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Political trust in times of globalization

*A multi-level study into the relation between globalization
and political trust*

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Abstract

This thesis is one of the first studies to investigate empirically the relation between globalization and political trust. Two different mechanisms are identified that explain how globalization might have an impact on political trust. The first is based on the assumption that globalization has a constraining effect on a government's set of feasible policy options, and holds that this makes a government less responsive to voter preferences, thereby leading to a decrease in political trust. The second assumes that globalization does not have the same impact on all segments of society, and predicts that citizens' attitudes towards globalization are positively related with political trust. In addition, it expects this relation to be more pronounced in countries that are more globalized. Hypotheses derived from these two mechanisms are tested by multi-level analysis on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted between 2002 and 2012. The results provide mixed support for the first mechanism. Political globalization is found to have a negative effect on political trust, but – contrary to expectations – no effect is found for economic globalization. However, the results do provide substantial support for the second mechanism. This supports the argument that there is a gap between the 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization in terms of trust, and that this gap increases as globalization increases. Although further work needs to be done to confirm these results and to refine the causal mechanisms, the results do reveal that the relation between globalization and political trust is a topic worthy of further investigation.

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1. Introduction

Globalization has been argued to challenge modern democracies in several ways. In the literature on the effects of globalization on domestic politics, one strand of research has focused on the consequences of globalization for policy-making by national governments. The conclusion of this research has often been that processes of globalization increasingly constrain national governments in their capacity to independently shape policy outcomes (e.g. Cerny, 1999; Mishra, 1998; Rudra, 2002). Globalization has therefore been linked with the decrease of state power and depoliticization in this literature. A second strand of research has studied the way globalization has affected the political attitudes and behavior of individuals. Scholars in this field of study have argued that globalization is becoming a new ‘critical juncture’ especially in European countries, leading to the restructuring of the political preferences of the electorate and a realignment of parties (e.g. Bornschier, 2010; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008).

Assuming then that processes of globalization have indeed affected state capacities on the one hand and have restructured political preferences of citizens on the other, it is plausible to expect that globalization affects the relation *between* the government and the governed as well. However, the empirical understanding of globalization’s effect on this relation is still limited. Some research has started to address this question by studying globalization in relation to topics such as electoral accountability (e.g. Fernandez-Albertos, 2006; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007), voter turnout (Steiner, 2010) and partisanship (Golden, 2004; Kayser, 2009). In general however the literature on this topic is not yet fully developed, leaving many questions still open (Kayser, 2007 provides an overview).

This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by looking at the relation between globalization and political trust. Political trust is one specific form of the relationship between governments and the governed that has hardly received academic attention in relation to globalization. Some scholars have speculated on such a relation, for example proposing that the decline of public trust in government of the last decade “may be the inevitable result of the declining role of government in the age of globalization” (Hardin, 2013: 32). Other research provides evidence for the effect of globalization on concepts related to political trust, giving an indication of the effect globalization might have on political trust. An example is Steiner’s (2010) finding that economic globalization has a negative effect on voter turnout. To my knowledge, only one study has addressed the relation between globalization and political trust directly. This study (which, to date, has not been formally published) does find that economic globalization has a trust-lowering effect (Fischer, 2012).

This thesis therefore explores further the relation between globalization and political trust. Integrating the insights of the two abovementioned strands of research, it investigates whether and how a country's level of globalization is related to individual-level attitudes of political trust. Two different mechanisms are distinguished that explain how globalization might have an impact on political trust: one that hypothesizes an effect of globalization on the trust of citizens in general, and one that looks at how it affects different segments of society in a different way. The first is based on the assumption that globalization has a constraining effect on a government's set of feasible policy options, and holds that this makes a government less responsive to voter preferences. This is hypothesized to lead to a general decrease in political trust. The second mechanism emphasizes that globalization does not have the same impact on all segments of society. Assuming that attitudes towards globalization differ according to citizens' gains and losses from globalization, as well as their value-orientation, it predicts that especially those who oppose globalization develop negative attitudes towards political institutions. In addition, this relation is expected to be more pronounced in countries that are more globalized. Both mechanisms are tested using a multilevel analysis of data from the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted between 2002 and 2012 in 29 countries.

Besides the filling of an academic void, the results of this study are highly relevant in social and political terms as well. In the first place it adds to the discussion on the societal effects of globalization. The value of this hardly seems to need explanation in a time when headlines are filled with news about issues such as immigrants waging their lives to enter Europe and protest against free trade agreement TTIP. Secondly, it gives more insight in the debate over the new social divisions that have been argued to be arising within national societies. If globalization does indeed create groups of winners and losers, and the gap between these groups in terms of trust increases as globalization increases, it would make the question how governments of globalized countries can compensate for this divide more urgent.

2. Theory

2.1. Globalization

Globalization is usually understood as the increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information, and culture (Held et al. 1999: 16), although not all scholars agree whether it is an effect or a cause of such exchanges (e.g. Guillèn, 2001). It is a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance, and produces

complex relations of mutual interdependence (Norris, 2000: 155). Issues associated with it are as diverse as a country's integration in the world market, its membership to international organizations and increasing cultural diversity as a consequence of immigration and new communication technologies. It is therefore a concept that is difficult to demarcate. In order to get a more precise understanding of it, it is useful to define it as consisting of different dimensions. Usually, three such dimensions are distinguished: economic, political and cultural (or social) globalization (e.g. Dreher, 2006; Keohane and Nye, 2000a). Other dimensions such as environmental globalization or military globalization are sometimes distinguished as well, but are less relevant for the purpose of this thesis.

Economic globalization can be characterized as “long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges” (Keohane and Nye, 2000b: 106). From the perspective of national governments economic globalization can be conceived of as integration in the world market, which is the consequence of free trade agreements and the removal of others kinds of trade-barriers. In the literature on economic globalization, a central question has been how it affects the extent to which governments can still independently exert control over their domestic socioeconomic policies. Some authors have argued that global market integration subverts the welfare state by limiting the possibilities governments have for welfare compensation (Burgoon, 2001; Mishra, 1999; Rudra, 2002). Others have assessed how economic globalization is related to all sorts of other domestic policies, such as education policies (Baskaran and Hessami, 2012), military expenditures (Bove and Efthyvoulou, 2013) and overall government spending (Dreher et al, 2008b; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001). Although this debate still is not settled, the conclusion has often been that globalization does limit the policy options governments have, and drives domestic policies in a certain direction.

Political globalization secondly can be expressed as the diffusion of government policies (Dreher et al., 2006). One could argue that all forms of globalization have political implications, so that it might seem strange to speak of political globalization as a separate dimension. However, this thesis conceives of political globalization as a more specific dimension of globalization, namely as a country's integration in the political community. In the words of Cerny (1997) it “involves the reshaping of political practices and institutional structures in order to adjust and adapt to the growing deficiencies of nation-states as perceived and *experienced* by such actors” (p. 243, italics in original). In other words, governments deliberately choose for elements of political globalization in order to achieve communal goals that they do not feel able to achieve individually. On a more concrete level,

political globalization refers to issues such as membership of international organizations, international treaty ratification and international peace missions.

Cultural globalization finally involves the “movement of ideas, information, images and people” (Keohane and Nye, 2000b: 107). Whereas economic and political globalization mostly take place at the level of institutional politics and political elites, cultural globalization is more about processes at the individual level, such as citizens becoming interconnected with foreign cultures. In politics, cultural globalization is often equated with immigration and increasing cultural diversity. Although immigration certainly is the politically most salient element of cultural globalization, it is only one of its elements (examples of other elements are the usage of new communication technologies and increasing tourism). Together, these elements have been reported to have a profound impact on intergroup relations. Some scholars have for example found that globalization increases identification with the nation and xenophobia (e.g. Jung, 2008), whereas others have reached an opposite conclusion (Ariely, 2011 and 2012; Norris and Inglehart, 2009). Yet, it is likely that not all segments of society experience the impact of cultural globalization in a similar way. Indeed, it has been argued that the gap between these experiences is so significant that it is plausible to speak of groups that ‘win’ and groups that ‘lose’ of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008 and Kriesi, 2010, 2014). According to this line of research, globalization has thus created new social divisions, which have been framed as ‘the new cultural cleavage’ (e.g. Bornschieer, 2010; Van Praag and Adriaansen, 2011).

Altogether, globalization has contradictory consequences for several aspects of domestic politics. This thesis assumes that two of these consequences are important with regard to political trust. Firstly the way in which it affects domestic policy-making by national governments, more specifically the way it constrains these governments to shape policy outcomes. And secondly the way in which it restructures citizens’ political preferences. For each of these two consequences, a mechanism is proposed by which it might affect political trust. In the logic of the first mechanism it is especially economic globalization that is important, whereas cultural globalization is more important for the line of reasoning of the second mechanism.

2.2. Political Trust

In order to relate these two mechanisms to political trust, this thesis first provide a framework to understanding political trust in relation to globalization. Following Newton and Norris (2000), at least three schools of thought can be discerned in explaining political trust: a social-psychological

explanation, a social and cultural explanation and an institutional performance model. The social-psychological explanation understands trust as a property of someone's own personality: as a result of someone's psychological development, someone is either trusting or not. The social and cultural model secondly holds that someone's individual life experiences and environment lead to social trust and cooperation, which in turn leads to trust in public institutions. According to this model, political trust is a function of a broad democratic culture with participating citizens. The institutional performance model lastly argues the actual performance of governments should be central in attempts to understand citizens' confidence in politics. This model assumes that the general public "recognizes whether government or political institutions are performing well or poorly, and reacts accordingly" (Newton and Norris, 2000: 56).

