

LEIDEN UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES

MSC POLITICAL SCIENCE,
TRACK: POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR AND COMMUNICATION

THESIS SUPERVISOR: DR. M.F. MEFFERT
SECOND READER: PROF. DR. H. DEKKER

Regional, National, and European Identities in Five EU Countries

Master Thesis

June 25th, 2013

Lucie Čadová
(S1253131)

Keywords: Territorial Identity, Regionalism, Regional Identity, National Identity, European Identity, Europeanization, Moreno Question, EU, Czech Republic, France, Poland, Slovakia, Spain

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| 1. Introduction | 3 |
| 2. Literature Review and Hypotheses | 7 |
| 2.1 Identity Concept | 7 |
| 2.2 National Identity | 10 |
| 2.3 Regional Identity | 13 |
| 2.3.1 Socio-Historical Perspective | 15 |
| 2.3.2 Demographic Perspective..... | 17 |
| 2.4 European Identity | 18 |
| 2.5 National, Regional, and European – Multiple Identities | 21 |
| 3 Methods | 23 |
| 3.1 Case selection | 24 |
| 3.1.1 The Old EU Members | 25 |
| 3.1.2 The New EU Members..... | 28 |
| 3.2 Sample | 32 |
| 4 Operationalization, Measurement | 33 |
| 4.1 Identity Configurations..... | 33 |
| 4.2 Identities and their Predictors | 36 |
| 4.3 Data Analysis..... | 39 |
| 5 Results and Discussion | 41 |
| 5.1 Overall Distribution of Territorial Identities | 41 |
| 5.2 Results from Moreno Question..... | 43 |
| 5.3 Spain – Catalonia, Galicia, Basque Country | 45 |
| 5.4 France – Brittany, Alsace | 48 |
| 5.5 Regression Analysis | 51 |
| 5.5.1 Discussion of the Models | 52 |
| 5.5.2 Country Discussion | 55 |
| 5.5.3 Do Identities Interact? | 56 |
| 6 Conclusion | 58 |
| 7 References | 60 |
| 8 Appendices | 66 |

Acknowledgements

I am sincerely grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Michael Meffert, for his intellectual guidance he showed me throughout my thesis writing, his availability, and stimulating discussions, which contributed to the quality of my research. Without his disciplined scheduling during the semester, this thesis would not be possible.

Besides, I would like to thank to my family and friends who supported me in any respect during the completion of the project.

1. Introduction

Today, we live in a modern European society, which is vibrant, dynamic and more and more flexible. Rarely do we stop and think about what constitutes our societies. We got used to the borderless travel, student exchange or the option to move anywhere in the EU obtaining the same rights as the country nationals. However, more than fifty years ago, the world - and Europe specifically - was a completely different place. Citizens were not secure of their future let alone their nation states; free travel was guaranteed only to a mere half of all Europeans and international trade was far from being borderless. It can be said that Europe has come a long way and is still walking, facing new challenges of tomorrow.

The European Union was founded on the premise of preventing future conflicts by creating economic and cultural exchange and on a sense of patriotism and attachment to the continent (Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). The founders of the European Communities Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul Henri Spaak and Alcide de Gasperi were convinced that the above mentioned patriotism will over time “cultivate” citizens’ warm support for European Communities and later for the European Union (Marks, 1999). This, however was before what constitutes “a European” became heavily politicized.

Due to the prevalent character of the European Union as a transnational organization, the past fifty years have seen a rapid increase in theorizing of what it means being Spanish European, French European or German one, to name just a few. Inglehart’s (1977) theory of post-modern society has become ever more salient with the success of holding the EU 15 and later 27 countries together without a violent conflict. With easily accessible resources and enduring security, the protectionist need for a center state is said to slowly disappear and the society enters a fully globalized community in which nationalities will cease to be of importance (Jelen, 2011).

Questions have been raised whether national identity will remain relevant in the future; however the present situation does not show any decline in national sentiment or disappearance of nationalities (Antonsich, 2009; Brigeovich, 2012; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Duchesne, 2008; Schrijver, 2004).

What we know about identities in this regard, is largely based upon quantitative studies that use public opinion surveys such as the Eurobarometer, World Values Survey or International Social Survey Program. These surveys regularly investigate the well-being and support of the ever growing EU (or in case of the World Values Survey, the world) community. A considerable amount of findings over the past twenty years mainly point to vast differences among all member countries, ranging from Euro-friendly Germany or Spain to Euro-skeptic United Kingdom (Risse, 2010). Thus, sentiments towards European identity seem to differ, and there is not a general trend towards a post-national state.

Pressures influence the citizens both from the top – the European level – as well as from the bottom – the regional level (Grüber, 2002). Historical regions and newly established ones have seemingly gained importance as they established a direct link to the EU, bypassing the national governments. What Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2005b) call the ‘Europe of the Regions’ which is the empowerment of regions, has initiated minority national sentiments and has encouraged regional activity in Brussels in the spirit of the principle of subsidiarity, only further entangling the already complex multilevel governance.

Nevertheless, as Kaplan and Herb (2011) have reported, people do not live in vacuum and neither do their identities. They are country nationals first, may or may not be tied to their region by history or common culture, and last, to various extents they are and feel European. Questions have been raised about the existence of European identity and the capacity of people to develop attachment to multiple territories (Elias, 1991). More recently, the

possibility of an individual having multiple identities has been confirmed in many studies that look into regionalism and the rise of sub-state identities (Brigevich, 2011; Carey, 2002; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001) as well as in study of Europe (Risse, 2010). However, how multiple identities relate to each other still remains a research puzzle.

The societal importance of identity construction lies in the fact that they imply conformity and thus support for the governing process (Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). Territorial identities link the individual with community on certain territory and through his or her interaction at a given level of governance strengthen the attachment to that level and in effect create political legitimacy (Risse, 2010).

To date there has been little agreement on what causes people to develop strong regional identity and weak national one and vice-versa. The generalizability of much published research on this issue is problematic; most previous studies focused on multilevel identities only in selected regions or in a single country (Martínez & Herrera, 2005; Brigevich, 2012; Carey, 2002 ; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Moreno, 2006), and their results were tied to the respective country or regional characteristics. In addition, no research has been found that focused on all levels of identities across various types of countries. And the existing accounts fail to resolve the character of identities in relation to each other. Therefore the aim of this thesis is firstly, to identify predictors of attachment to regional, national and European identity levels and secondly, to compare these levels across various countries.

The varied character of the 27 EU countries such as diverse administration, political systems and history, provides material for analysis of what constitutes territorial identities. In this thesis, regions of five countries (the Czech Republic, France, Poland, Slovakia, and

Spain) were selected for a comparative analysis utilizing secondary data collected for *International Social Survey Program on National Identities*.

Thus, this thesis attempts to avoid looking at identity as an isolated phenomenon to a specific country characteristic or a region; rather it sees it as a result or part of ongoing Europeanization and regionalization processes and pressures bestowed upon the European inhabitants. There are two primary aims of this study: first, to develop a model of predictors of identity level; second, to compare and contrast identity configurations across countries.

The study is therefore set out to assess the effects of individual factors on identity construction as well as unique historical country features. By employing qualitative modes of inquiry with a case-study design it looks at regions of varied character to expand the previous findings and offer new possible explanations on identity construction. It also aims to contribute to the discussion on the character of identities, which remains unresolved.

The analysis of this thesis has provided a confirmation that multiple identities exist, with more than a half of respondents holding multiple identities. This was shown by the results of both regression analysis and a country comparison of territorial identities. Furthermore, identity levels were found to reinforce each other: specifically regional and national identities increase the chances of citizens for developing European identity. Finally, some predictors of territorial identity proved to be more significant than others: national pride, relation to minorities, community size, distance from the capital, and evaluation of democratic system at home were determined as the main predictors whereas others had to be dismissed.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses

This study aims to address the following research question: what are the main predictors of identity and do they change with different territorial levels. In particular, this thesis works with several premises; first, individuals can hold multiple identities (Brigevich, 2011; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Risse, 2010; Schrijver) second, national identity is a default identity (Antonsich, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a); and last, identification implies conformity and can increase support for the governing process (Anderson, 1998; Risse, 2010).

2.1 Identity Concept

Variety of research has used the concept of identity. Identity formation has its roots in sociology and social psychology (Brigevich, 2011; Duchesne, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a; Risse, 2010). What we know about identities in large comes from Anderson's (1991) seminal work on "imagined communities", a community of people who do not know each other personally but are aware of the existence of others with the same interests and affiliations to the same nation. According to Anderson (1991) these imagined communities are required for a nation to rise. Although his work was mostly related to nationalism, Anderson's understanding of what constitutes a nation has penetrated many social science disciplines.

Risse (2010) as many others adopted Anderson's (1991) assumptions that identities are social constructs. Particular importance is given to sociological theories of self-conception, and the way one makes sense of where he or she belongs. Similarly, Hooghe and Marks (2005a) suggest that identity not only forms who one is but also what he or she identifies with, building a strong sense of loyalty and attachment to a group one identifies with. Identity building is a continuous process of making sense of "who" we are and "what" do we want. At the same time Duchesne (2008) revealed that identity construction can be also based on "who are they", in other words who "we" distinguish ourselves from.

Yet still, there has been little agreement on the concept of identity itself. The definitions have been frequently utilized to serve policy affirmation or elite decision making. However, the core difference between sociological theory and its application to political community is crucial for understanding the processes (Duchesne, 2008).

The most frequent usage of identities in the sociological term is as collective identities of for instance race, class or gender, which are activated by the individuals depending on the relevant context (Duchesne, 2008; Risse, 2010). From that perspective territorial identities work on the same principle, as individuals choose which context requires them to act on their regional, national or European feelings. The sociological tradition understands different identities as having subjective borders. However, when territorial identities are regarded, as such for the developed imagined communities the borders suddenly become very concrete (Duchesne, 2008). From the political science perspective communities are “groups of people whose purpose is to govern themselves” and providing them with empowerment through in-group relations (Duchesne, 2008, p.402). Thus the political understanding by definition limits the identity to the territory they govern by geopolitical arrangements, such as the state.

A large body of literature has also investigated the character of identities. Results from several studies have identified the possibility of individuals having multiple identities (Brigevich, 2011; Carey, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a; Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Risse, 2010). Risse (2010) utilized the term ‘nested identities’ to describe the multiplicity, where an individual is capable of developing attachment to the region where he lives, to his country, and finally to the continent, where his state is situated. In addition, these multilevel identities might prove complementary or exclusive. Furthermore according to another study, there are two dimensions of identities: the “strength” of attachment to territorial levels and the “fit” between the territorial levels (Brigevich, 2012).

Although some identities have been politically constructed and may seem permanent especially in case of old states, Duchesne (2008) proposes that identity is a process of constant negotiation, it is being contested at all levels and should not be studied as a static phenomenon. Antonsich (2012) similarly states that it is not the identity but the process of identification that should be studied. Identification can be understood as “a process that accounts for the way individuals develop the feeling of belonging to a group” (Duchesne, 2008, p. 403). One limitation of this explanation is that the authors do not explain how to measure the process.

Understanding of identities depends on individuals and how they make sense of the context in their home countries (Brigevich, 2009; Duchesne, 2008). This suggests that identities do not naturally develop outside of any influences. When looking at one territorial level, the others need to be taken into consideration as well (Jelen, 2011). It then depends on how the remaining identities are portrayed through lenses of the most dominant one, usually the national identity. It is therefore important to note that the process of identification is not constant and does not happen in a vacuum.

Having in mind Duchesne’s (2008) concept of identification with a territory, which she defines as an individual process of development of feelings of belonging; and building on the definition of identity Brigevich (2011, 2012) suggests in her research, identity is conceptualized for the purposes of this project as:

...a form of collective identity, type of attachment and feeling of belonging to a certain territory, which is linked to political and administrative authorities.

Table 1 below presents levels of attachment to territorial areas adapted from the general definition of identity.

