

'Truth is the first casualty'

How does embedded journalism influence the news coverage of TFU in the period 2006-2010?

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For all soldiers and journalists who risk their lives by fulfilling their private mission in war zones.

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Summary

In 2006, the Dutch Ministry of Defense introduces an official embed policy, when the Netherlands start participating in the NATO-led security mission ISAF in Afghanistan with Task Force Uruzgan (TFU). Hundreds of journalists participate in the embed program and only a few journalists work 'independently'.

From an ethical point of view, embedded journalism is considered as controversial. Main objection of critics is that embedded journalism blurs the boundaries between the military and the media. Analyses of researchers show that this symbiosis is also reflected in reports. This raises the question: ***in which ways does the Dutch embedded news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) differ from the Dutch non-embedded news coverage?***

In order to answer this question a content analysis is done on a selection (180 articles of five papers and three news magazines) of the Dutch news coverage of TFU between 2006 and 2010.

The results show that in general, the news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 is not dominated by embedded journalism. In the second period of TFU (2008-2010) there is even a tendency of less embedded journalism.

However, in general, embedded and non-embedded journalism do result in different content. Embedded journalism is connected with usage of a single type of source, that is military sources; topics related to the military (military actions, daily life at the camp); episodic framing; human interest framing in relation to the military; military framing and finally more positive headlines and more supportive elements regarding TFU/the Dutch government. Non-embedded journalism is connected with usage of multiple, especially Afghan sources; topics related to violence, Afghan society, culture and religion and economics and politics; thematic framing; human interest framing in relation to civilians and finally more critical headlines and more critical elements/statements regarding TFU/the Dutch government.

In several respects, embedded and non-embedded journalism are complementary. The majority of the embedded and non-embedded articles is neutral and within both groups individual journalists vary appreciation with criticism and/or challenging. So, this research emphasizes that both forms of reporting have added value and that a balance between embedded and non-embedded journalism contributes to diversity in news coverage.

1 Introduction: 'Truth is the first casualty'

'In war, truth is the first casualty'. This quote originates from an old Greek play writer of tragedies, Aeschylus, (525 BC - 456 BC) and is more than 2,000 years old. However, results of a Google-search in 2011 show that the quote is still very relevant and much used in discussions about modern warfare. Examples are quotes from the Republican senator Hiram Warren Johnson (1866-1945) and British politician Arthur Ponsonby (1871-1946) referring to World War I. More recent are the many applications of the quote in (critical) statements and articles regarding the Iraq-war, ranging from columnist Peter Wilby from the respected newspaper *The Guardian* (2007) to activist Julian Assange at a press conference in October 2010. Last but not least the standard work on war reporting and war propaganda by Phillip Knightley (2004) is entitled 'The First Casualty'.

In liberal democracies, the free acquisition of news and a free press are considered as great goods. In this, journalists (the 'Fifth Power') play a prominent part: they function as 'watch dogs'. This function is especially relevant in times of war. Journalists are expected to inform the public about the course of wars in which their countries are involved, since wars are being financed with communal money and lives of national military are at stake. On top of this, journalists are an important source regarding the observance of the Convention of Geneva (which protects civilians, prisoners of war and wounded soldiers) by the military. (Hendriks, 2008:9)

Over time, norms have been developed for 'good journalism'. The theory of journalism, developed by the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism, reflects nine principles that underlie journalism. The first and third principle underscores the importance of (verification of) the truth: 'journalism's first obligation is to the truth' and 'its essence is a discipline of verification'. The fourth and fifth principle confirm the necessity of objectivity and independence: 'its practitioners must maintain an independence from those they cover' and 'it must serve as an independent monitor of power'.

However, in war, not all parties have the same interests: 'The essence of successful warfare is secrecy; the essence of successful journalism is publicity'. This famous and much cited quote as used by the British Ministry of Defense in the Falkland war (Evans), reflects the tension between the military and the media. Throughout the ages, war journalists are confronted with propaganda and censure by (military) authorities. In the 20th century, new technologies and a firm information management have complicated the media-military relationship. A recently reintroduced and important component of this information management is **embedded journalism**.

1a *The phenomenon of embedded journalism*

Embedded journalism refers to 'news reporters being attached to military units, involved in armed conflicts' (Wikipedia). The term 'embedded journalism' can be applied to many interactions between the military and the media in the past. Recently, the term embedded journalism is above all associated with the invasion and following war in Iraq. The large-scale embed program as initiated by the Bush

Administration in 2003, is considered as a watershed in the US military-media relationship. At the start of the war, 775 reporters and photographers are travelling as embedded journalists. The degree of participation is high, but so is criticism. According to researchers like Brandenburg (2007) and Pfau et al (2004), embedded journalism blurs the boundaries between the military and the media. Journalists become part of the military team and might lose their required distance to the subject and get a limited focus. According to research by Pfau et al (2004) and Aday et al (2005) embedded journalism results in reports which are mainly episodic and focus on a military perspective. On top of this, according to Pfau et al (2004), embedded reporters produce stories with a positive bias.

In 2006, the Dutch Ministry of Defense (MoD) also introduces an official embed policy, when the Netherlands start participating in the NATO-led security mission ISAF in Afghanistan with Task Force Uruzgan (TFU). Hundreds of journalists participate in the embed program and only a few journalists work 'independently'. This unbalance evokes criticism and partly from the media themselves. One of the most outspoken opponents of embedded journalism is Arnold Karskens. According to Karskens, embedded journalism is no journalism, but 'defense-public relations' (IS Magazine, 2010). He especially opposes the (self-) censure. "When you're travelling embedded, you probably see half of what you would be able to see. You could consider this as half journalism. When Defense on top of this reviews your article with a red pencil, you keep a quarter." (...) "It's about keeping your intellectual freedom. (...) Who travels embedded is dealing with the red line. They pay your air tickets, your food, your safety and your transport. As a good journalist you are not able to sustain within the walls of Camp Holland, or you have the wrong attitude". (Koens, 2008).

Journalist Joeri Boom participates in the embed program but also reports independently from Uruzgan. In the book *Een nacht met duizend sterren* Joeri Boom looks back upon his experiences. He describes several downsides of embedded journalism: the limited freedom of movement and sole military perspective; the self censure due to identification with the military and the censure/pressure as executed by the Press Information Officers (PIO's) and the Ministry of Defense.

1b Research question and structure of the research report

Existing research concerning the impact of embedded journalism raises questions about the recent Dutch 'case' of embedded journalism. Is the micro-account of Boom exemplary for experiences of other journalists? What are the precise and concrete effects of embedded journalism on media coverage of a big and disputed mission like Task Force Uruzgan? Do embedded and non-embedded journalists structural write different reports about the war in Afghanistan and the Dutch involvement? If so, what are the exact differences? ***In which ways does the Dutch embedded news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) differ from the Dutch non-embedded news coverage?***

This research aims to answer the research question through a combination of a literature research and a content analysis. The research starts in the second chapter with a historical overview of the phenomena of war journalism and embedded journalism, including a description of the application of embedded journalism during the Iraq war. The third chapter contains a short description

of TFU; the (reception of the) embed policy of the Dutch Ministry of Defense and a summary of findings from journalist Joeri Boom during his stay in Afghanistan. The fourth chapter consists of a description of the practice of framing and an analysis of three existing researches regarding the effect of embedded journalism on the news coverage of TFU. In the fifth chapter the precise research question and hypotheses are formulated, followed by a description of the operational research and methodology in the sixth chapter. The seventh chapter contains the results of the content analysis of news coverage of TFU between 2006 - 2010. The research ends with a conclusion in the eight chapter, including an explanation of the results and the implications of this research. Finally, literature and appendixes can be found in chapter nine and ten.

2 War journalism and embedded journalism

This chapter gives an overview of the phenomena of war journalism in general and embedded journalism. It starts with an analysis of the impact of war journalism and the profession of war journalist. This is followed by a historical overview of war journalism, including the position of embedded journalism. The chapter ends with an analysis of a recent practice of embedded journalism during the Iraq-war.

2a *The impact of war journalism*

War sells: from a commercial point of view war journalism is one of the most successful branches of journalism. Copies of newspapers in wartime rise dramatically and some newspapers even go bankrupt after the ending of a war (Kennislink). It is no coincidence that war journalism is historically linked to another phenomenon in journalism: yellow journalism. During the American Civil War (1861-1865), sales figures of newspapers rise drastically when they report about the war. The focus is on quantity, not so much on quality. A famous quote is from a Chicago editor to a war correspondent who reports the civil war: 'Telegraph fully all news you can get and when there is no news, send rumours' (Knightley, 2004:23). In this war the media forsake ethics and objectivity: newspapers publish stories about non-existing battles and reporters make eyewitness accounts of battles in places they have never visited. 19th-century newspaper publisher Hearst (New York Journal) is fully aware of the 'sales power of war'. For commercial reasons, Hearst hopes that the revolution in Cuba in 1898 will lead to an American-Spanish war. He actually attributes to the realization of this war by publishing sensational drawings and reports about incidents in Cuba. (Vranckx, 2003.)

More recent examples of commercialized war journalism are the reports of the start of the Iraq-war in 2003 by the cables Fox, MSNBC and CNN. Nearly 70% of the Americans get most of the news about the war from cable. During the first two weeks of the war, average daily viewers for MSNBC and CNN increase more than 300 percent, while those for Fox rise more than 288 percent. (Sharkey, 2003.) Studies of organizations like FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting) show that the network news in the news coverage of Iraq disproportionately focuses on pro war sources: officials of the military and/or the government who support the war (Rendall, 2003). According to Sharkey (2003) it is clear which position the cables Fox and MSNBC hold in the Iraq-war. Their reports are 'overtly patriotic': they show the American flag back on the screen and/or the headline 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' and incorporate tribute-like items as 'Americas Bravest', which shows photographs sent in by family members of soldiers in Iraq.

The historical and recent high public interest in war journalism already points to its big impact. A review of literature shows that war journalism serves and possibly influences multiple audiences. First, there is the population. A review by Schaap (2011) of a study of Baum and Groeling (2010), named *War Stories*, shows that the way media report about war influences public opinion in the short term and on the long run. This influence is actually so big, that during a long period of time, real facts

about war do not matter: the 'real' version of war is less influential than the media version of war. So, particular in the first stage of war, politicians are able to influence the nation ('rally around the flag') through the media. This influence of the news coverage diminishes as war continues and the media and the public get better informed. Interesting is the possible influence on public opinion by embedded journalism. Researcher Lewis, who investigates the relationship between television, public opinion and the war in Iraq, states that in Britain the media have played a part in persuading a majority to support the war. According to Lewis this is not so much caused by media bias of embedded journalists, but by the embed system itself, which makes journalists focus on the progress of the war, at the expense of 'broader contextual issues' (2004:308).

A second audience group of war journalism is the political establishment. Although politicians may use the media to influence the public opinion about war, the media influences politicians as well. A recent term that relates to the relationship between media and politicians is the 'CNN-effect': the ability of contemporary media (like cable) to affect the conduct of (U.S.) diplomacy and foreign policy. Some critics like communication expert Schoeman state that the CNN-effect is overrated. Schoeman claims that media are only able to influence decision making concerning peace and safety when there is political disunity. (Gereformeerd Dagblad/Schoeman, 2007:61).

Finally, the third audience group of war journalism consists of the military. For ages, the assumption is that negative news coverage (may) affect(s) the morale of the military and recruitment of new soldiers. In many conflicts, like WO I/II or the Korean War, the interest of 'keeping up the military morale' is an important reason for officials to submit articles to censorship and forbid publications of (photos of) casualties. Sometimes, officials take control by starting up their own publications. During World War I the American army distributes its own newspaper, Stars and Stripes, to American soldiers on the western front to strengthen the morale of the U.S. troops (History.com).

The presumed impact of war journalism explains why the main stakeholders in conflict (authorities, the military or combatants) may try to influence, manipulate or silence the messenger: the war journalist.

2b *The profession of war journalist*

The profession of war correspondent, or as the definition states, 'a journalist who covers stories first hand from a war zone' (Wikipedia) appeals to the imagination. A video compilation by USC Annenberg (School for Communication & Journalism) shows that in popular culture the war correspondent offers one of the 'consistent heroic portrayals of the journalist' in movies, television programs and fiction books (IJPC). In famous (Oscar winning) movies like *The Killing Fields*, *The Quiet American*, *The Hunting Party*, *A Mighty Heart*, the main protagonists are war correspondents.

War journalism might inspire the imagination, it is also notorious for being the most dangerous form of journalism. The Committee to protect journalists (CPJ) states figures about deaths of journalists. From 1992 on, 913 journalists have been killed. 311 of them (34%) have been killed in war zones (May 2012). According to the CPJ to date (May 2012), the war in Iraq, which starts at 2003, has resulted in 151 murders (with a confirmed motive) of journalists. In 2010, Reporters Without Borders

speaks of 230 casualties of journalists (90% Iraqi, 10% non-Iraqi) in Iraq. This amount exceeds the death toll of journalists in 20 years of war in Vietnam (in which 63 journalists are killed) and makes the Iraq war the most lethal war for journalists since World War II (Reporters Without Borders, 2010:2). The rising amount of deaths can partly be explained by the fact that more journalists are covering wars, due to a higher demand for live reports and visualizations of wars (Hendrikx, 2008:12). But striking is also the changing cause of death. In the past the majority of journalists is killed in war violence. Conform the Geneva Conventions journalists are to be considered as non-combatant civilians, who enjoy protection in war violence. However, especially since Vietnam, journalists have lost their 'neutral' status and are increasingly becoming victims of kidnapping and murder. Famous war correspondent Sam Kiley explains: '... thanks to the disaster in Iraq and Al Qaeda efforts journalists are frequently seen as not only legitimate targets but good ways of getting publicity' (IFEX). In Iraq 93 media professionals have been abducted between 2003-2010, and at least 42 of them have been executed later (Reporters Without Borders, 2010:2). In Afghanistan, combatants like the Taliban consider (foreign) journalists as participants in the war: Afghan, Dutch, French, Italian, Japanese and U.S. journalists have been abducted (Wikipedia).

The former shows that war journalists operate under extreme physical threats and psychological pressure. So, it is not surprising that more than 25% of war journalists cope with post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) (Reuters, 2010), which is almost as common as under soldiers. Apart from the dangers, war journalists meet more obstacles in the execution of their profession. First, in many war zones there are logistical and technical problems, like the absence of infrastructure or fuel and limited methods of communication. Second, there are obstacles with respect to content. Understanding and describing a specific conflict requires knowledge/background information of the country and combatants and access to sources. Ignorance of the journalists; lack of time for analysis; lack of physical access to sources; propaganda and censure by combatants or authorities hinder this process of information processing. (Hendrikx, 2008:10-11.) Third, (forced) patriotism and or (unconscious) symbiosis with one of the combatants or involved parties like civilians can affect a neutral position and result in self censure. Some journalists, like Frits van Exter, state that the requirement of objectivism does not match with war journalism: 'True war journalism does not exist, because reporting of a war in a professional acceptable way, or a safe or objective way, has never succeeded.' (Verschave, 2003:4/5.) Verschave states that journalist Arnold Karskens agrees and states it is very hard for war journalists to give an objective view of war situations, because of the overwhelming circumstances. According to Karskens these circumstances entail a journalist often to subjectivism and siding with one of the involved conflicting parties (Verschave, 2003:5). Aside from the discussion about the degree of objectivism in the news coverage, it's clear that the profession of war journalism is hazardous and complicated. Reason why the NVJ pleads for an expertise center with information about (safety in) war zones and war journalist Joeri Boom advocates special education for war journalists, with among others instructions how to deal with propaganda and simulations of possible dangerous situations in war zones (NVJ/Waterval, 2010).

2c *Developments in war journalism in the 20th and 21th century*

War journalism is as old as wars and journalism. In the 20th and 21th century important developments occur which attribute to the recent reintroduction of embedded journalism. During WO I and WO II, only accredited correspondents from mass media report from the front lines of war, under the umbrella and strict censorship of the allied armies. The authorities claim the censure is necessary for reasons of security, but according to experts like Phillip Knightley (Jellema, 2010:16) it is more likely that the authorities don't want negative reports in order to safeguard support for the war and recruitment of soldiers. In Germany, home media and foreign (even neutral) media are under control of the Ministry of Propaganda, lead by Goebbels.

War reporting changes radically in the sixties when modern technology (like lightweight, portable cameras) enable fast and mass distribution of 'live' warfare recording. In Vietnam, journalists have unprecedented access to the war front. Journalists are free to accompany the troops and there is no censure applicable. (The Washington Post, 2006.) It is controversial whether this media policy has resulted in an overly critical news coverage and with that diminishing public support for American involvement in Vietnam. Researchers like Hallin state that the majority of news coverage has been positive and that a critical tone is introduced only when the U.S. government policy changes (Andere Tijden). However, the drastic loss of public support for the Vietnam war makes military leaders and politicians realize it's important to win the 'battle at home' as well.

As a consequence of the Vietnam debacle, political leaders initiate 'information management of conflicts' (Van Klink, 2007:14). Gradually, an embed policy is being (re)introduced: attachment of news reporters to military units. Early examples are application by the U.K. and the U.S.A. during the Falkland War (1982) and the First and Second Gulf War (resp. 1980-1988 and 1990/1991). In the Falkland War only a small group of 30 British journalists is allowed to join the military. They are prevented from moving freely in the war zone and their reports are censored: it is not allowed to report things that could damage the morale of the troupes or the image of the forces (Van Klink, 2007:14). In the Gulf War journalists are ranged in press pools, which accompany the military. Critical journalists loose their accreditation and independent journalism is not allowed (Beckers, 2008:20). The news coverage, which is focused on technology and does not show any casualties, leads to criticism and labeling of the Gulf War as a 'clean war' or a 'hi tech war'.

With Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) embedded journalism is applied on a large scale: at the start of the war, 775 reporters and photographers are travelling as embedded journalists (UC Berkely News, 2004). The degree of participation is high, but so is criticism, as is shown in the next section.

2d *A case of embedded journalism: Iraq*

Embedded journalism refers to 'news reporters being attached to military units, involved in armed conflicts' (Wikipedia). As the former section shows, the term 'embedded journalism' can be applied to many interactions between the military and the media in the past. Recently, the term embedded journalism is above all associated with the invasion and following war in Iraq. The large-scale embed

program as initiated by the Bush Administration in 2003, is considered as a watershed in the US military-media relationship.

What are the causes of establishing this new policy? Researchers Cortell et al (2010), explain that the decision to embed results from three main sources. The first cause is the changing information environment. New media technologies, (like cell phones, the internet and satellite-transmitting devices) enable global real-time reporting, but at the same time complicate effective media management by authorities (2009:673). The second cause is the failed media policy in Afghanistan. In this war the American news media have limited access to cover the war, which provokes criticism from the media, and leads to outrage when reporters/photographers are confined in a warehouse, to prevent them from covering the return of U.S. wounded soldiers ('warehouse incident'). At the same time, the authorities are not able to control the media coverage or to transfer 'an authoritative interpretation' of events (2009:667). The third cause is the institutional context, specifically the organization of decision making and the linkages between state and societal actors (2009:660). The media (bureau chiefs) enjoy close relations with the decision makers and are able to persuade the Department of Defense (DoD) to introduce the embed program in 2003.

Another political scientist, Heinz Brandenburg, states that the embed program in Iraq can be considered as a 'public affairs initiative' of the DoD. A statement of the DoD in 2003 illustrates the aim of the embedding process: 'to tell the factual story - good or bad - before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions' (2007:954). According to Brandenburg embedded journalism is a 'congenial' strategy because it overcomes differences in organizational structure between the military and the media; maximizes access for the media and integrates the public affairs component in military planning (2007:954). An important (positive) change is the decreased censorship: the post hoc compulsory review is replaced by 'censure at the source'. However, in the end, Brandenburg is critical of the embed policy. His main objection is that the embedding of journalists blurs the boundaries between the military and media: journalists become part of the 'team' (2007:960). This diminishes the 'watchdog' function of journalists.

