agencies need to be improved, and equal access to justice needs to be promoted.

A topic that we cannot fail to mention in this introduction is the topic of ethnicity. As we can learn from the description of the most recent history of the war in BiH, referring to the different groups of citizens in BiH, asks for a lot of precision, as a sensitive subject such as ethnicity requires great precision. Often the largest ethnic groups within BiH are referred to as 'Serbs', 'Croats' and 'Muslims', with or without the additive 'Bosnian'(Huiberts 2009, Collantes Celador 2009, institutes of the U.S. government and others) . Interesting to see is the difference in the way the groups are referred to. The terms 'Serbs' and 'Croats' relate to neighbouring nation states, while the third refers to followers of a world religion.
Having observed this difference, and having read literature on the history and the war(s) in BiH, I realized that this is not the only way of referring to these ethnic groups. In other literature, the Muslims are referred to as Bosniacs (Popovic 2010, Aitchison 2007, OSCE, Bieber 2002). Not to be mistaken by the term 'Bosnians' (any person from BiH, whether 'Serb', 'Croat' of 'Bosniac'). Something that even influential experts in the field of BiH's wartime and post-war history, like Richard Holbrooke former US diplomat and main negotiator for the IC in BiH during the war, does in his book 'To End a War'. In a way, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats are denied their membership of the Bosnian community by calling Bosniacs Bosnians (Bose 2002, Chandler 2005, Holbrooke 1998).

Membership was also debated back in Yugoslav times. Then the question was whether the Muslims (not named Bosniacs at that time) could form a separate nation within the former Yugoslav federation. The Žabljak constitution of 1992 (named after the location of the meeting where the constitution was signed) formalized the separate nation of the Muslims within the federation (Kalyvas & Sambanis 2005; 205). The decision to change the name 'Muslims' into Bosniacs, was taken during by the

Bosniac Assembly in Sarajevo in 1993. Later the term was accepted by the other nations in the Federation (International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies 2005; 6). More on this in paragraph 6.2.

Knowing all this made me realize that I also had to choose, in what way I would be referring to the ethnic groups in my thesis. Much can be said about what could be the best, or most correct way to do so, but after having read a lot of literature and having been in BiH, I came to realize that there is no good way of doing so. I have chosen to refer to the three main ethnic groups in BiH nowadays, as follows; Serbs, being the Bosnian Serbs (Christian Orthodox), Croats (Catholics), being the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniacs (Muslims).

Although not the main focus of research (citizens and police / state are) the IC will be often referred to in this thesis. Therefore it is important to distinguish what comes under this term. The IC is often referred to, when talking about the nations of the world, like the ones gathered in the United Nations. But more often it refers to countries from Europe and North America, constituting only one fifth of the world. In this thesis, the IC is defined of the countries, mainly from Europe, but also Turkey, Ukraine and North America, organized in the United Nations (U.N.), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the OSCE and many other intergovernmental organizations. From studying the war history of BiH we can learn that for instance many Middle East countries have been involved in supporting the Bosniacs. I restrict myself to these countries because they were, and most of them still are, involved in the state building process.

It can be argued that many more international organizations, groups and initiatives are present in BiH. And this is true. All over BiH and in Mostar their presence becomes clear. But this thesis is focusing on the relationship between the state and its citizens and the influence of intergovernmental organization in general. This research did not specifically focus on the role NGO's played in this process. Therefore, NGO's were consulted in this research, and will be individually mentioned, while the intergovernmental organizations' are named in one term; IGO's.

1.2   Personal motivation for research

This research is supposed to be the final paper of four years studying Cultural Anthropology and Development studies. I started this study as someone who had pursued a totally different career (namely in the fire brigade), but, through personal experience developed an interest in development aid and international projects. What better way to create opportunities for a career change than to start a university study? As a university study is supposed to do, especially Cultural Anthropology, it opened up my eyes and made me aware of many interesting topics and in the end even seemed to have changed my interests from Development Aid to international politics, conflict and security matters. Through a minor in Conflict studies, a fieldwork research on volunteering within Dutch Fire brigades and a BA dissertation on the role of the informal moments during the Dayton peace negotiations developed an interest in post conflict situations, the relationship between the state and its citizens, and security matters.

Through this interest, experience with the war history of BiH, and contacts with researchers and members of the IC working in the field of safety and security, specializing in Mostar, I learned more about the current challenges faced by BiH. One of these challenges being that BiH still struggles to find a sustainable way for its citizens to live together and feel protected by the state. One of the ways

the IC tried to improve the safety situation and relationship between citizens and the state, on local level, was by introducing the CP concept; a concept that gave me the possibility to look at many topics that I find interesting. It also offered me a possibility to come into contact with interesting organizations like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: OSCE, EUPM, representatives of the Dutch police and representatives of the Dutch Ministry of Defense.

1.3   Methodology of research

Doing research on a topic related to safety and security in a post war city, with such a specific history as that of Mostar, brings about certain challenges. For one, there is the sensitive topic of the war history, and the disturbed relations between the different ethnic groups that try to live together in Mostar; a topic that has been intensively studied by many scholars. Developing my research proposal, I was aware of this history and it was therefore that I choose not to focus on this relationship as a central topic in my research. I wanted to try to get away from this topic, and look at the realities in the streets of Mostar in 2010.

Then there was the more common challenge of getting access to the important groups of respondents for my research, being; citizens and police officers.
'Citizens', saying it like that, it sounds as if this is an easy accessible group of respondents, since they are all around us. But that, at the same time, makes it hard. Because where to start? Who to talk to?; especially when language becomes an issue, which mainly occurred among older people (hard to pinpoint an age, but let's say 40+, depending on educational level and life experience). The first respondents I met, apart from the owners of the pension I was living at, were students of the University of Mostar, situated in West Mostar. It was the first University I was able to find and was accessible. Through a student I met in the faculty café, I gained access to the student association of political science students. Interviewing students turned out to be a good way of getting a better understanding of the different opinions people have about the cooperation between citizens and the police, and politics in BiH. But it also lead (often during informal talks over coffee) to more insight in the way young people experience life in Mostar in general, and more specific, how they experience their safety and police conduct.

Through the students connected to the student association, I also came into contact with students studying English literature at the University of Mostar. Besides the fact that all students that I met where able to speak English and could therefore represent citizens in Mostar, though with a bias, I assumed that some of the English literature student would be interested in acting as my 'language assistant' (LA). And some of them indeed were my LA's. Because of them I was able to speak to more people. In my experience, working with an LA, meant that interviews were held at a more formal level and it was more difficult to stray off into personal experiences, anecdotes and more extensive talks on certain subjects. This was partly due to the presence of a third person (being the LA), and the fact that this was not a professional LA, but a student volunteering. This meant that time and interest was sometimes limited. Therefore I choose to concentrate the help of the LA on my interviews with the police officers, as many of the police officers couldn't, or didn't feel comfortable, speaking English, and as they formed one of the two main groups of respondents of my research.
Furthermore, I tried to overcome this challenge of limited interest in my topic of research by finding more students willing to help me with translating, and I explained more extensively the reason behind my research and why it is so interesting. This often helped to get the student interested and motivated as well. During some of the interviews I noticed that, while the respondent was telling a lengthy story, the LA only gave me a short version of the story. In many cases this worked, but sometimes I felt I

missed out on funny or interesting parts. Therefore I decided to have 'evaluation' talks / coffee brakes after the interviews, to ask the student, assisting me, more about how they experienced the interview, and what the things were that he / she noticed. This gave me more information that I could then add to my interview reports.

Being fully aware of the two sides present in the city, I felt I should make an effort talking to more people on the East side. Not that I didn't intend to do so, but it was the way my research developed. Therefore I made an effort to get into contact with key respondents who would be able to help me. And it worked, through an acquaintance of someone I met earlier; I came into contact with a respondent who was working at the University Džemal Bijedić, the university in East Mostar. Besides having an interesting interview with this respondent on trust (or the lack of) people have in the emergency services, I also came into contact with an American teacher, teaching English literature at this university. This again gave me the opportunity to talk to this university's students, about their experiences with the police, their views on society and the challenges it's facing and the way they saw their own role, as citizens of this city and country, in this whole process.

The fact that I was able to talk to students of both universities, made it possible for me to create a diverse group of respondents, concerning ethnicities. Especially because, different from the University of Mostar, that this university was considered to be a Croat only university (not completely true though, based on the fact that I saw two or three female students with a headscarf. A totally biased assumption, but still feeling that it is a strong indication), at the University Džemal Bijedić, students of all three ethnic groups could be found. The reason, as explained by the students, is that the tuition fee at the University Džemal Bijedić was considerably less than at the University of Mostar. At the same time the group of respondents is biased because we are dealing with a certain age group, and a certain social group. This certainly will have influenced their response to my questions, and I should therefore be careful not to generalize my conclusions. On the other hand, together with other interviews and observations I believe I have been able to develop a fairly objective view on the situation in Mostar.

The fact that I met many of the students through the debates I organized, helped in hearing the whole constellation of opinions present in these groups of students, but also gave the students a chance to get to know me a bit more. During the many coffee breaks following the discussions, I was able to talk informally to some of the students more extensively, and develop a deeper understanding of the reasoning behind their answers and opinions.
Before leaving for BiH I intended to focus my interviews on 'street cops', the police officers that work in the streets of Mostar, with its citizens, on a daily basis. Reasoning for this was that I felt that the higher ranking officers would be more likely to give me political correct answers and I felt it would not be likely that they could give me first-hand information when it came down to the contact between citizens and police officers. It turned out to be quite difficult to interview the street cops. I was not able to have any interviews with the street cops. Talking to them in the street was not an option. I didn't meet any 'street cops' able to speak English.
And even with the help of an LA, they declined any request for even the smallest chat. This could indicate that they feel uneasy talking about their job to (foreign) researchers. This information needs to be taken into account when assessing the information derived from the interviews with CP officers, who were willing to talk about their work. But then, they were addressed in a different way. Because, when I decided to ask a senior officer, who I was interviewing about the CP project, if I could interview one of his police officers, he arranged an interview with the police officers assigned to CP in Mostar.

This first interview with CP officers was arranged surprisingly fast as many CP officers were at the police station. Before I knew we (three CP officers, my LA and I) were sitting in a cramped room, tying to have a group conversation. After this first interview I was able to arrange more interviews with the CP officers, which I was allowed to arrange directly with them. The fact that this senior officer arranged an interview with his CP officers ran the risk that he 'selected' these employees to have an interview with me because they are loyal to him, the organization and the concept of CP. Because of this, they might have given less honest answers to my questions. This was a realistic risk that was not easy to prevent. Access to the Mostar police was not self-evident, so being able to interview the officers was an important start for my research. It all came down to very practical and bureaucratic obstacles that could only be tackled in a certain way. Take for instance entering a police station. It is not a building and an institution you can't just walk into. Or at least, that was not the approach I took. Entering the police office means that you have to pass a reception and a receptionist. If the person at the reception denies you access, or won't help you by contacting the right person, you can't just barge through. I was lucky, the receptionist at the police office in Mostar directed me to the senior officer concerned with CP quite easily.

My approach and attitude in this matter could be explained by the fact that I work in an uniformed organisation (Fire & Rescue Service), resulting in understanding of and compliance with the norms common to this types of organisations. Respect for rules, top down approach, and hierarchy.
Still, because the first interview took place with all three CP officers present at that moment, making it less likely to think that the senior officer only assigned loyal officers. The interviews that followed took place with only two or three of the CP officers, but they responded to my requests without consulting their senior officer. This gave me the feeling that the officers I interviewed were able to be relatively 'open' with me, and that the answers they gave me, were relatively objective. Of course some desirable answers were given but in general I would characterise the answers as open and thought through. Another way I tried to form a complete picture of the relationship between citizens and the police and the views on the CP concept within the police service was by interviewing EUPM officers, who, through their job, spoke to police officers in Mostar and the Cantons. This way the EUPM officers got an insight into the way local police officers experienced abstract concepts like CP. Together with information from interviews with and NGO involved in introducing CP in Mostar and literature on this topic I feel I was able to form a fairly complex view.

Access to EUPM mission members and other members of the IC working in Mostar, was gained firstly through the researcher at the Dutch Defence Academy, who I had met when preparing my research. She got me into contact with a Dutch police officer that just started working for EUPM that has one of its regional offices in Mostar. This contact turned out to be very valuable for my research, as it gave me insight into the work of the European Police Mission in Mostar and BiH. It also gave me an insight into the BiH police, through the eyes of an expert. Furthermore it also turned out to be an important personal contact, both being new in BiH, we could share our experiences.
The many informal talks I had with this respondent and his colleagues from EUPM and other IC related organizations, led to a lot of useful information. In informal conversations I heard many points of criticism about the involvement of the IC in BiH and the success of different programs.
Looking back at all this, I feel that the informal talks formed a research method in itself as I was not just there to chit chat; during conversations I deliberately asked questions related to my research topic. This could have led to violation of the ethical rules of scientific research. But I made sure all my respondents were aware of the fact that I was doing research and that their answers related to my research topic, were helping me to form a complete picture of the situation.

I discussed this with some of my respondents, who I met most regularly. We agreed that I would not quote them, due to our informal conversations.

Besides informal talks (often over a cup of coffee), group discussions, and interviews, based on a list of prepared questions, I also used laminated pictures that I carried with me. These pictures showed different ways the police interact with citizens. The shown images often led to reactions of the respondent and again gave me more information and new insights.

1.4 Design of the thesis

After introducing the topic of my research and in general terms, my argument, it is important to place this research into the relevant theoretical context. This is both necessary to be able to understand my observations better and to be able to, later, draw conclusions based on these observations.
In the third chapter personal stories and feelings and my observations come together with the observations and experiences of some EUPM officers in a chapter based on my field work. The notions, historic events and social and political structures need to be further explored to be able to better understand the situation as it is now. Whether it is the current makeup of the city of Mostar, the paradigm changes that greatly influenced the work of the police officers as representatives of the state, the social structures in which citizens of Mostar live and their opinion about their safety situation and the role the police has in this as do the EUPM police officer, representing the IC. The background of the stories, observation and experiences can be explored in many ways, both in the sense of scale and time and in the sense of theoretical level. Because the third chapter is both aimed at describing the local situation in Mostar, and giving an insight in the situation as it was at the beginning of 2010, in chapter 4 explanatory factors will follow with the notions core to the situation observed during my fieldwork period in the beginning of the chapter, gradually developing towards the national and international scale, going back in time at the same time.

It might look as an unusual order, but it makes sure that my field work results get the prominent place they deserve, not bombarding the reader with all that happened before the spring of 2010,   while at the same time offering the reader all the information necessary to understand the complex reality of BiH.

This introduction has already made clear that the world of the security sector and the international community is full of abbreviations. Therefore in appendix 8 an overview of the most common abbreviations can be found. Furthermore many respondents are quoted or referred to. To better understand their perspective it is important to get a better idea of who they are. Without breaking their anonymity I have tried to give a short overview of who they are in appendix 3. Before we can read about what the respondents have told me, and what I have observed during my three months in Mostar, it is important to place these observations and response concerning the relationship between citizens and the state in a theoretical context. Therefore the next chapter will deal with the main theories concerning citizenship.

2 THEORY ON CITIZENSHIP

When studying the concept of CP, and its implementation in Mostar, the question arises, what the theories are, that offer us the right tools to be able to draw conclusions based on what I have observed. Definitions, like that of Damir Čutura (Ministry of Interior, West Herzegovina Canton) - *"Community Policing means that there is a partnership between the police and the citizens in such a way that both partners work together in recognizing and solving problems in the community"* (SDC 2010; 14) - focus on the relation between citizens and the police. One of the outcomes of my fieldwork is that there is more to this relationship than becomes apparent from this definition. It is not just a relationship with the police, but a relationship with the whole state (represented by the police among others). This was confirmed by many scholars studying the role of policing in society. Fleming & McLauglin for instance state that *"what the public thinks, feels and says about the police and the stance of citizens towards the police, can, in many respects, stand as a key indicator of confidence in the state's ability to fulfil its side of the social contract"* (2010; 199). A contract that asks of citizens to comply with the law and to pay taxes so that other citizens (through their work for the police) can offer them protection (Hough et al 2010; Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002 in Bradford 2010; 179), but, at the same time, asks of the police officers to treat citizens with *"dignity, respect and consideration"*, something that, according to Waddington (2010; 1971) is a key element of the relation between the police and citizens in a liberal democracy. It ensures that citizens can trust the police, and that police officers should be reminded of who they work for.

When we then look at theories concerning the relationship between citizens and the state, we soon come to understand the central theories in this research are that of citizenship and trust.
The aim here is to learn from the theories behind the central observation of my fieldwork, that citizens lack trust in the state, and therefore in the CP concept (while this concept could be expected to increase trust), and try and find an explanation for these observations.

Studying the theories on citizenship, a renewed attention for citizenship can be detected. With globalization of the world considered to be increasing, and the social and political situation changing, politicians, community leaders and governments are all emphasizing the importance of citizenship (Ådnanes 2004; 795). Not that there is an unambiguous definition, because there are many forms of citizenship that can be distinguished. Fact is that theories on citizenship originate from the Greek and Roman era. But this thesis is, by no means, the place for an elaborate study of the history of the theory of citizenship. Instead, in this introduction I try to give a short overview of the development of the most relevant concepts, to create a better understanding of these concepts.

The Greek model on citizenship, based on the writings of Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC), presumes that in a city state (*polis*) individual citizens come together and form a community (koinônia) that brings together common interests and functions (as cited in Miller 2011; 2). In *Politics* (book II) Aristotle defines this as the city being a partnership between citizens (as cited in Clayton 2005; 14). In that city people, considered citizens (restricted only to a selective group of people), ruled the city state, which reflects in the Greek word *demokratia* (democracy), consisting of *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule). Very specific to this model was the fact that it was situated only in the city and that it presumed a form of selfless service to the public good.

Democracy is said to influence the behaviour of citizens in different ways; 1) through the freedoms that come with democracy: freedom of speech, assembly, press, all giving citizens the information they need to form an opinion on the quality of the states work, 2) because citizens (and who these citizens are depends on the definition of membership used) get a say in who represent them, 3) democracy is norm setting, changing the preferences of people. When it comes to the state actors that interact with citizens, democracy changes their behaviour too. Through democracy citizens are able to sanction the state, and the state is more likely to operate in a more impartial way, with citizens having a say in the policies made (Levi 2001; 14).

The Roman model of citizenship consists of two main characteristics. The republican model of citizenship is one in which the common people where able to appoint people who represented them. This was a new development as the common people were not fully represented before. The aristocracy had all powers before and found itself being confronted with chosen representatives. It didn't mean that the process of power to the people was complete. The senate was the highest institution in the republic and this institute was still ruled by the aristocrats. This situation resulted in a class conflict, in which citizenship was much more instrumental, creating a balance between the two groups. It was also the start of a form of democracy in which people participated in the collective, more for their own self-interest (Leydet 2011). The Roman republic turned into an empire when the Romans conquered other countries, leading to an imperial state form. Due to this expansion, the first thing that changed was the criteria for membership. People from concurred lands became citizens of the empire. Along with this change came the introduction of legal vs. political citizenship. This meant that all citizens of the empire fell under the same laws, while their political citizenship was related to the place where they lived. This separate existence of legal citizenship and political citizenship made private interests and the protection thereof even more prominent. It also resulted in a situation that a citizen of the conquered countries fell under Roman law, but voted for representatives in the government in his own country. This increased legal equality, but distanced the subjects from the lawmakers. It meant that people were ruled, instead of ruling themselves (Allen 2007; 6).

These political and legal views come back in two political traditions that are still very relevant; the republican and liberal tradition. The republican tradition considers liberty to be the result of laws that were created by citizens. Liberalism on the other hand sees laws as necessary but not preferred, and aims to preserve liberty as much as possible.

The increasing distance between the rulers and the once that are ruled, lead to the idea that the law was something situated outside the people, it was either nature or a god that created these laws. This subsequently led to monarchies, in which there was very little consent of the people necessary to create a law. Most of the theories of citizenship that were developed all revolve around the way the social contract between citizens is being shaped. Two 17th century English philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke debated the characteristics of the social contract. Hobbes argues that human beings are pursuing self-interest aggressively and distrust others. The state could offer security against the hard and violent world out there. Locke on the other hand saw the state as the main danger for the liberty of citizens. Locke said; *"to think that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions"*. Citizens can handle other citizens, it is the state (the lion) that it should be wary of. This example illustrates the dilemma of the relationship between the state and citizens (Mikelman 2011; 2).

The two great revolutions related to the relationship between citizens and the state, being the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789, both tried to find ways to solve the dilemma of the social contract. The constitutions that were formulated were contracts between citizens. In the American constitution 'we the people' are the central subject, while the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizens states that every individual has the right to be a member of a 'nation' (Halfmann 1998; 514). Bellamy (2008), argues that in the French Declaration the nation is considered to be the midway between Aristotle's city state and the Roman empire, the *"most viable alternative"* (Bellamy 2008; 43). The city state was too small to defend itself against external aggression, while the empire was too big to allow meaningful political participation. Most nations are of a size that makes both possible. These models have laid the foundation for the theories of citizenship that have political participation at its core. Bellamy stresses that we should not see the later developments of citizenship theories as a linear development. But the fact that many later scholars refer back to these models shows the importance to later theories.

Many current definitions emphasize the (legal) membership side of citizenship (who is a citizen and who is not), originating mostly from political science literature (Jonoski 1998; 10, Hirschman 1970 in Ådnanes 2004; 795). Roelofs, on the other hand states that 'being a good citizen' means; knowing citizenship rights and tending to volunteer activities, and by doing so he defines citizenship in a social way (Roelofs 1957 in Jonoski 1998; 10). Tonkens, takes this active role further (Tonkens 2009; 1). She distinguishes active citizenship as a way of citizens taking their responsibility to contribute to society. It originates from the interaction between citizens and the state. The feminist political theorist C. Mouffe (1992: 3) states that *"the notions of citizenship and community have been stripped of much of their content by liberal individualism, and we need to recover the dimension of active participation that they hold in the classical republican tradition"*. It needs citizens that feel responsibility to contribute to society and can bare that responsibility. Furthermore it needs state institutions that invite, supports and equips citizens, to take up that active role. Active citizenship is defined in literature (Marshall 1965 in Ådnanes 2004; 798), as consisting of agency and participation. It presupposes the idea that being a citizen, *"in the legal and sociological sense, means to enjoy the rights of citizenship necessary for agency and social and political participation. To act as a citizen involves fulfilling the full potential of the status"* (Harcup 2011; 16). Where previous scholars focus mainly on rights and responsibilities, Rustow in Kuzio (2001; 170) emphasizes the importance of consensus on certain values for stable democracies, while Canovan and Miller (in Kuzio 2001; 171) state that a functioning democracy needs 'communal solidarity' based on trust and a shared national identity.

The introduction above has shown the different aspects of citizenship that have been emphasized, in ancient times, by Aristotle and others, and in more recent times, by more recent scholars. One scholar, instead of focusing on one of the aspects of citizenship, gave a good overview of the aspects mentioned by other scholars. It was Dejaeghere, assistant professor at the University of Minnesota. She distinguishes four main aspects; 1) membership, 2) community, 3) rights and responsibilities, and 4) shared values and morals (Dejaeghere 2008; 359).

In the next sections I address each of these four aspects and then briefly clarify how these connect to the focus of this research and the situation in BiH. I also explore theories on trust; because if there is one thing that is important in a social contract, it is trust. Trust that all citizens will do their part as part of that social contract, and that the state will do its part.

2.1 Membership

Membership was an aspect of citizenship that was already identified by Aristotle, when he argued who should be considered a member of the city-states community, and who, therefore, could be involved in democratic decision-making. The definition of membership has undergone several changes through time, and very significant changes were related to the emergence of the nation-state, in the eighteen century (Habermas in Dejaeghere 2008; 359). In that case membership is related to inclusion into the political system, which does not automatically mean inclusion into (all other social systems of) society (Halfmann 1998; 513).

Kratochwil, describes states as follows; *"it is perhaps best to conceive of citizenship as a space within a discourse on politics that institutionalized identities and differences by drawing boundaries, both in terms of membership and in terms of the actual political practices that are connected with this membership" (*Wiener 2007; 16). So by generalizing (my interpretation) people's identity and the differences between people, and linking this to a political entity, people are made members of a state. It can be illustrated by a question about my own identity: in what way do Dutch citizens differ from Belgians? What is the unique identity of a Dutch person. Royal highness Princess Maxima of the Netherlands has addressed this issue in a speech that she gave at the presentation ceremony of a study of the 'Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR)', a council providing strategic policy analysis to the Dutch government. The studies topic was the 'Identification with the Netherlands' and the main claim was that there is no such thing as the 'Dutch Identity' (WRR 2007). The WRR advices the Dutch government not to claim 'the Dutch disposition', but instead to observe the ways citizens feel connected to the Netherlands (nos.nl 2007). Her Royal Highness Princess Maxima of the Netherlands endorsed the conclusion of the WRR study in the speech she gave; an opinion that led to a lot of critique in the media (nrc.nl 2007, network.tv 2007, Volkskrant.nl 2007), among scholars (Ellian, A., Scheffer, P., Kennedy, J.), politicians (Wilders, G. and Verdonk, R.) and within civil society. It is not my intention to go into the main arguments of the advice of the WRR or the speech of Princess Maxima. Something I did take from her speech was the question she raised when it comes to the differences between Dutch citizens and citizens of neighbouring countries. Princess Maxima points out there are many regional differences with the Netherlands and that there are many similarities with people in regions in neighbouring countries (my interpretation). Still I hold a Dutch passport and am therefore a Dutchman, a subject of the Dutch state.

The legal criteria for membership are defined by law and there are two main forms of membership that can be distinguished around the world. There is 'jus sanguinis', meaning that the nationality of people is based on the nationality of the persons parents. The other form is 'jus soli', meaning the right of the soil, which results in citizenship being determined by the place this person is born. Furthermore, the right to citizenship is recognized by Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a basic human right and is also a basis for the exercise of many other rights.

From the explanation above we learn that, citizenship as a legal status can be assigned to a person based on blood-line or place of birth, but we also learn that the legal status is not the only aspect of membership. On the other hand, becoming a member of a social system is far from self-evident.

The constitution of the current state of BiH tries to hold three ethnic / religious groups together despite a recent violent relationship. In line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the constitution of BiH guarantees membership to all citizens of BiH, while the primary responsibility for assigning membership is the responsibility of the two political entities that were created.

