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Master Thesis
MSc in International Relations and Diplomacy

Catalan Paradiplomacy, Secessionism and State Sovereignty

*The Effects of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy and the Artur Mas
Government on Catalan Paradiplomacy*

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Word Count: 18398

Leiden, 10 June 2015

Abstract

This thesis seeks to answer the question whether Catalan paradiplomacy represents a challenge to the national sovereignty of Spain by investigating its underlying legal framework, its de facto institutionalization, the main motives that drive said paradiplomacy, and how it is perceived by the Spanish government. Furthermore, it will attempt to uncover the causes that may have led to a confrontational paradiplomacy by highlighting two major changes that may have impacted the functioning of Catalan paradiplomacy: the 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the 2010 election of Artur Mas to the Catalan government. Based on a longitudinal within-case analysis and using process tracing, this thesis will investigate whether these changes in institutional structure or guiding motive have led Catalan paradiplomacy to challenge the sovereignty of its parent state. The findings suggest that it was not the 2010 election of Artur Mas, but his re-election in 2012 that prompted a change in the guiding motive of Catalan paradiplomacy towards the international promotion of the process of self-determination. While the Statute facilitated the expansion of Catalan foreign affairs and thus functions as a domestic opportunity structure, Catalan paradiplomacy by and large takes place within the Spanish Constitutional framework.

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List of Abbreviations

CiU	Convergència i Unió
EU	European Union
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
CARUE	Sectoral conference on affairs of the EU
CIDEM	Centro de Innovación y Desarrollo Empresarial
COPCA	Consortio de Promoción Comercial de Cataluña
CORE	Coordination of Spanish Regional Offices
DiploCat	Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia
FAP	Foreign Action Plan 2010-2015 of the Generalitat de Catalunya
IO	International Organisation
REGLEG	Conference of European regions with legislative power
SCT	Spanish Constitutional Tribunal
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

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1. Catalonia within Spain: Nationalism and the Process of Self-determination

On the 10th of July 2010, hundreds of thousands marched on the streets of Barcelona under the banner “We are a nation. We decide” (Parlament de Catalunya 2013, 2). This protest march, deemed the largest in the history of democratic Catalonia, marked the beginning of a process of self-determination which has dominated Catalan politics and society to this day (Connolly 2013, 57). Said process aims to culminate with the holding of a referendum on the permanence of Catalonia in Spain.

Catalans are proud of their cultural and historical heritage. They have struggled with the Spanish central governments for the preservation of their institutions, cultural space, and for greater self-government since their incorporation to the crown of Castile in 1715 (Chambers 2012, 13). However, after the advent of democracy and the Spanish constitution of 1978 restored the Catalan government (called “Generalitat”) and guaranteed Catalonia's right to self-government (Connolly 2013, 56), the large majority of the Catalan population did not question their permanence within Spain. In recent years, separatism has gone from occupying a relatively fringe position in Catalan politics to sitting at its very centre. Between 2006 and 2014, popular support for secession tripled from 14% to 45% (Muñoz and Tormos 2014, 315).

Partly responsible for this upsurge in support for independence is the deep economic crisis that shook Spain and Catalonia in 2008 and from which they are still slowly recovering. While the Generalitat had to enact deep spending cuts, much like the rest of the country, Catalan nationalist parties blamed those cuts on the fiscal deficit¹ between Catalonia and Spain (ibid., 324). However, what ignited pro-independence support as a social movement was the decision in June 2010 by the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal (SCT) to impugn several articles of the new Statute of Autonomy. Among them was a preambulatory clause that declared Catalonia to be a nation.

That same year, the nationalist wave propelled the centre-right nationalist party *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) into regional government. Led by Artur Mas, CiU had promised to ensure that the “right to decide” of the Catalan people was exercised (CiU 2010, 6). Re-elected in 2012, Artur Mas has sought to successfully conclude the process of self-determination, whatever the result. Secession being a possibility, the Generalitat is openly preparing for this eventuality by promising to lead a national transition (CiU 2012).

Successful independence hinges not only on separation from Spain, but also upon being recognized as a state by the international community. Already hailed as one of the most internationally active regions (Duran 2015), it is conceivable that the domestic conflict between

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The Generalitat has estimated the fiscal deficit at 8% of the GDP, yet the numbers vary depending on the used calculus method (Muñoz and Tormos 2014, 324).

Catalonia and Spain has spilled over into the international arena. This thesis seeks to investigate whether Catalan paradiplomacy challenges the national sovereignty of Spain, what its determinants are, and how that challenge is carried out.

The question of whether regions challenge their parent states by becoming actors in the international arena is at the heart of the academic literature on the topic. The literature review will elaborate on the nature of that challenge and how states have responded to it, while showing the gap this thesis seeks to fill. The case study requires two steps. Following a theoretical framework elaborated by Kuznetsov (2015), an encompassing descriptive analysis of Catalan paradiplomacy will be carried out. Suspecting that the 2006 adoption of the Statute of Autonomy and the 2010 election of Artur Mas had a substantial impact on Catalan paradiplomacy, a within-case longitudinal analysis will be done order to assess whether whether changes in institutional structure or motive of Catalan paradiplomacy have led Catalonia to challenge its parent state.

2. Theory and Research Design

2.1 Literature Review: The Emergence of Paradiplomacy in a Globalised World

The modern system of nation states enshrined diplomacy as a traditional competence exclusive to the state. Berridge (in Criekemans 2010, 64), defines diplomacy as “an essential political ability [...] its chief purpose is to enable *states* [cursive added] to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resorting to force, propaganda, or law”. Consequently, international law treats states as its main subjects. Yet regions have been internationally active throughout history (Duran 2015, 26). When academia and political authorities took notice of it in the late 1980s, it was through the lens of them challenging the exclusive authorities of the state.

The evaluation and perception of paradiplomacy in academic literature has considerably changed in the past decades. The early literature focused less on what the international activity of regions meant with regards to the evolution of the international system, but how it affected power relations within states through the prism of federalism studies (Ducachek 1990; Soldatos 1990; Kincaid 1990). In this light, the sovereignty of states in diplomacy and foreign policy was deemed as being “perforated” (Ducachek 1990) by regions “engaging in processes and arenas which are, in many senses, closely related to those of conventional intergovernmental diplomacy” (Hocking 1999, 20).

The participation of regions in international affairs was facilitated by globalization and the emergence of new communication technologies. Transnational issues such as environmental

concerns or an increasingly interconnected and competitive global economy not only directly affected the well-being of regional citizens, but also challenged the capacity of states to deal effectively with these issues by themselves. The blurring of lines between the global and the local prompted regions to become actors in an increasingly de-territorialised international arena (Hocking 1999, 21). “Disenchantment with the federal government's foreign policy, [...] and or awareness of the central government's inability to be effective alone in the promotion of subnational interests, lead to direct subnational involvement in international relations and, moreover, to policy and actor segmentation, thus segmenting foreign policy” (Soldatos 1990, 41). Instead of diplomacy in the singular, Cornago (2013) argues that it is more fitting to talk about “plural diplomacies” as more and more actors join the international arena. This perspective also implies a rather conflicting perspective on the regional activity of regions vis a vis states, as it implies the emergence of new power centres next to states.

However, the term “paradiplomacy” is in itself void of conflicting meaning. It is defined as “the international activity of regions” (Lecours 2002, 92) carried out parallel to that of the parent state. Since regions are “the territorial and administrative unit[s] on the first level of authority after the central government” (Kuznetsov 2015, 22) and thus (in most cases) lacking the power to conduct official diplomatic relations, the traditional diplomatic channels are still mostly closed to them. Rather, paradiplomacy is characterized by “a high degree of involvement of civil society and the private sector” (Keating 1999, 11). Even though the paradiplomacy of regions has become increasingly professionalized over the years, it is often opportunistic and experimental (ibid.).

Indeed, rather than spelling the end of the nation state, states have benefited of paradiplomacy as they learned to integrate them into their national diplomatic structures and see the positive sides of it. For example, international lobbying efforts of regions can increase their economic benefits (Kincaid 1990, 73). Also, a harmonized foreign policy between state and region would allow to share costs and pool resources, thus leading to a rationalisation of foreign policy (Soldatos 1990, 42). Finally, it adds a democratising element to international relations that was heretofore missing in foreign-policy-making processes (Kincaid 1990, 73). In the words of Cornago (2010), paradiplomacy has become “normalized”. The general consensus today is that paradiplomacy is not the cause of conflict between levels of government of a state (Kuznetsov 2015, 115). While regions may certainly challenge their parent state internationally, such as Québec's assertive diplomacy in its quest for independence, paradiplomacy is taken to be the reflection, not the cause of domestic conflicts.

Whether a region's paradiplomacy challenges the parent state depends on the motivations of regions and the opportunity structures presented to them. Keating (1999, 4) argues that a region's

paradiplomacy is driven by a combination of three different motives: economic, cultural, and political. Most regions are economically motivated (Ducachek 1990, 15-16). According to Hocking (1999, 22), “it is clearly the case that the twin objectives of trade promotion and investment attraction have been key factors in understanding the growing [regional] international presence over the last 20 years or so as regions and localities found themselves buffeted by international economic forces”. Directly affected by global economic pressures and the national responses to them proving inadequate, subnational officials increasingly turned to the international arena themselves to manage those pressures directly.

Next to economic reasons, regions with a distinct identity and their own language have cultural motivations. They look to strengthen ties with regions and countries that are culturally or linguistically similar to them (Kuznetsov 2015, 110). Sometimes, they will go beyond this and use the international arena as a space to assert their national and cultural distinctiveness. Paradiplomacy then becomes an “instrument of stateless nation-building” (Keating 1999, 12).

It is the political motivations that exercise the greatest influence on the paradiplomatic strategy of regions (ibid., 11). Political motivations are those that seek the expansion of regional competences. It is not surprising to find that this is often the case for regions that identify themselves as nations or are headed by nationalist leaders. Kuznetsov (2015, 66) summarizes this as the “nationalism dimension” of paradiplomacy, which assumes that “nationalism logically leads regional governments to seek international agency”. International agency is valued by nationalists because the discourse that dominates international relations places states and nations at its centre (Lecours and Moreno 2001, 4). By becoming actors on the international stage, “regions can both behave as nations and present themselves as such” (Paquin 2004, 211; Lecours and Moreno 2001, 4). Furthermore, the international arena offers a high degree of visibility, giving regional leaders the opportunity to cater to their audience at home (Lecours and Moreno 2001, 4). In this light, paradiplomacy is an instrument to stimulate nationalist mobilization in order to attain greater leverage over the parent state in negotiations over greater autonomy and national recognition (Paquin 2004, 212; Lecours 2002, 105; Lecours and Moreno 2001, 5).

While this type of “identitarian paradiplomacy” (Paquin 2004, 203) is a nuisance to central governments, it does not necessarily lead to increased conflict between region and parent state (Paquin 2004, 207). States can certainly look for ways to accommodate and integrate paradiplomacies into their broader diplomatic apparatus and foreign policy goals. However, accommodation can be near impossible if the region in question searches to secede from its state. In those instances, paradiplomacy becomes a necessity because eventual independence hinges on its recognition from the international community. “In the special cases where institutional change

sought by a regional government is independence, international activity becomes a functional necessity. Secessionist forces need to establish an international network and present their project to foreign states in the hope of obtaining formal recognition following an eventual declaration of independence” (Lecours and Moreno 2001, 5)². Thus, paradiplomacy may accelerate centrifugal processes taking place within certain countries. Duchacek (1990, 2) has coined a separate term for paradiplomacy that forwards a separatist message: protodiplomacy.

Whatever the motivations, the international arena is not a level playing field for regions. While motives are the main drivers of paradiplomacy, regions are faced with legal and structural constraints that limit their international capabilities. Regions lack external legitimacy and the legal powers to engage in diplomatic activity, and thus they have to rely on opportunity structures to advance their international interests (Lecours 2002; Lecours and Moreno 2001; Keating 1999). These opportunity structures can be domestic and external in nature.

Domestically, regions belonging to federal and democratic polities nominally have greater foreign policy powers (Duchacek 1990, 2). Their constitutions concede greater autonomy to regions, often providing an opportunity structure the latter can take advantage of or refer to when going abroad. This is not necessarily because of an explicit allocation of constitutional powers, but often because the very existence of different layers of autonomous government add “ambiguity in federal polities about the status of constituent governments in world affairs and about the authority of the general government to act unilaterally in foreign affairs” (Kincaid 1990, 64). In short, the opportunity for paradiplomatic activity is often linked to the level of regional autonomy at home (Lecours and Moreno 2001, 6).