Table 1: Levels of Territorial Identity

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| National identity | attachment and feeling of belonging to a national group dispersed in the national territory and embedded in the national administration |
| Regional identity | attachment and feeling of belonging to a regional community embedded within an area of regional political and administrative activity |
| European identity | surpasses the borders in feeling of attachment to an imagined community of Europeans who share the common space of the European Union and are embedded within the EU administration |

Table 1 shows three levels of territorial identities. Some researchers (Brigevich, 2010; Moreno, 2006; Vlachová & Řeháková, 2004) use local identity as a fourth level. Utilizing local level in the current thesis would create difficulties since its political community does not directly relate to both national and European administrative levels, and therefore does not fit both Duchesne's (2008) political science conceptualization and the process of regionalization.

2.2 National Identity

In 1977, Inglehart published his *Silent Revolution*, a time-series study of changing political values in Western democratic countries. Inglehart (1977) discusses the challenges of globalization together with modernization, which are also theorized to diminish the role of identities for individuals (Antonsich, 2012; Inglehart, 1977). Nevertheless, many writers have challenged Inglehart's claim on the grounds of missing evidence for that. In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature which confirms a consistent trend of strong national identities, rather than its decline (Antonsich, 2009; Brigevich, 2012; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Duchesne, 2008; Schrijver, 2004). What is more, in their research Hooghe and Marks (2005a) also found identification with a nation as the strongest and dominant attachment of the territorial identities.

National symbols reinforce the strength of attachment through socialization processes in education, upbringing and the media (Brožský, 2004; Dekker et al, 2003; Risse, 2010). In the post-war Europe, national identification was reinforced by the presence of conflict, which was identified as one of the strongest predictors of national identity (Fitjar, 2010; Marks, 1999).

Without the threat of immediate conflict, national identity has become more democratically negotiated through its benefits (Duchesne, 2008). Political empowerment within the territory such as the eligibility to vote, participate in referendums, but also basic things, such as personal liberties and freedoms provide further affirmative level to identification and that might also be the reason, why national identity is the strongest (Ibid, 2008).

In his analysis, Antonsich (2009) studied the strength of national identity through measurements of national attachment and national pride. His results show increasing trend in national sentiment across France, Italy and England. Dekker and colleagues (2003) also use national pride as a part of their established hierarchy for attachment to the nation, which starts as a scale of an individual having basic neutral affection to the state to an individual with nationalist feelings at the extreme end. Additionally, their research recognizes five cumulative levels of attachment (national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism). Derived from Antonsich's and Dekker's basic premise that national identity is based on emotions, the first hypothesis that this thesis will test is:

H1: The stronger the feelings of pride of the citizens towards the nation, the stronger their attachment to national identity.

In recent studies, national emotions and attitudes have been connected with multiculturalism (Antonsich, 2009). With increased mobility and virtually no borders, people

can profit from free movement. The European integration is said to set in motion influx of other country nationals from other EU member states and outside (Ibid, 2009). This may increase sensitivity of one's national identity and customs, especially when confronted with cultures different from one's own. In addition, minority groups may be blamed for various problems, which strengthen the majoritarian national identity of "us" against the external factor or "them". In other words, juxtaposition against others is also part of establishing the identity (Gerhartová, 2008; Duchesne, 2008; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). In this sense, the second hypothesis is:

H2: Antagonism towards other country nationals or national minorities is likely to reinforce national identity.

Apart from identities being based on how we define ourselves and how we relate to the 'other' groups, our national identity is challenged from the bottom – by the regions, and from the top – by the EU (Grüber, 2002). With traditional regionalism scholars focused mainly on the supra-national level, continents (Keating et al. 2003; Paasi, 2009; Riedel, 2005). However, in the post Second World War era, the emergence of the European Community and the process of European integration gave rise to new territorial arrangements, which ensured European peace and reemphasized the meaning of regions as sub-state units (Brusis, 2002; Keating et al., 2003). The New Regionalism, as this school of thought has become to be known, accentuates the mid-level of government in connection to regional administration and policy development (Keating et al., 2003).

2.3 Regional Identity

With the enlargement of the European Union to the current 27 states, most discussion centered around creating a sense of ‘Europeanness’ or common European identity (Risse, 2010). The political elite, media discourse and, to various extents, the nation states have promoted the European identity as a form of legitimization of EU policies on domestic level (Karolewski, 2011). Both regionalism and Europeanization may represent two seemingly contradictory flows aiming at establishing identities (Jones & Keating, 1995). The former focuses on economic distinctiveness whereas the latter on ideological legitimization of common administration.

In the past forty years there has been rapid advancement in empowerment of the regions through European integration and common economic policies. What previous research shows is that unlike national identity, regional identity is more complex and influenced by various factors. Some studies look at the importance of cultural and historical characteristics of the regions (Brigevich, 2011, 2012; Paasi, 2003); others examine the formal aspects of the regions in relation to the state they are situated in (Fitjar, 2010; Grüber, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). Another field of research investigates the dynamics of regional political parties and their influence on identities (Schrijver, 2004). There is also a large number of studies dedicated to linguistic variety in the regions (Ager, 1999). Therefore, it is hard to generalize what the main trends in regional research are and pinpoint the important influences in respect to regional identity.

One explanation for the growth of regional identity comes from Europe’s modern history whereby plenty of nations looked for self-determination based on their historical territories or linguistic specificity (Brodský, 2004). From the dissolution of Austria-Hungary Empire to the breakup of Czechoslovakia, tendency of nations to “emerge from peripheral

areas, forming ever smaller “de facto states” can be observed (Jelen, 2011, p. 381). And without an imminent presence of a conflict threatening the borders, the pressure from the center to the peripheral locations decreases, which enables the regional and local communities to look into their historical territories for own self-determination (Ibid, 2011).

With progressing integration of European countries, ‘regional nationalities’ or sometimes called ‘minority nationals’ saw an opportunity for their autonomy claims (Grüber, 2002). In response, regional devolution in Western Europe took place during the 1970s in Italy and Spain, during the 1980s in France and Belgium, and in 1990s in the United Kingdom (Keating & Wilson, 2009).

Although some scholars argue that oftentimes the regional reality is completely different than what policy makers tend to claim (Roca & Oliviera-Roca, 2007), translating regional identities into concrete policy measures remains the backbone of EU cohesion policy. The idea is to strengthen regional identity through increasing economic performance or reinforcing cultural policies which distinguish the unique character of the region (Paasi, 2009; Roca and Oliviera-Roca, 2007). Structural Funds and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) were established to facilitate regional development. However, member states had to make administrative adjustments in order to become eligible for such funding (Hebburn, 2008).

Following the economic goals, the European Commission utilizes ‘statistical’ units for the regions – NUTS or *Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques*, which determine the amount of funds received by the respective region based on its population and level of GDP in comparison with the European average (Brusis, 2002; Eurostat, 2011; Paasi, 2009). Both old and new EU member states have altered their territorial arrangements in order to fit into the NUTS clusters. NUTS units are often connected with delegation of power and in

result rising importance of the regions. Arguably, by providing such structures the EU aims at helping the regions to create a distinctive profile, which in turn strengthens the regional identity.

Adoption of Maastricht Treaty in 1992 further enhanced the importance of the regions through a principle of subsidiarity, which proposes that decision-making should be done at the level closest to the citizens of EU (Grüber, 2002; Hepburn, 2008, Keating, 2008). Thus both the Structural Funds and the establishment of new territorial units encouraged the creation of new administrative units of regional government so that the funds can be coordinated and the development policies harmonized (Ferry, 2003; Hepburn, 2008, Keating, 2008). This process has been gradually attained in Western Europe; however with the Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 the Commission has instead recommended centralized territorial reform and a ‘controlled’ creation of new regions in the candidate countries (Brusis, 2002; Keating, 2008; Moore, 2008).

In this research project, the main distinction among the countries is based in their recent history in relation to the European Union. Furthermore, regional identities are investigated through two other main categories – socio-historical and demographics.

2.3.1 Socio-Historical Perspective

Since EU serves as a political-economy factor, regions in countries with longer membership are expected to be different from regions with relatively short ones. It is sometimes the case that new regions in new member countries have been created on ad-hoc basis with political-economic incentive such as in countries of Central Eastern Europe (Paasi, 2009). Political ideologies do not create identification with the region instantly due to its novelty and because identities are tied to their territories through history and culture (Kaplan & Herb, 2011; Paasi, 2009). Thus the third hypothesis to be tested is:

H3: Citizens who live in regions of old EU-member countries will show stronger regional attachment than people who live in newly constituted regions of new member states.

A considerable amount of research has been dedicated to socio-historical background of regions (Fitjar, 2010; Grüber, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). This field primarily studies development of the regions, their struggle for self-determination, and how regional languages support autonomy claims.

Territories do not always copy the borders of states or nations, for instance Basque Country in Spain and Basque province in France both claim the same culture, history and language, yet belong to two different states (Ibid, 2011). When considering the level of autonomy in the regions, we need to ask: what constitutes a region in contemporary Europe? Is it the population as the NUTS units suggest, and how big should it be? Grüber (2002) in his work concludes that regions are defined by their relations to the central state, namely to what degree the central state delegates power to the sub-state level of governance. Furthermore, autonomy arguably increases isolation from direct scrutiny of the nation state and emphasizes the regional context (Fitjar, 2010) Deriving from that, the fourth hypothesis claims that:

H4: Citizens who live in more decentralized regions from the national administration will show stronger regional identities than people who live in centralized regions.

A common denominator such as language spoken only among regional in-group members makes the group further exclusive and distinctive from the national identity (Fitjar, 2010). Furthermore, regional language oftentimes serves as a cultural and linguistic distinction in support of autonomy claims (Ibid, 2010; Keating, 1999). However, this effect only applies to a regional language different from the official state language. This is because multilingualism, speaking languages that are official languages of other countries, would suggest openness to other groups and thus encourage more inclusive identity (Risse, 2010). Whereas in case of an

indigenous language such as Basque or Catalan, development of community of the “other speakers” increases the likelihood of in-group formation which is detached from the national language (in Spain the Catalan) and therefore develops weaker attachment to the nation. As a result, the fifth hypothesis claims:

H5: If an individual speaks a regional language, he or she is more likely to develop strong attachment to the region where the language is spoken.

2.3.2 Demographic Perspective

Demographic field of research which also includes focus on regional identities often compares distribution of the population from small towns to cosmopolitan capitals and their mutual distance. The research of Risse (2010) suggests that coming from a small community enhances the psychological presence and supports formation of strong identity bonds towards the region, the community is part of, rather than where there is a large anonymous community without the psychological presence. The more proximate and familiar the area is, the closer ties encouraged, as opposed to cosmopolitan cities that are largely anonymous and less integrated into identity communities (Antonsich, 2009).

Furthermore, citizens of smaller communities might become protective of their small bands and thus exclusive in their territorial identity, seeing other administrative levels as threatening the sovereignty of the community (Brigevich, 2012; Dekker et al., 2003; Fitjar, 2010). Hypothesis six, therefore, is:

H6: Citizens living in locations with smaller population will show stronger regional attachment than people living in localities with dense population.

The community size cannot be separated from the location of the region. Fitjar (2010), who found the location of a region a strong determinant of regional identity (also Deutsch,

1966), adopts a division among the center and periphery regions, which is integrated in hypothesis seven:

H7: The further citizens live from the capital the stronger their regional identity is.

This is because the capital is most frequently the administrative center of the country, it also includes national symbols and important historical sights, thus leaves little or no space for identification with any level but national. Therefore this explains that national identity remains largely uncontested in the capital and surrounding areas (Keating, 1999). Additionally, capital city tends to be cosmopolitan and larger in size, inviting large anonymous groups, whereas peripheral cities are more proximal with small communities.

How do regions relate to the state when the state is the main actor defining the regions? And how do the states and regions contribute to development of a common European identity despite their varied character?

2.4 European Identity

Previous studies compared national and European identities (Duchesne, 2008; Jelen, 2011; Kaplan & Herb, 2011) but many researchers focus only on small areas of the national and regional levels (Fitjar, 2010; Flynn, 2001). Those that look at all levels either expect the European identity to exceed the national and regional ones for the sake of European integration (Marks, 1999), or see the European identity as a threat to either national or regional identities (Brigevich, 2012; Carey, 2002).

Out of all three territorial levels, European identity is certainly the most abstract and therefore difficult to identify with (Anderson, 1991). European identity cannot be easily connected with a 'real space' to evoke feelings of belonging and establish loyalty, since the

space is in fact occupied already by regions and nation states (Risse, 2010, p. 23). Therefore, Risse (2010) criticizes this fact as the main obstacle for creating common European identity.