Pfau et al (2004) investigate the differences between embedded and non-embedded print news coverage of the first days of the military operations 'Iraqi Freedom' (invasion of Iraq in 2003); 'Enduring Freedom' (invasion of Afghanistan in 2002) and Desert Storm (Gulf War in 1991). According to Pfau et al, the inherent danger of embedded journalism is the maintaining of the perspective. This has two dimensions: embedded journalists may become too close to the soldiers they are covering and they may absorb in micro coverage and lose view of the big picture (2004:76). So, Pfau et al anticipate that embedded news coverage produces two effects: a more decontextualized news coverage and more positive stories about the military and its personnel. Their results show that embedded reporters indeed produce more decontextualized news coverage. They apply more episodic frames (personalized or illustrative stories), while non-embedded reporters apply more thematic frames (stories with an collective point of view or in-depth interpretive analysis). Next, embedded reporters produce stories that are more favorable in tone of the military and its personnel in particular. (2004:83.) Pfau et al explain this bias by citing the Social Penetration Theory. Embedded journalists are (temporarily) members of military units, come to know/like the troops they are covering

and will internalize the values of the military. The effects of this 'enculturation' are magnified by the facts that soldiers and journalists experience life-threatening situations (2004:78). Pfau et al conclude that embedded journalism enables a 'close-up-view' of military operations, but that the reporters lose perspective and an objective attitude.

However, content analyses of 'embedded' news coverage of other researchers show different results. Previously (in section 2a) it is mentioned that researcher Lewis finds that U.K. embedded journalists who report about Iraq do not so much expose bias in their news coverage, but focus on the progress of the war, at the expense of 'broader contextual issues' (2004:308). Aday et al. conduct a cross-cultural analysis of objectivity and television coverage of the beginning of the Iraq war, by analyzing 1.820 stories of five American networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News) and Al Jazeera. Focus is on bias: tone of the stories (objectivity) and the overall picture of the war (topics). In their analysis the researchers also include the reporter type (embedded or unilateral). Findings show differences in the drawn picture of the war but not in the tone of the news: the majority of stories is neutral at the story level (2005:16). The researchers find no evidence that embedded reporters are more likely to produce stories which are in favor of the American involvement in war. They do find differences in the topics of the news coverage. Embedded reporters produce more stories about coalition soldiers, and unilaterals cover more stories about Iraqi and civilian casualties and postwar construction. Since the range of topics of embedded reporters is more limited, Aday et al. conclude their research with a quote that refers to the desirability of more independence in war reporting.

2e Overview

The above sections show that war journalism, from a commercial point of view, is a successful branch of journalism and that it serves and influences/is assumed to influence multiple audiences. The profession of war journalist is hard: the correspondent traditionally operates in a dangerous environment, surrounded by stakeholders, who may try to influence, manipulate or even silence the messenger. In the past decades new risks, like abductions and murders, have emerged for war journalists in war zones and new technologies and a firm information management have complicated the media-military relationship. A recently reintroduced and important component of this information management is embedded journalism. From an ethical point of view, embedded journalism is considered as controversial. Main objection of critics, including researchers, is that embedded journalism blurs the boundaries between the military and the media. Analyses of researchers show that this symbiosis is reflected in reports, which are mainly episodic, focus on a military perspective and might also result in a positive bias. The next chapter contains a description of a Dutch case of embedded journalism: the embed policy as introduced with Task Force Uruzgan.

3 A Dutch case of embedded journalism: Task Force Uruzgan

This chapter starts with a macro perspective: a section about the embed policy of the Dutch Ministry of Defense and its reception by members of parliament and the media themselves. This is followed by a micro perspective: a summary of experiences of journalist Joeri Boom, who operated as an embedded and non-embedded journalist in Afghanistan. The chapter ends with a section about the Dutch mission Task Force Uruzgan, including a description of the background of ISAF, decision-making in Dutch parliament, the operation itself and an evaluation of the mission.

3a The embed policy of the Dutch Ministry of Defense

During the Bosnian War (1992-1996) the Dutch Ministry of Defense (MoD) has no control over the media and experiences its own Vietnam syndrome: the 'Srebrenica-syndrome' (Mans et al., 2008:12). The Dutch media distribute videos and images made by Serb embedded journalists and photographers of press agencies like AP. Videos and images of the conversation between the Dutch commander Karremans and the Serb colonel-general Mladic in hotel Fontana; the departure of the Dutch soldiers (when Karremans receives a lamp from Mladic) in Srebrenica and a party in Zagreb, attribute strongly to the negative image-forming of the mission. The MoD concludes that in order to gain popular support for operations, military engagement needs better communication (Mans, 2008:12). So, in 2003, when 1.100 Dutch soldiers are sent out to fight in Iraq, the MoD takes its first steps on the path of embedded journalism by offering embedded trips (Mans, 2008: 43). This is the prelude of an official embed policy, introduced in 2006, when the Netherlands start participating with Task Force Uruzgan in the NATO-led security mission International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

In 2006, the MoD launches its communication plan for TFU, named *ISAF Stage III, Uruzgan*. It is the first time the MoD writes a communication plan for a mission. The MoD explains the necessity in the introduction of the plan: 'It is to be expected that the mission to Uruzgan will be a hard mission, with possible various incidents. Right now, the interest of the media and the request for information within the own organization is already big'. (2006:3). The MoD states that communication attributes to the transparency that the MoD pursues. Target groups are politicians, population and the media; the military; the home front; the staff of MoD; international partners and the Afghan population. The main device of the communication strategy of MoD is: 'understanding leads to valuation' (2006:6). Pillars are transparency, continuity and central coordination. The MoD states it is essential that the perception of Dutch society does not deviate from the reality: drawbacks of the mission (pts, possible victims, abuses) should not be masked (2006:6).

According to the MoD facilitation of journalists in the province of Uruzgan, or embedded journalism is a consequence of the transparency that the MoD pursues. However, in the interest of objectivity and credibility, a certain distance between the military and journalists is required. Therefore, the stay of journalists will be limited to two weeks. Conditions for a stay with the military are respect for: safety rules (no publication of strategic sensitive information); the individual (no violation of safety

and privacy of the soldier); the home front (no premature publication of casualties before family is informed) and the coalition (no breaking of media rules from international partners) (Gedragscode voor media in Afghanistan, 2006). As for guarding of operational security, journalists have to agree with a compulsory review by a public relations officer of the MoD before publication (2006:8).

The new embed program meets with a diverse reception. In June 2006, members of parliament from the parties SP and Groen Links ask detailed questions about the code of conduct for journalists. They especially question the censure regarding operational security and state that it obstructs free acquisition of news. Another severe subject is the funding by the MoD, which collides with norms of independency. In 2007, Groen Links launches a plan for public funding of independent journalism, but in 2008 it turns out that there's no majority in parliament in favour of this plan (Karskens, 2008). However, as for participation, the embed program is very successful. Bekkers et al (2008) state that the MoD seldom had such a 'big and succesful media offensive'. In general, the media consider the embed policy as a welcome development, since it gives the media structural access in Afghanistan and the military domain and because it is cheap and safe. This weighs up to the disadvantages: censure and limited freedom of movement (Hendrikx, 2008:36). Hundreds of journalists participate in the embed program. Only a few journalists work 'independently': Antoinette de Jong, Philip de Wit, Arnold Karskens, Minka Nijhuis, Hans Jaap Melissen, Deedee Derksen, Bette Dam, Joeri Boom and Peter ter Velde (Boom, 2008; Beunders, 2011, Van Klink, 2010).

This unbalance evokes criticism and questions about the effect on the news coverage of Uruzgan. This criticism is also expressed by journalists themselves. One of them is Joris Luyendijk. In the television program 'De leugen regeert' of February 27, 2008, Joris Luyendijk discusses the news coverage with two journalists Conny Mus (RTL4) and Jeroen de Jager (NOS), who both participated in the embed program. According to Luyendijk, news coverage is one sided and incomplete: embedded journalists present information from one source, that is to say the Dutch MoD, as facts and don't hear the other side (like the Taliban or coalition partners). Mus and De Jager defend this attack by stating that verification of information by the MoD or consulting of Afghan sources/parties like the Taliban is not/hardly possible in Afghanistan. According to Mus, embedded journalists are experienced enough to avoid being kept at a leash by the MoD/spreading propoganda. Conclusion of the debate is that there is an 'overdose' of embedded journalism. De Jager concludes that he has reflected on the discussion about embedded journalism and that he will suggest the NOS to recruit a local journalist.

One of the most outspoken opponents of embedded journalism is Arnold Karskens. According to Karskens, embedded journalism is no journalism, but 'defense-public relations' (IS Magazine, 2010). He especially opposes the (self-) censure. "When you're travelling embedded, you probably see half of what you would be able to see. You could consider this as half journalism. When the MoD on top of this reviews your article with a red pencil, you keep a quarter." (...) "It's about keeping your intellectual freedom. (...) Who travels embedded is dealing with the red line. They pay your air tickets, your food, your safety and your transport. As a good journalist you are not able to sustain within the walls of Camp Holland, or you have the wrong attitude", so says Karskens. (Koens, 2008).

3b Experiences of journalist Joeri Boom

Journalist Joeri Boom is an experienced war journalist. He covers conflicts in Kosovo, Macedonia, Darfur, Iraq and Libanon for Nieuwe Revu, Algemeen Dagblad and Radio 1. Between 2006 and 2010, Boom travels eleven times to Afghanistan to report for the Groene Amsterdammer. Five times he participates in the TFU embed program, six times he travels independently. In his book 'Als een nacht met duizend sterren' he looks back upon his experiences in Uruzgan. Since Boom worked as an embedded and non-embedded journalist, this section contains a summary of his account.

From the start Boom is sceptical about his participation in embedded journalism. Boom fears the one-sidedness caused by focus on the military perspective; the censure by the MoD for reasons of security and above all the condition that journalists are only to leave the base when guided by the military (2011:26/27/29). During his first stay at Camp Holland in December 2006 Boom is already confronted with limits in his work. He is not able to check the progress of reconstruction since he is not allowed to leave the camp (2011:46); he notices that battlements between the Dutch and the Taliban are not notified to the press by the Press Information Officers (PIO's) (2011:56) and he is being requested to change or delete information in his work (2011:61). Though Boom dislikes his lack of independence as an embedded journalist, he chooses for another embedded stay, in order to portray the perspective of the 'normal' soldier and to accompany patrols. During this second stay in the Dehrafshang-area in 2007 Boom experiences that attacks and a scared and there for uncooperative population hinder the construction work of the PRT. Soldiers are in their own words 'saddled with an unworkable mission' (2011:93) and fights of the Dutch (like the attack on hill 1461) hardly get any attention in the press. Boom, 'in a need for adrenaline', decides to join another long patrol in June 2007 in one of the most dangerous areas in Uruzgan, Chora. Boom records an account by a captain of the battle at Chora, and ignores pressure by the PIO to withdraw his article. When Boom joins a long patrol in the Chora Valley he is faced with three dilemmas: pressure to take up arms himself; blurring of his own moral standards and the tendency to self censure, all caused by identification with the military (136 t/m 145). In later visits in 2007 Boom, due to fighting, again is not able to visit reconstruction projects. An attack by the Taliban at the Dutch base Camp Hadrian which is not revealed by the MoD, stimulates Boom to write an article about the 'derailed' PR-offensive of the MoD (2011:182). This article and the Chora-tapes of a military cameraman force the MoD in being more open about the fighting element of TFU. In his comments Boom criticizes the selective handling by officials of reports about the civil casualties in the battle at Chora (2011:198).

In June 2008 Boom joins a meeting at the MoD, to complain about the restrictions which are imposed on journalists after the 'Spin Ghar incident', when operational information about a future operation, despite a review by PIO's, is published (2011:221). The fact that some colleague journalist start trying operating independently from the army strengthens Boom in his decision to report non-embedded. In his research in Tarin Kowt for information about the progress of reconstruction (specifically a road between Chora and Tarin Kowt) he finds that the Dutch cooperate with a notorious Afghan warlord. His article about this relationship invokes questions in parliament (2011:253). In his final non-embedded trip in 2010 Boom visits Deh Rawod to research the safety of the area and facts

about the civilian casualties after bombardments. Boom finds some (unknown) interesting details about an invasion of Dutch military in an Afghan hospital (2011:281). He concludes that an embedded journalist is not able to check military progress; (lack of) cooperation between ISAF and the OEF (2011:274) and the effects of specific Dutch strategies, like dealing with tribes (2011:297).

Boom ends his book that from the perspective of the MoD the embed program is a 'big success', but from the perspective of Dutch journalism, a 'defeat' (2011:316). He calls embedded journalism a 'treacherous form of journalism' (2011: 317). It is cheap and helps producing exciting stories but at the same time makes it impossible to explain the conflict in Afghanistan, because of the (sole) perspective of the military. On top of this, embedded journalism seduces the MoD to execute 'a mild form of propaganda' (2011: 318). This all obstructs the journalistic function of watchdog.

3c Task Force Uruzgan: a controversial mission

TFU is the biggest Dutch mission since the Indonesian War of Independence in 1945-1949 (Klep, 2011:9): starting from March 2006 1.400 Dutch soldiers participate in ISAF. The commencement of ISAF dates back to 2001. In a reaction to the refusal by the Taliban-regime to hand over Bin Laden, in October 2001 the Americans and allies invade Afghanistan and oust the Taliban (Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF). In December 2001, the U.N. Security Council establishes a peace mission, consisting of NATO units, in order to support the new Afghan government with maintaining order and peace and reconstruction. Core of ISAF are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT's), which, under the protection of fighting units, should contribute to recovery of authority and infrastructure.

In June 2005, the Netherlands are requested to contribute to ISAF. The Netherlands prefer participation in ISAF to OEF because ISAF is UN-mandated and its character matches with the traditional Dutch preference for constructive aspects of intervention instead of fighting (Klep, 2011:16). The process of decision-making is troublesome. Coalition partner D66 initially objects the mission since it fears a fighting mission. Gradually D66 changes its position. The biggest opposition party, the PvdA, supports the mission on condition of a strict separation of ISAF-activities and fighting of terrorism. According to Klep in debates the cabinet and parliament do emphasize the 'soft side' of the mission to Uruzgan, the reconstruction, in order to 'sell the mission'. This attributes to a 'unnatural distinction between a fighting mission and a reconstruction mission'. (2011:45.) In February 2006 the Dutch parliament approves the mission with a big majority of 127 out of 150 votes.

At the start of the mission in 2006, Uruzgan is one of the most inhospitable and poorest provinces of Afghanistan. The socio-economic development is low. Formal government institutions are absent or have a small legitimacy; traditional structures based on family and tribe are more influential. The safety situation is bad: the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan Army (ANA) are undermanned and badly equipped. (Ministerie van Defensie, 2011:21/22.) Aim of TFU is to 'advance stability and safety by enlarging the support of the Afghan population for the Afghan authorities and reducing (...) support for the Taliban and related groups' (Ministerie van Defensie, 2011:19). Main areas of concern are stimulation of good governance, army and police, rule of law and reconstruction work. This approach is also referred to as the '3D-approach': Defense, Development and Diplomacy.

The 3D-approach is closely related to the NATO-doctrine of Counter-insurgency (COIN). In COIN the focus is not (only) on physical fighting of insurgents, but on 'winning the hearts and the minds' of the population and lessening their moral and support to insurgents. (Ministerie van Defensie, 2011:17.)

In 2006 TFU starts operating from two bases: Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod. The core of TFU consists of infantry, with a few artillery guns for support. Air support is on request. Most significant part of TFU is the PRT; main aim of the battle group (500 persons) is to protect the PRT (70 persons). In 2006 the situation in Uruzgan is calm; opposing military forces (OMF) are active in other parts of south Afghanistan and the Dutch military experience no casualties due to fighting. The Dutch are referred to as the 'lucky Dutch' (Boom, 2011:21) but claim the mission is a success because of the 'Dutch approach': reserved fighting and focus on winning the hearts and minds. In 2007 it becomes clear that the construction of an Afghan government, army and police is behind schedule. Casualties of eight Dutch soldiers due to suicide attacks, explosives and fighting, show that the mission is risky and far from peaceful. A fight between ISAF and the Taliban in the Chora district raises criticism because of the many civil casualties. In 2007 a debate starts about extension of TFU. The pressure (by U.S, Afghanistan and NATO) to continue is big. In November 2007, the mission is prolonged for two years.

From 2007, the focus of TFU is on 'Afghanisation' or local ownership, as a prelude of the exit strategy in 2010. Uruzgan experiences advance in material sense and on safety. Underlying structures of government however do not change. Polls in the period 2006-2008 show that only 40% of the population is in favor of the mission. In 2009 the NATO requests the Netherlands to prolonge its military presence in Uruzgan for one more year with a smaller number of soldiers. A second debate starts in which the PvdA sticks firmly to the deadline of 2010. In February 2010 the dispute about extension of TFU leads to the fall of the cabinet Balkenende IV (CDA, PvdA and CU).

What are the results of the efforts of TFU? Based on the 3D-approach one can distinguish three areas of results: safety, good governance and socio-economic development. As for safety, TFU has contributed to more safety for the population, especially in the urban areas. The presence of the Afghan army and police has grown and 1.000 cops have received training. According to the official TFU-evaluation safety is however 'fragile and not irreversible' (2011:104). As for good governance, the evaluation states that 'first good steps are taken with modest results' (2011:104). Klep states that (the ambitious) goals related to governance, rule of law, gender and the fight against drugs have not materialized (2011:193). He is more positive about the results which can be labeled as socio-economic development: healthcare, education, infrastructure and economic activity (2011:194). The TFU-evaluation of the MoD confirms that access and quality of health care and education are improved. The amount of health facilities and schools has doubled, resp. quadrupled (2011:123/125). Uruzgan has opened up thanks to reconstruction/asphalting of roads and extension of telecommunication networks, which has resulted in more economic activity. (2011:106/107.) The costs of the mission are 1.4 billion euro plus 600 million expenses for development programs (Klep, 2011:67). Finally, according to the evaluation of the MoD, in the image forming of TFU the civil aspects of the mission are under exposed. (2011:108).

3d **Overview and questions**

The above sections show that TFU is a controversial mission. In the process of decision-making a distinction grows between a fighting mission and a reconstruction mission. This distinction continues to dominate the debate in Dutch society about the benefits and prolongations of the mission. During the mission it gradually becomes clear that the reality in Afghanistan is harsh and goals of TFU are hard to attain. As for the news coverage, from the perspective of the MoD, the introduction of the embed program is a success: participation is high and only a few journalists travel independently. This unbalance in reporting also evokes criticism. Journalist Boom describes the downsides of embedded journalism: the limited freedom of movement and sole military perspective; the self censure due to identification with the military and the censure/pressure as executed by the PIO's and the MoD. Is the micro-account of Boom exemplary for experiences of other journalists? What are the precise and concrete effects on media coverage of a big and disputed mission like TFU? Do embedded and non-embedded journalists structural write different reports about the war in Uruzgan and the Dutch involvement? If so, what are the exact differences? The next chapter contains the results of an analysis of existing researches regarding news coverage of TFU.

4 Existing research on news coverage of Task Force Uruzgan

The fourth chapter consists of an analysis of existing research regarding framing and the effect of embedded journalism on the news coverage of TFU. The first section describes the practice of framing and types of media frames. The next sections contain an analysis of three researches regarding embedded journalism and its specific effects on reports on the TFU in Dutch media (television and newspapers). The chapter ends with an overview of the research.