This study does not aim to identify one explanation of political trust as the best explanation. Rather, it is to develop a perspective on political trust that shows how the different dimensions of globalization might affect political trust. Such a perspective must at least account for factors other than individuals' personal characteristics, as globalization is not likely to have an impact on these. It must also be able to account for changes in trust over time, since a changing degree of globalization should lead to a change in trust. With these considerations in mind, the social-psychological explanation not very useful. Because this explanation is more focused on personality traits, it has less attention for peoples' broader social context.

The social and cultural model would explain changes in political trust as consequences of changes in individuals' social environment. This model might therefore be able to explain a relation between globalization and political trust, since globalization (especially cultural globalization) surely has the potential to affect the social environment of citizens. It is not very controversial to claim that processes such as immigration and the emergence of a 'global village' have changed the way people live together. Some even have gone as far as to claim that these processes have challenged social solidarity and decreased the social capital of societies, which has led to a decrease in trust in other people (e.g. Bobo and Tuan, 2006; Putnam, 2007). Assuming that social trust spills over to political trust, it is clear how globalization might affect political trust according to this model. It should however be noted that the empirical evidence supporting such a spillover-effect is mixed (e.g. Hardin, 2013).

The institutional performance model too provides a useful perspective on political trust. Firstly, because it is supported by most empirical studies that have tried to explain the changes in trust of the last two decades. Newton and Norris's own research for example provides substantial

evidence for this model (and not for the other two), and so did many later studies (e.g. Letki, 2006; Newton and Zmerli, 2011; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). More importantly, the institutional model fits to the consequences of globalization this thesis focuses on, because these consequences mostly relate to governmental performance or citizens' perception of this performance. Following the institutional model of political trust, confidence in political institutions can be seen as based on a reciprocal relation between citizens and their government: citizens perform their civic duties (such as paying tax, respecting the rule of law and voting), and expect 'good institutional performance' by the government in return. This performance may consist of achieving economic growth, ensuring employment and guaranteeing public safety. On a more abstract level these expectations can be categorized under dimensions such as competence, accountability, intrinsic care and reliability (e.g. Van der Meer, 2010). Political trust increases when these expectations are met, and will decrease if they are not met. This leads to an understanding of political trust as the gap between the electorate's political preferences and the actual policies executed by its government. The wider this gap, the lower political trust is.

2.3. Constrained domestic policy-making

From this perspective on political trust, globalization can affect political trust by altering either the expectations of citizens or the institutional performance of governments. In the first mechanism distinguished in this thesis it mainly is globalization's supposed effect on this institutional performance that is important. In short, this mechanism presumes that globalization ties governments' hands by restricting the policy choices they have. This makes these governments less responsive to the needs and preferences of citizens, which in turn leads to a decrease in political trust.

The argument that globalization affects national governments' ability to shape policies and control their outcomes is one of the central theses of the globalization literature. As discussed earlier, it is especially the economic dimension of globalization that is important here. Economic globalization is expected to have several direct effects on socioeconomic policy options. Following Schulze and Ursprung (1999) at least four such effects can be distinguished (see also Steiner, 2010). Firstly, fiscal instruments become more and more ineffective as tools for controlling the national economy. Secondly, the competition over mobile direct investments as factors of production becomes more important. Thirdly, the competition on global markets between national economies as production sites increases in relevance. And lastly, the competition over sources of tax revenue between coun-

tries becomes more and more important. While these expectations themselves are rather commonly accepted, it is important to note that these effects do not imply actual policy outcomes. The outcome depends on national policy makers' concrete reaction to these effects.

Turning to the effect of globalization on actual policy outcomes, the academic debate is still split between two camps. At the one side of this debate are proponents of the efficiency hypothesis, and on the other side those who support the compensation hypothesis (see Meinhard and Potrafke, 2012 for a recent overview of this debate). The efficiency hypothesis firstly takes the intensified competition between countries as starting point and argues that globalization forces countries to stay competitive, and thus to be efficient. It predicts a 'race to the bottom' in tax- and welfare policies, and expects that globalization reduces the size of the government and its ability to bear the costs of the welfare state. Research under this hypothesis has found that governments are pressured to for example liberalize the labor market as national firms need to stay competitive (Dreher and Gaston, 2007), to lower taxes in order to attract and retain business, and even to cut public expenditure in general (e.g. Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Busemeyer, 2009; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Genschel, 2002).

The compensation hypothesis (or embedded liberalism hypothesis) has more attention for the demand side of politics. It is based on Katzenstein's (1985) observation that small European countries are relatively open to the world economy, but have large governments as well. Building on this observation, the hypothesis holds that economic globalization has led to economic uncertainty at the individual level, which has increased the political demand for protection against the risks of globalization. Depending on the extent to which incumbents have satisfied this demand, authors supporting this hypothesis have claimed that economic integration has actually led to an increase in the size of the welfare-state (Rodrik, 1998) or has at least not jeopardized the welfare-state (Plümper et al., 2009; Ursprung, 2008).

The final outcome of the debate is not yet clear. At least it shows that there is no uniform reaction towards economic integration, since this reaction depends on social and economic contexts. In addition, the results of empirical research are dependent on the type of policy that is looked at (tax, social or industrial policies). Some scholars have therefore argued that the efficiency and compensation effects actually neutralize each other. It might be the case that there is indeed a race to the bottom when it comes to tax rates, but that governments increase their social spending at the same time (Meinhard and Potrafke, 2012). Together, this might evidently lead to serious problems for governments.

Leaving the debate between the efficiency and compensation hypothesis aside, integration in the world market has been argued to affect the policy choices that governments face in other ways as well. One way is that integration in the world market comes with almost unavoidable structural changes for economic sectors. Following Ricardian logic, countries need to specialize in the sectors in which they have a comparative advantage to other countries, which makes some industries flourish whereas others disappear. This might lead to sectoral unemployment (Gaston and Nelson, 2004), and to a rising overall income inequality (Dreher and Gaston, 2008; Egger and Kreickmeier, 2009). In addition, the general argument can be made that economic globalization makes countries more dependent on the world market, making them more sensitive to fluctuations in the world economy. ‘Domino effects’ are more likely to occur when national economies become more intertwined (Hertz, 1999).

Altogether, the current state of the research makes it plausible to speak about the constraining effect of economic globalization on domestic policy-making. The fact that policy makers’ reactions are not uniform does not mean that domestic policies remain unaffected by the competitive pressures of integration in the world market. Although the most extreme variants of ‘race to the bottom’-accounts might have been too pessimistic, it is hard to find a scholar who claims that globalization has had no effect on domestic policies at all. It is therefore safe to conclude that “while controversies remain over the exact extent to which economic integration has diminished the capacity of national policy makers to influence relevant outcomes, we can reasonably assume that economic globalization does constrain national politics to significant degree” (Steiner, 2010: 446).

For this reason, globalization has also been linked with a decline of partisanship. Assuming that in the extreme, “governments may be compelled to carry out policies that are entirely ‘dictated’ by the forces of economic globalization” (Fischer, 2012: 19), the ideological profile of a government becomes less significant. No matter whether governments consists of left-wing or right-wing parties, they still may be pushed to liberalize the labor market, or to cut public spending. Indeed, research has found that party positions on a left-right scale become closer as a country is more integrated in the world economy (Steiner and Martin, 2012), and national governments’ room to maneuver has decreased (Cerny, 1999; Steiner, 2013). Although not all research supports this view (e.g. Garrett, 1998; Potrafke, 2009), several scholars have argued that in this way, globalization has led to a severe restriction of partisan politics since “the environment has changed in such a way that traditional social democratic instruments are no longer effective” (Moses 1994: 133). According to these scholars, political parties and governments in general have lost their capacity to develop their preferred

economic policies (e.g. Cerny, 1994; Strange, 1995). An especially telling example of this lack of national control over economic policies is the situation of EU member states, that have to deal with a single European market allowing people, goods, and services to move freely, and with a monetary policy which is beyond their direct control.

2.3.1. Linking constrained domestic policy-making with political trust

Taking this constraining effect that globalization might have on domestic policy-making into account, it becomes clear that economic globalization makes it more difficult for governments to fulfill their 'reciprocal responsibilities'. This in turn might lead to a widening of the gap between voters' preferences and actual policies, giving citizens the feeling that their government is not responsive to their wishes. As a result, increasing globalization goes together with a decrease in political trust. This is an argument similar to that of Fischer (2012), who indeed found empirical evidence supporting the claim that a stronger integration in the world market leads to a decrease in political trust.

It may seem rather ambitious to link a broad and disputed concept such as globalization directly with political trust. It might be questioned whether voters even notice a decrease in the policy-making capacity of their governments, and if they perceive their governments as less responsive as a consequence. Unfortunately, there is not much empirical evidence that directly links countries' integration in the world economy and the degree to which citizens perceive constraints in policy-making capacities.

One exception is a study by Duch and Stevenson (2010). Using two cross-national surveys, they show that citizens of countries with more open economies perceive economic growth of the national economy as dependent on growth in other countries, whereas citizens of countries that are less dependent on international trade do so to a much lesser degree. Secondly, they looked at whether citizens see issues such as the availability of good-paying jobs (and several comparable issues) as the result of 'global connectedness'. The results show that citizens do indeed perceive such a connection. More importantly, they show that the perceived importance of global connectedness for such issues is stronger in countries with a higher integration in the world market. Both findings make clear that citizens connect the openness of their national economy with their idea of whether it is their government or the international economy that is responsible for certain outcomes. This indicates that citizens are capable of perceiving a decrease in the policy-making capacities of their government as a consequence of economic integration.

Besides research linking economic integration and perceived constraints directly, there is some research available that links both indirectly. It has been found that citizens' voting behavior does respond to increasing integration in the world economy. Hellwig and Samuels (2007) for example report that globalization in the form of greater exposure to the world economy has reduced electoral accountability in democracies. They argue that politicians have tried to shift blame for poor economic performance to economic forces beyond their control. Electorates then have to a considerable extent accepted this reasoning and believe that governments in open economies are less competent to shape economic outcomes. They also account for this in their voting behavior, giving less attention to economic issues in their voting considerations. In short, this means that "by reducing perceived competency, globalization reduces voters' propensity to connect economic performance and incumbent performance" (p. 297). Similarly, Fernandez-Albertos (2006) has found that in open economies, "voters will value less the information they receive on the state of the economy, and, as a consequence, electoral behavior will be less influenced by economic performance" (p. 28).

