National Identity through Propaganda Media:
Psychological Warfare in Indonesia during the Japanese Occupation

Roos Rook
s1110969
MA Asian Studies
History, Arts & Culture

Introduction

Once named "wizard war" by Winston Churchill, the Second World War was a critical event in the shaping of the world. At the time, Churchill referred to the influence of new science and technology, but as Ferenc Morton Szasz justly points out, the real 'wizards' of the war operated in the field that influenced people's hearts and minds: the field of propaganda.[1] Propaganda exists in many shapes and sizes: pamphlets, stories in newspapers and magazines, film, leaflets or speeches on the radio. Around the world, this type of psychological warfare has been used to convince the enemy that their cause is lost and the home front that they are on the winning side. For example, Nazi-Germany would show their great victories in the news while the United States would show their own victories and depict Nazis (justly) as monsters.

The same was the case in Southeast Asia during the Asia-Pacific War, where Japan propagated a *Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere*. For this thesis I will examine Japanese propaganda from during the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands-Indies, that I will call Indonesia from now on. After a long period of Dutch colonial rule in the archipelago, the Japanese military came to take over Java on March 1942 and begin their military occupation. This lasted until August 1945 and eventually resulted in surrender by the Japanese. Although at first the Indonesians were happy to welcome them as 'liberators of Asia' at their arrival, even happier they were at their departure. The period leading from the beginning of the occupation up to august 1945 was one full of exploitation, violence and humiliation, but at the same time it was also a period in which the Indonesian identity and nationalist sentiment were shaped and developed, partly through propaganda. Ultimately it contributed to Indonesia's independence from the Dutch in 1949.

The Dutch colonialists' civilizing mission, the so called 'Ethical Policy,' had established a foundation for Indonesian elites through educational programs, providing them with "intellectual weapons" to voice resistance against their occupiers.[2] The Dutch were, however, successful at restraining nationalist sentiment.[3] They also considered the possibility, that Indonesian nationalists would form a serious movement that would be able to unify the diversified population of the archipelago and at the same time able to defend themselves from the Dutch military forces, to be small. When the Japanese military arrived, however, the Indonesians got the opportunity and space to spread their ideas, even though it was regulated. Frans Nieuwenhof cites a document in relation to the Japanese propaganda policy that confirms this:

> "The freedom of expression of the natives in the political field should be respected as much as possible. Economic hardship that was expected to appear should be mitigated to the best ability, and the political measures to be taken should in no case weaken their hope for the future. Therefore the existing rights of the natives to participate in the government should be extended. Native leaders should be appointed in important posts, thereby stimulating the hope and enthusiasm of the natives." [4]

[1] F. M. Szasz, "'Pamphlet's Away:' the Allied Propaganda Campaign over Japan During the Last Months of World War II," p. 530
[2] A. Vandenbosch, "Nationalism in Netherlands East India," *Pacific Affairs*. 4(12), p. 1053
[3] A. Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia,* p.85
[4] F. Nieuwenhof, "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia," p. 162

Additionally, the opportunity to get military training and weapons to fight for independence were introduced and nationalist leaders like Sukarno were given an audience, as will be discussed below.[5]

To successfully acquire human and natural resources, which was in essence the purpose of the occupation, the cooperation of the entire population was needed. In order to achieve this cooperation, the Japanese occupiers planned to create various kinds of propaganda and use this as a means to make the society cooperate with the Japanese war effort. The General Headquarters of the Japanese army stated that both military and ideological fighting were equally important. Ideological fighting was deemed especially important to infiltrate among inhabitants in occupied areas, making propaganda an essential part of the occupation. [6] For this thesis I will be looking at different formats of propaganda media like newspapers, leaflets, posters and film from this period through both primary and secondary sources, in which signs of Indonesian identity and/or nationalist sentiment are visible. My overall aim is to show the relevance of propaganda in the shaping and developing of national identity and sentiment in Indonesia during the Japanese occupation.[7]

According to H.A.J. Klooster, in Indonesia literature was *the* tool for conveying nationalist sentiment.[8] Additionally, Benedict Anderson writes in his book *Imagined Communities* that commercial print and mass literacy contribute to the feeling of being part of an imagined community through shared experiences that are shown in media, contrary to local or personal relationships.

Furthermore, in her PhD dissertation Maxine Rockwell argues that the development of nationalist movements was progressing very slowly in Indonesia. The reasons for this, according to her, were among others a lack of a shared cultural past (of any significance), the difficulty of uniting peoples from widely separated islands with different cultural developments into one common movement, and the presence of large non-indigenous population groups blocking progress of Indonesia and supporting Dutch rule.[9] As this thesis will show, the Japanese propaganda media responded to these aspects in the sense that they depicted Indonesia united as one nation with one people and the West (including the Dutch) as one common enemy. Taking all this into account, one could say that the media contributed to a sense of national consciousness. My overall aim is, on that account, to show the relevance of media in the shaping and developing of a national consciousness in Indonesia during the Japanese occupation.

Since the Indonesian archipelago is quite a large area to cover, my plan was initially to focus my research on Java, Sumatra and Celebes for the following reasons; the Japanese divided the archipelago into three administrative areas (which means there were actually three occupations going on, according to Kanahele) of which the aforementioned areas are good representatives. [10] However, since the most data is available from the Java region, where the nationalist movement supposedly was

[5] A. Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia,* p.84-94
[6] K. M. de Silva et al, *Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present,* p. 486
[7] M. Rockwell, "A Survey of Japanese Propaganda to the Netherlands East Indies during World War II," p. 23
[8] H.A.J. Klooster, *Indonesiërs schrijven hun Geschiedenis: de Ontwikkeling van de Indonesische Geschiedbeoefening in Theorie en Praktijk, 1900-1980,* p. 4-5
[9] M. Rockwell, "A Survey of Japanese Propaganda to the Netherlands East Indies during World War II," p. 20
[10] G. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence," p. iii

the most fervent and autonomous, in part due to Japanese mobilization campaigns through cooperation with nationalists,[11] the main focus of this thesis will be here.

There are several questions that I will keep in mind while doing this research: how is it possible that all of the archipelago's areas became one, even though they were so fragmented? How could a national identity created in this fragmented archipelago, which is incredibly diverse in terms of environment and culture? How big was the role the Japanese played in the creation of an Indonesian national identity, if they had a role in this? How do media contribute to a sense of national unity? Ultimately, the main question that I am aiming to answer in this thesis is "Did the propaganda media contribute to shaping and developing a certain Indonesian identity and a national consciousness during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia?" To answer this final question, I will analyze different kinds of media that have possibly contributed to the shaping and developing of a national identity and in particular visual media, because my knowledge of the Indonesian language is limited. I will incorporate and build on information from my own preliminary research papers as well and will I use visual material from the *Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies* and the *Nederlands Instituut voor Beeld en Geluid* .

Already in the 1930s there were several hundred thousand readers of nationalist-inclined newspapers in Indonesia[12] and novelists contributed to a national language/body of literature which is part of a national consciousness.[13] Here I will examine Indonesian-language newspaper *Asia Raya* and the Japanese- and Indonesian-language *Djawa Baroe* magazine. The *Djawa Baroe* and *Asia Raya* were controlled by the *sendenbu*, a propaganda division within the military government. This was a group of writers and intellectuals, set up to better integrate the Indonesian society and introduce them to Japanese ideology. The *sendenbu* included both Japanese and native people in management and publication; Indonesians who had been active in anti-Dutch movements for example**.** Contrary to the *sendenhan* that was in charge of propaganda and information concerning military operations, the *sendenbu* was concerned with propaganda aimed at civilians. Because the literacy among the Indonesian people was quite low due to poor education,[14] it is important to keep in mind that through images, movies and theatre a much bigger audience could be captured than through textual sources only. The Japanese were also aware of this fact and made use of visual media like posters and movies as well, in favor of their own regime, which is also why visual media is the main focus of this thesis.

Quite some scholars have contributed greatly to the topic of Japanese propaganda in Indonesia. However, the existing research is usually confined to one particular medium. Aiko Kurasawa, for example, wrote a lot on film propaganda on Java and Rei Okamoto focused mainly on comics in his work. If various propaganda media are discussed, such as in the work of Shigeru Satō it is not always discussed in connection with the influence on nationalist consciousness. This thesis, by contrast, attempts to explain the influence that Japanese propaganda in various media had in developing a national consciousness in Indonesia. This will be done through an introduction about the occupation of Indonesia in general and three subsections: first I will explain what the propaganda division is, language barriers that existed and propaganda through audiovisual and radio. Next print media,

[11] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945,* p. 36
[12] A. Reid, *A History of Southeast Asia, Critical Crossroads,* p. 420
[13] H. Sutherland, "Pudjangga Baru: Aspects of Indonesian Intellectual Life in the 1930s," p. 106-112
[14] A. Reid, *A History of Southeast Asia, Critical Crossroads* p. 420

common enemy propaganda and the reinforcement of national identity will be discussed. Finally I will discuss the relation between the propaganda division and nationalist movements.

The Invasion

When in September 1939 World War II broke out in Europe, Japan had already suffered huge economic losses due to the global depression in the 1930s. The Dutch authorities in Indonesia had introduced defensive trade restrictions towards Japan, which caused a decline in Japanese sales.[15] The embargo that the United States placed on petroleum and iron in 1941 added to the desperation of Japan, forcing it to seek to replace such sources for their war effort.[16] Because of the losses of lives in the Sino-Japanese war, Japan was not only in need for economic resources; human resources were declining as well.[17] Already before the war Indonesia was seen as a potential target for attaining human and material resources, but now that the Pacific War had begun Indonesia became an increasingly important object of attention in order to preserve peace and order, secure vital resources and local self-sustenance in Japan. This had to be achieved even at the cost of deprivation of the local people, according to Ishii Akiho, the colonel who contributed to this policy.[18]

In order to still get their hands on the much needed resources, the Japanese were preparing to invade the areas south of Japan. By doing so they took advantage of the situation, since the Western colonial powers originally occupying these areas were now busy fighting in the Second World War.[19] Before these invasions took place, the Japanese and Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs began trade negotiations mainly concerning oil export to Japan, which was of extreme importance to the Japanese government. Aside from securing oil supplies, another goal of the Japanese was to put Indonesia under Japan's political hegemony and in this way form a self-sufficient area. The policy regarding this goal, dating from the 25th of October, 1940, read in part

> "For these purposes, policies shall be implemented according to the following points:
> 1. To dissolve the current situation of the Netherlands Indies' dependence on the Euro-American economic block and make it part of the Greater East Asian economy
> […]
> 3. To propose to the Netherlands Indies co-operative development of resources in order to secure important resources which the empire needs from within the sphere of Greater East Asia, and thus to become independent, resource wise, from the United States and Britain as soon as possible."