The constitution of BiH states that *"no person shall be deprived of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Entity citizenship arbitrarily or so as to leave him/her stateless"*. It goes on to say that no person shall be deprived of citizenship on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. Citizens of the republic of Yugoslavia held dual citizenship; *"that of the federal state, and that of one of the six republics"*. Citizenship of the republic became important only when inter-republic relations were at stake. In daily life all citizens were equal before the law, no matter the republic they were living in.

Despite the legal framework defining membership, the events in BiH have shown that there is a clear distinction between membership of a legal entity, being the state, and membership of a community. Clearly the war has forced people to draw towards their ethnic communities and by doing this linking citizenship to the community.

2.2   Community

One of the scholars linking citizenship and community is the British Sociologist T.H. Marshall (1950: 28-9), he provided a definition of citizenship that is still considered by many as one of the basis for a modern day definition of citizenship. He states that "*citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed"* (in Lister 1997; 29). When subsequently looking up the word 'community' in a dictionary we see explanations like; *"a group of people having cultural, religious, ethnic, or other characteristics in common"*, *"people living in one locality"*, *"a group of nations having certain interests in common"*, *"society"*, *"common ownership or participation"* and *"similarity or agreement (community of interests)"* , in the World English Dictionary.

Marshall was certainly not the first to connect community and citizenship. According to Aristotle every city-state was a sort of community, and was established and aimed at achieving good things for their community. Aristotle calls this a political community (Miller 2011; 3). When subsequently looking at Anderson's definition of the nation, we can see that this (political) community forms an important basis for the nation; *"it is an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion"* (Anderson 1983; 6). Or simply said; *"All that I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one"* (Seton-Watson 1977, in Anderson 1983, 7). Etzioni (2011; 336) argues that communities are defined by social collectivities, in which members are bound together by affection and a core of shared values. This clear link between community and shared values and morals is confirmed by research (R. Puntnam and F. Fukuyama, and before them; R. Bellah and other sociologists) that shows that when a sense of community is not present, this leads to detachment and a feeling of alienation, leading to withdrawal from society, and acting in anti-social way (Etzioni 2011; 339). It supports what neo-communitarian scholars have said to be the strong side of communities, being that informal social control is institutionalized, which stimulates 'moral commitment' to other members of the community (Etzioni 2011 ; 340).

2.3   Shared values and morals

According to Cogan and Morris (2001), understanding, and in many cases, accepting the values of a community, and committing to them, is the only way to obtain membership of a community, which means access to citizenship (in Dejaeghere 2008; 361).

This relates closely to what says about a social group; *"A social group involves first of all an affinity with other persons by which they identify with one another, and by which other people identify them. A person's particular sense of history, understanding of social relations and personal possibilities, her or his mode of reasoning, values, and expressive styles are constituted at least partly by her or his group identity"* (Young 1989; 259). And as we have seen in the previous paragraph, the fact that people within a nation don't know each other all personally, by feeling one with the values and morals of a social group, someone can become part of the community.

The introduction of this chapter also shows that, because of individualism, the assumption that the community is formed by like-minded people, is stretched. The example of BiH shows that when values and norms of the different groups seem to go apart too much (I say 'seem', because in reality they might not differ that much, but in the minds of people, and especially politicians, they do. In my opinion this is a matter of negatively influenced perception), it is hard to form one community. At the same time scholars like Kennedy (2005) argue that multicultural societies show that different values come together in one country, and that, although these values might be contested and are a cause for debate, they may also unite. Studies into the definition of morals and values in different societies have led to eight distinct 'value-clusters'; democratic values, civic life and community values, fair government, national identity, social cohesion/diversity, self-cultivation, economic life and family values (Cogan and Morris 2001; 7). Its importance perceived differently, and in different combinations these value-clusters can be seen as the forms of values important to a community.

Studies into the creation of new communities, like that of the European Union, state that when debating *"the terms of citizenship" and "struggles for access to participation"*, a process is initiated that can lead to the creation of shared values and norms, among all that are involved in this process. This can lead to the feeling of belonging to a specific group, a community (Wiener 2007; 17).

Another way, through which shared values and morals create collectivity, is when they result in the creation of laws. Instead of restricting the individual liberties, laws are the expression of the individual freedoms, according to Rousseau. So, breaking the law means that the offender(s) need(s) to be made aware of the fact that a collective decision was violated. It is the institutions (justice and police) that keep up the principles of justice, *"as well as a set of norms and values"* (Wiener 2007; 11). We need to be aware that, for people to have the feeling that these laws are their laws, they need to have had a say in the creation of these laws. This will be explained further in paragraph 2.5 that is dealing with the topic of trust. In a situation where people had no say in the creation of laws, for instance in a dictatorship, the theory is that it will be harder for people to accept the laws, and its enforcement. This also relates closely to the topic of the next paragraph: rights and responsibilities, in which the role of citizens towards their community and the rights and responsibilities they have are further explored.

2.4   Rights and responsibilities

As argued by the British Sociologist T.H. Marshall in his definition of citizenship, all members of a community are, in principle, equal *"with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed"* (in Jonoski 1998; 3).

Rights and responsibilities concern the citizenship rights that each citizen has according to the constitution, while with responsibilities / obligations scholars mean the obligations citizens have towards the welfare of the community. It results in a situation that a democratic citizen is a person that is simultaneously, or in sequence, a person that rules and is ruled (Janowitz 1980; 3), meaning that citizens join in the governance of society and at the same undergo governance by the state. As we have seen in the introduction of this chapter, this is done through democratic processes, through which citizens can influence the creation, maintenance and enforcement of laws.

Marshall (1964) states that there is a range of citizenship rights which are legal, political, social, and participatory rights (Jonoski 1998; 6). And citizenship rights consist of 4 characteristics; 1) membership: determining who is member of nation-state and who is not. This determines who has rights and who doesn't, 2) active capacities to influence politics and passive rights of existence under legal system, 3) being universal, applying to all citizens and, 4) equality: rights and obligations of citizens are balanced as much as possible (Isin and Turner 2002; 13).

Finally citizenship rights and obligations exist on 3 levels; 1) the societal: development of citizen rights and obligations in countries, 2) the organizational: rights and obligations of groups, to form and act in the public arena and 3) the individual level: how do individuals see the relationship between rights and obligations? That last level relates most to the concept of CP, as this connects to the citizenship right of protection by the state, while at the same time, CP needs citizens to help the police in preventing- and solving crimes (SDC 2010; 18).

In more general terms, Marshall (1964) states that citizenship responsibility consists of the obligation to pay taxes, be educated**,** participation in the military service, and service to the community (in Janowitz 1980; 5). In many countries military services has been abolished and has been replaced by an army staffed by volunteers and professionals. Cooperation with the police is seen as a citizen obligation in most countries. In some countries (like the U.K. and the U.S.A.) the state kept relying on citizens for policing duties, in the form of *"watch and ward";* 'observation' and 'warning the police'. In these countries the state saw this as an obligation that citizens have towards the state and the society at large.

How people respond to these 'citizen obligations' in relation to their rights will be discussed below, based on my fieldwork results, (recent) history of BiH, and earlier experiences with CP. In general, what I observed was that the IC has made sure that the laws of the new state of BiH are in compliance with Universal Human Rights, but what seems to be lacking is that citizens feel confident enough to pick up the responsibilities that are bestowed upon them by the democratic system they find themselves in now; one of factors of influence, being the lack of trust in the state, and the trust in other citizens of BiH to live up to these responsibilities. As we will see later in this thesis, this responsibility is the key factor to the way safety and security can be provided in a democratic system; the state cannot perform its task in this field on its own. Without citizens taking a role in the creation, preservation and sometimes enforcement of the law, anarchy or a police state would be logical alternatives.

Before we go to my fieldwork results we need to explore the role of trust in citizenship as this will a key factor of the relationship between citizens and the state.

2.5 Trust

As mentioned in the introduction, trust is a key factor in a social contract between citizens and between citizens and the state, especially in a country as BiH, where history has proven that trust between citizens and trust between citizens and the state has disappeared. To be able to detect and explain the situations where trust has played a key role, we need to get a better understanding of the concept 'trust' and the way it is said to play a role in the relationship between citizens and the state, and between citizens bilaterally. Renewed attention for the role of trust in this process of establishing democratic rule was the result of the emergence of many new democracies, often in Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslav republics where communist regimes fell. When we talk about trust, there always is a chance of distrust, as before, during and after the war in Yugoslavia. Therefore, in this paragraph, an overview of the main views on trust and distrust, and the role of the state in creating trust.

Trust is defined as *"a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take risk in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definitions of self-interest"* (Levi 2001; 1). Hardin (1993 in Levi 2001) argues that trust can be seen as 'encapsulated interest'; meaning that both actors in a relationship play a role and that trust in the other presumes an interest of the other to act in the interest of the first. Therefore an assessment is being made if an actor is trustworthy, and can be given trust. Only if this trustworthiness is being confirmed, the trust continues. That is why Dasgupta (1988; 50) says; *"interpersonal trust, may be 'a fragile commodity', hard to construct and easy to destroy".* According to Levi (1988, 1997; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992 in Levi 2001) trust plays an important role in compliance of citizens, with government regulations. Interestingly the state and its institutions consists of individuals, and therefore, in this thesis, a distinction will be made between trust in an individual and an institution. *"Only persons can trust or be trusting"*, but trustworthiness can be linked to individuals and institutions. *"Trustworthiness of an institution can be defined as the agents of institutions that are competent, credible and likely to act in the interest of those being asked to trust the institution".* This shows that agents of the institution need to prove trustworthy for citizens to be able to trust the institution, confirmed by Waddington (2010; 197).

As said, there are two sides to a medal, trusting can turn out positive, but negative as well. Then it turns into distrust. In a post war situation, like that of BiH, it is quite understandable that there was a distrust of citizens towards the state and state institutions, like the police, and between citizens of different ethnic groups. By being distrustful citizens try to protect themselves from the harm that could be inflicted on them. As Gambetta (in Levi 2001; 4) describes, *"Collective distrust can lead to an effective and efficient organization of a group, while it can distance citizens from members of the other group at the same time".* And this was exactly the case in BiH during and after the war. The ethnic groups distrusted each other and organized themselves, to become strong groups, and strong opponents.

A common assumption is that development of centralized states led to the decline of social cohesion in communities, reduced cooperation among people, and apparently destroyed trust among people (Taylor 1982 and Gellner 1988). The question is whether this really is the case.

By quoting both scholars that argue for these assumptions and scholars that are much more nuanced about this, Levi, in her article, shows that there was more than just social cohesion in small communities before the central state developed.

Distrust among family members, villages and towns, for instance, was present as well.

Nevertheless, the state can both play a role in the decline of interpersonal trust, at the same time the state often plays an important role in establishing levels of trust among citizens, that make it possible for them to place trust in people they don't know personally; something that is important as we will see in chapter 4 (state and nation building). When the state wants to promote trust among citizens then citizens need to trust the state and its services in their role as 'trust producing' (Waddington 2010; 198). The central state has many tools at its disposal to enhance this trust. Through the states coercive powers the state might be able to prevent violence between groups, it is not the ideal tool to improve trust (Bradford 2010; 184). For it not to come to that, the state can make sure that essential information is available, that the relationship between citizens is monitored, and that problems are dealt with by enforcing rules. By doing this the state facilitates trust and enables social, political and economic activities. An examples is when minority rights are being guaranteed by the state, it enables citizens to work together, despite the initial distrust that might have been present. Something that is especially important in the post war situation of BiH.

Levi argues that a trustworthy state is able to influence interpersonal trust within the community. The theory states that when all goes well the social and economic situation should improve, which subsequently should positively affect the state's capacity to govern, and should result in citizens becoming more receptive for the states directives, laws and demands. And, as becomes clear all through Levi's argument: when the state fails to improve trust, or as a result of this, improve the social and economic situation, this might adversely affect events. To prevent this from happening, a trustworthy state is needed, and that is not something that comes naturally in a war torn country like BiH. For the state to be trustworthy, it should have policies and procedures that are made and implemented in a fair way and that feel legitimate. Furthermore the state's commitment should be real and genuine.

For the state to show its fairness four criteria are distinguished by Levi:

1   enforcing laws so that everyone complies with the agreed rules and values, making sure these policies apply to all. *"When citizens doubt the commitment of the state to enforce the laws and if its information and guarantees are not credible, then the state's capacity to generate interpersonal trust will diminish"* (Levi 2001; 7). Reaffirmed by Bradford (2010; 197) in his article focusing on trust in the police as representative of the state, in which he (based on Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002) underlines the importance of *"fair procedures and just treatment"* by providing *"uniform service"* to all citizens, instead of tailored service for specific groups of citizens,

2   make majorities as well as minorities feel respected by making sure *"those who lose can sometimes win"*. It relates to the fact that in democracies there are majorities and minorities (as we were able to see in citizenship). If the majority would be the only one benefitting this would likely lead to distrust within the minority. In most democracies, majorities don't stay majorities all the time, meaning that if these two groups don't make concessions to each other, once in a while, it might be counterproductive for them later on. In this way people are said to be more likely to accept unfavourable outcomes,

3   involving people in the policy making process. This could be done by involving community representatives, interest groups, but also just by a fair democratic process in an elective body. Idea behind this is that people are more willing to follow policies that were formulated through a process that is considered legitimate,

4   establish impartial institutions that rule over disputes in a fair manner; accept making sure that all citizens are treated equal, makes it more likely that citizens will except the decisions taken.

But none of this will work when citizens don't see the state as trustworthy. Therefore the state needs to make sure it has its own house in order. And as we were able to read before, the trustworthiness of an institution is defined by the agents of institutions that are reliable (not braking their promises) competent and working for the good of the people they are serving. This is supported by findings of Sandholtz & Taagepera who studied communist countries. According to them the politicians, who are being seen as serving their own interest instead of the public interest, are responsible for a decrease in trust in the state. One of the ways to regain trust in the state, according to Levi, is to sanction civil servants who choose for short time (personal) gains, as happens when a police officer is corrupted. By sanctioning them, they are expected, to work in the interest in of the state again. As mentioned above, in a democratic state the interest of the state should closely relate to the interests of its citizens. Sherman and Levi (1997) show that rewarding (amongst others, financial compensation) competent and honest civil servants can also contribute to the prevention of corruption. By doing so, citizens would place more trust in these civil servants, as they learn what they can expect of these competent and honest civil servants (Levi 2001; 8). Another way would of course be to hire the right personnel, proven its competence. This would also show the impartiality and trustworthiness of the state, according to Weber (1968 in Levi 2011; 11).

The importance of this is underlined by Coleman who explains the mechanism of transferring trust. When someone is trusted by others whom you trust, you are more likely to trust this person as well. According to Coleman this principal also applies to trusting the state. When people have had positive experiences with representatives of the state, these citizens are more likely to see the state as a trustworthy institute (Levi 2001; 6). Same goes for trust that is developed, or not harmed, in one domain of the state. This trust can be adopted by other domains in the state. Meaning that, in light of this thesis, if people have developed trust in the new police, it is likely that they will also put more trust in other domains of the state (Fleming & McLaughlin 2010; 199). Unfortunately this effect is two sided. Lack of trust, in for instance the politicians, may have a negative influence on level of trust in the state, and therefore the police. Jennings (1995 in Levi 2001; 7) points out that we need to distinguish the different state levels and institutes, as trusting the one doesn't automatically mean that the other is trusted.

Putnam states that people *"who have learned to trust individuals"*, for instance through non-formal education, are more likely to trust other people they don't know, until they are proven wrong of course. I would argue that the situation in BiH is opposite, due to experience during the war, many people no longer trusted their fellow countrymen. It isn't likely they will trust them again, until proven otherwise (Levi 2001, 6). When citizens feel they no longer benefit from the presence of a state, they are likely to distrust the state. Levi even mentions a 'costs and benefits analyses' that citizens make (Levi 2011; 9). If a state is fair and capable of being reciprocal that will be able to gain citizens trust. "W*hen they experience a return for their compliance with the states rules and when they feel treated with respect"*, quote from Levi 2001; 12. Civil servants treating citizens disrespectful therefore would be very counterproductive.

To see how citizenship theories link to real life it is time to discover the streets of Mostar. To meet the citizens of the city that is displayed in most studies as a divided city. In the next chapter we will meet some of the citizens of the city, meet police officers that work in Mostar and members of the IC whose task it is to help improve the quality of the work of the security sector. Through interviews and observations I have tried to gain an insight into the relationship between citizens and the police as representative of the state.

3   EXPERIENCING THE STREETS OF MOSTAR; case study

As we have seen in the previous chapter both rights and responsibilities form an important part of citizenship, as does trust. One of my main observations was that both citizens and representatives of the state were struggling fill in their own rights and responsibilities, and the role they both play in the division and balance between the two. Despite the fact that the war seems to be history to many of the citizens of Mostar, the conflict undoubtedly had a great influence on the current socio-political structure in the country. The balance between the rights and responsibilities of the citizens and the state established during Tito's rule, evolved gradually, but changed more radical after his death (more on this in paragraph 4.1, describing the history of Yugoslavia, leading up the war). The war that erupted shook up society so badly that the social and political balance got disrupted, and people's trust in each other and the state changed radically. Neighbours who trusted each other before the war became enemies, police officers who people might have turned to for help in Yugoslavia took up their weapons against these same citizens and politicians, representing the 'opposition', other people of Yugoslavia, who were working together towards an ideal Yugoslavia became each other's adversaries.

Now, fifteen years after the war, people in Mostar and the police, as being one of the representatives of the state, need to find a way to live and work together. Therefore they need to develop trust in each other, take up their own responsibilities and be assured of their rights. My fieldwork has shown that key to the reestablishment of this structure of rights and responsibilities is trust. Trust between citizens of different ethnic groups, and trust between citizens and the state. Ever since the war the IC has tried to support BiH to recover. One way of doing this was by taking on the lead in the peace process, and by suggesting solutions in the form of state structures and later on, suggesting and pushing for the implementation of new work ethics in the field.

From the moment the DPA was signed, the IC took an active role in following the agenda agreed upon in the DPA. But it was an agenda full of ideals and assumptions, set by negotiators; politicians, civil servants and military officers could not determine how citizens and civil servants in the field would fill in their rights and responsibilities and how this process would influence the trust they have in each other and the agenda that had been set. The new division between rights and responsibilities in the new country of BiH**,** set down in the DPA**,** had to find its own way on the streets of Mostar.

To demonstrate this, in this chapter, I first describe a walk through the city of Mostar, guided by an anthropology student, trying to give the reader a broader understanding of this city with its multiple facades, followed by an insight into the experiences of some of the police officers in Mostar, mainly the police officers involved in CP. The main focus is their interaction with citizens and the way they see their role as police officers, preserving the laws. Second a description of the way citizens of Mostar experience their safety situation and how they see their own role and that of the police.

Finishing this chapter with an unique insight into the way EUPM mission members experience their role in the process of re-establishing trust between citizens and the state and finding a balance between rights and responsibilities for both parties.

3.1 Discovering the streets of Mostar

The dramatic war history of Mostar, the symbolic destruction of the ancient bridge Stari Most, and the intense involvement of the IC to restore peace and cooperation across the division lines lead to a situation in which Mostar became both a symbol of, and a magnet for, reunification efforts (including many projects) and much research into this topic.

What I have found, reading literature on Mostar, and conducting interviews on this topic, is that people and researches have created a standard story consisting of metaphors. Metaphors like: 'crossing the border between the ethnicities', 'bridging the gap', and 'a need for new politics' (respondent 39). Metaphors used by many, but practiced by few. In literature and project reports 'bridging the divide' has become a symbolic reference to the ethnic groups opposing each other and the destroyed Stari Most that symbolizes that distance between the two comes back over and over again.

The divided city is the main focus point in other researches but not the focus of my research, therefore I tried to make this clear to my respondents. I did not want to approach this city as being a divided city, but I wanted to get to know the city like it is experienced by its inhabitants. And it is exactly that perspective that is important to be able to place my research findings. Me not becoming part of the many metaphors used for the situation in this city, but based on the realities of citizens, and based on how police officers and EUPM members experience them in their day to day life.

Preparing for this research one of the first things that I did was to get hold of a good map of the city, which was necessary to orient myself and to get a better understanding of the makeup of the city (appendix 2). As Mostar was a tourist destination in Yugoslav times, and has become a tourist destination again after the war, most of the maps available are maps designed for tourists, with the touristic highlights of the city in the centre of the map. In the 'field' I found out that the design of the city is quite different from the one displayed on most maps; being that the historic Ottoman centre, that is displayed as the city centre, is not the city centre as it is experienced by its citizens. Furthermore the recent history of the city makes us look at the East and West side of the city and the dividing line that we expect to be in the middle of the two. For those who have not studied the situation, the River Neretva, running through the city from North to South, is the first obvious point of orientation. But studying the course of the war we learn that the dividing line was not the River Neretva but the boulevard, running more to the West, and also from North to South, parallel to the river. The historic centre of Mostar, with the rebuild Stari Most as the centre piece, is not the only centre of the city. The part of the city situated parallel to the boulevard, in the direction to the Neretva and close to the Gymnasium, was assigned by the IC as the central zone designated to the cities official institutions.

Talking with, and observing the people living in Mostar, it becomes clear that they view their city from a totally different perspective. Looking at the way they move through the city, the places they visit and parts of the city they relate to in our conversations, I concluded that they look at 'their' Mostar from a personal perspective. For instance, for some the centre of the city is not so much the historic city or the central zone with all the local authorities' buildings, but they define the city centre by places that are important in their daily life. The young students I met told me they regularly spend their time at the university and at the many coffee bars that can be found all across both parts of the city.

Life in West Mostar centres around the Rondo, the roundabout not far from the city park and along the Kralia Tomislava, where the West Mostar university is situated close to. In East Mostar the university lies on the edge of the city located in a former military base, north of the cities' train station, between the main road to Sarajevo and the River Neretva, and is surrounded by a high wall. The landscaped park with the many different buildings at the outer site (faculty buildings, cafés, a mosque, sport facilities, but also housing for displaced persons and further away from the rest of the site, the base of a special police unit) is a district on its own. The city centre is much more than the historic centre that mostly aims for the many tourists visiting Mostar. Most Mostarians living in the East of Mostar spend much of their time in the streets between Musala square and the historic centre.

These descriptions show that, for the people living in Mostar, the city of Mostar looks quite different from the city displayed in the map. It is important to be aware of this, as it is too easy to see the city as a two sided city, centred around Stari Most, and divided in an Eastern / Bosniac and a Western / Croat side, just because its war history and post war development. Despite the fact that, in general, it could be argued that the majority of Bosniacs live on the East side of Mostar, and Croats in the West, based on observation and general demographic information people in Mostar don't seem to experience the city to be a divided one, as they have everything they need on their side of the city. At the same time, if they need something from the other side of town, most people feel free enough to travel to the other side. I experienced this when I joined some young journalists from West Mostar to visit a concert in a discotheque in East Mostar. I also met a respondent, a Bosniac, living in West Mostar. Responding to my surprised question why it was that he lived on this side of the city he simply stated that he was able to find a good apartment for a reasonable price on the West side. And that might well be the right and only explanation for his choice. But in my opinion, the fact that it was this respondent that took this step (which might seem quite unlikely in the apparently divided city), can also be explained by the fact that the respondent is a young idealist, active in a liberal political party and a firm believer that the citizens in Mostar can work together much more closely. Due to the fact that he and his family fled to the Netherlands during the war, he views his fellow Mostarians in a different way, making it easier for him to take this step.

During one of my observations sessions I sat at a coffee bar on the corner of Adema Buca and Titov Most, that looks out on a road connecting East and West Mostar, from the train station in East Mostar to Spanish square on the edge of West Mostar (appendix 2). It is a busy road, with shops, a bank, hotel, and coffee bars on both sides. The road lies in an area that has been pinpointed by the IC as the central zone when they started to get involved in the reconstruction of Mostar. They choose to have a central zone to host the cities' institutions, meant for both sides of the city, and to form a literal connection between the two sides of the city. It is in this zone that many communal institutes have their offices the city authorities, the water company, the central post office but it is also the place where the prison is located.

Looking out over the crossroad I observed a situation that I described in my research diary as: 'land without rules'. During the two hours I sat there nobody seemed to be obeying the basic traffic rules; cars in line for a red traffic light, blocking the cross road; cars from the other street driving up the crossroad anyway, and by doing so blocking the whole crossroad. Extensive use of the claxon was the result. On other moments cars were parked on the sidewalk, blocking it for pedestrians.

Sitting there in the sun, doing what is so typical in Mostar, drinking coffee, the whole situation gave me

a relaxed feeling; a relaxed atmosphere that can be experienced all over BiH. At the same time it is a typical example of how daily things like traffic don't seem to work, at least not through the eyes of a Dutch research student. It relates to what one of the respondents (29), working for EUPM, made clear to me; *"the Dutch word for traffic is 'verkeer', derived from the word 'verkeren', (which can be translated as 'working or living together') it is this basic agreement to live and work together on the street, in traffic, which is not taking place, in BiH, the way it should"*. Respondent 29 finds this characteristic for life in BiH. People, despite their differences could be expected to live together, and work together, to make everyone's life more easy and enjoyable. But people here seem to live their own life and don't seem to care so much about the life of people who are not close to them. Not realizing that their behaviour influences (positively and negatively) the lives of others. If they would realize this, respondent 29 was suggesting, this could be the first step in changing the chaotic situation at the crossroad that resembles the social and political situation in BiH.

3.2   Policing the streets of Mostar

Sitting at the terrace of this coffee bar I was also able to observe the response of the Mostar police to this somewhat chaotic scene. Driving up to the crossroad, the first thing that I noticed was that the police officers were not wearing their seatbelts. Reflecting on this while writing my thesis this could also be explained by the fact that police officers need to be able to get out of their cars quickly in case of an emergency and therefore not always wear their seatbelt. In that case it says something about my presumptions. Furthermore they stopped in the middle of the crossroad, not giving way when they should, and not letting pedestrians safely cross the zebra. Clearly, obeying traffic laws - laws that should be common to all (and kept by the majority) - was not part of their daily routine. This made them blend in and not setting the good example. We could wonder if they even knew this traffic law themselves, but as far as I know, they did. Everybody is confronted with these laws daily, and therefore are taught in primary school, and later for the driving license test. So they should be common knowledge. At the same time enforcing the law didn't happen either. Despite the fact that there was a car parked on the sidewalk the police officers did not take any action.