This again indicates that voters do indeed respond to the openness of their economy, and link it to the economic policy capacity of their government. Admittedly, the consequence this has for political trust is not a given. One might argue that voters simply know that their government is less powerful in a more open economy, therefore do not blame their government for decreased responsiveness, and as a consequence do not lose political trust. However, there are good reasons to say that it *does* matter. The abovementioned studies do show that voters perceive their governments as less capable to shape policy outcomes, and therefore as less capable to do what they expect them to do. From the perspective of the institutional performance model of trust it would therefore be expected that voters perceive a widening gap between their preferences and actual policies. Although electorates may account for this decreased responsiveness in their voting behavior, there is no direct reason to expect that voters adjust their *expectations* of the policies executed as well. Voters simply perceive a government that is less capable to respond to their needs.

Research by Steiner (2010) points in the direction of the latter argument. Assuming that economic globalization limits the capacity of states to shape outcomes, Steiner argues like Hellwig and Samuels that citizens are aware of such limitations. What is more, he argues that voters take these limitations into account when considering whether or not to vote in national elections, a claim that is supported by his study. "The result is a lower inclination to vote under conditions of high economic integration. Consequently, aggregate turnout is lower the more internationally integrated a national economy is" (2010: 445). In updates of this study, Steiner (2013) and Steiner and Martin (2012) find

empirical support for the claim that it is indeed citizens' perception of their governments' policy-making capacity and its room to maneuver that is the cause of this decrease in electoral turnout.

Linking voter turnout with the concept central to this thesis, political trust, most studies have reported that countries in which political trust or satisfaction with democracy is higher, levels of voter turnout are higher as well (e.g. Clarke et al., 2004; Karp and Banducci, 2008; Norris, 2002). The finding that awareness of constrained policy-making leads to lower voter turn-out does therefore make it plausible that it affects political trust as well. If voters in countries with a high integration in the world market trust their governments to live up to their policy expectations just as much as voters in countries with a lower degree of economic integration, why would their likeliness to vote differ? In short then, the first expectation guiding this thesis can be formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 1: The higher a country's level of economic globalization, the lower is its citizens' political trust.

Admittedly, this hypothesis does not capture the actual mechanism as outlined above, since it does not account for the degree to which governments are actually constrained in their policy-making abilities. However, relying on survey-data, it is hard to include a measure that does capture the public's perception of its government's policy-making capacities. Studies comparable to this thesis (such as that of Fischer, 2012 and Steiner, 2010) have the same problem, and do not provide a solution for it either. It is therefore the paragraphs above that should add plausibility to the idea that a confirmation of the hypothesis means that it is indeed globalization's constraining effect on policy-making that leads to a decrease in political trust.

2.3.2. Critical considerations

It is important to keep in mind that there has been very little research on the relation between globalization and political trust. In addition, there are more reasons to be careful when interpreting data concerning this relation. One reason is that the only existing research confirming a negative relation between globalization and political trust (Fischer's) does have methodological limitations. Firstly, it uses a worldwide sample. As Held et al. have argued, globalization should be understood as a process or a set of processes that do not follow linear logic or have equal impact on different societies across the world (1999: 27). It is therefore problematic to argue that economic globalization has a similar effect on political trust in countries all around the world, because there are so many other

factors that might interfere in this relation. Secondly, the study controls only for two variables on the country-level: national income and population size. Other country-level variables that have an impact on institutional performance and might affect political trust, such as the level of corruption, income inequality or party system – to name just a few – are not included in the model.

A second reason for caution is that some research has found that globalization has actually led to positive attitudes towards political institutions. Dreher and Voigt (2011) for example find that nation-state governments have a higher degree of credibility when they are a member of international organizations such as the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank. And both Torgler (2008) and Hesami (2011) report that globalization has a positive effect on citizens' trust in these international organizations. Surely the mechanisms at work here are of a different nature, since trust in international organizations follows quite a different logic than trust in national political institutions. As Torgler (2008) explains, trust in international organizations: "countries' capacity to act globally by creating international networks guaranteeing information, goods and capital flows increase the demand for international stability. (...) Such conditions may foster trust in international organizations as the UN" (2008: 69). Such an explanation obviously does not make much sense when applying it to trust in national institutions. Despite such differences, these results do show that globalization affects political trust in diverging, almost contradictory ways. This again draws attention to the consideration that one should be careful when interpreting the effect of globalization on trust.

Overall, the critical considerations presented here do not disprove the relation between globalization and political trust. Yet they do indicate that caution is needed when establishing this relation. One way to do this is to look at the separate effects of the different dimensions of globalization as well. As argued before, the concept of globalization consists of an economic, a political and a cultural (or social) dimension. Following the logic of the 'constrained domestic policy-making hypothesis', it is mainly the economic dimension that is expected to have an effect on political trust. Most research summarized above is about economic openness and integration in the world market, instead of globalization in general. Indeed, it is mainly economic globalization that is said to constrain policy-making by national governments.

Political globalization is less central to this reasoning. Yet it can still be said that elements of political globalization such as being a member of many international organizations and ratifying international treaties constrain the possibility of independent national policy-making as well. Being a party to a treaty for example can directly affect a country's policy options because it simply makes some policies impossible, or at least very costly. In addition, a country that plays a central role in the

international community might also be more sensible to the opinions and interests of other states. Scholars have argued that such countries are more easily ‘socialized’ to pursue certain policies because they more often follow ‘global scripts’ (e.g. Goodman and Jinks, 2004; Greenhill, 2010), and copy policies of their ‘sociocultural peers’ (Simmons and Elkins, 2004). In that sense, political globalization might also have an *indirect* effect on the autonomy with which governments develop policies. A negative effect of political globalization on political trust would therefore be compatible with the framework of the constrained policy-making hypothesis, although the effect would be expected to be weaker.

An effect of the third dimension of globalization, cultural globalization, on political trust could not be explained by this line of reasoning: it is hard to find a way in which cultural globalization constrains governments in their policy-making. This is especially so because this dimension does not really capture globalization in relation to governments and the political leadership, but more in relation to society. This is not to say that cultural globalization has no effect on political trust at all. Topics like immigration might certainly have an impact on political trust (the next section describes one way in which it might do so). However, such an effect does not fit in the framework of the constrained policy-making hypothesis. From this viewpoint, an effect of cultural globalization on political trust is therefore not expected.

When testing the effects of the separate dimensions of globalization on political trust, the expectation based on the constrained policy-making hypothesis therefore reads as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Economic globalization has a stronger negative relation with political trust than political globalization, and both have a stronger negative relation with political trust than cultural globalization.

In case this hypothesis is not supported, it would suggest that the first mechanism would need to be reconsidered, or that other mechanisms are at work as well.

2.4. Globalization as a critical juncture for European politics

The second mechanism distinguished in this thesis understands globalization as having a diverging effect on different social groups. It is not considered plausible that globalization has a uniform effect on a whole population. In short, this mechanism supposes that globalization leads to new social

divisions and that these divisions can partly be understood in terms of trust. Firstly, it assumes that the political trust of citizens who oppose processes of globalization is lower than that of citizens who are in favor of these processes. And secondly, that this relation is more pronounced in countries that are more globalized. In that sense, it does not look at the way globalization constrains the power of governments, but rather focuses on the effect of globalization on the ‘demand-side’ of politics.

As Kriesi et al. (2006 and 2008) have argued, there are three distinct ways in which citizens can ‘win’ or ‘lose’ from globalization. These ways correspond closely to the dimensions of globalization as distinguished in this thesis. Firstly, there is growing economic competition, brought about by the internationalization of production, the integration of product markets and the opening up of borders for labor from other countries. Secondly, globalization leads to growing cultural diversity. Some have experienced this development as a thread to the values and the collective identity of the autochthonous culture. In this case, we can speak of cultural competition. And thirdly, the opening up of borders has led to political competition between both national states themselves and states and supranational organizations, which has decreased the influence of national states (an argument which resembles the argument of the constrained domestic policy-making hypothesis). For people who strongly identify with the national community, this development will be interpreted as a loss, whereas cosmopolitan citizens will perceive it as a gain.

Kriesi et al. argue that together, these three consequences of globalization have led to a structural opposition between those who win and those who lose from globalization in Western Europe. The ‘winners’ have been labeled universalist or cosmopolitan, whereas those that lose have been referred to as the particularist or nationalist. Several scholars argue that these groups are increasingly important in understanding the social divisions in Western European politics (e.g. Bovens et al., 2014). Because these groups are of a rather heterogeneous nature in the sense that they do not fit easily in the traditional structure of national politics, the established political parties have problems coming to terms with these new groups. Instead, it has mainly been the new populist parties that have mobilized this conflict in order to seek electoral support. In doing so, they have put issues related to globalization on the political agenda, such as immigration, European integration and economic liberalization. The increasing importance of these issues has thus led to “the transformation of the political space and the repositioning of mainstream parties in this transformed space” (Kriesi, 2010: 683).

The emergence of the political conflict between universalist and particularist groups has been linked to political trust. It seems that the political trust of ‘particularists’ is lower than that of ‘universalists’. Definitions of populism – a concept inextricably linked to the particularist ‘family’ – have always had political distrust at their core (Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000). Indeed, political distrust has been found to be an important predictor of support for populist parties (Fieschi and Heywood, 2004). Focusing more specifically on the relation between citizens’ attitudes towards globalization issues and political trust, Den Ridder et al. (2014) have recently found that there indeed is a strong correlation between both in the Netherlands: the trust people have in politicians tends to be much lower for people with a negative attitude towards globalization issues than people with a positive attitude towards these issues. And interestingly, Hessami (2011) has found a similar relation between attitudes towards globalization and trust in international organizations (being the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank). The first step here is therefore to confirm this relation at the level of national governments, extending the scope from the Netherlands to Europe. This can be hypothesized as follows:

Hypothesis 3: Respondents’ attitude towards globalization is positively related with political trust.