Externally, macro-regions such as the European Union have provided opportunity structures for the international projection of regions (Cornago 2010; Lecours 2002, 96). Regions cooperate with each other through innumerable transnational networks, driven mainly by policies of the European Communities and the fact that participation in these networks does not require recognition as international actors (Duran 2015, 292). Furthermore, the EU's principle of subsidiarity has ensured that the voice of regions is heard in the EU and given them leverage to increase their status and participation levels.

This does not necessarily mean that the EU has exacerbated nationalisms in its member states. On the contrary, Connolly (2013, 83-84) argues that the EU often works as an escape valve for nationalist pressures. In an effort to identify the determinants of conflicting paradiplomacy, Tatham (2013) undertakes a large-n study based on surveys with regional representatives in

² For a legal argument on secession and the importance of international recognition in that regard, see Connolly 2013 and Wilson 2009.

Brussels. Paradiplomacy may act in concert with, parallel to, or in conflict with parent state diplomacy (Criekemans 2010, 39). Tatham (2013, 65) defines conflicting paradiplomacy as directly “geared toward the achievement of policy objectives that contradict those sought by their own member state”. It would not be far-fetched to think that nationalist regions would increase the levels of conflict. Surprisingly, Tatham finds that this is not the case. Instead, he discovers that what influences conflict levels in Brussels is absolute and relative resource richness (as in GDP/capita) of the regions and diplomatic accreditation. High absolute richness of a country increases conflict, while high richness relative to the parent state decreases it (ibid., 78). Furthermore, full diplomatic accreditation reduces conflict (ibid., 76) because it incentivizes cooperation with the parent state. In general, he finds that conflicting paradiplomacy in Brussels is rare (ibid., 73).

Yet so are regions that openly seek secession. In a large-n study surveying more than 100 Brussels offices, such deviant cases largely go unnoticed. There have been cases of strong secessionist movements in the EU, yet they must not necessarily have led to conflict in the diplomatic arena. In the EU, Scotland attempted in 2014 to secede from the British Union through the celebration of a referendum. This referendum however was agreed upon by both the Scottish and the British government. The concerted manner in which this process was carried out limits the potential for disagreement on the international stage, for the question of international recognition would already be resolved (Connolly 2013, 76). Furthermore, Criekemans (2010, 41) shows that Scotland's paradiplomatic apparatus is, in comparison to other legislative regions in the EU, relatively less institutionalized and focused more on image promotion and public diplomacy than in advancing a coordinated political agenda. While the Belgian regions Flanders and Wallonia boast strong nationalist movements, the fact that they enjoy full foreign policy powers regarding the EU makes conflicting paradiplomacy with the central government improbable (Bursens and Deforche 2010, 152).

Furthermore, nationalist governments do not necessarily seek secession. While they are likely to seek greater autonomy and might resort to the international arena for nation-building purposes or to mobilize their citizens, their demands may still be accommodated by the central government. The Basque government's paradiplomacy occasionally challenged the parent state, for example when it opened a political representation in Brussels against the will of Spain³. Also, the “plan Ibarretxe” sought the holding of a referendum on Basque permanence in Spain (Torres 2008). By allowing the first and blocking the latter, Spain accommodated Basque paradiplomacy as long as it played by the constitutional rulebook. In general, Basque paradiplomacy rarely went beyond nation-building purposes (Toticagüena 2005; Castro and Zubiri 2004, 99; Lecours and Moreno

³ The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal ruled in favour of the Basque government in sentence 165/1994, of 26 of May.

2001).

For regions whose goal is secession, accommodation is no longer a solution. The surveyed literature does not provide adequate explanations for the effects of secessionism on the relations with the parent state in the international arena. Yet, as the arguments above show, there is reason to believe that regions with the motivation to gain their own statehood will have an incentive to not only engage in paradiplomacy, but that such activity will challenge the sovereignty of the parent state.

2.2 Case Selection

Catalonia is named in the literature on paradiplomacy as one of the most advanced and influential subnational actors on a global scale (Duran 2015; Kuznetsov 2015; Criekemans 2010). It entertains several embassies in Europe as well as many economic representations and cultural institutes around the world. Catalonia has proven particularly adept at integrating into the European economy, EU structures, and in fostering inter-regional networks (Connolly 2013, 82). Criekemans (2010, 43) and Keating (1999,5) show that, traditionally, Catalonia has focused on the international promotion of Catalan identity, language, and the economy. As of 2010, Chambers (2012, 21) argues that “[...] the Catalan government has generally been careful to ensure that its promotion of Catalan interests on the international level has not come into conflict with those of Spain”.

However, two things have changed that could have altered this relationship. In 2006, the Generalitat adopted a new Statute of Autonomy. This statute has expanded the competences of the Catalan government regarding foreign policy (Statute 2006, Arts. 184 – 200). In 2010, the Generalitat released a “Foreign Action Plan” (FAP) that sought to fully institutionalize the changes envisaged in the statute and to build a foreign policy that takes full advantage of its new powers (Foreign Action Plan 2010). Criekemans (2010, 59), in his descriptive analysis of the diplomatic instruments used by regions with legislative powers, found that Catalonian foreign policy was undergoing an extensive overhaul towards reforming its structure to become more vertical and actively engaged to further political representation abroad. These developments are indications that the Statute may have offered Catalonia an internal opportunity structure to enhance its paradiplomacy. In how far has it enabled Catalan paradiplomacy? Is the regional legislation concerning foreign action in accordance with the national constitutional legal framework?

The second major development took place in 2010 with the election of a new regional government, which brought about a major change in Catalan government policy. The main policy goal of the government of Artur Mas has been the organization of a referendum on Catalan secession from Spain. Since the Spanish government has rejected the notion of a negotiated

outcome, this has put the Generalitat on a collision course with Spain. While the position of the Generalitat is that it defends the right to self-determination and not outright independence, its policies have been strongly characterized by preparing for eventual independence. As previously mentioned, paradiplomacy can often reflect domestic conflicts. As external recognition and accession into the EU is essential towards the achievement of this aim, how has this development impacted Catalan paradiplomacy? Has there been a change in the guiding motive, and thus in foreign policy content?

This thesis will investigate whether changes in institutional structure or motive of Catalan paradiplomacy have geared Catalonia to challenge the national sovereignty of Spain. To guide the analysis, a theoretical framework devised by Kuznetsov (2015) specifically for case studies in paradiplomacy will be used.

2.3 A Theoretical Framework for Case Studies in Paradiplomacy: Variables, Operationalisation, and Hypotheses

The fulfilment of this enterprise requires that two steps be taken. First, it is necessary to undertake a descriptive analysis of the Catalan diplomatic structure. Following Collier (2011, 824), “careful description is fundamental in all research, and causal inference [...] depends on it”. The study will be carried out on the basis of the theoretical framework provided by Kuznetsov (2015, 116). It is ideal for descriptive case studies because it neatly summarizes the different theoretical dimensions of paradiplomacy into six categories:

- A) causes of paradiplomacy
- B) the legal grounds of the country for paradiplomacy
- C) predominant motives
- D) the institutionalization of paradiplomacy
- E) the attitude of the central government towards paradiplomacy
- F) the consequences of paradiplomacy for the development of the parent state

Yet the aim of this study is also to uncover causal mechanisms, the second step of this thesis. Since paradiplomacy in itself does not challenge the sovereignty of states, and bearing in mind the arguments laid out in the literature review, Catalan paradiplomacy is considered a challenge to the state if:

- a) it is outside of the Spanish constitutional framework
 - ai) the Catalan laws concerning foreign affairs are outside of the constitutional framework
 - aii) Catalan paradiplomatic activities take place outside of the constitutional framework
- b) its motive, and thus its content, is to prepare the ground for secession

c) the parent state perceives itself to be challenged

The fulfilment of either one category would be enough to establish a challenge to the nation state. By concentrating on these categories, Kuznesov's framework is adapted accordingly (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Theoretical Framework

The categories “causes” and “consequences” are eliminated from the framework. “Causes” are eliminated because, as conceptualized by Kuznetsov, this category refers to the factors that gave birth to the paradiplomacy of a given region. This study, on the other hand, takes as its starting point more recent developments. In focusing on structural and motivational changes of Catalan paradiplomacy over time, the original causes remain peripherally relevant and are taken into account, but are not central to this study. Likewise, the category “consequences” will not be regarded. If the predominant motive is secession, this would already imply that the fulfilment of that goal has as its consequence the disintegration of the parent state. This category is thus largely superfluous on its own.

This leaves us with the following variables and their indicators (Kuznetsov 2015, 116):

A) Legal Grounds

A1) Constitutional and statutory competences regarding foreign affairs

A2) Level of legal permission of treaty-making with foreign actors granted to regional

authorities

A3) Constitutional requirements for consultations between region and state on foreign affairs issues

A descriptive analysis of the statutory and constitutional competences attributed to Catalonia in foreign affairs, as well as the pertinent laws and regulations, will be at the heart of this section. Special attention will be given to the level of treaty-making powers Catalonia enjoys, for this is a good indicator for the degree of actorness Catalonia has in the international arena. The signing of treaties also requires diplomatic accreditation, a key determinant of conflicting paradiplomacy for Tatham (2013, 76). By looking at the requirements for and mechanisms of region-state consultations on foreign affairs, it is possible to ascertain the possibilities the region has to influence foreign-policy-making processes internally, and whether they are used or not.

If Catalan foreign action legislation were to empower Catalan paradiplomacy beyond its constitutionally attributed competences, it would constitute a challenge to the parent state. It would mean that the Generalitat disregards the central authority of the state in matters of foreign policy and endanger a coherent national foreign policy by ignoring the internal mechanisms of interest accommodation. How will the constitutionality of Catalan laws regarding foreign affairs be judged? Such laws will be deemed outside the Spanish constitutional framework if they have been invalidated by the SCT. Appeals by the central government are not enough. While this might signal discontent with regional paradiplomacy, the constitutionality of regional legislation can only be established by the SCT. The necessary information to answer these questions will be drawn from a careful study of the Spanish constitution and Catalan Statute of Autonomy, the relevant legal documents (laws, decrees, and SCT sentences) concerning Spanish and Catalan foreign affairs, supported by relevant secondary literature.

Lecours (2002, 96-97) speaks of domestic opportunity structures as enabling or constraining the international activity of regions. The new Statute of Autonomy may have given the Generalitat the opportunity to increase its paradiplomacy beyond the powers defined in the Spanish constitution. However, Blatter et al. (2010, 180) argue that in general, regions follow the rules set by the overall constitutional framework and adjust their strategies accordingly. Contradicting those rules could diminish the effectiveness of paradiplomacy and the regional government be sanctioned through court rulings. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: Catalan legislation regarding foreign affairs does not lie outside of the Spanish constitutional framework.

Let us now turn to the second variable, broken down into the following indicators:

B) Institutionalization

B1) Regional Ministry of Foreign Affairs

B2) Permanent abroad offices

B3) Official Presidential visits

B4) Multilateral regional networks and International Organizations

B5) Work within central government delegations (EU)

B6) Public Diplomacy

The aim here is to ascertain whether the *de facto* institutionalization of the Catalan foreign policy apparatus coincides with the corresponding *de jure* framework. According to Kuznetsov (2015, 53) and Kincaid (1990, 67), this does not have to be the case. Furthermore, by analysing the way paradiplomacy is carried out, it might be possible to infer certain motives from it. Thus, the first indicator demands an investigation of the overall organisation of the Catalan paradiplomatic apparatus. How has it evolved over time, and how has it been affected by the Statute of autonomy and the change in government? Second, Catalonia entertains permanent political, economic, and cultural offices abroad. Their number, geographic location, and opening dates might give indication as to the guiding motive of Catalan paradiplomacy at a certain moment in time. The third indicator, official presidential visits, will compile number, destination, and predominant reason for presidential travels abroad. Additionally, attention will be paid to the host officials who receive the Catalan president. This might be an indicator for the level of international recognition Catalonia enjoys abroad. Under B4), the author will examine which networks and International Organizations (IOs) Catalonia is active in and its reason for joining. The fifth indicator will look at the permissiveness of the central government in allowing Catalan representatives in its diplomatic delegations. Due to the important role regions play in the EU, this section will elaborate on the relations between the Generalitat and the Spanish government on the European level. Finally, the last indicator will focus on public diplomacy. If Catalan paradiplomacy is too constrained by national legislation to pursue political motives, it might resort to more informal channels by involving civil society and private partners in its paradiplomatic activities.

Two changes have been made with regards to Kuznetsov's template. While he includes the indicator "participation at exhibitions/forums", it is disregarded here. Participation in such events is nowadays so common that it is difficult to infer any motive from it. Also, it is unlikely to provide information which cannot be given by the categories "official visits" and "networks". The second change is the addition of public diplomacy, as the use of informal channels is largely ignored by Kuznetsov.