Often European identity is treated through the lens of national identity because there really is not a clear framework for the process of identification with Europe (Duchesne, 2008). Naturally, by comparison Europe has not been reinforced through a war conflict which aided many nations in their self-determination; neither can Europe build on common cultural and linguistic history (Antonsich, 2012; Marks, 1999). Antonsich (2012, p.493) even claims that “Europe should not (and could not) become both nation and a state.”

Risse (2010) confronts this view: first, with justification that Europe does not have to have one common language, since many speak other languages that increase interaction with other Europeans and thus make the European space more ‘real’. Second, the European public sphere of communication may be created through national media networks through discussing common issues of all Europeans such as the environment, economy or security. In addition, in his view Europe has more than a shared history - it has common principles which developed for hundreds of years such as democracy, human rights, market economy, cultural diversity, and welfare state (Ibid, 2010).

Nevertheless, European identity still stands out from all identity configurations because it has been artificially encouraged, as Risse (2010) claims. Creation of common symbols or so called identity markers such as the European flag, anthem, Euro currency, and Euro passports present a few examples of such identity markers. Apart from concrete projects to enhance European identity, Hooghe & Marks propose that identities can also develop as a by-product of the European integration. Their reasoning is derived from Karl Deutsch’s (1996) study of nationalism, which suggests that common interest can cultivate common identity.

Overall, identification with Europe is a relatively novel process, for some even “embryonic” (Weigl, 2010). Also, it does not fulfill the requirements of national identity such as stable borders, common language and neither was European identity reinforced through war or conflict (Fitjar, 2010; Risse, 2010). Thus treating European identity as a “would-be-nationality” does not provide any improvements for understanding the concept. Nevertheless, if European identity is conceptualized in terms of the empowerment it provides to the polity as well as whether individuals are consciously choosing to be part of such community, it comes somewhat closer to what European identity is (Duchesne, 2008).

Research on European identities maintains satisfaction with a regime’s democratic performance or views on the EU membership as good indicators of attachment to Europe (Fitjar, 2010; Rohrschneider, 2002). When national regime underperforms citizens’ expectations such as is connected to corruption and other non-democratic practices, the individuals are likely to entrust the higher level of governance such as the European Union. In reverse, when one is satisfied with the high standards of democracy in his or her country one is at the same time compelled to see more flaws in the EU governance and thus in effect develop weaker relationship (Rohrschneider, 2002). It follows then that views of domestic situation may influence the attachment to EU (Anderson, 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a), and the eighth hypothesis will test exactly that:

H8: With citizens’ lower evaluation of the democratic system in the home country, the attachment to European level is likely to increase.

The sense of what being a European means is most frequently established at the domestic level. Hooghe and Marks (2005b) show that pro-European and Euro-skeptic views are presented through elite discourse. Furthermore, Llamazares and Gramacho (2007) concluded that party cues, political preference of the voters, influence the opinion on European Union in

Spain. Brigevich (2012) utilized party cues for establishing the strength of attachment of selected Spanish regions to the EU, with the assumption of a positive relation. The ninth hypothesis relates to political cues at the European level:

H9: The more positive opinion on European Union the citizens hold, the greater his/her identification with Europe.

2.5 National, Regional, and European – Multiple Identities

The majority of research to date treats European identity as secondary in respect to the national and regional ones (Hooghe & Marks, 2005b; Risse, 2010). If this logic is accepted and European identity is conceptualized as a secondary construct, it would imply that other levels may have an impact on the European identity.

Risse (2010) has termed the process as Europeanization of identities. In his seminal work, he maintains that European identity is not superior to the national one as well as it is not likely to substitute it. Therefore, he suggests that European identity should not be conceptualized as exclusive, since it only modifies existing patterns and builds an extra layer of identification. Previous research suggests that there is a positive relationship among all territorial levels called multiple or nested identities (Brigevich, 2011; Carey, 2002; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Risse, 2010). In countries with strong attachment to the region, the EU is likely to be perceived as a facilitator of power (Fitjar, 2010). Thus, hypothesis 10a tests the connection between regional identity and European identity:

H10a: Strong regional identity is likely to positively influence the attachment to European identity.

Nonetheless, findings of Carey (2002) and McLaren (2006) present a contrasting view that territorial identities are mutually exclusive especially when one level endangers the

sovereignty of the other. In this sense, delegation of power from states to EU may be commonly seen as a threat or limitation for the nation state (Carey, 2002). Therefore, European identity can indeed be seen in a reverse relationship to the national one, despite the positive relationship with regional identity as hypothesized above. Hypothesis 10b, therefore, is:

H10b: Strong attachment to Europe is likely to decrease attachment to the national identity.

Several attempts have been also made to show that European identity will eventually supersede lower level attachments. Duchsene (2008) refers to theories of individualism, which proposes that if the society becomes more individualistic, it will be easier to abandon national identity and cling more to Europe. In addition, multiculturalism should also increase this trend (Kaplan & Herb, 2011). Inglehart (1977) also predicted decrease in identification with the nation. In his study he suggests that such change will occur firstly with the most educated in the society and last for the least educated.

The above mentioned post-modernist theory of Inglehart, Duchsene and theory of multiculturalism of Kaplan and Herb remain heavily contested with increasing number of findings suggesting a rather opposite trend, however they still present an ultimate view in the field of identity research and should not be left unmentioned.

3 Methods

This research design is a secondary analysis of quantitative data from an *International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on National Identity II*¹. The survey has been conducted during 2002. The main challenge of using secondary data is always the fact that the original research might not be suitable for measuring the required variables (Babbie, 2010). However, due to large availability of secondary data in publicly accessible databases, it becomes easier to find datasets that fit the research question.

With large-scale multinational studies, the comparability might become an issue (Uher, 2000). The ISSP survey has adopted strict rules which ensure comparability among countries. Still, the main issue with the ISSP project is that it uses two techniques for collecting data: a self-administered questionnaire and face-to-face interviews (Ibid, 2000). Despite asking the same questions, it is problematic especially when sensitive questions are being asked. In the case of interviews, the respondents are more inclined to give socially desirable answers than when they fill the questionnaires themselves (Howitt & Cramer, 2008). For this reason, data collected through both research methods were compared to discover any systemic bias. However, no bias comparing the two data collecting methods was discovered.

The main strength of quantitative analysis is that it enables study of a representative number of respondents; although on its weak side it might strip out of the context. Furthermore, it may be arguable whether a questionnaire is the right approach to measure a given variable – such as identity in the present paper (Babbie, 2010; Fitjar, 2010). However, the survey technique is roughly the third most utilized research method in social sciences, which makes it widely popular and relevant for scientific research (Smith, 2008). Traditionally, vast amount of literature on identities works with predominantly secondary

¹ Dataset obtained from Geisis, Leibnitz Institute for Social Sciences

quantitative data (for instance Brigevich, 2011, 2012; Fitjar, 2010; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 2005b; Moreno, 2006; Risse, 2010); only few research designs rely on primary data (Antonsich, 2009; Dekker et al, 2003).

3.1 Case selection

To answer the research question these territorial levels are considered: regional, national, and European. Although attachment to various territorial units is often part of national studies, most of them do not include all levels or are not representative. Question 19b of ISSP also known as Moreno Question (see the actual phrasing in Table 12 in the Appendices), which is key to classification of sociological identities, has been included in only 8 countries, out of which only six are situated in Europe. Excluding Switzerland as non-EU member, the selection of countries for this analysis has become limited by its data availability; it still however presents a variety of countries in terms of characteristics, historical background, and administrative governance. The final selection of countries includes *the Czech Republic, France, Poland, Slovakia, and Spain*. Out of these, France and Spain, (although Spain joined in 1986) represent the original or “old” members of the European Economic Community, a predecessor of the EU. The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia represent countries of a so-called Eastern enlargement or “new” EU members, joining the EU in 2004.

It may seem odd to look at European identities of countries that joined the EU in 2004 when the data for the ISSP was collected only in 2002. There are two arguments which compensate for that fact: First, Switzerland as a non-EU country shows that one can develop a relationship to a continent of his residence, further intensified when the continent becomes represented in a trans-national organization (Risse, 2010). Thus, the patriotism towards Europe as a continent is in fact a deep rooted process on which the founders of Europeanization based EU integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2005b; Risse, 2010). Second, by the

time of data collection the above mentioned countries were already far advanced in the accession process which reflected especially on administrative changes of the regions as early as in 2000 (Brusis, 2002). Furthermore, the elite political discourse had been saturated with promotion of the European membership due to public referendum on whether to join or not, which took place in each country prior to the actual enlargement of the EU (Risse, 2010). Thus, arguably even the non-member countries have been exposed to EU discourse and intensified promotion of EU identity markers such as the flag, the ideology, possibility of common currency and others, which together have provided space for identity building and reconsideration of existing identities.

3.1.1 The Old EU Members

France was one of the founding countries of the European Communities. Arguably, France took this opportunity to its advantage and together with Germany now serves as one of the most important states in the EU (Risse, 2010). The history of the French territory is closely connected to its republican history, which first employed a unified school system, suppressed regional languages and insisted on purely French presentation of historical events (Baycroft, 2012). As a result, the French state has traditionally been a very centrist state, turning a blind eye on the provinces and their demands of recognition (Loughlin, 2008). Long lasting tradition of Jacobin state has always been suspicious of regionalists as they were opponents of the Revolution (Keating et al, 2003).

It was not until 1982 that the French government passed a set of decentralization laws, however, not as a result of negotiation with the regions but out of economic necessity (Balme, 1995). The centrally planned economic model for the regions created differences among the regions, with the majority of funding concentrated in the capital (Ibid, 1995). Although the

old system of departments and communes was left untouched, newly established regions gained democratic legitimacy through elections (Ibid, 1995).

Any attempts to compare French decentralization to other states such as Spain or Belgium would inevitably conclude that France has until the present day remained unitary and that regions serve as “peripher[ies] controlled and incorporated to the center” (Keating et al, 2003, p. 107). However, in the specific French case, the last thirty years brought by far the most extensive transition of power to the regions in the modern history of the republic (Balme, 1995). This has been notable in the most culturally distinct regions of Brittany, Corse or Alsace, whose identity claims based on cultural distinctiveness were unheard by the traditional Jacobin state. Nowadays, regional languages and history, which differs from the French national one, has found its place in schools and has been further emphasized through cultural projects (Keating et al, 2003). It would be then expected that regional identity is stronger in these regions than in other French regions.

Although decentralization gave rise to autonomous groups and regional parties, their “assertiveness remains limited” (Balme, 1999, p. 175). The combination of the old system of prefects and regional MPs created a new phenomenon of accumulating public positions, and its legitimacy remains undermined and messy (Ibid, 1999). With regional political representation the level of regional identity should also be reinforced.

Nonetheless, the regions benefited from their direct links to the European Union, especially for cultural and linguistic projects supporting their cultural heritage and identity, thus no longer remaining suppressed by the central state. Finally, with the aid of Structural Funds, some regions advanced economically, which gave them an incentive for regional identification enhanced through the pride of their achievement.

Spain, underwent a gradual process of decentralization, though in a completely different context. After the rejection of Spain's application to European Community for being undemocratic, the Spanish took a great pride in finally becoming members in 1986 (Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001). Spain as a colonial power has always nurtured more inclusive approach and equality in all their colonial territories (Fradera, 2012). Rise of regionalist distinctiveness began after Spain lost its colonies in Latin America; however any feelings of regionalism were suppressed early on by the authoritarian regime of Franco (Flynn, 2012). Return to democracy and being accepted in the European Communities carried strong symbolism in Spain, and the Spanish still remain closely attached to Europe as one of the most pro-European nations (Risse, 2010). Therefore, as the findings of Brigevich (2012) show, Spanish nationals should manifest greater attachment to Europe as well as to other territorial levels.

The relation to the EU and the strength of regional attachment make Spain an interesting case for analysis (Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001). Furthermore, the character of Spanish constitutional arrangement classifies it somewhere between federation and unitary state (Morata, 1995). Even the constitution in a unique sense recognizes the Spanish nation including "its nationalities and regions and the common lines that bind them together" (as cited in Flynn, 2001, p. 710). And thus the constitution recognizes all levels of governance that are in fact heavily historically interconnected but at the same time independent in a lot of administrative respects.