4a The practice of framing

As is shown in section 2d, research for application of frames is an important component of content analyses of news coverage. According to Robert Entman and Claes de Vreese (both experts in media and politics) in the journalistic process journalists and editors consciously or unconsciously make choices in the production of media content, in order to simplify or to give an interpretation for the audience. These choices define the frames, which are expressed in the presence or absence of certain words, phrases, images and sources. The applied frames influence again the readers of texts: media frames may affect learning, interpretation and evaluation of issues and events (De Vreese, 2005:52).

De Vreese (2005:54) distinguishes two types of frames: generic frames and issue-frames. Generic frames are general and are suitable for analysis of a large amount of new items. Issue-frames are related to specific events and are designed for detailed research of specific news subjects. As for generic frames, in *Is Anyone Responsible* (1991) Shanto Iyengar describes two much used broad framing approaches: episodic framing and thematic framing. Episodic frames seek to personalize and illustrate issues: they focus on the immediate event or incident and give little or no context. Thematic frames focus on the 'big picture' and provide interpretive analysis. They place events in a broader context, by for instance providing expert analysis or other background information. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) have identified another five generic news frames. First the conflict frame, which highlights a conflict between individuals, groups, institutions or countries. Second the human interest frame, which focuses on the human or emotional side of an event, issue or problem. Third, the responsibility frame, which emphasizes the responsibility of an individual, group or government for causing or solving a problem. Fourth, the morality frame, which places an event or problem in a moral or religious context. Fifth, the economic consequences frame, which stresses the economic consequences of an event, problem or issue for an individual, group, institution, region or country. (2000:95-96)

As for issue frames, in analyses of news coverage of wars several frames are applicable. Amy Jasperson and Mansour El-Kikhia (2003) identify the military frame, which offers a macro military perspective by focusing on war technology and military strategy/tactics, and the humanitarian frame, which focuses on victims and the toll of conflicts. Tijs de Geyndt (2011:43) refines the humanitarian

frame by distinguishing a 'humanitarian frame forces', which is based on the perspective from (individual) soldiers, and a 'humanitarian frame citizens', which starts from the perspective of (individual) citizens.

Starting from 2006, several Dutch researchers (political scientists and historians) study the phenomenon of embedded journalism and its specific effects on reports on the TFU in Dutch media (television and newspapers). In the next sections, an analysis follows of three researches, each with different points of view.

4b *Mans et al: influence on news coverage*

In *Eyes Wide Shut*, Ulrich Mans, Christa Meindersma and Lars Burema research the impact of embedded journalism on news coverage by Dutch national newspapers. Central questions are: how did the concept of embedded journalism develop, how does embedded journalism influence reporting on Afghanistan and how can embedded journalism attribute to a more diverse coverage in conflict areas (2008:7)?

Their field research can be split in two parts: 26 interviews with (intern)national journalists and staff of the MoD/ MoFA and a partly automatic/partly manual text analyses of articles in Dutch newspapers, published between March 2006 and December 2007. Their analysis focuses on seven elements: policy; selection criteria for journalists; timing; facilitation; freedom of movement; control over content and sanctions and includes two points of view: that of the MoD, and that of the press. According to the authors, from the point of view of the MoD, the embed program is a success because it has put TFU in the spotlight. The code of conduct of the MoD however does not always have clear guidelines and largely depends on personal interpretations by the staff (2008:24). As for the journalists, the embed regime marks a breakthrough in war reporting. Although in daily practice the review process does not cause conflicts, journalists do have fundamental problems with the compulsory review and are concerned about their lack of freedom of movement, since it blocks an independent verification of information of the military (2008:18/43).

The text analysis shows that in articles of embedded journalists, choices on topics, location, sources and type of analysis 'are centred on the immediate environs of the military mission' (2008:32). This leads to a dominance of 'tactical journalism' in coverage of Aghanistan: a focus on tactical issues, like military operations and daily activities of soldiers.

Finally an international comparison of embed programs of five countries (Netherlands, Canada, USA, AU, UK) shows that a compulsory content review as in the Dutch case is seldom, more common are lists with forbidden topics. Also, in the majority of cases, logistical support for journalists is limited.

Mans, Meindersma and Burema conclude their research by stating that the embed policy has created a 'diversity dilemma': there's more diversity in the type of journalists covering Afghanistan, but there is less diversity in terms of content (2008:42). The authors recommend clear rules and the dismiss of a compulsory review. Other recommendations are additional funding for journalists

reporting on conflicts and attribution of final responsibility for personal safety to the journalists themselves (2008:43).

Strong point of the research is the integration of a systematic analysis of the embed policy and its effects on reports. Limitations of the research are the absence of hypotheses and questions, its short time frame (2006-2007) and the missing of an analysis of the tone of the reviewed articles.

4c Van Klink: differences in news coverage

A much discussed and rewarded paper is *Media In Bed With Our Tough Guys* (2007) from political scientist Janet van Klink, Leiden University. Van Klink studies the impact of embedded journalism on the coverage of ISAF in five national newspapers. Her central research question is: 'to what extent does embedded news coverage of ISAF in newspapers differ from non-embedded news coverage?' (2007:8). Base of the research is a comprehensive and systematic content analysis of 217 newspaper articles (157 of embedded, 80 of non-embedded reporters). Van Klink tests eighth hypotheses regarding sources (military, organizations, locals, independents); topics (military actions, daily life at the basis, reconstruction, violence, refugees, economics, politics); framing (episodic/thematic, human interest, attribution of responsibility, 'tough guys' ((emphasis on the role of the military in the war)), 'winning the hearts and minds' ((emphasis on reconstruction task)) and bias (positive/negative tone).

According to the abstract, Van Klink's main findings are:

- Embedded journalists focus more on military sources and topics than non-embedded journalists.
- Non-embedded journalists employ more 'episodic', 'attribution of responsibility' and 'human interest' framing. [so called generic frames, BW]
- Embedded journalists employ more 'tough guys' and 'winning the hearts and minds' framing. [so called issue-specific frames, BW]
- Embedded journalists produce more positive stories about ISAF than non-embedded journalists. (2007:2)

ID: Van Klink contradicts her conclusion that embedded journalists employ more 'winning the hearts and minds' framing by stating in the section with results that there is 'no statistically significant relationship' between reporter status and this frame (2007:52). Next, results shows that non-embedded journalists do not employ more episodic framing, but thematic framing (2007, 44).

Van Klink explains the results of her research by the bounded location of embedded journalists and their attachment to the military (social identity/social penetration theory). Restrict access to locations influences sources, topics and framing and the identification with the troupes leads to episodic framing and a positive coverage of ISAF (2007:65). According to Klink, embedded journalism has serious implications for ISAF news coverage. The censure by the MoD, the limited use of sources in articles and the focus on military and reconstruction topics/the absence of the 'bigger picture', collide with norms for journalism in liberal democracies and diminish the 'watchdog'-function

of journalists (2007:66/67). Last but not least embedded journalism influences the perception of priority and interpretation of issues by people (2007:67).

Strengths of Van Klink's research are its thorough foundation, the well formulated hypotheses, the systematic analysis of hundreds of articles and the integration/application of two new frames related to war journalism and a measurement for bias. Limitation of the research is its short time frame (2006-2007). Van Klink recommends a research after the end of the TFU, in which a comparison is made between articles in the first and second half of the presence of the Dutch troops in Uruzgan, or a research of the impact of body bags on the content of embedded articles (2007:70). In an article in the *Spectator* in 2010, Van Klink already sketches developments in news coverage starting from 2006. Among these developments are a light trend from embedded journalism to non-embedded journalism due to diminished dependency (2010:221) and more attention for the views of the Afghan population (especially around the elections in august 2009); a possible less positive tone about TFU due to casualties among the Dutch military and more human interest framing of experiences of soldiers (2010:223).

4d Beckers: quality of news coverage

In *Missie Waarheidsvinding*, history student Erik Beckers, University Utrecht, researches the quality of the Dutch news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan in Dutch national newspapers. His questions are:

- Is the image of an insufficient, biased coverage of Afghanistan correct?
- Is the coverage insufficient due to the embedded system, because this system entails one-sidedness and bias?
- Is non-embedded journalism a better guarantee for a more honest, objective and complete coverage of Uruzgan?
- Does the news coverage show enough knowledge and judgment of military business and does it reflect the complex military reality?

Beckers pays special attention to two topics: reports on the special nature of the mission (i.e. counterinsurgency) and on civilian deaths. Base of the research is a qualitative content analysis of 400 articles, published in 6 national newspapers in 2006-2008. In his analysis, Beckers incorporates the application of five frames (conflict frame, human interest frame, economic consequences frame, responsibility frame and morality frame). But Beckers' main 'verdict criteria' are related to the reporting of the complex military reality in Afghanistan: attention for f.e. the variousness of interests and the weak government/corruption in Afghanistan; the violent history of Afghanistan; cultural differences with the West; the weak western popular support for the mission and the military strategy related to counterinsurgency.

Beckers findings show that embedded journalists often use the conflict frame and human interest frame, the latter applicated from the military perspective. The perspective of the Taliban is ignored. Non-embedded journalists use mostly the human interest frame, applicated from the

perspective of Afghan civilians. Next to this, the conflict frame is applied with attention for the perspective of the Taliban and disputes between ethnic tribes. Embedded journalists focus on the complex military reality and non-embedded journalists on the complex social, political and cultural reality.

According to Beckers research, both embedded and unembedded reporters vary appreciation and criticism of the work of the Dutch military (2008:141). In his analysis of articles from embedded journalists, Beckers finds few signs of identification with the military or self-censure (2008:134). So, Beckers does not agree with the thesis that embedded journalism leads to subjective reports. Moreover, Beckers states that subjective reports by Arnold Karskens show that non-embedded journalism is no guarantee for more objective coverage (2008:143). Beckers concludes that both embedded and non-embedded journalists in their own way contribute to the total picture of the conflict in Uruzgan.

Strength of Beckers research is his detailed content analysis of articles, which incorporates not only application of frames, but also bias and military knowledge. However, the results of an important part of the research (the analysis of the reports on military strategy and civilian deaths) seem to be based on a small selection of articles about two specific events (battlements of Chora and Kratak). Another limitation is the short time frame of analysis (2006-2008).

4e Overview of research

An analysis of existing research regarding embedded journalism and news coverage of Uruzgan shows some usable and interesting results.

First, a distinction can be made between two research methods: interviews with involved parties (journalists and co-workers of the MoD) and content analyses of news coverage by embedded and non-embedded journalists. As for content analyses, there are several units of analysis:

- **Sources:** military or non-military sources like organizations or ngo's; locals; independents (used by Van Klink and Mans et al)
- **Topics:** military actions; daily life at the basis; reconstruction; violence; refugees; economics; politics (used by Van Klink and Mans et al)
- **Frames:** conflict frame; human interest frame; responsibility frame; 'tough guys'-frame; 'winning the hearts and minds'-frame; economic consequences frame; responsibility frame and morality frame (used by Van Klink and Beckers)
- **Type of analysis:** episodic/tactical framing or thematic framing (used by Van Klink, Mans et al)
- **Bias:** positive/negative tone; objectivity/subjectivity (used by Van Klink and Beckers)
- **Quality:** representation of complex (military) reality (used by Beckers)

Second, results of researches show similarities and interesting differences. All researchers agree that in news coverage, embedded journalism is overrepresented. They also agree that topics and sources of embedded journalists are very much related to the military. Another common finding is that in embedded journalism the conflict frame and human interest frame (perspective of the soldier) are popular. Two researchers find that a common type of analysis by embedded journalists is tactical framing. However, as for bias, results diverge. According to Van Klink, embedded reporters are more positive towards ISAF. Beckers however concludes that embedded journalists do balance appreciation and criticism towards the military, and are no less objective than non-embedded journalists. An explanation for these differences might be that Van Klink in her conclusion emphasizes the positive tone of embedded journalists, while her results show that a majority has a neutral attitude. Another explanation might be the type of analysis: Van Klink focuses especially on the tone of articles, Beckers also includes quality of the coverage, like explanation of the complex military reality. The different results point that more research on bias is necessary.

Third, no research has been done yet on the whole news coverage of Uruzgan in four years: focus is on the first two years of the mission. To get a complete picture of the news coverage by non-embedded journalists, an analysis of the period of four years is required. Van Klink proposes at the end of her research (2007:70) to investigate differences between news coverage of the first and second half of the mission. An interesting analysis is whether the media, as a consequence of the criticism on 'the overdose' of embedded journalism (see section 3a), in the second period (2008-2010) show a more balanced news coverage or a different approach by embedded journalists.

5 Research question and hypotheses

The news coverage of TFU in the period of 2006-2010 is characterized by a specific form of war journalism: embedded journalism. Embedded journalism is controversial, because it supposedly obstructs independence and objectivity of journalists.

Content analyses of media coverage of TFU in the period 2006-2007 show that embedded journalism leads to usage of the military as main/only source; topics related to the military; usage of conflict and human interest frames (related to soldiers) and tactical framing. Findings regarding bias differ: some researchers state that embedded journalists are more positive towards the mission, other state they are neutral/do express criticism. As for the news coverage of the second part of the mission (2008-2010) no content analyses have been done.

During the first years (2006-2007) of the mission, the overdose of embedded journalism in the news coverage receives a lot of criticism, including from (embedded) journalists themselves.

Goal of this research is to get more insight in the effect of embedded journalism on the (quality) of the news coverage of TFU in the period 2006-2010.

5a Central question and sub questions

The central question of this research is:

In which ways does the Dutch embedded news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) differ from the Dutch non-embedded news coverage?

This central question disintegrates in three sub questions:

1. **To what extent is the Dutch news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 dominated by embedded journalism?**
2. **What are in general the differences in the news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 done by embedded journalists and non-embedded journalist, as for:**
 - **sources**
 - **topics**
 - **type of analysis**
 - **framing**
 - **tone**
3. **What are in general the differences in the news coverage of the first part of the mission (2006-2007) and the second part of the mission (2008-2010)?**

5b Hypotheses

Based on the exploration of existing literature the following hypotheses can be formulated:

1. The news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 is dominated by embedded journalism

2. The news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 done by embedded journalists and non-embedded journalist differs in:

- **Sources:** mainly military sources versus diverse sources (Dutch organizations and governments; international organizations and governments; Afghan organizations and governments; Afghan militant or religious leaders; Taliban; Afghan population or experts)
- **Topics:** topics related to the military (military actions, daily life at the camp) and (ISAF)-reconstruction versus violence; Afghan society, culture and religion; economics; politics)
- **Type of analysis:** episodic versus thematic framing
- **Framing:** military or human interest framing (perspective of the soldier) versus responsibility, humanitarian or human interest framing (perspective of the Afghan citizen)

3. The news coverage of TFU in the period 2006-2010 done by embedded journalists is, within its specific framing, not characterized by more bias than news coverage by non-embedded journalists

4. The news coverage of the first part of the mission (2006-2007) is more dominated by embedded journalism than the second part of the mission (2008-2010)

5. The news coverage of the first part of the mission (2006-2007) has a more positive tone towards TFU than the news coverage of the second part of the mission (2008-2010)

6 Operational research and methodology

Base of this research is a content analysis from articles about the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU, in five big national Dutch newspapers and three Dutch newsmagazines, in the period 2006-2010. The operationalization of the research is for a big part based on a similar research by Janet van Klink in November 2007, which consists of a content analysis of articles in five national newspapers, published in the period March 2006 - June 2007.

6a Unit of analysis and sources

The content analysis consists of an analysis of about 180 news articles. The research period covers the duration of TFU itself: from March 2006 (arrival of first troupes in Afghanistan) to August 2010 (official end of the mission).

As for newspapers, in order to be able to compare a big group of articles (ca. 120) covering the first part (2006-2008) and the second part of the mission (2008-2010), only five newspapers are used as a source:

- **Telegraaf:** biggest national newspaper; 695.635 issues (2009); right-wing orientation
- **Volkscrant:** third biggest national newspaper; 263.845 issues (2008); left-wing orientation
- **NRC:** fourth biggest national newspaper; 210.000 issues (2009); moderate progressive orientation
- **Trouw:** fifth biggest national newspaper; 91.000 issues (2009); religious (Christian) orientation
- **De Pers:** free national newspaper (mainly distributed in public transport), 300.000 issues (2012); high quality free newspaper with focus on political issues.

(source: Wikipedia.)

In the selection of articles from newspapers articles on opinion pages and commentaries are excluded. Articles in the accompanying news magazines are included.

As for independent news magazines, in order to be able to compare a big group of articles (about 60) covering the first part (2006-2008) and the second part of the mission (2008-2010), only three news magazines are used as a source:

- **Elsevier:** biggest Dutch news magazine (weekly frequency); 130.000 issues (2009); right-wing orientation
- **Vrij Nederland:** second biggest news magazine (weekly frequency); 42.025 issues (2011); left-wing orientation
- **Groene Amsterdammer:** fourth biggest news magazine (weekly frequency); 20.000 issues (2011); left-liberal orientation.

(source: Wikipedia/Weekbladpers.)

6b Sample and selection of cases

The selection of all articles is made in Lexis Nexis. Lexis Nexis contains articles which appeared on print only; so articles which appeared on the internet (like blogs) are excluded from this research. Underneath, the steps of composing the sample are described. All steps are repeated for the five newspapers and three news magazines (as mentioned in section 6a), for two periods: 1/3/2006 - 1/8/2008 and 1/8/2008 - 2/8/2010. So, in total, 16 'subsamples' are taken.

First, an automatic selection is done, based on the following keywords: **Afghanistan OR Uruzgan OR ISAF OR Oeroezgan.**

Second, another automatic selection is done, based on the names of correspondents who reported from Afghanistan during Task Force Uruzgan (2006-2010). The names of the correspondents are the result of research on the internet and contacts with editors of the newspapers and news magazines. A complete list of correspondents and their status (embedded/non-embedded/mix) and a list of search strings used in the automatic research are included in appendix 10A.

Third, a manual selection is done to collect relevant articles only: articles which are traceable to a specific correspondent, who (during a short or long period) was based in Afghanistan. Main check for basement in Afghanistan is the dateline ('Kabul', 'Kandahar', 'Tarin Kowt', 'Kamp Holland', etc.) and information from the editors of the newspapers or correspondents themselves (like travel schedules).

Fourth, a manual sample of a fixed size is made, based on the general amount of relevant articles from the source: 2 x 15 articles for the four 'big' newspapers, De Pers and De Groene Amsterdammer, and 2 x 5 for the 'smaller' news magazines Vrij Nederland and Elsevier. The composition of each sample is based on the percentual attribution of the correspondents in the total amount of relevant articles from one source (a newspaper or a news magazine). So, a sample contains comparatively more articles from a correspondent with a high attribution, than articles from a correspondent with a low attribution. In order to be able to make a selection which is representative for the whole period of research (2006-2010), all relevant articles are sorted in chronological order. Next, a random, but set spread selection is made. For example, from one correspondent the first, the third, the fifth, the seventh and the ninth article, etc. are selected. An overview of the composition of the 16 subsamples is included in appendix 10B.

6c Definitions and variables

Based on the central questions/sub questions and the hypotheses of this research, six clusters of variables can be distinguished. The independent variable is reporter status: embedded versus non-embedded journalism or a mix of these two. The five dependent clusters of variables are:

- **Sources:** military (ISAF, NATO or MoD); representatives of Dutch organizations and governments; representatives of international organizations and governments; representatives of Afghan organizations and governments; Afghan militant or religious leaders; Taliban (leaders and fighters); Afghan population; experts (scientists and journalists) or unknown sources

- **Topics:** military actions and strategy; daily life at the camp; reconstruction (activities); violence; Afghan society, culture and religion; economics and business; politics and law; different
- **Type of analysis:** episodic versus thematic framing
- **Framing:** human interest framing (perspective of the soldier or perspective of the Afghan citizen); responsibility framing; military framing; humanitarian framing
- **Bias:**
 - **tone** in headline and text about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community
 - **challenging of the picture** as drawn by the (Dutch) military; (Dutch) MoD; Dutch or international governments of the character and results of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community
 - **reflection** on the limits of the profession of non-embedded war journalist in Afghanistan or references to censure or unavailable/limited sources.