The necessary information will be retrieved from official Catalan and Spanish government policy documents and websites, and secondary literature. Also, data about government activity will be retrieved from newspapers. The author will rely upon the Spanish newspaper “El País” and the Catalan one “La Vanguardia” in order to ensure a balanced approach.

States are preoccupied with maintaining a coherent and unified national foreign policy (Lecours 2002, 95). If Catalan international activities were to take place outside of its legally attributed competences, it would endanger that prerogative and question the authority of the Spanish government. While it is unlikely that the Generalitat directly challenges Spanish sovereignty by enacting legislation outside the constitutional framework, it may interpret or stretch existing legislation to its limit and possibly surpass it. The *de facto* paradiplomatic structure might not coincide with the *de jure* framework.

H2: Catalan paradiplomatic activities take place outside of the constitutional framework.

Keating (1999, 5) states that political motives, unlike economic and cultural ones, strongly affect the choice of paradiplomatic strategy of a region. Given that acting against the constitutional framework might encarry costs, the use of informal channels would allow the Generalitat to promote political goals without openly and officially contradicting Spain in matters of foreign policy.

H3: Catalan paradiplomacy is likely to prepare the ground for secession through informal channels.

The analysis of the motives driving Catalan paradiplomacy, and to chart their change over time, is the purpose of the third category.

C) Motives

C1) Political

C2) Economic

C3) Cultural

The study of this variable is guided by the assumption that “the set of motives that drives paradiplomacy determines the region's [...] role of constituent government in the international scene” (Kuznetsov 2015, 111). Using the international arena to gain greater autonomy at home is not enough to constitute a challenge to Spanish national sovereignty. This is a common strategy among regions with nationalist governments. For Catalan paradiplomacy to challenge Spain's sovereignty, it will have to be guided by outright promotion of secession, or by preparing the

ground for it. Since it would endanger the territorial integrity of the parent state, that would be a policy objective that runs counter to that of the state, fitting the definition Tatham (2013, 65) provides for conflicting paradiplomacy. Catalonia is in the midst of a process of self-determination. Would the international defence of self-determination constitute a challenge to Spain's sovereignty?

The international promotion of the right to self-determination entails the acceptance of the outcome of said process. If third states were to accept the process of self-determination as legitimate, so they would have to accept an independent Catalonia if this were the result of said process. Furthermore, the SCT has denied that such a right to unilateral self-determination exists within the Spanish constitutional order (Comella 2014, 581). In sum, the international promotion of the process of self-determination will be classified in this study as an act that prepares the ground for secession and challenges the parent state.

An additional difficulty is the disentangling of political, economic, and cultural motives. Economic and cultural events may be politically motivated, and vice versa. To solve this conundrum, a political motive will only be inferred from economic or cultural acts if there is explicit mention of independence or to self-determination. The author will draw the necessary information from publicly available government documents, electoral programs from the governing CiU, speeches of Catalan political leaders, relevant news articles, and secondary literature. Furthermore, interviews will be conducted with Catalan and Spanish government officials.

In 2010, a government was elected into Catalan parliament that vowed to defend the “right to decide” of the Catalan people (CiU 2010, 82). Given the importance of external recognition in the case of secession, it is expected that the “right to decide” is also promoted externally.

H4: The predominant motive of Catalan paradiplomacy is preparing the ground for secession.

The final variable draws attention to the Spanish perspective on Catala paradiplomacy.

D) Central Government Attitude

Perception

D1) Paradiplomacy as a challenge to the whole nation

D2) Paradiplomacy as an opportunity for the whole nation

Cooperation

D3) Cooperative-coordinated pattern

D4) Cooperative-joint pattern

D5) Parallel-harmony pattern

D6) Parallel-disharmony pattern

This variable seeks to establish whether the parent state sees itself to be challenged and how it collaborates with the region in the international arena. How is Catalan paradiplomacy perceived, and what are the reasons for this perception? Do the instituted mechanisms mechanisms for collaboration between state and region work and are they deemed effective? The information for the perceptual dimension will be drawn primarily from official statements and expert interviews.

The practical dimension of cooperation patterns looks at the degree of collaboration between state and region in foreign affairs. This will also evidence whether mutual perceptions coincide with actual cooperation patterns. Cooperation will be judged as positive if the paradiplomacy is either coordinated by (D3) or carried out in joint fashion with (D4) the federal government (Soldatos 1990, 38). In the case of D5), the diplomatic activities of the region are carried out independently in accordance to their competency, but they do not contradict national foreign policy. If regional international activity were to contradict the nation state and act outside its control, the conditions of D6), then this would constitute a challenge to the nation state. The cooperative pattern can be established by drawing conclusions from A3) and B5). With regards to the Spanish domestic position on the process of self-determination, it is to be expected that:

H5: The Spanish government perceives Catalan paradiplomacy as a challenge to national sovereignty.

Finally, it has been theoretically established that while paradiplomacy does not cause domestic conflict, it can transport that conflict to the international arena (Kuznetsov 2015, 115).

H6: Since Catalonia challenges the sovereignty of Spain internally, so does it challenge its sovereignty externally.

A descriptive analysis of Catalonia's paradiplomacy is insufficient to show whether changes in structure and government have affected the paradiplomatic activity of Catalonia towards challenging the national sovereignty of Spain. Instead, it is necessary to chart the development of the above variables and indicators over time. In order to uncover the causal mechanisms, the theoretical framework will serve as the basis for a longitudinal within-case analysis.

2.4 Method of Analysis: Within-Case Analysis and Process-Tracing

Following George and Bennett (2005, 166), a longitudinal within-case analysis allows to investigate the impact of a particular event on a case by comparing the same case before and after that event

occurred. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy may have provided an internal opportunity structure to enhance the Catalan paradiplomatic apparatus. Its impact will be analysed by looking at the legal grounds and institutionalization before and after 2006. Similarly, the 2010 regional elections propelled into power a government whose goal has been the organization of a popular referendum on the secession of Catalonia from Spain. Thus, 2010 will serve as the benchmark for changes in motivation and institutionalization. Not only changes in the immediate aftermath of the events will be noted, but the variables will be observed “well before and well after” their occurrence (ibid.).

As George and Bennett point out (ibid.), “the most common challenge for the before-after design is that for most phenomena of interest, more than one variable changes at a time”. The used framework is very valuable here because it allows for the isolation of the variables “legal grounds”, “institutionalization”, “motives”, and “attitude of the central government”. In the time period 2006 until present, other factors deemed relevant in the literature for paradiplomatic activity have remained unchanged and thus represent valuable control variables. These are: diplomatic accreditation, identity, legislative region, democracy, and presence in the EU. However, one exception has to be made. While the richness levels (as in GDP/capita) of Catalonia relative to the other Spanish regions has remained more or less unchanged, its absolute richness levels have probably been affected by the economic crisis. This will need to be accounted for in the study, as it could have an effect on conflicting paradiplomacy according to Tatham (2013).

However, there may be other factors not listed here that may have had an unexpected causal effect on the observed variables. Thus, in order to prove a causal relationship between changes in the legal framework and in government with the variables contained in the theoretical framework, it is necessary to do process-tracing (George and Bennett 2005, 166). “The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (ibid., 206). Process-tracing will be carried out by applying four empirical tests on the evidence collected in the descriptive analysis. Following Collier (2011, 825), these are: “straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive”. These tests serve to establish the relevance of pieces of information for a causal relationship.

Next to documentary evidence, expert interviews will be carried out to attain the necessary information. Since “elite interviews can shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are not clear from an analysis of political outcomes or other primary sources” (Tansey 2007, 767), they could be critical contributions to ascertain the motives guiding Catalan paradiplomacy. Following a non-probability approach, interviewees have been selected according to their position within the Spanish and Catalan foreign policy apparatus and their availability (ibid.). On the Catalan side, the

selected interviewees were Mr. Altafaj Tardio, permanent representative of the Generalitat to the EU, and Mr. Albert Royo, secretary general of the “Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia” (DiploCat). While the first might provide information on the paradiplomatic actions of Catalonia in the EU and the relationship with the Spanish embassy there, the latter could provide more general information about Catalan paradiplomacy and the motives that guide DiploCat's work. From the Spanish side, the Counsellor of education to the Spanish embassy in Brussels, Mr. José Luis Mira, was interviewed. He was appointed for this interview by the ambassador and would be valuable to provide the perceptions of the Spanish side on Catalan paradiplomacy. Since the domestic conflict between Spain and Catalonia is very polarized politically, it was deemed important to add a neutral voice. Dr. Manuel Duran, who has done his PhD on paradiplomacy and written extensively on Catalan paradiplomacy, was an ideal candidate. Armed with inside information provided by experts and documentary evidence, we can proceed with the analytical part of the thesis.

3. Catalan Paradiplomacy: Legal Framework, Institutionalisation, Motives, and Perceptions

Following the theoretical framework, we will begin by outlining the legal framework upon which Catalan paradiplomacy is based, giving special attention to the 2006 Statute of autonomy. The *de jure* framework of Catalan paradiplomacy may not coincide with the *de facto* framework, to which we will turn our attention in the next section. Then, we will focus on the content of paradiplomacy, as we attempt to identify the main motives that have guided Catalan paradiplomacy during the different Catalan administrations, giving special attention to the government of Artur Mas. Finally, the last section will concentrate on how the Spanish government perceives Catalonia's international activities and on the cooperation between Spanish and Catalan actors abroad.

3.1 Assessing the Constitutionality of Catalan Foreign Action Legislation

3.1.1 Practice and Legality of Regional International Activities

In Spain, legal coverage of paradiplomacy was preceded by practice. The foreign affairs competences of the autonomous communities emerged in a process of continuous tension between them and the Spanish state. Anchored in the constitution of 1978, the state has exclusive competence over international relations (Art. 149.1.3). Accordingly, the original statutes of the regions did not attribute them foreign affairs competences of any kind. The Catalan statute of autonomy of 1979 only capacitated the Generalitat with the fulfilment of international treaties that affected its competences (Art. 27.3), and with the right of being informed about the signing of

treaties in matters of its competences (Art. 27.5) (Alemany in Mas et al. 2010, 73).

Yet it was unclear exactly which activities related to “international relations”. As Spain integrated into the international community and globalization blurred the lines between the international and the domestic, this definitional ambiguity became increasingly relevant. Regions soon became active in the international arena with the opening of tourism offices abroad. Sensing an opportunity for the economic development of the regions and thus for the country as a whole, the Spanish government issued a royal decree in 1988 giving legal cover to this practice and instituting mechanisms of coordination between the different tourism offices (Ministerio de Relaciones con las Cortes y de la Secretaría del Gobierno 1988).

However, international activities with more political content were quickly curtailed. Indicative of this was sentence 137/1989 of the SCT, which annulled an accord on environmental protection an autonomous community had closed with a foreign state (Castro and Zubiri 2004, 111). Both decisions are indicative of a pattern that exemplifies the general attitude of the state towards paradiplomacy: activities that promote regional economic development are perceived as opportunities, whereas engagement on the political level is a challenge to the state's monopoly on international relations.

Accession to the European Union in 1986 (Committee of Regions 2005, 238) challenged the understanding of what was traditionally called “international relations”. For the regions, EU politics directly affected their legislative processes at home, in matters of their competence. Also, since they were the ones tasked with the implementation of EU legislation, why were they not to have a say in it? For the regions, the EU was fundamentally about domestic politics. The state had a different opinion of this. These differing stances became evident when Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country established regional offices in Brussels in 1986 (Committee of Regions 2005, 238). Fearing that this would allow them to communicate with the European institutions directly, the central government responded that same year by accusing those acts as unconstitutional. The ensuing sentence of the SCT paved the way for paradiplomacy in the next decade.

Sentence 165/1994 not only allowed the opening of regional representations abroad, but it also defined which competences in international relations were the prerogative of the state and which, by default, were open to the regions. According to the SCT, international relations do not encompass the totality of international activities. It defines international relations as “the relations between international subjects governed by international law” (Tribunal Constitucional 1994, Art. 5). Thus, regions may not carry out actions reserved to states as subjects of international law (ibid., II Art. 6). They are not allowed:

- 1) to close treaties, (*ius contrahendi*)

- 2) nor to represent the state abroad, (*ius legationis*)
- 3) nor to create international obligations and responsibilities for the State.