The process of negotiating autonomy of the regions was very diverse; Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia, who gained autonomy in a "fast track" through referendums being the most advanced (Keating & Wilson, 2009). Indeed, they are the most distinct regions with multiple cultural backgrounds. In addition, up to 40% of the Spanish population speaks one of the three regional languages (Morata, 1995). The rest of Spanish 'autonomous

communities' is at various levels on the track to autonomy, resulting in diverse competences and not a single system. This in effect encourages bilateral relationships between the state and the regions and in essence aids the state in holding on to power.

One possible consequence of the individual relations of the regions to the Spanish state may be that regional attachment increased since the establishment of regional governments in 1978 and factual beginning of regional governance. However national identities have not decreased at the same time, which would suggest they simply coexist (Keating et al, 2003; Marks, 1999). Thus although states can be challenged by autonomy claims from some territories, their position has not been factually threatened.

Despite the Basque separatist terrorist organization ETA and the period in which it demanded full autonomy through the use of violence, most Spanish regions prefer being a self-governing unit within a Spanish state, cooperating with other regions and having direct links to Brussels (Hepburn, 2008). This is not only in case of poor regions but also in case of Catalonia, the most prosperous region (Keating et al, 2003). Overall, Spain is a vast country of many differences, which still affect its standing both within Spain and Europe (Ibid, 2003). The regional variety is being mixed with the common unifying factor of being Spanish and the perception of Europe as a partner.

3.1.2 The New EU Members

The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia all entered the European Union in 2004, not long after relatively peaceful overturn of communist regimes in 1989 and 1990 (Brusis, 2002). The countries faced many similar challenges of rebuilding their own state with democratic institutions, employing market based economy and the rule of law, and dealing with the communist past (Ibid, 2002).

After the revolution, Poland has remained almost 90% ethnically Polish, there were no strong regional or territorial claims. In addition, years of communist rule has fragmented the country into territorial entities much smaller than regions as proposed by EU NUTS system (Ferry, 2003). Therefore, the country had to apply vast territorial changes, which not always reflected historical claims of some regions (Ibid, 2003).

Poland under the strong lead of Solidarity, a former dissident group, aimed at establishing itself as a modern, open, democratizing country; there were two main influences coming from Catholicism that were both confirming and contradicting this image. First, the people's Catholicism, with origins in folk culture is strongly connected to national identity and portrays the Poles as protectionist and isolationist and hence different from others; to an extent this means not only different from the neighbors but other Europeans as well. And second, open Catholicism, which is more liberal in the Vatican tradition and open to everyone offering a dialogue (Krzeminski, 2001).

The Czechs and Slovaks, besides the so called Velvet Revolution dealt with another velvet issue, their velvet divorce, the dissolution of the federation of two linguistically similar nations that have shared one state for over 60 years (Brodský, 2004; Vlachová & Řeháková, 2004; Weigl, 2010). The federation of Czech and Slovak states was broken due to disputes on elite level despite a popular support of the majority of population in both countries for Czechoslovakia to remain federation (Vlachová & Řeháková, 2003).

During the years when Czechs and Slovaks shared their state, their differences were being downplayed and similarities highlighted; this though changed in the years following the break-up (Gerhartová, 2008). Both Czech and Slovak identities have been defined by the other – or rather what they are not. The Czechs turned their focus to the Western neighbors

and the Slovaks had to deal with self-determination alone for the first time in their own state (Ibid, 2008).

In the Czech Republic, there were two trends; first, one of pro-European support by the President Václav Havel and second, opposing Euro-skeptic flow. Despite these two contradictory flows, the Czech Republic managed to accomplish relatively smooth transition to democracy and integrate into NATO and later on in the EU (Brodský, 2004; Gerhartová, 2008). Whereas in Slovakia, any Euro-skeptic views suddenly became anti-nationalistic, since an EU membership of an independent Slovakia meant a separation from the Czechoslovakian past. Thus, pro-Europeanism became the default view whereas opposing views were judged as stereotypical nostalgia for the former federation, which according to the media rhetoric was unfair to Slovakia (Bodnár, 1988; Gyárfášová, 2001). The national question has always been first in Slovakia. The inclusion in Europe has shaped Slovak identity to the extent that it created sort of a “consensus without discussion”, unconditional support by the elite and people of the EU membership (Gyárfášová, 2001, p.51).

The above mentioned countries have been classified as old and new EU members, because this feature is amongst all their major political-historical difference. The communist past of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia is symptomatic for countries in Central Eastern Europe. It may be argued that Spain also had to deal with authoritarian past but it became democratic much earlier, which was decisive in this logic.

There are differences at the administrative level of the countries as well. Spain stands out as its regions present the most advanced form of autonomy within a state. The rest of the regions remain under the rule of the countries' governments. As new regionalism, theories of sub-state governance, maintains this should have a significant impact on the strength of regional identities in Spain. Regions with strong identities should be able to gain more

political power as opposed to those with only weak regional identities (Fitjar, 2010). Indeed, there has been proliferation of regional parties in France and Spain and less so in the new EU member states (Keating et al, 2003). The new EU-member countries cannot build on such culturally distinct regions, due to series of territorial changes that often resulted in artificially created regions and diminished the role of historical territories, and therefore regional identities cannot be assumed to play the same roles as in Spain and France.

In the new EU-member countries, high levels of national identity and European identity should be anticipated for various reasons: first, reinforcement of national sentiment through self-determination especially in Slovakia and Poland; second, being European became synonymous for modernity and prosperity in post-communist countries (Scherpereel, 2004). Therefore there should be differences in the attachments among the cases.

With the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it will be interesting to observe similarities and differences in identity construction since both countries have their own as well as shared history. In addition, Czechs and Slovaks have in fact dealt with multiple identities throughout the history of Czechoslovakia (Vlachová & Řeháková, 2003). As some authors note, the popular understanding was that people felt as Czech as Czechoslovak, despite the latter being a political construction of nationality, as there is no Czechoslovak nationality (Ibid, 2003). Therefore, Czechs and Slovaks should be more likely to have multiple identities including the European one, for as Marks' (1999) results show; one is more likely to be attached to multiple levels.

In respect to relations to the EU, Slovakia and Poland represent Euro-optimistic countries, while the Czech Republic tends to be situated on the more Euro-skeptic end (Eurobarometer 62 Report, 2005). Thus, the selection of countries should provide representation of both old and new EU member states, both pro-EU and EU-skeptic, and both

autonomous and centralized countries as general variations. Nevertheless, despite analyzing culturally diverse countries of as much variety as possible, this study does not include all 27 EU countries and the findings thus cannot provide for generalizations about the European identity for the entire continent, but only for the countries included.

3.2 Sample

The sample of the respective countries counts over six thousand respondents (Total N = 6 294) with the following numbers of respondents per country: the Czech Republic (N= 1207), France (N=1590), Poland (N=1219), Slovakia (N=1099), and Spain (N=1179). The unit of analysis in this case is the individual respondent and the unit of observation are responses to the ISSP questionnaire.

4 Operationalization, Measurement

4.1 Identity Configurations

Identities can be formed on multiple levels, such as the regional, national and European and they can differ in their strength and combination with other levels (Brigevich, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2005b; Risse, 2010). For the purposes of studying how various territorial levels coexist, each of these individual levels has to be conceptualized in respect to their inclusiveness or exclusiveness.

Derived from studies of Risse (2010) and Brigevich (2011, 2012) seven identity configurations are defined in a Table 2 below. The most recent study of Brigevich (2012) uses eight identity configurations ranging from the local level to nested identity. Nevertheless, her research rather focuses on the character of multiple identities and thus does not include European identity as a separate exclusive category. For this thesis, Brigevich's (2012) original configurations were adapted to reflect all main identity levels studied. Thus, local level was discharged, as it is not the subject of this study, and European level was added creating altogether seven identity configurations.

In order to identify social identity types, question nr. 2 from ISSP survey will be used: '*How close do you feel to your county (2b), to your country (2c) and to your continent (2d)?*'. The strength of attachment to various levels of identities is measured on a 4-point scale ranging from *not close at all* to *very close*. Respondents who feel *very close* or *close* to all levels will be classified as having *nested identity*. Inversely, respondents who feel *not close at all* or *not close* to all territorial levels belong to the unattached category.

Respondents who are *very close* or *close* to their region but not to the country or European levels are coded as *regional* and respondents who feel only *very close* or *close* to

their country have *national identity*. Similarly, respondents that are *close* or *very close* to Europe but no other levels are categorized as holding *European identity*.

Finally, respondents who are *very close* or *close* to both their regions and their country and *not very close* or *not close at all* to Europe, hold *regional-national identity*. Likewise, respondents who answered they felt *very close* or *close* to both country and Europe, with no or low attachment to the regional level, are coded as *national-European identity*. The phrasing of the ISSP question enables us to evaluate the strength of the attachment to individual or multiple levels (Brigevich, 2012).

Table 2: Identity Configurations

| Identity Type | Description |
|----------------------------|--|
| Nested Identity | Multiple identity characterized by attachment to all territorial levels |
| European Identity | Exclusive identity, attachment to Europe with no attachment to other levels |
| National-European Identity | Type of multiple identity with strong attachment to both national and European level |
| National Identity | Exclusive identity; strong attachment towards the nation, with weak or no attachment to other levels |
| Regional-National Identity | Type of multiple identity; attachment to both region and nation |
| Regional Identity | Exclusive identity with attachment towards the region only, weak or no relation to other levels |
| Unattached | Very weak or no feeling of attachment to any level |

Additionally, identity structures can be also assessed in terms of how they fit together (Brigevich, 2012), in terms of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, which broadens the scope of the above classification. Previous studies have based their criteria on a so called ‘Moreno Question’ derived from the research of Moreno et Al. (1998). This question is most frequently used in regional identity research and will be utilized for this study as well. ‘Some people think

of themselves first as [country nationality]. Others may think of themselves first as [region]. Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself? The answers take form of a bipolar scale that compares respondents' attachment from region to the state. The respondents are given five options from feeling only attached to region (*Exclusive Regional Identity*) to feeling attached only to the nation (*Exclusive National Identity*).

Respondents, who answer that *only regional identity* or *country identity only* describe them the best, have the *exclusive* identity. Respondents who are best described as *more regional than country identity, as regional as county identity* and *more country than regional identity* will be coded as having *inclusive* identity (See Brigevich 2011, 2012).

Evaluating identity constructions based on a survey carries one crucial problem – subjectivity (Brigevich, 2011, 2012; Marks, 1999; Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). The strength of the identity inevitably depends on the respondents' understanding of the scale and whether they make significant distinctions between very close and close. However, utilizing Likert scale improves the subjectivity issue from for instance Eurobarometer, which uses a 10-point numeric scale for the strength of attachment, in which the scale can be perceived even more arbitrarily. Also, the Moreno question presents a bipolar option to the respondents in which case it explicitly states the exclusivity of the categories, whereas the question evaluating strength does not enforce a choice between the levels. Therefore, these two questions measure similar categories but Moreno Question explicitly poses a choice between the territorial levels for the respondent. Nonetheless, Moreno Question used in the ISSP survey did not include European level and therefore the results of classification will be compared with the attachment to Europe from the measurements of identities on separate levels. This corresponds with the logic of European identity being a secondary one, as established in the Literature review, and in addition will show whether the exclusiveness of Moreno categories will have an impact on respondents' self-evaluation.

4.2 Identities and their Predictors

In this research, all territorial levels of identities serve as dependent variables. To establish predictors of national identity, Model 1 was conducted, which employs national identity as dependent variable. To measure regional identity and its predictors, Model 2 was developed with regional identity as dependent variable. To increase the reliability of the measures, Model 3 was established, which employs European identity as dependent variable, however also investigates the possibility of regional and national identity having an impact on European identity and thus treats the national and regional identities as likely predictors of European identity. It is expected that the independent variables connected to one level of identity may also influence results on other identity levels.

Independent variables or possible predictors will be described in relation to the hypothesized relationship to territorial levels. Table 11 in the Appendices summarizes all variables operationalized for analysis. Based on previous research two predictors of national identity were theorized. Feelings of pride are part of the hierarchy of national attachment and as such have been used to measure national identity in previous research (Antonsich, 2009; Dekker et al, 2003). Pride serves as an indicator of affectionate relationship one feels to his or her country of origin (Antonsich, 2009). *National pride* is measured by the question '*How proud are you of being [country nationality].*' The responses range from not being proud at all to being very proud on a 4-point scale.

