

The radical right vote and the role of fear

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Abstract

The main hypothesis which is tested in this paper is that voters who experience more fear are more likely to vote for radical right parties. The underlying idea of this hypothesis is that important explanations mentioned in the literature about the radical right vote are based on the experience of some sort of economic or symbolic threat. Research has shown that fear can influence people's decision-making and electoral behavior. Different analyses conducted in the paper support the claim that fear as a personal characteristic plays a role on its own when it comes to voting for radical right parties. While the measurement of fear was not optimal, the results show that further research should take the role of fear into account. These studies also have the task to find better ways to measure fear to look at the relationship in more detail.

Introduction

After the Second World War the extreme right and their ideas were - for obvious reasons - delegitimized. Therefore, the extreme right was largely insignificant until the 1970s. In the mid-1980s through 'the development of a new, innovative master frame (...) the extreme right was able to escape marginalization' (Rydgren, 2005: 414). This new frame combined 'ethnonationalist xenophobia based on the doctrine of ethnopluralism with anti-political establishment populism' (Rydgren, 2005: 432). In 1984 the French *Front National* was the first party which gained success with this new master frame. This success led to the adaption of the new frame by parties in other countries and a new 'party family' emerged (Rydgren, 2005).

In this paper I use the term radical right parties to refer to this group of parties, however in the literature there is no consensus about the name which is given to this party family. These parties are also called extreme right parties (e.g. Carter, 2005), populist right parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008) or anti-immigrant parties (e.g. Fennema, 1997; Van der Brug *et al.*, 2000). I use the term radical right party because this is the most often used term (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 474). According to Rydgren (2007) the use of 'radical' in the name of this party family is better than 'extreme' because these parties do not oppose to democracy as an idea. He reserves the term extreme for organizations who operate outside the democratic political institutions.

Radical right parties have received much attention in scholarly literature the last decades. One of the relevant questions is why people vote for radical right parties. The main focus of previous research has been on social and demographic background characteristics of those voters (e.g. Lubbers *et al.*, 2002; Van Gent *et al.*, 2013), their anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren, 2008), anti-establishment attitudes (Rooduijn, 2013) and the experience of economic difficulties (e.g. Lubbers *et al.*, 2002). A common thread among many of these explanations is the perception of some economic or symbolic threat. This - possible - underlying dimension of fear as a personal characteristic has received much less attention. Interest in emotions within the field of political psychology is relatively new, but the amount of literature which shows evidence that emotions shape political outcomes is rapidly growing. The consequences of emotions for voter decision-making in election campaigns is one of these topics (Brader and Marcus, 2013). Several studies confirmed that threat relates to right-wing attitudes (Onreat *et al.*, 2013: 791). However, when it comes to voting for radical right parties the role of emotions - and in particular the role of fear - did not get direct attention. In other words, fear is tested indirectly through for example anti-immigrant attitudes, but not directly as a predictor on its own. Given the obvious goal of the radical right rhetoric - to induce fear and anxiety among the public - this is surprising.

Fear, which follows from cultural and economic threats due to immigration, is an emotion which could potentially facilitate voting for radical right-wing parties. It is therefore valuable to test

whether fear has a direct influence on voting for radical right parties because if the hypothesis would be confirmed this would mean that current explanations for the radical right vote have an important underlying dimension. My research question therefore will be: Does a general feeling of fear facilitate voting for radical right-wing parties, and is this a specific characteristic for radical right party voters? I intend to answer this question in a study based on data from the European Values Study 2008 for radical right parties in seventeen European countries.

I will first discuss the most important explanations for the radical right vote, followed by a discussion how fear could have an effect for the radical right vote. Next I will explain how I test the role of fear. In the last two sections of this paper the results of the analysis and a conclusion are given.

Explanations for the radical right vote

Anti-immigrant attitudes and levels of immigration

Authors who use the term anti-immigrant parties often use this term due to the importance of the anti-immigrant rhetoric used by these parties (e.g. Fennema, 1997) and the fact that grievance over immigration is the only characteristic which unites all these parties (Ivarslfaten, 2008: 17-18). Furthermore, anti-immigration positions 'dominates the images voters have of these parties' (Rydgren, 2008: 740). While it is not the only attitudinal factor which matters, anti-immigrant attitudes are perhaps the most important ones and 'even if not all voters who hold anti-immigration attitudes vote for a new radical-right wing party, most voters who do vote for such parties hold such attitudes' (Rydgren, 2007: 250).

In an article about the *electoral impact of the British National Party (BNP) at the 2010 British General election* Cutts and Goodwin found that people who thought that the most important issue was immigration were five times more likely to vote for the British National Party (2014: 110). Different other studies have also shown that anti-immigrant attitudes facilitate voting for radical-right parties (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Zhirkov, 2014). These anti-immigrant attitudes should not be mistaken as a result from xenophobic attitudes, even if radical-right parties have xenophobic political programmes. Much more important as a predictor for the radical right vote is immigration scepticism (Rydgren, 2008: 760).

Zhirkov summarizes two interpretations which could explain anti-immigrant attitudes in advanced Western democracies and Western Europe in particular. The first interpretation is based on the classic work *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950), and essentially argues that 'anti-immigrant attitudes can be seen as an instance of general xenophobia and intolerance related to a wider authoritarian syndrome' (Zhirkov, 2014: 287)¹. The second interpretation puts emphasis

¹ This work shows the importance of a more psychological approach to explain the radical right vote.

on perceived economic conflicts and explains anti-immigrants positions 'in terms of realistic group conflict theory and competition over jobs between immigrants and natives' (Zhirkov, 2014: 287). Also with regard to other scarce resources such as housing, welfare state benefits, or even the marriage market voters could prefer to reduce competition in these areas (Rydgren, 2007: 250).

The latter explanation, however, might be too simplistic. In a study on the success of the Belgium *Vlaams Blok*, Coffé et al. (2007) for example found that there is a different relationship between population from Maghreb and Turkey and *Vlaams Blok* vote share on the one hand and population from other countries and *Vlaams Blok* vote share on the other hand. The first has a (highly significant) positive correlation, while the second has a (non-significant) negative correlation. This suggests that it is not the overall number of presence of foreigners which matters but that the religious or ethnic origin of immigrants, especially for those from an Islamic culture (2007: 149, 153), makes a difference. This relates to a discussion about the relationship between intergroup threat and out-group attitudes and the interplay between realistic group conflict theory and symbolic racism theory. I will return to this discussion in the next section about the role of fear.

While at the individual-level the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes is fairly robust, at the aggregate level results of the relationship between the (relative) number of immigrants living in a country and vote share for radical right parties show mixed results. Only a small amount of researchers found a positive correlation between both (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 483; see for example Knigge, 1998). Newman found that the real or perceived increase of immigrants in one's environment can trigger the perception of threat if the initial number of immigrants was low (Newman, 2013).

Based on the realistic group conflict theory the expectation would be that in constituencies or countries with relative more immigrants more people would vote for radical right parties, but research on this topic shows only weak support for this theory (Rydgren, 2007: 250). One of the reasons therefore is that most competition over these scarce resources is not national, but local. But even when this is taken into account support for the theory is not strong. Rydgren shows that in only in the Netherlands and Denmark voters who 'live in immigration-dense areas [are] significantly more likely to vote for the radical right' (Rydgren, 2008: 761). In Austria, Belgium, France and Norway he did not find such effects.

At the individual level the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and the radical right vote however seems clear, so I expect to find that anti-immigrant attitudes in my model have a positive influence on the radical right vote and that there is no reason to expect that there are countries where this relationship is different since anti-immigrant attitudes are the unifying characteristic of radical right parties (Ivarslfaten, 2008).