For all variables more specific definitions are formulated in the codebook, as included in **appendix 10D**.

6d Method of analysis and testing of hypotheses

A codebook is set up which contains all clusters of variables and possible, defined values. The codebook is for a big part based on a codebook as used by Van Klink in her research in November 2007.

To analyze the type of analysis (episodic/thematic framing), a code set is used, which is developed and tested by Pfau et al (2004) and Van Klink (2007). To analyze generic framing of articles (human interest framing and responsibility framing) code sets are used, which are developed and tested by Pfau et al (2004) and Semetko and Valkenburg (2000). To analyze issue framing of articles (military framing and humanitarian framing) code sets are developed, which are partly based on code sets as developed by Van Klink (2007) and De Geyndt (2011). Finally, to analyze the tone of articles, a code set is developed, which is partly based on code sets as developed by Aday (2005) and Van Klink (2007).

The coding is translated in a checklist (see appendix 10C). This checklist is the base for the analysis of the 180 articles. For each article, the analysis is done on paper. Results are imported in SPSS. All statistical analyses are done in SPSS. In the next chapter, results are presented in frequency and contingency tables. For a selection of items a distinction is made between the first (2006-2008) and second (2008-2010) period of TFU. Results concerning the tone of the articles are illustrated with (striking) examples and quotes from a selection of the analyzed articles.

Underneath table gives an overview of the variables: the categories; the scale; the origins of the categories (source or example); the statistical analysis as described in section 6e and relevancy of recoding.

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Categories</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Used source/example for definition</i>	<i>Statistical analysis</i>	<i>Recoding</i>
Metadata*: reporter status	4 categories (embedded; non-embedded; mix; total)	Nominal	Non applicable	1 frequency tables (reporter status); 4 contingency tables (reporter status against paper/author and period)	No
Sources	10 categories (for example military or Afghan population)	Nominal	Basis from Van Klink (2007:23-25) with add-ons of researcher	2 contingency tables (reporter status against type of source; total amount of sources)	No
Topics	8 categories (for example military actions and strategy or reconstruction)	Nominal	Basis from Van Klink (2007: 25-27) with add-ons of researcher	1 contingency table (reporter status against type of topic)	No
Type of analysis	5 categories	Interval	Basis from Pfau et al (2004:82) and Van Klink (2007:28/29)	1 MANOVA + 1 contingency table (reporter status against variables of frame)	Yes (value 1) -> for factor-analysis, reliability + MANOVA only ->ETFrame1new
Framing – generic – Human interest	4 categories	Interval/ratio	Basis from Semetko and Valkenburg (2000:100)	1 MANOVA + 1 contingency table (reporter status against variables of frame)	No
Framing – generic – Responsibility	4 categories	Interval/ratio	Basis from Semetko and Valkenburg (2000:100)	1 MANOVA + 2 contingency tables (reporter status against against variables of frame and assignment of responsibility)	Yes (value 2) -> for factor-analysis, reliability + MANOVA only -> RESPFrame2new

*Because of less relevancy, other metadata in this category are excluded from this table.

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Values</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Used source/example for definition</i>	<i>Statistical analysis</i>	<i>Recoding</i>
Framing – issue specific – military framing	5 categories	Interval/ratio	Basis from Pfau, Van Klink (2007:32/33) and De Geyndt (2011:43)	1 MANOVA + 1 contingency table (reporter status against variables of frame)	No
Framing – issue specific – humanitarian framing	4 categories	Interval/ratio	Basis from Pfau Van Klink (2007:33-35) and De Geyndt (2011:43)	1 contingency table (reporter status against variables of frame)	No
Frames - overview	5 categories	Nominal	Basis from Van Klink (2007:36)	Skipped (overlap with MANOVA)	No
Bias – tone in headline	3 categories (negative; neutral; positive)	Ordinal	Basis from Van Klink (2007:36/37 and Aday, 2005:9)	1 contingency table (reporter status against tone in headline+ frame)	No
Bias – tone in article	6 categories (extremely negative; negative neutral; positive; extremely positive; non applicable)	Ordinal	Basis from Van Klink (2007:36/37 and Aday, 2005:9)	1 contingency table (reporter status against tone in article + period)	No
Bias – challenging the picture as drawn by parties	3 categories (no; yes; non applicable)	Nominal	Researcher	1 contingency table (reporter status against challenging parties+ period)	No
Bias –reflection on limits of profession	2 categories (no; yes)	Nominal	Researcher	1 contingency table (reporter status against reflection on limits)	No

Intrareliability

The content analysis in this research is done manually. There is a risk that bias occurs, caused by preconceived opinion from the researcher or unsystematic measuring or coding by the researcher. There are statistical measures of inter-rater agreement or inter-annotator agreement for qualitative (categorical) items, like Cohen's Kappa coefficient. A kappa-score of zero means that the similarity is based on chance only, a kappa-score of 1 is a complete similarity. (Wikipedia.) Since all articles are analyzed by one person and individual articles are not 100% comparable due to different content, this measurement is skipped.

Reliability of frames

First, to get more insight in the structure of the dataset of the frames, a factor analysis is done. A factor analysis checks underlying patterns and correlations between different items and puts the items who have similar patterns together (SPSS Handboek). Appendix 10e contains the results of the factor-analysis. The outcome of the KMO and Bartlett's Test (an Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy of ,706) shows that application of a factor analysis is justified and patterns can be distinguished in the dataset. However, not all framing questions cluster into five frames. The variables of the responsibility frame; the episodic/thematic frame and the human interest frame are clustered together in a factor. The variables of the military frame and the humanitarian frame however are clustered with variables from other frames: there is a strong correlation between two variables from the military and humanitarian frame concerning reconstruction and between variables from the humanitarian frame and human interest frame. This outcome shows a review and adapting of the military and the humanitarian frame is required before further analysis can be done.

Second, to test the internal consistency of the frames itself, a reliability analysis is done for each frame. A check of the results of the factor analysis is done with Cronbach's Alpha. Cronbach's Alpha (or α) is a measure of internal consistency and a way to test whether one or more items are allowed to form together one scale (SPSS Handboek). Appendix 10f contains the results of the reliability tests. The reliability tests show that the reliability of the frames ranges from unacceptable to acceptable. The reliability of the human interest frame ($\alpha = ,728$) is acceptable and cannot be improved with correction. The reliability of the military frame and responsibility frame are questionable ($\alpha = ,635$ and $,698$), but acceptable ($\alpha = ,700$ and $,703$) after deleting of one variable ('The story discusses the winning the hearts and minds-strategy in the Afghan war' and 'The story suggests that the problem requires urgent action'). The reliability of the episodic/thematic frame is questionable ($\alpha = ,660$), but cannot be improved by deleting a variable. Finally, the reliability of the humanitarian frame is unacceptable ($\alpha = ,410$) and adaption leads to a still poor result ($\alpha = ,544$). As a result of the factor analysis and the reliability tests, the human interest and episodic/thematic frame are considered as suitable for further analysis without correction and the responsibility and military frame after correction. The humanitarian frame is skipped from further analysis (the unit only, not the variables itself).

(Statistical significance of) relationships between variables

Relationships between categorical variables are checked on statistical significance. Chi-square tests are applied to show whether there is a significant relationship at all. In case of nominal variables the strength and direction of relationships is tested with the association measures Contingency coefficient and Phi and Cramer's V.

The relationship between the reporter status (embedded, non-embedded, mix) and application of the frames is tested with MANOVA: Multivariate Analysis Of Variance. MANOVA enables comparing multivariate (population) means of several groups. It shows whether changes in the independent variable(s) have significant effects on the dependent variables and what the interactions are among the dependent variables and the independent variables (Stevens, 2002).

6f *Relevance and limitations of the research*

Relevance of the research is the analysis of the influence of embedded journalism on the news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU, as well as in the first period (2006-2008), as in the second period (2008-2010). Limitations of the research are:

- The limited number of analyzed newspapers (only five) and news magazines (only three) and analyzed articles (only 180 articles)
- The focus on articles published in newspapers/news magazines and the excluding of articles published on the Internet
- The excluding of an analysis of images connected to the articles, due to the source of the articles (database Lexis Nexis), which only contains texts
- The (possible) subjective character of the analysis, caused by the fact that the analysis is done by one person (the researcher) only.

7 Results

7a Population and cases

Based on the literature research as described in chapter 3, two predictions are made concerning the population. First, considering the high participation of the embed program of the MoD, it is predicted that the news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 is dominated by embedded journalism. Second, during the first years (2006-2007) of the mission, the overdose of embedded journalism in the news coverage receives a lot of criticism. So, it is predicted that the news coverage of the first part of the mission (2006-2007) is more dominated by embedded journalism than the second part of the mission (2008-2010). This section gives an overview of findings regarding reporter status and individual journalists; views and experiences from journalists; reporter status per publication and reporter status per period of TFU.

Reporter status per journalist

To get insight in the reporter status of journalists who have reported from Afghanistan, editors of the publications and the journalists themselves have been contacted (see appendix 10a). Criteria for embedded journalism is participation in the embed program of the MoD. Some journalists, like Chin-A-Fo and Dam object the division between embedded and non-embedded journalism and state that they have applied a mix (see the next subsection). In order to be able to incorporate this group of 'hybrid' reporters, the variable reporter status is split in three categories: embedded, non-embedded and mix.

Findings show that the relationship between journalists and reporter status is significant (Cramer's $V = ,857$, $p \leq ,01$). Contingency table 1 shows that a majority, 19 of the 26 individual reporters, is connected with one specific reporter status. First, from twelve reporters, all articles are the result of embedded journalism. From six of them (Derix, Eijvoogel, Huygens, Mikkers, Jansen and Korver), only one or two articles are selected, which diminishes the relevance of findings regarding their status. However, according to the journalists themselves or editors of their newspapers, these six journalists during TFU have reported embedded only. The same goes for journalists, from whom several (three or more) articles are selected: Van Bommel, Van den Boogaard, Koelé, Müller, Sanders and Vrijzen have reported embedded only. Second, from seven reporters, all articles are the result of non-embedded journalism. From two of them (Brummelman and Coenradie), only one or two articles are selected, which diminishes the relevance of findings regarding their status. However, according to the journalists themselves or editors of their newspapers, these two journalists during TFU have reported non-embedded only. The same goes for journalists, from whom several (three or more) articles are selected: Karskens, Nijhuis, Rohmsen, Vreeken and De Wit have reported non-embedded only. Third, all articles from one reporter (Dam) are the result of a mixture of embedded and non-embedded journalism. A minority, six of the 26 individual reporters, is connected with more than one reporter status. Boom, Chin-A-Fo, Ede Botje, Marlet, Righton have confirmed that they have combined forms of journalism: embedded, and/or non-embedded and/or a mixture of these.

Contingency table 1 – reporter status against author

		Type of reporter				
		Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total	
Author	Bemmel, Van	Count	5	0	0	5
		% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Boogaard, Van den	Count	4	0	0	4
		% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Boom	Count	12	5	0	17
		% within Author	70,6%	29,4%	,0%	100,0%
	Brummelman	Count	0	1	0	1
		% within Author	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Chin-A-Fo	Count	0	5	6	11
		% within Author	,0%	45,5%	54,5%	100,0%
	Chin-A-Fo, Müller	Count	0	0	1	1
		% within Author	,0%	,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Coenradie	Count	0	2	0	2
		% within Author	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Dam	Count	0	0	4	4
		% within Author	,0%	,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	Derix	Count	1	0	0	1
		% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Derksen	Count	0	11	1	12
		% within Author	,0%	91,7%	8,3%	100,0%
	Ede Botje	Count	2	2	0	3
		% within Author	50%	50%	,0%	100,0%
	Eijsvoogel	Count	1	0	0	1
		% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Huygens	Count	3	0	0	3
		% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Jansen	Count	2	0	0	2
		% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Karskens	Count	0	23	0	23
		% within Author	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Koelé	Count	3	0	0	3
		% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Marlet	Count	12	2	0	14
		% within Author	85,7%	14,3%	,0%	100,0%
	Mikkers	Count	1	0	0	1
		% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Müller	Count	5	0	0	5
		% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%

		Type of reporter			Total
		Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	
Author	Count	0	13	0	13
	% within Author	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Nijhuis	Count	2	3	0	5
	% within Author	40,0%	60,0%	,0%	100,0%
Righton	Count	0	6	0	6
	% within Author	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Rohmensen	Count	28	0	0	28
	% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
Sanders	Count	1	0	0	1
	% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
Sanders, Korver	Count	0	5	0	5
	% within Type of reporter	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Vreeken	Count	5	0	0	5
	% within Author	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
Vrijzen	Count	0	7	0	7
	% within Author	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Wit, De	Count	87	85	12	184
	% within Author	47,3%	46,2%	6,5%	100,0%

Views and experiences from journalists

Contacts of the researcher with journalists regarding their reporter status have resulted in more insight in personal experiences and viewpoints of journalists regarding (non)-embedded journalism.

Several journalists remark that the division between embedded and non-embedded journalism is artificial and should be put into perspective. Van Bommel (Volkskrant): 'Embedded journalism is a limited definition. You might travel with the MoD and stay on Kamp Holland, but still being able to report independently, under supervision of NGOs or the local police. Often, non-embedded journalism can be considered as embedded journalism as well: journalists travel and stay under protection of the main tribe'. According to Vrijzen (Elsevier) and Chin-A-Fo (NRC) fact checking and an independent attitude go well together with embedded journalism. Vrijzen: 'Finding the truth is independent from the status of the correspondent and especially depends on a good preparation. When a journalist is well prepared and informed, he/she is being able to discuss or counter decisions of the military regarding joining patrols or censure.' Chin-A-Fo: 'It is possible to stay with the military and still report independently. Of course, as a journalist you should be critical and put extra effort into the adversarial principle. However, when you're not capable of doing that, question is whether you're a professional journalist'. Journalists like Vrijzen and Chin-A-Fo add that in case of their participation in the embed program of the MoD, their magazines have stimulated independence from the MoD by paying their air tickets or insurance.

According to some journalists embedded journalism and non-embedded journalism are inextricably linked. Chin-A-Fo and Dam state that (in case of certain articles) they have mixed several forms of journalism. Chin-A-Fo: 'The normal journalistic handwork requires the adversarial principle and a hybrid approach'. Dam (Vrij Nederland): 'I do not advocate or object either embedded or non-embedded journalism. You have to mix both forms of journalism to complete a story'.

Several journalists who operated embedded admit that a compulsory review by the military and limited freedom were applicable, but are understanding about the imposed limits and/or relativise the impact on their work. Sanders (Telegraaf): 'Defence was very cooperative. No censure was applied, with exception of pure operational information. I have been able to publish negative and critical stories about TFU like the atmosphere on the camp after a casualty of a comrade and reservations of the military about the benefits of the mission'. Righton (Volkskrant): 'In Uruzgan, the public information officers wanted to read the article before publication in order to check whether the article contained inaccuracies or information which could endanger the safety of the military. As I remember, once, I was asked not to mention the last name of a soldier, to prevent determination of his family in the Netherlands. I honored this request'. Ede Botje (Vrij Nederland): 'Personally, I have noticed little interference by the military. Exception is an incident I describe in an article I wrote about the trip'. [In the article 'We zitten daar goed' of January 6, 2007, Ede Botje describes how he is being reprimanded by a sergeant for asking a local too many questions about the Taliban, BW.] Van Bommel has had 'no bad experiences with censure'. Only once, he had to withdraw an article about a future operation. Vrijnsen has submitted all of his articles for a review. According to Vrijnsen, sometimes mistakes were adjusted and passages were deleted. However, there was room for discussion and Vrijnsen was able to incorporate critical comments in articles, like notification of civil casualties in an article about the battle of Chora.

Vrijnsen admits that freedom of movement was limited, 'but this was not caused by Defense, but by the bad safety situation in Uruzgan. Defense never was a barrier and for imposed limits they had good arguments, like safety or secret operations'. Chin-A-Fo and Van Bommel state that initially on Kamp Holland freedom of movement was limited, but gradually changed for the better. Van Bommel: 'In the beginning, on Kamp Holland a culture of fear prevented allowing of journalists to leave the camp without escort by the military. From 2008 I started leaving the camp until a 18 kilometre distance from Tarin Kowt'. Chin-A-Fo: 'First, Defense was terrified that something would happen to me without their protection, whereas their protection often constitutes a risk. Later, Defense started considering it [leaving the camp without escort by the military, BW] as normal'.

As the above summary shows, only a selection of journalists has been consulted personally about their reporter status. A majority of these consulted journalists has operated embedded or has applied a combination of embedded and non-embedded journalism or a mixture of these forms. So, above findings might not be representative for the views of all of the 26 journalists. However, the comments and experiences from the journalists do indicate that a strict distinction between embedded and non-embedded journalism is artificial, and that in reality, less or more hybrid forms of journalism are applicable. Next, according to journalists who have operated embedded, embedded journalism does not automatically imply interference by the military like censure.

Reporter status in general

As for reporter status in general, frequency table 1 shows that in the dataset the amount of articles from embedded journalists (47.3%) is comparable to the amount of articles from non-embedded journalists (46.2%). The amount of articles from the group of journalists who employed a mixed form of journalism (6.5%), is considerably smaller. Since especially the results from embedded and non-embedded journalists are suitable for comparison, in the sections 7b t/m 7f the results of the journalists who applied a mix (henceforth called hybrid journalists) are analyzed separately/limitedly.

The equal division between articles of embedded and non-embedded journalists is not in line with the predicted dominance of embedded journalism. The former subsection shows that the group of 'pure' embedded journalists (twelve) is bigger than 'pure' non-embedded journalists (seven). However, as is reported in section 6b/shown in appendix 10b, the composition of the samples of every source is based on the percentual attribution of the correspondents in the total amount of relevant articles from one source. So, the equal division can be explained by differences in the output from embedded and non-embedded journalists. First, a selection of the embedded journalists included in this research, like Huygens, Jansen and Mikkers, visited Uruzgan by accompanying one or more short press trips/trips of officials only. Next, in Uruzgan, in line with the policy of the MoD, stays of embedded journalists were limited to two weeks maximum. On top of this, the MoD maintained a rotation schedule to stimulate participation of as many different media as possible. As a consequence, it is to be expected that the production of journalists who operated embedded only (like Van Bommel, Van den Boogaard, Derix, Eijsvoogel, Koelé and Müller) is limited in comparison to journalists who (partly) operated non-embedded (like Chin-A-Fo, Derksen, Nijhuis, Karskens, Righton, Vreeken and De Wit) and had the opportunity to stay and report from Afghanistan for several weeks, months or even longer.

Frequency table 1 – Frequency of reporter status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Embedded	87	47,3	47,3	47,3
	Non-embedded	85	46,2	46,2	93,5
	Mix	12	6,5	6,5	100,0
	Total	184	100,0	100,0	

Reporter status and publication

Findings show that the relationship between reporter status and publication is significant as well (Cramer's $V = ,545$, $p \leq ,01$). As contingency table 3 shows, in the dataset dominance of the reporter status strongly varies per paper/magazine. De Telegraaf and Elsevier show a strong dominance of embedded journalism, while De Pers shows a strong dominance of non-embedded journalism. All these publications have productive reporters (respectively Sanders, Vrijzen and Karskens) who applied a single form of journalism only. De Groene Amsterdammer shows a moderate dominance of embedded journalism. Its single reporter Boom applied both forms of journalism, but produced the majority of articles as an embedded journalist. Volkskrant and Trouw show a moderate dominance of

non-embedded journalism. De Volkskrant has two journalists who reported embedded only (Van Bommel, Koelé) and both papers have reporters who combined embedded and non-embedded journalism (Righton, Marlet) or reported non-embedded only (Derksen, Vreeken, Rohmsen and Nijhuis). However, in case of both papers the production of the non-embedded journalists was higher. Finally, NRC Handelsblad and Vrij Nederland show a balance between three forms of journalism. NRC has journalists who reported embedded only (Van den Boogaard, Derix, Eijvoogel, Müller); both publications have reporters who reported non-embedded only (Brummelman, Nijhuis, De Wit), applied a combination of embedded, non-embedded journalism or a mixture (Ede Botje, Chin-A-Fo) or, in case of Vrij Nederland, a mixture of embedded and non-embedded journalism only (Dam).