While national pride indicates emotional attitudes, *relation to other nationals or minority groups* shows the strength of national identity based on how one identifies himself in relation to 'others'. In addition, the relation to minorities assesses whether an individual differentiates between the majoritarian society and the minorities since such distinction would imply strong national inclination (Dekker et al, 2003). Reactions to a statement: '*Foreigners*

should not be allowed to buy land in [country].' with disagree strongly to agree strongly options on 5-point Likert scale were used to show influence on the national attachment.

For the purposes of this study a distinction is made between *old-EU member states* and *new EU-members*, as the EU as a political-economic factor is theorized to have an impact on countries and regions with longer membership. A cut off year of 2004, which is the year of Eastern enlargement of the European Union, was selected to mark the distinction between the new and old members. It provides the newly established states with a time frame during which pre-communist settlements were combined with administrative changes undertaken as partial requirement for joining the EU (Brusis, 2002). Countries that entered the European Union from 2004 onwards are regarded as new EU-member states whereas countries that joined previously are considered as old EU-members.

Socio-historical variables were included in measurements of the regional attachment. *Administrative decentralization* describes levels of decentralization from the national government. Each country will be analyzed on a case-study basis and evaluated based on the following criteria of three levels of administrative decentralization: whether the region is part of national administration and therefore *centralized*; whether it is a semi-autonomous unit with some powers *delegated* to the regions; whether the region is indeed an autonomous federal unit with individual representation and thus *devolved* from the national government (Litvack, 2013).

Regional language presents another socio-historical variable. It refers to the fact whether a respondent actively speaks a language that is bound within certain territory – *regional language*. It is measured on the basis of respondents answer to a question: '*Which languages do you speak most often at home?*' which is an open ended question that allows the respondents to list two languages they speak. Regional language is defined as a language

which is tied to a certain territory, spoken by at least half of the population in the territory and is not an official language of another country (Fitjar, 2010). The ISSP Survey recognized several regional languages that apply on territory of the studied countries, these are: Alsacien (FR), Basque (ES/FR), Breton (FR), Catalan (ES), Corse (FR), Gallego (ES), Occitan (FR), Proveni (FR). As the question was open-ended and the respondents could list two languages they speak at home, only the respondents, which mentioned a regional language in one of their listed languages were included in the analysis.

Following variables are demographic variables which assess the “size, density and distribution” in the character of the regions (Merriam & Webster, 2013). *Community size* of the respondents’ residence has been adapted to fit measurements of country specific categories. Since each country measured the community size on different scales, the top categories of larger countries had to be collapsed to create comparable levels of populations. After the correction the lowest unit includes population up to 2000 inhabitants and the most dense population level reaches over 100 000 inhabitants.

Another demographic variable is an assessment of the *distance from the capital*, arguably the center of the country (Fitjar, 2010). The region which includes the capital is the basic unit, the same in case the capital forms a region by itself, both are coded as 1. The next unit is formed by regions that have borders with the capital, coded as 2. The following unit does not have any borders with the capital and is recorded as 3. The rest is scaled up to 5 depending on their geographical distance, how many regions one has to cross from the capital. NUTS 2 statistical units will be used for calculating the distance in France, Poland and Spain and NUTS 3 clusters will be used for the Czech Republic and Slovakia to reflect the perception of what individual countries call ‘regions’. Find a list of all included regions in Table 13 in the Appendices section.

Evaluation of democracy has an impact on perception of democracy on the European level (Karp et al, 2003). The impact is measured by ISSP question: *'How proud are you of [country] in ... the way democracy works?'* with a 4-point response scale ranging from being not proud at all to feeling very proud. It is then expected that with lower evaluation of domestic political situation the likelihood of European identity should increase (Anderson, 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a).

EU membership opinion is a variable which addresses individual views about the European Union. Question: *'If there were a referendum today to decide whether [country] does or does not become/remain a member of the European Union, would you vote in favor or would you vote against?'* was used to reveal political inclination towards being pro-European or rather Euro-skeptic, which is in fact a concrete expression of views EU individuals hold. Both respondents from member and candidate countries were asked relevant variants of this question. All answers to both variants of the question were combined into one variable, which was used for the analysis.

Finally, consistent with previous research, standard socio-economic variables such as *age, and years of education* were included. Education was recorded into number of finished years of education to ensure comparability across different educational systems in studied countries.

4.3 Data Analysis

Data management and analysis was performed using SPSS 19. Variables were selected from the ISSP dataset and their scale was inverted when needed to reflect the effect measured. This was the case for Likert type questions. In the first step, a comparison of studied countries was drawn based on respondents' answers on the strength of attachment to the territorial levels and based on the fit (exclusiveness and inclusiveness) of the territorial levels by the Moreno

Question. Two territorial constructions are contrasted and results are discussed below. In the second step, ordinal logistic regression was carried out using the SPSS 19 program to identify predictors of each identity level. Previously outlined independent variables were used as possible predictors of territorial attachment. Model 1 predicts attachment to the national level; Model 2 estimates the attachment to regional level, and Model 3 to the European level. To determine whether regional and national identities can predict the strength of European attachment, they were included as independent variables for the regression Model 3 (Howitt & Cramer, 2008).

5 Results and Discussion

A multivariate analysis was carried out: first, a comparison of territorial identities across countries and second an ordinal regression analysis. High proportions of Spanish population with European identity, as reported already in previous research (Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Risse, 2010) and strong preconditions for developing regional identity make Spain an interesting case to focus on in detail. Similarly, linguistic multiplicity in France should facilitate different results (Ager, 1999). Therefore, a special section will be dedicated to Spain and France and the most significant regions will be discussed in detail. An in-depth analysis of Czech, Polish and Slovak societies will not be conducted due to their lack of linguistically significant minority nationals and a rather homogenous character of the regions. However, the results from these countries are important especially for their European identity as they represent relatively new-EU member states.

5.1 Overall Distribution of Territorial Identities

Utilizing a question, which asks about the strength of attachment, overall population has been classified in categories of territorial identity. Table 3 presents the configurations. It is apparent from the results that nested identity is the most frequent one; overall 55.7% of respondents hold nested identity and manifest relatively strong attachment to all regional, national and European levels. This supports the assumption that identities tend to be multiple and inclusive in respect to one another.

Regional-national identity forms the second largest category including 22% of respondents from the overall sample. The finding implies that respondents in this category have strong attachment to both regional and national levels but not to the European one. This is consistent with the observation that regional and national identities benefit from the

proximate psychological space (Risse, 2010). Furthermore, as it was hypothesized, it may be difficult to identify with a more abstract identity concept such as Europe, which therefore may be understood as a secondary identity for some (Antonsich, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a).

Table 3: Summary of identities per country

Overall Scores for Territorial Identities

| | TOTAL (%) | TOTAL (N) | CZ (%) | FR (%) | ES (%) | PL (%) | SK (%) |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Nested ID | 55,7 | 3503 | 63,6 | 40,7 | 73,7 | 47,9 | 61 |
| European | 1,4 | 91 | 1,8 | 1,6 | 0,9 | 1,2 | 1,7 |
| National-European | 7,5 | 472 | 5,3 | 11,3 | 1,8 | 13,4 | 4,7 |
| National | 7,0 | 438 | 5,7 | 8,6 | 0,9 | 14,7 | 4,4 |
| Regional-national | 22,0 | 1386 | 18,1 | 31,5 | 16,3 | 19,6 | 23,2 |
| Regional | 4,6 | 292 | 4,9 | 5,6 | 6,3 | 2,2 | 4,2 |
| Unattached | 0,6 | 38 | 0,6 | 0,6 | 0,1 | 1 | 0,7 |
| TOTAL (N) | | 6294 | 1197 | 1543 | 1178 | 1209 | 1093 |

National-European identity presents another type of multiple identity configurations. Although only 7,5 percent of respondents were classified as national-Europeans, members of this category are particularly notable in countries with strong attachments to national level such as Poland or France, who score above average on the national-European identity overall.

Furthermore, as the table shows, exclusive national, regional and European identity that would imply no attachment to other levels score very low, not more than seven percent from the overall sample. In comparison with nested and regional-national identity, this corroborates the idea that an individual is more likely to have multiple identities, when he or she is attached to one level already (Marks, 1999). This further implies that identities might prove more inclusive with the capacity to *nest* into each other rather than otherwise (Brigevich, 2012; Risse, 2010).

National identity remains relatively strong in the former communist countries, the strongest in Poland, which would conform the Catholic tradition of ‘otherization’ towards

others and perception of ‘Polishness’ as something unique (Krzeminski, 2001). National identity remains also high in France, which is in line with previous research (Brigevich, 2011). In addition, it reflects the long tradition of Jacobin or unitary state in France, which still shows to be prevalent despite decentralization of the regions in 1980s (Loughlin, 2008).

It is interesting to note that according to previous expectations both exclusive national identity and exclusive European identity configurations in Spain score only 0.9% of all Spanish respondents. This suggests that Spanish identities are inclusive and that individuals are defined by Spanish nationality at the same time as by their regional identity or their attachment to Europe (Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001). This may however vary per region and will be scrutinized in more detail in the next section.

5.2 Results from Moreno Question

As defined before, Moreno question measures the fit between individual identities. Since it presents more exclusive response options, more strict answers are expected. Similarly to the previous classification, Moreno question was also designed to measure identities. The scores of regional and national level therefore should not differ significantly from the previous measurements. Figure 1 presents summary of recorded responses across countries.

Table 4: Total scores on Moreno Question

Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?

| Response options | TOTAL (N) | TOTAL (%) | CZ (%) | FR (%) | ES (%) | PL (%) | SK (%) |
|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| only regional | 388 | 6% | 20,6 | 1,7 | 2,8 | 4,4 | 3,5 |
| more regional | 451 | 7% | 10,2 | 6,1 | 14,4 | 3,8 | 2,3 |
| as regional as national | 2013 | 33% | 29,7 | 33,6 | 58,8 | 33,9 | 6,1 |
| more national | 977 | 16% | 10,1 | 25 | 11,6 | 15,9 | 13,6 |
| only national | 2132 | 35% | 27,9 | 27,5 | 12,4 | 40,1 | 70,1 |
| other | 186 | 3% | 0,9 | 2,5 | 0 | 1,8 | 1,3 |
| TOTAL (N) | 6147 | 100 | 1172 | 1573 | 1159 | 1144 | 1099 |

Scores from Table 4 above show that regional-national identity is the case for most respondents. This supports finding from previous measurements taken in respect that the European level is not included. Furthermore, it confirms the assumption that multiple identities are usual occurrence.

However, the bipolar dimension of the Moreno Question revealed, that those that may have answered as feeling *close* or *very close* to both the region and the nation when tested through previous question, may have answered differently when presented with Moreno Question. Specifically, the most striking result emerging from the data is the increase in category national only, which implies only strong attachment to the nation. When comparing all the countries in Table 4, we can trace this increase to Slovakia, where the category national only reaches up to 70% where in contrast only 35% of respondents felt national only on average. This number differs from the overall 7% that felt strongly attached to the nation in the previous measurement. However, because Moreno question presents the respondents with a bi-polar type of question, the respondents might feel more compelled to distinguish between the identity levels unlike when they are asked about each of the identities separately.

Exclusive regional identity has approximately remained the same except for the case of the Czech Republic where over 20% of respondents answered they feel *only regional*. Based on a thorough analysis of the responses from individual regions, it was found that the percentage is drawn higher due to respondents from the capital, Prague, who predominantly answered as they feel regional only. While in fact the capital is a city-region, it tends to imply attachment to national identity rather than solely a region and thus as a result of confusion provides skewed results.

Moreno Question also enables to identify the nature of the identities. Below see a Table 5 including the classification of respondents into exclusive and inclusive. The overall

situation shows that identities tend to be rather inclusive than exclusive. Also in case of exclusiveness, national identity is a decisive factor, whereas exclusive regional identity does not occur that often. These findings would confirm previous classifications.