Economic perceptions and conditions

Economic concerns are not limited to competition with immigrants. The perception of economic problems in general and the threat of losing one's job facilitates voting for radical right-wing parties. This applies, of course, also and especially to those already without a job (Lubbers et al., 2002; Steininger & Rotte, 2009). This is related to the relative deprivation thesis, which has mostly been operationalized in economic terms. Relative deprivation occurs when someone compares his or her own current situation in a negative way with the past or with other groups (Rydgren, 2008). Although a negative evaluation of someone's own economic situation does seem to have a positive influence on the radical right vote, a bad economic situation does not automatically lead to an increase in votes for radical right parties. It might well be that in times of economic prosperity other issues than the economy, such as for example anti-immigrant issues, are more salient. Therefore radical right parties might be more successful when socioeconomic issues are less important (Hofstadter, 2002; cited in Rydgren, 2008).

At the aggregate level, however, some researchers found a negative effect between unemployment levels and voting for radical right-wing parties (see for example Lubbers et al., 2002; Knigge, 1998). This seems to be counterintuitive but 'it could be that people in these circumstances are afraid to lose what they have gained in times of economic prosperity' (Lubbers et al., 2002: 371) and therefore vote for such parties. Such counterintuitive findings suggest that it is less the actual experience that matters but a more diffuse experience of fear and anxiety caused by a perceived threat. This fits well with the hypothesis that a general feeling of fear facilitates voting for radical right parties, but I will come back to this topic later.

The radical right vote as a protest vote

A core message of populist parties is the rejection of the political establishment, both parties and politicians. Especially voters who are disappointed by and cynical about the traditional parties and who do not feel represented by them anymore, are supporters of populist parties. Also voters who have lower trust and confidence in democratic institutions and who are dissatisfied with how democracy works are more likely to vote for radical right parties (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002; Norris, 2005). In other words, according to radical right voters "the established order" has no idea of what ordinary people find important and only think about their own interests' (Rooduijn, 2013: 82). In a study which focused on the electoral performances of the Dutch populist parties in 2006 and 2010 Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) showed that also policy preferences and party leader evaluation influence voting for populist parties. On these two explanations voters for populist parties do not differ from voters for mainstream parties. The main difference between both groups of voters are the protest attitudes from voters for radical right parties. Voters for populist parties have

stronger protest attitudes. Schumacher and Rooduijn further found that from both populist parties they analyzed 'only the PVV has pure protest voters, which means that it is purely the anti-elitist message of the party that sways these voters' (2013: 132). This was the only radical right party they analyzed and shows support for the thesis that radical right parties attract pure protest voters. However, while radical right parties are often seen as protest parties, protest attitudes do not unite these parties to the same extent as anti-immigrant attitudes do (Ivarsflaten, 2008: 18). While basically all radical right parties attract voters with anti-immigrant attitudes, not all radical right parties attract protest voters. Also Van der Brug et al. (2000) draw the conclusion that voters for radical right-wing parties should in the first place be considered as policy voters. Thus, there are studies which conform the idea of radical right voters as protest voters and there are studies which reject this idea. An explanation therefore could be that the radical right vote is much more a protest vote when the radical right party first enters the political arena. Those who vote for a radical right party as a protest vote tend to go back to their original party of preference after one or two elections, leaving only the voters who identify themselves with the ideology of the radical right party as supporters of these parties (Rydgren, 2008). Therefore one could expect that in countries with relatively younger radical right parties (such as Alliance for the Future of Austria in Austria, Ataka in Bulgaria, Party for Freedom and Proud of the Netherlands in the Netherlands) the effect of protest attitudes on the radical right vote is stronger than in countries with radical right parties who already are longer represented in parliament. In general the expectation is that voters who have lower trust in democratic institutions are more likely to vote for radical right parties.

Nationalism and European integration

Another key characteristics of radical right parties is their nationalism. It is however a specific form of nationalism which applies to these parties. This form of nationalism 'emphasizes the antagonistic relationship between the Good nation and the Evil outsiders' (Rooduijn, 2014: 82). According to Mudde this form of nationalism can be referred to as nativism. This type of nationalism can be defined as 'an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state' (Mudde, 2007: 19) and forms a combination of nationalism and xenophobia (Mudde, 2007: 24). The most important and threatening 'non-native element' is formed by people who are considered as not belonging to the nation and could be 'immigrants or people of another race or religion' (Rooduijn, 2014: 82). Nationalism can also be seen as a result of globalization and the of the loss of identity related to it. The will to regain that identity makes that people turn to nationalism to strengthen their bond with the nation again (Koopmans et al., 2005; cited in Rydgren, 2008).

Related to this nativist character is the often Eurosceptic view of radical right parties. Given the threat that is perceived by non-native elements in this ideology, it is not surprising that also European integration is considered as a negative trend. An example of such a party is the British National Party. Cutts and Goodwin found Eurosceptic voters are more likely to vote for the BNP than voters who are in favor of closer cooperation with the European Union (Cutts and Goodwin, 2014: 110). Radical Right parties are opposed to admitting new members to the European Union and further economic and political integration. These conflicts however tend to focus on social values and symbolic issues, rather than specific economic or policy issues.

Therefore I expect that both nationalistic people and those who are against (further) European integration are more likely to vote for radical right parties. Although there might be a difference between the effect of these predictors in different countries. These effects might be stronger in countries who experience more disadvantages of globalization and European integration and less stronger in countries who experience more advantages of globalization and European integration.

Ideology and values

The ideological location of radical right wing parties is - as the name suggests - on the far right of the political spectrum. This means that voters for radical right wing parties tend to be more conservative, in favor of the status quo and opposed to social change. Therefore, these voters among other things consider the values of postmodernization as a threat to 'traditional values and national culture' (Zhirkov, 2014: 288). Postmodernization has winners and losers and those who are considered to be "modernization losers" want to undo the change that is associated with modernization (Minkenberg, 2003) because they have the chance of becoming 'superfluous and useless for society' (Betz, 1994: 32). These "modernization losers" in 'practical terms has usually come to refer to unemployed people and unskilled workers threatened by unemployment in the near future' (Rydgren, 2008).

Ideology in this sense is associated with the nativist character of radical right parties described above. Furthermore, parties from this party group share 'an authoritarian outlook (...) [and] aim for a society that is strictly ordered, and therefore emphasizes the importance of law and order' (Rooduijn, 2013: 82). Political conservatism can also be considered as motivated social cognition. Conservatism is here related to 'dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, openness to experience, mortality salience, system instability (...) uncertainty avoidance, integrative complexity, needs for order, structure and closure, and fear of threat in general' (Jost et al., 2003: 366). Conservatism in this respect is a way to deal with uncertainty and fear. Also in this respect we can thus see that conservatism might lead to radical right voting, but that conservatism is a result of the experience of fear.

Socio-demographical characteristics of the radical right voter

Previous research has shown that unemployed, less educated, non-religious, younger and male² voters are more likely to vote for radical right-wing parties in general (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002; Van Gent et al., 2013; Zhirkov, 2014). The effects of unemployment on the radical right vote already have been discussed above. A further remark has to be made about the education level of radical right voters. While Lubbers et al. (2002) found that lower educated people are overrepresented under radical right voters, other studies find that 'the radical right receives its strongest support from the mid-school stratum' (Rydgren, 2008: 249). Most of these socio-demographic characteristics lack an underlying theory. I will include these factors as additional predictors and treat them as control variables.

The role of fear

A common thread among the reviewed explanations above is the perception of some economic, cultural or symbolic threat. Given the obvious goal of the radical right rhetoric - to induce fear and anxiety among the public - it is surprising that it has not been tested before if the experience of fear has a direct influence on voting for radical right parties. Certainly now the amount of literature which shows evidence that emotions shape political outcomes is rapidly growing (Brader and Marcus, 2013).

Emotional reactions can be conceptually classified in various ways. The most recent approaches can be classified as 'neural process theories'. In these theories three dimensions of affective appraisal are considered to be important. Also the theory of affective intelligence, 'the most prevalent theoretical formulation in political psychology' (Brader and Marcus, 2013) has adopted these three dimensions. These three dimensions focus on enthusiasm, anxiety and anger. In this study I focus on fear and anxiety since these are "defensive" emotions (Brader and Marcus, 2013: 177). It is precisely this defensive reaction against a specific threat which provides a link to the explanatory factors discussed earlier.