This was not the only moment when I observed police officers witnessing laws being infringed under their eyes, without taking action. I also witnessed this when I sat down, again at a coffee bar, just outside the police station of the Mostar police. Situated in the middle of a square of housing blocks in West Mostar, a little bit hidden for visitors who stroll along Mostar's main roads, it's a coming and going of citizens and police officers. And during the course of my research, this would also become a place that I visited more than once, and a place that I walked by and observed even more.
The place where I was sitting was situated in the outside corner of an L shaped road, with the police station also situated in the corner of that L.
A road mainly meant for people living in the apartment blocks situated around that road, and leading to a parking place for residents and visitors of the police station. But the road was much busier than that. It was clearly used by people trying to escape the busy main roads. One police officer was assigned the duty to 'guard' the entrance to the site of the police station, patrolling 'his strip' back and forth. Probably there is a parking prohibition in the street, looking at how narrow it is, and the fact that there are several parking lots. (Noting this I realized that in the Netherlands it would be quite obvious that this street would have a sign saying that it is prohibited to park cars along the road, but, here I am in BiH, and apparently I had been in BiH long enough to doubt these assumptions that were so clear to me.)

The police officer points out the parking prohibition to some motorists parking their car along the road,

by blowing his whistle, or by addressing them. None of the motorists seemed impressed, leaving at their own pace, but also without any bad word being said. In the meantime while so many traffic laws are violated, with a police officer looking at it, that his positive actions fall in vain when I, being the critic that I am, see all the violations taking place. Giving right of way to people coming from the right … nobody seems to have heard that this actually is a part of the traffic laws. People seem to do whatever they chose.

Later I spoke about the situations where police officers did not seem to uphold the law that actively, with the CP officers that I interviewed. I asked them why they thought these police officers did not act upon the situation they saw, and why they did not uphold the law.
Respondents 41, 42, 43 and 44 told me; *"talking is an important part of a police officer's job, much more than it was for the police before the war"*. When asked, the CP officers told that; *"the police before the war was more violent, more repressive and focused on control"*. Now it is *"more talk talk talk"*. They talk extensively about the role of the police in post war BiH, that has gone through transition along with the political structure, from a hierarchy to a democracy. *"We don't want to be repressive"*, they say. They want to take the good parts of the old system and get rid of the bad parts. *"We are there to deal with the problems of the citizens and make people understand the need to obey the laws that are there for the good of all"*. This means they want to serve the people instead of using force to make people obey the laws, preventing offences from taking place and educating people, instead of writing tickets. And, according to them, they need to talk with the citizens of Mostar.

The high ranking officer responsible for education (respondent 44) that I interviewed later on this topic told me; *"the police had to change from an old system based on militias where the orders came from one place, into a new police that defends the democratic state".* When asked about the safety situation before and after the war respondent 44 answers; (with a small hidden smile) *"It might have been safer before the war, but society has changed. We might even have taken over some bad habits from the West (meaning Europe / U.S.A). But the change meant that we took the obligation to work with the democratic system".* For me this shows an experienced police officer, working for the police long before the war that has accepted the changes that the police had to undergo. He realized that his own opinion is subsidiary to his responsibilities as member in the management of the Mostar police service.

The CP officers define the main task of a police officer as; 'offer safety to the citizens of Mostar by protecting them and offer them help and assistance'. And they explain that they don't make a difference between citizens, when it comes to their ethnicity, although, at the same time they do 'admit' to have assigned the CP officers to the sectors they work with (appendix 9) according to their ethnic background; meaning that the two Bosniac CP officers are assigned to the two sectors in the East, while the Croat CP officers are assigned to the sectors in the West. But this doesn't mean they make a difference in their daily work, as they also don't make a difference between the neighbourhoods in the city. Crime is crime. The city is too small to pinpoint certain crimes. *"Crimes don't stay in one part of the city"*. Crime is crime is a statement that I also heard from a police officer (respondent 40) who had clearly nothing to do with the concept of CP.
He was one of the commanding officers of the Special Police Unit, with barracks on the outskirts of the campus of the University Džemal Bijedić, and assigned with police tasks concerning football violence, hostages, and other large forms of crime. When asked about the influence of the apparent division in Mostar, he simply answered *"our job is to catch the big criminals, in East and in West Mostar"*, subsequently giving examples of actions executed by his unit.
Respondent 44, the education officer, spend more words on the topic; *"The situation is normal now*

between East and West Mostar. Projects like CP have made this possible. Police officers from the East side, who worked in the West were not listened to, but that is not the case anymore, all because of these projects. Now driving through a red light is a crime no matter what ethnicity you have".

The CP officers, at the same time, keep emphasizing that they want to keep away from repression. Sounds to me like the textbook of CP in BiH, which at least means the training they received, has stayed with them.

But what about the many 'small' offences that I see happening in the streets, like the car parked on the side walk, or the motorist without a helmet stopping at the sidewalk both under the 'watchful eye' of a Mostar police officer? The officers passionately responded to this by explaining to me that policing is about giving and taking. *"It is our job to assess the situation and determine whether or not the offence is hurting anyone, when this is not the case, we should be flexible".* And by flexible they mean that the police officer should not just start writing a ticket, they should (for instance) address the driver, not more than that. My question was if they felt that citizens understand this flexible / selective way of enforcing, and according to the officers they do. According to these officers, the next time, when the situation is more serious people would understand better, and would be less likely to commit the offence. When later asking the officer responsible for education about this approach he agrees with this approach. He explains: *"a (police) officer is not just there to write tickets, he works preventive, by educating and explaining the people the reasoning behind the law. Then they (citizens) will understand why you don't park a car on the sidewalk. So without repression we try to deal with the challenges".* He thinks educating citizens an important aspect of the work of the police.

This situation made me wonder, do people really understand this selective form of preserving the law and would this increase, or decrease the trust in the police? As the responses of many of the citizens I spoke to indicated this selectiveness does not necessarily help to make citizens trust the police to do their job (also see Bradford 2010; 197). To study this more in depth I described to them the conversation I had with a respondent who told me about the lack of trust she had in the responsiveness of the emergency services. This respondent (46), a German national who is working in Mostar, explained that at a certain moment her car was stolen and she tried to reach the police using their general phone number (112 for the police), but they couldn't be reached. This is why, nowadays she has no general phone numbers of the police in her phone anymore. She only has personal cell phone numbers of high ranking police officers, phone numbers that were given to her by locals in case she needs to reach the Mostar police. When it comes to medical services she has learned not to trust on the ambulance service. Local family members told her that, in case of an emergency, she should bring the patient to the hospital herself. And that is what she did when a family member had heart failure. She drove him to hospital in her own car.

The police officers agree that it is important for the police to respond to all calls. That will improve trust among the people. Respondent 44, the education officer, said that *"the image of the police is getting better. We (he did not specify whether he meant the police or the people) are changing the way of thinking. Everybody (all working for the police) should be dealing with the problems of the citizens. There is no police when the problems of citizens are not dealt with anymore".* He continues by saying that *"Police officers know what is stated in the law, so now they have to start working together to tackle the problems of the community".* It is this last statement that connects closely to something said by the member of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Mostar, Mr. Valentin Inzko, when he was announcing the closure of the OHR office in Mostar in June 2010. He explained this decision was *"driven by what has been achieved in Mostar"*.

After 16 years of the IC's involvement in Mostar; a *"new Mayor (is) in place, and … the administrative unification of Mostar (is) largely complete"*. Being aware of the fact that there are still enough challenges he says; *"Mostar's politicians have all the tools they need to make the city work. What has been missing is the political will"* (OHR 2010). Both statements really support the conclusions of my research, namely that it is not the lack of good laws (offering people security of rights), but the way they are used and enforced (by police officers) that determine how citizens will experience the security of their rights. As we have seen in this paragraph police officers are selective when it comes to preserving laws. In the next paragraph we will see how citizens experience this police approach and whether or not this gives them the idea that their rights are being protected.

What the CP officers also indicate is that the media mostly focuses on the bad news, but what actually should happen is that the successes of CP should be advertised, for instance via the spokesperson of the police. When more people know about CP and its successes, than people will be more likely to participate. Of course the CP officers confirm that there are officers that are less active in doing their job, but all officers are bound to an ethical code for civil servants (RAI Steering Group 2010; 4). If they don't follow this code they will have to face the consequences. But the CP officers are quick to come up with an example from the Netherlands, showing that, also in the Netherlands there are police officers not taking their role so serious. Interestingly enough the education officer did the same thing. When I asked him about the inactive role of some police officers, he gives an example from the Netherlands in which the police did not take action (he says he has relatives living in the Netherlands). But he agrees that inactivity can lead to a bad image. There is an ethical code, which he finds in his pile of papers, by which police officers are evaluated. A poor assessment can lead to their dismissal.

During my interviews with the CP officers I was interested to find out whether they considered CP to be a new concept. So I asked them; *"When did you first hear about CP?",* respondent 42 answers; *"When it was (put) in my job description by my superiors",* continuing by explaining she was a police officer assigned to patrol duties (I get the impression that she did not volunteer for this job, but was asked by her superiors). Respondent 44 later explained that, as the Mostar police joined in the CP project, officers were recruited as special CP officers, and they received a specific job description to go with it. Respondent 42 continues to say; *"it (CP) was not new to me or any of the other colleagues. Contact with citizens is every policeman's job. But then it got called CP, and it became more than just listening to citizens"*.

Because of the apparent change in approach, compared to the approach of the pre-war police, the officers told me that in general it is easier for the young officers to become CP officers.

This is because the young officers are still in, or have just finished their training, while the older officers have been working in the police service for many years and find it harder to change their way of working. But all CP officers confirm that CP is an approach that they see as the core to police work since the police are there to protect and serve citizens. This is supported by the fact that all police officers in Mostar have received a basic training in the 'CP approach'. The education officer says the same as the CP officers and he adds that with this training, acceptance came, also for those police officers who worked in the old system from before the war.

These answers show that the approach was introduced as core to the police work. But the fact that all police officers, especially the ones that worked for the police before the war, needed training, in my opinion showed that it was not something that came naturally. And that conclusion is being collaborated by the CP officers that say that the police had to change its approach, from a repressive approach to an approach in which talking to citizens, and convincing them of the need to obey the law, became the norm. I would argue that this change of approach, and the firm rejection of repression as the police approach makes many police officers feel insecure. They don't feel secure about the way they should enforce the law anymore. Should they give an offender a fine, punish the offender by sending him to jail or should they talk and convince the offender to obey the law the next time? The result of this uncertainty is that the police officers become very selective in preserving the law. More often than necessary, and more often than citizens can understand (as will become clear in the next paragraph), the police choose not charge the offenders for the small offences, that take place on the streets of Mostar every day.

During an interview I asked the education officer how the CP concept was introduced in Mostar. He explained that it was introduced by UNIPTF and EUPM and that it was part of 5 projects. One of them was aimed directly at the safety of the citizens. As part of this project the CP concept was introduced. *"Did the EU play a big role in this?"* I asked him. Respondent 44 answered; *"actually the CP project was a Swiss supported project which was introduced by EUPM. Besides the Swiss NGO, a UK NGO was involved. The idea was to make a (BiH) strategy with a team of experts coming from all over the country and from all kinds of police departments. They had intensive meeting and developed a strategy together. Members of the expert committee visited European countries to get ideas"*.

When the strategy was taken to the field a local approach was developed for Mostar, resulting in a focus on education and meeting people in their neighbourhoods. Respondent 47 explained that the focus on education meant visiting primary schools and teach them about safety and about the work of the police. According to her this focus on kids by CP officers is good. It gets them to trust the police and that is good for the future of the safety situation in Mostar.
The CP officers were all assigned a certain sector (see appendix 9) in which they maintain these contacts. Furthermore, all police officers in the Mostar police service received a basic training to better understand the meaning of CP, and this led to a better acceptance of CP among the officers. (more information on the organization of the Mostar police in paragraph 4.1.2)
       When interviewing the education officer (respondent 44) I told him that I had always understood the CP concept to be all about consulting citizens. I derived this idea from an article (CSS 2007) on the CP initiative in Brčko District, Bijeljina and Mostar, being initiated by the Centre for Security Studies (CSS), in cooperation with a UK based NGO.
This article states that in Mostar the project was focused on two local communities of Mostar, MZ Podhum and MZ Brankovasc (see appendix 2). There, the local administration, the local police and citizens were brought together to form Security Forums (more on this initiative in paragraph 4.1.1).

Respondent 44 (the education officer) confirmed this and explained that initially (when CSS helped introducing CP in Mostar) there were two forums in Mostar. Because the CP officers told me that they don't use these forums, it led me to believe the forums are not in (active) use anymore. When asking the education officer if people were really attending these forums, I didn't get a straight answer. The education officer continued explaining; *"The forum is an independent body and is in contact with the police when necessary"*. He continues about new initiatives to bring the police closer to the citizens, for instance through a bike and motorbike patrol that will start in Mostar from the 1st of May. I tried to ask the question again; *"are people actually coming to the forums, as they are such a key part in the CP concept?"* He then gave me examples of occurrences where people complained about certain situations and where problems were solved through discussion in the forum. For instance, about unsafe roads and as a result of the discussion lights being installed. Again no straight answer, but his hesitation to answer, his body language and the fact that the CP officers say that they don't use these forums, led me to believe these are not in (active) use anymore.

This is something that I found really interesting because through a local employee, now working for EUPM and before that, working for the previous police missions, I came to understand that a form of meetings, similar to the citizens' forum, introduced by CSS, was in place when Tito's communist party still ruled over Yugoslavia. When asked if there was a community / neighbourhood structure in which people could share their needs and problems with the municipality, as representative of the state, respondent 47 (local employee of EUPM and of previous police missions) answered that there was. She stated that "*this was organized by the municipality. Every building had its own representative that represented the tenants in a committee consisting of all the representatives. They came together once in a while*". The meetings, among other things, where meant to discuss city wide projects. The municipality leader needed approval of the representatives for big projects. Problem was that most of the decision had already been made, making the meetings a farce and causing scepticism.

During our second interview, the CP officers mentioned, when asked about the way they come into contact with citizens, that they contact building block chairmen, schools and local community representatives. I wasn't aware of this last form of representation (local community representatives) , so I asked them to explain. The CP officers told me that these people are paid by the local community to represent a certain neighbourhood and to work in that neighbourhood to improve the situation there, based on the indication given by the residence. I found the fact that these community representatives are being paid interesting, because I was expecting volunteers representing the inhabitants of a certain neighbourhood and instead they seem to function more as a link between the inhabitants of these neighbourhood and the city authorities. Volunteers of the neighbourhood don't seem to exist, according to respondents 41 and 42, and this fits the observation of respondent 36, a politically active young man who stated that *"people lack a feeling of personal responsibility for the governing of their country"*, according to him, the fact that people are not taking action means that; *"the situation is not bad enough yet"*.

The CP officers continue, telling me that it is actually these community representatives, 'by nature' respected citizens in the neighbourhood and school teachers, to be the most useful sources of information, while the volunteer building block committee members are said to be not a big source of information to the police. Respondent 42 explains this; *"building block committees are more concerned with the maintenance of their building, and are less concerned with safety issues"*. Therefore respondent 42 hardly visits building block meetings, but she does act as an advisor to these committees and can answer their questions.

The officer responsible for education (respondent 44) adds; *"within the CP strategy there were several goals; traffic police would work on road safety and at least one school a year would therefore be visited. Then there was also this game they played with the kids.. couldn't really figure out what the game was about. Furthermore the police visited high schools as part of the CP project. They tried to stop the calls of bomb threats that came from high school students that wanted to avoid exams"*.

When I ask respondent 44 to explain what other ways there are for a CP officer to get into contact with citizens in their sector, he explains that an idea box was introduced. The idea was that the chairman of the forum would be responsible for opening the box and directing the suggestions to the right organization or government body. Besides that, a survey has been conducted in the last couple of years, and this year the third survey will take place. Goal is to find out how citizens experience their safety situation. The survey will be conducted by an independent research institution and will be paid by the Swiss, and the outcome can be used by the police, to set their (new) priorities.

3.3   Meeting Mostar's citizens

One of the things I wanted to find out during my research in Mostar was how the people in Mostar saw the police, and how they thought about topics like safety and the role of citizens in their own safety. Observations, like the traffic situation at the crossroad in the 'central zone' and the one close to the police station, gave me the impression that citizens are somewhat reluctant to take up their own responsibility when it comes to safety and security. I gained access to (a part of) the people of Mostar through journalists from a local newspaper and through students of the two universities of the city. The Mostar University (the university at the West / Croat side of Mostar) proudly stated to be the only university in BiH to teach in the Croat language. Which, in itself, is an interesting fact as this language emerged when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved and evolved out of the common language for the largest part of Yugoslavia; Serbo-Croatian. The uniqueness of the language, compared to the other languages in BiH, is highly debated among scholars, but the fact is that it is used by Croats in BiH to distinguish themselves. I conducted a group discussion with political science students that are members of a student society. They regularly organize debates on political issues and make field trips to places like the Croat and the BiH house of parliament. When I asked if they would be interested in a debate on the safety situation in Mostar / BiH and the role of police and citizens, the board of the student society responded positively. They indicated that they were giving me the opportunity to organize a debate on the topics I suggested, and through that, gaining access to a group of students.

On the 8th of April members of the student association came together and we debated eight statements. From literature and interviews with members of EUPM, and with respondent 36 (a political active NGO worker, who grew up in the Netherlands during the war), I came to understand that the Cantonal police service, is very ineffective. Any solution for improvement of this situation is closely related to the political organization of the country. At this moment the police in the FBiH is organized along the lines of the political structure, meaning that there is a federation police and a police service in all cantons.

Many foreign politicians and diplomats have suggested a reorganization of the police service, to increase its effectiveness (Muehlmann 2007; 43). This effectiveness should be increased by assigning responsibility of police matters to state level and by changing the police areas. These areas are designed for effective policing, and not on political grounds. Lastly the reorganization should reduce the political influence on the work of the police. (More on this in chapter 4, paragraph 4.2)

Based on this knowledge, the first 3 statements that I formulated, were; (1) local safety would be better served with a police service that would be locally directed instead of a cantonal police service, that is being directed by the cantonal government (as it is now), (2) fighting organized crime in BiH should be a priority of the police. For the police to be effective it should be reorganized and be organized in such a way that it overlaps canton borders, (3) if the organization of the police (effectiveness, response time, costs etc.) would benefit from organization based on operational areas, then this would be favourable over the current organization per canton. (Note: operational areas are part of a police reform proposal, done by the IC in 2004-2005. More on this proposal in chapter 4.2, page 49) Biggest argument against this idea is that entities will lose control over 'their' police.

During the weeks that I got to know the students, through conversations, but also through checking out their Facebook pages, I developed an image of them, an image that indicated me that the political sympathy of most of them was for the Bosnian Croat nationalist parties like HDZ and HDZ 1990. I derived this image because some of the key figures (male) in the student union were expressing their preference for a 3 republic solution for BiH (the opinion of both HDZ and HDZ 1990), a solution that is ruled out by both the IC and the Bosniacs. Besides this, some of them displayed flags of the republic Herzeg-Bosnia (the unrecognized entity created by the Bosnian Croats in 1991), pictures of the Croatian president and the Croat national football team on their Facebook. Due to the image I developed of them I was expecting answers of most of the students present that would represent an outspoken nationalistic, Croat, viewpoint. But when it came to the organization of the police, the statements I had prepared (see appendix 4, statement 1, 2 and 3) did not lead to a debate and the students did not seem to be familiar with the organization of the police. I thought that, as political students, they would, but probably I was comparing them to myself. As I am working for the emergency services myself, I might not be the best reference. A more scientific explanation is given by Bradford (2010; 184) who explains why young people might be more likely to have a neutral or even negative opinion about the police; neutral because they have no recollection of times in which the general opinion of the police was more positive (in the U.K. where research was conducted by Reiner 2000) or negative (in the case of BiH).

In general, all students were in favour of an effective police service (the concept 'effective' not further defined by me during the debate, and not made more explicit by the students, but a conclusion based on the range of answers given during the debate) even if this meant the police would be organized differently, in compared to the way it is organized at this moment.

Being in favour of a different type of structure, means that the police would no longer be controlled by an ethnical majority in the city or canton anymore. This could happen when the police, for instance, would be more centrally structured. I was surprised to see that the students did not argue against such a solution.
Leaving me with the observation that, different from what I expected, a large part of these students are more critical towards the political opinions within the conservative Croat political movement (main political parties in that movement being HDZ and HDZ 1990) than I expected. I asked respondent 36, who was present at the debate, how this difference between my earlier observation and the outcomes of the discussion, concerning the structure of the police, could be explained. He explained that, of course these students are critical towards the solutions that politicians suggest, because they too see that there is a huge gap between the promises made by the political parties and actual political achievements.

At the same time it is likely that these students grew up in families of which a majority strongly supports HDZ and HDZ 1990 (people from outside the city of Mostar are said to be more conservative and therefore more likely to vote for these parties, than those living in Mostar). Combining this fact with the fact that one's future career can be positively influenced when becoming a member of a large political party (in case of the Croat side of BiH, being HDZ or HDZ 1990), might explain why many of them will support these parties in the end, while they were critical towards them during the student debate.

When talking about the safety situation in Mostar, some students, mainly men, argued that the other side of Mostar (East / Bosniac) is an unsafe place for them to go. Other students in the group rebut this argument and ask them if they really visited 'the other side'. One guy answers; *"yes, about three times, once when family living in the US came over and they wanted to visit the Stari Most, and the other times for a football match"*. The debate continued in Croatic. On another occasion I was able to ask this student what made him feel unsafe. He told me he had the feeling he was looked at because of the cross he was wearing around his neck. It showed me that some young people easily fall back on the story of **'the divided city'**, while more and more young people are critical about this story. They try to look at the facts and make up their own mind. They don't visit the other side that often, not because they can't, but because they don't need to.

Besides the issue of the two sides of the city, the general feeling was that the police are not doing a good job**,** this despite the fact that I informed them on the statistics that show, (and confirmed EUPM police officers) that the Mostar police has a good crime – solve ratio. Students responded by saying *"the police thinks and says they are doing a good job, but they are not"*. Furthermore the students had little trust in the democratic control over the police. They explained this emphasizing the slow decision making process within the Mostar city council, that makes that governing of the city often stalls. It is caused by the major differences between the representatives within the council, based on the ethnic divide, but it is also due to political and personal interests. The students indicate that they would rather go to the media when they want to address a problem.

During an interview with two journalists (respondent 32 & 31), one working for a local newspaper (Dnevni List, the only newspaper published in Herzegovina, written in the Croat language) and the other working for a local radio station (considered Bosniac) I asked them about the apparent tendency of people to turn to the media instead of the politics or the police. Why would this be, I asked them? According to both respondents this happened because of a general disappointment in politicians and the police service. *"The same people have been in power for a long time, and they did many things wrong"*.

But how can a journalist change this situation? *"A journalist can bring things to light".* But does it help? *"Sometimes"*, but both respondent 31 & 32 are not really positive about changes that can be made due to the work of a journalist. *"People will call a journalist when the official structures don't help…, so it also leads to many small problems being magnified"*.

I further explored the ability of journalists to help change the situation of citizens with respondent 33, who is working for Dnevni List as a reporter on crime. He tells me that he gets his information off the internet and the official channels, like the police spokespersons. When it concerns local crime news, he tries to find out the names of the people involved / eyewitnesses and calls them or visits them. But time is limited. He gets about 3 hours per article.

When asked what sort of crimes the police should focus on more he tells me; *"I think Mostar is a safe place and the police are doing a good job. But people often complain. Complains that are brought to the newspaper are often concerning petty crime. The complaints are made by people who are not happy with the way the police took up their complaint or call"*. On my question if he publishes stories like that, he answers; *"no, for my articles I am depending a lot on the information of the police. Therefore I need to keep up my good relationship with the police"*. He says, he makes sure he asks the police for their side of the story. I ask him if he does the same when a story is coming from the police. Does he check those facts too? Respondent 33 says this is difficult. *"It is hard finding a witness of an event, when you don't have a name, and your time is limited"*. What does happen is that people respond to an article through the website, saying that the newspaper articles are too one-sided. Even the police sometimes responds to certain newspaper articles (as far as I know, not through the website though), their comment is that most stories have more than one side to it. Is the police right to say this? Yes, often they are, but there just isn't enough time to do more research on a story. Same goes for reports on corruption. The topic is not off limit in their newspaper, but there just isn't enough time to research the report. And when they do write about this, then this doesn't automatically result in an investigation. Even in cases that, so respondent 33 thinks, would lead to an investigation in other countries. And equally important, he says that citizens/readers don't respond to the articles.

The insight these journalists gave about how they work, (realizing that these journalist represent just a fraction of the journalists in BiH) doesn't give an explanation for the fact that people seem to trust them more than politicians. At the same time, it might say a lot about the (lack of) trust people have in politicians. It may be that, although journalists are not able to change their situation, they can give citizens the feeling that they are being heard, and that their concerns are taken serious. The fact that readers don't seem to respond to articles about corruption for instance, to me, shows a great deal of reluctance among citizens, reluctance to take action. And in my opinion, this relates back to the lack of trust in institutions like the police and the state; a lack of trust that is explained by, amongst others, the fact that corruption is present at all levels of BiH society.

The journalist, who, through his work, had an insight in the work of the police , stated that the police are doing a good job, meanwhile many of the students state that a tougher and more active approach of the police would increase the amount of respect people have for the police and the law: knowing that one will get caught if committing a crime.
Scientific literature that zooms in on the work of the police, mentions that research into public trust in the police service is not that common. Two trends are being observed in the UK; 1) trust and public confidence has shown a decline since the 1950's.
Back in the 1950's the police was unchallenged and was seen as protector of *"law and order"* (although Weinberger 1995 puts this in perspective by warning for 'nostalgia') and being the "moral representatives of both community and nation" (Branford 2010; 179). Since then an increased level of debate can be observed when it comes to police action and policies. A trend that, in a changing society where people, who have always trusted the police, turn to the police as a beacon of stability and law & order, is being observed by Loader and Mulcahy (2003, in Bradford 2010; 180). According to Jackson and Sunshine 2007; Jackson et al 2009) this support for the police is connected to a fear for disorder. Something that has become reality in BiH, and therefore a clear situation in which citizens might have lost trust and confidence in the police force of pre-war BiH. Although, it can also be argued that the police turned to protection of their own group, which could have resulted in trust for the ethnically divided police, explaining the lack of trust in the united police service.