For the reasons discussed above, this is not a very controversial expectation. However, much less is known about the direction of this relation in terms of causality. Does a lower trust in politics lead to a more negative attitude towards globalization? Or does globalization have a stronger negative impact on the political trust of people with a negative attitude towards globalization than it has on people with a positive attitude? Den Ridder et al. seem to agree more with the former explanation, and argue that an already existing political distrust leads to negative attitudes towards globalization. These negative attitudes then should not be explained by substantial or ideological orientations, but rather by confidence in politics in general. People might see globalization as part of the agenda of a political elite they distrust, and therefore oppose it. And another possibility is that people are afraid of the structural changes they perceive because of an already existing distrust in politics, and that negative attitudes towards globalization are only a part of a larger societal discontent. This line of reasoning follows the logic of what Derks (2004) has coined ‘welfare populism’. This concept describes the idea that negative attitudes towards the welfare state by the lower educated should be seen as consequences of feelings of social deprivation instead of consequences of an ideological doc-

trine. In short, attitudes towards globalization do not affect political distrust in this reasoning, but political distrust affects attitudes towards globalization.

However, the mechanism proposed here assumes that the relation works the other way around. It emphasizes that despite the fact that people have opposed globalization issues, processes such as European integration and the influx of immigrants have continued gradually. Moreover, although opposition towards issues related to globalization has been prominent on the demand side of politics (voters), this opposition has until recently been far less clearly expressed at the supply side (parties). This is what Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) have argued, which implies that the preferences of voters related to globalization have been underrepresented in politics. As a consequence, voters opposing processes of globalization might have perceived their government as unresponsive to their needs, resulting in political distrust. Häusermann and Kriesi follow this logic when they assume that “structural ‘losers’ of globalization develop more generally negative attitudes towards political institutions and processes” (2015, 216). In other words, globalization leads to a gap in terms of political trust between those who oppose globalization and those who endorse it.

Following this logic, it would be expected that this gap in terms of trust *increases* as globalization increases. If it are indeed issues of globalization that have a negative impact on the political trust of particularists (and possibly a positive impact of that of universalists), this impact should increase as globalization increases. Besides expecting that individuals with a more positive attitude towards globalization are likely to have a higher political trust (hypothesis 3), I therefore also expect that this relation is stronger in countries that are more globalized. This idea is expressed in the fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: The relation between individuals’ attitudes towards globalization and political trust is stronger in countries that are more globalized.

The new insights that the testing of this hypothesis provides are interesting in the first place because they contribute to the understanding of the supposed new social divisions and their relation with globalization. The question whether more globalization reinforces the emergence of these divisions has not been empirically addressed yet. In addition, it also provides a test-case for comparing expectations in the line of Den Ridder et al. with expectations comparable to that of Kriesi and Häusermann. In case the hypothesis is supported, it would indicate that the logic of Den Ridder et al. alone does not suffice to explain the relation between attitudes towards globalization and political trust.

Instead, it would support the view that globalization has a stronger impact on the political trust of people with a negative attitude towards globalization than it has on people with a positive attitude. Or in other words, that the gap between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization increases as globalization increases.

Comparing the mechanism outlined here with the first mechanism, it is different in two ways: firstly because it is not the supposed policy-constraining effect of globalization per se that is assumed to lower political trust, but rather people’s attitude towards globalization and the way governments deal with these attitudes. Secondly, this mechanism is not limited to economic globalization. Cultural globalization is supposed to have the same effect, or might even be more important here. In fact, the negative attitude towards globalization of these particularists is often argued to be a consequence of cultural instead of economic considerations. According to Hainmueller, negative attitudes towards immigration should not be seen as a consequence of increasing economic competition, but rather as opposition to cultural diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006 and 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). In a same vein, McLaren (2006) has argued that resistance to European unification is not driven by utilitarian material self-interest calculations, but by considerations of values and identity. And Wolfe and Mendelsohn (2005) have even argued that opposition to trade liberalization is more determined by values than material self-interest factors. In short, whereas the constrained policy-making hypothesis has no place for the cultural dimension of globalization in its logic, it is central to this second mechanism.

Therefore, I again test the effect of the different dimensions of globalization separately. For this mechanism it is more difficult to express a clear expectation guiding this test. One reason for this difficulty is that the actual functioning of this second mechanism depends on how the first mechanism works. In the case that globalization has a trust-lowering effect on citizens in general, this effect is supposed to be reinforced when people have a negative attitude towards globalization, while it is tempered for people who have a positive attitude towards it. In case it does not, it means that globalization has a negative effect on the political trust of the ‘particularists’, whereas it actually has a *positive* effect on that of the ‘universalists’. In the second place, all three dimensions of globalization are supposed to create winners and losers in a different way, all three dimensions might have an effect according to this second mechanism. However, for the arguments discussed in the previous paragraph, cultural globalization is expected to have the strongest interaction effect with individuals’ attitude towards globalization. In other words:

Hypothesis 5: Cultural globalization has a stronger effect on the relation between individuals' attitudes towards globalization and political trust, than political and economic globalization.

3. Methodology

3.1. Case and data selection

As argued before, globalization has a different impact on societies across the world. The way globalization affects trust might be dependent on political culture, regime type and many other country-level variables. This means that it might be problematic to look at the relation between globalization and political trust worldwide. In addition, the theory of globalization as a critical juncture has been based on developments specific to European countries, and the second mechanism as described above therefore mainly applies to those countries. For these two reasons, the focus of this thesis is narrowed to European countries, as it limits variation in country-level variables and makes the results fit better in the framework of globalization as a critical juncture.

For the analysis of these European countries this study uses data provided by the European Social Survey (ESS). The advantage of this dataset is that it – in contrast to the European Value Survey – includes measures of all relevant individual-level variables, such as political trust and attitude towards globalization issues. Furthermore, the ESS allows for longitudinal comparisons because it has been conducted in six waves from 2002 to 2012. In total the ESS incorporates data from 36 countries, of which 32 are available for longitudinal comparison. For theoretical reasons, the focus is further narrowed down to 29 of those 32 countries (leading to a dataset including 267.595 respondents). Russia, Israel and Turkey are excluded in order to limit the variation in country-level indicators and national political cultures. In addition, a dummy variable is included to control for a difference in effect of globalization in Eastern and Western European countries. All countries that were founding members of the OECD are coded as Western European countries here¹, with exception of Greece because globalization is supposed to affect Greece in a way that is more similar to Eastern- than Western European countries. The remaining countries are coded as Eastern-European (the reference category).

¹ The European founding members are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

3.2. *Dependent variables*

The dependent variable of this thesis is trust in parliament. This variable is measured on a ten-point scale, with 0 meaning having no trust in parliament at all, and 10 meaning complete trust in parliament.. Trust in government specifically would be more ideal for testing the constrained policy-making hypothesis (i.e. hypothesis 1 and 2), but this indicator is not available in the ESS. From the perspective of this thesis however, trust in a country's parliament is very close to trust in government: the legislative power of parliaments is restricted in the same way as the executive power of governments. Approaching both institutions in a similar way is therefore not uncommon in political science (e.g. Job, 2005), and trust or confidence in parliament is often used as a measure of political trust (e.g. Newton, 2001; Tolbert and Mossberger, 2006).

It might be argued that satisfaction with government, which is measured by the ESS, could be an alternative dependent variable. The advantage of this variable would be that it would capture respondents' evaluation of government specifically. Yet there are important differences between the concept of satisfaction, and the concept of trust that is central to this thesis. Scholars have argued that satisfaction refers to an evaluation of a specific performance or service, in this case being government performance (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003). Trust on the other hand describes a more structural attitude and is more encompassing. Because the theory of this thesis is more about structural attitudes than relatively short-term evaluations, trust is a more interesting dependent variable for this thesis, and trust in parliament is chosen as the dependent variable².

3.3. *Independent variables*

Globalization. In the last decade, several indices have been developed that try to measure globalization as a multifaceted concept. Examples are the Foreign Policy Magazine globalization index, the GlobalIndex (Raab et al. 2008), and the Maastricht Globalisation Index (Figge and Martens 2014). However, the KOF Index of globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al. 2008a) has come to be the index that is used most. Since 2008, over 100 studies have used this index, the majority of them as the main explanatory variable (see Potrafke, 2015 for an overview of these studies). In defining globalization, the KOF Index (composed by the KOF ('Konjunkturforschungsstelle) Swiss Economic Institute, hence the naming) follows Clark (2000), referring to it as "the process of creating networks

² As a comparison, an additional analysis was conducted with government satisfaction as the dependent variable. The results of this analysis (which are not presented here) were similar to those of the analysis with trust in parliament as a dependent variable, but showed less effect of the country-level variables.

of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital, and goods” (p. 86). It includes 23 indicators, which are used to create three sub-indices: one index of political globalization, one of economic globalization and one of social globalization (it should be noted that I am referring to this latter category as cultural globalization).

The economic index measures actual economic flows and restrictions. It consists of measures of actual financial flows (such as total trade and foreign direct investment) on the one hand, and restrictions (such as import barriers and tariff rates) on the other. The political index captures countries’ institutional links with other countries and international organizations. More specifically, it includes measures of (among others) a country’s membership in international organizations, embassies on its territory and ratification of international treaties. The social (or cultural) index lastly is about the exchange of people, information, images and ideas, and is composed by using data on personal contact (with foreign cultures), data on information flows (the use of internet and news media) and data on cultural proximity (for a precise description of the variables included and the weighting techniques see Dreher et al., 2008a). Combining these sub-indices, one overall index is created.