Fear is one of the most studied emotions and closely related with anxiety. Some scholars argue there are differences between both. For example the distinction between generalized anxiety disorders and specific fears made by clinical psychologists (see Brader and Marcus, 2013). However, the terms are used interchangeably by most political psychologists (Brader and Marcus, 2013: 177), which is what I will do in this paper. Fear is considered as 'a product of an emotional system (...) that monitors the environment for potential threats and adapts behavior accordingly. (...) [It] motivates (...) risk-averse behavior, including actions aimed at prevention and protection, conciliatory acts, hiding, and flight' (Brader and Marcus, 2013: 178). One of the many events which can activate fear are "stereotypic portrayals of threatening out-groups" (Brader et al., 2008, cited in Brader and

² However, 'the reason for this has hardly been theorized and further analysed' (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 483).

Marcus, 2013).

In a meta-analytic review Riek et al. describe the relationship between intergroup threat and out-group attitudes. They observe a shift from two competing theories towards a more integrated approach. At first realistic group conflict theory (RGCT) and symbolic racism theory were two competing theories. The RGCT described a process in which two groups had to compete for scarce resources. When this is the case, in-group solidarity may be increased, which leads to a larger distinction between in-group and out-group and intergroup hostility. It is even less important if the self-interest of a member of the group is threatened directly. A member of the group can also perceive a threat when his or hers self-interest is not threatened directly but the interest of the group is threatened (Riek et al., 2006: 336-337; see also Sherif & Sherif, 1969 and Bobo, 1983). This is related to the earlier mentioned relationship between economic perceptions and the radical right vote. In other words, the findings of Lubbers et al. (2002) that people seem to have a defensive reaction to 'protect' their jobs by voting for radical right parties when they feel threatened by out-groups.

On the other hand, the symbolic racism theory described a process where racism did not result from competition over scarce resources but from conflicting values and beliefs. When members of one group perceive a larger gap between their own values and the values of another group, this may lead to increased negative out-group attitudes (Riek et al., 2006: 337-338). This approach seems more related to the anti-immigrant attitudes radical right voters have.

While these two views were considered as competing at first, more recently they are seen as complementary. In this view it is not only competition over scarce resources or value conflict which influence negative out-group attitudes, but a combination of both (Riek et al., 2006; McLaren, 2001; Wilson, 2001). At the end of their review Riek et al. concluded that integrative frameworks are indeed 'advantageous relative to examining each threat type separately' (Riek et al., 2006: 345). However there are still uncertainties since it is difficult to know exactly the direction of causality between (perceived) threat and negative attitudes. Experimental studies could give a better insight in this relationship (Riek et al., 2006), however that is beyond the scope of this paper. This complementary view and the related complexity shows perhaps also why some studies on why people vote for radical right parties found counterintuitive or contradictory results, because the focus often is on one of these theories, while the interaction between both also seems important. It can also account for the findings of Coffé et al. (2007), since the symbolic racism theory can explain why it is only the presence of a specific group of foreigners which leads to voting for radical right parties.

Radical right parties often use a kind of rhetoric which focuses on threats resulting from both competition over scarce resources and value conflict. Onraet et al. (2013) found that at the national

level there is a positive relationship between threat indicators (for example inflation, unemployment and life expectancy) and right-wing attitudes. According to Hatemi et al. 'individuals with a higher degree of social fear have more negative out-group opinions, which, in this study, manifest as anti-immigration and pro-segregation attitudes' (2013, 279). Social fear, according to psychological theories, can arise when people 'who are naturally more prone to insecure attachments to others, and thus disproportionately fear the loss of such attachments, are also more prone to being anxious of new people and novel situations that might threaten those relationships' (Hatemi et al., 2013: 280). Thus, the goal of the rhetoric used by radical right parties is to create a feeling of fear for such threats by those voters who are sensitive for such a rhetoric. The strategy used by radical right parties - offering easy 'solutions' for the perceived threats - can be particularly successful if they can activate existing negative group stereotypes (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008).

Fear might also reflect a more fundamental personal predisposition for anxiety. It is increasingly clear that "fear constitutes both a genetically informed, stable, but malleable trait-based disposition, as well as a transitory state-based response that can be elicited or manipulated by environmental conditions" (Hatemi et al. 2013: 280). Thus, fearful reactions can also have a genetically informed cause. Fear is also associated with political conservatism and extremism (Jost et al, 2007), which can arise from uncertainty avoidance and threat management.

Based on these arguments, one would expect that people who experience fear or are sensitive to the induction of fear are more responsive to the rhetoric which is used by radical right parties. That's why I expect that voters who experience more fear are more likely to vote for radical right parties.

Methodology

To test these explanations I will use two multilevel logistic regression models. A multilevel model makes it possible to account for methodological details and use predictors from different levels. The model in this study has two levels. The first level of this model will contain individual predictors and the second level contains predictors at the country level. I use a logistic regression model since the dependent variable is dichotomous. I use two models to contrast radical right voters with both other party voters (model 1) and people who said they would not vote (model 2). There are two reasons to use two models instead of one. First, if one model would be used and in this model radical right voters were contrasted with both voters for other parties and people who would not vote at the same time it would not be possible to say if fear is a unique characteristic for radical right voters. If the influence of fear in this model would have been positive, it could just as well be because voters in general experience more fear than people who do not vote. Therefore in the first model radical right voters are only contrasted with voters for other parties. Second, the second model is used to make it

possible to also say something about the difference between voters for radical right parties and people who would not vote.

The data for the individual level will be obtained from the European Values Study (EVS) 2008. Except for Finland (internet panel) and Sweden (postal survey) this study uses face-to-face interviews. A basic English questionnaire was translated into other languages. In some cases country specific questions were asked, but they are of no relevance for this study.

Case selection

Seventeen countries will be included in the analysis (see table 1). These countries are included because they have at least one radical-right wing party based on a list of radical right-wing parties from Zirkov (2014), Werts *et al.* (2013) and expert surveys given in the documentation of the EVS³ (selected radical right parties are shown in table 1). Another possibility would be to include only countries where radical right-wing parties are successful. However, this would lead to a biased case selection. Given this selection of countries the initial sample size is 26.352. Including multiple countries has as an advantage that it is possible to say something about the relationship between fear and voting for the whole radical right party 'family' instead of the relationship between fear and only one specific party.

The dependent variables

As discussed above I will conduct two multilevel logistic regression analyses to compare radical right wing voters with

other party voters and citizens who abstain. The dependent variable for the first model is if a respondent would vote for a radical right-wing party. In the EVS respondents were asked for which

Table 1. Selected countries and parties

Country	Radical right-wing parties
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria Alliance for the Future of Austria
Belgium *	
- Flanders	Vlaams Belang
- Wallonia	National Front
Bulgaria	Ataka
Denmark	Danish People's Party
Finland	True Finns
France	National Front National Republican Movement
Germany	Republikaner National Democratic Party German People's Party
Greece	LAOS
Hungary	Miép Jobbik
Italy	Lega Nord Fiamma Tricolore
Netherlands	Party for Freedom Proud of the Netherlands
Poland	LPR
Romania	PRM
Slovakia	SNS
Slovenia	SNS
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party Swiss Democrats Federal Democratic Union Freedom Party Ticino League
Turkey	MHP

* I will use Flanders and Wallonia as two different 'countries' in my analysis.

³ Based on these sources three other countries could also have been included: Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, it was not possible to identify the radical right voters in Sweden and the United Kingdom, since these were not (individually) included in the questionnaire. For Norway, see footnote 4.

party they would vote if there 'would be a general election tomorrow'. Those respondents who said that they would vote for one of the parties mentioned in table 1 are coded with a 1 and respondents who said they would vote for another party are coded as a 0. The dependent variable for the second analysis is also a dichotomous variable which distinguish voters for radical right parties (coded as 1) and citizens who answered they would not vote if elections were held (coded as 0).