After several months of fruitless trade negotiations between the Japanese government and Indonesia, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs reacted with this idea of a 'Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,' combining the Japanese interests and Southeast Asia's various movements for independence.[20] After Japan's proposed hegemony was not acknowledged by Indonesia's minister of

[15] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945,* p. 4-5
[16] F. Nieuwenhof, "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia," p. 161
[17] T. Fujitani, "Right to Kill, Right to Make Live: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during WWII," p. 14
[18] G. Kenichi, "Modern Japan and Indonesia; the Dynamics and Legacy of Wartime Rule," p. 547
[19] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945,* p. 4-5
[20] F. Nieuwenhof, "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia," p. 162

commerce and the U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan, the invasion of Japan's 16th Army in Java followed in March 1942.[21]

The Occupation

As stated in the introduction, the Japanese authorities believed that the ideological fight was especially important to gain cooperation from the people of Indonesia. Therefore propaganda was a crucial part of the occupation. The message that the Japanese used to attract people's attention was that they were the 'liberators of Asia,' here to free them from the Western colonialists and to establish a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity *Sphere* consisting of East & Southeast Asia that would be led by Japan, the '*big brother'* as they would call themselves.[22] In order to achieve this goal, the propaganda suggested that it was crucial that Japan would win the war: if this would not be the case, Indonesia would become a colony of the Dutch again. The fate of Indonesia was therefore portrayed as if it depended on that of the Japanese.[23]

Soetan Sjahrir, the first Indonesian to become a Prime Minister, observed that the whole Islamic population of Indonesia was pro-Japanese and that Japan was continually increasing in popularity – even in more remote areas – contrary to the Dutch who were increasingly seen as incompetent leaders. He wrote that this response can be explained as (understandable) hatred towards the Dutch colonialists, political opportunism (nationalist eagerness to work together with the Japanese authorities, hoping for better chances than they had with the Dutch) or some another forms of manifestations of nationalism.[24]

Among the Japanese occupiers were people who could be called *ethici*, or 'missionaries,' who were trying to bring the old Asian values and the 'Japanese spirit' to Indonesia. This group of missionaries consisted of writers, media specialists and intelligence operatives. Their task was to convince the Indonesian population of Japan's mission to create a 'Greater Asia, ' by winning the war and thereby liberating Asia from the Western and colonial oppression. Then they would be able to create a harmonious and thriving new order by combining Western science, technology and progress with Eastern values of morality, spirituality and community. The missionaries conveyed the message that winning the war and creating a 'Greater Asia,' was only possible through the exploitation of resources such as petroleum, food and manpower. To get these resources, local cooperation had to be ensured.[25]

According to Anthony Reid, the Japanese occupation could in this sense be called idealistic. He gives an example of young Japanese teachers that were sent to the south to open new schools and institutes. They were inclined to believe that the Indonesian people were very much like the Japanese, but they were only lacking in morality because of the failing Dutch system before them. Reid wrote that one headmaster told his students that "they were not brought here to enjoy themselves but to teach the Japanese seishin[26][…] discipline and hard work[…] and the laziness [the westerners] have

[21] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945,* p. 7-8
[22] K. Mori & K. Hirano, *A New East Asia: Toward a Regional Community*, p. 29
[23] K. M. de Silva et al, *Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present,* p. 486-487
[24] G. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence," p. 1
[25] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 2-3
[26] *Seishin* 精神 referring to "the Japanese spirit and mentalitiy"

taught you for hundreds of years is going to be wiped out." These teachers aimed at the 'Japanization' of the Indonesian people by conveying Asian values, but instead – or at the same time – it could be said that they were busy creating a new identity.[27]

Kurasawa shines a light on the old Asian values in Asian Panorama. One important aspect of these values and the Japanese spirit is *discipline.* She adds that this value was especially emphasized in a military context. Next, Kurasawa names simple life, economy in expenditure and self-sacrifice. Because the population was becoming poorer and poorer, 'simple life' and 'economy in expenditure' as values were used to make the people 'accept' living in poverty, Kurasawa explains. An example she gives is the encouraging of saving money, to reduce food consumption. Self-sacrifice (suicide) for the nation was very much respected and seen as sacred (an example of this is the *Barisan Berani Mati* – Suicide Corps). Another value that was promoted was *diligence*: one of the main reasons the Japanese came to Indonesia was for human resources and therefore people were encouraged to work hard.[28] This is shown in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows a ship in the making, with an accompanying text saying that building ships is for the benefit of defending Greater Asia, encouraging the audience to enroll in craft school. Figure 2 connects to this with a song. The lyrics tell the audience to "swing axes, wield hammers, to build boats – the guards of the sea."



Figure 1 - "Bikin Kapal" building ships for Greater Asia, by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies

[27] A. Reid, "Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword," in *Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy, p. 23-24

[28] K. M. de Silva et al, *Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present,* p. 487-488



Figure 2 - "Bikin Kapal" song, by Asia Raya (27th May, 1944)

In reality, more emphasis was put on practical themes with a concrete goal in propaganda activities, than on ideological and moral themes – Kurasawa suggests that it might be because of the fact that Indonesians did not like 'Japanization,' and they did not like being merged into the Great East Asian culture sphere. They did not really believe in the 'common race, common ancestor' cultural affinity, that Japan wanted to promote. When the Japanese authorities realized this, they gradually switched their propaganda policy to social-economic needs such as figure 1 and 2.[29]

However important this thought-war was to the Japanese, in the end it might have been even more important for the people of Indonesia, who now got a chance to voice themselves. Indonesian playwright and fiction writer Anjar Asmara, who was part of a Greater East Asian Culture Association, who has written the following at the dawn of the occupation:

> "Japan [...] recognizes itself as an older brother that will lead Indonesia in building its culture as a weapon to strengthen the spirit of *Asia Raya*"
>
> "Because we are aware of the greatness and nobility of the aspiration for *Asia Raya*, we proclaim: let us begin with local culture. This is the first step. Teach each race to be true to its own culture […] It is our hope and conviction that our culture will be shaped first among ourselves, so that we might at a future date seek a way of steering it towards the culture of *Asia Raya*" [30]

Additionally, a schoolteacher, Djawoto, observed that the Japanese arrival alone had a big impact on Indonesian consciousness. He wrote that people were so impressed by Japanese sacrifice and what it had accomplished, that they were very enthusiastic to "join in shaping the social agenda:" popular astonishment at Japanese success had to be used to achieve the same kind of unity in Indonesia.[31] These statements are good examples of the hope and the chance that was given to Indonesia in expressing their culture and identity, even though they coincided with realistic concerns that these expressions might be limited.

[29] A. Kurasawa, "Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese 1942-1945," p. 91
[30] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity," p. 289-291
[31] Ibid, p. 286

The Propaganda Division

Propaganda was considered to be one of the most important tasks of the Japanese military: it was a tool for conveying 'Asian values' in order to win support for a Greater Asia and acquiring human and natural resources. Propaganda affairs were managed by a department within the military government, called *sendenbu*. The *sendenbu* was in charge of propaganda and information aimed at the people of Java, where they had their base. Certain activities were also organized by Indonesian natives instead of Japanese, but the control was never fully trusted to their hands. Within the *sendenbu* were specialized departments with different functions; there were departments for publishing newspapers, reporting, domestic broadcasting, producing movies and distributing movies. Furthermore, there was another organization that was concerned with the promotion of traditional Indonesian arts, introducing Japanese culture and educating and training Indonesian artists. In this organization Indonesian specialists worked full-time and Japanese instructors would train them.[32] Lastly there was a special unit for the expansion of the propaganda network, called the District Operation Unit.[33]

This subsection will discuss the challenges that the propaganda division encountered language-wise and how this problem was potentially beneficial for Indonesian nationalists. Subsequently this part will discuss two of the most important ways for the propaganda division to convey propaganda to a big audience: through audiovisual material and through radio.

Language

The Dutch, as former colonialists, played an important role in developing a national language. The Dutch education system favored indigenous languages but used one particular language – Malay (similar to *bahasa Indonesia)*[34] – as main language so everyone in school had to speak Malay even if it was not their own language.[35] The same goes for press and literature, causing Malay to become the national language of Indonesia due to systematic promotion by the colonial state and its consequent emergence.[36] In this way, people from all over the archipelago would feel part of an imagined community, because they all had to speak and read the same language.[37] In higher schools lectures were normally in Dutch.[38]

In 1942, the Japanese abolished the Dutch language and made Indonesian (*bahasa Indonesia*) and Japanese the official languages but instead of referring to the Indonesian language Japanese administrators would refer to it as the Malay language.[39] The fact that the Japanese used Indonesian as a language too, can in part be explained with the words of Japanese journalist Ichiki Tatsuo[40] (who would later renounce his nationality and become an Indonesian independence fighter):[41]

---

[32] Jawa Gunseikanbu, *Jawa Nenkan* 1944, p. 167-168 & *Djawa Baroe* no. 8, p. 8-10
[33] A. Kurasawa, "Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945," p. 59-61
[34] F. Dhont, "Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-Political Change in the Javanese Principalities under the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during World War II," p. 85
[35] D. Henley, "The Origins of Southeast Asian Nations: A Question of Timing," p. 270
[36] Ibid. p. 269-272
[37] Ibid. p. 269-272
[38] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 535
[39] Ibid, 251
[40] Ibid, p. 350-351
[41] K. Goto, *Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World*, p. 196-209

> "After the imperial army had conquered Java, there were people around who argued that the words "Indonesian [language]" and "Indonesian race" should be eradicated. I always disagreed, and I complained […] that these sorts of opinions were no more than shallow, myopic nonsense. […] In order for Japanese to penetrate completely, it is necessary that we aim for the maintenance of the Indonesian language as its platform. Moreover, it is precisely the Indonesian language, which now advances in Java, that must serve as the future standard language not only in the former territories of the East Indies, but also within the broader Indonesian sphere identified both in geography and anthropology."[42]