Table 5: Classification of Inclusive/Exclusive Identity based on Scores from Moreno Q.

| <i>Moreno Question: Exclusive/Inclusive Identity</i> | TOTAL (%) | TOTAL (N) |
|--|------------------|------------------|
| Exclusive regional identity | 6 | 388 |
| Inclusive identity | 56 | 3 441 |
| Exclusive national identity | 35 | 2 132 |
| Other | 3 | 186 |
| Total | 100 | 6 147 |

In summary, both Moreno Question that evaluates fit, and previous measurements that focused on strength, should measure the same identities and therefore yield roughly similar results. In contrast with previous research of Brigevich (2012), who looked at Spain, the results do not corroborate each other perfectly. Certain variance was expected since the Moreno question excluded European level. However, the major difference is much stronger exclusive national identity than expected. Therefore, using the Moreno Question and the evaluation of strength interchangeably in research might prove problematic when dealing with multiple countries, unlike for utilization on a single country case study such as the research of Brigevich (2012). On the other hand, major trends of multiple identities were confirmed and in line with previous measurements. In addition, extreme scores were easily clarified.

5.3 Spain – Catalonia, Galicia, Basque Country

Spanish regions or *comunidades autonomicas* present very specific cases. There are 17 autonomous communities in Spain with three at the highest level of autonomy – Catalonia, Galicia and Basque Country (Keating & Wilson, 2009; Morata, 1995). All three regions have claimed autonomy based on historical development and also linguistic tradition of regional

languages. Catalonia, with the capital Barcelona is often termed as a success story and one of the most advanced Spanish regions (Keating et al, 2003). Galicia on the other hand tends to be described as a peripheral region with tradition in clientelism (Ibid, 2003). Basque Country underwent a transformation from violent actions against the Spanish state to a rather peaceful region with a strong identity (Flynn, 2001).

From the identity configurations in Table 6 below, we can observe that Nested identity remains predominant in Catalonia and Basque Country as was the general trend. Exclusive national and European identities present low scores or are even nonexistent in all three regions. However due to low numbers of respondents per region, the classification remains inconclusive.

Table 6: Territorial Identities in Spain

Identity Configurations (%)

| Region | Nested | European | National-European | National | Regional-National | Regional | Unattached | Total (N) |
|----------------|--------|----------|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|------------|-----------|
| Catalonia | 79,7 | 0,5 | 1,6 | 0,5 | 6,4 | 11,2 | 0 | 187 |
| Galicia | 43,7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50,6 | 5,7 | 0 | 87 |
| Basque Country | 71,2 | 0 | 1,5 | 0 | 6,1 | 21,2 | 0 | 66 |
| Spain Overall | 73,7 | 0,9 | 1,8 | 0,9 | 16,3 | 6,3 | 0,1 | 1178 |

As Table 6 above presents, there are some differences among regional identities between the regions. Basque Country shows strong exclusive regional identity above the Spanish average. This is not surprising since Basque's identity has been strongly reinforced in the recent history of Spain and connected to violent acts of the ETA organization (Flynn, 2001). Similarly, higher scores for Catalonia confirm expectations of strong regional identity.

Overall, the scores corroborate previous research on Spain which revealed that the Spanish are capable of multiple identities on all levels (Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Risse, 2010). With the already active ability of possessing multiple identities on regional and

national level, the Spanish took great pride in entering Europe and perceived it as a separation from the Franco's regime (Risse, 2010). Therefore, a significant portion of nested identities exists even in regions where regional identity should be the strongest and exclusive. In the specific case of Galician region as presented in the table above, the attachment to the European level has not been added to the multiple identities of the Galicians to the same extent as in Catalonia or Basque Country. The character of identities citizens of Galicia hold already manifests itself through high scores on regional-national identity, which is also a multiple identity. Nevertheless, in comparison with the other two studied regions in Spain, nested identity scores are significantly lower in Galicia. Thus, only a temporal study can show whether multiple identities of regional-national level can actually transform into a nested identity in the future.

Table 7: Classification based on Scores from Moreno Q.

| <i>Moreno Categories (%)</i> | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|
| Spain | regional only | more regional | as regional as national | more national | only national | Total (N) |
| Catalonia | 1,6 | 31,6 | 44,9 | 20,9 | 1,1 | 187 |
| Galicia | 1,1 | 2,3 | 96,6 | 0 | 0 | 87 |
| Basque Country | 9,4 | 26,6 | 56,3 | 7,8 | 0 | 64 |
| Spain Overall | 2,8 | 14,4 | 58,8 | 11,6 | 12,4 | 1159 |

Table 7 presents classification for the same regions based on the Moreno Question, which includes more explicit categories. In the table above, differences between the regions can be observed. While in Galicia there is a high proportion of inclusive regional-national identity, in Catalonia and Basque Country feeling more regional increased and can compete with the largest regional-national category. Furthermore, Basque Country region shows higher scores for exclusive regional identity, this may refer to specific Basque 'non-Indo-European' culture and their language which does not even belong to the Iberian linguistic family and is related to Gaelic, Celtic language (Flynn, 2001).

Catalonia also scores high on feeling more national, this may be as Keating and colleagues (2003) noted that Catalans happily accept multiple identities. Another possible explanation may be the perception of Catalan as a nationality. Such understanding would then complicate the results and may even increase the numbers as such. Catalonia in fact has all national identity markers such as own flag, anthem, capital, government and also 94% understand the regional language and 68% speak Catalan (Ibid, 2003). Thus, it is very likely that there may have been confusion, although it may as well be a sign of Catalonia's openness and inclusiveness. Further focus on Catalonian perception of what is understood as nationality, whether Spanish or Catalan, is therefore needed.

5.4 France – Brittany, Alsace

France as a relatively centralized country is not very favorable towards regional independence. However, there are historical regions that have always differed from the French unitary state be it due to their characteristic language or own history (Keating et al, 2003). Brittany is one of the most stereotyped French regions for being not French at all. Alsace on the other hand is a border region with strong loyalty to France and the European Union, however influenced by Germanic culture (Collins, 1998). Both Brittany and Alsace are characterized with regional languages spoken in their area; however, they mostly remain cultural pearls under the official French, rather than everyday language.

Table 8: Territorial Identities in France

Identity Configurations (%)

| Region | Nested | European | National-European | National | Regional-National | Regional | Unattached | Total (N) |
|----------------|--------|----------|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|------------|-----------|
| Brittany | 41,9 | 2,2 | 3,2 | 1,1 | 41,9 | 8,6 | 1,1 | 93 |
| Alsace | 45,2 | 2,4 | 9,5 | 2,4 | 28,6 | 9,5 | 2,4 | 42 |
| France overall | 40,7 | 1,6 | 11,4 | 8,7 | 31,4 | 5,6 | 0,6 | 1529 |

Table 8 shows the distribution of identities in the regions. It is apparent that multiple identities are the strongest in both regions. Nested identity copies the overall French average, however in comparison with previous analysis of Spain shows much lower number of nested identities in France. Regional-national identity is particularly strong, which is in line with the previous research that French respondents are very attached to their nation but in some regions can manifest similar attachment to their regions.

Particularly interesting is the fact that exclusive identification with the region is above average in both regions, whereas the attachment to the national level is lower, especially in the case of Brittany. It follows that in the regions multiple identities of nested type or regional-national type are predominant together with a regional type, however exclusive national identity is not very characteristic in both regions. In addition, it is hardly surprising that Alsace also scores high on national-European identity, because its capital Strasbourg is a one of the seats of the European Parliament, which may reinforce the identification with the European level (Collins, 1998).

Table 9: Classification based on Scores from Moreno Q.

| <i>Moreno Categories (%)</i> | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|
| | regional only | more regional | as regional as national | more national | only national | Total (N) |
| France | | | | | | |
| Brittany | 2,1 | 20,2 | 40,4 | 20,2 | 14,9 | 94 |
| Alsace | 0 | 22 | 41,5 | 17,1 | 14,6 | 41 |
| France Overall | 1,7 | 6,1 | 33,6 | 25 | 27,5 | 1573 |

Table 9 presents results of Moreno question, which show strong regional-national attachment. Higher scores on more national and national only categories differ from previous measurements which showed only weak attachment to the national level alone. This is in line with the unitary French state which preached homogenization and strong national identity for years (Balme, 1995). However it confirms, what was already mentioned that Moreno

Question does not measure identities in a similar fashion as the separate evaluation of attachment to each level of identity.

From the data in Table 9 you can also see that more national and national only form larger portions of the overall French population in contrast with the regional only and more regional categories. It confirms strong French identity that includes regional identities rather than making them exclusive such as was the case in Galicia. Overall, there is very low attachment to the regional level only, which seems to be balanced by higher percentage on exclusive national identity – a result of a strong French state.

In brief, primary analysis of five specific regions, which were likely to vary from the average country characteristics, revealed differences as expected. While no significant differences were found between the French regions, in Spain, the region of Galicia proved different from Catalonia and Basque country. The major difference was in lower amount of nested identities in Galicia and higher share of regional-national identities. These differences may be explained for instance by Catalonia's active position in the EU, which increased foreign investments and inter-regional cooperation in Catalonia (Keating et. al, 2003). On the contrary, Galicia has been moved to the periphery of European activity and local businesses suffered from the transition as well as the prevalent clientelistic ties (Keating et al, 2003). This development may have then undermined the attachment to European level for some Galicians and has reinforced their attachment to the region and the state as main pillars. Again the sample for each of the regions remains small and further research with explanatory focus of these differences is necessary.

5.5 Regression Analysis

Ordered logistic regression was used to predict the attachment to different territorial levels. Three models were employed to reflect on three territorial levels: national, regional and European. Results obtained from the statistical analysis are shown in Table 10.

Table 10: The effects of predictor variables on identities

Estimates for models of the predictors of territorial attachments

| Variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | National | Regional | European |
| Sex | -0.086 (.064) | 0.017 (.060) | 0.049 (.311) |
| Age | 0.014 (.002) | 0.010 (.002)*** | 0.003 (.002) |
| Education (yrs.) | -0.002 (.002) | 0.000 (.001) | 0.003 (.001)* |
| Community size | 0.049 (.023)* | -0.043 (.021)* | 0.043 (.022)* |
| National Pride | 1.186 (.052)*** | 0.454 (.046)*** | -0.072 (.050) |
| Foreigners tolerance | -0.154 (.028)*** | -0.132 (.026)*** | 0.096 (.027)*** |
| Regional language | -0.377 (.155)* | 0.239 (.149) | -0.048 (.147) |
| Distance | 0.002 (.030) | 0.150 (.028)*** | -0.074 (.029)** |
| Euro opinion | -0.087 (.085) | -0.125 (.079) | 1.062 (.084) |
| International language | -0.059 (.140) | 0.013 (.132) | 0.213 (.135) |
| Proud demo. work | 0.185 (.044)*** | 0.062 (.041) | 0.115 (.042)** |
| Czech | -0.233 (.112)* | 0.214 (.106) | 0.225 (.109) |
| French | 0.470 (.113)*** | 0.080 (.105) | -0.962 (.110)*** |
| Polish | -0.151 (.110) | -0.932 (.104)*** | -0.077 (.107)** |
| Spanish | -0.279 (.126)* | 0.932 (.119)*** | -0.258 (.122)* |
| Slovak | 0.204 (.112)* | -0.214 (.106) | -0.225 (.109)* |
| Regional attachment | — | — | 0.495 (.051)*** |
| National attachment | — | — | 0.986 (.062)*** |
| N | 4 264 | 4 201 | 4 083 |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.238 | 0.147 | 0.210 |

5.5.1 Discussion of the Models

The first model compares which of the predictors (independent variables) is related to the national identity. It explains 23, 8% of the variance in national identity. From the data in Table 8 we can see that hypothesis 1 can be accepted. Scores on national pride were significant at the $p < 0.0005$ level. This confirms that proudness of being a country national reinforces positively the national identity. Furthermore, scores on the tolerance of other country nationals or minorities corroborates hypothesis 2 again at the $p < 0.0005$ level of significance. The more antagonism one shows towards other country nationals, the more is his national identity reinforced. Thus both hypothesized indicators of national identity are confirmed.

Interestingly, as data in the Table 10 present, there are other variables which predict National identity; regional language and being proud of how democracy works in the country. Regional language is negatively related to national identity at the $p < 0.05$ level of significance. Thus, being able to speak regional language actively lowers the attachment to the National level of identity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, being proud of the country's democracy again tends to reinforce attachment to national level and as such copies the trend of national pride variable at the same level of significance.