Self-reported vote is in theory not the only possible dependent variable. Also evaluation scores by voters for radical right parties would be an option. The use of evaluation scores make it possible to measure the relationship between all voters and their attitude towards radical right parties directly. Together with a large range of possible answers a this could give possibilities to look in more detail to this relationship. Furthermore, if both linear regression models with evaluation scores and logistic regression models with vote intention are used and results show the same pattern this gives more weight to the conclusions. However, evaluation questions were not asked in the EVS and therefore I will only use vote intentions. This is not per se a bad solution, but if evaluation scores also could have been used it would just have mean I had some more options for my analysis.

Measuring fear

At the individual level the - for the goal of this study - most important predictor is 'fear'. This predictor will be based on five questions from the EVS which are about fear for different phenomena. These five items could be considered as possible threats. If respondents perceive these threats, these treats can induce fear. As discussed earlier this fear could both be more genetically informed as well as politically motivated. Important is that respondents were asked whether they were *afraid* of a certain issues. Based on these five questions a fear scale will be made which will be used to analyze the influence of fear. Respondents were asked whether they were afraid of⁴:

1. The loss of social security;
2. The loss of national identity and culture;
3. (Country) paying more and more to the European Union;
4. A loss of power in the world for (country);
5. The loss of jobs in (country).

For each of these five items respondents could answer on a 10 point scale, ranging from 1 (very much afraid) to 10 (not afraid at all). For the fear scale these variables will be recoded in such a way that they range from not afraid at all (1) to very much afraid (10).

Based on a principal component analysis and a reliability analysis combining these five items into one fear scale can be justified. The principal component analysis (PCA) showed only one

⁴ These fear questions were asked in all countries except Norway. Therefore Norway is excluded from the analysis. In Turkey only the third questions was not asked. From all respondents only 2.7% did not answer any of these questions. 94.1 % of the respondents answered at least four questions.

component with an eigenvalue above one (Eigenvalue = 3.253 with 65.1 percent explained variance). The results of a reliability analysis with the five items also supported the use of a single fear scale ($\alpha = .865$). Excluding one of the items would have lowered Cronbach's Alpha. In appendix A results of the same tests are shown per country. These results show support for a single fear scale in all countries. Differences between the countries are only small and for all countries only one component and a high Cronbach's Alpha was found.

For each respondent the scores off all the questions they answered will be add up and dived by the numbers of questions the respondent answered. Thus, the fear scale which will be used in my model is based on these five items and measured on a 10 point scale.

It should be noted that this way of measuring fear is not automatically the best way. One of the reasons therefore is that not all persons have the same conceptualization about specific emotions (Brader and Marcus, 2013: 187), which makes measuring emotions trough surveys more difficult and could lead to validity problems. Furthermore, the questions which are used to create the fear scale might have a right-wing bias. This would of course be a problem. But since some of the (more economic) items are certainly not only related to radical right parties and the strong support for one fear scale, this does not seem to be a problem. Therefore, to get a first impression about the effect of fear on voting for radical right-wing parties and the fact that PCA and reliability analysis show very strong support for a single fear scale the way fear is operationalized in this study is sufficient. But in the conclusion this reservations should be kept in mind.

Other explanatory variables at individual level

Next to the fear predictor other predictors mentioned in previous research will be included in both models. At the individual level sixteen other variables to control for other explanations for radical-right wing voting based on previous research will be included, these can be obtained from the EVS 2008 dataset. First, four variables are included which measure anti-immigrant attitudes. These are all measured on a 10 point scale. The questions and the possible answers for these variables are given in table 2.

Table 2. Anti-immigrant attitudes

Predictor	Question	Scale *
Jobs	Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality]	01 - Do not take away 10 - Take away
Cultural life	Immigrants undermine [country] cultural life	01 - Do not undermine cultural life 10 - Undermine cultural life
Crime problems	Immigrants increase crime problems	01 - Do not make it worse 10 - Make it worse
Welfare system	Immigrants are a strain on welfare system	01 - Are not a strain 10 - Are a strain

* In the EVS dataset lower values indicate the most anti-immigrant attitudes. For these analyses, these variables are recoded in a way that higher values indicate the most anti-immigrant attitudes.

To account for economic perceptions and conditions a dichotomous variable if a respondent is unemployed or not will be included. Next, confidence in parliament and confidence in government (both measured on a 4-point scale, from 'a great deal' to 'none at all') and evaluation of the current government (measured on a 10 point-scale, from 'very bad' to 'very good') are included to test the hypothesis about the radical right vote as a protest vote. To test the hypotheses about nationalism and European integration two variables will be included. First, nationalism (how proud are you to be a (country) citizen, measured on a 4 point scale, from 'not at all' to 'very proud'). Second, European unification (measured on a 10 point-scale, ranging from 'should gone further' to 'has gone too far'). Furthermore, a variable will be included with the self-reported position of a respondent on the left-right scale (measured on a 10-point scale, from 'left' to 'right')

Last but not least, some socio-demographic characteristics are included: male gender, age (in years), highest education level (measured on a 8-point scale), annual household income (measured on a 12-point scale), and attendance of religious services (measured on a 7-point scale, from 'more than once a week' to 'never, practically never').

Independent variables for country level

For the country levels I include the following variables in my model: unemployment level in 2008 and the relative number of immigrants in 2005. For unemployment and relative number of immigrants also the relative change compared to respectively 2007 and 2000 will be included. Unemployment figures are taken from the websites from Eurostat and Trading Economics (for Switzerland)⁵. Figures about immigrants are obtained from publications from the United Nations⁶.

Results

In appendix B descriptive statistics for the variables included in the models are given (for most variables the average and the standard deviation is given). The first thing that should be noted is the relatively high amount of respondents in the European Values Study who said they would vote if elections were held the next day. When these 'EVS-turnout' figures are compared with actual turnout figures of national elections 'EVS-turnout' is much higher (see table 3). Only for Turkey the difference is below five percentage points. For the other countries the difference is much higher. For France the difference is 29,3 percentage points and for Romania even 36,6 percentage points. This could influence especially the results of the logistic regression which compares radical right voters with citizens who abstain. This last group is either underrepresented in the sample of the EVS or

⁵ http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en and <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/switzerland/unemployment-rate>

⁶ <http://esa.un.org/unmigration/TIMSA2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?msax> and World Population Policies 2005, UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

respondents are less likely to admit they would not vote in elections.

Further, we can see in the appendix that there are substantial differences between radical right support in the different countries. Support is highest in Switzerland (23%), Austria (19%) and Finland (12%) and lowest in Wallonia, France and Germany (2%). Two remarks have to be made about vote intentions of respondents in the EVS. First, since it is not a focused electoral study actual electoral choices from respondents could be different if elections are held

Table 3. Turnout national elections and EVS results

Country	EVS	Nat. elec.	Year	Difference
Austria	84,8%	78,8%	2008	6,0%
Belgium	96,1%	87,2%	2010	8,9%
Bulgaria	69,0%	60,2%	2009	8,8%
Denmark	97,3%	87,7%	2011	9,6%
Finland	88,6%	70,4%	2011	18,2%
France	89,5%	60,2%	2007	29,3%
Germany	79,5%	70,8%	2009	8,7%
Greece	88,8%	70,9%	2009	17,9%
Hungary	74,2%	64,4%	2010	9,8%
Italy	85,8%	80,5%	2008	5,3%
Netherlands	88,0%	74,7%	2010	13,3%
Poland	65,6%	48,9%	2011	16,7%
Romania	75,8%	39,2%	2008	36,6%
Slovakia	79,2%	58,8%	2010	20,4%
Slovenia	73,8%	64,7%	2011	9,1%
Switzerland	70,3%	48,6%	2011	21,7%
Turkey	88,7%	87,2%	2011	1,5%

Source election turnout: <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu>

(much) later (Zhirkov, 2014). Second, since voting for radical right parties might be socially undesirable, respondents could decide not to answer they would vote for a radical right party (Vanhoutte & Hooghe, 2013). Also the fear levels between the countries differ quite substantial. Fear levels are highest in Finland, Slovenia and Turkey (with averages above 7) and lowest in Bulgaria, Denmark, Poland and Romania (with averages below 5,5).