Above findings are based on a sample set of 180 articles only, which may not be representative for the publications or its journalists. However, a majority of the publications (with exception of De Telegraaf and Elsevier) has one or more reporters who combined embedded journalism and non-embedded journalism or applied non-embedded journalism only. On top of this, in case of five publications, the output of embedded journalists was either absent (De Pers), or dominated by output of non-embedded journalists (Trouw, Volkskrant) or by a combination of non-embedded journalists and hybrid journalists (NRC, Vrij Nederland). **So, the results do not confirm the hypothesis that news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 is dominated by embedded journalism.**

Contingency table 2 – Frequency of reporter status per paper

Paper		Type of reporter			Total
		Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	
NRC Handelsblad	Count	11	13	7	31
	% within Paper	35,5%	41,9%	22,6%	100,0%
Volkskrant	Count	10	19	1	30
	% within Paper	33,3%	63,3%	3,3%	100,0%
De Telegraaf	Count	35	2	0	37
	% within Paper	94,6%	5,4%	,0%	100,0%
Trouw	Count	12	19	0	31
	% within Paper	38,7%	61,3%	,0%	100,0%
Elsevier	Count	5	0	0	5
	% within Paper	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
Groene Amsterdammer	Count	12	5	0	17
	% within Paper	70,6%	29,4%	,0%	100,0%
Vrij Nederland	Count	2	4	4	10
	% within Paper	20,0%	40,0%	40,0%	100,0%
De Pers	Count	0	23	0	23
	% within Paper	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
Total	Count	87	85	12	184
	% within Paper	47,3%	46,2%	6,5%	100,0%

Reporter status and timeframe of TFU

Findings show that there is a significant relationship between reporter status and the period of TFU (Cramer's $V = ,359$, $p \leq ,01$). As contingency table 3 shows, articles in the first half of TFU (2006-2008), show a light dominance of embedded journalism (62%). However, articles in the second half of TFU (2008-2010), show a light dominance of non-embedded journalism (57%) and a bigger presence of a mixture of embedded and non-embedded journalism (12.8%).

Contingency table 3 – Frequency of reporter status per period

		Type of reporter			Total	
		Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix		
Period TFU	2006-2008	Count	61	36	1	98
		% within Period TFU	62,2%	36,7%	1,0%	100,0%
	2008-2010	Count	26	49	11	86
		% within Period TFU	30,2%	57,0%	12,8%	100,0%
Total	Count	87	85	12	184	
	% within Period TFU	47,3%	46,2%	6,5%	100,0%	

Reporter status, period of TFU and paper

Findings show that there is a significant relationship between reporter status, the two periods of TFU and the paper as well (Cramer's $V = ,449$ and $,692$, $p \leq ,01$). As contingency table 4 shows, in the first half of TFU (2006-2008), articles from De Telegraaf, Elsevier and De Groene Amsterdammer show a strong dominance (100% and 80%) and articles from Trouw a light dominance (53%) of embedded journalism. Articles from De Pers show a strong dominance (100%) and articles from De Volkskrant and Vrij Nederland a light dominance of non-embedded journalism (53.5% and 60%). Articles from NRC are evenly divided: 50% embedded and non-embedded journalism.

The picture changes in the second period. Compared to the first period, De Pers shows an equal dominance (100%) and De Volkskrant, Trouw and Groene Amsterdammer show a bigger dominance (73.3%, 75% and 100%) of non-embedded journalism. In case of two publications, NRC Handelsblad and Vrij Nederland, articles show a stronger dominance (80% and 46.7%) of hybrid journalism. In case of De Telegraaf, the dominance of embedded journalism is still big, but slightly diminished (88.2%).

Above findings might partly be caused by differences in the two sample sets (one for 2006-2008 and one for 2008-2010) of the publications. However, it is striking to note, that in case of all seven publications, in the second period there has not been an upward trend to embedded journalism.

So, the results confirm the hypothesis of a tendency of less embedded journalism in the second period of TFU.

Contingency table 4 – Frequency of reporter status per timeframe and paper

Period TFU	Paper		Type of reporter			
			Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total
2006-2008	NRC Handelsblad	Count	8	8	0	16
		% within Paper	50,0%	50,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Volkskrant	Count	6	8	1	15
		% within Paper	40,0%	53,3%	6,7%	100,0%
	De Telegraaf	Count	20	0	0	20
		% within Paper	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Trouw	Count	8	7	0	15
		% within Paper	53,3%	46,7%	,0%	100,0%
	Elsevier	Count	5	0	0	5
		% within Paper	100,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Groene Amsterdammer	Count	12	3	0	15
		% within Paper	80,0%	20,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Vrij Nederland	Count	2	3	0	5
		% within Paper	40,0%	60,0%	,0%	100,0%
	De Pers	Count	0	7	0	7
		% within Paper	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Total	Count	61	36	1	98
		% within Paper	62,2%	36,7%	1,0%	100,0%
2008-2010	NRC Handelsblad	Count	3	5	7	15
		% within Paper	20,0%	33,3%	46,7%	100,0%
	Volkskrant	Count	4	11	0	15
		% within Paper	26,7%	73,3%	,0%	100,0%
	De Telegraaf	Count	15	2	0	17
		% within Paper	88,2%	11,8%	,0%	100,0%
	Trouw	Count	4	12	0	16
		% within Paper	25,0%	75,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Groene Amsterdammer	Count	0	2	0	2
		% within Paper	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Vrij Nederland	Count	0	1	4	5
		% within Paper	,0%	20,0%	80,0%	100,0%
	De Pers	Count	0	16	0	16
		% within Paper	,0%	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
	Total	Count	26	49	11	86
		% within Paper	30,2%	57,0%	12,8%	100,0%

7b Sources

Research has shown that embedded journalism leads to a specific use of sources (see section 4e). It is predicted that embedded journalists mainly use military sources and non-embedded journalists use more diverse sources (Dutch organizations and governments; international organizations and governments; Afghan organizations and governments; Afghan militant or religious leaders; Taliban; Afghan population or experts).

Type of sources

Contingency table 5 gives an overview of the relationship between reporter status and ten types of sources. Descriptions of the ten sources are included in appendix 10d Codebook – definitions of variables.

The results show that embedded journalism is above all connected with usage of one specific type of source: military sources. In almost all articles (95.4%) embedded journalists use low ranked and high ranked ISAF and NATO personnel and representatives of the Ministry of Defense as a source. Non-embedded journalists apply military sources in 24.7% of their articles.

In contrast, non-embedded journalism is connected with several types of sources. First, the *Afghan population*: in 65.9% of the non-embedded (versus 12.6% of the embedded) articles, civilians are consulted who are not aligned to an organization: elders, shopkeepers, medical personnel of hospitals, teachers, cap drivers, farmers, fixers, patients in clinics, etc. Second, *representatives of Afghan organization/government*: in 61.2% of the non-embedded (versus 14.9% of the embedded) articles, persons are consulted who are aligned to the Afghan government (President, Ministers, Members of Parliament), local government (Governors or policemen) or Afghan organizations and NGOs (f.e. the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission or AIHRC). Third, *representatives of international organizations/government*: in 30.6% of the non-embedded (versus 5.7% of the embedded) articles, persons are consulted who are aligned to international organizations (f.e. United Nations), international NGOs (f.e. Amnesty International) or non-Dutch and non-Afghan governments (f.e. the United States or Pakistan). Fourth, *experts (scientists and journalists)*: in 20% of the non-embedded (versus 11.5% of the embedded) articles, Afghan and international scientists, journalists, magazines, thinktanks (f.e. Senlis) are consulted. Fifth, *representatives of Dutch organizations/governments*: in 12.9% of the non-embedded (versus 11.5% of the embedded) articles, persons are consulted who are aligned to the Dutch government (Prime minister, ministers, Members of Parliament, spokespersons) or Dutch organizations/NGOs (like Cordaid). Sixth, *different sources*: in 5.9% of the non-embedded (versus 0% of the embedded) articles, expats are consulted: f.e. Dutch or American citizens living and working in Afghanistan. Seventh, *Taliban (leaders and fighters)*: in 4.7% of the non-embedded (versus 0% of embedded) articles, journalists, ex-Taliban leaders and fighters are consulted.

Finally, a hybrid form of journalism is connected with two types of sources: *Afghan militant, religious or tribal leaders* (f.e. warlords like Mohammed Khan, mullahs and jirga-delegates) and an *unknown source*. It is striking that in hybrid articles, usage of four types of sources, military (75%),

representatives of Afghan organization/government (25%), Afghan population (33.3) and experts (16.7%), ‘floats’ between usage of these sources in articles by embedded and non-embedded journalists.

So, in general, embedded journalism, is above all linked to one type of source: military sources. Non-embedded journalism is connected to a more diverse usage of sources and especially to local sources (Afghan population and representatives of Afghan -local- governments and NGO’s) and international sources (representatives of international organizations/governments).

Contingency table 5 – Types of sources by reporter status

		Type of reporter			Total	
		Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix		
Overview of sources ^a	Military source (ISAF, NATO or MoD)	Count	83	21	9	113
		% within Type of reporter	95,4%	24,7%	75,0%	
	Representatives of Dutch organizations/governments	Count	10	11	1	22
		% within Type of reporter	11,5%	12,9%	8,3%	
	Representatives of international organizations/government	Count	5	26	1	32
		% within Type of reporter	5,7%	30,6%	8,3%	
	Representatives of Afghan organization/government	Count	13	52	3	68
		% within Type of reporter	14,9%	61,2%	25,0%	
	Afghan militant, religious or tribal leaders	Count	3	5	1	9
		% within Type of reporter	3,4%	5,9%	8,3%	
	Taliban (leaders and fighters)	Count	0	4	0	4
		% within Type of reporter	,0%	4,7%	,0%	
	Afghan population	Count	11	56	4	71
		% within Type of reporter	12,6%	65,9%	33,3%	
	Experts (scientists and journalists)	Count	10	17	2	29
		% within Type of reporter	11,5%	20,0%	16,7%	
	Unknown source	Count	2	2	1	5
		% within Type of reporter	2,3%	2,4%	8,3%	
	Different source	Count	0	5	0	5
		% within Type of reporter	,0%	5,9%	,0%	
Total		Count	87	85	12	184

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Amount of different types of sources

Contingency table 6 gives an overview of the relationship between reporter status and the amount of sources. The relationship between reporter status and amount of different types of sources is significant (Cramer's $V = ,283$, $p \leq ,01$).

Results show that embedded journalism is connected with usage of one single type of source: In 63.2% of the embedded (versus 24.7% of the non-embedded) articles, only one type of source is used. In contrast, non-embedded journalism is connected with usage of multiple types of sources. In 38.8% of the non-embedded (versus 21.8% of the embedded) articles two sources are used. In 16.5% of the non-embedded (versus 9.2% of the embedded) articles three sources are used. In 15.3% of non-embedded (versus 5.7% of the embedded) articles four sources are used. Finally, a hybrid form of journalism is especially connected with usage of one or two types of sources (both in 41.7% of the articles).

The dataset shows, that in case of usage of one type of source, embedded journalists focus on military sources and non-embedded journalists on Afghan population and representatives of the Afghan organizations or government. **The results do confirm the hypothesis that embedded journalists mainly use military sources and non-embedded journalists use more diverse sources.** However, this does not imply that non-embedded journalists always apply multiple types of sources: in 25% of their articles, only one single type of source is being used.

Contingency table 6 – Amount of used sources by reporter status

		Type of reporter				
		Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total	
Amount of sources	,00	Count	0	1	0	1
		% within Type of reporter	,0%	1,2%	,0%	,5%
1,00		Count	55	21	5	81
		% within Type of reporter	63,2%	24,7%	41,7%	44,0%
2,00		Count	19	33	5	57
		% within Type of reporter	21,8%	38,8%	41,7%	31,0%
3,00		Count	8	14	1	23
		% within Type of reporter	9,2%	16,5%	8,3%	12,5%
4,00		Count	5	13	1	19
		% within Type of reporter	5,7%	15,3%	8,3%	10,3%
5,00		Count	0	1	0	1
		% within Type of reporter	,0%	1,2%	,0%	,5%
6,00		Count	0	2	0	2
		% within Type of reporter	,0%	2,4%	,0%	1,1%
Total		Count	87	85	12	184
		% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

7c Topics

Research has shown that embedded journalism leads to a focus on specific topics (see section 4e). Descriptions of the seven topics are included in appendix 10d Codebook – definitions of variables. It is predicted that embedded journalists focus on topics related to the military (military actions, daily life at the camp) and (ISAF)-reconstruction. It is expected that non-embedded journalists focus on violence; Afghan society, culture and religion and economics and politics.

Most dominant topic

Contingency table 7 gives an overview of the relationship between reporter status and dominant topic. The relationship between reporter status and dominant topic is significant (Cramer's $V = ,487$, $p \leq ,01$).

Results show that embedded journalism is primarily connected with military topics. First, *military actions and strategy*: 51.7% of the embedded (versus 2.4% of the non-embedded) articles are about (non-reconstruction) activities like convoys, patrols, operations and fights, F16's-flights, bombardments, defusing of IED's and/or military strategy and tactics, like evaluations of military strategy or change of strategy or command. Second, *daily life at the camp*: 6.9% of the embedded (versus 0% of the non-embedded) articles focus on activities and life of the military at the base: descriptions of the base and its facilities; people who are working on it; camp rules/protocol and visits of Dutch officials, journalists or artists/entertainers.

In contrast, non-embedded journalism is connected with different and more diverse topics. First, *violence*: 24.7% of the non-embedded (versus 16.1% of the embedded) articles focus on sources and consequences of violence (threats, attacks, bombardments and kidnappings) for the military and civilians and/or descriptions of 'enemies' and victims of violence (military or civilian casualties). Second, *politics and law*: 22.4% of the non-embedded (versus 9.2% of the embedded) articles either focus on international politics (f.e. visits of heads of state to Afghanistan; tops about Afghanistan or Dutch politics concerning Afghanistan); Afghan national politics (f.e. national elections and jirgas); Afghan local politics (f.e. ruling of governors); division of power between Afghan officials and non-officials (like militant leaders); the power of tribes or the practice of Afghan law. Third, *Afghan society, culture and religion*: 21.2% of the non-embedded (versus 0% of embedded) articles focus on descriptions of Afghan society and explanations of (practices related to) culture and religion (f.e. marriage or wearing of the burka); life of Afghan citizens; reintegration of Afghan emigrants or opinions of Afghan citizens about ISAF or other parties in the war in Afghanistan. Fourth, *reconstruction activities*: 16.5% of the non-embedded (versus 16.1% of the embedded) articles focus on either reconstruction of Afghanistan in general (f.e. social-economic progress or development of infrastructure) and/or reconstruction activities by the army (f.e. building roads, prisons, hospitals and schools; training of agents; meetings with locals about reconstruction) and/or by Afghan/international organizations and NGO's (f.e. programs of UN, CORDAID and the Afghan government). Fifth, *economics and business*: 8.2% of the non-embedded (versus 0% of the embedded) articles either focus on the economic situation in Afghanistan in general (f.e. economic progress; employment); doing business in Afghanistan (f.e. shopkeeping) and/or commodities and livelihoods (f.e. opium farming). Sixth, *different*: 4.7%

of the non-embedded (versus 0% of the embedded) articles are about live, work and experiences of correspondents themselves.

Finally, a hybrid form of journalism is connected with especially dominance of the topics politics (33.3%), reconstruction activities and military actions and strategy (both 25%) and Afghan society, culture and religion (16.7%).

The results do confirm the hypothesis that embedded journalists focus on topics related to the military (military actions, daily life at the camp) and that non-embedded journalists focus on violence; Afghan society, culture and religion and economics and politics. Embedded and non-embedded journalists pay similar attention to reconstruction activities.

Contingency table 7 – reporter status against type of topic

			Type of reporter			
			Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total
Most dominant topic	Military actions	Count	45	2	3	50
		% within Type of reporter	51,7%	2,4%	25,0%	27,2%
	Daily life at the camp	Count	6	0	0	6
		% within Type of reporter	6,9%	,0%	,0%	3,3%
	Reconstruction activities	Count	14	14	3	31
		% within Type of reporter	16,1%	16,5%	25,0%	16,8%
	Violence	Count	14	21	0	35
		% within Type of reporter	16,1%	24,7%	,0%	19,0%
	Afghan society, culture and religion	Count	0	18	2	20
		% within Type of reporter	,0%	21,2%	16,7%	10,9%
	Economics	Count	0	7	0	7
		% within Type of reporter	,0%	8,2%	,0%	3,8%
	Politics	Count	8	19	4	31
		% within Type of reporter	9,2%	22,4%	33,3%	16,8%
	Different	Count	0	4	0	4
		% within Type of reporter	,0%	4,7%	,0%	2,2%
	Total	Count	87	85	12	184
		% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

7d Type of analysis and framing

Based on the literature research as described in section 4e, several predictions are made concerning type of analysis and framing. As for type of analysis, predicted is that embedded journalism leads to episodic framing and non-embedded journalism to thematic framing. As for framing, predicted is that embedded journalism leads to military or human interest framing (perspective of the soldier) and non-embedded journalism to responsibility, humanitarian or human interest framing (perspective of the Afghan citizen). This section gives an overview of generic findings regarding type of analysis and framing (obtained by a MANOVA-test) and results for type of analysis/the four frames separately.

Generic findings (MANOVA)

The relationship between reporter status and application of type of analysis and framing is tested with MANOVA: Multivariate Analysis Of Variance. MANOVA enables comparing multivariate population means (in this case means of type of analysis and the frames) of groups (in this case embedded, non-embedded and hybrid journalists). Since the reliability of the humanitarian frame is unacceptable (see section 6e), this frame is excluded from the MANOVA-test. So tested are four clusters of dependent variables: type of analysis (episodic-thematic framing); human interest, responsibility and military framing. Results of the MANOVA-test are included in Appendix 10g.

Starting point (or 0-hypothesis) of MANOVA is that the variance of the dependent variables is equal across all groups: the means of the three groups on the scales of the four variables are equal. Outcomes of the multivariate tests (Pillai's Trace) show that this is not the case. In the dataset 26% of the variability (Partial Eta Squared = ,262) in type of analysis and framing is being determined by the three group levels.

Table 1 in Appendix 10g shows that the means (or the strengths) of type of analysis and the three frames strongly vary per group. As for tone of analysis (episodic-thematic framing) the hybrid group has the highest mean, followed by the non-embedded group. As for human interest framing, the non-embedded group has the highest score. As for responsibility framing, the hybrid group has the highest score. Finally, as for military framing, the embedded group has the highest mean. Table 2 in appendix 10g shows that the F-values of type of analysis and two types of frames (human interest framing, military framing) are significant ($p \leq ,01$). The F-value of the responsibility frame is insignificant ($p \geq ,05$). Outcomes show that the largest variability is caused by the military frame (Partial Eta Squared = ,370), followed by type of analysis (Partial Eta Squared = ,189) and human interest frame (Partial Eta Squared = ,108).

So, the MANOVA-test shows that there is a significant relationship between reporter status and type of analysis, human interest framing and military framing. Embedded journalism is connected to military framing; non-embedded journalism to human interest framing and hybrid journalism/non-embedded journalism to thematic framing.

Type of analysis: episodic-thematic frame

As is explained in section 4a type of analysis refers to episodic-thematic framing. Episodic frames seek to personalize and illustrate issues: they focus on the immediate event or incident and give little or no context. Thematic frames focus on the 'big picture' and provide interpretive analysis. Tone of analysis or episodic-thematic framing is measured with four variables.