Besides the fact that it accounts for the multifaceted nature of globalization, the advantage of the KOF index is that it is available for up to 208 countries over the period 1970-2010. However, it evidently is not possible to develop an index that can truly measure globalization as if it were a thermometer. Every index by definition has some disadvantages that should be taken into account, and the KOF index has some too. For example, the measure of social globalization includes indicators such as the number of McDonald’s restaurants and the amount of IKEA stores. In this respect, the KOF index measures globalization as a concept related to Westernization. Globalization is not necessarily the same as Westernization though, but can also take non-Western forms such as Islamic globalization (Potrafke, 2015).

Attitude towards globalization. All waves of the ESS measure respondents’ attitude to several globalization issues. For this thesis, three are most relevant: respondents’ attitude towards cultural diversity, towards European unification and towards economic integration. These three items are measured by the following questions: 1) is your country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants, 2) has European integration gone too far or should it go further, and 3) is immigration bad or good for your country’s economy (all these questions are measured on a ten-point scale). Admittedly, the atti-

tude towards economic integration is about topics like free trade agreements just as much as it is about the consequences of immigration for the economy, and the third question only takes the latter into account. However, as the European Social Survey does not measure attitudes towards such topics, the issue is only measured by this indicator. Combined, I believe these three items still provide a good indicator of respondents' general attitude towards globalization. All three items are weighted equally in the scale into which the three indicators are combined.

3.4. Control variables

On the country-level, this study controls for two other elements besides globalization that might have an impact on political trust (by adding country-level indicators to the ESS dataset manually). Firstly the economic situation of a country, and secondly the political performance of a state. The economic situation of a country is measured using the following indicators:

- *Economic performance*, measured by a country's GNP based on data provided by the IMF. Many authors have argued that individuals' trust in political institutions is strongly related with their economic situation. A country's general level of economic performance is therefore an important indicator to control for when testing the relation between globalization and political trust.
- *Income inequality*, measured by the Gini-coefficient based on data provided by Eurostat. It has been argued that a higher degree of income inequality can be a strong determinant of political trust (e.g. Uslander and Brown, 2005) and it is therefore important to include it in the model. Income inequality might be especially relevant for testing Hypothesis 4, since more income inequality might mean that 'losers' of globalization lose even harder, while 'winners' are winning even more.
- *Public social expenditure*, measured as a country's aggregate social expenditure as a percentage of its GDP, based on data provided by the OECD. Social expenditure is an important control variable as it is essential for the theory of the constrained policy-making hypothesis. Although the effect of globalization and economic openness on a country's amount of public spending is disputed (see the above-explained debate between the efficiency hypothesis versus the compensation hypothesis), scholars agree that social expenditure is one of the most important tools governments have to compensate for the effect of globalization. This means

that the hypothesized negative effect globalization has on political trust can be compensated for by increasing social expenditure, and a positive effect of social expenditure on political trust is therefore expected.

- *Population size.* Strictly speaking, population size is of course no economic variable. However, it is included in the model for two reasons. Firstly, controlling for population size is a way to account for the size of the domestic market (e.g. Fischer and Somogyi, 2011). It is a well-established finding that the size of the domestic market matters with regard to the pressure domestic firms perceive to integrate in the international market. A larger domestic market might imply that the pressure on domestic firms to expand decreases, and that the competitive pressure by foreign competitors on domestic economic policies is lowered. Secondly, the variable might capture a country's heterogeneity concerning trust (e.g. Alesina and LaFerrara, 2002).

The second element this study controls for at the country-level is the effect of political institutions. Obviously, a framework in which the understanding of political trust is based on institutional performance should account for the actual performance and structure of a country's political institutions. And what's more, several recent studies show that the political trust of higher educated people is more sensitive for the quality of political institutions than that of lower educated citizens (e.g. Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). Because attitudes towards globalization have been strongly linked with the level of education, it might be the case that the relation between attitudes of globalization and political trust is weakened in countries with poor institutional performance. The effect of political institutions is measured using the following indicators:

- *Level of perceived corruption.* Corruption evidently is crucial for citizens' evaluation of institutional performances. Transparency International has developed a corruption-index defining corruption as the "misuse of public power for private benefit", ranking countries on a scale from 100 (not corrupt) to 0 (highly corrupt). It is useful that this index measures *perceived* corruption, which is more relevant for citizens' political trust than an 'objective' measure would be.
- *Quality of democracy.* Just like corruption, it is evident that the quality of a democracy can be essential to citizens' evaluation of institutional performances. In terms of measurement,

there is a broad range of indices measuring the quality of democracies to choose from. This thesis uses the Democracy Barometer, developed by Bühlmann et al.. What makes this index very useful is that it is designed specifically to determine the quality of *established* democracies. As Bühlmann et al. argue, most indexes “are too unsubtle to measure the fine but obviously existing differences in the quality of democracy between countries” (2008: 3). Since I am mostly interested in countries with a relatively high level of democracy, an index accounting for the subtler differences between these countries is rather useful.

- *Effective number of parties*. It has been argued that more consensual democracies offer more space for populist and anti-globalization sentiments to be expressed than majoritarian democracies (e.g. Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007). Therefore, it could be the case that people opposing globalization are more confident that their viewpoints will be represented in parliaments in more consensual democracies than in majoritarian democracies. This could in turn temper the relation between one’s attitude towards globalization and political trust. The most common indicator used to measure a country’s party system (besides Lijphart’s index (Lijphart, 1999), which only incorporates 19 European countries) is the *effective number of parliamentary parties* (ENPP), which is a measure developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). This thesis uses data provided by Gallagher (2015), and takes the measure of the number of parties in the elections held most recently before the ESS-edition under consideration.

On the individual level, this study controls for socio-demographic variables that fit into the institutional performance model of trust. It is a well-established finding that citizens’ socio-economic status and available human capital are essential in this respect. I therefore control for respondents’ economic background by looking at their occupation. In the ESS occupation is measured using the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), which I have recoded into the ten basis categories of this classification³ (using clerks as reference category). Secondly, education is controlled for by including the ESS’s measure using the European version of the International Standard Classification of Education (ES-ISCED) in the model (using the ‘upper tier upper secondary’-category as reference category). This measure consists of seven categories (ranging from ‘lower than secondary education’ to ‘higher tertiary education’) and a residual category (‘not possible to harmo-

³ The ten categories are 1) Armed Forces 2) Managers 3) Professionals 4) Technicians, associate professionals 5) Service and sales workers 6) Clerks 7) Agriculture and fishery workers 8) Craft workers 9) Plant and machine operators and assemblers 10) Elementary workers.

nize into ES-ISCED'). Because respondents falling under this latter category behave very similar to respondents in the two highest categories of education (Bachelor-level degree and Master-level degree) with regard to their relation with income and trust, and because results would be significantly distorted when excluding this category, this residual category too is included in the model. Lastly, Tucker et al. (2002) argue that someone's subjective evaluation of the economy might be more important than his or her objective position. A third individual-level control variable is therefore included measuring respondents' evaluation of the present state of their country's economy (measured on a ten-point scale).

A second set of individual level control variables is included concerning respondents' political values and general trust. Political ideology firstly is measured on a ten-point scale referring to respondents' left-right self-placement. Because the effect of ideology has been reported to be curvilinear by some research (e.g. Steenbergen et al. 2007), its square is also included. Secondly, people's ideological engagement is controlled for by including a dichotomous variable measuring if people feel closer to one party than another (not doing so being the reference category). Thirdly, people's political interest is measured by including a four-category item asking how interested people are in politics. Fourthly, taking into account the argument of Den Ridder et al. (2014) that negative attitudes towards globalization might be a consequence of a general lack of trust, and more in general the psychological explanation of political trust which understands it as connected to someone's general trust, this study also controls for people's trust in other people (which is measured on a ten-point scale). Fifthly, this study controls for age. And finally, it controls for gender by the inclusion of a dummy variable for being female.

As a final control a variable controlling for a time-effect is included. In the period under consideration political trust tended to decrease over time, presumably partly due to the financial and economic crisis. Not controlling for a time-effect might therefore negatively affect the correlations between trust and independent variables. Although the GDP per capita control variable and the individual-level variable measuring respondents' evaluation of the state of their economy are supposed to account for development such as the financial and economic crisis, they might not have been fully captured by the control-variables included in the model. The same goes for other developments that have affected political trust.

It might be argued that respondents' attitude towards globalization is an important explanatory variable for the third and fourth hypothesis, and should therefore be included as a control in the models testing the first two hypotheses as well. However, this variable has the problem that it has

many missing cases (112.325 respondents on a total of 267.595 respondents are missing), due to the fact that the three single indicators it consists of all have a considerable amount of system-missing cases. Including this variable might therefore produce distorted results, so it is not included in the model testing the first two hypotheses. Yet for testing the third and fourth hypotheses this variable is of course indispensable, so it is included in the models testing them. In order to control whether the effect-sizes of the final models are not distorted too much by the missing cases, I compare the changes between the first two and the latter models.

3.5. Analyses

For the first mechanism, the relation between globalization and political trust is analyzed using a multi-level model with both individual and country-level indicators (which are specified in Appendix Table 1). In addition, it is done using cross-country longitudinal data, and the model therefore consists of three levels: the individual level, the country level and the country-year level. The additional value of comparing countries in a longitudinal way is that it allows for a comparison that is less distorted by country-specific characteristics, making it clearer to what extent variation in trust can be attributed to the effect of globalization. To test Hypothesis 1 and 2 a model is used that includes the measures of the three different dimensions of globalization, i.e. the sub-indices of the KOF-index. The explanatory strength of these dimensions is then compared.