However, deeming that in order to “correctly fulfil its attributed functions, an autonomous community may have to engage in certain activities, not only inside its territory, but also outside of the territorial limits of Spain” (ibid., Art. 2). The tribunal thus adopts an approach of *in foro interno*, *in foro externo*, establishing that regions are allowed to act abroad within their domestically attributed competences. As long as the above rules are observed, the international activities of regions are deemed constitutional, including the opening of regional representations in Brussels. This sentence became the basis of common understanding between government and regions with regards to the constitutional provisions for “international relations”. In the years following, the autonomous communities expanded to varying degrees their international presence as permitted by SCT 165/1994.

3.1.2 The 2006 Statute of Autonomy: Enshrining Practice into Law

Even though they were widely accepted as the new norm, the interpretations forwarded by the tribunal did not find their way into state law for many years. Yet as regions expanded their international activities, so the need arose to give those activities a firmer legal footing. In contrast to Catalonia's 1979 Statute, which did not mention international relations, the new 2006 Statute contains 17 articles on the EU and external action (Arts. 184 – 200). More than expanding regional competences, says Duran, “the Statute enshrined in law already existing practices”.

Articles 193.2 and 184 anchor the *in foro interno*, *in foro externo* interpretation of the SCT. Article 193.1 adds a little wrinkle to this interpretation. It states that, other than its competences, the Generalitat should also promote Catalonia's interests abroad, while respecting the international relations competence of the state. In order to do so, it may establish offices abroad (Art. 194). While the celebration of treaties remains a prerogative of the state, the Statute allows to close accords of collaboration in affairs of its competences (Art. 195). If the state negotiates treaties that impinge on the competences of Catalonia, the Generalitat may ask that it be included in the delegation (Arts. 196.2 and 185) or even ask that it close the treaty itself (Art. 197.3). The remaining articles encourage transborder and inter-regional cooperation (Art. 197) and participation in international organizations, specifically UNESCO (Art. 198).

With regards to the EU, articles 186 and 187 establish that, in matters of competence of the Generalitat, Catalan representatives shall participate in the formation of Spanish positions and in Spanish delegations to the EU and, specifically, the Council of the European Union. Furthermore, article 192 mandates the establishment of a Catalan delegation to the EU, turning the already

existing office in Brussels into a proper delegation with a political mandate.

The Statute clearly delineates regional and state competences in international relations. “However, it is interesting to note that although the [Statute] manifests a clear desire for autonomy in the international sphere, it also indicates a resolve for a renewed cooperation with the Spanish government and emphasizes the importance of intergovernmental mechanisms” (Aldecoa and Cornago 2008, 12). The constitution does not provide for intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, for it did not account for paradiplomacy. Its emergence called for mechanisms of coordination to ensure a unified front in foreign policy. The SCT sentence 165/1994 already recommended the establishment of such mechanisms in order to ensure a unified front in foreign policy. This recommendation was followed suit with the creation in 1998 of the bilateral commission Generalitat-State.

Created to deal with European matters (Paquin 2004, 227), the 2006 Statute elevates it to “general and permanent framework for relations between the Generalitat and the Spanish government” (Art. 183.1), including matters regarding European policy and foreign affairs (Art. 183.2 g), h)). The state followed the statutory directive and instituted it into law in October 2007 (Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas 2007). The commission is an instrument designed to aid cooperation, but it also gives the Generalitat the opportunity to influence Spanish policy making internally through deliberation and the adoption of accords (Casas i Rondoní 2011). However, decisions taken by the Commission are not legally binding, nor does it come with an enforcement mechanism (ibid.,19). Its functioning is thus utterly dependent on the will of both the Generalitat and the state.

A second consultation mechanism is the sectoral conference on affairs of the EU (CARUE). Created through law 2/1997, its task is to facilitate cooperation between the autonomous communities and the state in Brussels (Robledo 2006, 145). It gives the regions a voice in forming Spain's policy stance towards EU institutions, and it deals with all questions connected with EU relations (Committee of Regions 2005, 247). However, CARUE suffers from similar weaknesses as the bilateral commission, in that its effectiveness depends on the political will of the different parties (ibid., 248).

Given that Spanish politics are strongly polarized, there being political will for cooperation is not guaranteed. Even though the 2006 Statute means for cooperation between state and Generalitat, it also claims greater regional autonomy in many areas, not least in foreign affairs, than originally foreseen by the Spanish Constitution. Thus it was hardly surprising when the Spanish government questioned the constitutionality of the Statute and brought it to the SCT in 2006 (Tribunal Constitucional 2010). Among many others, it contested most articles relating to foreign

action. The state again perceived greater political autonomy of the regions as a challenge to central government authority.

3.1.3 The Statute as a Domestic Opportunity Structure

The constitutional tribunal declared itself on the matter in June 2010. In its sentence, it decided the unconstitutionality of many articles of the Statute and changed them accordingly (ibid.). However, the governmental challenges to the articles concerning foreign action and EU relations were all dismissed by the tribunal (ibid., 213-216). Concerning foreign affairs, the Statute is clearly within the constitutional framework and a continuation of the doctrine established by SC 165/1994.

The Statute gives Catalan paradiplomacy official recognition and a clear and enforceable set of guidelines and principles. Still, ambiguities remain in the statutory texts. This has given the Generalitat the opportunity to demand greater autonomy in paradiplomacy than a stricter reading of the Statutory articles by the central government or the constitutional tribunal would provide. For example, the Permanent Representative of the Generalitat to the EU Amadeu Altafaj argues that the Statute demands direct participation in the Council of the EU following article 187, whereas the State argues that said article does not specify whether such participation is direct or indirect. Also, demands have been made that the Spanish government support full participation of Catalonia in UNESCO, as demanded by article 198 of the Statute (Llorens in Mas et al. 2010, 22). According to Manuel Duran, the fact that the Statute not only allows international activities derived from the domestic competences, but also the promotion of its overall interests, is a potential loophole for greater paradiplomatic autonomy. This interpretation is echoed by the Foreign Action Plan 2010-2015 (FAP) of the Generalitat when it states that the Statute allows for the promotion of Catalonia's interests in all areas (FAP 2010, 31).

The legal framework has continued to evolve since 2006. Prior to the Statute, Catalan legislation purely on foreign affairs was non-existent. Without a clear legal cover defining the limits and possibilities of paradiplomacy, Catalonia's international activities were always tentative so as not to incur the antagonism of the parent state. After the Statute's release, ten laws on foreign action have been adopted, all referring to the Statute as their legal umbrella (Secretaría de Asuntos Exteriores y de la Unión Europea a). In this sense, the Statute was a watershed moment for Catalan paradiplomacy. Two laws, one Spanish and one Catalan, are of particular relevance. The Spanish government reacted to the new legal reality by adopting in March 2014 a new law of foreign action and service to the state (Jefatura del Estado 2014). This law is the attempt of the government to establish greater control over the paradiplomacy of its regions, as well as to eliminate inefficiencies. Thus, article 5.2 (ibid.) obliges the autonomous communities to inform the ministry of foreign

affairs about travel plans abroad and activities of external projection. It also encourages that regional delegations abroad be installed within the premises of the Foreign Service of the state (ibid., Art. 12.4). Finally, while naming the limits to paradiplomacy already established in SCT 165/1994, it adds an additional limit by stating that paradiplomacy may not be of prejudice to the foreign policy of the state (ibid., Art. 11.3).

Catalonia released its own and very ambitious law of external action in December 2014 (Departament de la Presidència 2014b). Its aim is to fully unleash the potential for paradiplomacy with regards to the foreign action articles in the Statute and it outlines the foreign policy responsibilities of the different regional governmental institutions. It restates the Generalitat's ambition to become a fully recognized international actor, to promote Catalonia's interests abroad, as well as to support the internationalization of its economy and culture (ibid., Art. 4). The Spanish government moved to appeal the law in April 2015 (Tribunal Constitucional 2015) because, according to Vice President Soraya Saénz de Santamaría, the law “treats the Generalitat as an international actor next to the Spanish State” and it undermines the Spanish prerogative in foreign affairs (La Vanguardia 2015b). In doing so, the government again fell back on defending that which it perceives as its core political competences. The law is temporarily suspended until the SCT reaches a verdict. With the constitutional validity of the Catalan law of external action still up in the air, the preliminary conclusion is that the Catalan laws that guide its paradiplomacy are within the constitutional framework of Spain.

Box 1: Summary Legal Framework

A1) in foro interno, in foro externo

A2) No Treaty-making powers

A3) Consultation mechanisms:

Bilateral Commission; CARUE

The Statute is not a challenge to the sovereignty of Spain. On the contrary, it contains mechanisms calling for cooperation between the Generalitat and the State. Like any legal document, it can be interpreted many ways, and how it is interpreted depends largely on the motive behind it. It is thus entirely possible that the *de facto* institutionalisation of Catalan legislation exceeds its *de jure* framework. The ensuing chapter will investigate whether that is indeed the case.

3.2 Institutionalization of Catalan Paradiplomacy

3.2.1 The Regional Ministry of Foreign Affairs

After the adoption of the Statute, a decree was issued that brought foreign action under direct control of the Presidency (Departament de la Presidència 2010, Art. 3.1.8). Decree 118/2013 (Departament de la Presidència 2013) created the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and of the European Union, and placed it directly under the Department of the Presidency. The Secretariat, as outlined by article 44.2 of decree 80/2014 (Departament de la Presidència 2014a), is responsible for:

- a) the general direction of foreign relations
- b) the general direction of multilateral and European Affairs
- c) the general direction of development cooperation
- d) the delegation of the Generalitat to the EU
- e) the delegations of the Generalitat abroad
- f) the general subdirection of programme coordination and management




Figure 2: Institutional Framework of Catalan Paradiplomacy


All branches of paradiplomatic activities are brought under a single roof (Figure 2). This is at the same time evoking of and a significant development from the early stages of Catalan paradiplomacy. Jordi Pujol is widely acknowledged as being the godfather of modern Catalan paradiplomacy. During his tenure from 1980 until 2003, “Pujol became the architect of Catalonia's foreign policy, forging it as an international public relations strategy, in which the president of the region became the embodiment of Catalonia” (Duran 2015, 176). In those times, Catalan paradiplomacy was highly personalized, but it lacked a professional and institutionalized support system. This was probably due to the lack of legal coverage of paradiplomacy at the time. The current institutional framework carries on the presidential paradiplomatic tradition while palliating those early weaknesses.

This process of institutionalization and centralisation of Catalan paradiplomacy is the first of several objectives outlined in the FAP. That it appears in first place is logical, for only with a coherent structure “[...] of the highest possible political-administrative order” is it possible carry out a consistent and effective foreign action (FAP 2010, 39). The FAP itself is a reflection of the changes undergoing the Catalan paradiplomacy. By focusing on distinct foreign policy objectives, it brought guidance to a foreign action which, up to that moment, lacked a grand design.

The centralisation of the paradiplomatic institutional apparatus was accompanied by substantial expenses, borne by the Generalitat (see Table 1 in Appendix). Several things are worth mentioning when regarding the expenses on foreign relations over time (Graph). Until 2006, foreign relations did not have its own budgetary category. The cost of official visits abroad and internationalization efforts was carried by the Presidency's budget. At the time, foreign relations was equated with development cooperation. This changed in 2006, the year the new Statute of Autonomy was issued. Regional foreign action now had legal cover and expenses sky-rocketed, reaching its high point in 2008 due to the opening of four official representations abroad and a strong commitment to development cooperation. After 2008, expenses decreased, a reflection of the economic crisis that prompted heavy budget cuts across the board.

In 2010, Artur Mas became the new President of Catalonia. In the year after his election, expenses for foreign relations decreased. Yet while expenses for foreign action decreased by 50% with respect to the watermark of 2008, the budget for development cooperation was slashed by 67% in the same timespan. Budget cuts continued to assail development cooperation until 2014, but expenses for foreign action remained remarkably consistent. 2014 marked the first time in which expenses for foreign action exceeded those for development cooperation. This is indicative of the importance the Generalitat attributes to foreign action, possibly due to internationalization efforts of the self-determination process. Indeed, the budget project reports of 2014 and 2015 name the

internationalization of the self-determination process one of the three main priorities for the foreign action of those years (Projecte Pressupostos 2015, 74; Projecte Pressupostos 2014, 66). In 2015, more funds have been allocated to foreign relations, which is consistent with the Generalitat's overall commitment to increase spending.



Graph: Expenses by the Generalitat in Foreign Relations (in Million €) per year

The impact of the Statute and Artur Mas' election have clearly influenced the make-up of Catalonia's paradiplomatic apparatus. It is the Statute which allows its existence by acknowledging paradiplomacy and anchoring it in law. What was practice then became institutionalized. Artur Mas continued to drive forward the process of institutionalization and centralization in times of economic crisis. The numbers show remarkable commitment from the Generalitat to a non-essential activity for a region such as foreign action. This prioritisation of paradiplomacy by the Generalitat could speak to the importance of promoting the self-determination process abroad.