In table 4 the results of the two multilevel logistic regression analyses are given. The first model shows the radical right voters compared to voters for other parties. The second model shows the radical right voters compared to citizens who abstain. Below the results of both models are discussed⁷.

Radical right voters versus other party voters

As expected the fear scale has a significant influence in the model were radical right voters are contrasted with voters for other parties. A voter is 1,11 times more likely to vote for a radical right party if his or hers fear level increases with one unit. At the individual level most predictors have a significant effect in the expected direction based on the reviewed explanations. Only two predictors have an unexpected effect, because income and unemployment have an odds ratio of 1,00 and thus has no effect while a negative respectively positive effect was expected. Furthermore, two variables

⁷ Some models were tested in which random slopes were used. Especially for predictors related to protest attitudes given the expectation given in the review part. Also models with whit random slopes for the fear scale were tested. Apart from some small details for the fear scale predictor, which are discussed in the section about the average fear scores for voters of different parties (page 21 and further), these test showed no reasons to include random slopes, so the models presented here have only a random intercept.

have an effect which is in the expected direction, but are not significant. These two predictors are nationalism and one of the anti-immigrant attitudes (crime problems). Given the consensus in the literature about anti-immigrant issues the fact that one of these items is not significant is surprising, but since the other three anti-immigrant attitudes are significant, there is no reason to doubt the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for radical right parties.


Table 4. Voting for Radical Right Parties

Fixed effects	Model 1: Vote for Radical Right Party versus vote for other party			Model 2: Vote for Radical Right Party versus abstain		
	Odds ratio	95% C.I. for odds ratio		Odds ratio	95% C.I. for odds ratio	
		Lower	Upper		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	0,00 ***			0,01 ***		
<i>Level 1 predictors</i>						
Fear scale	1,11 ***	1,06	1,16	1,02	0,97	1,08
Male	1,51 ***	1,28	1,78	1,78 ***	1,45	2,19
Age	0,98 ***	0,98	0,99	1,00	0,99	1,01
Education	0,93 **	0,88	0,97	1,08 *	1,01	1,15
Income	1,00	0,96	1,05	1,06	1,00	1,13
Unemployed	1,00	0,69	1,45	1,01	0,65	1,55
Distrust in parliament	1,24 ***	1,09	1,45	0,87	0,73	1,02
Distrust in government	1,34 ***	1,17	1,52	0,97	0,82	1,15
Evaluation government	0,91 ***	0,86	0,95	0,96	0,90	1,02
Nationalism	1,13	1,00	1,27	1,45 ***	1,25	1,69
Left right scale	1,31 ***	1,26	1,37	1,39 ***	1,32	1,47
European unification	1,09 ***	1,05	1,12	1,04	1,00	1,06
Attendance religious services	1,09 ***	1,04	1,14	0,91 **	0,86	0,97
Immigrants - Jobs	1,06 **	1,04	1,14	1,01	0,96	1,06
Immigrants - Cultural life	1,07 ***	1,03	1,11	1,01	0,96	1,06
Immigrants - Crime problems	1,04	0,99	1,10	1,02	0,96	1,09
Immigrants - Welfare system	1,09 ***	1,05	1,15	1,06	1,00	1,12
<i>Level 2 predictors</i>						
Unemployment	0,77	0,58	1,01	0,75 *	0,51	0,98
Unemployment change	0,98	0,94	1,03	1,02	0,97	1,07
Immigrants	1,01	0,92	1,11	0,97	0,86	1,07
Immigrants change	1,00	0,99	1,01	1,00	0,98	1,01
Random effects						
	Std. Dev.			Std. Dev.		
Intercept	0,81			0,97		
AIC	4548,4			2489,2		
BIC	4716,1			2443,2		
Deviance	4502,4			2443,2		
N	10.817			2.698		
Countries	18			18		

*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05

The other predictors show a significant effect in the expected direction and thus confirm what was mentioned in the literature review. The three other anti-immigrant attitudes (jobs, cultural life and welfare system) have a positive influence and are significant. Male, younger, less educated and less religious people are more likely to vote for radical right parties. Also people who have less confidence in parliament and government are more likely to vote for radical right parties. The odds ratio for the evaluation of government is below 1, but given the coding of this variable this means that people who are less satisfied with the current government are more likely to vote for radical right parties. The effect of the left-right scale predictor is relatively high and shows that, not surprisingly, voters who tend to see themselves are more right are more likely to vote for radical right parties. The same applies for voters who think that European unification has gone too far. At the second level the four predictors about unemployment and immigrants show that based on the odds ratio the effect of the current situation is stronger than the relative change compared to the past. However, the predictors at the second level are not significant.

Figure 1. Effect of fear on voting for Radical Right Parties (P, with 95% C.I.) based on a Zelig simulation



Based on this model the effects of fear on the radical right vote is shown in more detail in figure 1. This figure shows two Zelig simulations (see Kosuke et al., 2008 & Kosuke et al., 2009). The first simulation shows the effect fear has on an average voter. In this simulation all the predictors have mean or typical values. The chance a fearless person would vote for a radical right party is approximately 2 percent. This chance slightly increases to 4,5 percent for a fearful person. If we look at the second simulation, which shows the effect of fear for a potential radical right voter, the effect is stronger. The predictors in this simulation have values which are typical or average for an radical right voter (e.g. male, younger, less educated, stronger anti-immigrant attitudes). For this simulation the chance of voting for a radical right party increases from 15 percent for a fearless to 35 percent for a fearful person.

Radical right voters versus citizens who abstain

The second model in table 5 show a contrast between radical right voters and respondents who said they would not vote in elections. When radical right voters are compared with citizens who abstain, the influence of fear is only slightly positive. But it has no significant influence anymore. Also most other predictors at the individual level are not significant anymore in this model. Only four predictors stay significant and one predictor which wasn't significant in the first model becomes significant in the second. This last predictor is nationalism which has a positive and relatively large odds ratio in this model. The predictors at the second level show a similar effect as in the first model, but again most of them are not significant. Unemployment levels in this model have a significant negative effect.

In general, the results of the second model show that voters for radical right parties and citizens who would not vote in elections have more in common than voters for radical right parties have in common with voters for other parties. This is in contrast with findings from Zhirkov, who found that radical right voters are not only characterized by higher anti-immigrant attitudes compared to voters of other political parties but also compared to abstainers (Zhirkov, 2014).

Fear levels for voters of different parties

In figure 2 for each country the fear levels of voters for all national parties are shown⁸. This makes it possible to compare fear levels of voters of different parties within countries. The expectation would be that the voters of radical right parties have the highest average fear level. The parties are ordered based on their position on a left-right scale (based on expert surveys used by the European Values Survey)⁹ (EVS, 2011). In Austria, Denmark, Finland¹⁰, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Slovenia and

⁸ In figure 2 abbreviations for the parties are used. In appendix C the full party names and the number of respondents who said they would vote for the party are given.

⁹ For some countries and political parties no placement on a left-right scale were given, these countries and parties are marked with a *. In countries were for none of the parties a left-right placement was given, parties

Switzerland the radical right parties indeed have the most fearful voters. Thus in two-thirds of the countries it is not the radical right party that has the most fearful voters. However, in most of these countries the voters for radical right parties still have relative high fear levels. In three countries only one other party has voters with higher fear levels and in three countries two other parties have voters with higher fear levels. And in some of these cases the confidence intervals of the parties having voters with higher fear levels are extremely high, due to the fact that only few respondents said they would vote for these parties. Thus, based on these countries one can also conclude that voters for radical right parties have relatively high fear levels compared to (most) other parties. Only in three countries the average fear level of voters for the radical right party are low compared with other parties. These countries are Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia. The question is whether there is an explanation for these deviating cases.