For testing Hypothesis 3, 4 and 5 then, the same model is used with inclusion of the globalization attitude variable and its interaction with the three different dimensions of globalization. The interaction is included because for testing the fourth and fifth hypothesis, this study looks at the cross-level interactions between the individual-level attitude towards globalization and the country-level of globalization. In addition, I also include a cross-level interaction variable of attitudes towards globalization and the East-West dummy variable as a control. It might be the case that the relation between attitudes towards globalization and political trust is mainly a Western European phenomenon. Indeed, the literature on the new social divisions as a consequence of globalization focuses almost exclusively on Western European countries. Because Western European countries are in general more globalized, including the globalization attitude variable only in interaction with the three dimensions globalization is therefore likely to overestimate the effect of these variables on political trust.

4. Results

4.1. Descriptive results

The first step of this analysis is to investigate the distribution of the dependent and independent variables. Figure 1 presents the variation of political trust across countries and time. Two main patterns can be observed from this figure, both of which are in accordance with earlier research. First, relatively low trust-scores are especially found in Eastern European countries, whereas average trust is highest in Western and especially Northwestern European countries. With a mean level of 4.3 for all countries and average scores of countries ranging from 2.1 (Bulgaria) to 6.2 (Denmark), the level




Figure 1. Political trust across countries and time (dots in the blocks represent respondents).

of political trust varies substantively among the countries. Second, in general there is a declining trend in political trust. Although there are some exceptions (all of which are Western European), this negative trend can be found in the majority of countries.

Moving to the variation of general globalization (meaning the score on the overall index of globalization, consisting of the three sub-indices of globalization) by country (Figure 2), the order of the countries is very similar: Eastern European countries (and Iceland) constitute the less globalized half of the countries under analysis, Western European countries the more globalized half. The fact that the distribution of both the dependent and the independent variables so closely follows the East-West divide, justifies the inclusion of the Eastern-Western Europe dummy variable. This variable controls for differences in the variation of political trust between Eastern and Western European countries, which without the inclusion of this control variable might have been attributed to the effects of one of the country-level indicators.

Furthermore, the East-West pattern indicates that the more globalized countries are also the countries with a higher GDP and better institutional performance scores. Indeed, common sense would argue that there might be a high correlation between some of the country-level variables,




Figure 2. Globalization across countries (average score for period 2002-2012).

making high levels of multicollinearity a potential problem. However, looking at the collinearity statistics when including only the country-level variables in an OLS-regression model with political trust as dependent variable (Appendix Table 2), it turns out that collinearity statistics are not problematic. Although not all VIF-scores are close to 1, for all of them the score is well under 10. What is notable as well is that there is sufficient variation among the three sub-indices of globalization to not pose serious multicollinearity problems. Apparently countries which are highly globalized with regard to for example the economic dimension, are not necessarily equally highly globalized from a political or cultural perspective.

4.2. Constrained domestic policy-making

The argument of the constrained domestic policy-making hypothesis is that globalization constrains governments in shaping policy outcomes, leading to a decrease in political trust at the individual level. The multilevel model that is used to test this argument is presented in Table 1. Including all variables, the sample still consists of 161.188 respondents. As a first observation, it is notable that almost all individual-level variables have a statistically significant effect, whereas the majority of the country-level variables has not⁴. Indeed, the estimated residual standard deviations of the three levels of the model show that most variance is situated at the individual level (about 65 percent of the total variance, while differences between countries account for 18 percent and differences between country-years for 17 percent). The variance at the levels of countries and country-years is sufficient to justify the multi-level model, but the differences in variation between the different levels are important to consider when interpreting the results.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that higher levels of globalization lead to a decrease in political trust. The results presented in Table 1 do not provide strong support for this hypothesis. Although the effect of economic globalization is indeed negative, it is not statistically significant. This finding contradicts the findings of Fischer (2012). To put this result in perspective however, it is useful to place it in the context of the other country-level variables, most of which have no statistically significant effect either. Since country-level variables that are commonly used in relation with political trust – such as economic performance and the quality of democracy – do not have a statistically significant effect on political trust, it is a bit less surprising that a less commonly used indicator as economic globalization does not have a statistically significant effect either.

⁴ When interpreting the effects, note that the coefficient are unstandardized. Appendix Table 1 shows the range of all variables, making it easier to interpret the effect size of the coefficients.

Table 1. Multilevel OLS models: Impact of globalization on political trust.

Model 1		
	b	se
<i>Individual-level variables</i>		
Trust in people	0.161***	(0.002)
Interested in politics	0.329***	(0.007)
Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties	0.320***	(0.011)
Satisfied with present state of economy	0.351***	(0.003)
Left-right placement	0.130***	(0.008)
Left-right placement squared	-0.010***	(0.001)
Age	-0.002***	(0.000)
Gender (Female)	-0.018	(0.011)
Education		
Lower than secondary	-0.036	(0.028)
Lower secondary	-0.085***	(0.021)
Lower tier upper secondary	-0.103***	(0.020)
Advanced vocational	-0.001	(0.025)
Lower tertiary, BA-level	0.135***	(0.024)
Higher tertiary, MA-level	0.123***	(0.025)
Not possible to harmonize	0.274*	(0.126)
Occupation		
Armed Forces	0.185*	(0.084)
Managers	-0.012	(0.024)
Professionals	0.081***	(0.022)
Technicians and associate professionals	-0.006	(0.020)
Service and sales workers	-0.033	(0.020)
Agriculture and fishery workers	0.111**	(0.032)
Craft workers	-0.144***	(0.022)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	-0.198***	(0.024)
Elementary workers	-0.025	(0.023)
<i>Macro-level variables</i>		
Economic globalization	-0.012	(0.010)
Political globalization	-0.021*	(0.009)
Cultural globalization	0.027*	(0.012)
Population	0.000	(0.000)
GDP per Capita	0.005	(0.005)
Gini Inequality	-0.006	(0.017)
Public social spending/GDP	0.036*	(0.019)
Quality of Democracy	0.034	(0.021)
Corruption	-0.009	(0.008)
Effective number of parties	-0.052	(0.059)
Eastern-Western Europe	0.116	(0.268)
Time effect (ESS Round)	-0.097**	(0.041)
(Intercept)	-0.284	(1.413)
<i>Variance components</i>		
Country (SD)		0.349
Country-years (SD)		0.354
Individual (SD)		2.014
N		161188
AIC		683983

Model is estimated by OLS-regression; *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).
 Note: coefficients are unstandardized.

Following this reasoning, a statistically significant effect of the other two dimensions of globalization would be remarkable as well. Yet both political and cultural globalization do have a statistically significant effect. Moreover, they are the only country-level variables that do so, together with public social spending. Hypothesis 2 makes a prediction about the relative effect of those dimensions. It expects that when comparing the three dimensions, economic globalization would have the strongest negative effect, and political globalization the second strongest negative effect. Both dimensions are expected to have a stronger negative effect than cultural globalization. With economic globalization not having a statistically significant effect, this hypothesis is not fully supported. However, the results do support the prediction that political globalization has a stronger negative effect than cultural globalization. In fact, while the effect of political globalization is statistically significant negative, the effect of cultural globalization is statistically significant positive.

How to explain this effect of the political and cultural dimensions of globalization? As discussed in the theory section, political globalization does have the potential to constrain national governments in their policy-making. Firstly, because diffusion of policy-making can directly restrict governments' policy options since ratifying treaties and agreements can render certain policies impossible. Secondly, because being a more prominent member of the international community might 'socialize' governments to pursue certain policies. The negative effect of political globalization thus fits in the framework of the constrained policy-making hypothesis. Of course, this explanation is not a definitive explanation, especially because the empirical results do not report about the actual degree to which governments are constrained in their policy-making. The question whether this is actually the mechanism that the results indicate is therefore close to speculation. In addition, if it is indeed the constraining effect that explains this negative effect, a statistically significant effect of economic globalization would be expected as well, which is not the case. From the theoretical perspective of this thesis however, this explanation remains the most plausible one.

The finding that cultural globalization does not have a negative effect on political trust too is compatible with the argument of the constrained policy-making hypothesis. However, the positive effect as reported is somewhat surprising from this perspective, and the framework proposed here does not have a direct explanation for it. After all, cultural globalization cannot be said to *increase* the policy-making capacities of governments. It is therefore tempting to start speculating. Recalling that immigration is only a small part of cultural globalization and consists of elements such as tourism and usage of new communication technologies as well, it can be argued that citizens in more culturally globalized countries become more knowledgeable about the life circumstances in other countries

and more ‘cosmopolitan’. This might have the effect that citizens start to appreciate their own democratic institutions more. It might also have the effect that citizens experience their national government less as playing a central role in their life, and therefore as less threatening. Yet such explanations are at this moment not more than speculation, and the results presented here do not provide evidence for them.

4.2.1. Effect of control variables

Turning to the control variables at the macro-level, only two others have a statistically significant effect: public social spending, and the variable controlling for a time effect. With regard to the theoretical framework, the positive effect of social expenditure is interesting. As outlined in the theory section the constrained policy-making hypothesis assumes that social spending is one of the most important tools governments have to compensate for the effect of globalization. And indeed, the results support the idea that a presumed negative trust-effect of globalization can be counteracted by increasing social spending, because public social spending has a statistically significant positive effect. Secondly, the most plausible explanation for the negative effect of the time-variable is the financial and economic crisis. It is telling that the countries that have been hit the hardest by the crisis (Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Iceland and Spain) are among the countries with the most negative trend (see Figure 1). Apparently the GDP per capita-variable and the variable measuring the subjective evaluation of the economy do not fully capture the negative consequences of this crisis.