3.2.2 Permanent Abroad Offices

The most visible element of Catalan paradiplomacy abroad are the representational offices. Over the years, Catalonia has spread a wide net of offices all over the world, be it a political representation,

an office of economic promotion, or a cultural centre (Representación exterior)⁴. While the offices for economic and cultural promotion by far outnumber the political delegations, we shall concentrate on the latter because it is here where most has changed since the adoption of the Statute. While Duran (2015, 208) argues the former may perform other, more diplomatic, tasks in countries where no political representation is present, no mention of independence or self-determination has been found on their respective websites or constituting documents. The assumption here is that they mostly fulfil tasks of economic and cultural promotion.

Catalonia possesses five political delegations abroad. They are located in Brussels, London, Paris, Berlin, and Washington D.C. The last four were established in 2008, and two more delegations are set to open in Vienna and Rome later this year (El País 2015). The establishment of these delegations are covered by article 194 of the Statute. They do not breach the *ius legationis* of the state, for the Catalan representatives do not have diplomatic status and thus are not official representatives of the state. Only with help from Spain, who could recognise them as part of a diplomatic mission, could they attain a status of some formality and be officially recognized by the host state (Colino 2007, 38-39). As such, Catalonia's delegations follow a system of co-location with their so called “Catalan Houses”, which house a political delegation, but also economic and cultural representation (Duran 2015, 210).

Their task is to facilitate bilateral relations with host and neighbouring countries (Duran 2015, 204; Departamento de la Vicepresidencia 2008b – 2008d). Next to bilateral relations, the delegations are also to maintain relations with the multilateral institutions located in the host countries (Duran 2015, 203). The Paris delegation is thus to facilitate participation in UNESCO (Departamento de la Vicepresidencia 2008b), the Washington one to promote collaboration with United Nations (UN) organisations (Departamento de la Vicepresidencia 2008e). In addition, all delegations are to support Catalan communities abroad and to follow the general instructions of the Generalitat (Departamento de la Vicepresidencia 2008a). These are not only circumscribed to the external projection of the domestic competences but, as the Generalitat's FAP (2010, 47) specifies, the delegations are to promote the Generalitat's interests in all areas.

Even though Catalan delegations lack the official status that would allow them to officially represent the Generalitat's interests in all areas, this language symbolically highlights the autonomy and actorness Catalonia strives for in the international arena. According to the previous Catalan government's minister of foreign affairs Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira, the delegations were “to set Catalonia on the international map” (Duran 2015, 203). Francesc Homs, minister of the presidency and spokesperson for the government of Catalonia, goes even further when stating that the new

4 There are 34 offices of economic promotion led by the government agency “Acció”, and nine cultural offices.

Rome and Vienna delegations are “to establish relations with other countries for the recognition of a Catalan state, if the Catalan population were to decide this outcome”(Government of Catalonia 2014). By establishing the delegations in state rather than regional capitals, Catalonia shows that it strives to act on the same playing field as states and be recognized as such.

Special mention has to be made of the Brussels office. Established in 1986 as a private-public enterprise called “Patronat Pro Europa”, it was turned into a proper diplomatic delegation in 2005 (Duran 2015, 197). The responsibilities of the head of delegation, Amadeu Altafaj, are varied. He is responsible for the communitarian policies within Catalonia's competences and the application of communitarian law. Furthermore, the delegation participates in various regional networks and in the Committee of Regions. Catalan representatives participate in working groups of the Commission as part of the delegation. Finally, lobbying for Catalan interests will be done through informal channels. Notice the explicit distinction between competences, which are fulfilled through official channels, and interests, advocated informally.

The latter function has become particularly important after the status of the delegation chief was elevated to that of permanent representative (Departament de la Presidència 2015). According to the permanent representative Amadeu Altafaj, this status gives him the official capacity to function as “the official political interlocutor of the Generalitat to the EU to explain the process of self-determination on behalf of the Catalan government”. Such a denomination is, under international law, usually reserved for accredited ambassadors of states and the relevant decree has been appealed by the Spanish government (La Vanguardia 2015a). Nevertheless, the permanent representative fulfils his new function through, by his own account, channels such as informal meetings with ambassadors, interactions with think tanks and the press, etc. The SCT has yet to declare itself on the matter.

3.2.3 Official Presidential Visits

The President of the Generalitat has been an important asset in the internationalization of Catalonia since it regained its autonomy. During Jordi Pujol's long presidency, presidential visits were his key paradiplomatic instrument (Duran 2015, 177). To give an idea, Colino (2007, 37) notes a total of 50 travels abroad by the Catalan president and other government officials in 1994. Presidential visits have remained relevant as a paradiplomatic tool. Through independent research, the presidential travels from 2008 – 2015⁵ have been recorded (see Table 2 in Appendix).

It shows that, while the number of presidential visits has not varied over the years (with the exception of 2014), their motive has. The main reasons for the travels are promotion of the Catalan

5 These years have been selected due to the availability of data.

economy and EU-related issues. Since 2012, the number of visits to promote the economy has substantially increased. This could be a government strategy to increase foreign direct investment as a result of the economic crisis. Also since 2012, travels have been made with the intention to internationalize the process of self-determination. This has been done through meeting officials of that country or giving public speeches on the process. Since the motives recorded here are the ones officially given by the government, the number of visits used for internalization of the right to decide might even be higher. It is conceivable that all while promoting the Catalan economy, the occasion is also used to inform about the process of self-determination and to dispel, for example, any fears independence could have on foreign investment. This, however, is speculation.

It is not uncommon for the President of the Generalitat to be received by highest political dignitaries. In fact, that was the main value of Jordi Pujol's personalized style of paradiplomacy. Anecdotal evidence, gathered from newspaper articles, shows that Artur Mas has had troubles of reaching those highest political circles in his visits abroad. He has mostly met with political officials at the ministerial level. Yet, after having embarked on the process of self-determination, he failed to be received by ministers of Putin's government in his visit to Moscow in 2012 (Noguer 2012b), and a meeting with the French ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense the next year were cancelled at the last minute. According to El País, “the influence of the Spanish embassy in these events varies depending on the source, but all agree that [...] the foreign authorities prefer to avoid any potential for crisis with the Government of Spain” (Noguer 2013a). Where the state's hand was clearly visible was when it issued a veto on a petition from Artur Mas to be invited as a “special guest” on the 2014 summit of the International Organization of La Francophonie, not having been previously informed by the Generalitat of said petition (González 2014). In sum, although Artur Mas frequently uses official visits abroad to promote the Catalan economy and internationalize the process of self-determination, it seems like he has more difficulties than his predecessors in meeting with the highest political mandataries. This might help explain why Mas did only three trips abroad in 2014, the year of the referendum. With enough battles to fight at home, it is possible that Mas chose to concentrate his energy there if the political gains of the presidential visits did not live up to expectations.

3.2.4 Participation in Multilateral Regional Networks and International Organisations

Catalonia is a member of a large number of networks (see Appendix, list 1). Article 197 of the Catalan Statute explicitly mandates that Catalonia should seek participation in them. The value of networks is perfectly summarized by Duran (2015, 287): “For the Catalan Generalitat, being involved in territorial cooperation is not only a means to sidestep the Spanish state and tap into

various flows of European funding, but also (and even more importantly) an instrument to reassert its political as well as cultural primacy within both the Mediterranean and the Pyrenees”.

Such has been the case of European Territorial Cooperation. It has strengthened decision-makers at the regional level because it provides the regions with an instrument with which to pose as new diplomatic actors vis-à-vis the state (ibid., 279). Regardless of the actual success of the network policies, they are a tool of regional empowerment which allows them to pursue their interests in the international arena, among equal partners. This is exactly the value of networks for Catalonia. The FAP 2010-2015 (2010, 67) defines this value as a facilitator of contacts with regional authorities and of lobbying against state and European institutions. REGLEG for example, the network for regions with legislative powers, lobbies for direct regional involvement in the EU legislative process (REGLEG). European networks specifically also allow Catalonia to highlight its European vocation and compromise with European integration (Sala de Premsa 2015).

For all their value, Duran (2015, 292) argues that network diplomacy is becoming a lesser tool in Catalan paradiplomacy. The decreasing number in the past years of presidential visits with motive of regional networks testifies to their decreased importance (Table 2). Instead, the focus of Catalan paradiplomacy has turned to participation in IOs. Today, Catalonia entertains accords of collaboration with eleven UN organizations related to development cooperation (FAP 2010, 63) (see Appendix, list 2).

Again, it is the Statute which mandates participation in international organisms that are of relevance for Catalonia's interests (Art. 198). Participation, however, is dependent on the rules of every organisation. The large majority of them awards full membership only to states. Nevertheless, regions may often affiliate themselves with IOs. Said affiliation of autonomous communities with IOs have to be green-lit by the state (Colino 2007, 59). Why is the prospect of becoming a member of IOs so enticing for Catalonia?

IOs are an exclusive club that mostly allow entry only to states. Participation or affiliation would symbolically demonstrate that Catalonia is part of the community of states. This is part of a grander strategy, outlined in the FAP (2010, 61), which envisions a “new multilateralism” in which regions are no longer excluded from effective participation in international affairs and are international actors with full rights. Yet Catalonia's impetus for IO participation is guided by an additional rationale: the Counsel for the National Transition, instituted by Artur Mas as an advisory board on the process of self-determination, recommends membership with IOs as a way to prepare the ground for secession. It argues that multilateral recognition, awarded by IO participation, is an essential step for the eventual recognition of an independent state (Consell 2014b, 7).

Catalonia's strategy of increasing their international profile through incremental IO

participation is best evidenced by their partnership with UNESCO. This organization is of special interest to Catalonia because it “[...] explicitly deals with the topic of cultural diversity” (Duran 2015, 203). This longstanding interest in UNESCO is even given special mention in the Statute (2006, Art. 198) and has led to the opening of the UNESCO Centre of Catalonia in Barcelona in 1984 and to the signing of two memoranda of understanding. In 2013, a third one was signed. This memorandum authorizes direct participation of Catalonia in UNESCO-led forums, next to the Spanish delegation (Government of Catalonia 2013). It does not provide Catalonia with a permanent representative, but it certainly strengthens their presence at UNESCO and their autonomy from Spain. Direct participation in UNESCO does not break Spanish law, for it is anchored in the Statute. Here again, the Statute of 2006 works as an opportunity structure for Catalonia's paradiplomacy.

3.2.5 Work within Central Government Delegations

The autonomous communities are seldom included in central government delegations. The Statute states in article 196 that, “when treaties affect Catalonia directly and singularly, the Generalitat may ask the government to integrate representatives of the Generalitat in the negotiating delegations”. The Spanish law of external action and service to the state posits that the government will inform the autonomous communities of international dealings affecting their competences. Similarly, the latter may ask the government for support of their international initiatives (Jefatura del Estado 2014, Art. 14.3). Furthermore, the government will collect and integrate the positions of the regions into its overall foreign policy strategy (ibid., Art. 35.3). These provisions are rather vague. More importantly, their fulfilment depends on the political will of the respective parties. Yet before we delve further into this issue, let us regard the one area where region-state cooperation is most prominent: the EU.

The position of the regions in EU-matters is represented by the Spanish permanent representation to the EU in the person of the Counsellor for Autonomous Affairs (Robledo 2006, 144). Created in 1996, he serves as the information channel between Brussels and the autonomous communities, and he liaises with the regional offices present in Brussels (ibid.). Since 2004, two Counsellors are chosen by the regions, and they may follow negotiations on European issues of interest to the regions, informing them of the newest developments (ibid., 145).

The Counsellor serves mostly as an instrument of information exchange. In addition, the autonomous communities convened the Coordination of Spanish Regional Offices (CORE). A voluntary and flexible arrangement, CORE is an informal coordination and consultation body

between the autonomous communities (Rodrigo 2012, 125). “Within CORE, the delegates of the different regional offices convene *inter se*, with representatives from the Spanish Embassy and with EU officials” (Duran 2015, 197).

While the Counsellors and CORE allow the regions to take influence on Spanish positions, Catalonia covets direct participation, mostly in the Council of the European Union⁶. Thus far, all autonomous communities agree on one delegate to represent all of them in the Spanish delegation, when matters of their competence are being discussed (Robledo 2006, 147). The regions have agreed to select said delegate on a rotational basis. The Catalan Permanent Representative, Amadeu Altafaj, expressed dissatisfaction with this situation. The Statute allows Catalonia to “participate in the formation of the positions of the state to the European Union, especially to the Council of the EU [...]” (Art. 186.2). Mr. Altafaj argued that this implies direct participation, contrary to the indirect participation that is the status quo and the interpretation of this article by the state. On occasion, a Catalan government representative is included in the Spanish delegation when matters of direct relevance for Catalonia are treated. However, Mr. Altafaj describes this presence as testimonial and defines its value as more symbolic than practical.