In Bulgaria the radical right party is *Ataka* (Attack). Since 2007 public opinion research showed that support for *Ataka* declined (Smrčková, 2009: 61). On average respondents who said they would vote for *Ataka* had a fear level of 4.7. With an average score of 5.1 Bulgaria has the lowest average fear level of all countries included in the analysis (see appendix B). The expectation would still be that voters for the radical right party have the highest fear level. But this could also be an indication that fear is less relevant in Bulgaria and therefore also a less important issue when it comes to party choice. Combined with a declining support for the party this could be a possible explanation of the unexpected findings in Bulgaria. However, based on the available data it is not possible to say if this mechanism really exist. Furthermore, *Ataka* is described as a party with a complex identity by Kristen Ghodsee (2008). She argues that the party combines both radical right and radical left elements. Therefore it could be that the average fear level of voters for the is lower than expected, because the party does not only attract radical right (and based on the hypothesis fearful) voters.

The radical right party in Slovakia is *Slovenská národná strana* (Slovak National Party, SNS) (average fear level of respondents: 5,4). Slovakia is also among the countries with on overall a relatively low fear level (5.5, see appendix B). When fieldwork for the EVS took place the Slovak National Party was part of the government coalition (Haughton & Rybář, 2008). This could be a possible explanation why the party did not attract fearful voters. If voters experience fear and hope for changes which would help take away their fear, it is less likely they would vote for a party which is part of the government coalition. Therefore it could be that fearful voters went to other parties.

are ordered alphabetically. In countries were only for a few parties the left-right placement was missing, these parties are placed at the left. The radical right party in Romania (PRM) is placed more to the left. But in the documentation from the EVS it was mentioned that for this party it was difficult to place it on a left-right scale.

¹⁰ In Finland only respondents who said they would vote for other parties than the ones that were mentioned in the survey had higher scores on the fear scale.

Figure 2. Fear levels (with 95% C.I.) of voters for different parties⁷



In Hungary there are two radical right parties. One is the *Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja* (Hungarian Justice and Life Party, Miép) with an average fear level of 7.1. The second one is a party which emerged after the decline of Miép (Halasz, 2009): *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom* (Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik) with an average fear level of 6.7. Contrary to Bulgaria and Slovakia the average fear level in Hungary is relatively high (7.0, see appendix B). A possible explanation for the fact that in Hungary the most fearful voters say they would vote for other parties than the radical right parties could be - somewhat contradicting - the success of Jobbik. Because of the success of the party other parties adopt policies which are in line with the beliefs of Jobbik (Stadelmann, 2013). As a result it is possible that fearful voters therefore feel not only the radical right party can solve their problems, but that other parties can do the same.

Despite these deviant cases, in general one could say the graphs in figure 2 support the main hypotheses that fearful voters are more likely to support radical right parties.

Conclusion

The main hypothesis which is tested in this paper is that voters who experience more fear are more likely to vote for radical right parties. The underlying idea for this hypothesis is that much of the explanations mentioned in the literature about the radical right vote are based on the experience of some sort of economic or symbolic threat. Research has shown that fear can influence people's decision-making and electoral behavior. The effect of such psychological factors received much less attention in relation to voting for radical right parties. This paper is set up as a first exploration of the effect of a general experience of fear on the radical right vote.

To test the fear hypothesis data from the European Values Survey from 2008 was used. In this survey respondents were asked whether they were afraid of five different phenomena. At first sight these questions suggest two dimensions, a social and economic dimension. However, a principal component analysis and scale reliability showed high internal consistency between these five items. Therefore, together these items show a single underlying fear trait. This fear scale is included in two multilevel logistic regression models in which also other predictors for the radical right vote were included. In the first model radical right voters were contrasted with voters for other parties and in the second model radical right voters were contrasted with citizens who said they would not vote if elections were held. In the first model the fear scale had a significant and positive effect on the radical right vote. In the second model the fear scale had a very small effect and was not significant, suggesting that respondents who said they would not vote have more in common - when it comes to the experience of fear - with radical right voters than radical right voters and voters for other parties do. The findings of the positive effect of fear on the radical right vote found further support based on a Zelig simulation which showed that average voters were more likely to vote for a radical right party

when they become more fearful and other explanatory variables were held constant. This effect was even stronger for a typical radical right wing voter. Looking at the average fear levels of voters for different parties also showed that radical right parties often have support from one of the most fearful group of voters. These results show that a general feeling of fear indeed facilitates voting for radical right parties.

However, as argued in more detail before, the way fear is measured in this study is not optimal. The questions which were used to create a fear scale may already have a right wing bias. Furthermore, the test which is used is not necessarily the best one to test whether fear as a personality characteristic facilitates voting for radical right parties. Next, this study uses self-reported vote intentions as a dependent variable. Another option would have been the use of evaluation scores of (radial right) parties. This would created more opportunities since all respondents would have evaluated radical right parties. However, to get a first impression of the role fear might play in facilitating voting for radical right wing parties it is sufficient. A general feeling of fear as a personal characteristic should be taken into account in further studies, but these studies should also find better ways to measure fear (for example by making use of experimental studies).

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Appendix A) Principal component analysis and reliability scale per country

Country	Components with eigenvalue above one	PCA		Cronbach's Alpha
		Eigenvalue	Percent explained variance	
Austria	1	3,334	66,7	,875
Belgium	1	3,007	60,1	,833
Bulgaria	1	3,218	64,4	,860
Denmark	1	3,246	64,9	,864
Finland	1	3,378	67,6	,877
France	1	3,137	62,7	,850
Germany	1	2,914	58,3	,821
Greece	1	3,403	68,1	,882
Hungary	1	3,002	60,0	,831
Italy	1	3,123	62,5	,849
Netherlands	1	3,056	61,1	,841
Poland	1	3,574	71,5	,899
Romania	1	3,378	67,6	,880
Slovakia	1	3,279	65,6	,869
Slovenia	1	2,871	57,4	,813
Switzerland	1	3,371	67,4	,879
Turkey *	1	3,258	81,4	,924
Total	1	3,253	65,1	,865

* In Turkey only four questions were asked (see also footnote 4).

Appendix B) Descriptive statistics

Country	N	Valid N (listwise) *	Would vote	Vote RRP	Abstain	Fear scale		Male	Unemployed
						Mean	Std. Dev.		
Austria	1510	593 / 195	85%	19%	43%	6,2	2,5	43%	2%
BE - Flanders	918	683 / 66	97%	8%	68%	5,9	2,1	49%	5%
BE - Wallonia	591	410 / 18	95%	2%	23%	6,5	2,1	47%	8%
Bulgaria	1500	372 / 171	69%	9%	14%	5,1	2,7	42%	9%
Denmark	1507	876 / 87	97%	9%	73%	5,4	2,4	50%	2%
Finland	1134	555 / 106	89%	12%	43%	7,1	2,2	49%	6%
France	1501	1028 / 134	89%	2%	15%	6,7	2,2	46%	5%
Germany	2075	932 / 218	79%	2%	6%	6,7	2,1	48%	11%
Greece	1500	621 / 95	89%	3%	16%	6,5	2,4	43%	4%
Hungary	1513	696 / 289	74%	3%	6%	7,0	2,3	48%	8%
Italy	1519	466 / 94	86%	10%	28%	5,6	2,5	48%	7%
Netherlands	1554	924 / 171	88%	11%	17%	5,6	2,0	45%	1%
Poland	1510	407 / 219	66%	4%	5%	5,2	2,3	44%	7%
Romania	1489	319 / 128	76%	6%	11%	5,3	2,6	44%	3%
Slovakia	1509	332 / 110	79%	9%	19%	5,5	2,3	40%	6%
Slovenia	1366	376 / 144	74%	11%	19%	7,1	2,1	46%	4%
Switzerland	1272	450 / 228	70%	23%	32%	5,5	2,3	46%	2%
Turkey	2384	695 / 185	89%	8%	26%	7,3	2,8	44%	14%
Total	26352	10735 / 2658	83%	8%	21%	6,2	2,5	46%	6%

* Model 1 (Vote for radical right party vs. vote for other party) / Model 2 (Vote for radical right party vs. abstain).