Coming to the effect of the other country-level variables, it should be noted that this is not the first multilevel-analysis to report so little country-level variables having an effect on political trust. Paxton (2007) for example finds no positive effect for the quality of a country’s democracy either. And using the European Social Survey just like this thesis, Van der Meer (2010) too finds no relation between economic performance and political trust. A plausible explanation is that much of the effect of country-level indicators is captured by the individual level variables. The fact that the East-West variable has no statistically significant effect, whereas Figure 1 indicated a clear relation between political trust and region (countries being Eastern or Western European), at least indicates that the differences between these countries have been sufficiently captured by other variables. Still, it remains remarkable that *none* of the variables like economic performance, corruption and quality of democracy has a statistically significant effect, while the political and cultural dimensions of globalization have.

The individual level variables then are the predictors with the strongest effect. All but the gender-variable have a statistically significant effect. These effects are in accordance with previous

literature. Political interest and engagement (being close to a party) both have a positive effect. Evaluation of the present state of the economy has a positive effect too, and turns out to be the predictor with the strongest effect. Both a linear and a curvilinear effect were found for left-right self-placement, meaning that political trust is higher for people on the extreme right than for people on the extreme left, but is highest for respondents in the middle-categories. Newton and Norris (2010) report a similar effect. Regarding age earlier studies report mixed results, but the negative effect found here has been reported by previous studies as well (e.g. Anderson and LoTempio, 2002). Turning to the education variable, the results show that trust increases for respondents as education increases, as would be expected. Finally, a similar pattern is found for the occupation variable in the sense that the trust of white-collar workers is higher than that of manual workers (although elementary workers and respondents working in agriculture are an exception).

4.3. Attitudes towards globalization and interaction effects

Hypothesis 3 predicts that respondents' attitude towards globalization is positively related with their political trust. Figure 3 displays the average correlation between attitudes towards globalization and political trust across countries and time. The figure shows a consistent trend: in every country, the attitude towards globalization is positively related with political trust. This is of course without controlling for other variables, but serves as a first indication. Looking at the strength of the correlation across countries, the correlation seems to be stronger in Western European countries such as Finland, Great Britain and Sweden, and less strong in Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Poland and Ukraine. This again justifies the inclusion of the Eastern-Western Europe dummy variable, now with regard to testing the hypotheses predicting an interaction effect between attitudes towards globalization and the actual globalization of a country (Hypothesis 4 and 5). As a final observation, the figure also gives an indication of the average attitude of towards globalization across countries (by displaying the of the dots along the x-axis). Here there is no clear pattern in the order of the countries in terms of the East-West divide or other country-level variables. Although the attitude in Northwestern European countries is in general relatively positive towards globalization, the attitude in countries like the UK and France is relatively negative.

Table 2 presents the results of the model which is used to test Hypothesis 3, as well as Hypothesis 4 and 5. The model differs from the first model due to the inclusion of the globalization attitude variable, and by the inclusion of the interaction variables. Because of the inclusion of the

attitude variable, the sample-size decreases significantly (from 161.188 to 89.626). Yet despite the smaller sample size the effects are similar to those reported in model 1. The effect-sizes of the independent variables differ, and the effect of two variables ceases to be statistically significant (age and time-effect), but the general picture remains the same.

The only interaction effect of globalization attitudes and a dimension of globalization which is not statistically significant, is the model including the interaction with economic globalization (model 2). In this model, the attitude towards globalization does have a statistically significant positive effect on trust by itself. This finding is thus in accordance with the expectation of Hypothesis 3.




Figure 3. Relation between globalization attitude and political trust across countries and time.

In the other two models, the globalization attitude variable does not have a statistically significant effect on itself. However, in these models the interaction effect with globalization is statistically significant. By only looking at the numbers, it is difficult to say whether or not these results support the prediction of Hypothesis 3 that attitudes towards globalization have a positive effect on political trust, because the variable should be interpreted in combination with the interaction effects. In order to visualize how these effects work together, they are plotted in Figure 4 and 5. These figures show the estimated effect of attitudes towards globalization on political trust for the lowest and highest score of political and cultural globalization, and for the region in which a respondent lives (i.e. whether a respondent lives in an Eastern or Western European country). In both figures, the effect of attitudes towards globalization on trust is positive. In other words, political trust is higher for people who are more positive about processes of globalization. It should be noted that the effect is depending on a country's degree of globalization, as well whether a country is Eastern or Western European. In Eastern European countries and less globalized countries the effect is weaker, and probably not statistically significant. With regard to Western European countries and more globalized countries however the results do provide support for Hypothesis 3. This finding thus supports the argument that there is a gap between 'losers of globalization' and 'winners of globalization' (I will use these terms to refer to citizens with a positive attitude towards globalization and a negative attitude towards globalization respectively) in terms of trust

Besides showing a positive relation of globalization attitudes on political trust, the results in Table 2 thus also show that the strength of this relation depends on the region in which respondents live: the interaction effect of globalization attitudes and the East-West dummy variable is statistically significant. Looking again at the visualized effects displayed in Figure 4 and 5, they show that the effect of globalization attitudes on political trust is stronger in Western European countries than in Eastern European countries. This was expected, because the emerging division between winners and losers of globalization has often been described as a Western European phenomenon.

The main reason for including this East-West interaction variable into the model was to prevent an overestimation of the interaction effect of the dimensions of globalization and political trust. The results in Table 2 shows that the cross-level interaction effects of both cultural and political globalization with the inclusion of this control, globalization attitudes remain statistically significant (Figure 4 and 5 show an estimation of this effect as well). This finding support Hypothesis 4, which predicts that the relation between individuals' attitudes towards globalization and political trust is stronger in countries that are more globalized. Assuming that there is a gap between the winners and

Table 2. Multilevel OLS model: Impact of attitudes towards globalization and globalization on political trust.

	Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Individual level variables						
Attitude towards globalization	0.107***	(0.032)	0.002	(0.045)	0.018	(0.047)
Trust in people	0.141***	(0.003)	0.141***	(0.003)	0.140***	(0.003)
Interested in politics	0.246***	(0.009)	0.246***	(0.009)	0.246***	(0.009)
Feel closer to a particular party than others	0.283***	(0.014)	0.283***	(0.014)	0.283***	(0.014)
How satisfied with present state of economy	0.318***	(0.003)	0.318***	(0.003)	0.318***	(0.003)
Left-right placement	0.033***	(0.003)	0.033***	(0.003)	0.033***	(0.003)
Left-right placement squared	-0.007***	(0.001)	-0.007***	(0.001)	-0.007***	(0.001)
Age	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Gender	0.019	(0.015)	0.019	(0.015)	0.019	(0.015)
Education						
Lower than secondary	0.053	(0.042)	0.053	(0.042)	0.053	(0.042)
Lower secondary	0.006	(0.030)	0.006	(0.030)	0.008	(0.030)
Lower tier upper secondary	-0.018	(0.027)	-0.019	(0.027)	-0.017	(0.027)
Advanced vocational	0.030	(0.035)	0.030	(0.035)	0.030	(0.035)
Lower tertiary, BA-level	0.129***	(0.032)	0.131***	(0.032)	0.130***	(0.032)
Higher tertiary, MA-level	0.084*	(0.034)	0.085*	(0.034)	0.084*	(0.034)
Not possible to harmonize	0.421**	(0.163)	0.420**	(0.162)	0.424**	(0.163)
Occupation						
Armed Forces	0.058	(0.112)	0.057	(0.112)	0.057	(0.112)
Managers	-0.045	(0.031)	-0.045	(0.031)	-0.045	(0.031)
Professionals	0.017	(0.028)	0.016	(0.028)	0.016	(0.028)
Technicians, associate professionals	-0.034	(0.026)	-0.035	(0.026)	-0.034	(0.026)
Service and sales workers	-0.039	(0.027)	-0.039	(0.027)	-0.039	(0.027)
Agriculture and fishery workers	0.108*	(0.043)	0.108*	(0.043)	0.109*	(0.043)
Craft workers	-0.094**	(0.029)	-0.093**	(0.029)	-0.093**	(0.029)
Plant and machine operators	-0.137***	(0.032)	-0.136***	(0.032)	-0.137***	(0.032)
Elementary workers	-0.005	(0.030)	-0.005	(0.030)	-0.005	(0.030)
Macro-level variables						
Economic globalization	-0.017	(0.015)	-0.016	(0.014)	-0.016	(0.014)
Political globalization	-0.035***	(0.010)	-0.043***	(0.011)	-0.035***	(0.010)
Cultural globalization	0.044**	(0.017)	0.045**	(0.017)	0.037*	(0.017)
Attitude x Economic globalization	0.000	(0.000)				
Attitude x Political globalization			0.001**	(0.001)		
Attitude x Cultural globalization					0.001*	(0.001)
Population	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
GDP per Capita	0.009	(0.006)	0.009	(0.006)	0.008	(0.006)
Gini Inequality	0.009	(0.021)	0.009	(0.021)	0.008	(0.020)
Public social spending/GDP	0.052*	(0.026)	0.052*	(0.026)	0.051*	(0.026)
Quality of Democracy	0.031	(0.025)	0.030	(0.024)	0.029	(0.024)
Corruption	-0.011	(0.009)	-0.011	(0.009)	-0.011	(0.009)
Effective number of parties	0.031	(0.079)	0.030	(0.078)	0.031	(0.078)
Easter-Western Europe	-0.472	(0.325)	-0.410	(0.325)	-0.400	(0.326)
Attitude x Eastern-Western Europe	0.072***	(0.009)	0.081***	(0.008)	0.070***	(0.009)
Time effect (ESS Round)	0.011	(0.063)	0.011	(0.063)	0.011	(0.063)
(Intercept)	-1.419	(1.705)	-0.791	(1.710)	0.054	(1.597)
Variance components						
Country (SD)		0.276		0.275		0.277
Country-years (SD)		0.431		0.430		0.429
Individual (SD)		1.977		1.976		1.977
N		89626		89626		89626
AIC		377073		377065		377067

Models are estimated by OLS-regressions; *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).