Direct representation is conceded to the regions in the committees and working groups of the EU Commission. Currently, the autonomous communities participate in more than 100 committees, and Catalonia is currently represented in five working groups (Gobierno de España). Furthermore, the regions receive a voice in the European legislative process through the Committee of Regions⁷. Created in 1992 by the Maastricht treaty, Catalonia was one of its main advocates at the time (Committee of Regions 2005, 241). Today, Mr. Altafaj describes the Committee as an “institution that has reached its ceiling”.

Catalonia aims higher and wants to have a greater say in the legislative process of the EU than what it is currently awarded. Since inclusion of regional representatives in Spanish delegations is decided by the parent state, regional influence can depend on the domestic political situation. Given the currently tense Spanish-Catalan relations, there is little impulse for cooperation between both sides beyond the legally prescribed. For this reason, Catalonia has begun to explore other, more informal channels by which to take influence internationally.

3.2.6 Public Diplomacy

The idea of creating a very own public diplomacy strategy was first proposed by Catalonia's FAP as one of the five strategic priorities identified in the plan. Even though the primary public diplomacy

⁶ The Maastricht Treaty established that the State representative in the Council “does not have to be a minister of the central government” (Robledo 2006, 146).

⁷ Each of the 17 autonomous communities nominate one member. Four more seats are occupied by representatives of local entities (Committee of Regions 2005, 237).

tool, DiploCat, was instituted in 2012, its gestation process began earlier, and thus before the process of self-determination began. Albert Royo, the secretary general, very consciously makes this point when asked of the impact of the “right to decide” on Catalan public diplomacy.

The Generalitat defines public diplomacy in its FAP (2010, 72) as “the sum of governmental and civil society initiatives and acts that aim to inform public opinion, national and international, and influence it, with regards of the image of Catalonia one wishes to project”. Public diplomacy is a tool often resorted to in paradiplomacy because it “fills the gap” of lacking formal foreign affairs competencies (Xifra and McKie 2012, 820). Facilitated by modern communication technologies, it is often used by regions for nation-building purposes (Melissen 2011, 17). Mr. Royo explains that DiploCat was created due to a necessity and an opportunity. The necessity was that Catalonia had a distinct international vocation, yet it lacked representation abroad. The opportunity was the re-imagining of the “Patronat Catalunya Mon”. When the delegations abroad became full political delegations, this private-public consortium was kept alive and turned into Catalonia's overarching public diplomacy framework.

Already under Jordi Pujol, public diplomacy was used to promote and build Catalan identity. Famous are the ads placed in foreign newspapers during the 1992 Olympic Games, asking 'Where is Barcelona?', the answer being Catalonia and not Spain (Keating 1999, 5). However, public diplomacy only was fully embraced and institutionalized with the FAP. While it is easy to take public diplomacy as “mere” propaganda or lobbying, effective public diplomacy requires something else: “public diplomacy is increasingly based on listening to 'the other', that is about dialogue rather than monologue, and is not just aimed at short-term policy objectives but also a long-term relationship building” (Melissen 2011, 10). While this relational aspect is missing in the FAP definition, it is repeatedly brought forward in conversation with Mr. Royo as he refers to DiploCat as a means to “establish a dialogue between societies”.

DiploCat is also meant to internationalize Catalonia's assets. That means the promotion of Catalan culture, language, and economy. In order to promote the “brand Catalonia”, DiploCat aims to establish relations with academia, or, as Mr. Royo puts it, “the anteroom to political circles”. Additionally, it promotes the placement of Op-eds from government officials on the international press, and it regularly invites foreign decision-makers and political officials to organized visits in Catalonia.

While Mr. Royo describes the creation of DiploCat as part of a “natural process” of paradiplomatic development informed by Catalonia's long-standing international vocation, minister of the presidency Francesc Homs stated upon DiploCat's creation that “the self-determination process in which we are engaged in will be a priority” (Noguer 2013b). If DiploCat's website is any

indication, its main priorities are indeed the promotion of the Catalan economy and the internationalization of the self-determination process (Consejo de Diplomacia Pública de Cataluña). Since DiploCat is constituted by a large variety of social actors, from the Generalitat to entrepreneurial entities, academic institutions, local representatives, and sports clubs, it is able to craft a unified message across civil society sectors. This consensus at home allows the spreading of a consistent narrative and image, of which the self-determination process has become an integral part. Indeed, the Counsel for the National Transition recommends an active communication strategy about the domestic political process to, ultimately, “prepare for the phase of recognition of Catalonia as an independent state” (Consell 2014a). Involved in this active communication strategy is the Catalan diaspora.

The use of diasporas can be an instrument of public diplomacy (Duran 2015, 210). Diasporas are a valuable instrument because they function as “bridge-builders” between countries and societies (Rana 2009, 367). If they are involved and integrated into an entity's public diplomacy, they extend the reach of the promotional efforts and provide a valuable entry point into foreign publics. The Catalan diaspora is organized in Catalan communities, of which 103 are active (Representación exterior). They receive institutional and financial support from the Generalitat so that they may promote and represent Catalonia abroad as agents of public diplomacy (Duran 2015, 213-14). In short, Catalan diasporas are to be “ambassadors of being Catalan” (ibid.).

Box 2: Summary Institutionalisation

- B1) Centralisation, rationalisation, and professionalization of the paradiplomatic apparatus
- B2) Five political delegations
- B3) Internationalization of self-determination process and economy promotion as the prime motives for presidential visits
- B4) Increased focus on IOs instead of regional networks
- B5) Limited opportunities to work within central government delegations
- B6) Public and Diaspora Diplomacy as tools to promote the “right to decide”

Does Catalan paradiplomacy take place outside of the constitutional framework? The answer is a clear no. By giving legal coverage and defining the competences of the Generalitat in the international arena, the Statute has allowed for the centralisation, professionalisation, and rationalisation of Catalan paradiplomacy. The Generalitat is intent on exploiting the full potential offered by the Statute, and in doing so it occasionally flirts with its limits and overstretches its provisions, testing the resolve of the Spanish government to contain Catalan paradiplomacy. Yet, by and large, this is not enough to conclude that Catalan paradiplomacy acts outside of its

constitutional confines. In fact, this only reinforces the notion of the Statute as an opportunity structure.

Instead it makes use of informal channels to advance its interests when they are not in line with those of Spain and to internationalize the “right to decide”. Has this political motive become the main principle guiding Catalan paradiplomacy, ultimately aiming to prepare the ground for secession? How have the guiding motives changed over time, and has the 2010 election of Artur Mas had an impact on them? The following chapter will attempt to provide an answer to these questions.

3.3 Guiding Motives: A New Double Export

3.3.1 The Evolution of Catalan Paradiplomacy until 2010

Since 1980, the different administrations of the Generalitat have had a distinct impact on the main motives guiding paradiplomacy. Still, they were informed by the two historical constants of Catalan politics: self-government and belonging to the Spanish state (Mas 2014, 9-10). This was the maxim of Jordi Pujol's centre-right nationalist government that governed Catalonia from 1980 until 2003. Paradiplomacy was a means to create a conscience internationally about the existence of Catalonia as a distinct nation, within the Spanish constitutional order (Paquin 2004, 229). Paradiplomacy can have great symbolic value. It can “entail the externalization of the concepts of political autonomy and sovereignty of non-state entities, as well as the internationalization [...] of the identity of their polity” (Duran 2015, 221). Paradiplomacy was an instrument of nation-building, and it was pursued via Pujol's active travel agenda on the one hand, on the concept of the double export on the other.

The double export is a strategy that aims at strengthening Catalonia's international presence with the simultaneous promotion of the Catalan economy and culture (ibid., 177; Paquin and Lachapelle 2005, 83). Thanks to its geographic position and history as a trading power, “internationalization has always been an integral part of Catalonia's economic profile” (Duran 2015, 174). This did not change under Pujol, as it presented itself as a champion of free trade and European integration (Paquin 2004, 211). In doing so, export promotion and the attraction of FDI became one of the core pillars of Catalan paradiplomacy (Duran 2015, 207). Two institutions, COPCA and CIDEM⁸, were created in 1985 to further those goals, their abroad offices becoming some of the first official Catalan representations abroad.

Lachapelle (in Paquin 2004, 210) argues that part of Catalonia's identity is the “capacity to respond to the effects of globalization and international competition while preserving their distinct

⁸ COPCA: Consorcio de Promoción Comercial de Cataluña
CIDEM: Centro de Innovación y Desarrollo Empresarial

cultural identity”. The promotion of this cultural identity functioned as the accompaniment of economic internationalization. Culture is a perfect vehicle and discursive framework for nation-building because it relies on and maximizes cultural and identitarian uniqueness. In the words of Artur Mas, culture is a strategic element for Catalonia because it is inextricably connected to the image the world has of Catalonia (Mas 2013, 12). The foundation for this was laid by Jordi Pujol's paradiplomacy, opening “Houses of Catalonia” all over the world which presented Catalonia's history and heritage as key identifiers for what it means to be Catalan (Paquin 2004, 220). At the heart of international cultural promotion, however, lies the Catalan language (Duran 2015, 234). It actively promoted the teaching of Catalan in the Spanish departments of foreign universities (Paquin 2004, 221). Furthermore, the Generalitat sent teachers of Catalan abroad (ibid., 220). Relying on culture as a carrier of paradiplomacy gave Catalonia political power, for it could position itself as a defender of nonstate languages and cultures (Duran 2015, 234).

The foundations of modern Catalan paradiplomacy obeyed mostly economic and cultural motivations. However, it had a distinct political element as well. The creation of the Committee of Regions and establishing a presence in Brussels where core concerns for the Generalitat. Pujol's active international agenda increased his prestige, thus giving him greater leverage in internal political negotiations with Spain, a game he played deftly. The international promotion of Catalonia as a nation was predicated upon achieving recognition as a nation, but as a nation within Spain. Indeed, his time in office was marked by absence of conflict with Spain (Paquin 2004, 225). The downside for Catalan paradiplomacy was that, since it was so reliant on the president, it remained unfocused and fragmented. As Duran argues, “there was no grand design behind it”. This changed under the “tri-partit”.

“Tri-partit” is the moniker given to the coalition between the socialists, the centre-right nationalist CiU, and the separatist “Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya” (ERC) that governed Catalonia from 2003 to 2010. In this arrangement, the responsibilities for foreign affairs fell to the leader of ERC, Josep-Lluís Carod Rovira (Duran 2015, 177). With him at the helm, paradiplomacy became more ambitious and an instrument to increase autonomy at home. The opportunity for this was offered by the 2006 Statute of Autonomy, and articulated in the FAP. While paradiplomacy under Jordi Pujol intended to put Catalonia on the map, but with no grand design to guide it, the FAP brought focus to it by centring on distinct foreign policy objectives.

A shift in the Generalitat's management of its international activity reflects the increased political ambition attached to paradiplomacy. The Pujol administration regarded paradiplomacy as an instrument to transmit an idea of Catalonia internationally. Now, the Generalitat shifted away from this perception of paradiplomacy as an intangible value and moved towards diplomatic

mimicry. By emulating the diplomacy of states, appropriating its structures, instruments, and values, it would aid its legitimacy as an international actor and support its bid for greater autonomy (Duran 2015, 344). By adopting the language of states, it would put itself on the same playing field. For, as stated in the FAP (2010, 13), Catalonia now aimed to become a global actor that is responsible and capable of confronting global challenges and defend its interests. To this end, it opened delegations abroad in 2008 and significantly increased spending for foreign action. The FAP even advocated a diplomatic upgrade of its delegations, for them to “make full use of the rights, immunity and privileges provided for in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations” (Duran 2015, 204).

One of the avenues used to increase Catalonia's international relevance was development cooperation. Increased participation in development projects allowed it to become a partner of the relevant IOs, NGOs, and UN organizations. As Catalonia “recognizes itself as a “part of the international development community”, it has to coordinate its actions with the other actors” (FAP 2010, 62). Also, it allowed Catalonia to cast itself as a responsible actor and defender of human rights, thus adding legitimacy to its paradiplomacy (ibid., 33). Large expenses were committed to making development cooperation one of the focal points of Catalan paradiplomacy (Table 1).