In the Jakarta Medical College, to name one organization, Dutch instructors were replaced by doctors born in Indonesia. The senior teaching and administrative staff of this college were, on the other hand, Japanese. Therefore classes were now often in Japanese, as were the textbooks, and the students had to attend classes on Japanese language and culture too.[43] Combined with the daily obligatory singing of the Japanese anthem, bowing towards the imperial palace and saluting the Japanese flag, this caused for a lot of discontent among students.[44]

The insistence that the Japanese language had to replace Dutch in higher schools as well as in governmental administration evoked negative reactions,[45] since there were almost no Indonesians who were familiar with Japanese.[46] Likewise, as shown in figure 3 and 4, the Indonesian newspaper *Asia Raya* and magazine *Djawa Baroe* both frequently published Japanese language lessons, and the Indonesian articles in *Djawa Baroe* were paralleled by Japanese translation too. Even the radio would broadcast lessons in Japanese for both adults and children.[47] Furthermore the text in figure 5 encourages adults and children alike to read the ジャワシンブン (*Djawa Shimbun*) in Japanese because '*bahasa nippon, bahasa timoer asia raja*' (the Japanese language is the language of Great East-Asia). The idea of these lessons was that, "so long as there are no Indonesians who can speak Japanese, then relations between Japan and Indonesia will always remain difficult." [48]

Indonesian journalists, however, suddenly enjoyed greater prominence than they ever did before. They were now able to exercise some influence through the press. It is true that newspapers were censored by Japanese authorities, but so few Japanese were able to understand Indonesian that many journalists had to exercise self-censorship.[49] As will be discussed in more detail below, the Japanese authorities were eager to offer nationalists jobs instead of leaving space for them to possibly create underground activities or movements out of discontent. Oto Iskandar di Nata, Soekardjo Wirjopranoto (who would be director or the *Asia Raya* newspaper) and many others were therefore offered positions in the press, radio and propaganda field, since mass communication was of top priority.

---

[42] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 350-351
[43] Ibid, p. 535-536
[44] Ibid, p. 536
[45] G. McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,* p. 104
[46] H. Benda, "The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java" p. 543
[47] A. Kurasawa, "Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese 1942-1945," p. 87-88
[48] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 352
[49] G. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia," p. 44



Peladjaran bahasa Nippon

NIPPONGO 2.
TJARA MELI-
SANKAN DA-
LAM BERHI-
TOENG (8).

Berapakah: tiga per-
empat dari delapan?
Enam.

Berapakah: empat
dari pirlima sepoe-
loeh?

Delapan.

$6 \times \frac{1}{2} = 3$
$8 \times \frac{1}{2} = 4$
$10 \times \frac{1}{2} = 5$
$3 \times \frac{1}{3} = 1$
$6 \times \frac{2}{3} = 4$
$8 \times \frac{3}{4} = 6$
$10 \times \frac{4}{5} = 8$

にっぽんご　二十八
かずの　かぞへかた　（八）
「八の　四ぶんの三は　いくつに　なりますか。」
「八　です。」
「十の　五ぶんの四は　いくつに　なりますか。」
「八　です。」

Figure 3 – “Peladjaran bahasa Nippon” Japanese language lesson , by Asia Raya (September 7, 1944)



Peladjaran bahasa Nippon

NIPPONGO 3.
HIRAGANA (3).

„KA" Apa nama hoeroef ini?
Itoe hoeroef jang berboenji „KA"

„KI" Apa nama hoeroef ini?
Itoe hoeroef jang berboenji „KI"

„KU" Apa nama hoeroef ini?
Itoe hoeroef jang berboenji „KU"

„KE" Apa nama hoeroef ini?
Itoe hoeroef jang berboenji „KE"

„KO" Apa nama hoeroef ini?
Itoe hoeroef jang berboenji „KO"

「か」　コレハ　ナント　イフ　ジデスカ。
　　ソレハ　「カ」　トイフ　ジデス。
「き」　コレハ　ナント　イフ　ジデスカ。
　　ソレハ　「キ」　トイフ　ジデス。
「く」　コレハ　ナント　イフ　ジデスカ。
　　ソレハ　「ク」　トイフ　ジデス。
「け」　コノジ　ハ　ナント　イフ　ジデスカ。
　　ソレハ　「ケ」　トイフ　ジデス。
「こ」　コノジ　ハ　ナント　イフ　ジデスカ。
　　ソレハ　「コ」　トイフ　ジデス。

Figure 4 – “Peladjaran bahasa Nippon” Japanese language lesson, by Asia Raya (1944)

Figure 5 – “ニッポンゴデハナシマセウ” Let’s speak in Japanese , by Desain Grafis Indonesia

Therefore good communication was indeed a necessity, as the words of Ichiki Tatsuo already explained, and for good communication Indonesian writers, poets and journalists were indispensible. Because of the new level of importance they would enjoy, many were eager to cooperate, [50] albeit not always according to how the Japanese administration might have imagined: the Indonesian-language newspaper *Asia Raya* (literally: Greater Asia) was supposed to be a means to promote Japanese-Indonesian cooperation and mutual comprehension, as it was a means of conveying Japanese propaganda. For a large part, however, the newspaper was an Indonesian project, comprised of cooperator and non-cooperator segments of the nationalist movement. These journalists were convinced that there was a possibility that Indonesian nationalism and Japanese ideals for a Greater Asia could be unified.[51] Advertisements in the *Asia Raya* were even the most important source of revenue for the nationalist *Tiga*-A Movement[52] that will be discussed in more detail below.

Asia Raya was based upon the notion of shared Asian interest – instead of using force, the propaganda division achieved its goals through a small group of Indonesian representatives, but in the end these people were largely left without interference. The newspaper was not controlled very strictly and the staff was all Indonesian that possessed relatively autonomous. A reason for this was the existing language barrier.[53] In this case, the fact that "relations between Japan and Indonesia will always remain difficult" if one does not speak the other language, applies the other way around: many Japanese did not speak Indonesian, making censorship rather difficult.

According to Japanese censorship, all forms of public writing and expression had to be submitted to the broadcast unit of the propaganda division, but this unit too was submitted to the language barrier, resulting in Indonesian staff to do the censoring. In this light it is no surprise that this unit turned a sympathetic eye to Indonesian nationalism from time to time, resulting in the fact that Indonesian journalists had a limited sense of autonomy.[54]

Making *bahasa Indonesia* and Japanese both official languages coincided with various difficulties. The *Jawa Nenkan* – a yearbook about Java by the military administration – recorded that in various places Javanese was still very widely spoken and that *bahasa Indonesia* was still not the universal language. This was for a large part due to lack of proper education which was problematic for Japanese propaganda efforts, because this means that a large part of the population could not understand it. Other problems were the fact that the literacy among the Indonesian population was below 10 percent,[55][56] and that the Japanese language lessons evoked negative reactions. A solution for this language barrier is a set of drawings forming a story, like a film script. Figure 8 is one of these drawings.

[50] G. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia," p. 44
[51] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 313-314
[52] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 41
[53] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 322-324
[54] Ibid, p. 328
[55] F. Dhont, "Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-Political Change in the Javanese Principalities under the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during World War II," p. 85
[56] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 322

These stories would be mostly about how heroic the Japanese armed forces were and the role of Japan in the Greater East Asian empire, but also about how Indonesian men could sign up for auxiliary forces.[57]

For the Indonesian nationalists the language barrier that existed with the Japanese authorities turned out to be beneficial because they enjoyed a sense of editorial freedom. Furthermore the words 'Indonesia' and 'Indonesian' could be frequently used in publications, confirming the existence of an Indonesia every day and despite the low literacy rates, *Asia Raya* was already circulated 23.000 times in the first two weeks, which was considerable compared to earlier newspapers circulating in Java.[58]

Audio-visual Media

Out of all different propaganda media, movies seem to have had the most impact on society in general, but especially on rural society. The *sendenbu* took over every existing movie company so that movies were now produced by the *Nippon Eigasha* (Japan Movie Company). Movies from America and other enemy countries were banned, so movies had to be imported from Japan.[59] Kurasawa writes that usually before a movie was screened or a play was about to start, an official from the propaganda division or a prominent local leader would give a speech – free admission to plays and movies could attract an enormous audience, and also reach the illiterate population. In the play or movie itself too, propaganda messages were subtly hidden; [60] movies could not show western influenced individualistic ideas or frivolous behavior, but instead had to emphasize the Japanese spirit and Asian values, and take a positive role in educating the population in order to discourage Westernization.[61] The audience did not mind this in their craving for amusement amidst the war.[62] All Japanese films that were screened on Java were mostly in *bahasa Indonesia*, the Indonesian language. This contributed to the development of a national feeling during the occupation, according to Frans Nieuwenhof.[63] As stated earlier, however, *bahasa Indonesia* was still not the universal language on the archipelago so the movies might not be understood by the whole population, but rather serve as amusement only.

One of the most interesting films the Japanese government made during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, according to David Desser, is the film *Ahen Sensō* (Opium War) dating from 1943.[64] It was part of the on-going justification for the Japanese war effort and expressively anti-British so it fits right in with all the "common-enemy" type of propaganda. According to Desser, *Ahen Sensō* was intended for Japan to show that they are indeed "anti-imperialist saviors" of their newly conquered Asian lands.[65] An Indonesian version of *Ahen Sensō* (Perang Tjandoe) was distributed all over Java in December 1943 and reviewed in the magazine Djawa Baroe (no.24).[66] On the other hand, many thought the film to resemble Hollywood Orientalism because of its stereotypical representation of

[57] Beeldbank WO2, image number 180728
[58] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 321
[59] A. Kurawasa, "Propagada Media on Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945," p. 67-69
[60] Ibid, p. 66
[61] Ibid, p. 69-71
[62] Ibid, p. 66
[63] F. Nieuwenhof, "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia," p. 164
[64] D. Desser, "From the Opium War to the Pacific War: Japanese Propaganda Films of World War II," p. 32
[65] Ibid, p. 32
[66] A. Kurawasa, "Propagada Media on Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945," p. 97

Chinese history and because it made us of Western music and film style; [67] the plot is even derived from the Hollywood film *Orphans of the Storm*. Therefore the propaganda value was little.[68] Additionally, as David Desser states in his article, using parts of a Hollywood film in propaganda reveals that the Japanese liked and respected at least something about America. The fact that Britain was more often the target of anti-enemy propaganda adds to this argument, according to Desser, and could even say something about Japan's fear and respect for the US military.[69]

Ahen Sensō is, of course, not the only movie reflecting recurring propaganda themes: an example of a Japanese movie reflecting the earlier mentioned 'Asian Values' self-sacrifice and discipline is shown in figure 6. The subtitles "offering the soul for mutual safety," must refer to the Japanese soldier who is willing to defy the *oedara berbisa* or toxic air. The screening date is presented in roman Japanese, *hachigatsu,* or August, which is part of instilling the population with the Japanese language as discussed above.