Country	Age		Education		Income		Distrust parliament		Distrust government	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Austria	46,3	17,7	5,1	1,4	6,4	1,9	2,9	0,8	3,1	0,7
BE - Flanders	49,0	17,6	4,9	2,0	7,2	1,9	2,7	0,7	2,9	0,7
BE - Wallonia	46,5	17,2	4,9	2,0	6,9	1,8	2,6	0,8	2,9	0,8
Bulgaria	50,2	17,7	5,3	1,8	2,3	1,2	3,4	0,7	3,3	0,8
Denmark	49,8	16,8	5,1	1,8	8,0	1,9	2,2	0,7	2,5	0,7
Finland	46,9	15,1	6,2	1,6	8,0	2,4	2,7	0,8	2,7	0,8
France	50,0	18,4	5,0	2,1	6,8	1,9	2,6	0,8	2,9	0,8
Germany	49,7	16,6	5,3	1,4	6,2	1,8	2,8	0,8	2,9	0,7
Greece	49,6	18,4	4,3	2,1	5,2	1,7	2,9	0,8	3,1	0,9
Hungary	44,6	17,6	4,8	1,6	3,6	1,0	3,1	0,8	3,2	0,8
Italy	47,9	18,2	4,7	1,9	6,3	2,1	2,8	0,8	3,0	0,8
Netherlands	54,8	17,3	4,8	2,0	7,3	2,1	2,6	0,7	2,6	0,7
Poland	44,6	17,2	5,0	1,8	4,1	1,8	3,1	0,8	3,1	0,8
Romania	48,1	17,3	4,7	1,8	3,0	1,8	3,0	0,9	3,0	0,9
Slovakia	53,6	16,6	4,8	1,6	3,6	1,1	2,6	0,8	2,6	0,8
Slovenia	48,5	18,1	4,7	2,2	5,7	1,9	2,6	0,7	2,7	0,7
Switzerland	49,8	17,8	5,2	1,7	8,4	2,0	2,3	0,7	2,4	0,7
Turkey	40,6	15,4	3,1	2,1	2,9	1,2	2,4	1,0	2,5	1,1
Total	48,2	17,6	4,8	1,9	5,4	2,6	2,7	0,8	2,9	0,8

Country	Evaluation government		Nationalism		Left - right scale		European unification		Attendance religious services	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
	Austria	4,6	2,2	3,3	0,8	5,2	2,0	6,9	3,0	4,8
BE - Flanders	4,7	1,8	3,1	0,7	5,3	1,8	6,1	2,5	5,3	1,9
BE - Wallonia	4,2	1,7	3,2	0,7	4,7	2,0	6,8	2,6	5,8	1,8
Bulgaria	3,2	1,8	3,1	0,8	5,3	2,5	4,1	3,0	4,7	1,6
Denmark	5,8	2,2	3,4	0,7	5,4	2,0	5,7	2,7	5,2	1,5
Finland	5,6	2,1	3,5	0,6	6,0	2,4	7,1	2,6	5,5	1,5
France	4,0	1,9	3,3	0,7	5,0	2,3	6,7	2,6	5,8	1,7
Germany	5,3	2,0	2,9	0,8	4,8	1,7	6,6	2,7	5,5	1,7
Greece	3,9	2,2	3,6	0,6	5,5	2,2	6,2	2,9	3,6	1,4
Hungary	3,2	1,9	3,2	0,7	5,5	2,1	5,8	2,7	5,4	1,7
Italy	3,9	2,1	3,3	0,8	5,3	2,4	6,0	2,8	3,7	1,8
Netherlands	5,6	1,6	3,1	0,7	5,4	1,8	6,1	2,4	5,1	2,1
Poland	4,4	2,0	3,5	0,6	6,0	2,0	4,8	2,6	2,9	1,5
Romania	4,6	2,3	3,2	0,7	5,8	2,2	4,2	3,0	3,4	1,4
Slovakia	5,5	1,9	3,3	0,7	4,9	2,0	5,1	2,6	3,9	2,2
Slovenia	4,7	2,0	3,6	0,6	5,0	2,0	5,4	2,8	4,8	1,9
Switzerland	6,4	1,9	3,3	0,7	5,2	1,8	5,9	2,7	5,3	1,8
Turkey	4,8	2,3	3,7	0,6	5,9	2,4	5,4	2,8	4,0	2,2
Total	4,7	2,2	3,3	0,7	5,3	2,1	5,8	2,9	4,6	2,0

Country	Immigrants Jobs		Immigrants Cultural life		Immigrants Crime problems		Immigrants Welfare system	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
	Austria	6,4	2,9	6,4	2,9	7,6	2,5	7,5
BE - Flanders	5,7	2,6	5,6	2,7	6,8	2,4	6,8	2,3
BE - Wallonia	5,9	2,8	5,9	2,8	6,4	2,5	7,1	2,4
Bulgaria	6,4	3,0	4,1	3,0	6,4	2,9	6,3	3,0
Denmark	3,1	2,3	4,5	2,7	7,2	2,4	6,6	2,5
Finland	4,9	2,8	4,0	2,7	6,9	2,4	6,5	2,4
France	4,7	2,8	5,0	2,9	5,2	2,7	6,1	2,7
Germany	6,4	2,6	6,0	2,6	7,5	2,3	7,6	2,4
Greece	6,7	2,8	5,5	3,0	7,3	2,6	6,7	2,8
Hungary	7,5	2,5	5,0	3,0	7,2	2,5	7,4	2,4
Italy	5,4	2,8	4,9	2,9	7,3	2,5	6,1	2,7
Netherlands	5,3	2,3	5,2	2,4	6,7	2,1	6,1	2,2
Poland	5,5	2,7	4,4	2,7	5,6	2,5	6,1	2,5
Romania	5,5	3,2	4,6	3,1	5,1	2,9	5,0	2,9
Slovakia	6,4	2,6	4,6	2,8	6,8	2,3	7,0	2,3
Slovenia	6,0	2,9	5,4	2,9	6,6	2,6	6,7	2,6
Switzerland	4,9	2,5	5,0	2,6	7,0	2,3	6,7	2,4
Turkey	6,9	2,7	6,6	2,7	6,6	2,7	6,7	2,6
Total	5,8	2,9	5,2	2,9	6,7	2,6	6,6	2,6