While Catalan international activity was increasingly guided by political motivations, the notion of the double export remained highly relevant. One of the five main objectives outlined in the FAP is the internationalization of the Catalan economy (ibid., 109). Indeed, the Generalitat created “Acc16” in 2008 by merging COPCA and CIDEM, a move intended to eliminate redundancies and harmonize internationalization efforts. Asia and North Africa were identified as key markets for Catalonia, and visits by the President together with Catalan entrepreneurs to Japan, Morocco, and Algiers give credit to these intentions. Similarly, the diffusion of Catalan culture remained relevant. The Generalitat created the institute Ramon in 2005 Lull to promote the Catalan culture and language abroad (Colino 2007, 47). Yet even though the importance of language and culture for Catalan paradiplomacy is mentioned repeatedly in the FAP, and participation in UNESCO remains a major goal (FAP 2010, 100), cultural matters are not one of the five main objectives outlined in the FAP. Cultural matters seemed to have taken a back seat to political and economic affairs.

For all of Catalonia's increased international political ambition in the years 2003-2010, its paradiplomacy did not present a challenge to Spain's national sovereignty. Under Pujol, Catalonia's paradiplomacy meant to highlight Catalonia as a distinct nation. Under the “tri-partit”, Catalonia aimed for recognition as a state, but as a state within Spain. Catalonia desired greater autonomy, but not independence. The Statute called Catalonia a state (Art. 3), and the SCT left that article intact, meaning that the aim of recognition as a state is not counter to the constitution. Yet ERC is an

independentist party. Duran also says that ERC sees paradiplomacy more as protodiplomacy and thus as a tool for achieving independence. However, Carod-Rovira stated at the time that while Catalonia aspires to its own foreign policy, it is to be kept within the Spanish legal framework and based on collaboration and mutual respect with the Spanish Government and Diplomacy (Colino 2007, 42). The FAP itself, while charting an ambitious international strategy, highlights repeatedly the need for seeking synergies and cooperation with the central government. Ultimately, paradiplomacy between 2003 and 2010 was well within the two historical constants of achieving greater autonomy within the Spanish state. Was that pact broken by the government of Artur Mas?

3.3.2 The Election of Artur Mas in 2010: A Turning Point for Catalan Paradiplomacy?

The election of Artur Mas in 2010 did, perhaps surprisingly, not bring about a major change in Catalonia's diplomatic priorities. Says Duran (2015, 177), “[...] the diplomatic priorities stayed remarkably consistent, because of the large degree of consensus on external policies that the region should follow in order to strengthen its global as well as domestic stance *vis-à-vis* the authorities in Spain”. The FAP 2010-2015, even though released under the previous administration, remained the guiding document for Catalan paradiplomacy. In conversation, Duran adds that staying the course is surprising due to CiU's historical conservatism. Staying the course meant continuing to assert itself internationally, potentially at the risk of eliciting conflict with Spain. However, he adds that CiU's attitude towards paradiplomacy was a reflection of a changed domestic reality. Indeed, a closer inspection reveals slight but significant changes in discourse and proves that the nationalist popular wave that began in summer of 2010 had repercussions on Catalan foreign action.

During the 2010 electoral campaign, CiU issued an entire book for the presentation of its ideas on foreign affairs (Mas et al. 2010). In it, CiU recalls the traditional motive of nation-building when saying that “Catalonia, as a nation, has the right to be visible internationally” (ibid., 18). It goes on to invoke the ambition of the “tri-partit”-years of being recognized as a state on equal terms to the Spanish one, citing the Belgian regions and their control over foreign policy as an example (ibid., 20-21). But at the same time, it reminds that “the Spanish state is, presently, the state of the Catalans” (ibid., 18).

This implies that Catalonia's presence in Spain could change over time and, indeed, the foreign policy manifesto supports the “right to decide” of the Catalans to chose their own future. The electoral program of CiU to the parliamentary elections 2010 posits the “right to decide” as one of CiU's four core electoral premises (CiU 2010, 6). Yet in these documents, the “right to decide” is not linked to independence from Spain. Instead, in 2010 CiU understood the “right to decide” as the “right to decide the full management of [Catalonia's] economic resources, by means of their own

financing model [...]” (ibid., 82). CiU linked the right to decide with achieving greater self-government and, crucially, the achievement of a fiscal pact with the central government. Consequently, CiU's foreign policy program mentions the “right to decide” in connection with achieving international recognition as a nation, not as an independent state (Mas et al. 2010, 53).

Next to the issue of national recognition, what defined the first legislature of Artur Mas was the economic crisis. Now more than ever, the Generalitat resorted to paradiplomacy as a tool to attract investment. CiU's foreign policy program places a heavy emphasis on economic initiatives, stating that “the president of the Generalitat has to be the first merchant of the Catalans, the “traveller” of Catalan companies” (ibid., 17). Table 2 shows that Artur Mas kept that promise. Both the economy and the issue of national recognition guaranteed the relevance of paradiplomacy as a channel to attain externally what could not be achieved internally.

Domestically, Artur Mas engaged in negotiations about a fiscal pact with the newly elected Spanish president Mariano Rajoy. The failure of those talks prompted Artur Mas⁹, who had bet his electoral promises on that card, to call snap elections for November 2012. It also changed the meaning of the “right to decide” from the right to fiscal autonomy and national recognition towards independence from Spain. Two official visits abroad from Artur Mas in 2012 prior to his re-election reflect that change in meaning (table 2). In July 2012, with the negotiations on the fiscal pact still ongoing, he visited Lisbon to demand a “fair fiscal pact” (Noguer 2012a). The travel can be seen as a strategy to gain leverage in the domestic negotiations. In contrast, when Mas visited Brussels in November that year the talks had already failed and snap elections announced. During that visit, the president of the Generalitat spoke of the right of the Catalan people to decide whether they wanted an independent Catalonia in Europe (García 2012). The traditional guiding motive of Catalan politics, greater autonomy in exchange for a commitment to Spain, was now broken.

While CiU did not outright support independence due to an internal split in the matter¹⁰, it vowed to bring the process of self-determination to a successful close, whatever the result. CiU's electoral program for the 2012 parliamentary elections is solely focused on the issue of national transition and the need to build structures of state (CiU 2012). This includes a national foreign policy and a diplomatic apparatus that can sustain it. The national transition is aimed towards “achieving an own state within the European framework” (ibid., 15). The role of foreign action would be to “promote the maximal possible integration of Catalonia in the world” and that the national transition be accompanied by “greater institutional, social, cultural, economic, and national

9 The negotiations between Mas and Rajoy were considered as failed by September 20, 2012 (El País 2012).

10 CiU unites two parties, *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC) and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*.

Whereas CDC fully committed to independence from Spain even before the fiscal pact negotiations failed (Roger 2012), *Unió* has so far denied support for secession.

recognition” (ibid., 137). Whereas in 2010 the economy was the major focus point of Catalan paradiplomacy, now political issues take centre stage.

The 2012 election reaffirmed Artur Mas as president of the Generalitat, although CiU had lost its absolute majority and required the support of the traditionally separatist ERC to form a government. In his speech of investiture, Artur Mas reinforced the pursuit of a national transition based on the “right to decide” as the prime objective of his newly elected government (Mas 2012, 2). His efforts are supported by a broad parliamentary majority. With Resolution 5/X (Parlament de Catalunya 2013, 3), the parliament declared the “Catalan people as a sovereign legal and political subject” and their right to decide their own future via democratic means. This is echoed in the Catalan law of external action, which defines the “right to decide of peoples” as one of the guiding principles of Catalan paradiplomacy (Departament de la Presidència 2014b, Art. 3e)). Following the parliament's lead, Artur Mas instituted the Counsel for National Transition, which was to issue recommendations to the president for a successful national transition. The Counsel sees international activities as indispensable for achieving a system of international support and alliances that would eventually help the recognition of an independent Catalan state (Consell 2014a, 5; Consell 2014b, 7;). That the Counsel's advice is heeded was evidenced by a Speech Artur Mas (2015, 2-3) gave in January 2015. Defending the necessity of situating Catalonia in the international arena, he stated the following: “[...] in the moment of truth, which we hope will not arrive too late, everything will hinge on international recognition, something we tend to forget from time to time”.

Box 3: Guiding Motives

C1) Political: guiding motive since 2010

C2) Economic: guiding motive since 1980

C3) Cultural: guiding motive from 1980-2010

Catalan paradiplomacy has adopted a new double export. While Catalan paradiplomacy under Jordi Pujol was guided by the promotion of the Catalan economy and culture, now the cultural aspect seems to have been supplanted by the “right to decide”. Since there are special institutions for the promotion of the economy, this perhaps leaves the political efforts more focused towards the “right to decide” and thus the preparation of the international scene for secession from Spain. Yet the turning point for Catalan paradiplomacy was not, as initially expected, the year 2010. Rather, the preparation of the ground for secession became a guiding principle of Catalan paradiplomacy after the 2012 election of Mas.

Could it not be that it was not Artur Mas' re-election, but ERC's renewed political relevance after the 2012 elections, that brought about the politization of Catalan paradiplomacy? After all, it

was under ERC's stewardship in the years of the “tri-partit” where paradiplomacy was rationalised, professionalised, and institutionalised. Furthermore, ERC is a separatist party that views paradiplomacy as a tool to achieve independence. What speaks against this train of thought is evidence that CiU already defended the use of paradiplomacy to internationalize the domestic conflict before its re-election in 2012 (CiU 2012). It was not CiU's need for ERC support to form a government that radicalised CiU's policies. Rather, it was their pre-existing ideological closeness that facilitated cooperation between the two parties.

By internationalizing Catalonia's bid for independence, a domestic conflict spilled over into the international arena. How the Spanish government perceives this apparent challenge, and whether it affected the cooperation between the Spanish ministry of foreign affairs and Catalan paradiplomacy, will be the topic of the next chapter.

3.4 The Attitude of Spain towards Catalan paradiplomacy

3.4.1 The Perceptual Dimension: “What Diplomacy?”

The Spanish government's position to Catalonia's demands for a referendum follows a legal argument. The constitution proclaims the Spanish nation's indivisibility and does not allow for referendums to be carried out by the autonomous communities (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación 2014, 12). Following this argument, not only would a referendum by the Generalitat be illegal, but the hands of the government are also tied on the matter because allowing a referendum would endanger the indivisibility of Spain. Only a change of the constitution could legally empower the Generalitat to call a referendum on independence. Spain's approach towards Catalan paradiplomacy follows the same rationale.

Following article 149.1.3 of the constitution (1978), the state has exclusive competence over international relations. It follows that Catalan paradiplomacy cannot, legally speaking, exist. When asked about the international activities of Catalonia, Mr. José Luis Mira, the Spanish Counsellor of Education in Brussels, responded that “Catalan diplomacy does not exist.” It makes no difference whether one called it paradiplomacy, international activity, or diplomacy. Since it does not exist, Catalan paradiplomacy does not mount a challenge on Spanish sovereignty. There are no Catalan diplomats pursuing a political agenda, only Catalans within the Spanish diplomatic service. The question about potential conflict between Catalan representatives and Spanish diplomats thus becomes obsolete.

There is a method to this outright denial of existing realities. When asked about this, Manuel Duran responded that while denial of Catalan paradiplomacy was their official position, Spain was well aware of Catalan paradiplomacy. Yet “acknowledgement of Catalan paradiplomacy would

force Spain to acknowledge that there are other international actors besides the Spanish state”. Acknowledging it would mean having to engage with it, something the Spanish state is not ready to do. The rationale behind the Spanish position became clearer as the conversation with Mr. Mira wore on. He did not deny there being a domestic conflict between the Spanish government and Spain. Rather, he saw it as a temporary political situation. Comparing the nationalist surge in Catalonia to the Basque “plan Ibarretxe” of the mid-2000s, he argued “what goes up, the time will come where it comes down again”. With this in mind, the Spanish strategy of denial is one that aims at outlasting the Catalan nationalist surge.

The fact that there is a coherent strategy towards Catalan paradiplomacy indicates that it is perceived as a challenge. The ministry of foreign affairs sent a directive to all Spanish embassies outlining the official Spanish position on the conflict with Catalonia. There, it says that “the initiative of convoking a referendum in Catalonia based on a pretended “right to decide” represents a big political (and also juridical) challenge” (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación 2014, 238). It is logical to assume that so are international activities that internationalize said right. Mr. Royo has no doubt that this is the case, adding that Spain will defend its competences “tooth and nail”. The strongest indication that Spain feels challenged by Catalan paradiplomacy is the fact that the government moved to appeal the Catalan law of external action. Following the appeal, Vice President Soraya Saénz de Santamaría said that the law “treats the Generalitat as an international actor next to the Spanish State” and it undermines the Spanish prerogative in foreign affairs (La Vanguardia 2015b).