Figure 6 – "Oedara Berbisa," by Asia Raya (1944)

Aside from movies, theatre plays were another way to influence an audience. Anthony Reid, in *Southeast Asia under the Japanese Occupation*, mentions two plays with recognizable themes. The first one is Momotaro, portraying Japan, who is fighting off the 'evil West.' On the way he meets the personifications of China, Philippines and Indonesia, who are suffering and want to help him fight the enemy. Secondly, he describes a play about two Indonesian friends of which one is imprisoned due to nationalist writing. He undergoes terrible torture, but has enough strength and courage to tell the enemy that they can never build anything like Borobudur and that they have reduced literacy with as much as 40 percent, making them look bad and inferior. In the end he dies a hero, while his friend joined the Dutch police and dies as a traitor.[70] The first one shows the recurring theme of propaganda

[67] P. Fu, *Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: The Politics of Chinese Cinemas,* p. 110
[68] P. Fu, *Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: The Politics of Chinese Cinemas,* p. 110
[69] D. Desser, "From the Opium War to the Pacific War: Japanese Propaganda Films of World War II," p. 41-43
[70] A. McCoy, *Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation,* p. 24-25

against the West, while the other play shows anti-West propaganda and two of the old values mentioned above: self-sacrifice and discipline.

Just like shown in this last play where Borobudur was mentioned in the sense that the West could never have something so great, ancient 'Indonesian' history – so dating back from before colonization – became glorified in order to encourage anti-West sentiment. Aside from plays, this also manifested itself in songs about Majapahit and Srivijaya, both great ancient kingdoms located in what is now Indonesia. Likewise, national heroes like Diponegoro, who was the leader of an extensive rebellion against Dutch occupiers, were being honored in plays and dances; the Japanese encouraged stories about the 'Indonesian people' fighting against the Dutch.[71]In doing so, the idea of the pre-existence of an Indonesian nation was created or reinforced.

Besides the entertaining theatre and movies, newsreels were also used to convey information, such as the Emperor's Birthday.[72] Before a movie would start, in large cities even throughout the day, a short overview of current affairs would be shown. The *Nederlands Instituut voor Beeld en Geluid* has a small collection of these newsreels in their archive. One of the newsreels, dating back to September 1943, is from *Nampo Hodo* or 'news of the south,' produced by *Nippon Eigasha.* Although Japan was struggling in the war, the newsreel shows large groups training marines and a simulated fight for 10 minutes long to convince the audience that the war was going well for Japan, contrary to reality.[73]
After 1943, the main subject of film (and propaganda in general) switched from ideological & moral propaganda to protection, promoting food production, and recruitment of volunteers to aid the Japanese Army due to big losses in the war.[74] A later *Nampo Hodo* newsreel from January 1, 1944, [75] is an example of this. The film encourages people to become volunteers for the sake of 'their own country,' thereby stimulating the idea of the existence of an Indonesian country. The volunteers are depicted collectively working on a military airbase while singing motivating songs.

The film starts with a speech by aforementioned nationalist Oto Iskandar di Nata, who was a prominent fighter for Indonesia's liberation from the Dutch. Sukarno and Hatta are also present in a march that follows. As discussed above, the Japanese encouraged such fighters for independence and national heroes to appear on stage, in favor of their anti-West propaganda. On the flipside, showing national heroes all over the country and thereby connecting them with the masses also stimulates national consciousness; people could identify with them as being people of the same kind, making them part of one nation. In this sense, using nationalist leaders was ambiguous and working in two ways.

One of the *sendenbu* officials has said that Sukarno actually used them to promote his own nationalism and was never tied to his superiors,[76] but in this case it is hard to find out if Sukarno voiced his own nationalism in his speeches or the Japanese version of it, since both cases are Indonesian nationalism. To quote Frank Nieuwenhuis: "Japan inadvertently stimulated Indonesian nationalism, although their intent was selfish."[77]

[71] K. M. de Silva et al, *Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present,* p. 494
[72] F. Nieuwenhof, "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia," p. 173
[73] Beeld en Geluid Collectie, *Nampo Hodo (7), 01 sep 1943*
[74] F. Nieuwenhof, "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia," p. 174
[75] Beeld en Geluid Collectie, *Nampo Hodo (20), 17 nov 1944*
[76] F. Nieuwenhof, "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia," p. 165
[77] Ibid, p. 165

Theories exist that the Japanese authorities *thought* that Sukarno's speeches were full of praise for the Japanese; about how bad the West was, and that they would encourage the people to support Japanese war effort. After an examination of these speeches, about 75% turned out to be pure nationalism. In the speeches Sukarno would use a lot of subtleties and double talk that the masses – especially Javanese – would be able to pick up, but the Japanese would not.[78] However, Indonesians at the time did not agree with this theory and scholars afterwards did not either.

Because of a shortage of bigger commercial movie theatres, there existed moving theater teams who were in charge of outdoor movie projections so that in rural areas people were also able to enjoy movies and the included propaganda. The *sendenbu* knew how important audio-visual mass media was to acquire the people's cooperation, so therefore they tried to promote the people's access to it. This was also the case for radio broadcasting.[79]

Radio

After the surrender of Dutch-Indies military forces on the 8th of March 1942, the *sendenbu* repaired the existing Dutch radio transmitters and took over radio broadcasting. [80] They put a lot of effort in building up the radio network in Indonesia. A large public was able to receive radio broadcasts through "singing-towers," that were set up in certain points throughout cities. To reach the biggest possible audience through radio, public receivers were installed in streets, in parks and in markets[81] and there were certain times throughout the day on which people were required to listen to official broadcasts that often included speeches by Sukarno.[82]

On the 1st of October that year a special department for radio control was brought into life, the *Jawa Hōsō Kanrikyoku,* which was under control of the N.H.K. (*Nippon Hōsōkyokai,* the Japanese broadcasting corporation*)*. The radio broadcasting mainly focused on the midland of Java and had an Indonesian as well as a Japanese section.[83] The Japanese broadcasts focused on news from the homeland (rebroadcasts from the N.H.K.). The Indonesian component, basically like all other forms of media, focused on teaching the native people about the ideology of a Great Asia, why Japan had to win the war but also about Japanese language and culture. A day-long radio broadcast-schedule shows that the news, speeches included, was broadcasted in Indonesian, Javanese, Sundanese and Japanese for those learning the language – at certain times during the day there were Japanese lessons broadcasted to. That means that Sukarno's and other nationalist's speeches could be understood by most of the Indonesian population and that the propaganda authority was concerned with giving the biggest audience possible access to the government's intentions.[84] During Dutch colonial times, Indonesian nationalist leaders never had a chance to convey messages directly to the people, so now that they could it must have made a great impact to the audience.[85]

---

[78] G. McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,* p. 108
[79] K. M. de Silva et al, *Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present,* p. 489
[80] F. Dhont, "Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-Political Change in the Javanese Principalities under the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during World War II," p. 92
[81] K. M. de Silva et al, *Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present,* p. 488-489
[82] G. McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,* p. 108
[83] A. Kurasawa, "Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese 1942-1945," p. 87
[84] Ibid, p. 88
[85] Ibid, p. 89

Aside from political broadcasting, there were also a broadcasting-programs focusing on entertainment. These programs played traditional Indonesian and Javanese music (*keroncong* and *gamelan*) and *wajang* as a radio show.[86] Propaganda songs were continuously sung – comparable to commercials on TV nowadays – and used in broadcasts or as background music for films. These kinds of songs would be about fighting and working spirit (not unlike the song published in the newspaper as seen in figure 2), a Greater Asia, praising national heroes and the like. Although the effect of radio broadcasts was not as striking as visual propaganda, the effect was definitely widespread and reached a larger audience at one time with low cost and labor.[87] Even so, not everyone was happy with the Japanese propaganda broadcasting:

> "When the Japanese broadcast music in Java, many people would listen, but when propaganda commenced, some walked away saying 'Nihon-Bogong' (Japan-lies)"[88]

Furthermore the influence of radio was geographically limited.[89] Historians like Nugroho Notosusanto and George McTurnan Kahin hold the opinion that through radio, important nationalist speeches by, for example, Sukarno, were broadcasted and made available in almost every city and village and in multiple languages too. Therefore they state that these speeches would reach a great amount of people nationwide.[9091] Many villages, however, had no electricity and therefore no radio. Only in a few large cities along main streets and in public places radios were installed. Additionally, in time certain radios broke down and were never repaired.[92] As a result, the propaganda staff discovered that a lot of people – even relatively high educated school teachers – did not know who Sukarno and Hatta were, or only after Indonesian Independence.[93] But contrary to film, radio broadcasts were in multiple languages, so more people were able to understand what was being said.

[86] L.F. Jansen, *In deze halve Gevangenis,* p. xix-xx
[87] A. Kurasawa, "Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese 1942-1945," p. 89
[88] Ibid, p. 93
[89] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 57
[90] G. McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,* p. 108
[91] N. Notosusanto, *The Japanese Occupation and Indonesian Independence*, p. 11
[92] W. Frederick, *Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution*, p. 114
[93] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 58

A Common Enemy and the Creation of a Nation

In this subsection, more propaganda in printed media will be discussed, such as leaflets and magazine and newspaper material. Furthermore a frequently recurring propaganda theme will be discussed in more detail, which is the creation of a common enemy of Indonesia and Japan, and how this contributed to the development of a national consciousness. Additionally, the creation or development of the idea of a (pre-existing) Indonesian nation in media will be discussed as well as aspects reinforcing national identity such as a national anthem, flag and dress.