At the same time public confidence and trust in the police is high on the political agenda in many Anglophone countries (Fleming & McLaughlin 2010; 199, Waddington 2010; 197, Bradford 2010; 179) and has been there for many years. This might explain why CP has been introduced in BiH by the IC since the expectation is that CP will improve the relationship between citizens and the police, and therefore trust and confidence in the state. Based on Fukuyama 1996 and O'Neil 2002, Fleming & McLaughlin put forward the question whether a decline in trust in the state can be explained by a general trend observed in a consumer society. I would argue that the phases BiH's society went through are incomparable to countries like the UK where Fleming & McLaughlin's research refers to. Still it is important to understand this international context, especially because the IC was the initiator of the CP concept in BiH. Understanding the history of the concept and the experiences countries had with this concept can explain the expectations the IC had for CP in BiH. And it can help analysing the effects (or lack of) of the CP concept on public confidence in the police and the state.

Referring to the call of the students for a tougher and more active approach of the police in my interview with respondent 44, the police officer responsible for education, he strongly rejected the suggestion of a tougher police approach to improve respect. *"No, police will not act repressively (in their daily conduct) anymore"*. Again he points out the existence of the code of ethics and continues; "*Now there are rules for everything and you cannot just do what you (as a police officer) want anymore".* It shows close resemblance to the answers the CP officers gave me when talking about the difference between the police before and after the war. The new approach, being just talk, talk, talk', was everything but repressive. That repressive approach is done and dusted.

This strong rejection of everything that was even remotely repressive led me to believe that the police management, due to the police's war and pre-war history, has emphasized a contrary (non-repressive) approach, strongly encouraged by the IC. Understandable when considering the history of the police, at least considered more repressive during the Yugoslav era, and violent during the most recent war. Still, the effort to restore trust through a totally different and non-violent approach seems logical, but the remarks of the citizens, arguing in favour of a stronger approach by the police, indicate that the scale has flipped to the opposite side too much. A good balance between the soft and the tough approach needs to be found. People need to be able to trust the police again and rely on a swift approach.

During the student debate at the University of Mostar I suggested that the source of the solution, for many of the problems that the students say their country faces, lay with the people themselves. If people would take more responsibility for their own situation, and that of their society, and therefore live up to the laws that were democratically decided upon, more problems would be solved. Some students support this statement. They connected this to the discussion about the economic situation, stating that if the economic situation were to improve many of the problems would be solved as well. The student's opinion differs when it comes to how to improve this economic situation. Some feel that, firstly, the ethnic discussion needs to be solved, for many students this means, that in future BiH should be consisting of 3 entities, based upon the ethnic divide; so, 3 entities, a Croat, a Bosniac and a Serb entity. To me the fact that there is no consensus on the way forward for the improvement of the economic situation, but more general to find a way forward for the political impasse, is one of the reasons why citizens are reluctant to take up any responsibility for their society. Why bother when, in the end, on political level, developments reach a deadlock.

I wanted to find out how critical these students were about the laws of their country, and about their role as citizens in creating a situation that is aimed for by means of these laws. As an example I took road safety, because I was informed by one of my respondents, that at night there is a ban on driving for drivers younger than 21. Students think traffic safety is an important issue and tell me that many young drivers drink and drive. Most of the students agree with rules like this ban to prevent accidents. They argue that it is mostly young people causing accidents while driving late at night and drinking.

When asked if any of them sticks to these rules, the majority answered negatively. So there is a discrepancy between their reasoning and the actual reality. They agree with the reasoning of the above mentioned ban, but don't stick to the rule themselves. Furthermore I came under the impression that the students lack a sense of criticism towards the rules, and the effects of these rules on things like personal freedom. This lack of criticism was not present during a political debate between youth representatives of the main political parties in Mostar, organized by the student society. I found the students much more liberal now than when I got to know them earlier during the debates of the student society. The representatives were asked to present their parties policies specifically aimed at youth. Most of them could only present their charity work for youth and the rhetoric of the big parties was that if young people want to achieve something in life, they should join their party. The students were critical of the rhetoric of the political parties. One student stated: *"I don't want your meat"*, referring to a political party of which is said to have handed out free meat to people who did vote for them, and said: *"people should vote for a Liberal party like LDA"* (referring to the last speaker, respondent 36).

The question arises why students were critical in a debate, but not critical when it comes to laws, or in general, towards the challenges within society. Talking about this with respondent 36 (young, political active, working for his own NGO, from Mostar but fled to the Netherlands during the war), he explains that for the future career of these students it is important to become a member of one of the big political parties. This explanation is confirmed by Devine and Mathisen in their CMI report on Corruption in BiH 2005. In this report they point out that the public sector is an important employer in BIH and that the nationalist parties are greatly influencing this public sector (Devine & Mathisen 2005; 11)

In my opinion the criticism can be explained by youthful enthusiasm in the setting of a debate, together with the fact that the statements of most of the political representatives were so trivial, that I was not surprised it provoked a reaction, also due to the more critical and appealing statements of representative 36 (the only representative of a political party not openly Croat), fuelling the discussion. From interviews and observations many examples were given that can be linked to my general argument that the citizens and the state of Mostar struggle with the balance between rights and responsibilities: 1) political parties don't seem to take their (youth) policies seriously, 2) that some parties 'buy' votes, and 3) that membership of a political party helps your career. This, to me doesn't seem like the ideal circumstances for a healthy social and political climate and greatly influences peoples trust in the state.

Later I was able to arrange student discussions at the University Džemal Bijedić of Mostar, the other University of Mostar, situated at the east side of Mostar. It is considered the Bosniac University of the city. Access to this university was made possible through my contact with an American teacher working at the University, providing English classes through a program of the American Embassy in Sarajevo (Respondent 45). Part of her English course was debates, which made the students use their English skills and had them practice expressing themselves in English. For these debates she was looking for a suitable topic. Both our needs came together and resulted in me preparing two forms of

debate for two of her classes. The first form was a pro – con debate in the style of the British House of Commons. The House of Commons debate, presumes two teams, one arguing in favour, the other against a certain statement. One week before the debate all the students received information through e-mail about the topic for the debate (see appendix 5), and a list of statements and the question whether they would be pro or con. Which team was in favour and which team against was determined by the teacher. This meant that I was not able to determine the real opinion of the students concerning the addressed statements. On the other hand it did help me to get to know the students, and for them to get to know me. The second debate form was a Public Forum Debate (PFD) in which the students needed to display a logical argument, based on sound reasoning and an in depth analysis. This should be done based on evidence, and countering/refuting arguments of the opposing team. The debate was based on topics I suggested (appendix 5) and this debate offered me a lot more information and insights into the students thought about the topics like corruption and crime, their views on laws that were effecting them, contact with and views on the police and the role they considered the IC to play in their country.

For these students safety and security was not the most obvious topic for a discussion. A link with the war history of BiH is easily made, despite the fact that this is not the focus of my research. Students at the Džemal Bijedić University made it clear to me from the start; they were willing to participate in the discussions, would debate the topic, and were okay with me using the information for my thesis, but they were not willing to debate the war history and the ethnic unrest. They explained to me that the reason for this was that the student population was mixed. Where the vast majority of the students at the University of Mostar is Bosnian Croat, at the University Džemal Bijedić the student population is much more mixed, from Bosniac, Croat and Serb families. This made these topics a delicate matter, and besides, they said, they were fed up with this topic. That is what they indicated to me from the moment I introduced my research topic.

Starting the debates with their image of the police, the students pointed out that they did not see the police in Mostar that often. They mainly see them conducting traffic controls. Controls that seem very random (some cars are stopped, most are not) and not well organized (3 police officers standing along the road, not a big fyke that traps all cars, in order to have everyone checked). The students don't feel this adds anything to the safety situation in Mostar.

Figure 3.1   Random traffic controls by Mostar police officers

Interestingly enough, traffic and traffic controls were often mentioned, in both literature and interviews with police officers. According to respondent 29 traffic controls are an effective way for the police to catch criminals, who, like anybody else, need to move around. Policing literature indicated the increase in car ownership (in the UK) has led to an increase in encounters with the police. Especially the middle class, who, before, had little experience with the police, do now meet up with them on a regular basis influencing their opinion of the police (Girling et al 2000; Smith 2007a in Bradford 2010; 182).

Still these students say they feel safe in Mostar. They are not afraid to walk in the street during the night. That doesn't mean that there is not (organized) crime around. Many of them have examples of organized crime, examples from their own experience, or from their immediate surroundings, and can even point out connections between the criminals and public servants. This makes them distrust the system, but they say they don't relate this to their own safety situation.
More than during the debate with the students at the University of Mostar, these students were critical about the laws of their country. But all in all they felt the intentions of the ban on driving at night for drivers younger than 21, for instance, were good, they just felt the police should enforce these rules more, but they were not explicit on how the police should do this. This shows an interesting contradiction, they say they can understand the reasoning behind certain laws, and even agree with them, but at the same time they say they need someone else to make them aware to obey the law.

I also asked journalists I met, about their sense of safety. On the question *"how can you be made to feel safer?"* Respondent 32 answers; *"we need more police"*, respondent 31 responds to my question by saying; *"more police in the streets can also lead to more fear"* (The number of police officers is an indication for the level of insecurity). Respondent 32 continues, and seems to alter her answer a bit. She says; *"it is more important that the police comes when you need them / when you ask them to come"*.

Typical when talking to many people in Mostar is the prejudice people have towards police officers. They consider them, so to say, not very smart. One striking example was the student who helped me translate at many of my interviews. She stated that *"the police officers* (that we met) *were actually nice people you could talk to and laugh with".* She did not expect this beforehand, and this first visit to a police station was different, in a positive way, from what she expected.

The students at the University Džemal Bijedić were laughing at the police officers and considered them, and the political system they are representing, to be incompetent. At the same time, when asked for it, they couldn't come up with good examples or experiences they had with the police, which would prove this incompetency. When asked if they think people will contact the police in case of problems, these students felt this was highly unlikely, due to the lack of trust in the police they had. Part of this could be explained by the fact that the media is not reporting any success achieved by of the police. When I asked respondent 33, one of the journalists, if he knew the police campaign Krimolovci (the police hotline to call in large crimes to the national police agency SIPA. Crimes related to corruption, drug trafficking, illegal weapons etc.), he told me that journalists do not get excited by success stories. They want the negative stories. When asking him if people trust the police, he answers; *"the police spokesperson told me that they want a better relationship with the citizens of Mostar. They need to see the police as a friend and a service. In the past the police was considered bad. And they still are, due to corruption and bribes".* These answers show a lack of trust in the police, rightly or wrongly.

Talking to the students at the University Džemal Bijedić about my feelings that citizens hold the key to the solution for many of social and political challenges faced, they tell me that theoretical knowledge of the societies' structures made them feel that, idealistically speaking, people do hold that key. The main problem is that people developed an image of the police and the state in general, that caused a lack of confidence that the police / state will be able to help them in facing these challenges and solve the problem they are all presented with. This lack of trust is based on the stories they hear (hearsay), and the little interaction they have with the state representatives like the police.

Exceptions confirm the rule; I met only one respondent (52) that could give me an example of a citizen initiative to make a change in their own society. In the neighbourhood of this student, (studying political science at the University of Mostar, and active in church life) which is positioned just outside Mostar city which can be called a suburb of Mostar, despite the fact that many people are travelling by bus to Mostar there was no bus stop. Some young people of her age started a campaign to get people to sign a petition to get the city council to place a bus stop. And they were successful! I asked her how they achieved this. Did they have special contacts within the city council? *"No, it was actually the campaign that was convincing! They went to the people in the neighbourhood to ask for their support. People know each other and had something like 'let's see how far we can get' if we don't try we won't get anything'. What helped was that there was a clear need for the bus stop, there are many people using the bus stop, so why wouldn't they get the bus stop? And it worked! The bus stop was placed".*

Trying to discover the cause of the distrust in police and the state, unavoidable led to a debate topic on corruption. This because BiH scored 3.1 on a scale of 10 in Transparency International's 2004 Corruption Perception Index and citizens in BiH see corruption as the second largest problem in their country, after unemployment (Devine & Mathisen 2005; 8). And according to Devine & Mathisen corruption is not new to BiH, it was already present in pre-war Yugoslavia.

This is explained by Sandholtz & Taagepera who state that in a communist / socialist system competition is lacking among entrepreneurs and civil servants (Sandholtz & Taagepera 2005; 111). When asked, people agreed that corruption is an important reasons for this feeling of distrust. According to Sandholtz & Taagepera a working democracy is important to fight corruption and I agree with this. But this is the big picture, in the streets there are two parties involved in corruption. There is not only the police officer accepting the bribe, there is a citizens giving money to a police officer as well. In BiH they have a special term for the money that people give to a police officer, to make a fine disappear. It is called 'coffee money', supporting the police officer in his or her daily activity; drinking coffee. This is something that I considered an example of police that are not taking its tasks seriously. But one of my respondents, respondent 47 objected to this view. She told me; *"drinking coffee is part of their job. Not only is a police officer's entitled to a brake, the coffee bar is also an important place to retrieve information. Do you really think that the police officers are not listening to the stories the other visitors of the coffee bar are telling each other? This is their way to get information about things that are going on in the neighbourhood"*. I guess that is the moment that a Cultural Anthropology student knows that he is being made aware of his biased nature. And looking back at my research period, even I have used the coffee bar as a key research site, using it for interviews and for observations.

When people give coffee money to a police officer, they are being corrupt, and are supporting this corruption, the corruption they see as one of the causes of the ineffective system, aren't they? Yes, the students joining in the debate agree with this, but they try to explain their situation by staying; *"it is cheaper for me to pay, 20 KM (10 Euros) coffee money instead of a fine of 50 KM"*. They defend this choice saying; *"the police officer can also decide not to suggest the option of the coffee money, and / or accept the coffee money"*. Especially because these students feel that police officers in Mostar earn good money (1000 KM a month). This example supports my argument that citizens and state are still trying to find the right balance between their responsibilities and their rights.

The fact that the students believe that police officers are earning good money is interesting, because among my respondents (students and many others) there is an inconsistency when it comes to the payment of police officers. Some think police officers earn very little money. For instance two of the journalists I spoke to took it up for the police officers; *"their pay is small, so they need to take coffee money to earn enough money"*. Both respondents (31 & 32) express a general disappointment that corruption keeps everyone trapped. *"If you want a job you need connections, if you want to earn a decent living as a police officer you need coffee money"*. Others, like the students of Džemal Bijedić University feel they earn a lot of money. It might have been My Dutch upbringing that prevented me from asking the Mostar police officers themselves what they earn. The information derived from EUPM states that the average income in BiH is 789 KM, and that of a police officer in the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton is 1038,05 KM, including meal allowance (EUPM 2010). More on this in paragraph 4.2. Sandholtz & Taagepera argue that corruption is part of BiH's culture (2005; 111 and Hutchcroft 1997) and the longer corruption is present amongst the countries elite, the more likely citizens are to develop a disbelief in the integrity of the elite and are more likely to develop corruption amongst themselves as well (Rose in Sandholtz & Taagepera 2005; 114). It is Sandholtz & Taagepera's analyses that communism has influenced the cultural values and has made self-survival and self-expression necessary, making corruption a necessity within the communist society.
Although there are also arguments against this view, it lead to me asking my respondents if this kind of corruption might be part of the way of doing things in BiH, and if maybe, people like me, shouldn't just consider this corruption, I got mixed responses.

I felt a contradiction between academic opinions and their own actions in the street. What I did derive from their reactions was a general sense of hopelessness. They saw an inconstancy between their call for a more effective police apparatus and their own actions, and they didn't see a way out of this situation.

Many of my interviews ended with a question about the role of the IC. What do people in Mostar think when it comes to IC? Are they better off with or without IC? Most students of the University of Mostar agreed that it would be good for the IC to leave BiH. The reason behind this being that the current presence of the IC leads to a lack of self-initiative with the locals.

The 3rd year students of Džemal Bijedić University were very outspoken about how they saw the role of the IC. According to them the aim of IC is unclear. They don't know much about what the IC does for BiH. The only information they get, is what they tell me, is what they hear through TV shows and other media attention, speaking about big projects (road safety campaign, drug busts and anti-corruption campaigns) or large arrests (like the criminals that robbed gabling offices in Mostar, or drug criminals). What is not said is what the structural progress is, due to the involvement of the IC. Apparently this is not interesting enough. Based on this lack of information the students are of the opinion that the IC's contribution to the safety situation in BiH is limited.

This lack of knowledge about the role and the achievements of the IC also became clear when asking the journalists, respondent 31 & 32, about this. They were not sure what would happen if the IC would leave, although they do say that war wouldn't start again when they leave, they also feel now is not the right time for them to leave either. When talking to them about the IC it became clear to me that they had only little knowledge about the involvement of the IC in BiH, because they kept talking about SFOR when they meant the IC. SFOR was the NATO lead military Stabilization FORce stationed in BiH between January 1996 and December 2005, and it was succeeded by EUFOR (EUropean lead FORce), which is, on smaller scale, still present in BiH. Both were military missions, while there were, and still are, also civilian missions, like EUPM (European Police Mission) present in BiH.

From the exam candidates of Džemal Bijedić University, with whom I discussed my debate topics, I got the impression that they were more informed about political and social issues.

When discussing the role of the IC one student was very negative about the OHR. In his opinion the OHR should change things structurally, with (political) force, before the people of BiH could take over. Like the 3rd year students, they were also quite negative about politics in general. They referred to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDA), who brought a donkey to a city council meeting in Mostar, to protest against the time it took to elect a major for the city of Mostar. This election took more than a year, from October 2008 till the end of 2009. By that time the OHR had ordered the election of a Mayor by the city council, something that had been tried by the council itself 17 times before (OHR 2009). To force a breakthrough, the OHR altered the rules for election. Instead of the 2/3 majority that was needed, a 50% +1 majority was enough. On the 20th of December 2009 the Bosnian Croat Ljubo Beslic (HDZ) was elected as the new Mayor of Mostar (Dnevni Avaz 2009).

Interestingly, among the exam students there was also a student that was much more positive about the police. She came with examples of police officers not skipping their patrols, something that is considered abnormal by many students, and police officers reporting colleagues taking coffee money. She considers this as a positive development because this could reduce the problems with corruption and increase peoples trust in the police.

The fact that she was using actual examples was quite refreshing. In the same group there was a student that, more than any other student, was very negative about the situation in BiH. She related all the negative situations to nationalism and politics, but when asked for examples, she went silent.

All these reactions show that whatever the actual influence the IC has on the balance between rights and responsibilities between citizens and the state, many citizens don't feel the IC has any positive influence on the stalemate between citizens and the state. Like the students bring forward, when giving an example of the inability of the IC to help (either in a diplomatic or a more forceful way), "*get the different parties to reach a consensus on the way forward in the economic and political debate*".
On the other hand, I would like to argue that it was the IC in the first place, who got the warring parties to sit around the table and later to sign the DPA.
And following that important step they have helped to bring the country to where it is now. One respondent (28) illustrates this evolvement by telling me about the experiences he had in BiH. Before he became a member of the EUPM mission, he was in BiH as a mission member of UNIPTF. Right after the war had ended he was stationed in Srebrenica and was transferred to Mostar at a later stage. From that time he remembers that he had joined patrols with Mostar counterparts. It was not abnormal for them to run into a fight between East and West Mostarians, which meant that they were throwing hand grenades at each other near the boulevard. Compared to that time, things have really improved in Mostar.

3.4 Strangers' eyes on the streets of Mostar

By chance I had the opportunity to meet some of the police officers working for EUPM. Talking to them gave me an insight in the world of the 'mission members' as they are sometimes referred to.
As EUPM, as was its predecessor UNIPTF, was actively involved in setting the standards for the 'new' police in BiH - and trained, took part in, and now mentors and monitors the work of the police - and they played an important role in the process of regaining trust of citizens in the work of the police.

This latest role, to monitor and mentor their BiH counterparts, was quite different from the work respondent 29, a Dutch police officer that just started working for EUPM, was doing back home, he explained to me. We need to be aware that most of the EU police officers working in BiH are very experienced officers, in doing their specific jobs, not so much in monitoring or being a mentor. Most of them have had a long career within their national police service. Now they choose to sign up for a mission of one year in a foreign country. One other Dutch mission member, based at EUPM's HQ in Sarajevo, jokingly told me that there are three different motives for police officers to join an international mission; *"the high salary, problems within their marriage, or both"*, and looking at his medals he had participated in more than one mission. Monitoring and mentoring takes place at management and senior level, meaning that EUPM officers come in contact with high ranking officers in management positions and those leading large investigations. This approach is meant to decrease the selectiveness of the police in BiH. Now not all criminal cases are being investigated and prosecuted, thus leading to a decrease of trust among citizens in the police and the law. EUPM officers need to see to it that investigations are being done in a proper way and that cases are really being taken to court. Within the Mostar office the EUPM officers are assigned to a certain geographical area of responsibility, connecting them to a cantonal police, and to local police stations.

The monitoring and mentoring role of EUPM shows that the mission is based on a completely different paradigm than that of its predecessor, UNIPTF. That mission started right after the signing of the DPA and the mission can be characterized as 'hands on' involvement with the police in BiH, like joined patrols, training, selection, education and the authority to impose changes. EUPM can't impose any changes, but needs to mentor their counter towards these changes, and should report the (lack of) progress, so that the IC can adjust its approach towards the BiH state, the local state institutions and political institutions.

During an informal conversation respondent 29 explained to me that he experienced his task as difficult. He found establishing contact with his counterparts difficult and he felt like it took him quite some time. It is interesting to notice that the counterparts from BiH meet a new EUPM contact person every year. Respondent 29 felt it was easier to perform the monitoring part of his task (observing and reporting), in comparison to his mentoring task. He felt that mentoring jeopardized the relationship with his counterparts, because he would need to confront his counterpart with the things he thought needed to be improved. A mission member working with EUPM for several years explained to him and me that the mentoring part, telling the counterpart what can be improved, is a very important part of the mission. He pointed out that mission members don't need to be afraid of the effect that their comments might have on the relationship between them and their counterparts.
He had experienced the 'Balkan way', by which he meant that the counterparts accepted the comments that the counterpart gave them directly, or through reports to the EUPM HQ. They will work with their mentor(s) again the next day, despite possible negative comments.

I wanted to know how the local counterpart, the Mostar police, experienced the involvement of the subsequent missions, UNIPTF and EUPM. Therefore I asked respondent 44, the education officer, if the CP project felt imposed. According to him it did not feel forced. *"The project is a big advantage for the police"*. (Whenever I asked a question that could lead to criticism towards the IC, this officer kept far from criticism. When I asked him *"What will happen when EUPM leaves?"*, respondent 44 only answered; *"they (EUPM) have been very helpful. They are good workers who came to our help"*.) For me, this statement made it painfully clear that there was an involuntary connection between the counterparts. Over the years the IC has taken up a decisive role in the development of BiH's state institutions. Despite the fact that the IC is decreasing its influence on the ground, there is still a need for the state institutions of BiH to live up to the IC's standards. Not doing so could have all kinds of negative consequences: one of the biggest being the denial of the reward that has been 'offered' to BiH; membership of the EU.

To be able to keep performing their role of monitoring and mentoring, EUPM needs to be flexible and willing to make adjustments, according to respondent 47. Although this paradigm of change, which took place from UNIPTF to EUPM, might seem logical when thinking of an exit strategy for the IC from BiH, respondent 30 tells me *"we can only achieve the goals of the mission, when we have executive powers to force changes"*. Now goals are often not reached according to respondent 30. At the same time, hearing the argument of the respondent working for EUPM Mostar for about 5 years, and listening to the mission members of EUPM Mostar, I feel the main problem is that some of them lack specific mentor abilities, which makes it harder for them to fully implement EUPM's mission. This raises questions as to the way EUPM members are recruited for the mission, and selected for specific jobs within the mission. An anecdote that gives a good impression of the failure of these procedures is given by respondent 29.

He says an EUPM mission member that is an expert on corruption, and is in BiH to mentor and monitor his BiH counterparts on the topic of corruption, came from the Ukraine and needed to bribe his boss to be able to sign up for EUPM.

The difference between the experience of individual EUPM officers and the goals of the mission is significant because it highlights the difference between the goals of the IC's approach and the execution of the way to achieve these goals. This discrepancy does not contribute to a feeling of regained trust that developments are on the right track.

PART II   EXPLANATORY FACTORS

4   NEW WAYS OF POLICING

*"Bosnia is a wonderful country, fascinating, with nothing ordinary in the habitat or people….
Undoubtedly Bosnians are rich in hidden moral values, rarely found… But, you see, there is one thing
the people of Bosnia must realize and never lose sight of – Bosnia is a country of hatred and fear…
Yes, Bosnia is a country of hatred. That is Bosnia."* (Andric 1945 in Bose 2002; 95).

Many of the things that respondents said and observations that I made, need to be interpreted, placed
into context, against a theoretical background and linked to historic facts, to be able to assess their
value to my research. Only then will it be possible to draw conclusions about the relationship between
citizens and the police (as a representative of the state) and the level of trust that exists between the
two.

The central topic in chapter 3 was the city of Mostar, its police officers and its citizens. In this chapter, I
explore more fully, concepts like Community Policing, security sector, state and nation, and how these
can be used to better understand the relationship between the police and citizens in Mostar.
Additionally, the historical circumstances that led to the current situation in Mostar are clarified,
including the way the IC established a new police service in Mostar and BiH, the way the security
sector and police were reformed and the way the states and nations of BiH were built. Lastly an
overview is given of the historic process that led to the war. This process offers explanatory factors for
the current relationship between citizens and the state, the relationship between citizens and the
political structure of BiH.

4.1   Background of Community Policing

As explained in the introduction of this thesis, CP was used to look at the relationship between citizens
and the state and to determine how concepts like CP have influenced the way citizens and the state
interact. Many studies have shown how to achieve a growing partnership between police and
community, divided in two categories; Community-Oriented Activities - mainly school and sport
projects, media campaigns and community groups, and Police-Oriented Activities - training of police
officers and modernizing equipment and buildings (DeBlieck 2007; 5).

To develop a better understanding of the concept of CP as it was introduced in BiH, it is important to
study this history of the concept and the definition of CP as applied by EUPM in BiH. When EUPM
took over from UNIPTF they focused on improving the effectiveness of policing, based on best
European practices (Huiberts-van Dijk 2009; 1). One of these ´best police practices´ is the concept of
'community policing'. They hoped that by positively influencing the relationship between the state and
its people, trust would increase, and people would be less reluctant to work with the police to create a
safer society.