Contingency table 8 shows results for 179 of the 184 cases. So, in almost all articles of all groups episodic-thematic framing is more or less applied. A majority of the relevant embedded (70.7%) and non-embedded (55.3%) articles focus on *description of events and persons*. The dataset shows that embedded journalists tend to focus on soldiers and/or their activities like patrols, fights (f.e. the battle at Chora), flights with apaches or F16's, devising of IED's, etc. Non-embedded journalists tend to focus on Afghan officials or citizens and/or (victims of) events like attacks or bombardments and events like elections.

However, non-embedded journalists tend to complement descriptions of events and persons with more background information. First, in 82.4% of the non-embedded (versus 45.1% of embedded) articles events are placed in a *cultural, political or social context*. The analysis shows that in general, non-embedded journalists give more information about f.e. Afghan culture (like relations between men and women); the influence/power of tribes and phenomena like corruption. A smaller group of embedded journalists (especially Van den Boogaard, Boom and Marlet) places military persons and events in a political context, like Dutch or Afghan politics, or the Afghan cultural/social context, like conflicts between tribes or social norms. Second, in 41.2% of the non-embedded (versus 17.1% of embedded) articles *historical sequence and causes* are incorporated. Non-embedded journalists tend to give more information about the (long) history of conflicts in Afghanistan or the rise and fall of the Taliban. Third, in 47.1% of the non-embedded (versus 29.3% of embedded) articles *prognoses and consequences of events* are incorporated. Non-embedded journalists tend to give more information about f.e. the social and economic consequences of continued violence and combat of opium farming and expected results of training of the Afghan police; the elections or proposals for amnesty. A smaller group of embedded journalists (especially Boom, Marlet and Sanders) incorporates prognoses and consequences in their articles, which are usually related to extension or ending of ISAF/TFU or changing of the military approach. Finally, in 31.8% of the non-embedded (versus 12.2% of embedded) articles *statistics or analysis of experts* are included. Non-embedded journalists (especially Nijhuis) tend to incorporate more statistics (about f.e. socio-economic progress or safety) from NGOs like the U.N. and analysis/comments from scientists (f.e. political scientists, lawyers or economists) and other journalists. As for embedded journalists, especially Boom incorporates statistics and expert analysis (f.e. from thinktank Senlis and other journalists) regarding reconstruction, opium farming, civil rights and support for the mission.

Finally, the hybrid group of journalists tends to thematic framing: in a majority of the articles, events or persons are placed in a context (75%), historical sequence or causes (66.7%) or prognoses and consequences (75%) are incorporated and statistics or expert analysis (58.3%) are included.

The results do confirm the hypothesis that embedded journalists apply more episodic framing and non-embedded journalists more thematic framing.

Contingency table 8 – Episodic-thematic framing by reporter status

		Type of reporter				
			Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total
ETFrame responses ^a	Focus on events or persons	Count	58	47	5	110
		% within Type of reporter	70,7%	55,3%	41,7%	
	Placing of events in a context (cultural, political or social)	Count	37	70	9	116
		% within Type of reporter	45,1%	82,4%	75,0%	
	Incorporation of historical sequence or causes	Count	14	35	8	57
		% within Type of reporter	17,1%	41,2%	66,7%	
	Incorporation of prognoses and consequences of events	Count	24	40	9	73
		% within Type of reporter	29,3%	47,1%	75,0%	
	Inclusion of statistics or analysis of experts	Count	10	27	7	44
		% within Type of reporter	12,2%	31,8%	58,3%	
Total		Count	82	85	12	179

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Human interest frame

As is explained in section 4a type human interest framing refers to a focus on the human or emotional side of an event, issue of problem. Human interest framing is measured with four variables.

Contingency table 9 shows results for 129 of the 184 cases. So, in a majority, but not in all articles of all groups, human interest framing is more or less applied. The amount of relevant cases from the non-embedded journalists (70) is slightly bigger than that of the embedded journalists (53). A big majority of the relevant embedded (90.6%) and non-embedded (98.6%) articles contain a *human example or a human face of the issue*. The dataset shows that embedded journalists tend to focus on the military. Almost all articles contain portraits of or interviews with military of all ranks (from lieutenants, colonels, sergeants, corporals to soldiers) and with all kinds of specialties, ranging from air force members (pilots of F16's, Cougars and Apaches), PRT-members to specialists like spotters, bomb disposal experts, forward air controllers and GLA gunmen. In contrast, non-embedded journalists tend to focus on Afghan officials, like policemen, governors or politicians and on Afghan citizens, varying from remigrants, shopkeepers, students, to victims of bombardments and medical staff and patients in hospitals. Next, a smaller but similar majority of the embedded (67.9%) and non-embedded (77.1%) articles contain a description *how individuals and groups are affected*. Again, embedded journalists describe experiences and effects of events on the military. Examples are descriptions of feelings of tension or fear during executing of tasks (like devising of IED's or patrolling in a dangerous area); relief, pride or discharging after (successful) operations or sadness after loss of comrades. Non-embedded journalists focus on experiences and effects of events on officials and civilians. Examples are descriptions of feelings of frustrations or anger about attacks and bombardments by Taliban or ISAF; fear of violence or dissatisfaction about international or national

policy or corruption. Almost half of the non-embedded (45.7%) and a small minority of the embedded (18.9%) articles contain details of the private or personal lives of persons. Non-embedded journalists tend to give details about the lifestyle or family of civilians, like partners and (grand) children. In a lesser degree embedded journalists give details about the private life of the military. Last, a small minority of the non-embedded (25.7%) and embedded (17%) articles contain adjectives or vignettes that generate feelings or compassion. Non-embedded journalists usually apply this in case of descriptions of people in miserable circumstances (like surviving relatives of civil casualties or patients and prisoners). Embedded journalists apply this in case of dramatic descriptions of military actions/actions of the Taliban or in portraits of the military.

Finally, the hybrid group of journalists tends to a similar use of human interest framing as the embedded journalists. In a majority of the relevant articles, a human example or human face (100%) and descriptions of how individuals/group are affected (66.7%) are given. In a minority of articles, details of private or personal lives of persons (33.3%) or adjectives or personal vignettes which generate feelings or compassion (16.7%) are employed.

The results do confirm the hypothesis that embedded journalists apply human interest framing in relation to the military and non-embedded journalists in relation to civilians. In general, embedded journalism is less connected with human interest framing than non-embedded journalism. However, human interest framing also seems dependent on the style from a journalist. The dataset shows that certain embedded (Boom, Sanders) and non-embedded (Chin-A-Fo, Karskens, Nijhuis, De Wit) journalists apply stronger human interest framing than their colleagues.

Contingency table 9 – Human interest framing by reporter status

		Type of reporter				
			Non-embedded	Mix	Total	
Human interest responseset ^a	The story provides a human example or human face of the issue	Count	48	69	6	123
		% within Type of reporter	90,6%	98,6%	100,0%	
	The story employs adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathycaring, sympathy or compassion	Count	9	18	1	28
		% within Type of reporter	17,0%	25,7%	16,7%	
	The story emphasizes how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problem	Count	36	54	4	94
		% within Type of reporter	67,9%	77,1%	66,7%	
	The story goes into the private lives of persons	Count	10	32	2	44
		% within Type of reporter	18,9%	45,7%	33,3%	
Total	Count	53	70	6	129	

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Responsibility frame

As is explained in section 4a responsibility framing refers to emphasis on the responsibility of an individual, group or government for causing or solving a problem. Responsibility framing is measured with four variables. Results of the MANOVA-test show that the relationship between reporter status and the responsibility frame is insignificant. Therefore, the analysis of the results is limited.

Results in contingency table 10 show results for 159 of the 184 cases. So, in a majority, but not in all articles of all groups, responsibility framing is more or less applied. The amount of relevant cases from the embedded journalists (78) is similar to the amount of cases from non-embedded journalists (70). A big majority of the relevant embedded (97.4%) and non-embedded (98.6%) articles suggest that *the government, an individual (or group of people in the society) is responsible for the issue*. It makes sense that in many articles about a mission like TFU and a country in war like Afghanistan, responsibility is less or more a subject, whether the articles are from embedded or non-embedded journalists.

However, differences do show up when the *assignment of responsibility* is analyzed. The relationship between reporter status and assignment of responsibility is significant (Cramer's $V = ,435$, $p \leq .01$). Results in contingency table 11 show that in a majority of the embedded (55.2%) and a minority of the non-embedded (16.5%) articles responsibility is assigned to the Taliban. In many articles of embedded journalists only the Taliban are labeled as responsible for conflicts, violence, attacks and bombs against the military and/or civilians, either in specific cases or in general. Non-embedded journalists tend more to a multiple assignment of responsibility. In 42.4% of the non-embedded and 20.7% of the embedded articles, responsibility is assigned to several groups. In non-embedded articles, multiple responsibility for issues, like lack of safety or lack of socio-economic progress, is usually assigned to combinations of the Taliban and the Afghan government, militant leaders, ISAF and the international community. In embedded articles, multiple responsibility for issues as lack of safety is usually assigned to a combination of the Taliban and the (supposedly corrupt, inefficient or non-present) local or national Afghan government. Less applied combinations are the Taliban and warlords/militant leaders, and in more critical articles (see section 7f), the Taliban and ISAF itself. In 18.8% of the non-embedded and 12.6% of the embedded articles no responsibility is assigned. In a smaller minority, 8.2% of the non-embedded and 1.1% of the embedded articles, responsibility is assigned to ISAF/TFU only.

Next, a majority of the embedded (64.1%) and of the non-embedded articles (55.7%) suggest solutions to the problem. In embedded articles suggested solutions concern military actions by ISAF (like using of F16s) or extension of ISAF; the 'Dutch approach' or the Winning-the-Hearts-and-Minds-strategy; improvements of Afghan government and increasing of involvement of Afghan police or military. In non-embedded articles suggested solutions often concern socio-economic ones, like involvement/programs of NGOs or more support of donors; cultural ones like a change of the Afghan mentality regarding women; politic ones like improvement of the Afghan government; and to a lesser extent, strategic military ones like legalization of opium or training of Afghan military. The other two variables (suggestions of *ability to alleviate the problem* or *requirement of urgent action*) are not

discussed, since they resp. slightly double with the previous described variable or have little added value in the analysis.

Finally, all relevant hybrid articles suggest that the government, an individual (or group of people in the society) is responsible for the issue. Responsibility is assigned to a combination of parties (33.3%), Afghan militant or religious leaders (16.7%), ISAF/TFU (16.7%) or other parties (16.7%).

The results do not confirm the hypothesis that non-embedded journalists apply more responsibility framing, since the relationship between reporter status and responsibility framing is insignificant. However, the relationship between reporter status and assignment of responsibility is significant.

Contingency table 10 – Responsibility framing by reporter status

		Type of reporter					
			Non-embedded	Mix	Total		
		Embedded					
Responsibility Response set ^a	The story suggests that some level of gov't has the ability to alleviate the problem	Count	29	35	8	72	
		% within Type of reporter	37,2%	50,0%	72,7%		
	The story suggests that the government, an individual (or group of people in the society) is responsible for the issue	Count	76	69	11	156	
		% within Type of reporter	97,4%	98,6%	100%		
	The story suggests solutions to the problem	Count	50	39	7	96	
		% within Type of reporter	64,1%	55,7%	63,6%		
	The story suggest that the problem requires urgent action	Count	25	35	3	63	
		% within Type of reporter	32,1%	50,0%	27,3%		
	Total		Count	78	70	11	159

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Contingency table 11 – Assignment of responsibility by reporter status

			Type of reporter			
			Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total
The story suggests that the government, an individual (or group of people in the society) is responsible for the issue	No	Count	11	16	1	28
		% within Type of reporter	12,6%	18,8%	8,3%	15,2%
	Afghan organization or government	Count	2	4	0	6
		% within Type of reporter	2,3%	4,7%	,0%	3,3%
	Taliban	Count	48	14	1	63
		% within Type of reporter	55,2%	16,5%	8,3%	34,2%
	Afghan militant or religious leaders	Count	0	0	2	2
		% within Type of reporter	,0%	,0%	16,7%	1,1%
	ISAF/TFU	Count	1	7	2	10
		% within Type of reporter	1,1%	8,2%	16,7%	5,4%
	International organization/ government	Count	2	4	0	6
		% within Type of reporter	2,3%	4,7%	,0%	3,3%
	Combination of 1,2,3,4,5,6	Count	18	36	4	58
		% within Type of reporter	20,7%	42,4%	33,3%	31,5%
Other	Count	5	4	2	11	
	% within Type of reporter	5,7%	4,7%	16,7%	6,0%	
Total	Count	87	85	12	184	
	% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	

Military frame

As is explained in section 4a military framing refers to a macro military perspective by focusing on war technology and military strategy/tactics. Military framing is measured with five variables.

Contingency table 12 show results for 101 of the 184 cases. So, in a majority, but not in all articles of all groups, military framing is more or less applied. The amount of relevant cases from the embedded journalists (79) is much bigger than the amount of cases from non-embedded journalists (16), which makes comparison between the two groups less relevant.

In a majority of the relevant embedded articles (59.5%) the *military strategy and tactics in the Afghan war* of TFU, ISAF or NATO are discussed. Embedded journalists write about the balance between fighting and reconstruction; the ink spot strategy and counterinsurgency; the military approach in specific operations; the attribution of the air force; the rules of engagement and finally the exit strategy of ISAF. Next, in 44.3% of the articles embedded journalists write about the *Winning the Hearts and Minds-strategy in the Afghan war*. The degree of attention differs: in many articles embedded journalists mention this strategy only briefly. A smaller group of articles contains ample descriptions of visits of the military to/meetings with locals and reconstruction activities of the PRT. In a similar amount of articles (43%) embedded journalists describe *military actions or dangerous situations*. Journalists describe operations (like the Battle of Chora); patrols (which they often accompanied themselves); actions of the air force or pioneers and (danger from) attacks on convois. Next, in 41.8% of the articles embedded journalists write about the *military organization*. They often

write about the experience and capacities of specialists like snipers, special forces, pioneers and air force members; the attitude of the Dutch military towards the code of conduct/the rules of engagement and, in a lesser degree, about the means and size of the troupe. Finally, in 36.7% of the articles embedded journalists write about the *professionalism of the military material or advanced technology*. Popular subjects are air force material (Apaches, Cougar helicopters, F16s), reconnaissance systems like RecceLite and material for detection of bombs.

Non-embedded journalists tend to write about two aspects only: the military strategy or tactics (81.3%) and the the Winning the Hearts and Minds-strategy (31.3%). Non-embedded journalists do not write about the military organization, military material or technology and do not describe military actions or dangerous situations.

Finally, in a majority of relevant hybrid articles military strategy or tactics in the Afghan war (66.7%) and the Winning the Hearts and Minds-strategy (50%) are discussed. In 33.3% of the articles descriptions are given of the military organization and of military actions. So, as for military framing, the hybrid group ‘floats’ between the embedded and non-embedded group.

The results do confirm the hypothesis that embedded journalists apply more military framing.

Contingency table 12 – Military framing by reporter status

		Type of reporter				
		Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total	
Military responseset ^a	The story discusses the military strategy or tactics in the Aghan war	Count	47	13	4	64
		% within Type of reporter	59,5%	81,3%	66,7%	
	The story discusses the military organization and/or capacities/heroism of military personnel	Count	33	0	2	35
		% within Type of reporter	41,8%	,0%	33,3%	
	The story discusses the professionalism of military material or advanced war technology	Count	29	0	0	29
		% within Type of reporter	36,7%	,0%	,0%	
	The story gives detailed descriptions of military actions or dangerous situations	Count	34	0	2	36
		% within Type of reporter	43,0%	,0%	33,3%	
	The story discusses the winning the hearts and minds-strategy in the Afghan war	Count	35	5	3	43
		% within Type of reporter	44,3%	31,3%	50,0%	
	Total	Count	79	16	6	101

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Humanitarian frame

As is explained in section 4a humanitarian framing refers to emphasis on the perspective from citizens and a focus on the toll of conflicts and victims. Humanitarian framing is measured with four variables. The reliability analysis has shown that the reliability of the humanitarian frame is unacceptable (see section 6e). Therefore, the analysis of the results of the variables of this frame is limited.

Results in contingency table 13 show results for 135 of the 184 cases. So, in a majority, but not in all articles of all groups, the four variables are more or less applied. The amount of relevant cases from the embedded journalists (54) is smaller than the amount of cases from non-embedded journalists (71). Underneath the major differences between the two groups are described.

In a majority of relevant articles (66.7%) embedded journalists write about *reconstruction activities*. The degree of attention differs. In many articles embedded journalists mention reconstruction activities only briefly, without examples. A small group of articles contains ample descriptions of visits of the military to/meetings with locals and reconstruction activities of the PRT, like building of roads and bridges and training of Afghan military/agents. In a smaller amount of articles (38,9%) embedded journalists write about *civil casualties*. Usually they mention civil casualties briefly. Exceptions are Van Den Boogaard, Boom and Vrijzen who pay ample attention to civil casualties, in articles about resp. Operation Medusa, the battle at Chora and the bombardment of Chenaz Tu. Civil casualties are never the main subject of an embedded article, except for two articles: one of Boom ('Our civil casualties') and one of Jansen ('Criticism after battle at Chora').

As for the non-embedded journalists, in a majority of relevant articles (66.7%) they write about the *costs of war and how lives of Afghan citizens are affected by the conflict in Afghanistan*. They write ample reports about how lives of people, ranging from citizens in Kandahar, women, businesspeople, opium farmers, to surviving relatives of civil casualties, are affected by violence, attacks, bombardments or other side-effects of war. Next, in many articles (66.2%) *opinions of Afghan citizens about (parties in) the conflict in Afghanistan* are described. Non-embedded journalists give insight in opinions of Afghan citizens, ranging from shopkeepers/businesspeople, students, politicians (presidential candidates and Members of Parliament), governors, scientists, to ex-Taliban members, about the war in Afghanistan, responsible parties and possible solutions.

Finally, in half of the relevant hybrid articles (50%) reconstruction activities and opinions of Afghan citizens about (parties in) the conflict in Afghanistan are discussed.

The results do not confirm the hypothesis that non-embedded journalists apply more humanitarian framing, since the humanitarian frame itself is unreliable.

Contingency table 13 – Humanitarian framing by reporter status

		Type of reporter				
			Non-embedded	Mix	Total	
Humanitarian responses ^a	The story discusses reconstruction activities of TFU or humanitarian relief by other parties in Afghan war	Count	36	31	5	72
		% within Type of reporter	66,7%	43,7%	50,0%	
	The story discusses the costs of war and/or shows how (lives of) Afghan citizens are affected by the conflict in Afghanistan	Count	11	48	4	63
		% within Type of reporter	20,4%	67,6%	40,0%	
	The story goes into (details of) civil casualties	Count	21	18	1	40
		% within Type of reporter	38,9%	25,4%	10,0%	
	The story shows opinions of Afghan citizens about (parties in) the conflict in Afghanistan	Count	15	47	5	67
		% within Type of reporter	27,8%	66,2%	50,0%	
	Total	Count	54	71	10	135

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

7f Bias

Bias refers to a type of reporting which has (negative/positive) subjective, value-laden elements or signs of over identification with a party. Based on the literature research as described in chapter 3, two predictions are made concerning the bias. First prediction is that the news coverage of TFU in the period 2006-2010 done by embedded journalists, within its specific framing, is not characterized by more bias than news coverage by non-embedded journalists. Second prediction is that the news coverage of the first part of the mission (2006-2007) has a more positive tone towards TFU than the news coverage of the second part of the mission (2008-2010).

This section gives an overview of findings regarding reporter status and the tone in the headline/the article itself about TFU/the Dutch government, ISAF/NATO or the international community; challenging the picture of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community and finally reflections on the limits of the profession of journalist.