Print Media

Even though paper was scarce and expensive, enough time and effort was put into print media.[94] In 1940, as state control over media intensified, magazines and newspapers had to merge, resulting into less publications and therefore less space for cartoonists and authors to make publications. This was especially the case for comics and propaganda leaflets targeting enemy troops as well as the Asian populace.[95] In spite of this, the idea that propaganda was a means to an end still prevailed so a lot of effort was still put into the production of print media.

Beginning in 1940, the Japanese military started producing many propaganda cartoon leaflets and illustrations, meant for the Asian populace and enemy troops. The ones aimed at the Asian populace were used to evoke antagonism of the people toward the Allied powers during the Pacific War that started in 1941.[96] The illustrations below are examples of such propaganda. Figure 7 belongs to the leaflet-category. It depicts a British soldier who has finished at least one bottle of alcohol, while in the background Indonesian Muslims are seen praying. The text above this leaflet says SETAN which is equal to Satan or the devil. The fact that the word devil has been used indicates that this leaflet was especially targeting the Muslim population of Indonesia, since drinking alcohol is forbidden in Islam making this British man an infidel – or in this case the devil.

Next, in figure 8, a large crowd consisting of Indonesian men is depicted cheering and holding the Japanese *hinomaru* flag. Next to the crowd is the reason why they are cheering; knives have been stuck into both the American as the English flag, indicating a certain defeat or a wish for defeat. Figure 8, instead of being a leaflet, is part of a series of illustrations produced by the propaganda division. When personnel from the propaganda division would visit *desa* (villages in the countryside) these illustrations were shown. This is an indication of the need for visual propaganda – especially on the countryside - since no text is being used whatsoever, the images speak for themselves.

[94] R. Okamoto, "Fuku-chan Goes to Java: Images of Indonesia in a Japanese Wartime Newspaper Comic Strip," p. 113
[95] Ibid, p. 66-67
[96] Ibid, p. 17-18

Figure 7 – "The West as the devil," by psywarrior

Figure 8 – "The West as Common Enemy," by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust-, en Genocidestudies

The *Djawa Baroe* published a good example of the use of common enemy-propaganda and at the same time encouraging a national identity. The story is about a part of Balinese history: between 2566 and 2568 (1906 and 1908) the Dutch invaded kingdoms of Bali that were still independent, Badung, Tabanan and Klungkung, to seal Dutch control on the island of Bali. The preface of the story, visible in figure 9, introduces the Dutch as a European race that was looking for colonies for the sake of their trade, industry and capital. The history of the loss these last Balinese kingdoms is portrayed as a fight of the "Indonesian nation" (*bangsa Indonesia*) against the Dutch: a struggle that shows the desire of a nation to defend its independence (*perlawananjang menoendjukkan soenggoeh-soenggoeh hasrat soeatoe bangsa oentoek mempertahankan kemerdekaannja*). That is to say, this part of history of the kingdoms of Bali is framed as one of the Indonesian nation and therefore also suggesting and reinforcing the existence of an Indonesian identity.

„POEPOETAN" (I)

TJERITERA PETIKAN DARI SEDJARAH DJATOEHNJA KERADJAAN-KERADJAAN

DI BALI

Oleh: Darmawidjaja

PENDAHOELOEAN

Kira-kira sedjak tahoen 1510 terdjadilah diantara negeri-negeri Eropah soeatoe perlombaan mentjari tanah djadjahan, teroetama sekali oentoek kepentingan perdagangan, indoesteri dan kapitaal bank masing-masing negeri itoe.

Dalam sedjarah nafsoe mendjadjah ini biasa disboet imperialisme modern, jang sifatnja bertambah lama bertambah hebat dan keedjam. Banjaklah bangsa-bangsa berwarna menderita nasib jang amat tjelaka oleh nafsoe pendjadjahan negeri-negeri imperialis Barat jang tidak sedikitpoen merasa teralang perasaan kemanoesiaannja oentoek membocnoeki anak negeri tanah bangsa-bangsa lain, seperti di Kongo, di Afrika Selatan, dan daerah Afrika lainnja, di India, di Australia, Filipina, Tiongkok dan lain-lain lagi.

Dan negeri Belanda tidak poela kalah dalam memoeaskan nafsoe angkara moerka ini diboemi Indonesia. Dengan kempoenan dan tergesa-gesa karena takoet daerah-daerah Indonesia didoedoeki oleh negeri-negeri Barat jang lain, didjalankannja programma penakloekan jang seloeas-loeasnja; kita seboet beberapa peperangan-peperangan jang berhoeboeng dengan itoe: Atjeh, Djambi, Tapanoeli, Bandjarmasin, Palembang, Bali, Lombok dan seterocenja.

Adapoen akan sedjarah poepoetan Badoeng dibawah ini adalah soeatoe perlawanan bangsa Indonesia terhadap orang Belanda, saitoe perlawanan jang menoendjoekkan soenggoeh-soenggoeh hasrat bangsa oentoek mempertahankan kemerdekaannja. Semoea ahli-ahli tentang Bali dengan tiada ketjoealinja, mengakoei belaka akan sifat damai dari orang Bali. Tetapi meskipoen demikian, keradjaan-keradjaan di Bali satoe-satoe ditakloekkan dan didjarah orang Belanda dan penakloekan dan pendjarahan itoe achirnja memoentjak dalam „poepoetan" Badoeng, Tabanan dan Keloengkoeng (1906 — 1908).

Oentoek pendjelasan tjeritera dibawah ini, selain dari soember-soember jang bersifat ilmoe pengetahoean tidak poela sedikit kita ambil oensoer-oensoer dari kitab karangan Aage Krarup Nielsen dan roman karangan Vicky Baum.

Figure 9 **–** "Poepoetan, the downfall of Balinese kingdoms," in Djawa Baroe no. 24 (December 1944)

Figure 10 – "I Gusti Bagus Jelantik, Balinese King," Djawa Baroe (1943)

Figure 11 – Sukarno and Tojo in Batavia (7th July, 1943), by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust-, en Genocidestudies

The conjuring and reinforcement of the notion of a pre-existing Indonesia, such as in the story above in which is suggested that the Balinese kingdoms were part of an Indonesian nation fighting for independence from the Dutch, was enhanced by the inclusion of a daily 'Indonesia' heading in *Asia Raya*'s news pages. These news briefs usually came from Java, but they also included stories from other places on the archipelago if available. The construction of 'Indonesia' had been underway in the nationalist press for a while, but this was the first time that an official, government-approved publication spoke in these terms in the Indonesian language itself. [97] The use of the words Indonesia and Indonesians were critically important to the existence of Indonesia itself too – by using these words, its existence appeared as a certainty, even though its future was not certain yet.[98]

Noteworthy is the fact that in a lot of this common enemy-propaganda, the 'enemy' is England and the US, and not necessarily the Netherlands. A possible explanation is the fact that both these countries had a bigger role in the war Japan was waging. Therefore, since one goal of the propaganda activities was to convince Indonesians Japan had to win the war for their own benefit, the Indonesians had to be convinced that these countries were their biggest enemies as well, rather than the Dutch.

[97] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 351
[98] Ibid, p. 350

Flag & Anthem

Not unlike other colonized nations, the Indonesian archipelago did not have an official flag until their day of independence, even though there already was a flag designed in 1922 by the Indonesian Union, a nationalist organization of Indonesian students. This flag was also adopted by the Indonesian Nationalist Party later in 1928. When looking at figure 12 below, almost all nations are represented by their national flags, but in Indonesia only the Japanese flag is visible. When Indonesia was invaded, the Indonesian and Japanese flags were both seen everywhere, but a mere twelve days after "liberation" from the Dutch, the Indonesian flag was already abolished – the Japanese flag could be used on formal occasions instead.[99]

The national anthem went through a similar event. Ethan Mark mentions an Indonesian nationalist associate, Yusuf Hasan, who became a spokesman in Radio Tokyo's prewar and wartime Malay-Indonesian language broadcasts to the Indies that were listened to by many Indonesians who had access to radio. His radiobroadcasts would be opened by *Indonesia Raya,* the anthem of the Indonesian nationalists.[100] Likewise, just before the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 the Japanese authorities broadcasted *Indonesia Raya* and rhetoric about Asia for the Asians on the radio.[101] There was still hope that it was possible to unite Japanese ideas of a Greater East Asia with Indonesian nationalism. This is visible in a broadcast by Hasan from March 26th, 1942:

Figure 12 – "Western Defeat," by The Asia-Pacific Journal

[99] F. Dhont, "Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-Political Change in the Javanese Principalities under the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during World War II," p. 90
[100] Ibid, p. 55
[101] Ibid, p. 90

> "Brothers of the same race and fatherland! It is now almost four months that we have continued to shout and give speeches before this microphone, in the aim that our people in general will better realize, be more aware of, and also work even harder for, the fatherland. As you hear, *our* national anthem *Indonesia Raya* can be heard every night from Tokyo. Tonight we expressly offer to the people of Indonesia a speech […] which we have expressly entitles "The power and strength of the people is an important tool for achieving Indonesian independence."[102]

Together with the red and white flag, the anthem would be banned soon after this broadcast. This caused great disappointment among the Indonesian people, especially because in a speech by Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki from January 22nd 1942, independence was promised in short order.[103] The banning of the Indonesian anthem and flag, together with a ban on discussing Indonesia's future political status on the 20th of March and the Japanese design of a Greater Asia instead, were all reasons for concern.[104] On the other hand, for some people (followers of Greater Asianism and elite nation-builders) the ban of Indonesian flags also meant Japanese victory and a collapse of the former Western order, paving the way for new Asian opportunities. [105]

During the formation of the *Poetera* movement, as will be discussed below in more detail, nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta tried to implement the flag and anthem again, but their requests were denied. Only after Prime Minister Koiso declared future independence in 1944, the red and white flag and *Indonesia Raya* became obligatory on every public occasion. The visibility and meaning of them had become more significant – especially for the uneducated and illiterate – than any ideological rhetoric.[106] On the exact day of Koiso's declaration, the *Asia Raya* immediately published the Indonesian anthem that had been abolished before, although it was still not acknowledged as national anthem but rather as a popular song. From that day up until the actual independence on August 17th 1945, many items were published in *Asia Raya* and other media related to the independence that was promised to come. Now such content was approved of by the Japanese, making it easier to publish and spread nationalist ideas throughout the archipelago.