Defining community policing is not an easy task according to Van Os (Program manager at the Dutch
Police Academy). He states that it was by no means possible to come up with a European definition of
community policing, when attempting to do so (van Os 2005; 1). This can come as no surprise when
studying national examples of police practice, like the example of the raging debate in France between
right and left over policing in the banlieues (Collantes Celador 2009; 237).

In light of this knowledge it is most interesting to see what definition of community policing was used in BiH. An interesting document is the 'Strategy for Community-Based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. A document composed by a group of local experts consisting of (police) representatives of all ministries of interior and national police agencies of BiH, supported by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC/DEZA). Together they have formulated a strategy for introducing Community-Based Policing in BiH. In this strategy community-based policing (CBP) is defined as *"an organizational philosophy that promotes partnership between police and community. It is based on the premise that both the police and community work together to identify problems such as crime, drugs, the fear of crime, and antisocial behaviours." The philosophy is based on the principles of partnership, empowerment, problem solving, accountability, service orientation and project management"* (Ministry of Security of BiH 2007; 5). The document states that the strategy intends to *"improve the rights and freedoms of all citizens of BiH"*, therefore public administration standards and operational effectiveness of police agencies need to be improved, and equal access to justice needs to be promoted. All these efforts should lead to BiH becoming an EU member state. The strategy resulted in the creation of a manual, to be used as an educational tool for new police officers and as a handbook for police officers in the field. For the creation of this manual again a large group of representatives of national and local police services worked together, using Swiss material produced on the topic of CP (SDC 2010).

Mostar Police officers assigned to the CP project (respondent 41 & 42) told me: *"it would be better for everyone to have more trust in the police. When a citizen sees a police officer they should have the feeling they can turn to him. I wished everyone would realize that every police officer will help".* They see trust as a key factor in the relationship between citizens and the police. It is an example that stresses the importance of a good relationship between the state and its citizens for the police to be able to work properly. The police officers have the feeling that the citizens of Mostar do not get enough information about the success of 'their' police. This results in a lack of trust in the police to do a good job and book results. Whether or not these successes are really there is being disputed by citizens, NGO's, IGO's and members of the IC. What respondents do agree on is the lack of trust people have in the police. Respondent 18, working for a research institute**,** focused on security issues, mentions that people are lacking trust in the police as they don't see the result. Furthermore the police are said to be impolite toward citizens. Another reason for the lack of trust in the police mentioned is the unequal treatment of people, by the police and other government agencies. All this shows the relevance and importance of the introduction of CP.

But the introduction of CP was not self-evident. This is illustrated by one of the EUPM respondents (28), a police officer from Hungary. He remembered the introduction of the CP concept in his own country. He described to me how, in Hungary, the neighbourhood police officers, during communist times, were seen as the eyes and ears of the regime. The concept was known, the connotation was less likeable. Like in BiH new European practices, like democratic policing and community policing, are being introduced in Hungary. There CP is also seen as a form of crime prevention, which is not always the most popular part of policing for Hungarian police officers.

4.2   Creating the new police of BiH

As we have seen in chapter 3 the image many citizens have of the police is a negative one. Many people lack trust in the police, and don't have the feeling that the police are able to help them when needed. For people to be able to trust the police, the police should be able to address people's needs, which means that the police should be 'effective' in doing their job. Based on information from respondents who have studied the political structure in BiH and organizational structure of the police, and studied literature on this topic, it would seem that the organizational structure of the police might even have negatively impacted its effectiveness.

To be able to understand the relationship between the negative experiences of citizens with the police and the structure of the police, I'll give an outline of the way this structure has developed and what is said about the effectiveness of this structure. Bellow I discuss corruption which is another factor that greatly influences citizens' trust in the police. As many respondents mention, coffee money is a concept known to all citizens in BiH, and is widely accepted as a way to bribe police officers. At the same time (part of the) citizens I spoke to, understand that corruption has a negative influence on the way the state is able to function. Cause for the continued existence of this practice, as indicated by many, is the low average wage of both citizens and police officers, and of course, the short term effects for both citizens (no fine) and the police officer (extra income). To get a better understanding of the background of this explanatory factor, in this paragraph I examine more closely the payment structure of the police in BiH and the average wage of police officers. Finally we will look at the role the IC had in establishing a new police in BiH right after the war, and how the different missions of the IC, (there have been six different missions) focused on the police over the years. The first missions tried to influence the work of the police, while missions that followed were focused, among other things, on creating a police apparatus based on the outcomes of the DPA that would answer the political needs and the criteria of effective, dependable and accountable police services.

Organizational structure of the police
A new structure for the organization of the police formed the basis for all efforts of the EUPM that followed. Studying the organization of safety and security of BiH, it is important to realize that, in general terms, the central state has to share its control over the police with the entities. There are two main entities, being the FBiH and the RS. Besides that there is Brčko. In this chapter the focus is on the FBiH in which Mostar is situated.

Article 3 of the constitution of BiH states, that the central government has the responsibility for International and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol. The Entities are responsible for 'providing a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civil law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for the internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to in Article II (of the constitution), and by taking such other measures as appropriate' (Constitution of BiH 1995). This is based on the assumption that the state holds the monopoly on *" the means of legitimate force.., whether through the application of coercive sanctions by police to regulate interpersonal relations within a community, or through the protection provided to state and society by armed forces against external enemies"* (Bayley 1975; 328 in Caparini & Fluri, 2006; 4).

Control over the Ministry of Defense was in the hands of the entities right after the war. Only through the 2005 Defense Reform Agreement a national Ministry of Defense was created, that took over the coordination of the two entity armies (RS Army; VRS and the Federation Army; VF). Now, the Army of the Republic of BiH is one army, with the two entity armies merged into one. The only residue of the previous organizational structures that is left is the fact that in each of the countries are 3 infantry brigades; there are at least 3 battalions, each of these 3 formed by soldiers from one particular ethnic group. So, for the different ethnic groups there is still a need to have something of an 'own' army. There are organizational choices like these that show if at all and how the other groups are trusted. In my opinion, the fact that the current organizational structure is much more integrated than before is a hopeful sign for everyone believing in the possibilities of one BiH.

When it comes to criminal law enforcement, the state, through its Ministry of Security, is responsible for inter-Entity (FBiH and RS) and external (BiH – other countries) criminal law enforcement and the relations with Interpol. To do this there are 4 organizations active at state level; SIPA (State Investigation and Protection Agency), the Border Police (protecting the boarders of BiH), the Interpol office and the directorate for coordination. Furthermore, there are departments, like an educational department and a forensics department that support the efforts of all police organizations in BiH. The FBiH, through its Federation Ministry of Interior, is responsible for a safe environment for all its citizens and should therefore take care of combating terrorism, inter-cantonal crimes, drug trafficking and organized crime within the Federation. The Federation consists of 10 cantons, within these cantons the cantonal Ministry of Interior is responsible for establishing and controlling police services in its canton (EUPM 2010).


Figure 4.1   Police structure BiH (EUPM 2010)

Through this complete structure the police services within BiH should be able to work in cooperation, functioning as an independent state towards other police organizations outside BiH. Unfortunately it doesn't, as this structure holds in itself, a large degree of independence for the different elements (the FBiH and the RS and within the FBiH, the cantons) of this structure. This is inherent to the general solution that was found in the DPA, for the, almost incompatible interests of the ethnic groups making up BiH. As is shown in chapter 3 and will be shown in the rest of this thesis, the layered and defuse structure, together with the underlying reasons for this structure, make cooperation and communication difficult. Because the police structure is directly linked to the political structure, politicians are able to influences almost all levels of the police organization. Therefore it is almost impossible to implement national police policies, when they are politically controversial, and cooperation between police authorities is easily disrupted by that same political interference.

Ineffectiveness

One of the reasons citizens gave, for not trusting the police to do a proper job, is its ineffectiveness. Respondents gave me four main reasons for the ineffectiveness of the police. One was the strict laws on the police organization. These laws make the organization inflexible and rigid when it comes to promotion and rotation. This is the conclusion of respondent 27 (an EUPM mission member who was at the end of his one year mission when I met him) who worked closely together with police commissioners of the 4 cantons in his EUPM sector and who developed a feeling for the challenges they face during their job. He told me that the police commissioner is an independent official, appointed by an independent selection review board (ISRB), but in many ways he is under close scrutiny. The media, the different ethnic groups and the minister of Interior all look closely and critically at the work of this police commissioner. The ethnic groups want to make sure that one of them is in this position, while the minister of Interior tries to influence the police commissioner through the police budget, because it is the minister of Interior who approves the police budget in his canton. This leads to a situation where the police commissioner needs to go to the minister of Interior and get approval for all expenditure, even stationary.

This situation makes the police commissioner dependent of the minister of Interior, although this minister can't officially interfere with police matters. It is the lack of power over money that makes the police commissioner dependent on the minister. This increases the danger that a police commissioner needs the follow a political line that is based on ethnic considerations, instead of safety oriented politics, meant for all citizens of BiH.

According to respondent 47 (local employee of EUPM and previous police missions) this does not mean that police officers lack motivation to do a proper job. *"Even when the police officers were not paid, due to budget negotiations that were stalled by political disagreements the police officers kept working".* When asked about the professionalism of the police commissioners, respondent 27 said that *"many police commissioners are professionals, more than politicians. They are good at their police job, but are less good at retaining the necessary budget".* According to respondent 27 this professional approach also shows in the cooperation between police services in the different cantons. This cooperation is not self-evident, and is a cooperation between Croats, Bosniacs and Serbs. The cooperation that does take place is cooperation based on a personal relationship and not on the organizational structure. The problem that surfaces here is that the police organization is vulnerable to the politicians, which leads to insecure police officers and distrust among citizens.

According to respondent 2 (working as an advisor on security sector reforms for a diplomatic mission) the second reason for the ineffectiveness of the police is the generation of police officers that was trained and had worked before the war. These old police officers apparently keep the police from developing in a positive direction, partly confirmed by the statements of CP officers (41, 42 & 43) in Mostar, who stated that new police officers are asked to take up the CP task, although the police officers are still 'in' the repressive system of policing.

Ethnic division
A third reason that is brought up by respondents involved in the police is the way the different leadership positions in the state institutions of the new county are divided amongst the ethnicities. The general agreement that ethnic groups will equally share governing and management positions is anchored in the DPA. For the police service this means that all management positions are shared along the lines of ethnicity. The result is a situation where, when the police commissioner is of one ethnicity, the deputy commissioner should be of another ethnicity. An understandable approach based on the ideal of having the different ethnicities working together, but this approach also results in a situation that any advancement of police officers is being stalled. As respondent 27 observed, due to this ethnic distribution key, it is hard for the police management to reward police officers and to keep them motivated. Since promoting one employee is only possible when the other position (for instance the deputy) is filled in by someone of the other ethnicity. This ethnic distribution condition therefore creates congestion when it comes to human resource management, blocking promotion possibilities. And the problem that occurs then is that police officers, who are not motivated, cannot be expected to perform the best job they can.

Payment
The forth reason is the payment of police officers. As said before in chapter 3, this payment differs strongly between cantons and state levels and is considered insufficient.
Many citizens link payment, or the lack thereof, to the topic of corruption. And that corruption relates to the lack of trust they have in the police.
According to several citizens and journalists, police officers in Mostar are underpaid, which, according to these respondents (31 & 32), has influence on their work. It is interesting to question why people are under this impression. EUPM information states that the average monthly wage of a police officer in the federation was KM 789,- (approx. €403,-) a month (in 2008). As this is an average this means that much higher and lower salaries are being given, depending on the canton and the number of citizens within the canton. Besides the basic salary the income consists of several allowances, like the transportation allowance (that varies hugely among police services in the different Cantons) and a percentile increase according to the length of service. Police officers in the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton earn an average of 1038,05 KM a month, including meal allowance (EUPM 2010).

Average wages are only interesting when we can compare them to the average household expenditure. In 2008 this was circa KM 1,550 with a minimum expenditure around KM 1,100 (average household of 3 members), according to the BiH Statistics Agency. As we can see there is a discrepancy between the income and expenditure. It is not hard to imagine that because of such a negative difference between income and expenditure a police officer is more likely to be open to corruption and second jobs, both possibly interfering with the effectiveness of his police job, and therefore forbidden.

The fact that there is a difference in payment of police officers between the cantons can have an additional influence on the relationship and cooperation between police officers from different cantons. Differences among cantons are the obvious result of the fragmented political organization and can negatively influence the effectiveness of law enforcement across cantonal boarders. And that is something BiH really can't use as criminals don't stop at canton boarders. It was even jokingly said (respondent 29) that, where politicians can't seem to find a way to work together in BiH, criminals on the other hand don't seem to have any problems, no matter what ethnicity they are, they find a way to work together.

Effectiveness

Many foreign politicians and diplomats, among many others the former prime minister of Belgium, Wilfried Martens who chaired the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC), have suggested a reorganization of the police, to increase its effectiveness. The initial proposal of the PRC consisted of three main changes to the structure of the police in BiH: 1) the *"exclusive constitutional competency for all police matters vested at the state level"* (such as legislative and budgetary authority, 2) the adjustment of the policing areas of the local police to areas designed according to practical and technical criteria (the result being that the interethnic division lines would be crossed, and that police areas would include Serb, Bosniac and Croat areas which would raise issues concerning sovereignty, an issues mostly raised by the Serbs, but also felt by the Croats), 3) the political influence on the work of the police should end (Muehlmann 2007; 43).

All this information, the diffuse structure, the influence of the minister of Interior on the daily operations of the police, the (lack of) payment for police officers and the difference in payment among cantons, raises the question; can the police in BiH really be effective? EUPM officers (27 & 29) tell me that the crime rate is fairly low, especially in combination with a high number of crimes solved by the police. They see this as a hopeful signal that the police in BiH is indeed able to do a good job. At the same time respondents, both citizens and EUPM mission members, point out that law enforcement on street level is not taken serious. They refer to the situation in the streets of the city centre (see chapter 3, paragraph 3.2). Law enforcement and the responsiveness of the police to citizens' calls are an important way by which the police can improve citizens' trust in the police. Striking example is that when I asked if respondents would call the national phone number to report a crime, many of them tell me they do not trust that there will be any response given to their call. This raises the question wither or not the crime rates and numbers on solved crimes are accurate. It can be argued that, as the number of crimes is often determined by the number of reports, the willingness of people to go to the police and file a report, is a key factor when it comes to the crime rate that is recorded. If people don't trust the police to solve the crime / make an arrest, they might not go to the police to file a report, hence, keeping the crime rate low.

When asking respondent 41 and 42, both CP officers in Mostar, they say they realize that *"for people to trust the police we need to show result"*. As we have seen in chapter 3, concerning the minor offences at street level, they suggest a soft approach of 'talk talk talk'. But when it comes to serious crimes they indicate that the police needs the help of the prosecutor's office. They need to prosecute based on the information that the police delivers to them. Respondent 29 (working for EUPM) agrees with this argument and says that he observes that the prosecutor's office is reluctant to take up big cases.

When asking for an explanation this respondent explains; *"in big cases telephone taps are common, even in BiH. The techniques for phone taps are there and the law allows the police to use them when the prosecutor's office agrees. The danger with telephone taps is that you never know who will end up at the other end of the line. Prosecutors are afraid that politicians turn out to be on that other end. This would not be good for their careers and therefore prosecutors find these techniques unfavourable".* While respondent 29, he being a very experienced detective, finds these techniques invaluable to police work. This example shows that even when the police organization is made more effective, results can only be achieved when all agencies in the chain do their job. Only then safety and security for all citizens of BiH can be achieved.

Trying to improve the cooperation between the many different police agencies of BiH and prosecutors office in big criminal cases is one of the current priorities of the IC police mission EUPM. But BiH has seen many police -, military - and civil missions over the years, all with their own goals and approaches. The speed, with which the missions follow each other, raises questions whether or not the goal of each mission is being achieved.

<u>UN led missions</u>
When the UN involvement in BiH started on 21st of February 1992, UNPROFOR (United Nations PROtection Force) was created. This protection force had the task to create conditions that would make it possible to start negotiations on an agreement that would lead to peace and security in the former Yugoslavia. Ending the war was done through diplomacy and military force. When the DPA was officially signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris, UNPROFOR transferred its authority to IFOR (multinational Implementation FORce), led by NATO, tasked with monitoring the peace treaty between the warring factions. On the 21th of December 1995 the Security Council of the United Nations adopted resolution 1035 through which the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was established. Part of this mission was the Mine Action Centre (MAC), the representation of the Secretary General (Boutros Boutros-Ghali at that time) in BiH and the UNIPTF. UNIPTF's task was connected to two main responsibilities of the UN; coordinate humanitarian assistance and take the lead role when it came to dealing with issues relating to refugees and displaced persons and help the parties in BiH to carry out their law enforcement responsibilities as agreed upon in the DPA.

During the first mandate UNIPTF's general objectives were, maintaining public order and supporting the entities with rebuilding the country. One of the main goals during this first mandate period was ensuring a successful first nationwide election. Concerning the police, UNIPTF mainly observed and inspected the police and the judicial system. The mandate of UNIPTF was prolonged on the 12th of December 1996 by the UN Security Council. UNIPTF was asked to also monitor the human rights situation, investigate allegations of human rights abuses by police officers, monitor the police activities in Brčko and supporting the restructuring of the police and judicial system. This included educating police officers and public servants in the judicial system, with a focus on drugs and organized crime fighting. From 2000 to 2002, UNIPTF focused on organizing a police service that would function according to: *"internationally recognized humans rights and fundamental freedoms'"* (Chandler 1999, 51 in Huiberts 2009; 7). *"The most fundamental principle of democratic policing is to ensure that the human rights of the population are respected,"* said Mr. Robert Wasserman, Deputy Commissioner of the UNIPTF. This meant restructuring the post-communist and post-paramilitary police forces and judiciary through training, selection, certification and de-certification procedures.

Besides that the police force was to be democratized, *"by establishing a de-politicized, impartial, accountable, multi-ethnic police service that represented the society it served and abided by the rules of community policing"* (International Crisis Group 1999; 44). Right after the war the police of BiH witnessed a large influx of former soldiers, due to the fact that the number of soldiers had to be reduced. This resulted in a large group of untrained and often unskilled police officers. When UNIPTF was deployed in BiH, one of the first actions they took was to look at the war history of the police officers that they met in the police force.

UNIPTF had to develop standards to downsize the police services to a size that was in balance with the number of citizens and was comparable to the number of police officers in other Western European countries. Selection and vetting were part of the process of downsizing; the goal was to end up with a police service with a size that fits the countries characteristics and its budget. Furthermore these police officers had to be trained in modern police practices, and the whole police organization had to be offered technical assistance to become an effective law enforcement agency. This political correct description was put in perspective by respondent 47, a local who had worked as a language assistant for the several international missions and remembered that role of UNIPTF. She told me; *"one of the main tasks (of UNIPTF) was to clear the Mostar police forces from these ex- army police officers, first of all them that 'had blood on their hands' and then those that did not perform according to the standards"*. Nowadays the new recruits have finished high school and go through a full police training, which should increase their knowledge on laws and their abilities to enforce these laws.

UNIPTF can be characterized by the fact that, as it was a UN mission, mission members came from all over the world, as were their ideas on policing techniques. Respondents working for the Mostar police during the time UNIPTF active in Mostar remember these mission members and their training methods very well. For my interview it was even an icebreaker. When asked, police officers were not very willing to give their opinion about EUPM, they said; *"don't bite the hand that feeds you"*. But asking about experiences with UNIPTF police officers, for instance the Indian police officers that apparently told BiH riot police to use snakes to scare off protestors lead to a lot of reactions and opinions on the involvement of UNIPTF in BiH.

Respondents 41 and 43 even felt offended by the fact that the UNIPTF mission members approached him and his colleagues as if they did not know how to perform as a police officer. The UNIPTF were even explaining to the Mostar police officers the basic skills of a police officer, like how to stop a car. It is important to take this information into account when looking at newly introduced concepts, like CP. Experiences like these with international police officers and projects introduced by them can influence their attitude towards projects like CP.

Members of UNIPTF were mainly members of military police units in their own country, and they were working in a war and post war situation that was all but calm. For instance when NATO bombed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in spring 1999 UNIPTF mission members were confronted with protests (partly) pointed at them. Compared to UNIPTF and other missions, the EUPM mission is referred to, by some mission members, as a holiday mission (like respondent 30, a military police officer from Italy, who was a EUPM mission member in 2010, but was also part of the military mission KFOR, in Kosovo). The apparent peace and the improved living conditions in BiH make it a much easier mission.

When I asked respondent 47 if she saw a difference between the pre-war and post-war police officers, she answered *"I can't see that much difference, but if I have to point out a difference I would say it is their attitude towards the public. Pre-war police officers in general were more distant and stricter. The post-war police officers are more relaxed towards the public"*.

Since 1997 the IC *"arrogated to itself more and more powers of direct intervention in Bosnia's public life"* (Bose 2002; 7), mainly through the office of the OHR. This office was responsible for supervising and coordinating the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The OHR received many governmental and legislative powers, including the power to remove government officials from power, who did not or do not comply with the implementation of the DPA. This was done because of the non-compliance of many officials, which resulted in little progress in the implementation process of the DPA. An example of the use of these powers was when, by the end of 1999 and in 2000, the OHR ordered the ministry of Interior in Mostar (responsible for the police service), that was still divided at that time, meaning there was a Croat Ministry-, and a Bosniac Ministry of Interior, to implement a directive. This directive stated, among other things, that police officers were obligated to wear official uniforms, a uniform that is identical in the whole Federation, with a cantonal insignia, patches etc.

Furthermore, the directive was very specific about the use of flags and coats-of-arms, and official seals and stamps. These needed to be either representing BiH (for instance through the coat of arms of BiH), the federation (with its flag being a combination of a Bosniac and a Croat symbol, and the European stars), the canton (with a symbol designed not to refer to any ethnic group, but to the River Neretva, forming the centre of this canton), or the city (in the case of Mostar, a symbol referring to the River Neretva and the Stari Most) and should not be related to one ethnicity (see appendix 6). The problem was that the people working in the Croat wing of the Ministry Interior in Mostar, but also by Croat police officers, working in the city and the rest of the canton, were using and wearing the checkerboard, being the symbol for the Croats. And they didn't wear the official symbols on their uniforms either, identifying them as working for one of the cantons of the Federation (Bose 2002; 78). Their Bosniac colleagues on the other hand, did wear the Federation insignia on their uniform, and therefore kept to the directive, as they were supposed to. This unwillingness of the Croats working for the Mostar police, to work as part of a united police service, could be seen in every joint activity police officers at both sides of the city were undertaking. Whether it was joint patrols, working jointly on any of the police stations, or attending at a crime scene, everybody could identify a police officer's ethnicity right away. This turned the ideal of a unified and neutral police service into a farce (Bose 2002; 128).

This situation did improve over the years; UNIPTF was able to enforce the reunification of the two police forces in Mostar, resulting in one police organization for Mostar. Important factors for this result were the directives mentioned above together with the effect of *"the strangers eyes* (that of the IC) *that 'forced' change"* (respondent 27) because of the constant presence of the IC. Still some things needed to improve through a change of attitude of the police officers themselves. An example given to me by respondent 47 shows this changing attitude of the police officers. *"The name tags, that were part of the new uniform of the police officers in Mostar, and were introduced by UNIPTF, made it possible for citizens to see the ethnicity of the police officer* (as both first and family names can be linked to ethnic groups). *At a certain point in time most police officers felt this was something undesirable, and they removed the name tags".* It shows a change in the mind-set of the local police officers and it shows that the local police officers themselves have played an important role in this process of change. Without their cooperation, change could not have been accomplished.

<u>EUPM</u>

The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over from UNIPTF in 2003, being EU's first international police mission under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). An example of a gradual shift of responsibilities from the UN to the EU, something that BiH's authorities had no say in. Something that, according to Chandler (2007; 345) is undesirable, as there transitions were part of an informal and unaccountable mechanism, imposed from above, and without any involvement of the people or elected representatives of BiH Chandler 2007; 345)

As with many of the missions, the goals of the mission(s) changed over time. EUPM 1 (2003 – 2006) was orientated on projects and programs. The mission focused on sustainable policing (Council Joint Action, 11 March 2002 in Huiberts 2009; 8) and local ownership, all to create a police service that lives up to international standards. To achieve this, a 'functional hierarchy of local decision making' was created and an effort was made to do more on the development of managerial skills, and through that on capacity building (Collantes Celador 2009, 236-237 in Huiberts 2009; 8).

Furthermore the mission statement was translated in 4 goals for the period of 2003 – 2005;
1) development of police independence and accountability;
2) the fight against organized crime and corruption;
3) financial viability and sustainability of the local police; and
4) institution- and capacity-building.

The principal of local ownership makes that EUPM aims for local participation in reforms necessary to achieve the above mentioned goals. In 2009 Collantes Celador signalizes the downside of this approach, as she mentions the inability of EUPM, unlike the OHR, to *"remove or discipline reluctant police officers"* (Collantes Celador 2009; 235). Unlike UNIPTF, EUPM is not present at local police stations. Their focus is the management level of the Bosnian police services.
On invitation of the Bosnian authorities the EU decided on a follow-up mission of EUPM I; EUPM II, for the duration of two years (2006-2008). This 'new' mission's focus was monitoring, mentoring, and inspection. Goal of this new approach was to create a professional and multi-ethnic police service, which can be sustained and operated according to the best European standards. Furthermore, during this second mission there was more support to increase the capability and capacity of the local police to identify and disrupt organized crime and corruption. EUPM II (2006-2007) was extended into EUPM III (2007-2009) focused on: police reform, the fight against organized crime, and inspection of the police. EUPM III was extended (2009-2011) and the focus shifted more to the fight against organized crime and corruption. As we can see the mission objectives have been revised several times, emphasizing more and more on the fight against major and organized crime, whereas the role of police in local society (community policing) seems to have disappeared; more about this subject in the next paragraph.

This fight against Organized Crime and Corruption is felt to be important, by the EU, as BiH is said to host a large number of criminal groups, which are involved in serious and organized crime. BiH is seen as an important link in international criminal activities that threaten EU countries. The police seemed incapable to fight these criminal organizations, even worse, they sometimes seemed to be involved in, or at least corrupted by, these criminal organizations. Fighting the criminal organizations is made more difficult because of the ineffective politicians, corruption, and fragmented infrastructure. All examples of an ineffective police, influencing the impression people have of the police.