Tone in headline per period

The tone in the headline is researched with regard to references to either TFU/the Dutch government, ISAF/NATO or the international community and is measured with a interval scale. The three categories are negative, neutral and positive. Articles which do not contain any reference to either TFU/the Dutch government, ISAF/NATO or the international community are considered as irrelevant (category 'non applicable').

Contingency table 14 gives an overview of the relationship between reporter status and the tone in the headline, split for two periods (2006-2008 and 2008-2010). For both periods, the relationship between reporter status and the tone in the headline is significant ($p \leq ,01$).

Results show that both in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 a big majority (85.2% and 76.9%) of the headlines of embedded articles has a neutral tone. Many journalists apply neutral, informative headlines with no value-laden elements, whether the message of the article is neutral (f.e. new military material), positive (f.e. an successful operation) or negative (f.e. loss of soldiers). Examples are:

'WATER WAR' (Van Bommel, November 11, 2008)

'Flying but no fighting for the British' (Van den Boogaard, August 26, 2008)

'Killed in Uruzgan. Twelve Dutchmen' (Boom, January 4, 2008)

'Taliban killed by Dutchmen'; Colonel speaks of tough battle in Uruzgan' (Derix, June 10, 2006)

'"Going Kinetic" in Kamp Holland: Embedded in Uruzgan' (Ede Botje, December 16, 2006)

'Van Loon takes over charge of ISAF' (Koelé, November 2, 2006)

'Entering war with a knife and a paintbrush' (Marlet, June 11, 2009)

'Winning confidence with a subtle game' (Righton, July 26, 2010)

'Unmanned aerial vehicles to Uruzgan' (Sanders, August 1, 2009)

'Uruzgan: the fight for Chora' (Vrijzen, January 5, 2008)

Both in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 in a minority of embedded articles (9.8% and 19.2%) positive headlines are applicable, with subjective elements which indicate identification with a party (TFU). Examples are:

'Respect for troops in Afghanistan' (Huygens, December 27, 2008)

'DOMINATION OF THE TALIBAN!' (Sanders, October 21, 2006)

'Afghan cops will miss the Dutch very much' (Righton, March 30, 2010)

"Our" F16's an absolute necessity in Afghanistan' (Mikkers, August 26, 2006)

Both in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 almost none of the non-embedded articles contains a positive headline. However, in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 similar groups of non-embedded articles (19.4% and 20.4%) contain a negative headline. Examples are:

'<<We only believe the Netherlands when we see it with our own eyes>>; Report from Afghanistan' (Boom)

'We are doing business with a killer' (Karskens, July 19, 2010)

'Demoralizing Mission' (Karskens, August 3, 2009)

"If the Netherlands stay here, nothing will change" (Karskens, November 25, 2009)

"Bombs in one hand, medicine in the other hand"; Afghan citizens do not trust the Dutch military either' (Nijhuis, June 1, 2007)

"We already have enough weapons here"; Afghanistan-top Afghan criticism on plans of the US to establish a civilian's militia' (Rohmensen, March 31, 2009)

The dataset shows that non-embedded journalist Karskens especially applies 'negative' headlines: nine (40%) of his 23 articles contain a negative headline. It is remarkable that in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 4.9%/3.8% of the embedded articles contain a negative headline as well. Most striking one is a headline above an article of Boom, with a quote of a soldier:

"Be honest, man, this is not Isaf any more, is it?"; Fights in Uruzgan' (September 28, 2007)

Finally, in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010, in 19.4%/20.4% of the non-embedded articles no reference is made to either TFU/the Dutch government, ISAF/NATO or the international community.

An overview of both periods shows that for embedded articles there is a light trend of more positive headlines (from 9.8% to 19.2%), at expense of neutral articles (from 85.2% to 76.9%). For non-embedded articles no big changes are applicable.

As for the group of hybrid articles, in 2008-2010 almost all headlines are neutral.

Tone in article per period

The tone in the article is also researched with regard to references to either TFU/the Dutch government, ISAF/NATO or the international community and is measured with a interval scale. The

five categories are extremely negative, negative, neutral, positive and extremely positive. Articles which do not contain any reference to either TFU/the Dutch government, ISAF/NATO or the international community are considered as irrelevant (category 'non applicable').

Contingency table 15 gives an overview of the relationship between reporter status and the tone in the article, split for two periods (2006-2008 and 2008-2010). For both periods, the relationship between reporter status and the tone in the headline is significant ($p \leq ,01$).

Results show that both in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 a majority (67.2% and 53.8%) of the embedded articles has a neutral tone. Many embedded journalists write neutral, informative articles with no value-laden elements, whether the subject of the article is neutral (f.e. new military material), positive (f.e. a successful operation) or negative (f.e. loss of soldiers). Especially the journalists Van Bommel, Müller and Van den Boogaard keep distance to the military/report neutrally. However, in quite some embedded articles in 2006-2008 (18.0%) and in 2008-2010 (42.3%) supportive elements are identifiable. In some cases journalists seem to identify themselves with the military, as is shown by quotes from an article from embedded journalist Boom, who describes a patrol he accompanies:

*"Western and north-eastern of us are mountains from which we are flooded [...]. **Luckily**, the Taliban often fail to strike. So, **we** press the switch and we consider ourselves safe. [...] Aim of **our** five day patrol is to contact the population of the westbank with the prt. [...] **We** almost walked into an ambush and then were attacked on hill 1451."* (March 16, 2007)

Another example of supportive elements are (light) value-laden comments or references to heroism, as is shown by quotes from two articles from embedded journalist Vrijzen about a peloton and bomb experts:

*'**Understanding**, that's how you could call the Dutch military. They do not hunt for insurgents. Only when the Taliban attack, they shoot back'. [...] But the Taliban were also frightened by the **will power** of Lieutenant Marx and his men.'* (December 30, 2006)

*'This is the story of the **heroes** Captain Rolf and his five bomb experts in Uruzgan.'* (April 28, 2007)

The dataset shows that embedded journalist Sanders has the biggest amount of articles (13 or almost 50%) with supportive elements. In these articles Sanders incorporates either negative value laden comments about the opponents of the Dutch military, or positive value laden comments about the Dutch military themselves, as is shown by quotes from two articles:

*'That Taliban warriors operate as **dirty as sly**, is shown by the fact that lately especially usage of those simple improvised explosive devices is increasing'* (December 29, 2007)

*'These are the men of Echoteam, 2nd peloton, Alpha-company, 44th battalion armor infantry 'Johan Willem Friso' from Havelte and they deserve nothing more than **respect**'.* (December 22, 2007)

Sanders also applies value laden comments on aspects of the mission itself, like the advanced material, as is shown by the next quote from an article about the Dutch airforce:

*'If there is one international conflict in which the air force acts as a **lifesaver**, it is the ISAF [...] mission in Afghanistan'.* (September 22, 2007)

The supportive character is strengthened by the fact that Sanders applies many quotes of the military itself with positive value-laden terms, as is shown by quotes from the same article about the airforce:

*"It is a **miracle weapon**, the Apache gives us faith. [...] Colonel Ron Hagemeyer, commander Air Task Force: "We **play in the Champions League**. And believe me, those are accomplishments at **top level**".'* (September 22, 2007)

In contrast, results show that both in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 a big group (30.6% and 42.9%) of the non-embedded articles has a critical tone. Many non-embedded journalists incorporate criticism in their articles regarding either TFU/the Dutch government, ISAF/NATO or the international community. Especially the non-embedded journalists Boom, Karskens and Nijhuis write articles with criticism, either expressed by protagonists or by the journalists themselves, as is shown by quotes from a selection of their articles:

*'The village Barnabad [...] depends on opium farming. Don't bother them with **fine words** about the government of the by western troops supported president Hamid Karzai and the democratically elected parliament in Kabul.'* (Boom, May 19, 2006)

*'For more than three years the Dutch troops are in Uruzgan. **The 'reconstruction mission' ends in nothing**. Teachers walk away, agents have to blackmail citizens.* (Karskens, August 3, 2009)

*'The mission in Uruzgan has only improved healthcare. **But you don't win the war with sticking plasters**.* (Karskens, December 2, 2009)

*"**I hate them** [the American military, BW]", says Daoud, a 30 year old shopkeeper [...] "We Pashtun resent foreign interference." Abrupt he ends: "**They have to leave**".* (Nijhuis, April 9, 2010)

*'Staff and visitors of the hospital start discussing busily when it comes to the presence and help of the foreign troops in Tarin Kowt. **Anger about the bombardments dominates**. [...] "They have bombs in one hand, with the other hand they give us medicine" [...]'.* (Nijhuis, June 1, 2007)

The dataset shows that again especially non-embedded journalist Karskens applies criticism: 14 (60%) of his 23 articles contain negative comments about either TFU/the Dutch government,

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ISAF/NATO or the international community. As for embedded journalists, especially Boom applies criticism: four (30%) of his twelve articles contain negative comments about the military, MoD, or the Dutch government, as is shown by quotes from a selection of articles:

*'Meanwhile, it is clear to everyone that the government has **lied**. There has hardly been any reconstruction. And the population does not support fighting missions.'* (January 4, 2008)

*'Diplomatic quarters [...] were concerned about restrictions of Defense [safety restrictions for a visit of a delegation of members of parliament, BW]. [...] Their fear was ungrounded. **Because, without seeing anything**, the majority of the members of the delegation concluded that the Netherlands did an excellent job that above all had to be continued.'* (September 7, 2007)

Finally, in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010, in 19.4%/20.4% of the non-embedded articles (versus no embedded articles) no reference is made to either TFU/the Dutch government, ISAF/NATO or the international community. As for the group of hybrid articles, in 2008-2010 a majority (72.7%) of the articles is neutral, and a minority (27.3%) is critical.

An overview of both periods shows that for embedded articles there is a light trend of more supportive articles (from 18% to 42.3%), at expense of critical articles (from 14.8% to zero). For non-embedded articles there is a light trend of more critical articles (from 30.6% to 42.9%), at expense of neutral articles (from 44.4% to 34.7%).

Challenging the picture per period

The tone in the article is also researched with regard to challenging the picture of the character and results of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community, as drawn by the (Dutch) military; (Dutch) MoD; Dutch or international governments. The variable is nominal: the two categories are yes and no. Articles which do not contain any reference to either TFU/the Dutch government, ISAF/NATO or the international community are considered as irrelevant (category 'non applicable').

Contingency table 16 gives an overview of the relationship between reporter status and challenging the picture, split for two periods (2006-2008 and 2008-2010). For both periods, the relationship between reporter status and challenging the picture is significant ($p \leq ,01$).

Results show that both in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 in a majority (70.5% and 96.2%) of the embedded articles journalists do not challenge the picture. However in 2006-2008 there is quite a big group of articles (29.5%), in which the character and results of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community are questioned. In their articles journalists like Van den Boogaard, Boom, Jansen, Marlet, Sanders either question the contrast between the original goals of TFU (focus on reconstruction) and reality (fighting) or (restraint) reports about fighting and casualties by the MoD and the Dutch government.

Especially Boom applies a lot of challenging (in eight or 60% of his twelve articles). In several articles Boom refers to criticism of soldiers on the communication of the MoD and the Dutch

government about the character and progress of TFU. In the article 'Als een nacht met duizend sterren' (June 2007) Boom states that the press conference by Dick Berlijn about fights in the Chora Valley was followed by criticism of the military, as the following quote shows:

*'Why did Defense **withhold** information about the intensity of the previous fights in the area? At Kamp Holland bitter comments circle that now civilian casualties have occurred, the severance of the fighting has to be admitted.'* (June 29, 2007)

In the article 'Zeg eens eerlijk man, dit is toch geen Isaf meer?' (September 28, 2007) Boom again states that the MoD, in her reports, should do more justice to the truth about Uruzgan: staggering reconstruction and hardening fighting. According to Boom the periodical overviews of the MoD 'amount to propaganda': main parts are about reconstruction and the fights are mentioned briefly. Boom also quotes and refers to soldiers who complain about the reports of the MoD and emphasize the importance of communicating the 'truth'. Sometimes journalists challenge the military themselves. F.e. in his article 'Luchtmacht: omzichtige oorlog' (April 7, 2007) Vrijzen challenges the military by asking critical questions about the bombardment of Chenaz Tu, as the following quote shows:

*'Was the high tech air force **allowed** to rely on the information of a half illiterate police chef? Can an attack based on communication in two languages and over five tranches, be considered as **responsible**?'* (April 7, 2007)

As for the non-embedded articles, results show that especially in 2008-2010 there is quite a big group of articles (28.6%), in which the character and results of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community are questioned. Journalists like Boom, Chin-A-Fo, Derksen, Nijhuis and Karskens either question the contrast between the original goals of TFU (focus on reconstruction) and reality (fighting); the rose-tinted picture of the conduct of the elections, (attribution of the international community to the) reconstruction and safety in Afghanistan and the simplified representation of parties in the conflict. The journalists either challenge the picture with their own comments, or with comments from third parties. In the article 'Tekenen van fraude in onveilige regio's' (August 27, 2009) Chin-A-Fo quotes a spokesperson of the Afghanistan Analysts Network who questions the overall picture of the national elections by the international community:

*"Those statements [statements by Obama and the UN about a successful election, BW] are more jubilant than appropriate and **do not reflect how the Afghansen experienced the election.**" [...] "Many governments feel an enormous pressure to state that things went well. Else, they get difficult questions in their own country, like: what are we doing in Afghanistan?"* (August 27, 2009)

Especially Karskens applies a lot of challenging (in twelve or 50% of his 23 articles). Karskens challenges the picture by either the military or the Dutch government/the MoD of the process and

benefits of reconstruction and the presence of the Dutch military; the combat of production of opium or of casualties due to bombardments, as is shown by quotes from a selection of his articles:

'The hospitable of Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan would be refurbished with Dutch money. Nothing shows this has indeed happened'. (July 17, 2009)

*'The population of Uruzgan is 'very pleased' with the Dutch military, says the governor. Is that true? [...] Commander of Task Force Uruzgan Marc van Uhm expressed similar words to De Pers: "I find them to be very pleased with our presence". But, when one discusses with people on the streets, the **comments** almost always are negative'*. (November 25, 2009)

Finally, in 2006-2008 and 2008-2010, a similar group of non- embedded articles (19.4% and 20.4%) is non-applicable. As for the group of hybrid articles, in 2008-2010 a majority (72.7%) of the articles contains no challenging. An overview of both periods shows that for embedded articles there is a trend of less challenging (from 29.5% to 3.8%) and for non-embedded articles of more challenging (from 16.7% to 28.6%).

Overview of tone

An overview of the items related to the tone shows the following results. **First, the results do not confirm the hypothesis that the news coverage of TFU in the period 2006-2010 done by embedded journalists, within its specific framing, is not characterized by more bias than news coverage by non-embedded journalists.** Embedded articles do have more positive headlines and contain more supportive elements/less critical statements regarding TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the Dutch community. However, the content of the majority of embedded articles is neutral. As for challenging, the picture is divided. In 2006-2008, embedded articles contain more challenging elements. In 2008-2010, non-embedded articles contain more challenging elements. **Second, the results do not confirm the hypothesis that the news coverage of the first part of the mission (2006-2007) has a more positive tone towards TFU than the news coverage of the second part of the mission (2008-2010).** Again, the picture is divided. In 2008-2010 more embedded articles contain positive headlines and contain more supportive elements and less challenging regarding TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the Dutch community. However, in 2008-2010 non-embedded articles contain an equal amount of critical headlines, but more critical articles and more challenging elements.

Reflection on the limits of the profession

Final item in the research of the tone is the fact whether the journalist incorporates reflection on the limits of the profession or references to censure or unavailable/limited sources. The variable is nominal: the two categories are yes and no.

Contingency table 17 gives an overview of the relationship between reporter status and reflection on the limits of the profession. The relationship between reporter status and reflection is

significant ($p \leq .05$). Results show that reflection on the limited of the profession is incorporated in only a minority of the embedded (21.8%) and non-embedded (8.2%) articles.

Embedded journalists (like Boom, Ede Botje, Marlet, Müller and Vrijzen) especially refer to the limited freedom of movement; the preview by Defense and the unavailability of independent and/or Afghan sources, as is shown by quotes from a selection of articles:

'The first question every journalist asks at Kamp Holland is: "Please, give me the grand tour of the projects." The regular answer is: "A tour is not to be taken for granted, we are dependent from available capacity". (Boom, September 7, 2007)

'Embedded journalists leave the camp only now and then. The majority of the time we spend on the camp.' (Ede Botje, December 16, 2006)

*'(This article has been checked by Defense for operation information. The facts **could not be put to independent or Afghan sources.**)'* (Boom, November 9, 2007)

*'With a view to safety of the troops Defense has had **access to this article**. At request of Defense only from commanders the surnames are mentioned.'* (Marlet, September 1, 2006)

'This story is based on documents of Defense, verbal statements of directly involved army officers and photo plus video recordings of Dutch soldiers during the battle for Chora.' (Vrijzen, January 5, 2008)

Non-embedded journalists (like Derksen, Karskens and Nijhuis) refer to the limits in the execution of their profession because of lack of safety, freedom of movement or means and to limited sources as is shown by quotes from a selection of articles:

'I want to talk with Afghans. Real ones. I want to know what they find from all the changes in their country in the past years. But that wish immediately encounters me with danger. For, it will not be easy to speak with, for example, an Afghan housewife.' (Derksen, August 12, 2006)

'The Dutch military presence [...] has resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties. Exact numbers are not available, since there is no local delegate of a human rights commission and the International Red Cross is not active in the province.' (Karskens, May 5, 2008)

In general, the results show that embedded journalists apply more reflections about the limited in their profession than non-embedded journalists.