Note: coefficients are unstandardized.




Figure 4. Effect of attitude towards globalization on political trust in interaction with political globalization and region. Note: simulated political trust based on model 3 in Table 2. Ticks on the Y-axis represent 0.5 increases.




Figure 4. Effect of attitude towards globalization on political trust in interaction with political globalization and region. Note: simulated political trust based model 4 in Table 2. Ticks on the Y-axis represent 0.5 increases.

losers of globalization that can be described in terms of trust, these findings are in line with the idea that this gap increases as globalization increases. This indicates that the trust gap between winners and losers of globalization is to some extent indeed a *consequence* of globalization. However, note that this applies only to the political and cultural dimensions of globalization, and not to the economic dimension of globalization (since the interaction with economic globalization is not statistically significant).

Hypothesis 5 made predictions for the effect-sizes of the different dimensions of globalization relative to each other. It expected that the interaction effect of cultural globalization and atti-

tudes towards globalization is stronger than that of political and economic globalization. This expectation is supported with regard to economic globalization, since cultural globalization does indeed have a stronger effect. However, when comparing political and cultural globalization, the interaction-effects are similar. This indicates that not only cultural globalization reinforces the emergence of winners and losers of globalization, but the political dimension of globalization does so as well. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is only partially supported.

Lastly, the effects of the control variables are fairly similar to model 1, and therefore do not need to be discussed again. The only difference that is noteworthy is that the time-effect does not have a statistically significant anymore. A very likely explanation for this finding is that the interaction effects partly capture this difference in trust over time, meaning that the attitude towards globalization issues have become more negative over time. Such a negative trend in globalization attitudes might to a considerable extent be a consequence of the financial and economic crisis. Indeed, Serricchio et al. (2013) have found that the crisis has increased Euroscepticism and that the countries most affected by the crisis have experienced the most severe increase in Euroscepticism. If the economic crisis then has indeed had a negative effect on globalization attitudes, it might be asked why the interaction with economic globalization is not statistically significant, but there is a plausible explanation for this: Serricchio et al. also show that “the economic crisis did not substantially bring economic factors back in as an important source of Euroscepticism” (p. 51).

5. Conclusion

Is political trust affected by globalization? And if so, how? The goal of this thesis has been to provide an answer to these two questions. Being one of the first studies addressing this question empirically, it proposes two distinct mechanisms by which globalization might affect political trust. The first is based on the assumption that globalization has a constraining effect on a government’s set of feasible policy options, and holds that this makes a government less responsive to voter preferences, thereby leading to a decrease in political trust. The second assumes that globalization is more and more central to understanding the current divisions within European societies, and predicts that citizens’ attitudes towards globalization are positively related with political trust. In addition, it expects this relation to be more pronounced in countries that are more globalized. In other words, that there is a gap between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization in terms of trust, and that this gap increases as globalization increases.

The results of this study provide mixed support for the hypotheses derived from the first mechanism. The existence of a negative effect of economic globalization on political trust is not confirmed. This finding contradicts the expectation that it is mainly the economic dimension of globalization that has constrained national governments, and thereby led to a decrease in political trust. However, the findings do support the prediction derived from this mechanism that political globalization has a negative effect on political trust. A possible explanation for this finding is that political globalization either directly constrains policy-making on the national level by the restrictions imposed by treaties and agreements, or indirectly does so because of the ‘socialization effects’ more politically globalized countries experience (e.g. Goodman and Jinks, 2004; Simmons and Elkins, 2004).

Critical to understanding these effects is whether economic and political globalization have indeed constrained governments in their policy-making. Yet the design of this study does not account for this constraining effect, and does thus not allow for a further exploration of the causal chain. This is a problem for related research as well (e.g. Fischer 2012; Steiner, 2010), and emphasizes the importance of further research to understand more precisely which mechanisms are at work here. Nevertheless, the results do show that globalization has a relatively strong impact on political trust compared to country characteristics which are generally found to have an effect on trust, such as economic performance and corruption. This is a remarkable finding that has not been reported by earlier research. Despite the lack of evidence on the causal argument, these findings therefore do provide new insights for the literature on the effect of globalization on domestic politics.

The empirical results of this research do support the predictions of the second mechanism. Firstly, a consistently positive relation is found between globalization attitudes and political trust, meaning that trust is higher for people with a more positive attitude towards globalization. In addition, this effect is stronger in Western European countries. This finding is in accordance with the idea that the emerging gap between winners and losers of globalization is mainly a Western European phenomenon. Most importantly, the results show that this gap in terms of trust increases as globalization increases. This supports the theory that new social divisions are arising as a consequence of the effects of globalization. This finding thus contributes to our understanding of the newly emerging social divisions and the role of globalization herein. It indicates that governments of globalized countries would be well advised to pay more attention to the way they can counteract this new divide.

Because hardly any previous literature is available that addresses the relation between globalization and political trust, the main purpose of this thesis was to identify possible mechanisms instead of testing more precisely a particular part of an established theoretical framework. Looking at aggregate numbers and broad concepts, this study is open to the criticism that it links rather broad concepts without providing more specific evidence for the causal mechanisms at work. Indeed, it is evident that further work needs to be done to confirm the results and to refine these causal mechanisms. As a suggestion, it would be interesting to focus on a smaller set of countries, thereby limiting the variation in other relevant variables (only the 17 countries that were coded as Western countries in this thesis for example). Such an analysis might also benefit from a more lengthy longitudinal comparison. The ESS was only started in 2002, but the European Value Survey (EVS) for example has been conducted since 1981.

However, the results do reveal that the relation between globalization and political trust is a topic worthy of further investigation. The empirical evidence indicates that the different dimensions of globalization each in their own way have a considerable impact on political trust, thus adding to the emerging literature about the relation between national governments and their citizens in the light of globalization. In addition, the results show that the effect of globalization is not to be underestimated in understanding the emergence of new social divisions. Both findings contribute to scholarly understanding of globalization, but are certainly relevant outside the academic arena as well.

Appendix

Appendix Table 1. Variable description and coding

	Range	Mean
<i>Individual level variables</i>		
Trust in parliament	0-10	4.33
Attitude towards globalization*	0-10	5.3
European unification	0-10	5.2
Immigrants bad for culture	0-10	4.9
Immigrant bad for economy	0-10	5.6
Trust in people	0-10	4.97
Interested in politics	1-4	2.37
Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties	0-1	0.49
How satisfied with present state of economy	0-10	4.34
Left-right placement	0-10	5.09
Age	12-123	47.46
Gender (female is 1)	0-1	0.54
Education		
Not possible to harmonize (residual)	0-1	0.26
Lower than secondary	0-1	0.08
Lower secondary	0-1	0.14
Lower tier upper secondary	0-1	0.15
Advanced vocational	0-1	0.07
Lower tertiary, BA-level	0-1	0.07
Higher tertiary, MA-level	0-1	0.07
Occupation		
Armed Forces	0-1	0.01
Managers	0-1	0.09
Professionals	0-1	0.13
Technicians, associate professionals	0-1	0.15
Service and sales workers	0-1	0.15
Agriculture and fishery workers	0-1	0.04
Craft workers	0-1	0.13
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	0-1	0.08
Elementary workers	0-1	0.12
<i>Country-level variables</i>		
KOF Index of Globalization	61-92	83.1
Economic globalization	52-99	80.3
Political globalization	50-98	89.4
Cultural globalization	57-97	81.6
Population (x1.000)	290-82.531	22.305
GDP per Capita (x 1.000)	0.6-100	31.3
Gini Inequality**	22-38	29
Public social spending/GDP (%)	13-33	22.8%
Quality of Democracy**	45-75	58.6
Corruption***	22-97	67.7
Effective number of parties	2-9.1	4
Eastern-Western Europe (Western is 1)	0-1	0.59

Note: N = 89.626, or 161.188 with exclusion of the Attitude towards globalization variable.

Details on coding: * Variable is constructed equally weighting the three indicators ** Missing values linearly interpolated *** A higher score indicates *less* corruption

Appendix Table 2. Collinearity statistics for country-level variables

	Model 1	Model 2
	VIF	VIF
Globalization	2.388	
Economic Globalization		3.721
Political Globalization		2.189
Cultural Globalization		3.432
Population	1.905	3.794
GDP per Capita	2.828	3.228
Gini Inequality	1.412	1.459
Public social spending/GDP	1.687	1.986
Quality of Democracy	6.647	7.763
Corruption	6.223	7.911
Eff. no. of parties	1.895	2.039
Eastern-Western Europe	3.178	3.304

Note: dependent variable is trust in parliament

Appendix Table 3. Countries included per ESS-round

	Round 1 (2002)	Round 2 (2004)	Round 3 (2006)	Round 4 (2008)	Round 5 (2010)	Round 6 (2012)
Austria	•	•	•	•	•	
Belgium	•	•	•	•	•	•
Bulgaria			•	•	•	•
Croatia				•	•	
Cyprus			•	•	•	•
Czech	•	•		•	•	•
Denmark	•	•	•	•	•	•
Estonia		•	•	•	•	•
Finland	•	•	•	•	•	•
France	•	•	•	•	•	•
Germany	•	•	•	•	•	•
Greece	•	•		•	•	
Hungary	•	•	•	•	•	•
Iceland		•				•
Ireland	•	•	•	•	•	•
Italy	•	•				•
Lithuania				•	•	•
Luxembourg	•	•				
Netherlands	•	•	•	•	•	•
Norway	•	•	•	•	•	•
Poland	•	•	•	•	•	•
Portugal	•	•	•	•	•	•
Slovakia		•	•	•	•	•
Slovenia	•	•	•	•	•	•
Spain	•	•	•	•	•	•
Sweden	•	•	•	•	•	•
Switzerland	•	•	•	•	•	•
Ukraine		•	•	•	•	•
UK	•	•	•	•	•	•

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