To improve this situation EUPM actively supports police restructuring based on three EU principles for police restructuring (see the political agreement adopted by the RS National Assembly, the Federation Parliament and the BiH State Parliament in October 2005). Furthermore EUPM aims to improve police management and operation capabilities, and the cooperation with other law-enforcement agencies, mainly on state level. To improve the overview of politicians over the police, EUPM works together with the OHR, this way they hope to reduce the involvement (inappropriate interference) of politicians with police operations. Fighting the criminal organizations EUPM assists the local police in planning and conducting their operations by mentoring and monitoring. These actions should also lead to the identification of structural challenges, corruption and criminal links within the police.

Very important when comparing UNIPTF with EUPM is the fact that EUPM has no executive powers. In case of non-compliance or misconduct EUPM cannot take any direct action, like UNIPTF could. EUPM needs to take a written recommendation for action to the OHR. Many respondents argue that the lack of executive powers makes their work more difficult and less effective.
It makes many mission members feel as if they are there only to create and/or keep peace and stability, and that the only other goal of EUPM leadership is to say; *"mission accomplished"* (respondent 1). This feeling is confirmed by researchers that state that the local ownership mantra can be seen as an exit strategy, or even worse, as a cover up for failing reforms led by the IC; *"Bosnian input or ownership of the policy-making process has been little more than rhetorical"* (Chandler 2007; 337). Citizens confirm this feeling; to them the local ownership approach feels like the IC is losing interest in BiH (respondent 1). Whether this explanation is the only possible one, is debatable.

4.3 Security sector, police reforms and local participation

Much of the literature argues, and EUPM officers confirmed to me, that CP was 'overshadowed', by the Police Reforms (reconstructing / centralizing of police service) and the (unnecessary) politicization of 'European police standards/practices' to fit a model of statehood not shared by all local stakeholders" (Collantes Celador 2009; 231). In simple words: the fact that the IC was trying to establish a police service that operated according to EU standards, but that is also organized in a way the IC seems fit for BiH, caused resistance among the nationalist politicians. The suggested changes in the reforms meant that their power and interests were harmed. This meant that the suggested changes were under fierce political debate within BiH. In this process of politicization, the Office of the High Representative, OHR, (which has executive powers exceeding that of the presidency of BiH) played an important role.

As said in the introduction of this thesis, people lacked trust in the state. To *"uphold the illusion of the law being omnipresent and effective, law enforcement must appear to be predictable, procedural, regulated and, above all, visible to the public"* (Hansen 2006; 282). Therefore, the IC tried to restore this trust. The important role of the state is to provide security in an effective and efficient manner, within a democratic framework and within the country (Hänggi 2004; 2). And it is the police's job to do so. Due to this reason the IC focused on the police in BiH through UNIPTF and later EUPM. Like the IC's missions in BiH, peacekeeping missions in post conflict countries undergo a certain sequence, to restore or built local law enforcement capacity. This sequence can be organized, among others, along the lines of the form of security offered, and the institutes that supply this security. It is important for the argument being presented here to get a better understanding of the effect of the reforms, because, as we will see, it influences the relationship between citizens and the state.

As shown below (figure 4.2), in the sequence of peacekeeping missions, according to Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, the supplier of security shifts from being a foreign military force to an international police force that hands over its powers to local law enforcement agencies.


Figure 4.2   Peacekeeping mission sequence (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall 2005; 219)

This process that started on national level, is aimed at restoring (and improving) the security sector. *"The security sector… incorporates all state institutions, which are mandated to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion. This ranges from the military, the police, military police, paramilitary forces, the intelligence and secret services, border and customs guards and the judicial and penal institutions"* (Hänggi 2004; 2).
The British non-governmental organization 'Saferworld' adds to this definition; the civil structures that have a responsibility for management and oversight of the security sector (Forman 2006; 4). Important to point out in the case of BiH is the argument Foreman (2006; 2) makes concerning authoritarian regimes like the former Yugoslav state: *"Unlike other areas of public sector reform, security is a complex issue where the state has been weakened by some form of authoritarian regime."*

This can be easily illustrated by the statement of respondent 47 (local employee of EUPM and previous police missions) as cited on page 32. She mentions the meetings organized by the municipality that where meant to discuss city wide projects. The municipality leader needed approval of the representatives for big projects. Problem was that most of the decision had already been made, making the meetings a farce and causing scepticism. This is important because it caused citizens to distrust the state's institute's responsibility to provide safety and security, which makes it more difficult for people to trust the state. Another reason for this distrust was that during the war the national army fell in the hands of the Serbs, while all the ethnic groups established their own para-military groups and even small armies. Police officers took side and did not represent the Yugoslavian state police anymore. These forces committed atrocities against people of other ethnicities, and after the war many of these soldiers and police officers ended up in the post-war police force (at that time still separated per ethnic group). So both the experiences with the police before the war, using a concept similar to CP, but not really involving citizens in their safety situation and the war, in which police officers played an ambiguous role, lead to a great deal of distrust amongst citizens of BiH.

The capacity to provide safety and security needed to be restored and therefore distrust needed to be overcome in order to the necessary trust in the police and the state again.

Generally speaking, for most post-conflict countries *"the overarching goal of police reform is to move from a model of policing based on repression and social control to a model based on prevention and investigation"* (O'Neill 2004; 7). Restoration or building the capacity to provide security was done by creating a new army and police, and by reequipping and training these new institutions. But often this is considered insufficient by the IC and therefore it often takes the lead in post conflict reform processes. Security Sector Reforms (SSR) deals with (a post war) security sector that in many cases was non-democratic controlled (by government) and not overseen (by population), inefficient and dysfunctional, as it was the case in Yugoslavia, where the police and the army were used to protect the interest of the politicians in power. The goal of these reforms was to change it into a democratically controlled and overseen, efficient and effective security sector (Huiberts and Teftedarija 2009; 2). The examples of SSR's in countries like Bosnia Herzegovina, Burundi and Afghanistan show**,** that SSR's are no easy processes and encounter many difficulties, like, among others**,** the security sector which is resistant to public input (Caparini & Fluri 2006; 5). This means that the security sector is not ready to include citizens in their work, and is not open for critique and suggestions of citizens. The process of SSR is mostly initiated by external parties**,** and/or is being demanded by external parties. Within the field of SSR's, police reforms are a small and understudied sub-field.

The police service, concerned with the day to day safety of the citizens, plays a key role in the sense of security that people feel. Being able to end the external actors' (the international peacekeeping forces) involvement in BiH security, means that the civilians need to be able to trust the state and its police (Huiberts 2009; 3). To achieve this, the international community takes on an active role in guiding the police service. Literature states that the key concept in this process has been local ownership; giving the local community an active role in the direction the police is being taken.

Local ownership
Local ownership is a concept often used in development projects, but a concept that was not used in the post-conflict and security sector reform field until the end of the nineties. The concept was declared central to the EUPM activities in BiH and was already mentioned in the first mission statement, *"sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice, and thereby raising current BiH police standards"*. But what the definition of local ownership is, is debated. What is clear from this discussion is that 'control of the peace process and the future, must at least be in the hands of local actors'. The question is in what phase of the process that the local community should be in control (Huiberts 2009; 4). In this research I have used the more elaborate definition of local ownership by Collantes Celador**:** *"local participation in the reform process but also local capacity to govern policing matters"* (Collantes Celador 2009; 234).

EUPM found it important to gradually hand-over the responsibility of this reform process to legitimate representatives of the local population, thereby creating 'local ownership', and not creating top-down and imposed reforms. This resulted in a hierarchy of local decision making, from the political level down to the local police unit. On the political level the Ministerial Consultative Meeting on Police Matters was re-established. On the level of Police Commissioner/Director of Police, the Police Steering Board was re-established, both established by the mission in 2003.

        Local ownership was shaped by the development of Project Implementation Boards, as advised by EUPM, which have now been established throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. *"The Boards are responsible for developing projects at the local level and involve both the local police and EUPM advisers"*.

Besides organizing local ownership through state organized panels, like that of the Project Implementation Boards, there is also another approach to local ownership, that of local ownership through civil society's involvement. Increasingly Bosnian civil society is involved in reform processes. We see an increasing number of campaigns that call on civil society and the community to be involved in the fight against organized crime. An example is the campaign called 'Usudi Se' (Dare) that tried, through a hotline, to raise awareness about the 'harmful impact of crime on the citizen's daily lives' and motivate civilians to notify the police when criminal activities are suspected. (Vainio 2008; 5). According to Annan this *"all* [is] *an essential step forward, in that the responsibility for implementation is delegated to the level where police services are delivered, which in turn maximizes the principle of local ownership"* (Annan 2005; 6). Local ownership was also necessary as part of the 'exit strategy' of the international community and external donors (Huiberts 2009; 3).

Civil society
According to Caparini & Fluri (2006) the security sector reform literature states that another form of inclusion of citizens is through civil society. Civil society can contribute to a good functioning security sector by acting as a watchdog, mainly by representative organizations, interest groups and NGO's taking up this role. Looking at the situation in BiH, we need to be aware, that civil society (like many other parts of society), as we know it, is underdeveloped, as in most former authoritarian regimes and post-war countries. Looking at the examples in chapter 3, we still see a lack action taken by civilians. This does not mean there aren't any NGO's. Contrary, there are plenty NGO's in Mostar. But most of them are created with support from the IC and international NGO's and they are not rooted in the Mostar society. And as we can see in this chapter, this has a negative influence on the overview over the security sector, as the political oversight is also disrupted by ethnic politics. It relates closely to the observations that citizens are reluctant to take up their own responsibilities.

It was Benjamin in 1921 who foresaw some of the complexities of modern policing. He stated that the democratic police (a constructed concept, which is therefore arbitrary) must be seen to protect and represent, both the 'people' – represented as series of communities – and the state. Key characteristics for this are transparency and accountability. The police must appear to be protecting the good citizens, while identifying the criminals and preventing crimes, and to be active in the community to identify potential criminals. This makes it much more complex, intensive and time-consuming then a more authoritarian form of policing. At the same time it asks of citizens a voluntary consent, when it comes to this power of the state, in exchange for protection (census and censura) (Ball 2006; 1, Waddington 2010; 197, Bradford 2010; 179) This explains the general problem that (poor) people in (the former) non-democratic countries, complain about, which is, the police being unresponsive, corrupt and brutal. The fact that they come from a former non-democratic country means that an opinion is developed that the state takes care of everything, at the same time they might not always trust the state.

Where the police services function as may be expected of them, "*corrupt justice systems can significantly undermine their effectiveness. Inadequate and corrupt public security and justice systems have often led people to attempt to provide their own security"*.

The poor are more likely to turn to 'self-help' justice and security, including vigilantism (Human Rights Watch 2002; 7) My observation is that the situation in BiH has gone through this phase and has moved on, respondent 28 with UNIPTF mission experience directly after the war (1996-1997) and

EUPM mission experience in 2010. This does not mean that we shouldn't take this information into account. This is a situation where the police in BiH also had to go through.

Like Caparini & Fluri (2006), Ball emphasizes the importance of democratic checks and balances to prevent the security forces to be used for partisan political purposes or intervene directly in the political process (Ball 2006; 2). As I have argued in chapter 3, the doubt that is still present among many police officers is that they feel unsure about what kind approach to choose, fearing that they are to repressive, while at the same time we see citizens that are reluctant to take their own responsibilities.

<u>State – police relations</u>

Besides the above mentioned practical challenges, the scientific discussion also touches upon the academic discussion of state – police relations and the role the police (and military) play in legitimizing the state. This is relevant, as it is the exact same situation as we have in BiH, where the complete police structure (cantonal and national) represents the structure of the BiH state. Benedict Anderson studied the role the military played in legitimizing the state in post-colonial countries, like Indonesia. Based on his studies he argues that the absence of countervailing domestic powers, ethicized basis for recruitment, and military forces being used to maintain internal power structures in a country, all contribute to the central role that national armies have played in the process of the post-colonial state and nation building (Anderson 2002; 268). To me this shows great resemblance with the recent history of BiH, since the Yugoslav regime had many state forces (the JNA; Yugoslav National Army, the UDBA; department of state security, SDB; the state security service and MUP; the special police unit), including the police, at its disposal to uphold the internal power structures. These state institutes have shown great disrespect of the rights of the citizens of Yugoslavia. Like during the years 1961-1974 when student protests were beaten down by the police (Robertson; 1), but also in the nineteen eighties when the secret police pursued underground nationalist groups. And this is what they were used for; upholding and supporting Tito's regime. During the war the police were part of the inter-ethnic aggression. Therefore the police in BiH can be compared to the military in the post-colonial countries in Andersons' studies. By taking control over the reestablishment and reforms of the security sector, the international community seems to try to avoid the 'mistakes' that Anderson warns us for. This effort has resulted in monitoring the recruitment process (with the EU standard being introduced), reforming the police structure and in supporting a further 'democratization' of BiH state and entity structures. I also argue that the CP project can be placed under this umbrella, as CP creates a relationship between citizens and the state in which they are expected to work together, and gain each other's trust. Trusting that rights are guaranteed and protected and responsibilities are taken by both. This should act as a balance in the two roles of the police; repression when necessary, prevention and pro-action as much as possible.

As mentioned earlier, it is important to realize that police reforms in general are part of security sector reforms and the process of state building. The same goes for the police reforms in BiH; they play *"a key role in Bosnia and Herzegovina's internationally-supervised state building process. It is one of the four key conditions to move the country closer to its European future"* (Collantes Celador 2009; 231). This means that we should see the police as legitimizing and enforcing the state of BiH, being multiple nations in one state. A fragile construct, but a construct that could, if proven to be sustainable, be exemplary for other post conflict countries. In the next chapter this construct of multiple nations in one state will be studied more closely.

5   INSTITUTIONALIZING PEACE IN A NEW BIH

"The 1995 peace agreement was a treaty 'designed to end a war', not to built a state."
Mantra of the international officials (Chandler 2007 ; 336).

The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), that was signed in December 1995 ended the 4 year war between the warring parties in BiH. It also created a new country and a state structure, that significantly differed from the previous state structure; one that should ensure peace and stability.
In this chapter the theories of state- and nation building are explained, to offer the theoretical background of the state- and nation building process that BiH went through since the war. This should help to better understand the relationship between citizens and the state in the new reality.
A new reality in which the relationship between citizens and the state and peace between citizens, is institutionalized through the state structure on national, federational and local level.

5.1   State- and nation building

The DPA (and especially the appendixes) deal with state-building and the reconstruction of society and thereafter with ending hostilities, according to David Chandler (2007; 339). Now, 17 years after the DPA was signed, BiH is considered a weak state (Chandler 2007; 346). According to Bose, who studied BiH and other countries where a state building process is taking place, the state needs strengthening, because a weak state is an ideal breeding ground for criminal networks and networks of 'elite' that *"exploit public resources for personal enrichment"* (Bose 2002; 26). Chandler is more cynical, he states that the political process since Dayton can be described as *"the continuation of war by other means"* (Chandler 2007; 336). And this is exactly why the abstract topic of state- and nation building, but also security sector reforms, relates closely to the feeling of citizens in Mostar, that not only the police are inefficient, but that this can be linked to the weakness of state institutions on cantonal and national level in BiH.

Theoretically the dominant political institutions are; state and nation. In a post-war situation, like that of BiH, both need to be rebuilt. It is important to understand that in most common theories the two are inseparable. To create a better understanding of both concepts, these concepts need to be defined first, before I can explain the process of state- and nation building per concept.

The state
The state is defined by Weber (in v. Hoof & Ruysseveldt 1998; 187) as a human society, bound to a certain territory, with the monopoly on the use of force and raising taxes, that enable the state to govern the country. The state is legitimized to constrain and coerce people, and maintain behavioural norms, and the state controls the definition of public interest (Nagengast 1994; 116).
In addition, the 'modern nation-state' can be characterized by a claim over one territory by only one authority. The nation-state is supposed to provide a homogeneous order and peace within the territorial borders and to provide citizens with equal rights. Other theories describe the state as being a social contract on the use of violence, also described as law preserving and law making powers. And in yet another theory the protection that the state should provide is defined more specifically, pointing out that the state should protect against violence from outside the territory and emphasizing that the *"locally powerful demand tribute in order to stave off their own violence"* (Tilly 1985 in Kelly & Shah 2006; 251).

Despite this, it still results in a definition of the state being the political management of a specific geographic territory and its inhabitants, done by a centralized government, with its institutions and public servants. These institutions and its public servants need to act 'impersonal', while they are said to be a mirror of the society (Nagengast 1994: 116).

There are two theories concerning the origin of the state, the first being the conflict theory, that sees the emergence of the state as a way for the elite to remain in power over their subordinates (amongst others Kelly & Shah 2006; 250). The second sees the emergence of the state as providing stability for increased complexity, beneficial for the growth and development of that state.

Theories that define the state make it clear that the state should be able to manage state-society expectations and is only successful when it is considered legitimate in the eyes of its population. The state can only do this based on a minimum administrative capacity. It should have a functioning civil service and a 'public financial management system', that is able to raise funds, mainly in the form of taxation (Fragile States Group 2008; 38). State building subsequently, is the process through which states are supposed to (re)function more effectively and according to certain standards. The OECD-DAC's Fragile States Group (2008), states that it is therefore necessary to develop *"capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state, driven by state-society relationships"*. In the situation of BiH this definition of the OECD-DAC's Fragile States Group proves inadequate. Legitimacy of the state still needs to prove itself in BiH. In the DPA the new state of BiH was recognized, a state covering most of the geographical area of republic BiH that existed before in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but with a new state form and apparatus, different from that of former Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina. It is my opinion that the layered and diffuse structure of the state of BiH, that is so characteristic for the current state, and a result of the war history and international political considerations, makes that people's loyalties are not always connected with the state of BiH. State building had to take place and the legitimacy of the state, being the FBiH and the state of BiH, needed to prove itself. In other words; *"the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubts or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to"* (Bose 2002; 3).

During a visit to BiH, in October 2010, Mrs. Clinton, Secretary of state of the USA, talked about the importance of putting differences behind you, as the love for the same country should be put above that. Like she did after she opposed Barrack Obama, when running for office, and lost. Working under president Obama meant putting the differences behind her. A student present at the venue told her; *"You said that you love the same state. Unfortunately, that is the major problem we have here. Our politicians often prefer other countries more than our state"*. She seemed to be referring to Milorad Dodik, the newly elected, outspoken nationalist Bosnian Serb leader who is now president of the Bosnian Serb republic (RS). Mr. Dodik has called Bosnia an 'impossible state' and has said he wanted his republic to secede (Cooper 2010; 2). The layered and defuse structure, makes it almost impossible for BiH to become one state, to which all groups feel the same loyalty. This is partly due to the underlying motivation behind the layered and defuse structure, being the fact that the ethnic groups are given as much independence as possible. Something that finds its origin in the negotiations, that, according to David Chandler (2007; 336), were conducted by the nationalist political parties of the ethnic groups, parties that were also the instigators of the war in BiH and who were also influenced by the fact that both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats get their support from an influential neighbouring country.

This fact causes all kinds of problems, for instance when it comes to the role of the state in the provision of safety and security, because, as said before, the state has a monopoly on the use of violence. In return, the state is responsible for providing safety and security to its citizens. This can be seen as a social contract. The common institution responsible for the provision of security within BiH, (as compared to external, done by the military) is the police. When looking at the organizational structure of BiH the questions arise, what is the state, on what level does it operate, and what state level is then responsible to provide safety and security. There is a central state (BiH), which is consisting of the FBiH and the RS. To make it more complex, in the FBiH there are 10 cantons (among which the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton in which Mostar is situated), that are, to a large extend, independent when it comes to safety and security policies. Crimes do not have the tendency to stop at the borders of a canton, or the tendency to restrict itself to one ethnic group. As we have been able to read in the previous chapter, the police structure is connected to the political structure, and therefore, in FBiH, it's the canton that is responsible for its police. Considering the fact that there are 10 cantonal police services, chances are that criminals are able to get away, due to (communication) problems between the different police services. As is confirmed by respondent 27, a EUPM police officer working on management level, who states that cooperation between the cantonal police services, is depending on personal relationships between police commissioners. When it comes to practical cooperation he sees that in many cases the cooperation is good (there where the personal relationship between police commissioners is good), but sharing information is a bigger problem.

The IC has been actively involved in creating institutions and thereby trying to organize the countries state structure, from the moment the DPA was drafted. In the DPA, article III, for instance, the division of responsibilities between the state and the entities (FBiH and RS) is being defined. Some say that the attempts of the IC have been aimed at centralizing the organization of BiH, suggesting a preference of the IC for the mono-national federation, based on the common theoretical ideal of a nation-state, meaning that there would be one state (as there is now) but also one nation. The assumption being that this would decrease the animosity among the different ethnicities within BiH.

The nation
What is considered to be a nation? When studying literature on this topic, we can distinguish many different definitions. Mauss for instance, defines a nation as follows; *"We understand by nation, a society integrated in material and moral terms, with a stable and permanent central power, fixed frontiers, and a relatively stable moral, mental and cultural unity among the inhabitants who consciously respect the state and abide by its laws* (1969: 584, translated), and by this he is incorporating the state and the nation. Kuzio underlines Mauss' description of the nation by stating that the nation is characterized by a collective power, creating a 'we' and by citing Dahl (1989) who argues with Mauss the presence of 'fixed borders' and 'a people'. According to Dahl, if these presuppositions are not present and if there is a political community who calls these borders into question, democratization will not be conciliated (Kuzio 2001; 171). Amitai Etzioni, in his article 'citizenship in a communitarian perspective' (2011; 336), focusses more on values, traditions, identity and the ideas about the future. All these descriptions show a resemblance and focus on similarities between the values and morals of people living in a certain geographical area, creating a sense of belonging to that place and togetherness with these other people.

Benedict Anderson takes another approach and goes into the question, what makes a nation? He defines a nation as; *"an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign"* (Anderson 1983; 57).

'Imagined' because members of a nation, even the smallest ones, will not get to know each other. Feeling part of the nation means you will have to imagine this nation to be present. Althusser 1971 in Bowman (2003; 334) states that in the case of Yugoslavia national aspirations of the different groups within the country were combined with the image of the Yugoslav nation. People recognized that they were addressed by this 'new' community, and that they were part of it. Anderson ascribes an important role to communication done by the media. Bowman is critical about Benedict Anderson's theory. He argues that communication can help promote the abstract idea of a community, but it is all about the meaning of the idea that is communicated that determines if people are able to identify with it and fight for it. Identifying is done based on an identity that is already present, and the individual needs - the worries this individual has - being addressed in the media. When this happens than the worries that individual experiences become a collective phenomenon as they are explained in nationalist terms. The image people have of the nation is determined by the way the nation is being displayed, but just as important is the way people see the nation themselves, based on their own experiences (Bowman 1994; 142). Even though people might be chasing a fantasy, when it feels as a coherent world this can be cause for citizens to take (violent) action (Bowman 2003; 321). This violence is an important aspect of nationalism, as, according to Bowman, nationalism seems to originate from violence. This violence can be imaginary, when people of a (non-existing) nation feel that violence is inflicted on them, making them feel that they can only be safe when they embrace an independent state (Bowman 2003; 319, Tilly 1985 in Kelly & Shah 2006; 251) . This new nation functions as an antidote to the (imagined) violence that is threatening them. The fact that people, who have not felt part of that certain community or nation before, now suddenly become part of it, due to the imagined threat.

Gellner (1964; 169) helps us answer the question if nations are created by nationalism, because it is present below the surface. He argues that nationalism invents nations where they do not exist. This theoretical statement can be best illustrated by the case of former Yugoslavia. Although large parts of the territory of Yugoslavia were under Austria-Hungarian rule before WWI, it was only when Yugoslavia became a country (Kingdom of Yugoslavia) after WWI, that the ideal of one nation came up. By hard repression King Alexander perused this ideal. As did Tito, who lead the liberation of Yugoslavia after WWII and who brought the different republics together into the federation of Yugoslavia. Through media and education, but also through repression, (imprisoning many 'nationalistic' leaders) Tito created a common history and ideology, and through that a new nation was created. But as we can see in this thesis, recent history of that same Yugoslavia has shown that Yugoslav nationalism, as it was created by Tito, did not last for eternity. Because from the 1980's onwards, nationalistic movements mainly in Serbia and Croatia picked up again, that ultimately led to the war that broke up Yugoslavia. Studies of transition in post-communist states (showing close resemblances to the socialist Yugoslavia) show that where a national identity is present, transition becomes more easy. Examples of the easier transition, for the author, are Poland and the Czech republic (Kuzio 2001; 172). Taking these historic events in account, the process of existence and disappearing of nationalism never stops. We can see this all around the world, but also close to home. The Netherlands emerged out of individual states to form one nation state. But now, in an age of globalization, new alliances are formed. Where European cooperation and unity is increasing on one hand, regional sentiments are also increasing on the other.

Nationalism finds its origin in the industrial revolution. Because of the increasing mobility, ties based on kinship, religion and local communities weaken and decrease and there is a need for a cohesive ideology. Like theories on the state there are two main theoretical explanations on the origins of the nation.

- One argues that a nation existed naturally before the emergence of the states, with the nations being unique and distinctive (Nagengast 1994; 117).

- The other theory states that nations are constructed by its members by a sense of collectiveness and commonality. (Anderson 1983, Camoroff 1987, 1989, 1992, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, Kedourie 1985, Smith 1987, Tambiah 1988 in (Nagengast 1994; 118).

There are different mediums that contribute to homogenization, necessary for nationalism; the art of printing and a common language that both offer an opportunity to share knowledge and create 'shared knowledge'. When we observe the current situation in BiH we see that newspapers are often connected with ethnic groups; Croats in Mostar reading the 'local' Dnevni List in Croat language, or the Zagreb based newspapers, while the Bosniacs read the Sarajevo based newspapers. A common spoken language is present, although Serbs use the Cyrillic language in writing. All people can understand each other when talking. It was only when Yugoslavia fell apart, differences within the language were highlighted, to create distinct languages. The last medium to contribute to homogenization, necessary for nationalism is the education system. According to the constitution of FBiH (1995), *"cantons are solely responsible for developing educational policies, including declarations for education, ensuring education, as well as developing and implementing cultural policies"*. Like many things in FBiH, the education administration is organized on several levels, including federation, canton, municipality, and school levels, resulting in many challenges when implementing the education policies, regulated by law. *"One dilemma concerns the question of whether to organize the public education system into special national schools with separate curricula"* (Pasalic-Kreso 1999; 1).