Yet not all of Catalan international activities seem to be regarded as a challenge. Mr. Mira acknowledges Catalan international activity as those activities undertaken by the Catalan empresarios and businessmen. He lauds their efforts in promoting the Catalan economy, which is to the benefit of the entire state. It seems that, when approaching Catalan paradiplomacy, the Spanish government seems to have fallen back on a well-established pattern: international activities that promote regional economic development are acknowledged and perceived as opportunities, whereas engagement on the political level is a challenge to the state's monopoly on international relations.

3.4.2 The Practical Dimension: Coexistence “Side by Side”

It is difficult to classify the relationship between the Catalan representatives and the Spanish embassies. As described by Colino (2007, 39), “the relations between Spanish embassies and the offices of the different [autonomous communities] vary greatly in the different countries, ranging from relations of maximal cooperation, mutual recognition and tight collaboration in some cases, to mutual ignorance or cold relations, which in part depends on the personality of the ambassador and

the attitude of the autonomous delegate”. However, some boundaries can be established. Catalan paradiplomacy cannot be described as being carried out jointly with the Spanish state. While there are mechanisms for Catalonia to influence Spanish decision-making internally, those are currently of limited use due to the domestic political situation. Furthermore, Catalonia has worked hard to establish its own foreign affairs apparatus and representational offices abroad, next to those of Spain. Yet it can also not be classified as independent, for it lacks treaty-making powers and diplomatic status. Neither fully cooperative nor fully confrontational, Catalan-Spanish international cooperation lies somewhere in between.

For Mr. Mira, since there are no Catalan diplomats, they are fully integrated within the Spanish diplomatic apparatus and thus relations are seamless. Furthermore, he adds that the working relationship is between people, who are able to work well together no matter the domestic political situation. This is echoed by the Catalan permanent representative in Brussels, Amadeu Altafaj. While he heads a Catalan political delegation and thus disproves Mr. Mira's denial of Catalan paradiplomacy, he describes the day-to-day working relations with his Spanish counterparts as positive and as characterized by institutional respect. However, he adds that domestic politics can interfere with the positive day-to-day relations.

It is Mr. Duran who perhaps best describes relations between Catalan representatives and Spanish diplomats. He argues that their relationship is not confrontational, but they “live next to each other”. Confrontation exists on the national level, between Madrid and Barcelona, not among their offices abroad. Rather, referring to the Catalan office in Brussels, cooperation between Spain and Catalonia depends on mutual interest to do so. While this will be the case more often than not, there will be instances in which Catalonia will feel its interest best represented by sidestepping its Spanish counterparts and acting on its own. Such is the case with the process of self-determination, which Catalonia promotes independently through informal channels. This works both ways however, as sometimes it is the Spanish delegation that will not want to cooperate with the Catalan one.

Prior to the Catalan bid for independence, the international relationship between Spain and Catalonia seems best classified as following a cooperative-coordinated pattern. Keating (2000, 10) found that “there is, indeed, a great deal of cooperation between the Spanish and the Catalan actors abroad, especially on economic matters”. Colino (2007, 54) agreed with this. Today, that relationship seems best classified as a dysfunctional cooperative-coordinated relationship. Coordination mechanisms exist, yet they are highly politicized and thus dependent on the will of the central government to engage in cooperation. While the day-to-day working relationship is sound, Catalonia will on punctual issues informally defend its own positions.

Box 4*Perception*

D1,2) Economic promotion as an opportunity,
political one as a challenge

Practice

D3) dysfunctional cooperative-coordinated
pattern

4. Conclusion

Catalan paradiplomacy plays by the rules. The Generalitat might interpret those rules to its advantage, yet for the most part it acts within the Spanish constitutional framework. By giving clear legal coverage and also defining the competences of the Generalitat in the international arena, the 2006 Statute of Autonomy has significantly allowed for the development and professionalisation of the Catalan paradiplomatic apparatus. Gone are the days in which Catalan paradiplomacy was carried almost entirely on the shoulders of the President of the Generalitat. In addition, the Statute contains articles that, depending on interpretation, would increase the Generalitat's international powers beyond what the SCT and the Spanish government intended. There is no denying that the Statute has worked as a domestic opportunity structure. However, the Statute in itself is not a challenge to the sovereignty of Spain. On the contrary, it contains mechanisms calling for cooperation between the Generalitat and the state. Like any legal document, it can be interpreted many ways, and how it is interpreted depends largely on the motive behind it.

The guiding motive of Catalan paradiplomacy has changed over the years. Under Pujol, the so called double export of cultural and economic promotion informed Catalonia's international activity, the goal being recognition as a nation. Today, there is a new double export. The promotion of the process of self-determination has become a guiding motive of equal importance to the economy. The integration of the process into Catalan paradiplomacy began after Artur Mas' election in 2010. However, the “right to decide” was still tied to the achievement of a fiscal pact with the parent state. It was not until negotiations failed and Artur Mas was re-elected in 2012, that the “right to decide” implied the possibility of independence from Spain. The main tools used by Catalan paradiplomacy to promote the process abroad are lobbying actions, affiliation with IOs and networks, presidential visits, and public diplomacy. This reaffirms Blatter et al. (2010, 180), who find that regions are unlikely to act outside of the constitutional framework. Rather, Catalonia resorts to informal channels to promote the process of self-determination. In doing so, Catalan

paradiplomacy challenges the national sovereignty of Spain because it promotes a policy whose outcome would endanger Spain's territorial integrity.

This thesis finds that regional nationalism can indeed lead a region to challenge the parent state internationally. It thus contradicts Tatham (2013, 77), who finds the contrary. However, it is not nationalism *per se* that challenges states, but only that which aims at independence rather than recognition as a nation or as a federal state. Whereas the latter can be accommodated by the parent state, that is more difficult with secessionism. Since different nationalist goals may have different consequences for paradiplomacy, a refinement of the nationalism dimension could be in order to mirror this reality.

Can Catalonia's international activities then be described as protodiplomacy? Protodiplomacy is the kind of paradiplomacy that articulates a separatist message (Kuznetsov 2015, 30; Ducachek 1990, 2). Yet this is not what Catalonia does. Instead, Catalonia's paradiplomacy is geared towards achieving a certain status as an international actor and building a system of alliances that would support an eventual secession. The narrative it promotes abroad is not concentrated on independence, but on the legitimacy of the internal process of self-determination. This makes for a slight but important difference that calls into question the usefulness of the term protodiplomacy in its contemporary definition.

Still, these findings may be applicable only to the Catalan context. In order to increase their generalizability, the Catalan case needs to be tested against others. Scotland and Québec come to mind as they have at some point in time vied for independence. Are the motives that guide their paradiplomacy contingent on the election of a government that vies for secession? Both regions have differently developed paradiplomacy structures. In how far is secessionist paradiplomacy dependent on a professionalised and centralised paradiplomacy apparatus, and is there a difference in the instruments used? The case of Bavaria would also be an interesting comparison, for it boasts a highly developed paradiplomacy, yet there is no conflict with the parent state. What are the implications for the Catalan case? By increasing the numbers of cases it would be possible to develop a theory that fleshes out the political and nationalist motivations of a region's paradiplomacy and the elements that sustain it.

Avenues for further research abound. In addition to the message it promotes, Catalan paradiplomacy is focused on building institutions of state, to which belongs an effective foreign policy apparatus. The building of state institutions in the Catalan state presents no direct challenge because it follows the rules. However, Catalonia's narrative of being a state and the achievement of international recognition radically depends on it. Does a professionalized and centralized paradiplomacy influence the guiding motives and the content of paradiplomacy? Does it better

sustain a separatist message? This nexus between domestic structural and institutional elements and the international arena has not yet been sufficiently explored from a paradiplomacy perspective and deserves a closer look.

This thesis assumes that domestic societal factors, such as economic growth, affect paradiplomacy only through the ballot box. However, it is possible that domestic occurrences directly influence Catalan paradiplomacy. For example, DiploCat unites many different societal actors under its roof. Also, for Catalan paradiplomacy to spread a coherent message abroad there needs to be a certain consensus on that message across civil society at home, especially seeing how the Generalitat also relies on diasporas and Catalan citizens as paradiplomacy instruments. Further research needs to be done in how domestic occurrences, for example popular movements and the economy, may directly impact the international activities of regions.

The Catalan case itself will remain relevant as regional and national elections at the end of this year will test the longevity of the process of self-determination. How the results affect Catalonia's paradiplomacy will be interesting to observe. Is Spain right in betting on the slow demise of the process as the economy recovers? This might happen and also change the positions Catalonia defends internationally. However, the will of Catalonia to have its own voice internationally is unlikely to subside. Institutions have been build and powers devolved. By denying this reality, the Spanish government is endangering the coherence of its foreign policy. Perhaps this will change once the secessionist narrative wanes. However, both the Spanish government and the Generalitat should look towards cooperation, not competition or confrontation, as the best opportunity to pursue their interests.

The fragmentation of the international arena and the accompanying rules and norms is a global phenomenon (Hocking et al. 2012, 5). Spain's continued centralist approach to foreign affairs seems outdated and not equipped to face these challenges. As argued by Hocking et al. (ibid.), “the breakdown of the distinction between domestic and international affairs means that the national interests of a country now involve the 'whole of government'” and therefore, the importance of coordination between government agencies”. By expanding the internal cooperation mechanisms and making them independent from political will, Spain and Catalonia would take a first step in that direction. Yet his development will have to be preceded by a domestic political solution. Paradiplomacy, after all, is not the cause but the reflection of conflicts at home. The relations between the Catalan offices and Spanish diplomatic representations abroad are not as strained as one would think. This provides a good basis for increased cooperation between both foreign policy apparatuses, for the benefit of both sides.

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Appendix

Table 1: Expenses by the Generalitat in Foreign Relations (in Million €)

Year	Total Foreign Relations	Foreign Action	Development Cooperation
2001	14,5	-	14,5 (2.410.000.000 pesetas)
2004	19	-	19
2005	29	-	29
2006	50	6	44
2008	93	26	67
2009	75	25,2	49,8
2010	56,8	17,8	39
2011	35	13	22
2012	26,9	11,9	15
2014	16,5	10,3	6,2
2015	19,7	11,1	8,6

Assembled from the following sources:

for 2000 – 2011: Departament d'Economia i Coneixement

for 2010 – 2012: Transparència Gencat

Projecte Pressupostos 2014 and 2015

*no data for the year 2013

Table 2: Official Presidential Visits

Year	Total Nr. Visits	Date	Country	Motive
2008	6		Brussels	EU
			Brussels	EU
			Morocco	Economy promotion
			France	Regional network
			Japan	Economy promotion
			Mexico	Memorandum of Understanding Catalonia-Nuevo León
2009	6		Brussels	EU
			Andorra	Accord Andorra-Catalonia
			Czech Republic	Regional network
			France	Regional network
			Algiers	Economy promotion
			Denmark	UN
2011	6	27.1.2011	Toulouse	Regional network and economy
		3.3.2011	Brussels	EU
		27.5.2011	London	Economy promotion
		6.6.2011	Brussels	EU
		21.9.2011	Brussels	Regional network
		24.11.2014	Rome	Culture
2012	8	9.1.2012	London Munich	EU
		29.2.2012	Morocco	Economy promotion
		21.3.2012	Brussels	Regional network
		19.6.2012	USA	Economy promotion
		10.7.2012	Portugal	Internalization of self-determination process
		1.11.2012	Russia	Economy promotion
		7.11.2012	Brussels	Internationalization of self-determination process
2013	7	25.2.2013	Amsterdam	EU
		22.4.2013	Brussels	Economy promotion
		6.7.2013	Brazil	Economy promotion
		30.9.2013	Brussels	EU
		9.11.2013	Israel	Economy promotion
		24.11.2013	India	Economy promotion
		?	Paris	Internalization of self-

				determination process
				Accord UNESCO-Catalonia
2014	3	28.2.2014	Brazil	?
		3.6.2014	France	Culture and
				EU
		17.6.2014	USA	Economy promotion
2015	1	7.4.2015	USA	Accord Catalonia-California for economic cooperation
				Internalization of self-determination process

Sources: Agenda de Govern, supplemented by searches on El País and La Vanguardia

List 1: Networks with Catalan Participation

European Territorial Cooperation: Euroregion Pyrenees-Mediterranean, The Working Community of the Pyrenees, Programme MED.

Other European networks: Four Motors of Europe, REGLEG, Conference for peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR), Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), Assembly of European Regions.

Global networks: Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4SD), Forum of Regional Governments and Global Associations of Regions (FOGAR), United Cities and Local Governments.

Source: Duran 2015, 292

List 2: Catalonia – UN collaboration

UNDP, UNHCR, FAO, UNWFP, UN Women, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNRWA, OHCHR, UN NGLS, and the global fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

Source: Secretaría de Asuntos Exteriores b