Model 2 presents regression results for regional identity. This model captures almost 15% of the variance and as such is somewhat weaker than the previous model. Overall, the model confirms two out of three hypotheses about regional identity. First, the assumption that respondents with origin in low populated areas such as villages and small towns tend to have stronger regional identity, is confirmed. Thus, hypothesis 6 can be accepted. In addition, the community size has an impact on national as well as European identity. In both these cases, the strength of identities increases with the size of community one comes from.

Second, the data presented in Table 10 corroborate the distance hypothesis (H7). As the distance of the region from the capital increases, regional identity tends to be stronger at the $p < 0.0005$ level of significance. Surprisingly, hypothesized effects of regional language proved absent in the regression analysis. Therefore, the regional language hypothesis cannot be confirmed (H5). Although, the results did not show significant results for regional identity, regional language negatively influences the attachment to the national level at the $p < 0.05$. Therefore, although regional language presumably does not increase the regional identity it seems to slightly undermine the national one.

In general, no trend can be observed among the countries whether they are long established democracies or newly formed states. In addition, the level of regional autonomy which differs from other countries specifically in Spain did not influence the results and did not set Spain aside from the other case studies contrary to the expectations. Thus both the third hypothesis, which claims that the length of EU membership increases regional identity, and the fourth one about administrative decentralization were rejected.

Finally, Model 3 shows results of the regression analysis for European identity, which explains 21% of the variance. Although the model of European identity is stronger than the model of regional identity, it only confirms two original hypotheses. What is interesting in this data is that predictors of other territorial identities proved statistically significant in relation to European identity as well.

With respect to the evaluation of the political regime at home, a negative relationship was hypothesized, whereby low evaluation of democracy at home should increase the inclination to European attachment. However, the regression presents an opposite trend at the $p < 0.005$ significance level. Thus, with more positive evaluation of domestic government, the

attachment to European level of identity will probably be stronger. It is inevitable then to reject hypothesis 8 about the regime evaluation.

In terms of public opinion, that is whether one holds pro-European views or tends to be rather Euro-skeptic, the analysis did not show any effects on European identity that would be statistically significant. Although after observation of the data, it can be stated that the relationship would be positive as was hypothesized, it does not surpass the significance level and therefore H9 cannot be confirmed.

Apart from the theorized predictors, more indicators of European identity were revealed by the regression analysis. Evidence was found that European identity is likely to be stronger in places with increased community size ($p < 0.05$). Distance variable confirms similar trend, attachment to European level will be reinforced in central regions and regions closer to the capital ($p < 0.005$). Finally, tolerance of foreigners was found to significantly increase the European identity at the $p < 0.0005$ level. This result further corroborates earlier findings and is at the same time one of the strongest indicators of European identity.

The present findings on European identity seem to be consistent with the logic of Europeanization and globalization. Respondents coming from large capital cities should encounter foreigners more often and take them as a part of community they identify with at the European level. In contrast, when the experience with foreigners is low such as in peripheral locations or small towns, own identity, both national and regional levels is redefined in relation to the foreigners as others and is therefore exclusive such as the findings confirm.

Nevertheless, contrary to the original assumptions, speaking either regional or international language does not manifest any effects on European attachment. This finding

confirms Risse's (2010) theory that identification with Europe can be developed regardless of common language as long as mutual issues are being discussed across countries.

5.5.2 Country Discussion

All case study countries were included in the regression analysis. The results of Model 1 corroborate findings from the country classification in the previous section. French and Slovak nationals are more likely to have strong National attachment than Czechs and Poles. Furthermore, in case of Spanish citizens it is even unlikely that they will develop strong national identity. Such results seem to be consistent with findings of Brigevich (2011, 2012), Diez Medrano & Gutierrez (2001) and Keating et al (2003).

Returning to the findings of Model 2 on regional identity, it is not surprising that Spanish nationals would score on the regional identity above the significant level of $p < 0.0005$. In contrast, Polish nationals seem to be unlikely to develop regional identities.

There are several possible explanations of this result. First, Poland underwent a territorial reform prior to 2000 and its accession to the European Union (Brusis, 2002). Many units which served as regions under the communist regimes were combined to reflect the statistical units created by the EU – the NUTS (Brusis, 2002). Consequently, new regions not always reflected old historical territories and therefore despite its physical proximity did not encourage the inhabitants of those areas to identify with the regions. Arguably, if that was the case, other countries which employed territorial changes and the process of building a new state should show similar results, however that is not the case.

Another possible explanation may be that the emphasis in Poland was more on the National identity after the fall of communism and during the process of establishing new state. This explanation is however not supported by the data in Table 8, which shows no

statistically significant effect on Polish national identity either. A further study with more focus on the differences among the post-communist countries is therefore suggested.

Finally, four out of five studied countries cannot be expected to develop strong attachment to European level. This also accords with previous observation in which exclusive attachment to Europe did not exceed 1.8% (see Table 3 of identity configurations in section 5.1). This is also in accordance with the findings that more than half of the respondents (55.7%) tend to have nested identities, which means a combination of all three levels of identities. Although not statistically significant, the Czech Republic makes an exception from this trend. At this stage of the research it is not clear why specifically Czech nationals should make an exception to the general and, therefore similarly with the case of Poland further research will be needed to determine this.

5.5.3 Do Identities Interact?

As the theoretical part suggests there are many studies that present contradictory views on the interaction of identities. Therefore both national and regional identities were tested as predictors of European identity building on the previously established logic that European identity is a secondary one and that national and regional identity benefit from the proximal space they pose to the citizens.

As can be seen from the data above, the hypothesis 10a that regional identity positively influences the attachment to Europe is confirmed at a strong significance level of $p < 0.0005$. A comparison of the results reveals that national identity increases the European identity almost twice as much as the regional one (also at the $p < 0.0005$ significance level). It is apparent that identities reinforce each other, which is in accordance with Marks (1999). It is quite revealing since it was expected that the regional attachment would strengthen the European identity more, since the EU technically empowers the regions economically and

culturally and encourages a degree of independence from the state (Carey, 2002). In addition, as in hypothesis 10b national identity was theorized to weaken European identity exactly because Europe tends to be seen as the adversary of the state assuming functions that used to belong exclusively to the nation state. Therefore, it is striking that the relation follows the opposite direction and national identity reinforces the European one, which means that hypothesis 10b cannot be accepted.

However, these results should be interpreted with caution as the data did not show any similar trend among the studied countries and therefore the relationship of individual level of identities may vary as was already shown in the preliminary country classification. Furthermore, when looking at the comparison of the countries it is important to bear in mind that each of the models measures the strength of the attachment to the level of territorial identity respectively and not the interaction as was the case of the country classification in the preliminary analysis. More research on this topic which takes these predictor variables (national pride, relations to other country nationals, community size, distance from the capital, and positive evaluation of democracy in the home country) into account will be needed as well as looking for additional predictors that can improve the models.

6 Conclusion

This thesis project has investigated the puzzle of which factors influence territorial identities but also how identities coexist whether they are exclusive or inclusive and if they reinforce or contradict each other. The study was set out to determine predictors for regional, national and European levels of identities and as such contribute to the research on identity construction. Returning to the hypotheses posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to state that national pride, relations to other country nationals, community size, distance from the capital, and positive evaluation of democracy in the home country are predictors of the strength of territorial identities. On the contrary, effects of regional language, state administration, and public opinion on the EU variables were absent in the regression analysis.

One of the most important findings of this study is a confirmation that identity levels reinforce each other: namely the national and the regional increase the likelihood of developing the European identity with the national identity having almost twice as much stronger impact than the regional one. At the same time, one of the more significant findings is that identities tend to be inclusive and nested into each other rather than exclusive as confirmed both by the regression analysis and country comparison of territorial configurations.

Additionally, the relevance of identity research is clearly shown on the findings that more than half of the studied sample holds nested identities and feels strongly attached to all territorial levels. This is good news for future legitimacy of the European Union. Furthermore, although regions are being encouraged to cooperate and new economic, political and institutional spaces have been developed, the states are no less relevant now than before. Therefore European integration and the creation of regional-level governance can be summarized as having a rather positive effect on identities at all levels.

Taken together, there are still differences among European countries in respect to identity constructions. This study has shown however that the distinctions do not copy the lines of the length of EU membership and thus are more related to a country's unique history and the characteristics of individual territories. Since the study focused primarily on the creation of comparative framework among countries, there were major limitations in the scope of exploring country-specific results in some cases questions remained unanswered, therefore future research focusing in depth on those differences is recommended.

Finally, a number of important limitations need to be considered. First, the ISSP will issue a new dataset in 2014, which may reflect the state of identities more accurately. Second, it needs to be established which framework to use for the creation of identity configuration as questions assessing the strength of attachment do not always corroborate results of Moreno Question. The bi-polar response option simply does not measure identities in the same way as a separate evaluation of attachment at each level and authors should consider that. Third, country analysis as well as generalizability of findings outside of the studied cases is limited by the character of the countries. Although country case studies usually present low comparability on the measurement of identities, in-depth focus is necessary to provide sufficient explanations for unexpected results.

This research has proposed many questions in need of further investigation. Considerably more work will need to be done to determine more predictors of identity constructions and to improve the model. However it would be interesting to utilize the identity constructions developed in this thesis for comparison of all European countries as well as for measuring of the development of identities over time.

7 References

- Ager, D.E. (1999). *Identity, Insecurity and Image: France and Language*. UK: Frankfurt Lodge.
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, Ch. J. (1998). When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration. *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 31, 569-601.
- Antonsich, M. (2009). National Identities in the age of globalization: The case of Western Europe. *National Identities*. Vol. 11, Nr.3. 281-299.
- Antonsich, M. (2012). Bringing the Demos back in: People's views on 'EUropean Identity'. *European Societies*.
- Babbie, E. (2010). *The Practice of Social Research*. Belmont: Wadsworth
- Balme, R. (1995). French Regionalization and EU Integration: Territorial Adaptation in a Unitary State. In Jones, B. and Keating, M., *The European Union and the Regions*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Baycroft, T. (2012). National Diversity, Regionalism and Decentralism in France. In Augusteijn, J & Storm, E. *Region and State in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. UK:Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bodnár, J. (1988). Philosophy and Slovak national identity. *In History of philosophical thought in Slovakia*. Bratislava: Veda.
- Brigevich, A. (2011). (Brigevich, 2011) Paper prepared for *European Union Studies Association*, Boston March 3-5.
- Brigevich, A. (2012). Peeling Back the Layers: Territorial Identity and EU Support in Spain. *Regional and Federal Studies*. 205-230.
- Brodský, J. (2004). Czech Identity and Returning to Europe. *Sien Quarterly*. 9-22.

- Brusis, M. (2002). Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Re-creating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institution*. 531-559.
- Carey, S. (2002) 'Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?', *European Union Politic*. Vol. 3, Nr.4. 387–413.
- Collins, L. (1998). The dynamics of regional identity in a frontier region: The case of Alsace. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, Vol. 13, Nr.1, 29-55.
- Dekker, H. & Malová, D. & Hoogendoorn, S. (2003). Nationalism and Its Explanations. *Political Psychology*, Vol. 24, Nr.2, 243-376.
- Demography. (2013). In *Merriam-Webster's Learner's Dictionary*. Retrieved from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/demography>.
- Deutsch, K. W. (1966). *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*. Cambridge, Mass.: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and New York: Wiley, 1953; 2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966.
- Diez Medrano, J. & Gutierrez, P. (2001). Nested identities: national and European identity in Spain. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. vol. 24, nr. 5. 753–778.
- Duchesne, S. (2008). Waiting for a European Identity... Reflections on the Process of Identification with Europe. *Perspectives on European Politics and Sociology*, Vol. 9, Nr.4, 397-410.
- Elias, N. (1991). *The Society of Individuals*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. (Original work published 1987).
- Eurostat. (2011, December 2). *NUTS – Principles and Characteristics*. Retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/principles_characteristics
- Eurobarometer (2005). *Eurobarometer 62*. Oct.-Nov. 2004. Brussels: European Commission.