Appendix C) List with parties from figure 2

Country	Country N	Country	Country N
Abb. party	Full party name	Abb. party	Full party name
	Party N		Party N
Austria		848	
BZÖ	Alliance for the Future of Austria	49	
HPM	Dr. Martin's List - For Democracy, Control, Justice	7	
FPÖ	Austrian Freedom Party	109	
Other	Other parties	18	
SPÖ	Social Democratic Party of Austria	293	
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party	200	
KPÖ	Communist Party of Austria	11	
DG	The Austrian Greens	133	
LF	Liberal Forum	28	
Belgium - Flanders		649	
MR	Mouvement Réformateur	2	
VB	Vlaams Belang	61	
LD	Lijst Dedecker	37	
CD&V	Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams	193	
Other	Other parties	8	
VLD	Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten Open	97	
SP.A	Socialisten en Progressieven Anders	106	
N-VA	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie	85	
Groen!	Groen!	50	
SLP	Sociaal Liberale Partij	5	
Ecolo	Ecolo	4	
CHD	Centre Démocrate Humaniste	1	
Belgium - Wallonia		469	
CD&V	Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams	3	
PTB-UA	Parti du Travail de Belgique - Unité Antifasciste	2	
FN	Front National	8	
PS	Parti Socialiste	165	
CDH	Centre Démocrate Humaniste	84	
Other	Other parties	9	
LiDé	Libéral Démocrate	1	
MR	Mouvement Réformateur	88	
Ecolo	Ecolo	108	
Groen!	Groen!	1	
Bulgaria		741	
NVP	Novoto Vreme (New Age) Party	3	
E-RP	Euro-Roma party	6	
BRP	Bulgarian Women's Party	4	
KPB	Communist Party of Bulgaria	3	
DP	Democratic Party	5	
VMRO-BND	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Bulgarian National Movement	7	
DG-VMRO	George's Day Movement	2	
SDS	Union of Democratic Forces	33	
BAPU-AS	Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union Alexander Stambolijski	4	
NDSV	National Movement for Stability and Progress	10	
BSP	Bulgarian Socialist Party	191	
BSDP	Bulgarian Social Democratic Party	26	
DPS	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	94	
GERB	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	222	
Ataka	National Union Attack	70	
ZPB	Green Party of Bulgaria	8	
BAPU	Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union	13	
Other	Other parties	11	
DSB	Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria	25	
SSD	Union of Free Democrats	4	
Denmark		1236	
DF	Danish Peoples Party	108	
SD	Social Democrats	279	
EL	Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten)	23	
SF	Socialist Peoples Party	251	
Venstre	Venstre, Denmark's Liberal Party	377	
NA	New Alliance (Liberal Alliance)	5	
KF	Conservative Peoples Party	103	
RLP	Radical Left Party	86	
KD	Christian Democrats	4	
Finland		714	
Other	Other parties	11	
PS	True Finns	89	
KD	Christian Democrats	19	
VAS	Left Alliance	40	
KESK	Center party	99	
SDP	Social Democratic Party	135	
RKP	Swedish People's Party in Finland	13	
VIHR	Green League	116	
KOK	National Coalition Party	192	
France		1040	
NF/NRM	Right Wing Extremist Parties (National Front, National Republican Movement)	26	
MPF	Movement for France	30	
OLWP	Other Left Wing Parties (Radical Leftist Party, Republican's and Citizen's Movement)	27	
HFNT	Hunting, Fishing, Nature, and Tradition	29	
PCF	Communist Party	44	
LWEP	Left Wing Extremist Parties (Revolutionnary Communist League, Labour Class Combat, Workers Party - PT)	58	
OEP	Other Environmentalist Parties	35	
PS	Socialist Party	307	
Other	Other parties	22	
UMP	Union for a Popular Mouvement	237	
NC	New Centrist Party	50	
LV	Green Party	66	
MoDem	Democratic Movement	109	
Germany		1246	
DVU	German People's Party	5	
NPD	German National Party	13	
Rep	Republicans	8	
Other	Other parties	21	
CDU/CSU	Christian Democratic Party/Christian Social Union	430	
FDP	German Liberal Party	114	
PDS	The Left/Party of Democratic Socialism	237	
SPD	German Social-Democratic Party	287	
GP	The Green Party	131	
Greece		918	
KKE	Communist Party of Greece	66	
LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally	31	
PASOK	Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement	324	
Other	Other parties	96	
ND	New Democracy	311	
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left	90	

Country			Country N	Country			Country N
Abb. party	Full party name		Party N	Abb. party	Full party name		Party N
Hungary			800	Romania			655
KDNP	Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt		20	PNG-CD	Partidul Noua Generatie-CrestinDemocrat		31
MKMP	Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt		3	PRM	Partidul România Mare		36
	Munkáspárt			Other	Other parties		16
Other	Other parties		29	PC	Partidul Conservator		14
Fidesz	Fidesz Magyar Polgári Szövetség Fidesz		465	UDMR	Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din România		50
MIÉP	Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja		9	PD-L	Partidul Democrat-Liberal		244
FKGP	Független Kisgazda és Polgári Párt		4	PSD	Partidul Social Democrat		154
JOBBIK	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom		16	PNL	Partidul National Liberal		96
SZDSZ	Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége		36	PNCD	Partidul National Crestin Democrat		8
MDF	Magyar Demokrata Fórum		24	PIN	Partidul Initiativa Nationala		6
MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt		183				
CP	Centrumpárt		11				
Italy			772	Slovakia			688
SVP	Südtiroler Volkspartei (minoranza tedesca, con Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese)		4	KSS	Komunisticka strana Slovenska		16
LN	Lega Nord (Bossi)		61	KDH	Krestanskodemokratice hnutie		73
FT	Fiamma Tricolore - Destra Sociale		13	SF	Slobodne forum		8
FN	Forza Nuova (non presente nelle due isole maggiori)		4	LSHZDS	Ludova strana-Hnutie za demokraticke Slovensko		27
PdL	Il Popolo della Libertà		202	SNS	Slovenska narodna strana		64
PCdL	Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori (non presente al Sud e nelle isole)		10	SMER	SMER - Socialna demokracia		346
ReC	Rifondazione e Comunisti Italiani (Lista Anticapitalista)		35	SMK	Strana madarskej koalicie		77
UDC	Unione di Centro (UDC-Rosa Bianca)		67	ANO	Aliancia noveho obcana		2
PD	Partito Democratico		269	Other	Other parties		8
IdV-LDP	Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro		68	SdkUDS	Slovenska demokraticka a krestanska unia-Demokraticka strana		67
SL	Sinistra e Libertà		23				
LB-P	Lista Bonino-Pannella		14				
LDR	Liberal Democratici Riformisti		2				
The Netherlands			1130	Slovenia			744
TON	Proud of the Netherlands		92	SNS	Slovenska nacionalna stranka		81
PVV	Party for Freedom		37	SLS	Slovenska ljudska stranka		59
SP	Socialist Party		136	DSU	Demokratska stranka upokojencev		74
SGP	Reformed Party		22	LDS	Liberalna demokracija Slovenije		82
CU	Christian Union		61	LIPA	LIPA		10
PvdD	Party for the animals		25	SNP	Stranka nove politike		72
CDA	Christian Democratic Party		301	SD	Socialni demokrati		172
Other	Other parties		6	SDS	Slovenska demokratska stranka		157
VVD	Liberals		178	Other	Other parties		7
PvdA	Labour Party		189	NS-KLS	Nova Slovenija - Kršcanska ljudska stranka		30
D66	Democrats 66		102				
GL	Green/Left (GroenLinks)		73				
Poland			668	Switzerland			599
KPEiR	National Party of Rentners and Pensioners		18	TL	Ticino League		2
URP	Union of Real Politics		1	SD	Swiss democrats		4
LPR	League of Polish Families		24	FDU	Federal Democratic Union		7
PSL	Polish Peasant Party		46	SPP	Swiss people party		126
PiS	Law and Justice		157	C-S	Christian-social		5
UPR	Union of Work		5	Rad	Radicals		89
PK	Party of Women		11	SLP	Swiss labor party		16
SRP	Self-defense		6	CD	Christian democrats		81
PO	Civic Platform		331	Oth.	Other parties		30
SLD	Union of Left Democracy		54	GLP	Green liberal party		26
PPP	Polish Labour Party		4	LP	Liberal party		22
SDPL	Socialdemocracy of Poland		4	SP	Socialist party		129
PD	Democratic Party		7	GP	Green party		55
				EPP	Evangelical People's Party		7
				Turkey			1071
				CHP	Republican People's Party		235
				DP	Democrat Party		17
				MHP	Nationalist Action Party		91
				DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti		16
				BBP	Great Union Party		3
				AKP	Justice and Development Party		594
				SP	Felicite Party		18
				Other	Other parties		16
				DTP	Democratic Society Party		76
				SHP	Social Democrat People's Party		1
				ANAP	Motherland Party		4