[102] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 55-56
[103] Ibid, p. 56
[104] Ibid, p. 258
[105] Ibid, p. 259
[106] F. Dhont, "Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-Political Change in the Javanese Principalities under the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during World War II," p. 91

Figure 13 – Hoisting the Flag in front of the building of the Japanese Military Government Advisory Board in Jakarta, by Asia Raya (May 28, 1945)



Figure 14 – "Indonesia Raja" Great Indonesia, by Asia Raya (September 8, 1944)

Figure 15 – "Under the National Flag – Fight with Japan for an Independent Indonesia!" (1944), by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs- Holocaust en Genocidestudies

National Dress

As Ikeya shows in her article through an example of modern Burmese women, clothing plays an important role in shaping national identity.[107] For leaflets dropped in Southeast Asia and India, nationality was portrayed through 'typical' national costume.[108] For example, in figure 8 shown above, the crowd appears to be wearing a *peci* or *songkok,* which is also visible in figure 11 and 16 where it is worn by Indonesian political leaders. This is a cap associated with Malay culture and mostly worn by Muslim men. In audiovisual material, Sukarno is always seen wearing such a cap. Figure 10 above, the image of the Balinese king, is an example of traditional dress. Even though the example is a regional one, the accompanying text (shown in figure 9) speaks to the whole Indonesian nation through their common history of fighting against the Dutch – in this way, such traditional culture can associated with on a national level and not just on a regional level.

Likewise, there are also many illustrations in which Malay men wear *sarong,* and for example Burmese men *longi,* which is not surprising but can be seen as confirming and emphasizing national dress and therefore national identity. Figure 16 below is a good representation of the idea that national clothes are part of national identity; every nation is depicted in their own outfit – in this case some wear their national military outfits instead of the traditional one, but it still reflects the aspect of reinforcing national identity. Another point this image tries to convey is how good it is to be one Great East Asia as the text also indicates: it says that the people of East Asia will destroy America and Britain by uniting – they will study their hardest and spread their superior culture over the world. "Our hearts are one."

Figure 16 – "One of Heart," by 2bangkok

[107] C. Ikeya, "The Modern Burmese Woman and the Politics of Fashion in Colonial Burma," p. 1277-1308
[108] R. Okamoto, "Pictorial Propaganda in Japanese Comic Art, 1941-1945: Images of the Self and the Other in a Newspaperstrip, Single Panel Cartoons and Cartoon Leaflets," p. 195

Propaganda through Nationalist Movements

This subsection will discuss three important nationalist movements that have existed throughout the period of the occupation and their relation with the propaganda division and if this relation was beneficial for the development of nationalist consciousness.

Pergerakan Tiga A

Aside from media, the Japanese authorities also tried to propagate their ideas through nationalist movements that were in part under their control. The promise of independence for Indonesia and stimulating nationalism played an important role in Japanese propaganda on Java. The words from the last commander of the 16th army commander, Yamamoto Moichiro, show how Japanese stood regarding independence-propaganda:

> "When we look at the Indonesian independence movement during the Japanese occupation, it is quite easy to conclude that the Japanese government intended to grant the Indonesians their independence very early after the invasion. This misunderstanding follows from a superficial assessment of Japanese propaganda before the landing operations. In this propaganda we described the prospects of the liberation of Asia […] The consequence was a continuous friction between radical nationalists and the 16th army." [109]

On March 20, 1942, Japan issued a new law declaring that "*all sorts of discussion, actions, suggestions or propaganda"* [110] or political activities against all matters of state would be forbidden. The Japanese tried to secure cooperation of nationalists through participation within or outside of the administration, as journalists, for example, like stated above. However, the ban on political activity caused political tensions among both nationalists and the whole Indonesian population. This seemed to have caused some concern among the authorities – how could they reduce these tensions? An answer was found within both Indonesian nationalism and Japanese propaganda.[111]

At first the propaganda division planned to spend a lot of time, staff and material on an extensive anti-Dutch campaign in an attempt to use anti-colonialism for the purpose of mass mobilization.[112] However the Dutch were quick to surrender before the plan could be carried out. Now left with a lot of time on their hands and tension still in the air, the first Indonesian political movement, guided and organized by the Japanese propaganda division, was brought to life: the *Pergerakan Tiga A,* also known as *Tiga A* or Triple A movement.[113] This movement was also connected with the Islamic unification movement (*Persiapan Persatuan Ummat Islam*). [114] Through the *Tiga-A* movement, the Japanese sought to ease tensions, initially on the propaganda front through – for example – speeches given by nationalists in favor of the Japanese war effort on the radio.

The leaders of this movement were Raden Samsudin and Shimizu Hitoshi. Samsudin was a former member of *Parindra* (Partai Indonesia Raya) – a nationalist political party in the Netherlands Indies

[109] F. Nieuwenhof, "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia," p. 164
[110] Ibid, p. 164
[111] G. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia," p. 45
[112] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 37
[113] Ibid, p. 45
[114] F. Nieuwenhof, "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia, p. 164

that aimed to achieve their goals by cooperation with the Dutch. After losing faith in this cooperation, many members of Parindra including Samsudin started to believe the Japanese 'Asia for the Asians' propaganda and wanted to try and promote their nationalist ideas in cooperation with the Japanese authorities instead.[115] Hitoshi was the head of the Japanese propaganda section.[116] Aside from Samsudin, many prominent nationalist leaders seemed to be reluctant in joining the movement because some (like Mohammad Hatta) believed it to be a cheap propaganda exhibition, but also because some were simply not available at the time, sometimes due to imprisonment. [117]

Advertisements in the *Asia Raya* were the most important source of revenue for the headquarters of the nationalist movement,[118] aside from funding from the propaganda corps.[119] The Triple A Movement stood for three slogans that were first seen printed in the newspaper *Sekidōhō*, directed at Japanese readers, and later on posters in Indonesian as well as Japanese as seen in figure 17 below:

Japanese	Indonesian	English
Ajia no Hikari Nippon	*Tjahaja Asia Nippon*	Japan, Light of Asia
Ajia no Botai Nippon	*Pelindoeng Asia Nippon*	Japan, Mother/Protector of Asia
Ajia no Shidōsha Nippon	*Pemimpin Asia Nippon*	Japan, Leader of Asia

Figure 17 – "Triple A Movement," by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust-, en Genocidestudies (1942)

[115] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 37
[116] Ibid, p. 39
[117] G. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia," p. 47
[118] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 41
[119] Ibid, p. 39

The movement, however, did not turn out to be a success.[120] The Japanese and Indonesian leaders of the movement unsurprisingly differed in ideas about the purpose of the movement, which can even be seen when translating one of the slogans '*ajia no botai nippon'.* The Japanese word *botai* 母体 can be translated as 'base' or 'parent organization'. The Indonesian word used instead of *botai*, *pelindoeng*, could be better translated as 'protector' or 'shield'. So the Japanese version of the slogan would translate to "Japan, the base of Asia" while the Indonesian version would mean "Japan, protector of Asia."

Additionally, as stated above, the absence of more prominent leaders was a cause of failure[121] and even though Samsudin was cooperating with the Japanese propaganda division, he called Indonesia *'tanah toempah darah kita Indonesia'* (our homeland Indonesia) in a radio speech on April 21 (1942), which was meant to provoke nationalist sentiment. This was not well received by the Japanese authorities:[122] after Samsudin's speech concerns rose about the Indonesian name of the movement. The word *pergerakan* (literally 'movement') in the Netherlands Indies referred to nationalist movements defying colonial authorities, [123] or in other words the general struggle of all groups to achieve independence for Indonesia.[124] Machida Keiji who was head of the propaganda corps wrote in the *Sekidōhō* that it should be remembered that the movement was originally meant to be the "Emperor's World Movement," and was aware of the possible dangers attached to the use of the word *pergerakan*. [125]

The complex part of this movement is that the Japanese wanted to make use of the anti-(western) colonial sentiment that was part of the Triple A Movement, but at the same time they were afraid that these same anti-colonial feelings would turn against them.[126] Among the population the movement did not have much support either: the total membership of the *Tiga A* Movement somewhat exceeded 4.000, mainly by young Indonesians through its sponsorship of athletic events, making it a relatively small movement.[127] Satō wrote that according to most historians the *Tiga A* movement was being called "a childish and disorganized campaign characterized by streams of empty words, parades and waving of flags or as a comedy written by the propaganda corps and acted by Indonesians," in short not a success.[128]

[120] G. McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,* p. 103
[121] G. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia," p. 48
[122] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 44
[123] Ibid, p. 44
[124] W. Frederick, *The Putera Reports: Problems in Indonesian-Japanese Wartime Cooperation*, p. 1
[125] Ibid, p. 44
[126] Ibid, p. 44
[127] G. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia," p. 49
[128] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 49

Poetera

After a few months the *Tiga A* Movement fell apart. In March 1943 a new mass movement, *Poetera,* was organized with, surprisingly, many similarities to the *Tiga A* Movement.[129] This time, however, prominent nationalists such as Sukarno and Hatta *were* present. *Poetera* is short for *Poesat Tenaga Rakjat*, meaning the concentration of people's power. The Japanese military administration formed this movement in part to secure cooperation from the Indonesian people, and in part to relieve discontent among nationalists: they believed it would be safer to let the Indonesian nationalists participate than to let them do nothing and leave space for them to possibly create underground activities or movements.[130] However, three months after its creation Hatta had already called the organization's performance "completely unsatisfactory."[131]

Causes for *Poetera'*s failure were, in the first place differences in goals from the Japanese and the Indonesian side leading to animosity. [132] Contrary to Samsudin who was appointed leader from the *Tiga A* movement, both Sukarno and Hatta were very persistent during negotiations with the Japanese authorities and they made it very clear that they were aiming at a nationalist movement, focusing on the idea of 'Indonesia.' In that case they would have a powerful political base in case of political change. The idea of 'Indonesia' included the use of 'Indonesia Raya' as anthem, the use of the Indonesian red and white flag and the use of the word Indonesia.[133]

The Japanese authorities saw new possibilities for total mobilization in this movement. They wanted a new movement to use the population's anti- (Western) colonial feelings combined with the influence that the participating nationalist leaders had, in order to exercise influence over the population in favor of their cause: a powerful new Java as an essential part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Sukarno and Hatta's idea of 'Indonesia' was therefore impossible to accept. The use of the national flag and anthem, two important national symbols, were also considered to be too nationalistic and therefore inappropriate for this movement. As a result of negotiations resulting in total compromise from the Indonesian side*, Poetera* was free of any sign of Indonesian nationalism.[134]