- Ferry, M. (2003), The EU and Recent Regional Reform in Poland. *Europe-Asia Studies*. Vol. 55, Nr.7. 1097-1116.
- Fitjar, R. D. (2010). Explaining variation in sub-state regional identities in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*. 522-544.
- Flynn, M.K. (2001). Constructed Identities and Iberia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.25, Nr. 5. 703-718.
- Fradera, J.M. (2012). The Empire, the Nation and the Homelands: Nineteenth-Century Spain's National Idea. In Augustejn, J & Storm, E. *Region and State in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. UK:Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gerhartová, M. (2008). The Transformation of Czech and Slovak National Identity and Creation of the 'New' Other. *Central European University*.
- Grüber, K. (2002). Globalization, Regions, Nations and Integration: Central and Western European Perspectives. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol.3, Nr.2, 199-228.
- Gyárfášová, O. (2001). From Defense against the "Others" to the Formulation of its own Interests: The Case of Slovakia. In Drulák, P., *National and European identities in EU enlargement: views from Central and Eastern Europe*. Prague: Institute of International Relations.
- Hepburn, E. (2008). The Rise and Fall of a 'Europe of the Regions'. *Regional & Federal Studies*, Vol.18, Nr.5, 537 – 555.
- Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2005a). Calculation, Community and Cues Public Opinion on European Integration. *European Union Politics*. vol.6, nr. 4. 419–443.
- Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2005b). *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Howitt, D. & Cramer, D. (2008). *Introduction to Statistics in Psychology* *(4th Edition). Essex: Pearson Education Limited.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The silent revolution: changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton University Press.
- International Social Survey Programme: National Identity II. (2003). Gesis – Leibnitz Institute for the Social Sciences. Retrieved from

<http://info1.gesis.org/dbksearch19/SDesc2.asp?no=3910&tab=3&ll=10¬abs=&af=&nf=1&search=&search2=&db=E>.

- Jelen, I. (2011). Forming new national identities: a retrospective. *National Identities, Vol.13, Nr.4*, 379-388.
- Jones, B. and Keating, M. (1995). *The European Union and the Regions*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Kaplan, D. H., & Herb, G. H. (2011). How geography shapes National Identities. *National Identities, Vol.13, Nr.4*, 349-360.
- Karolewski, P.I. (2011). European Identity Making and Identity Transfer. *Europe-Asia Studies. 935-955*.
- Karp, J.A & Banducci, S.A. & Bowler, S. (2003). To know it is to love it? Satisfaction with democracy in the European Union. *Comparative Political Studies. vol. 36 nr. 3*, 271-292.
- Keating, M. (2008). A Quarter Century of the Europe of the Regions. *Regional and Federal Studies, Vol.18, Nr.5*, 629–635.
- Keating, M., Loughlin, J. and Deschouwer, K. (2003). *Culture, Institutions and Economic Development. A study of Eight European Regions*. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Keating, M. & Wilson (2009). Renegotiating the State of Autonomies: Statute Reform and Multi-Level Politics in Spain. *West European Politics, Vol 32, Nr. 3*, 536-558.
- Litvack, J. (2013). What is decentralization? The Online Sourcebook on Decentralization and Local Development. Retrieved from http://www.ciesin.org/decentralization/English/General/Different_forms.html.
- Llamazares, I. & Gramacho, W. (2007). Eurosceptics Among Euroenthusiasts: An Analysis of Southern European Public Opinion. *Acta Politics. Nr.42*, 211–232.
- Loughlin, J. (2008). The slow emergence of the French regions. *Policy & Politics, Vol. 36, Nr. 4*, 559-571.

- Krzeminski, I. (2001). The National Identity and European Consciousness of Poles. In Drulák, P., *National and European identities in EU enlargement: views from Central and Eastern Europe*. Prague: Institute of International Relations.
- Marks, G. (1999). Territorial Identities in the European Union. In J. Anderson, *Regional integration and democracy: expanding on the European experience*. Boston, MA, USA: Roman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Martínez-Herrera, E. (2005). The Effects of Political Decentralisation on Support for Political Communities: A Multivariate, Longitudinal and Cross-sectional Comparison of the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Quebec and Scotland. Doctoral thesis, *European University Institute*.
- McLaren, L. (2006). *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan
- Moore, C. (2008). Beyond Conditionality? Regions from the New EU Member States and their Activities in Brussels. *Comparative European Politics*, Vol.6, Nr.2, 212-234.
- Morata, F. (1995). Spanish Regions in the European Community. In Jones, B. & Keating, M. *The European Union and the Regions*. UK: Clarendon Press.
- Moreno, L., Arriba, A. & Serrano, A. (1998). Multiple identities in decentralized Spain: The case of Catalonia. *Regional & Federal Studies*. 65–88.
- Moreno, L. (2006). Scotland, Catalonia, Europeanization and the ‘Moreno Question’. *Scottish Affairs*, vol. 54, 1-21.
- Paasi, A. (2009). The Resurgence of the ‘Region’ and ‘Regional Identity’: theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe. *Review of International Studies*, 121-146.
- Riedel, R. (2005). Regionalism in the Context of a Political System. In: Tarrosy, Istvan & Rosskogler, Gerald (eds.). *Regional Co-operation as Central European Perspective*. Pecs, Hungary: Molnar Printing House.
- Risse, T. (2010). *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Roca, Z. & Oliviera-Roca, M. N. (2006). Affirmation of territorial identity: A development policy issue. *Land Use Policy*. 434-442.

- Rohrschneider, R. (2002). The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-Wide Government. *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 46, Nr. 2, 463-475.
- Scherpereel, J. A. (2004). Renewing the Socialist Past or Moving toward the European Administrative Space? Inside Czech and Slovak Ministries. *Administration and Society*. Vol. 36, Nr. 5, 553-593.
- Schrijver, F. (2004). Electoral performance of regionalist parties and perspectives on regional identity in France. *Regional & Federal Studies*. Vol.14, Nr.2, 187-210.
- Schrijver, F. (1999). *Regionalism after regionalization: Regional identities, political space and political mobilization in Galicia, Brittany & Wales*. Vossiuspers: University of Amsterdam.
- Smith, E. (2008). *Using secondary data in educational and social research*. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Open University Press.
- Uher, R. (2000). The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). *Schmollers Jahrbuch* 120, Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 663-672.
- Vlachová, K. & Řeháková, B. (2004). Česká národní identita po zániku Československa a před vstupem do Evropské unie. *Sociologický ústav Akademie věd České republiky*.
- Weigl, J. (2010). Evropa a národnostní identita z české perspektivy. *Centrum pro ekonomiku a politiku. International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy*.
- Wilkinson, R. & Pickett, K. (2010) *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*. London: Penguin Books.

8 Appendices

Table 11: Variable Operationalization

| Variable | Description |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| National pride* | Feeling of pride towards the nation; 1= not proud at all, 2= not very proud, 3= somewhat proud =, 4= very proud |
| Relation to other country nationals* | Positioning of individuals in respect to 'others'; 1= disagree strongly, 2= disagree, 3= neither agree or disagree, 4= agree, 5= agree strongly |
| Old – New Regions | Classification of the country EU membership; 1= joined prior to 2004, 2= joined from 2004 onwards |
| Administrative decentralization | Classification of the region in relation to state administration; 1= centralized, part of national administration; 2= delegated, semi-autonomous unit, 3= devolved, autonomous federal unit with individual representation |
| Regional language* | Variable indicating the types whether respondent speaks regional language at home; 0 = no, 1= yes |
| Community size* | Ordinal variable corresponding with the size of the respondent's residence; 1= less than 2 000, 2= 2 000 to 10 000, 3= 10 000 to 50 000, 4= 50 000 to 100 000, 5= more than 100 000 |
| Distance from capital | Assessment of the region's distance from the capital; 1 = the capital/region including the capital, 2 = having borders with the capital, 3= no borders with the capital, 5 = being the most distant from the capital |
| Evaluation of democracy* | Respondent's proudness of democracy in his country; 1= not proud at all, 2= not very proud, 3= somewhat proud, 4= Very proud |
| EU membership opinion* | Evaluating positive or negative opinion of EU; 1=in favor, 2=against |
| Age* | Respondent's age ranging from 15 to 98 |
| Education* | Number of years of respondent's finished education, ordinal variable with 1 = less than 5 years, 2= 6-9 years, 3 = 10-13 years, 4 = 14 and more years of education |
| Nationality* | CZ= Czech, FR= French, PL= Polish, ES=Spain, SK=Slovak |

*Note: these variables have been constructed using responses to *International Social Survey Programme* data 2003.

Table 12: Questions as stated in ISSP 2003

| Variable | ISSP Question | Response Options | Question Nr. |
|---|--|--|--------------|
| Identity constructions | How close do you feel to your county? | Very close, Close, not very close, not close at all, can't choose | 2b |
| | How close do you feel to your country? | Very close, Close, not very close, not close at all, can't choose | 2c |
| | How close do you feel to your continent/Europe? | Very close, Close, not very close, not close at all, can't choose | 2d |
| Moreno Question | Some people think of themselves first as [country nationality]. Others may think of themselves first as [region]. Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself? | Only [regional identity]. More [regional identity] than [country nationality]. As [regional identity] as [country nationality]. More [country nationality] than [regional identity]. Only [country nationality]. | 19b |
| National Pride | How proud are you of being [country nationality]. | Very proud, Somewhat proud, Not very proud, Not Proud at all | 16 |
| Relation to minorities | Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [country]. | Disagree strongly, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, agree strongly | 6 |
| Regional language | What languages do you speak most often at home? | Regional language =1, other =0 | 17 |
| Community size | Where do you live? | 1= village with less than 2 000, 2= small town, 2 000 to 10 000, 3= town, 10 000 to 50 000, 4= city. 50 000 to 100 000, 5= big city, more than 100 000 | - |
| Evaluation of democracy in home country | How proud are you of [country] in ... the way democracy works? | Very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all, Can't choose | 5 |
| EU membership "opinion" | If there were a referendum today to decide whether [country] does or does not become/remain a member of the European Union, would you vote in favor or would you vote against? | Vote in favor Vote against Can't choose | 24 |

Table 13: List of the regions included for analysis per country

| | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Czech Regions (14) | 12 Champagne-Ardenne | Slovak Regions (8) |
| 1 Prague | 13 Lorraine | 1 Bratislava county |
| 2 Central Bohemia | 14 Picardy | 2 Trnava county |
| 3 South Bohemia | 15 Lower Normandy | 3 Trencin county |
| 4 Pilsen | 16 Limousin | 4 Nitra county |
| 5 Carlsbad | 17 Franche-Comté | 5 Zilina county |
| 6 Usti n/L | 18 Nord-Pas de Calais | 6 Ban. Bystrica county |
| 7 Liberec | 19 Upper Normandy | 7 Presov county |
| 8 Hradec Kralove | 20 Île-de-France | 8 Kosice county |
| 9 Pardubice | 21 Corse | |
| 10 Vysocina | 22 Alsace | Spanish Regions (17) |
| 11 South Moravia | | 1 Andalucia |
| 12 Olomouc | Polish Regions (16) | 2 Aragon |
| 13 Moravia-Silesia | 1 Dolnoslaskie | 3 Asturias |
| 14 Zlin | 2 Kujawsko-Pomorskie | 4 Baleares |
| | 3 Lubelskie | 5 Cataluña |
| French regions (22) | 4 Lubuskie | 6 Canarias |
| 1 Midi-Pyrénées | 5 Lodzkie | 7 Cantabria |
| 2 Rhône-Alpes | 6 Maloposkie | 8 Castilla-Leon |
| 3 Aquitaine | 7 Mazowieckie | 9 Castilla-La Mancha |
| 4 Centre | 8 Opolskie | 10 Extremadura |
| 5 Pays de la Loire | 9 Podkarpackie | 11 Galicia |
| 6 Bourgogne | 10 Podlaskie | 12 La Rioja |
| 7 Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur | 11 Pomorskie | 13 Madrid |
| 8 Languedoc-Roussillon | 12 Slaskie | 14 Murcia |
| 9 Brittany | 13 Swietokrzyskie | 15 Navarra |
| 10 Auvergne | 14 Warminsko-Mazurskie | 16 Pais Vasco |
| 11 Poitou-Charentes | 15 Wielkopolskie | 17 Comunidad Valenciana |
| | 16 Zachodniopomorskie | |