This situation is resembled by the Gymnasium in Mostar, the oldest and highly respected educational institution in Mostar. Once home to the intelligentsia of the city, now, under huge pressure from the IC, offers secondary education to students of all ethnic groups, but at separate times during the day. While an educational institution is a place where the youth of a country can come together to learn a common language and history, in BiH they are separated and are taught their own language and own history. According to Bose, young generations can be brought closer together by encouraging schools, that are teaching different curricula in the same school, to introduce 'shared and common' elements in the curricula. It is his opinion that this strategy can only be realized if the IC can persuade the Serbs and the Croats to accept *"that the 'shared and common' heritage pertains not just all Bosnians cutting across distinctions of denomination, nationality and entity, but the peoples and successor-states of former Yugoslavia as a whole"* (Bose 2002; 136).

Figure 4.3   Gymnasium in Mostar

Like Mauss, many theories have connected the nation and the state with a society (Grillo 1980 in Reis 2004; 252). The result of this is that citizenship is being seen as the outcome of the connection between 'authority, dealing with power of the state, and 'solidarity' and the feeling of belonging through a common identity, being the nation (Bendix, 1964; Reis, 1988, 1997 in Reis 2004; 252). Or as Weber says; *"One might well define the concept of nation in the following way: a nation is a community of sentiment which normally tends to produce a state of its own"* (Weber, 1946:176). It all relates to the current situation in BiH where there is one country, one state, (although very defuse), but more than one nation.

The following quote of Alija Izetbegovic (former president of BiH) shows the immediate challenge when suggesting such a solution for BiH. *"If we hold a rally for democracy, a few intellectuals show up; but if we hold one for the (ethnic) nation, thousands of people will take part"* (Izetbegovic in Hayden 1993; 73). Thus indicating that, by no means, is there one nation in BiH. Despite the fact that officially there are only two entities (the FBiH and the RS) it becomes clear from all observations, interviews and literature, that a large majority of citizens still do not share the feeling of being 'Bosnians', or being member of the Federation of BiH (Croats and Bosniacs), for that matter. It's only the Serbs in the RS that can be considered to have a semi-nation state.

According to Kuzio (2001; 174, based on Bunce 1999 & Offe 1991) there is an ideal sequence in rebuilding a 'civic state'; 1) state & nation building, 2) establishing a market economy, 3) democracy. But instead, in BiH all these this are happening at the same time. Many scholars argue that the lack of civic nationalism (opposed to ethnic nationalism) influences this process of transition negatively. This makes political and economic improvements less supported.

Scholars today argue that in many countries this concept of the nation-state is outdated. Some have even said the days of the nation-state, as we know it, are over (Van Creveld, 1999). And whether or not this is completely true, we can see this change in the form of the increased formation of independent regions with their own nationhood (Basque in Spain, the nations making up the U.K.), but also in Africa (the creation of South-Sudan) and the situation in the Middle East.

Despite this change I experienced the need among the politicians and the citizens in BiH for a nation-state, or states. But they all have totally different views on the makeup of this nation state, depending on the group they belong to. The case of BiH does clearly show that the different national affiliations do not overlap the design of the state. The state of BiH has to deal with affiliations of three different nations, being the Croat, Bosniac and Serb entities, with a further difficulty that the Croats and Bosniacs form one federation. At the same time these nations are closely related to the neighbouring, and more homogeneous, nation-states of Croatia and Serbia. This last means that for the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia there is little need and little interest to work together for the BiH state. Combined with the lack of trust in politicians and a lack of experience with the concept of accountability through elections means that a majority of the citizens of BiH is not investing in political participation (Devine & Mathisen 2005; 10).

The situation described above is a clear example of people living in a structure where multiple loyalties are present. They need to determine their loyalties within their canton, their entity and in BiH as a country. This all seems to be in contradiction with theories concerning the necessary circumstances of a 'successful' country. Scholars like Mill say that citizens should share a common nationality, with common sympathies. This would make people more willing to work together and be under the same government (Mill 1861 in Baubock 2000; 7). Cosmopolitan liberals denounce ethnic nationalism and promote civic & constitutional patriotism which could be transformed to larger units (Baubock 2000; 7). Both views on the loyalties of people seem far from reality in BiH.

The problem in BiH is that none of the representatives of the ethnic groups, that are in power, want to be in either of the federations (FBiH or the federation forming the state of BiH). The Bosniacs and Croats need to be in the FBiH, to counter balance the Serbs, while all 3 need to be in the federation BiH, as any other solution would lead to the collapse of BiH. And that option is not accepted by the IC. According to Chandler it was because the IC foresaw this position of the different groups, that the state structure was not submitted for any parliamentary procedure or election. Instead the elections, nine months after signing the DPA, based on the constitution, had to restore BiH's ownership (Chandler 2007; 339). In general the Bosniac representatives always preferred a federation as a solution for BiH, hoping that this would lead to a centralized and unitary state, while (again in general) the Bosnian Croat representatives prefer a solution in which three equal entities form the BiH federation. The Bosnian Serbs representatives prefer a similar solution with responsibilities decentralized to the entities as much as possible.

The information on the content of the newly created constitution of BiH and the knowledge on the situation on the ground, being that people are citizen of the state of BiH, but are part of different nations referring to the entities, supports Halfmann's argument that *"the erosion of the state's capacity to uphold the fusion of 'nation' and state"* is *"a consequence of the functional differentiation of modern society"*. But Halfmann's conclusions are based on the observations of processes in, what he calls 'modern society'. Without wanting to go into a debate about how modern BiH is, I would argue that the events on the time path of BiH are very different from the events on the time path of other countries where the capabilities of the state, to uphold this fusion, seem to diminish. But, where his argument does fit the situation in BiH is when he states that the current state's weakness *"results from the limits of territoriality as a basis for membership vis-a-vis the transnational membership"*. Bosnian-Croats ascribe membership first of all to their ethnic group, then to an ideal of an own state; Herzeg-Bosna, and thirdly to the state of Croatia, many having a dual citizenship, both that of BiH and of Croatia.

The Bosnian-Croats I have spoken about this matter, do make a clear distinction, they are first of all Bosnian-Croats. They feel much more related to the state of Croatia (and to the nation) than to the state of BiH. A similar situation exists with the Bosnian Serbs).

This is confirmed by the observations of the former Slovenian president Milan Kučan. He stated that *"these three concepts (the three conflicting views on what kind of a state Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs can share) never really met, let alone reconciled.."* (Crisis Group, Bosnia Briefing N°62 6 May 2011). It shows that Baubock is right in saying that *"expanding democracy across borders cannot be accomplished by an appeal on morality or reason even when the appropriate institutions are being created, especially when the loyalties and interests of people are being 'threatened' by this new authority"* (Baubock 2000; 5). In my opinion this means that many people will keep defying the authority of the state and its institutions as long as they don't feel represented by these institutions. And the same goes for the civil servants working for these institutions, they constantly need to juggle with their loyalties. Loyalty to the law of the state that they are representing and enforcing, but also loyalty to their social background and their personal beliefs. It shows that there is a gap between the theories on the state and the nation, and the realities in BiH. While the organisations and the structures of the state are being provided legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens of BiH cannot be provided. It needs to be earned. The legitimacy, in my eyes, is closely related to the nation, that, as we have been able to read, is present in many different appearances, making it hard to fit the available theories. In the next paragraph more will be clarified on how the state structure were created, and how the design tried to form a bridge between the theories on the state and nation, and the realities in BiH.

5.2   How peace in BiH was institutionalized

To end a war, all kinds of tools are available, both military and diplomatic. Preventing war from happening again needs totally different tools, and more importantly, as we have been able to read in the previous paragraph, prevention needs a sustainable solution. In Dayton Ohio, the IC tried to find that sustainable solution in the form of a new state structure for a new nation, being Bosnia and Herzegovina, *"on the basis of little more than the ruins and rivalries of a bitter war"* (Bose 2002; 1). This state structure was defined in the DPA, and its main focus was safeguarding the security and position of all ethnic groups within BiH. As we have been able to read in chapter 3, this structure has great influence on the effectiveness of the state and its institutions, and the way citizens perceive and trust the state. To be able to better understand the reactions of my respondents, a better knowledge of the new state structure and the ideas behind it is necessary. Therefore in this paragraph an overview of the state structure and how this structure came to existence, characteristics of federations, preferred state form by each of the ethnic groups and information on the governing structure of the city of Mostar.

To safeguarding the security and position of all ethnic groups within BiH, decentralization was introduced. Post war BiH was divided in two entities, the FBiH consisting of Bosniacs and Croats (51% of the territory) and the Republika RS (49% of the territory). The proportions were the result of the situation on the battlefield, where the Bosnian Serbs were still strong despite the offensives of the Croat and Bosniac armies and the involvement of the IC, together with the diplomatic aim to have the FBiH to form a counter weight for the Bosnian Serbs.

The country as a whole is governed by a three man presidency and a Parliamentary Assembly consisting of two chambers; the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The presidency consists of one Serb, one Croat and one Bosniac, directly elected by the people from their own entities.

The state of BiH has only limited powers. It deals with foreign politics, foreign trade, customs, monetary policy, inter-entity communication, international and inter-entity law enforcement, and transportation (Chandler 2000; 67). *"The Federation is given exclusive responsibilities for defence, …. combating terrorism, inter-cantonal crimes, drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime;.. "* (Bose 2002; 70).

A federation is defined as a constitutional division of decision making power, between two or more territorial levels of government (Bose 2002; 241). Federations are said to be one of the two ways to built new political communities, based on former national identities (Baubock 2000; 7). Federalism is based on loyalties to the unit(s) that make up the overarching federation. That is way it is possible to address the internal demand for self-government while being able to work inside a larger unit of the federation. The other way would be 'assimilation' into the larger community that replicates the particular traits of nationhood.

There are many possible designs of federations, but in general two designs can be distinguished;
- National(izing) / mono-national federation is aiming to make a sovereign polity with a national culture. The federation is a step towards a centralized state that should create this polity and culture**,** which, in general, is the ideal of the Bosniacs.
- Multi ethnic / multinational federalism, a design based on two or more national or ethnic cultures, that will be expressed, institutionalized and protected in the design. The design rejects integration and assimilation, and instead believes in the possibility of multiple national loyalties**,** a design that is more in line with the ideas of the Croats and Serbs as more autonomy is guaranteed.

Currently BiH is structured along the lines of this second design. The problem is that they were not dealing with two or three equal entities who each could take up an equal share in the federation. Instead they were dealing with two entities; the FBiH and the RS. The FBiH is a federation consisting of Croats and Bosniacs. The FBiH is made up of ten cantons, being federal units, all with a decentralized form of self-governance. This means that *"all governmental functions and powers not specifically assigned to the national level, among others law enforcement, are the responsibility of the canton governments"* (Chandler 2000; 67). Out of the ten cantons five are predominantly Bosniac, three predominantly Croat, and two have a mixed populations, among these two is the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (Canton 7). As we could see in paragraph 4.2 with the example of the logo's designed for the different levels of the state, it is stipulated that the cantons shall be named solely after the cities which are the seats of the respective cantonal governments or after regional geographic features. Interesting enough this approach for the names of the administrative regions was also taken during Yugoslav times, when it was meant to *"banish names of Serbian or Croatian national(ist) connotation"* (Bose 2002; 77). Within the RS on the other hand there is a strong central form of governance, with no cantonal structure; instead there is a national government and sixty-plus municipalities. The police services are centrally governed, with five police districts (Brčko district not taken into account).

This structure was both the outcome of negotiations and of the work of a team of American diplomats and lawyers who were involved in preparing suggestions for the state model during the negotiations in Dayton. This can be read in the book of the chief negotiator Holbrook (1998). The result of this work on the state structure ended up in the DPA as annex 4; the constitution of BiH. This made Bose (2002; 60) claim that BiH is *"a state by international design and of international designs"* a rightful one.

In practice, this federal structure of BiH means that citizens are both members of their entity and of the federation(s) (Bosniac – Bosnian-Croat federation and the federation of the two entities, FBiH and RS) and this last one, the federal state of BiH itself is *"composed of individual citizens as well as of the states"*. Sovereignty of the state BiH (foreign policy) is located at the federal (BiH) government, while the internal sovereignty (amongst many other, education, police, healthcare etc.) is shared between the state of BiH and the entities, and in case of the Bosniacs and Croats, also within their cantons (Baubock 2000; 11).

Under constant debate

A returning debate is that of the favoured state form of BiH. Outcome of the DPA was the division of power based on the population proportions (favoured by the Bosniacs), while the Croats wanted an equal division, resulting in three entities (Bose 2002; 88). This choice indicates a choice for the multinational federation model. The recurring argument is that the current state form is not working the way it should. Therefore many Croats argue that a change of state form should be allowed, meaning that the DPA principals should be omitted. This change could develop in two directions. One direction advocates action by the IC to further integrate BiH into a federative association, while the other direction advocates that the IC should allow a 'hard partition', meaning the disintegration of the country. It is mostly leaders of the Republika Srpska, and in lesser numbers the Croat political leaders, that advocate for a 'hard partition' (Bose 2002; 92). One of the reasons for this disagreement on the future of BiH can be found in the explanation of the cause of the war. Most Croats and Serbs in BiH see the most recent war as a 'Civil War' while, most Bosniacs see it as an act of 'external aggression'. They argue that the republic of BiH was founded in April 1992, that was reaffirmed by the Dayton Peace Agreement at the end of 1995 (Bose 2002; 19), and through that became a legitimate state that was invaded by 'foreign' troops, like the YNA, led by Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, and the Croat National Army assisted by militarized groups from the local Serb and Croat population. According to David Owen (negotiator in BiH between 1992 and 1994), the *"borders - the internal boundaries of the six republics in the former Yugoslavia and the boundaries of the current independent states - should have been negotiable"*. *Not allowing this greatly hampered the EC's attempts at crisis management in July-August 1991"* (Bose 2002; 49). By saying this he meant that he was open to the creation of new countries with a different map. By not allowing a 'hard partition', not many other solutions are left. The solution chosen in Dayton, a decentralized organization of the country divided along ethnical lines, is what is left. A 'soft partition', with a weak (central) government and ideally, more mixing of people each year (Bose 2002; 46), might well be the only possible solution, according to Robert Dahl; *"a complex system with several layers of democratic government, each operating with somewhat different agenda"* (Bose 2002; 94).

The most important question remains however; is the solution that the IC seems to propagate a solution that fits the realities of BiH. Does this solution take into account the historical context and institutional precedent that combined make the national-collective identities (Bose 2002; 93)? For now, the path chosen did not get full support of everyone in BiH. *"Paris studied this approach and concludes: "it still provides a better basis for international engagement with conflict-torn societies that the alternatives- giving up on the challenge of building co-existence between groups and effectively sponsoring partition"* (Pars, R. 1997 in Bose 2002; 90). While F. Whelan (1983, in Bose 2002; 48) argues that when the politicians dispute the boundaries, or *"the extent and compositions of the political community",* the sovereignty (the democratic power of the state over the citizens in the country) of the unit (being the country BiH) is being disputed. During my research I have heard several employees of international organizations say that the Dayton Peace agreement is not sufficient anymore.

Because of how the political system of BiH was designed the political situation is now in a deadlock (respondent 1). But as the researchers mentioned above argue, the question is whether or not there is a better solution for the problems faced. All of the described solutions come with another set of challenges. And that is where the problem starts. No one knows what to go for anymore. Politicians on all sides have not fully accepted the chosen solution and stall every important decision that needs to be taken, until the OHR forces a solution (see among others, the election of the mayor in Mostar). This situation contributes greatly to the lack of trust between citizens and the police as representatives of the state. If the politicians responsible for the creation of laws and supervision of state are not able to agree, why listen to the directives of the officers representing that state and the law?

As mentioned, the IC was closely involved in drafting the constitution of BiH, not only in the field of the state structure, but also in other parts of the constitution. One of the things that really changed for the people of BiH, with the new constitutions, was the in-cooperation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in article II of the constitution (in Annex I of the constitution, an overview of the additional human rights agreements that now apply to BiH, is given). This does not mean that citizens had no rights in Yugoslavia. Just as today, the state of Yugoslavia was responsible for securing the rights of its citizens (Le Monde 2006), but the war made people experience that citizen rights were neither universal nor secure. Trust in these (new) rights needs to be restored by the current state.

5.3 The city of Mostar

Mostar is one of the few cities in the federation of Bosnian-Croats and Bosniacs that is made up of almost equal numbers of both ethnic groups, and has only a small percentage of Bosnian-Serb inhabitants. Before the war the population of Mostar was divided along the following numbers; the largest number of the population ,34,6%, was Bosniac (43.930), 34% of the population was Croat (43.037), 18,8% was Serb (23.846) and the smallest group of the population,10,1%, was the Yugoslavs (12.768) (fsz.ba; 1991). This percentage of people that choose to identify themselves with the 'supranational status of Yugoslav' was remarkably high, compared to the rest of BiH (5,5%). Mostar was a vibrant, cosmopolitan and tolerant city, while the surrounding area can be characterized as being inhabited by traditional and rural communities. The closest town to the west of Mostar is Siroki Brijeg, with a 99 per cent Croat population.

The war influenced the numbers strongly. Many Serb inhabitants were driven out in 1992 as Bosnian-Croat and Bosniac troops opposed the occupying Serbian, controlled YNA and Serb paramilitary forces, and eventually drove them out of Mostar. Out of the twenty thousand Serbs in Mostar before the war, only a thousand remained. After the war, new citizens came to the city from the countryside where they were either driven out because of the war, or they came because they sought new opportunities in the city. Since the war both ethnic groups (Croat and Bosniac) have argued that they are the largest group and therefore are entitled to more (political) power. But no census has been conducted, so there is no exact data on the number of people, and their ethnicity, in Mostar. As respondent 27 explained to me, having that census could lead to an unpleasant conclusion for one of the ethnic groups. Respondent 27 even argues that it is not good for the people in Mostar to know the exact number of (ethnic) people and they should rather settle for the idea that both groups are approximately the same size, meaning that they should work together to govern the city.

<u>Governing the city</u>

To govern this city a complex structure of the division of power has been created based on the Interim Statute of the City of Mostar. The goal was to give all inhabitants of the city a (fair) share in governing the city and its surrounding area.

The IC took the initiative to negotiate a Statute of Mostar, and getting the local strongmen to agree. This did not happen without fierce discussions and the IC showing its muscle by ordering a structure for Mostar. Local Croats reacted by protesting and attacking the IC representative(s) in the streets of Mostar. This led to an emergency EU meeting where the pressure of the large neighbour Croatia, through EU member states, was applied, and the plan altered. It finally resulted in a structure in which the city of Mostar was divided in sectors (3 and 3) assigned to the two ethnicities, while a central sector was meant for the city authorities, that would both work from that sector and govern it. The city council is made up of members of all ethnicities, so this sector was seen as the central sector.

When talking to two Croat Mostarian students studying at the University of Mostar (respondent 37 & 38), they were quick to mention the political construction in Mostar and in BiH as an important factor for making the society dysfunctional. When they refer to the political construction they mean the power division within the local government in Mostar and the power division in the state of BiH. According to these two respondents the Croatian citizens of Mostar were *"deprived of their fundamental rights"*, namely that the Croatian citizens should be provided with a political system that recognizes the majority vote. According to them *"it is the most democratic system after all"*. Respondent 37 is sure the Croats have a majority in Mostar, and argues that; *"it is only fair, as in other cities in BiH, like Banja Luka and Sarajevo**, the other ethnic groups* (red. Being the Serbs in Banja Luka and the Bosniacs in Sarajevo) *have a democratic majority* (red. and therefore political power).*"*

6   RISE AND FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA

It is undeniable that the war that destroyed all that was left of Yugoslavia has had great influence on the current situation of BiH. Whether it was the social and cultural makeup of the country, the relationship between citizens and the state, or the situation in the city of Mostar. In this chapter a short overview of the war in Yugoslavia that led to the independence of BiH and of the country that the socialist state of Yugoslavia was before, and how it came to be that country. Aimed at putting in perspective that what I observed, what people told me and what literature refers to, concerning the relationship between the current situation in Mostar, and the history of the country.

6.1   How war in Yugoslavia led to independence of BIH

In 1990, nationalistic and separatist sentiments led to the collapse of Yugoslavia. Milosevic's call for a Greater Serbia grew and Slovenia and Croatia representatives left from a tense and heated congress of the communist parties of the federation of Yugoslavia. It was the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. Each and every republic belonging to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had to decide whether to stay in the Federation or to declare its independence. It was in this year that elections were being held in BiH. Alija Izetbegovic, the later president of BiH, participated in this election and it was his political party that won the elections. In 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, in the case of Slovenia this involved only a short battle, but in the case of Croatia the Serbs in Croatia resisted a separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia by declaring the independent republic of Srpska Krajina. These Serbs wanted to become part of Milosevic's Greater Serbia. Now, 15 years after the war we know they didn't succeed. BiH had two choices, declaring an independent state, like Slovenia and Croatia did, or to join Milosevic's Yugoslavia. In 1992 a referendum was held among the citizens of BiH and the majority of the people voted for independence and implicitly for a war with Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs.

On the 6th of April 1993 the EU and the USA recognized the independence of BiH. Soon thereafter Serbs managed to capture more than half of BiH and as the war raged on, both in the Serb and in the Croat and Bosniac controlled areas, ethnic cleansing took place. Politicians that orchestrated these atrocities were cooperating with criminal networks, a way, these politicians said, to defend the interest of their people, but a cooperation that turned out to last till after the war, and therefore decreasing citizens trust in politicians even further (Devine & Mathisen 2005; 9). The Croats and Bosniacs formed an alliance to fight off the Serbs, but in the meanwhile the Croats founded the 'Croatian Republic Herzeg-Bosna'. It was not until 1995 that the 'Croatian Republic Herzeg-Bosna' was dissolved under pressure of the UN.

<u>The war in Mostar</u>

In Mostar, the alliance between de Bosniacs and the Croats turned out to be weak and while tensions rose and the number of conflicts between the two parties increased. In 1993 fights over the reign in the city, broke out, between Bosniacs and Bosnian-Croats. This led to the destruction of large parts of the city, including the bridge in Mostar of the 16th century, which was built by the Ottomans and a symbol of the cultural diversity of Bosnia that connected the Croat side of the city with the Bosniac side. The fights made large numbers of citizens leave the city, but the conflict was not fought along clear lines of division. While Bosniacs fought together with Serbs against the Croats in Herzegovina (Mostar area), Bosniac groups fought each other in North-West Bosnia, and at the same time in central Bosnia the Croats and Serbs joined to fight the Bosniacs.

It was in these years that the UN started to install their safe havens to protect the Bosniacs in Sarajevo, Gorazde en Srebrenica. Between July 6 – 16, 1995 the 'safe haven' Srebrenica was captured by the Bosnian Serbs, led by the Bosnian Serb Ratko Mladic. Thousands of Muslim men and boys were being separated from the rest of their families and later killed, despite the presence of UN soldiers (NIOD 2002; 2533).

Diminishing trust
In all of the wars that took place between 1990 and 1995 in Slovenia, Croatia and BiH, nationality, ethnicity and religion played a key role. Not only armies, but also paramilitary groups, police officers and civilians faced each other with violence. The police, divided among ethnic lines, took part in the military campaigns against armed forces - army, police and militia units - of the other warring parties. These warring parties did not stick to military campaigns only, they also terrorized citizens.
Where police officers could be expected to protect civilians, during and after the war in BiH the police forces often had been protecting their own ethnic civilians and encountered the civilians of the other ethnicity with violence. Striking examples were the police assisting in the removal of the local people of another ethnicity, leaving an ethnic homogenous area, a process that can be called 'ethnic cleansing' (ICG 2000; 18 and CPCS 2011; 98). Ethnic cleansing is more than just a horrible human crime and catastrophe, it can also be seen as a deliberate policy to alter the socio- geographical makeup of (parts of) the country.

An important observation made by one of my respondents working in the education sector was that the power of the state, and people's trust in that state, was lost during the war (respondent 19). The state that once was strong and united, was not anymore. Their state, which always knew what was best for its citizens, wasn't there anymore. Instead, there was violence all around, and the state(s) that existed was only interested in the benefits of their ethnic group, the safety of people no longer seemed to be a priority. Leading to distrust among citizens and distrust between citizens and the (other) state(s).

We could say that the one positive thing was that due to the fall of the safe havens and the ethnic cleansing that followed, the IC committed itself to end this war. It led to an increase of their negotiation efforts, but probably more importantly, to the increased use of military force. A series of intensive military campaigns by the West, against the Bosnian Serbs, altered the proportions on the battlefield. For the first time, the Croats and Bosniacs were able to drive the Bosnian Serbs out of large areas they occupied, resulting in a situation in which there was almost a 50-50 division between the Bosnian Serbs and the Croats and Bosniacs together. This changed the willingness of the parties to engage in negotiations. Holbrook, the American negotiator, was able to get the parties together and have them agree upon the DPA in the end (Bose 2002; 2).

6.2   Socialist Yugoslavia; unity and diversity

The history of BiH before the most recent was can be described as tumultuous, with wars playing an important role in this history of the country, as did the political changes that followed these wars. For this thesis it is important to have an understanding of this tumultuous history, as it formed the foundation for the new country of BiH that came into existence. As we can read in chapter 3, this history also had impact on the social structure in BiH and in Mostar specifically, and on the relationship and trust between citizens and between citizens and the state.

Over the past 1000 years Bosnia and Herzegovina have been confronted with occupation, annexation and foreign influence. From 1180 to 1463 Bosnia was an independent kingdom, but thereafter foreign influence started to grow. It were the Ottoman Turks that invaded the region at the end of the 14th century and ruled there for some 500 years. From 1580 to 1878 Bosnia became an 'ayalet', being the largest territorial unit in the Turkish Empire (Izetbegovic 2001). This Ottoman influence can still be seen, for instance in the name Balkan which derives from Turkish and means mountain. The name has been used for this area since the early 19th century. At the end of the 17th century the Austro-Hungarian Empire gained influence in the region. It managed to gradually take over the power in the region of the Ottoman Turks. In 1878 the Austrians occupied Bosnia and in 1908 Bosnia and Herzegovina was annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire (BBC s.a.).