The Japanese administration always had a close eye on the movement and the participating nationalists never got a chance to organize and lead people on their own and while *Poetera's* activities commenced, opposition grew stronger. Hatta wrote

> "In concluding our overview of *Poetera*'s work in the past three months, it must be said that its situation has been entirely unsatisfactory. […] The leadership and the directors feel that their freedom of action has been extremely limited. […] For the people *Poetera'*s present situation is unsatisfactory since it was previously widely believed that *Poetera* would give leadership to various popular efforts. […] Aside from propaganda the people see no concrete results of their activities.[…] If it is only a

[129] Ibid, p. 50
[130] Ibid, p. 50
[131] W. Frederick, *The Putera Reports: Problems in Indonesian-Japanese Wartime Cooperation*, p. 9
[132] Ibid, p. 9
[133] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 51
[134] Ibid, p. 51 - 53

> matter of propaganda, the *Sendenbu* should be enough. […] What is the use of *Poetera*?" [135]

Soon after this report, the movement was dissolved.[136] The differences that existed regarding the establishment of this movement and the Japanese ambiguous stance towards Indonesian nationalism created fundamental problems for *Poetera:* on the one had nationalists were welcomed to participate in this movement but on the other hand their activities were increasingly restricted to nothing but propagating for the Japanese:

> "Although according to the original plans contained in its constitution and special regulations *Poetera* was to have done many things, the government decided, after *Poetera* was under way, that anti-Allied propaganda was to be emphasized. With this decision, other efforts were downgraded. Anti-Allied propagandizing was accomplished through mass meetings and, with *sendenbu* help, penetrated into the villages. The *sendenbu* contributed the films, *Poetera* the speeches."[137]

Although film was welcome entertainment during these difficult times, the speeches were not well received due to bad economic circumstances. Important factors for *Poetera'*s failure were the crises that existed in Java at the time: rice shortage, labor problems, and shortage and demoralization of Indonesian leadership.[138] The nationalists participating in *Poetera* tried to win people over for their cause by conducting mass rallies, radio broadcasts and appealing on people's nationalist feelings, but their influence was geographically very limited.[139] As explained earlier in this thesis, radiobroadcasts were geographically limited. Furthermore, on propaganda tours to the countryside the speeches that were held would be in *bahasa Indonesia*. However, most peasants spoke Javanese, Sundanese or other vernacular languages. Additionally, these propaganda tours were limited to areas where *Poetera* had branch offices.

In the end, *Poetera* turned out to be a movement, in part created but not trusted by the Japanese authorities and therefore it was decided that it should be dissolved. They wanted nationalists to participate but in the end this made them even more cautious and therefore it was placed under stricter control than the *Tiga-A* movement was.[140]

[135] W. Frederick, *The Putera Reports: Problems in Indonesian-Japanese Wartime Cooperation*, p. 58-61
[136] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 57
[137] W. Frederick, *The Putera Reports: Problems in Indonesian-Japanese Wartime Cooperation*, p. 65
[138] Ibid, p. 9
[139] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, p. 57
[140] Ibid, p. 59

Jawa Hōkōkai

After *Poetera* was dissolved, a new mass organization was established to replace it in March, 1944. By this time the Japanese felt that war was not going well at all – the economic conditions in Java were worsening and the popular morale was low.[141] The new movement was called *Jawa Hōkōkai* or *Himpoenan Kebaktian Rakjat* in Indonesian (Java Public Service Association). This time it would be led by the Japanese director of military administration instead of Indonesian nationalists.[142] The *Jawa Hōkōkai* included a bureau and an advisory board. Sukarno was appointed director of the *Jawa Hōkōkai* bureau and Hatta vice-president of the advisory board.[143] This was a means for limiting the movements and advancement of nationalist movements.[144]

Its main objective was similar to that of the *Tiga-A* and *Poetera:* reinforcing the administrative system through a mass organization/total mobilization.[145] Unlike *Tiga-A* and *Poetera*, however, the *Jawa Hōkōkai* also had a deeper control of the population as its purpose, because the military became increasingly dependent on the people's labor.[146]

The organization was not mainly a political one, but a "practical service movement that aimed at promoting Japan's military administration policies and it's friendship with all inhabitants of Java." [147] It was based on the Japanese concept of *hōkō*: service to higher authorities. Satō quotes the occupation authorities in their explanation of the *Jawa Hōkōkai* foundation spirit:

> "Hoko spirit means selfless service to the Sublime and Divine. It is the essence of the Japanese spirit which runs throughout Japanese history, […] it is also to be regarded as the quintessence of Oriental Morality in general, which regulates the life and language of the people of Java, their pious devotion to God and their sincere attitude in everyday life. The great and sacred duty of the people of Java can be accomplished only by awakening this spirit and giving an organizational form to it."

Because this concept of *hōkō* was foreign in Java, the Japanese authorities referred more often to the more familiar concept of *kewajiban* (duty). Two of the *kewajiban* imposed on the people were the surrender of their rice and labor to the Japanese authorities. [148] The propaganda division also produced a film "*Tonarigumi*" in which the importance of mutual help in war time through neighbourhood associations was emphasized. The *Jawa Shinbun* reported that the Jawa Hōkōkai played a positive part in rice delivery in some residencies, but generally it had become worse and reforms did not improve the efficiency of the Japanese military administration.[149]

---

[141] B. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946,* p. 28
[142] L. Sluimers, "The Japanese Military and Indonesian Independence," p. 32
[143] H. Burgers, *De Garoeda en de Ooievaar; Indonesië van Kolonie tot Nationale Staat,* p. 315
[144] G. McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,* p. 110
[145] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, p. 71*
[146] B. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946,* p. 28
[147] K. Goto, "Modern Japan and Indonesia: The Dynamics and Legacy of Wartime Rule," p. 543
[148] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, p. 20-21*
[149] Ibid*, p. 71-75*



Figure 18 – Djawa Hokokai (1944), by Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust-, en Genocidestudies

The *Jawa Hōkōkai* did not last long; the public opinion of the organization deteriorated at a quick pace. Satō writes that an Indonesian advisor to the government reported that the people were increasingly ignoring the government's policies. The main reason for this was the increasing difficulty with which the people obtained food and clothing – the distribution of commodities was unfair and the material situation of the people had worsened greatly. People felt that the *Jawa Hōkōkai* was just another propaganda trick, just like the *Tiga A* Movemet and *Poetera.*[150] Furthermore their activities were mostly meaningless, because the *Jawa Hōkōkai* representatives spoke in Indonesian while most people did not understand this. Many people who attended their speeches came because they were summoned or forced by a special police unit, which was another reason for discontent amongst the population.[151] As Satō writes: "What could be the use of the speeches of the *Jawa Hōkōkai* representatives who were not familiar with the place and who did not speak the people's language?"[152]

[150] E. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java, 1942-1945," p. 564
[151] S. Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, p. 151*
[152] Ibid, p. 151

Conclusion

First of all I would like to emphasize that I have focused on Java, so this conclusion is mainly valid for the Java region. In this thesis I have tried to answer the question "Did propaganda media contribute to shaping and developing a certain Indonesian identity and a national consciousness during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia?" On the one hand, as was the case for *Ahen Sensō,* the propaganda value of what was published was probably not always as high as the Japanese hoped for. Furthermore, the geographical reach of propaganda was limited and due to low literacy rates propaganda in text-form reached a small part of the population. On the other hand, propaganda that *did* reach its audience surely supported the creation and reinforcement of a national identity and Japan inadvertently stimulated Indonesian nationalism, although their intent was selfish.

While under Dutch control the Indonesian population was kept passive, while the Japanese actively mobilized the whole population for their war effort – psychologically and physically – through movie nights, fixed radio broadcasts and various organizations such as the nationalist movements that were discussed. Nationalists like Sukarno were used by the Japanese authorities to unite Japanese and Indonesian interests in an attempt to keep the population at ease. By giving Indonesian nationalists positions in the press, radio and propaganda field, the authorities also tried to keep them from creating underground activities or movements. At the same time, in doing so nationalists were given the opportunity, though limited, to spread their ideas through for example newspapers and speeches.

Furthermore, Japanese propaganda media depicted Indonesia united as one nation with one people and the West as one common enemy. This was done through emphasis on national dress, declaring *bahasa Indonesia* one official language of Indonesia, referring to Indonesia as 'Indonesia' and Indonesian as 'Indonesian' in texts and promoting a shared national history. Because Indonesian nationalism and Japanese expansionism were driven by differing motivations, but by the same enemy – the West and its imperialism – this was a frequently recurring theme in propaganda media as well. Additionally the Japanese authorities promised independence quite soon in the occupation period. It is likely that these images of a free Indonesia kept lingering in the minds of the people, and that they could spark the thought that independence was even possible. In this sense the Indonesian people were being united by anti-colonial feelings and a wish for independence.

In conclusion, by using Indonesian nationalist leaders for their own propaganda purposes, the people of Indonesia were subjected to them through radio, photos in newspapers or newsreels – which must have had an impact on people living isolated in rural areas. Furthermore they had the opportunity to know what was going on in their nation and to become more familiar with what was going on outside of their village or city. What's more is the idea of the existence of an Indonesian nation, sometimes with a pre-existing history and tradition, that was that was conveyed in media. In other words, even if Japanese propaganda itself was not effective, the people were increasingly receiving information about their nation and its leaders through different media. Therefore, even though its reach might have been limited, Japanese propaganda media in Indonesia certainly did contribute to the development of an Indonesian identity and the national consciousness of the Indonesian population.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Newspapers

Asia Raya (May 3, 1944 – September, 1945)

Jawa Shimbun (1943 – 1945)

Magazine

Djawa Baroe no. 1 – 24 (1943)

Djawa Baroe no. 1 – 24 (1944)

Djawa Baroe no. 1 – 15 (1945)

Film

Beeld en Geluid Collectie. *Nampo Hodo (7), 01 sep 1943*. http://in.beeldengeluid.nl/collectie/details/expressie/79250/false/true

Beeld en Geluid Collectie. *Nampo Hodo (20), 01 jan 1944.* http://in.beeldengeluid.nl/collectie/details/expressie/79593/false/true

Secundary Sources

Anderson, Benedict. *Java in the Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 2006

Beeldbank WO2. 180728. https://beeldbankwo2.nl/nl/beelden/detail/cb25fa38-025a-11e7-904b-d89d6717b464/media/c53f0c33-519e-a17d-2ba6-44610ee60b39?mode=detail&view=horizontal&q=japan%20indonesie&rows=1&page=46

Benda, Harry. "The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java." *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 15, no. 4 (August 1956): 541-560

Bertrand, Jacques. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Bodden, Michael. "Utopia and the Shadow of Nationalism: The Plays of Sanusi Pane 1928-1940." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 153, no. 3 (1997): 332-355

Bruckel, Geraldine. *Een waar Indisch Verhaal/A True Dutch-Indonesian Story*.

Burgers, Herman. *De Garoeda en de Ooievaar: Indonesië van Kolonie tot Nationale Staat*. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2010.

Dhont, Frank. "Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-political Change in the Javanese Principalities under the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during World War II." PhD diss., Yale University, 2012

Frederick, William H. *Visions and the Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989.

de Graaf, Hermanus. "The Indonesian Declaration of Independence: 17th August 1945." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 115, no. 4 (1959): 305-327

Goto, Ken'ichi. "Caught in the Middle: Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence in 1945." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (March 1996): 37-48

Goto, Ken'ichi. "Modern Japan and Indonesia: The Dynamics and Legacy of Wartime Rule." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 152 no. 4 (1996) 536-552

Groen, Petra and Touwen-Bouwsma, Elly. *Nederlands-Indië 1942, Illusie en Ontgoocheling*. 's-Gravenhage: Sdu Uitgeverij Koninginnegracht, 1992.

Hatta, Mohammad. *The Putera Reports: Problems in Indonesian-Japanese Wartime Cooperation*. Translated with an Introduction by William H. Frederick. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971.

Henley, David. "Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism: Indonesia and Indochina." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, no. 2 (April 1995): 286-324

Henley, David. "The Origins of Southeast Asian Nations: a Question of Timing." In *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, ed. John Breuilly, p. 263-286. Oxford: University Press, 2013

Ikeya, Chie. "The Modern Burmese Woman and the Policits of Fashion in Colonial Burma." The Journal of Asian Studies 67, no. 4 (November 2008): 1277-1308

Inomata, Yoshiki. *Nihon Senryōka Indoneshia Tabigeinin no Kiroku*. Tōykō: Mekon Publishing, 1996

Kahin, George McTurnan. *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2003.

Kaminsky, Arnold. *Nationalism and Imperialism in South and Southeast Asia: essays presented to Damodar R. SarDesai*. New Delhi: Manohar, 2005

Kanahele, George Sanford. "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: a Prelude to Independence." PhD diss., Cornell University, 1967

Kellman, Steven and Magill, Frank. *Magill's Survey of World Literature*. Pasadena: Salem Press, 2009.

Kingston, Jeff. "Reshaping History: The Pan Asian View on *Merdeka.*" *Critical Asian Studies* 33, no. 3 (2001): 473-478

Klooster, H.A.J. *Indonesiërs schrijven hun Geschiedenis: de Ontwikkeling van de Indonesische Geschiedboefening in Theorie en Praktijk, 1900-1980.* Dordrecht: Foris Publications Holland, 1985

Kurasawa, Aiko. "Propaganda Media on Java under the Japanese 1942-1945." *Indonesia*, no. 44 (October 1987): 59-116

Kurasawa, Aiko. "Mobilization and Control: A Study of Social Change in Rural Java, 1942-1945." PhD diss., Cornell University, 1988.

Kushner, Barak. *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006.

Lapian, Adrian. "Personal Reflections on the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia." *Southeast Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (June 1996): 211-223

Mark, Ethan. "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-Occupied Java, 1942-1945." PhD diss., Columbia University, 2003

Mark, Ethan. "Asia's Transwar Lineage: Nationalism, Marxism and 'Greater Asia' in an Indonesian Inflection." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 65, no. 3 (August 2006): 461-493

McCoy, Alfred. *Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation*. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980

Miyake, Yoshimi. "Language Policy of Indonesia: Nationalism and Bahasa Indonesia." Educational Studies, no. 44 (2002-03): 263-272

Mōri, Kazuko & Hirano, Kenichirō. *A New East Asia: Toward a Regional Community*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2007

Morimoto, Takeshi. *Zai-Jawa Nihongun no Heiki no Yukue: Daijuroku Gun to Indoneshia no Dokuritsu*. Tōykō: Ōtori Shobō, 2000

Mrazek, Rudolf. "'Let Us Become Radio Mechanics': Technology and National Identity in Late-Colonial Netherlands East Indies." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 39, no. 1 (January 1997): 3-33

Nieuwenhof, Frans. "Japanese Film Propaganda in World War II: Indonesia and Australia." *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 4, no. 2 (1984): 161-177

Notosusanto, Nugroho. *The Japanese Occupation and Indonesian Independence*. Jakarta: Department of Defense and Security, Centre for Armed Forces History, 1975.

Oda, Yasutaka. "Nihongunseika no Djawatou ni okeru Senden Kōsaku Zasshi 『ジャワバル DjawaBaroe』 no Hyōshi wo Chuushin ni." *Hanguk Ilbon Geunde Hakhwe* 43 (February 2014): 313-340

Okamoto, Rei. "'Fuku-chan' Goes to Java: Images of Indonesia in a Japanese Wartime Newspaper Comic Strip." *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 25, no. 1 (1997): 111-123

Okamoto, Rei. “Pictorial Propaganda in Japanese Comic Art, 1941-1945: Images of the Self and the Other in a Newspaper Strip, Single-Panel Cartoons and Cartoon Leaflets.” PhD diss., Temple University, 1999.

Otmazgin, Nissim Kadosh. “Geopolitics and Soft Power: Japan’s Cultural Policy and Cultural Diplomacy in Asia.” *Asia-Pacific Review* 19, no. 1 (2012): 37-61

Post, Peter and Touwen-Bouwsma, Elly. *Japan, Indonesia and the War*. Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal- Land en Volkenkunde, 1997

Post, Peter and Horton, William Bradley. *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War.* Leiden: Brill, 2010

Reid, Anthony. “The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites: Northern Sumatra in 1942.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 35, no. 1 (November 1975): 49-61

Reid, Anthony. *The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979

Reid, Anthony and Akira, Oki. *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945.* Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986

Reid, Anthony. *A History of Southeast Asia: Critical Crossroads.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015.

Rockwell, Maxine. “A Survey of Japanese Propaganda to the Netherlands East Indies during World War II.” PhD Diss., University of California, 1945.

Satō, Shigeru. *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*. Singapore: Chong Moh Offset Printing Pty Ltd, 1994

Satō, Shigeru. “The Pangreh Praja in Java under Japanese Military Rule.” *Bijdragen tot Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 152, no. 4 (1996): 586-608

Satō, Shigeru. “Indonesia 1939-1942: Prelude to the Japanese Occupation.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 37, no. 2 (June 2006): 225-248

Satō, Shigeru. “Gatot Mangkupraja, PETA and the Origins of the Indonesian National Army.” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 166, no. 2/3 (2010): 189-217

Shiddiqi, Nourouzzaman. “The Role of the ‘Ulama’ during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945).” PhD diss., McGill University, 1975.

Shiraishi, Aiko. “Buritaru Hannichi Houki no Shiteki Kousatsu: Indoneshia Hachigatsu Kakumei Joukyoku.” *Tounan Ajia Kenkyuu* 13, no. 4 (March 1976): 535-558

de Silva, K.M., Kiribamune, Sirima, de Silva, C.R. *Asian Panorama: Essays in History, Past and Present*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1990

Sluimers, Lázló. *Samurai, Pemuda und Sakdalista: die Japaner und der Radikalismus in Indonesien und den Philippinen, 1941-1945.* Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1972.

Sluimers, Lázló. “The Japanese Military and Indonesian Independence.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (March 1996): 19-36

Steele, Peter. “Memorializing Colonialism: Images of the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia in Japanese Popular Theatre.” *Asian Theatre Journal* 29, no. 2 (fall 2012): 528-549

Sutherland, Heather. “Pudjangga Baru: Aspects of Indonesian Intellectual Life in the 1930s.” *Indonesia,* no. 6 (October 1968): 106:127

Szasz, Ferenc Morton. ““Pamphlets Away”: The Allied Propaganda Campaign over Japan During the Last Months of World War II.” *The Journal of Popular Culture* 42, no. 3 (2009): 530-540

Taylor, John G. “Tod Jones. Culture, Power and Authoritarianism in the Indonesian State: Cultural Policy across the Twentieth Century to the Reform Era.” *Asian Affairs* 45, no. 3 (October 2014): 539-541

Touwen-Bouwsma, Elly. “The Indonesian Nationalists and the Japanese ‘Liberation’ of Indonesia: Visions and Reactions.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (March 1996): 1-18

Vandenbosch, Amry. “Nationalism in Netherlands East India.” *Pacific Affairs* 4, no.12 (December 1931): 1051-1069

Vickers, Adrian. *A History of Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

List of Illustrations

Figure 15 “Under the National Flag – Fight with Japan for an Independent Indonesia!” (1944). Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs- Holocaust en Genocidestudies

https://beeldbankwo2.nl/nl/beelden/detail/5b6ed1d8-025a-11e7-904b-d89d6717b464/media/e0101d3d-a7e7-e98d-adc4-312e13df7d01?mode=detail&view=horizontal&q=indonesie%20japan&rows=1&page=8

Figure 16 One of Heart. 2bangkok
http://2bangkok.com/wwiipropaganda.shtml

Figure 17 Pergerakan Tiga A. Beeldbank Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust-, en Genocidestudies

https://beeldbankwo2.nl/nl/beelden/detail/5b7980ce-025a-11e7-904b-d89d6717b464/media/fac6836f-520a-61e2-825e-155697481c1c

Figure 18 Djawa Hokokai. Beeldbank Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust-, en Genocidestudies.

https://beeldbankwo2.nl/nl/beelden/detail/5b79271e-025a-11e7-904b-d89d6717b464/media/9c8e3251-81a7-d43a-026e-9dee41ab16da