It was during these Austro-Hungarian times that the administrators concluded that *"Integration (the effort to encourage a nationally neutral 'Bosnian' identity that would eliminate appeal of national – particularly Serb- identities), in the conventionally understood sense of the term, is simply not an option in Bosnia"* (Bose 2002; 31). Instead the different 'nationalities' were given a place in the governing structures of the country. This continued until Yugoslav times (Bose 2002; 45). And it were the nationalistic powers during Yugoslav times, that led to the nationalistic inspired wars in the Balkans. It shows that the political (ethnic division in the political structure) and social challenges that are faced now in BiH, are not new. And this example makes clear that the one nation-state solution that is also propagated at this time was considered unrealistic back then.

In response to this unrest the Austrian-Hungarian Emperor's heir, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was send to the area. His assassination (28 June 1914) by a Bosnian Serb student, Gavrilo Princip, triggered the First World War. After the First World War the Austrian-Hungarian Empire collapsed and under the Versailles peace treaties BiH became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that was given the name; Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

WWII

Peace in the Balkan was short lived, on the 6th of April 1941 German troops invaded the kingdom of Yugoslavia, and World War II began for this part of the world. The administration of parts of the country was granted to the 'Independent State of Croatia', considered to be ruled by fascists that wanted people to convert to Catholicism and Jews, Roma, Serbs, Muslims and anti-fascist Croats became victim of this puppet state of Germany. Serbia came under control of the Germans, Montenegro was occupied by the Italians, and so was Kosovo. As we can see, the different ethnic groups present in the kingdom were divided and by being so, were instigated against each other, because they *"promoted incompatible national aspirations as a means of dividing and ruling the area"* (Bowman 2003; 328).

Creation of the Socialist state of Yugoslavia (SFRY)

In April 1945 Tito marched his partisans into Sarajevo and liberated BiH. In so doing, Tito (re)united Yugoslavia and established a Socialist state of Yugoslavia (SFRY), encompassing the geographic area that is today BiH. A federation of six republics, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia was created.

To decrease the power of the largest country within the federation, Serbia, the provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina were given an autonomous status. This structure was designed to contain the national aspirations that were present in the republics of Yugoslavia. It created a *"supra-national state"* above all other national aspirations (Bowman 2003; 331). Aspirations especially of the three largest groups in Yugoslavia being the Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs. All for their own, but comparable, reasons, being autonomy and unity amongst their own group, which, in most cases, is spread over the territory of Yugoslavia. By creating republics, to reduce the power of Serbia (Montenegro and Macedonia), new nationalities were introduced.

The new federation also strengthened the position of the Muslim population in Yugoslavia, mostly living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All this was recorded in the constitution of 1967 (Allcock 1992 in Bowman 2003; 329). During the whole period of Tito's rule, the leadership of the country tried to overcome challenges of nationalism and inter-ethnic tensions and promote the sense of being one nation. Tito framed this as 'brotherhood & unity' (Godina 1998 in Bowman 2003; 328) and placed the enemy outside of Yugoslavia. First this enemy was fascism (during World War II), then the threat of the Soviets, and later the capitalist west. Whether or not Tito was able to create a sense of unity can be debated, but history makes it clear that the most recent war drove people away from each other again and created a situation in which there are three nations, with mutual values and morals, but not feeling that they are one.

Despite the efforts of Tito to create unity the reality was that the Yugoslav state was highly centralized due to political control exercised by the Communist Party. In 1963 a new constitution was adopted that led to more decentralization. The process of decentralization was completed when in 1974 a new constitution was adopted that saw the republics and autonomous provinces as the sources of political power (they had veto power over federal legislation).

   Tito's rule led to a period of relative stability and foreign loans led to economic progress. The Federal state protected the Yugoslav nation and the national minorities living in the Federation and tried to help the republics that were economically behind (Bowman 2003; 329). But in 1980 Tito died, without having a successor, and many expected the federation to break up. Through a presidium of representatives of the different republics Yugoslavia managed to survive for another ten years (BBC s.a.). But the central state, was less able to protect the citizens and their (economic) situation. Moreover politics, economics, art and culture were seen as opposites between the state and the people (Mastmak 1991 in Bowman 2003; 330). At the same time these sentiments lead to negative feelings amongst citizens in Yugoslavia. The state kept trying to improve the unity and the homogeneity which led to more anti-reaction amongst citizens.

<u>Power to the people</u>
During Tito's time different constitutions were introduced that showed a development of state ideology. It changed from being a Soviet Satellite state, with primary Marxist-Stalinist-Leninist vision of the state, to a state based on socialist ideas that went its own way, away from the Soviet mother. In this process the ideal of governance of the state shifted, towards a Yugoslav ideal, based on workers self-administration; socialist democracy. This meant that many federal responsibilities were transferred to decentralized bodies like the republics, the communes and their committees.
Workers were also involved in Workers' Councils in companies.

According to Dragan Popovi communes were tasked to stimulate the participation of citizens in the communal bodies (commissions, committees, and citizen's council). Furthermore there were voters' meetings, all meant to involve citizens in the governance of the state and the society.

Through this system in both society and companies, citizens and workers were involved in decision making on many topics; investments, salary, taxes etc.

This approach was not approved by all within the communist party elite and led to a division within the party between 1963 and 1972. Ideally the new approach meant that workers / citizens would have a large role in social and political life of the state. But all of this was very idealistic; many people chosen or appointed, were not capable of taking the responsibilities assigned to them as people's representative or committee member. Most of the members of the councils were less educated and inexperienced in management.
They were not able to manage the profits made; instead of investing these profits in the company they worked for, it was spend on bonuses, extra wages and holidays.
Literature dealing with communism even states that; communism provided 'structural incentives' for corrupt behaviour. Corruption became part of daily life and became part of the culture, and transition to democracy and a market economy have not changed this completely, Sandholtz & Taagepera even say the form of democracy and market economy in BiH have been greatly influenced by this culture of corruption (Sandholtz & Taagepera 2005; 109).
One of my respondents (respondent 47) from Mostar remembers citizen meetings, based on this Yugoslav state ideal. She remembers that these meetings were held to 'listen' (emphasis placed by myself) to people's needs, organized along the lines of the chairmen of housing blocks. According to this respondent these meetings gave an unsatisfactory feeling as they were said to be for the citizens but instead they were used by the state to present their plans. The current approach of CP did not seem very different to her. Despite this, another respondent (respondent 32) described the pre-war time as much more organized. The state was functioning and life was organized.

PART III   DRAWING CONCLUSIONS

7   CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis I have studied in what ways the concept of Community Policing (CP) was used to improve the relationship between citizens and the police as a representative of the state of Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH), and how it influenced the level of trust between those two. At the heart of this thesis are the observations and interviews gathered during my 3 months field work period in the city of Mostar. To be able to draw conclusions based on this research I have focused my research on the way Mostar's citizens and police officers interact with each other. The Mostar Police service is being chosen as research subject as it operates in a city with its own specific history, considerably influenced by the war, challenged by the multi-ethnic character, and being a key city in the new state structure of Bosnia Herzegovina. Furthermore Mostar was one of the first cities in BiH where the CP concept was introduced with help of the International Community (IC). The citizens of Mostar are, in my research, mainly represented by students and journalists.

Looking back at the situation in Mostar, I need to conclude that both citizens and the state are still trying to find an uneasy balance. And this process sometimes comes across as a vicious circle they can´t seem to get out of. Citizens wait for a state that can be trusted, while the state needs citizens that are involved in the society at large, to perform better and built up trust among citizens.

<u>Daily life and CP</u>
One of the striking observations of one of my respondent working for EUPM, the EU police mission in BiH, was that citizens in BiH have not yet been able to fully understand the meaning of the word 'verkeer' (the Dutch word for traffic). According to this respondent *"the Dutch word for traffic is 'verkeer', derived from the word 'verkeren', (which can be translated as 'working or living together') it is this basic agreement to live and work together on the street, in traffic, which is not taking place, in BiH, the way it should"*. The respondent finds this characteristic for life in BiH. People, despite their differences could be expected to live together, and work together, to make everyone's life more easy and enjoyable. But people here seem to live their own life and don't seem to care so much about the people who are not close to them. Not realizing that their behaviour influences (positively and negatively) the lives of others. And this is exactly what's lacking, people who feel responsible for the society they live in.

In Mostar, I observed a situation in which citizens of the so called 'divided city' indeed lived their lives on their side of the city. But not because they feared the people on the other side, but mainly because they had everything they need on that side. This did not mean that there is a situation of separation. Not at all, people felt free to go to the other side, and occasionally do so, whenever convenient. But when there's no need to go, or they wouldn't. Instead they stayed by themselves.

Both observations show an attitude which is problematic, as it is the responsibility of all citizens, that is considered to be important when it comes to safety and security, to take their own role in detecting unsafe situations and violations of the law. This can be everything from talking to a neighbour who plays his music to loud, to reporting a crime to the police. That is the responsibility that comes with the right they have to be protected by the state. One does not go without the other. But what we see in my thesis is that citizens hardly take upon them this responsibility.
They live their own life, together with friends and family and the people within their ethnic community.

My explanation for this situation is that the war threatened people in their personal safety and showed them that both fellow countrymen and the state could not be trusted anymore. Instead they turned to 'their own', hoping that they could still trust them

Still the concept of CP could potentially bring both citizens and citizens and the police closer together, and increase the understanding for each other's position, but people seem to lack trust in the concept. The concept of CP shows resemblance with the ideal of the Yugoslav state, to involve citizens in decision-making processes. Problem was, that while citizens were involved they apparently weren´t listened to. Citizens with this experience are not likely to trust a similar concept, introduced after a war that disintegrated the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). And this is exactly what happened. None of the citizens I spoke to recalled concrete actions of the police to come into contact with citizens. And both CP police officers and citizens show sceptics towards such action. Police officers mentioned that such meetings didn't provide useful information, while citizens didn't believe that anything would be done with the issues they would raise.

As we have been able to read in this thesis, due to the war the Yugoslav state broke down in ethnic fractions leading to inter-ethnic violence. The police, who had been representing the state, became an instrument of the fractions. By becoming an instrument in the war, trust in the police, and therefore the state, was seriously damaged. In a post-war society like that of BiH, one of the key elements in restoring trust is to provide safety and security through the restoration of law and order and by doing so preventing conflict from reoccurring. That is where the police came in.

The new police
The new police organisation that was built after the war was built on the foundations of the DPA and the new state structure that was designed. The IC was involved in the creation of that new police in BiH. A small part of that major operation was the introduction of the Community Policing concept as one of the many ways to positively influence trust among citizens and the state. Key to this concept is a police service that approaches citizens, to share information, to raise issues and to address safety related challenges together. It implies a new approach of the police towards citizens. Like my respondents within the Mostar police explained, police officers needed to keep far from the old, repressive way of policing. Instead they choose, as they explained to me, to 'talk talk talk' with the citizens of Mostar. This change of approach made that the police officers didn't feel secure about the way they should enforce the law anymore. Should they give an offender a fine, punish the offender by sending him to jail or should they talk and convince the offender to obey the law the next time? The result of this uncertainty was that police officers became very selective in preserving the law. More than necessary, and more than citizens understood, they choose not to address the offenders of the small offences that take place in the streets of Mostar every day, again to avoid to be seen as 'to repressive'.

    This new approach of the police did not yet have the effect the police had hoped for. Instead, students tell me they are sceptical about the quality of the job done by the police. They consider the police, and the state it is representing, to be incompetent. While the journalist, who, through his work, has an insight in the work the police, stated that the police is doing a good job. Many of the students think that a tougher and more active police approach would increase peoples respect for the police and the law.

Clearly citizens and the police find it difficult to find a new balance when it comes to the police approach and the role citizens have in this. In my opinion it is unavoidable that in a post-conflict situation a new balance has to be found. The challenge for BiH is that BiH seems to be defying all theories of state- and nation building and by doing that creating challenges that link to the theoretical field of citizenship, as described in chapter 2. The state structure of BiH as agreed upon in the DPA is a construct that tries to combine nationalist aspirations of the three ethnic groups with international political interests in a way that seems hard to accept for any of the groups. The fact that the state form is still debated and that there are several national aspirations undermining the central state makes it hard for people to place trust in the state, whatever the state form may be.

It is unclear to me whether or not the central state is sending out a message of unity, but for people to place trust in the institutions of the central state (like the police, arguable whether it represents the central state, but at least it's not linked to one of the ethnic groups anymore), it is my opinion that there needs to be a level of identification with something larger than their own group. Something like the nation of BiH. Now we have state institutions, like the police, without people identifying (and therefore trusting) with the nation of BiH. Citizens of this new state Bosnia Herzegovina need to develop a 'new' sense of citizenship, especially because of the disturbed relationship between the citizens and between citizens and the state. To achieve this trust between citizens and citizens and the state need to be restored. I would like to argue that the same is applicable to the police officers. When the politicians would leave the debate on the state form for what it is (with or without changes to the current state structure) than police officers could stand firm for the laws of the state, which might decrease their selectiveness and improve their image, leading up to more trust in the police.

<u>Hope for the future</u>
Is there any hope for the future, reading about all the challenges BiH is facing? I would say there is! On a general level we see that Mostar is not as divided as it is portrayed in many articles about Mostar. The safety and security situation has dramatically improved over the last 17 years and on street level people are able to get along in a way that makes it possible for them to live a ´comfortable´ life without the fear of violence being omnipresent. But because politicians can´t seem to find a way to do the same, the vicious circle can´t seem to be broken. It might be that that this is the last big change that is needed to turn BiH in a positive direction. Politicians are like roadblocks in a road, or like unmaintained roads. They are hard and unsafe to drive on and people will only drive on those roads if necessary.

Despite the fact that the IC is trying to take away these blockades and show the best way to design and maintain roads, their efforts could also be seen as interfering. As we could see with the police officers that were enforcing the law selectively, only because they were trained to keep away from repressive policing. Because of this (and other reasons) a situation emerged with insecure police officers that are not respected or trusted by citizens. It is like having a co-driver, constantly commenting your driving skills. This results in an insecure driver, and road users, who lack trust in that driver, and therefore take their distance to stay safe. The time has come for the IC to take another step back and let the state of BiH show that it earns the trust of its citizens, and let citizens of BiH and the police find that uneasy balance between rights and responsibilities of citizens on one side, and the police approach on the other side. Problem is that this will only work when all who are involved are committed to improve the situation for all citizens of BiH.

I find it very hopeful to see that the police officers seem to have been able to break with the past and leave the repressive approach behind. I find it unlikely that the police will fall back on this old way of doing things any time soon. And this is a success due to the contribution of the IC.

Another hopeful sign I see is the fact that the students I spoke to are much more critical towards the state and their own role in society, than I expected. If they are able to keep this critical approach when their adults, I think there is a chance that they will form a generation that takes up a more active role in society. And by doing so, creating a connection amongst the different groups within society, and a connection with their state institutes.

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Appendix 1

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Figure 4.5   Map Bosnia and Herzegovina (www.mapnavigation.net)

Appendix 2

Map of Mostar

Figure 4.6   Map Mostar (www.comune.fi.it)

Appendix 3

List of respondents

Nr.	Respondent		Description
1	Researcher and Teacher in the field of International Security		Researching police reforms in Mostar
2	Military Advisor for a diplomatic mission		Experienced military officers working both in Croatia and BiH
18	Researcher in the field of Safety and Security		Centre for Security Studies Sarajevo
19	Employee of an international education organization		Working there as communication officer
27	EUPM police officer management level		Male, experienced police officer, from West European country
28	EUPM police officer management level		Male, experience police officer, second mission in BiH, from an Eastern European country
29	EUPM police officer		Male, very experienced detective, from West European country
30	EUPM police officer		Male, experience police officer, advisor to SIPA, went on a previous mission to Kosovo, from a Southern European country
31	Journalist for local newspaper in Croat language		Female, Croat, general news
32	Journalist for local radio station		Female, Bosniac, general news
33	Journalist for local newspaper in Croat language		Male, Croat, crime reporter
36	Political active, young man		Bosniac, Working for a NGO, grew up in the Netherlands
37	Student at the University of Mostar, technical department		Male, Croat, board member of the local branch of an international student association
38	Student at the University of Mostar, technical department		Male, Croat, board member of the local branch of an international student association
39	Student at the Dzemal Bijedic University, technical department		Male, Bosniac, board member of the local branch of an international student association
40	Commanding officer, Mostar Police		Special police Unit, riot police and special interventions
41	Community Policing Officer, Mostar Police		Male, Bosniac, rank = cop (first rank)
42	Community Policing Officer, Mostar Police		Female, Bosniac, rank = cop (first rank)
43	Community Policing Officer, Mostar Police		Male, Croat, rank = cop (first rank), older than the other two CP officers

44	Mostar Police officer, management level		In charge of education
45	Lecturer at the Džemal Bijedić University, language department		Female, American, working for a language program initiated by the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo
46	Working for NGO active in the field of education		Croat citizen, NGO is American, married to a German
47	EUPM language assistant		Female, Croat, experience LA, worked for several international missions in BiH
52	Student at the University of Mostar		Female, Croat, active in Church, political science student

Appendix 4

Student discussions
University of Mostar
8th of April 2010

1   local safety would be better served with a police force that would be locally directed instead of
a   cantonal police force, that is being directed by the cantonal government (as it is now)
2   Fighting organized crime in BiH should be a priority of the police. For the police to be effective
    it should be reorganized and be organized so that it over arches canton borders.
3   If the organization of the police (effectiveness, response time, costs etc.) would benefit from
    organization on the basis of operational area's then you are in favour of that instead of the
    current organization per canton. (note; part of a police reform proposal done by the EU.
    Biggest argument against is the idea that entities would lose control over 'their' police)

4   It is too much of a foreign expectation that civilians of Mostar will participate in community
    meetings with police and municipality officials to discuss topics like safety.
5   Respect for the police starts with the police tackling the major issue of corruption, or does it
    work vice versa; respect for authority will break down the system of corruption.

6   Inhabitants of Mostar prevent the institutions concerned with safety and justice (Police,
    Prosecutor and Judges) from doing their work properly by participating in any form of
    corruption.
7   Youth delinquency would be prevented by a though approach of the police. Curfew for
    youngsters under 17 and a ban on driving at night for drivers younger than 21 are therefore
    good measures.

8   The safety situation in BiH does not benefit from international presence in BiH.

Appendix 5

Student pro-con debate
University Džemal Bijedić of Mostar
29th of April 2010

<u>Pro – Con debate preparation information</u>

I = The law that makes you wear a seat belt in a car is a waste of time and money.

Pro Being in favour of this statement you will probably be of the opinion that the police has no time to enforce this law. There are far more important things to work on. Besides that you could also be worrying about the lawfulness of this law. Isn't it an individual right to decide what risk you take in for instance traffic. It is not as if you are hurting anyone else by wearing no seat belt. It is the victim of a car crash his or her own problem is no seat belt was worn. Let the law take care of more important things. Instead the authorities might want to focus on education of drivers and their passengers on the benefit of wearing a seat belt.
Other pro reasoning could be all the practical disadvantages of having to wear a seat belt and the technical improvements that are and will be developed to protect people in the car, without having to wear a seat belt.

Con Being opposed to this statement you can arguments could go into the medical costs of victims of car accidents who were not wearing seat belts, the number of people killed in car accidents, deaths that could have been prevented if these people would have worn a seat belt. The need to protect people from their own mistakes then there is the police officer, fire-fighter and medic who has to see all the victims who did not wear a seat belt. Shouldn't we prevent all these terrible accidents?

II = Reporting even the smallest crime to the police is important to improve the safety of the society.

Pro = Being in favour of this .. you will be thinking about the need for accurate statistics to detect trends in society. Trends like an increase of a certain crime in a certain area. Having these statistics can help the police and local government to fight this form of crime, and can give the citizens an argument to demand action.
A more abstract argument is that it is everyone's responsibility to make laws work. You need people who enforce the law, but as they cannot be everywhere at all times you need people to obey the law as well. Otherwise it will become a mess. It might be so that not many people report their crime just yet, then starting this social practices is even more important. It might lead to a drop in the number of crimes. Finally you could just argue it is just the right thing to do.

Con = Why would your report small crimes, it is a waste of time, the police won't bother

solving the crime and even if they would try they will not be successful.

And why would be bother about these small crimes, are they so bad? Let them have this car radio, let them demolish some things in the street.. why make a problem out of all this? 'Nema problema'.

Besides, can you imagine the time it takes to go and report these crimes. People have better things to do! If only they would make reporting a crime more easy. Let's wait for technology to improve!

Pro – Con debate preparation information

General information:

The organization of the police is linked to the state structure in BiH.
Information on the police structure can be found at:

http://www.fup.gov.ba/joomla/index.php

To increase the cooperation between the police and the citizens of Mostar a project called Community Policing was initiated by a research center in Sarajevo.
Information about this project can be found on:

http://www.css.ba/projects/index.html#ongoing

BiH has seen a large involvement of international organizations in many parts of society and state institutions. Now 15 years after the Dayton peace agreement many people say it is time for the international organizations to leave. Others think they still have an important job to do and should therefore not leave. In relation to the police the European Police Mission (EUPM) is the most important international organization. Find out about their mission and work:

www.eupm.org

Corruption is a topic often mentioned when talking about the police. Where does BiH stand in comparison to other countries. Have a look at this site;

www.transparency.org

Information on crime statistics:

Whether or not the police does a good job is a subjective question. From your perspective you will be able to answer this question, but the chance that someone else will have a different answer is very much present. In 2004 a research was conducted. You can find this research at:

http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/files/docs/publications/en/FunctRew/BiHPoliceFinalReport2004-06-30ENPRINT.pdf

The research can give an idea of the subjects that you can base your opinion on. As it is a research from 2004 it can be expected that the situation has changed.

Other info can be found on;

https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=115557

<u>Information on car accidents:</u>

http://www.car-accidents.com/country-car-accidents/bosnia-herzegovina-crash.html

http://www.unece.org/trans/roadsafe/unda/Halkida_Pres18_Bajrambasic.pdf

http://www.anapolschwartz.com/practices/seat-belt-failure/seatbelt-statistics.asp

Student pro-con debate
University Džemal Bijedić of Mostar

Student debate on safety situation and police conduct in Mostar

Have you ever wondered why police officers seem to drink so much coffee?
And why people, who give the police coffee money, also complain about the police being corrupt?

What did you do when you observed somebody breaking the law? Did you take action?
Who would you talk to when structural forms of crime keep occurring in your neighborhood?

Questions that all relate to the work of the police and the relationship between the police / the state and you, the inhabitants of Mostar
Questions that interest me and questions that I hope to discuss with you.

Who am I? I am Tom Kievit, a MA student Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. I am in Mostar for a research on the police and the way they deal with a project called Community Policing. And no Community Policing without the community. But does the Police manage to get in contact with the community and are they able to deal with the challenges? And is the community ready to be a partner for the police?

Join the debate, be critical on the relationship between community and state and let yourself be challenged. What can you do to have the police work on the topics you feel are important!?

Open discussion topics

Crime
Organized crime makes safety situation for people in Mostar unacceptable.

Through rules on road safety (like the one that forbids young people below 21 to drive after 23:00 at night) roads are made safer.

Individual police officer do a good job in fighting day to day crime. It is the bigger system (politics and corruption) that is preventing the police from being effective.

Contact
It is unlikely that people will go to the police to discuss their security situation. Their worries will not be taken seriously.

People should trust the police in doing a good job and therefore should go to the police more with information and concerns.

BiH has a civil society that is critically and actively participating follows in society.

Corruption

Respect for the police starts with tackling the mayor issue of corruption

People who join in corruption are as corrupt as the police officers who except it.

The international definitions of corruption should not 1:1 apply to BiH.

Impartiality
Police is prejudiced and favours one above the other ethnicity.

International community
The safety situation in BiH does not benefit from the presence of international organizations like EUPM and IFOR.

Pro – Con debate preparation information

The organization of the police is linked to the state structure in BiH.
Information on the police structure can be found at:

http://www.fup.gov.ba/joomla/index.php

Whether or not the police does a good job is a subjective question. From your perspective you will be able to answer this question, but the chance that someone else will have a different answer is very much present. In 2004 a research was conducted. You can find this research at:

http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/files/docs/publications/en/FunctRew/BiHPoliceFinalReport2004-06-30ENPRINT.pdf

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BiH has seen a large involvement of international organizations in many parts of society and state institutions. Now 15 years after the Dayton peace agreement many people say it is time for the international organizations to leave. Others think they still have an important job to do and should therefore not leave. In relation to the police the European Police Mission (EUPM) is the most important international organization. Find out about their mission and work:

www.eupm.org

Corruption is a topic often mentioned when talking about the police. Where does BiH stand in comparison to other countries. Have a look at this site;

Pro – Con debate preparation information

Choose two topics that steer up most discussion.

Appendix 6

Coat of Arms and Flag of BiH

Flag of the Federation of BiH

Appendix 7

Information EUPM

The number of EUPM staff on 1st of January 2010 was 280. Of this 280, 150 were International Police Officers (from all EU-countries and six non EU-countries), 25 International contracted and 50 national staff members. EUPM works from 4 regional offices in the 4 sectors displayed in the figure below. Besides the 4 sectors EUPM works from their headquarters in Sarajevo, assisting the national police organizations, like SIPA.

Appendix 8

Abbreviations

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CP	Community Policing
CBP	Community-Based Policing
CSS	Center Security Studies ; independent research, educational and training enterprise in Sarajevo
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
EUFOR	European Force
EUPM	European Union Police Missions
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ; one of two entities of BiH
HDZ	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) ; political party for Croats in BiH and Croatia
HDZ 1990	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990 (Croatian Democratic Union 1990) ; political party for Croats in BiH, split of the HDZ of BiH
HQ	Head Quarters
IC	International Community
IFOR	Multinational Implementation Force ; BiH
KM	Konvertibilna Marka ; BiH's Convertible Mark
KFOR	Kosovo Force ; NATO's force in Kosovo
LA	Language Assistant
LDA	Liberal Democratic party
MAC	Mine Action Centre ; BiH
MoI	Ministry of Interior ; BiH
MUP	Special police unit in Yugoslavia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRC	Police Restructuring Commission
PFD	Public Forum Debate

RS   Republika Srpska

SDB   State security service in Yugoslavia
SFOR   Stabilization Force ; NATO force in BiH
SFRY   Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIPA   State Investigation and Protection Agency ; BiH
SSR   Security Sector Reforms
SDC/DEZA   Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

UDBA   Department of state security in Yugoslavia
UNIPTF   United Nations International Police Task Force ; BiH
UNMIBH   United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNPROFOR   United Nations Protection Force ; BiH

YNA   Yugoslav National Army

Appendix 9

CP sectors Mostar police