Contingency table 14 – Tone in headline per period by reporter status

Period TFU				Type of reporter			Total
				Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	
2006-2008	Tone in headline about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community	Negative	Count	3	7	1	11
			% within Type of reporter	4,9%	19,4%	100,0%	11,2%
		Neutral	Count	52	22	0	74
			% within Type of reporter	85,2%	61,1%	,0%	75,5%
		Positive	Count	6	0	0	6
			% within Type of reporter	9,8%	,0%	,0%	6,1%
		Non applicable	Count	0	7	0	7
			% within Type of reporter	,0%	19,4%	,0%	7,1%
		Total	Count	61	36	1	98
			% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
2008-2010	Tone in headline about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community	Negative	Count	1	10	0	11
			% within Type of reporter	3,8%	20,4%	,0%	12,8%
		Neutral	Count	20	28	10	58
			% within Type of reporter	76,9%	57,1%	90,9%	67,4%
		Positive	Count	5	1	1	7
			% within Type of reporter	19,2%	2,0%	9,1%	8,1%
		Non applicable	Count	0	10	0	10
			% within Type of reporter	,0%	20,4%	,0%	11,6%
		Total	Count	26	49	11	86
			% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Contingency table 15 – Tone in article per period by reporter status

Period TFU		Type of reporter					
		Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total		
2006-2008	Tone in article about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community	Extremely critical	Count	0	2	0	2
			% within Type of reporter	,0%	5,6%	,0%	2,0%
		Critical	Count	9	11	1	21
			% within Type of reporter	14,8%	30,6%	100,0%	21,4%
		Neutral	Count	41	16	0	57
			% within Type of reporter	67,2%	44,4%	,0%	58,2%
		Supportive	Count	11	0	0	11
			% within Type of reporter	18,0%	,0%	,0%	11,2%
		Non applicable	Count	0	7	0	7
			% within Type of reporter	,0%	19,4%	,0%	7,1%
Total		Count	61	36	1	98	
		% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
2008-2010	Tone in article about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community	Critical	Count	0	21	3	24
			% within Type of reporter	,0%	42,9%	27,3%	27,9%
		Neutral	Count	14	17	8	39
			% within Type of reporter	53,8%	34,7%	72,7%	45,3%
		Supportive	Count	11	1	0	12
			% within Type of reporter	42,3%	2,0%	,0%	14,0%
		Extremely supportive	Count	1	0	0	1
			% within Type of reporter	3,8%	,0%	,0%	1,2%
		Non applicable	Count	0	10	0	10
			% within Type of reporter	,0%	20,4%	,0%	11,6%
Total		Count	26	49	11	86	
		% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	

Contingency table 16 – Challenging the picture per period by reporter status

Period TFU			Type of reporter					
			Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total		
2006-2008	Challenging the picture as drawn by the (Dutch) military; (Dutch) MoD; Dutch or international governments of the character and results of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community	No	Count	43	23	1	67	
			% within Type of reporter	70,5%	63,9%	100,0%	68,4%	
		Yes	Count	18	6	0	24	
			% within Type of reporter	29,5%	16,7%	,0%	24,5%	
		Non applicable	Count	0	7	0	7	
			% within Type of reporter	,0%	19,4%	,0%	7,1%	
	Total			Count	61	36	1	98
				% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	2008-2010	Challenging the picture as drawn by the (Dutch) military; (Dutch) MoD; Dutch or international governments of the character and results of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community	No	Count	25	25	8	58
% within Type of reporter				96,2%	51,0%	72,7%	67,4%	
Yes			Count	1	14	3	18	
			% within Type of reporter	3,8%	28,6%	27,3%	20,9%	
Non applicable			Count	0	10	0	10	
			% within Type of reporter	,0%	20,4%	,0%	11,6%	
Total			Count	26	49	11	86	
			% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	

Contingency table 17 – Reflection on limits of profession by reporter status

		Type of reporter				
		Embedded	Non-embedded	Mix	Total	
Reflection on the limits of the profession of non-embedded war journalist in Afghanistan or references to censure or unavailable/limited sources	No	Count	68	78	10	156
		% within Type of reporter	78,2%	91,8%	83,3%	84,8%
	Yes	Count	19	7	2	28
		% within Type of reporter	21,8%	8,2%	16,7%	15,2%
Total		Count	87	85	12	184
		% within Type of reporter	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

8 Conclusion

8a Summary of results

Aim of this research is to answer the question: ***In which ways does the Dutch embedded news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) differ from the Dutch non-embedded news coverage?*** A content analysis of a selection (180 articles of five papers and three news magazines) of the news coverage of TFU between 2006-2010, shows the following results.

As for **population and cases**, results show that a majority of the reporters is connected with one reporter status: embedded or non-embedded. A minority applies a combination of these two forms of journalism. Some journalists object the artificial division between embedded and non-embedded journalism and state they apply a mix in writing an article. So, next to embedded and non-embedded journalists, a third group of hybrid journalists can be distinguished. In this research the analysis of the hybrid group of journalists is limited, due to the small amount of articles.

An analysis of the cases shows that, despite the bigger amount of embedded journalists, the amount of articles of embedded journalists and non-embedded journalists are comparable. An explanation for the bigger output of non-embedded journalists is the fact that, in contrast to embedded journalists, they have the opportunity to stay and report from Afghanistan for several weeks, months or even longer.

An analysis of reporter status per publication shows that dominance of the reporter status strongly varies per newspaper/magazine. De Telegraaf and Elsevier show a strong, and De Groene Amsterdammer a light dominance of embedded journalism. Volkskrant and Trouw show a moderate, and De Pers and a strong dominance of non-embedded journalism. Finally, NRC Handelsblad and Vrij Nederland show a balance between the three forms of journalism. A majority of the publications (with exception of De Telegraaf and Elsevier) has one or more reporters who combine embedded journalism and non-embedded journalism or apply non-embedded journalism only. On top of this, in case of five publications, the output of embedded journalists is either absent (De Pers), or dominated by output of non-embedded journalists (Trouw, Volkskrant) or by a combination of non-embedded journalists and hybrid journalists (NRC, Vrij Nederland). So, the news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 is not dominated by embedded journalism.

Finally, an analysis of reporter status per paper for the two timeframes of TFU (2006-2008 and 2008-2010) shows that in case of all seven publications, in the second timeframe there has not been an trend of more embedded journalism.

As for **sources**, results show that embedded journalism, is above all linked to one type of source: military sources (low ranked and high ranked ISAF and NATO personnel and representatives of the MoD). Non-embedded journalism is connected to a more diverse usage of sources and

especially to local sources (Afghan population and representatives of Afghan -local- governments and NGO's) and international sources (representatives of international organizations/governments).

Next, results show that embedded journalism is connected with usage of one single type of source and non-embedded journalism with usage of multiple types of sources. However, this does not imply that non-embedded journalists always apply multiple types of sources: in 25% of their articles, only one single type of source is being used.

As for **topics**, results show that embedded journalists focus on topics related to the military (military actions, daily life at the camp) and that non-embedded journalists focus on violence; Afghan society, culture and religion and economics and politics. Embedded and non-embedded journalists pay similar attention to reconstruction activities.

As for **tone of analysis**, results show that a majority of the embedded and non-embedded articles focus on description of events and persons. The dataset shows that embedded journalists tend to focus on soldiers and/or their activities like patrols, fights (f.e. the battle at Chora), flights with apaches or F16's, devising of IED's, etc. Non-embedded journalists tend to focus on Afghan officials or citizens and/or (victims of) events like attacks or bombardments and events like elections. However, non-embedded journalists tend to complement descriptions of events and persons with more background information by incorporating historical sequence and causes, prognoses and consequents of events and statistics or expert analysis.

As for **framing**, results differ per frame. As for **human interest framing**, results show that embedded journalists apply human interest framing in relation to the military and non-embedded journalists in relation to civilians. In general, embedded journalism is less connected with human interest framing than non-embedded journalism. However, human interest framing also seems dependent on the style from a journalist. The dataset shows that certain embedded (Boom, Sanders) and non-embedded (Chin-A-Fo, Karskens, Nijhuis, De Wit) journalists apply stronger human interest framing than their colleagues.

As for **responsibility framing**, results show that the relationship between reporter status and responsibility framing is insignificant. However, the relationship between reporter status and assignment of responsibility is significant. In many articles, embedded journalists assign the Taliban as responsible for conflicts, violence, attacks and bombs against the military and/or civilians, or a combination of the Taliban and the Afghan government as responsible for issues as lack of safety. Non-embedded journalists tend more to a multiple assignment of responsibility. In non-embedded articles, multiple responsibility for issues, like lack of safety of lack of socio-economic progress, is usually assigned to combinations of the Taliban and the Afghan government, militant leaders, ISAF and the international community.

As for **military framing**, results show that embedded journalism is connected with military framing. Embedded journalists write about military actions and strategy, the military organization, military material or technology and the Winning the Hearts and Minds-strategy. Non-embedded journalists tend to write about two aspects only: the military strategy or tactics and the Winning the Hearts and Minds-strategy.

As for **humanitarian framing**, results show that the humanitarian frame as a set is unacceptable. Results of the individual variables show that embedded journalists, in a different extent, write about reconstruction activities and civil casualties. Non-embedded journalists write about the costs of war/how lives of Afghan citizens are affected by the conflict in Afghanistan and describe opinions of Afghan citizens about (parties) in the conflict in Afghanistan.

Finally, as for **bias or tone**, results show that embedded articles do have more positive headlines and contain more supportive elements/less critical statements regarding TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the Dutch community. However, the content of the majority of embedded articles is neutral. As for challenging the picture of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community, as drawn by the (Dutch) military; (Dutch) MoD and Dutch or international governments, results differ. In 2006-2008, embedded articles contain more challenging elements. In 2008-2010, non-embedded articles contain more challenging elements.

As for differences in tone between the first and second part of the mission, the picture is also divided. In 2008-2010 more embedded articles contain positive headlines and contain more supportive elements and less challenging regarding TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the Dutch community. However, in 2008-2010 non-embedded articles contain an equal amount of critical headlines, but more critical articles and more challenging elements.

Last, results show that embedded journalists apply more reflections about the limits in their profession than non-embedded journalists.

8b Testing of hypotheses

Above results indicate that some hypotheses as formulated in the beginning of this research can be confirmed and some cannot be confirmed.

The results of the content analysis **do confirm the hypotheses:**

- of a tendency of less embedded journalism in the second period of TFU
- that embedded journalists mainly use military sources and non-embedded journalists use more diverse sources
- that embedded journalists focus on topics related to the military (military actions, daily life at the camp) and that non-embedded journalists focus on violence; Afghan society, culture and religion and economics and politics. However, embedded and non-embedded journalists pay similar attention to reconstruction activities.
- that embedded journalists apply more episodic framing and non-embedded journalists more thematic framing
- that embedded journalists apply human interest framing in relation to the military and non-embedded journalists in relation to civilians. In general, embedded journalism is less connected with human interest framing than non-embedded journalism.
- that embedded journalists apply more military framing.

The results of the content analysis do **not confirm the hypotheses:**

- that news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 is dominated by embedded journalism
- that non-embedded journalists apply more responsibility framing, since the relationship between reporter status and responsibility framing is insignificant.
- that non-embedded journalists apply more humanitarian framing, since the humanitarian frame itself is unreliable.
- that the news coverage of TFU in the period 2006-2010 done by embedded journalists, within its specific framing, is not characterized by more bias than news coverage by non-embedded journalists
- that the news coverage of the first part of the mission (2006-2007) has a more positive tone towards TFU than the news coverage of the second part of the mission (2008-2010)

So, in summary, results show that in general, the news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 is not dominated by embedded journalism. In the second period of TFU (2008-2010) there is even a tendency of less embedded journalism. Next, embedded journalism is connected with usage of a single type of source, that is military sources; topics related to the military (military actions, daily life at the camp); episodic framing; human interest framing in relation to the military; military framing and finally more positive headlines and more supportive elements/less critical statements regarding TFU/the Dutch government. Non-embedded journalism is connected with usage of multiple, especially Afghan sources; topics related to violence, Afghan society, culture and religion and economics and politics; thematic framing; human interest framing in relation to civilians and finally more critical headlines and more critical elements/statements regarding TFU/the Dutch government.

8c Explanation of results

For (selections of) the results several possible explanations can be given.

First, results show that the news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan and the Dutch engagement through TFU in the period 2006-2010 is not dominated by embedded journalism. This does not match with the general presumption that embedded journalism has dominated the news coverage of TFU. However, the composition of the dataset is based on the real amount of relevant articles from journalists. So, one explanation for the difference is the bigger output of non-embedded journalists, who, in contrast to embedded journalists, have the opportunity to stay and report from Afghanistan for several weeks, months or even longer. Another explanation is the composition of the samples: it is possible that the amount of (articles from) embedded journalists is underrepresented.

Second, results show that embedded journalism is connected with usage of military sources; topics related to the military; episodic framing; human interest framing in relation to the military; military framing and finally more positive headlines and more supportive elements/less critical statements regarding TFU/the Dutch government. For a big part, these results match with results from other researchers who investigated either the news coverage of Iraq (like Pfau et al, Aday et al and Lewis)

or the news coverage of the first part of TFU (like Mans, Van Klink and Beckers) (see section 4e). Their analyses also show that embedded articles focus on a military perspective and are mainly episodic. Researchers Pfau et al explain these results by referring to the closeness of the embedded journalists to the military (the Social Penetration Theory), which attributes to a micro-perspective, at the expense of broader contextual issues (see section 2d). However, as for bias, results diverge. In contrast to findings of Aday et al and Lewis this research shows that (though the majority of embedded and non-embedded articles is neutral) embedded journalism is connected with more supportive elements/less critical statements than non-embedded journalism. Differences in findings regarding tone might be related to real differences in the output of the analyzed articles, but might also be caused by (subjective) measurement of the researchers.

8d *Implications of research*

The results of this research show that in several respects (usage of sources, topics, framing, type of analysis), embedded and non-embedded journalism are complementary. In general, embedded journalists report a conflict from a military perspective. Non-embedded journalists report a conflict from a social and civilian perspective. As for bias or tone, the majority of the embedded and non-embedded articles is neutral and within both groups individual journalists vary appreciation with criticism and/or challenging the picture as drawn by third parties. So, this research emphasizes that both forms of reporting have added value and that a balance between these forms of journalism contributes to diversity in news coverage.

However, this research contains some limitations. First limitation is the limited number of analyzed newspapers/news magazines and analyzed articles; the excluding of articles published on the Internet and an analysis of images connected to the articles. Second limitation is the (possible) subjective character of the analysis, caused by the fact that the analysis is done by one person (the researcher) only. Third limitation is the collecting of relevant articles (based on a selection of keywords and several automatic and manual selections), which may have resulted in sample sets which are not representative for the population. Fourth limitation is the execution of the research itself: one of the issues-frames (the humanitarian frame) has turned out to be an unreliable frame and frames have been adjusted to diminish overlap/enhance the reliability.

So, the author recommends further research on differences between embedded and non-embedded articles, especially with regard to generic framing and issue-framing.

9 Literature

9a Articles, blogs and videos

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Appendix 10a List of correspondents and search strings

<i>Publication</i>	<i>Name journalist</i>	<i>Status Non-embedded</i>	<i>Non-embedded – more info</i>	<i>Status embedded</i>	<i>Embedded – more info</i>	<i>Status Mix</i>	<i>Mix – more info</i>
Volkskrant	Deedee Derksen^	x	Period unknown	x	Period unknown		
	Natalie Righton*	x		x			
	Rob Vreeken^	x					
	Noël van Bommel*			x			
	Theo Koelé^			x			
NRC	Antoinette de Jong*	x		x	2007 (1 time)		
	Arnon Grunberg^			x			
	Philip de Wit^	x	Correspondent based in N. Delhi				
	Hanneke Chin-A-Fo*	x	2009 (elections)			x	British and Canadian army, NATO
	Bette Dam*					x	
	Jaus Müller^			x			
	Juurd Eijsvogel^			x			
	Wim Brummelman^	x	Correspondent based in N. Delhi				
	Raymond van den Boogaard^			x			
	Steven Derix^			x			
Telegraaf	Kirsten Coenradie*	x	May 2010				
	Charles Sanders*			x	2006-2010		
	Ruud Mikkers*			x	August 2006		
	Ruud Korver^			x			
	Herman Stam*			x	October 2007		

<i>Publication</i>	<i>Name journalist</i>	<i>Status Non-embedded</i>	<i>Non-embedded – more info</i>	<i>Status embedded</i>	<i>Embedded – more info</i>	<i>Status Mix</i>	<i>Mix – more info</i>
Telegraaf	Paul Jansen*			x			
	Stan Huygens^			x	December 2008		
	Joris Polman^			x			
Trouw	George Marlet*	x	December 2007 (ANA); October 2008 (NGO's); June 2010 (NGO's)	x	June and September 2006; April 2007; December 2007; October 2008; June 2009; June 2010		
	Gert Jan Rohmensen*	x	March 2008 (Kabul/Charikar); March 2009 (Kabul); August 2009	x	March 2008 (Kandahar Airfield); March 2009 (German military)		
	Minka Nijhuis*	x	spring 2007; spring 2010				
De Groene	Joeri Boom*	x	May 2006; June 2008 (Kabul/Tarin Kowt); March 2010 (Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod)	x	December 2006 (Kabul Military Airport/Kamp Holland); February 2007 (Kamp Holland/Dehrafshan-area); June 2007 (Kamp Holland/Choravalley); September 2007(Kamp Holland/Camp Hadrian); October/November 2007 (Baluchivalley/Kamp Holland)		

<i>Publication</i>	<i>Name journalist</i>	<i>Status Non-embedded</i>	<i>Non-embedded – more info</i>	<i>Status embedded</i>	<i>Embedded – more info</i>	<i>Status Mix</i>	<i>Mix – more info</i>
Vrij Nederland	Minka Nijhuis^	x					
	Bette Dam*					x	
	Harm Ede Botje*	x	March/April 2007	x	November/December 2006		
Elsevier	Eric Vrijzen*			x			
De Pers	Arnold Karskens^	x					

* = info has been checked with journalist itself. ^ = info has not been checked with journalist itself, but through research or third sources (like editors of the newspaper or magazine)

Search strings

<i>Source</i>	<i>String</i>	<i>Comment</i>
<i>Algemeen</i>	Afghanistan OR Uruzgan OR ISAF OR Oeroezgan	
<i>Volkskrant</i>	Derksen OR Righton OR Bommel OR Vreeken OR Koelé	
<i>NRC</i>	Boogaard OR Antoinette de Jong OR Müller OR Derix OR Grunberg OR Chin-A-Fo OR Eijsvoogel OR Kranenburg OR Philip de Wit OR Bette Dam OR Brummelman	Skipped: Grunberg (out of scope of research) and Kranenburg (no confirmation of stay in Afghanistan)
<i>Trouw</i>	Marlet OR Nijhuis OR Lagas OR Rohmsen	Skipped: Lagas (no confirmation of stay in Afghanistan)
<i>Telegraaf</i>	Buitenland OR Reportage OR Sanders OR Mikkers OR Kabul OR Kandahar OR Kamp Holland OR Tarin Kowt OR Deh Rawod	
<i>De Groene</i>	Joeri Boom	
<i>Elsevier</i>	Nvt	Manual selection
<i>Vrij Nederland</i>	Nvt	Manual selection
<i>De Pers</i>	Karskens	

Appendix 10b Composition of samples

Overview per source

Search results							
	<i>Period</i>	<i>Results search terms</i>	<i>Result automatic filter</i>	<i>Result manual filter</i>	<i>Percentage of total</i>	<i>Intended size sample</i>	<i>Result sample</i>
Volkscrant	1/3/2006 - 1/8/2008	2768	459	112	18%	15	15
	1/8/2008 - 2/8/2010	2226	401	129	21%	15	15
Telegraaf	1/3/2006 - 1/8/2008	1438	432	42	7%	15	20*
	1/8/2008 - 2/8/2010	1250	606	18	3%	15	17*
NRC	1/3/2006 - 1/8/2008	2888	460	73	12%	15	16*
	1/8/2008 - 2/8/2010	2334	317	49	8%	15	15
Trouw	1/3/2006 - 1/8/2008	2159	206	56	9%	15	15
	1/8/2008 - 2/8/2010	1620	180	62	10%	15	16*
Vrij Nederland	1/3/2006 - 1/8/2008	239	239	9	1%	5	5
	1/8/2008 - 2/8/2010	205	205	8	1%	5	5
Elsevier	1/3/2006 - 1/8/2008	463	463	6?	1%	5	5
	1/8/2008 - 2/8/2010	275	275	0?	0%	5	0**
De Groene Amsterdammer	1/3/2006 - 1/8/2008	284	71	20	3%	15	15
	1/8/2008 - 2/8/2010	231	29	2	1%	15	2**
De Pers	1/3/2006 - 1/8/2008	337	22	8	1%	15	8**
	1/8/2008 - 2/8/2010	628	75	28	5%	15	15
Totaal		19345	4440	616	101%	200	184

* Deviations caused by decision to shrink the sample after analysis was partly done. Articles kept, since results are relevant.

** Deviations caused by lack of relevant articles in sample.

Overview for each journalist

Publication	Journalist	Amount 2006	Percentage	Size sample 2006	Amount 2008	Percentage	Size sample 2008
<i>Volkscrant</i>	Derksen	68	61%	9	26	20%	3
	Righton	1	1%	0	42	33%	5
	Vreeken	0	0%	0	39	30%	5
	Van Bommel	23	20%	3	20	16%	2
	Koelé	20	18%	3	2	1%	0
	Totaal	112	100%	15	129	100%	15
<i>Telegraaf</i>	Sanders	30	71%	17	12	67%	12
	Mikkers	2 of 3	7%	1	0	0%	0
	Korver	7	16%	[skipped]*	0	0%	0
	Jansen	2	4%	2	0	0%	0
	Stam	1	2%	0	0	5%	0
	Polman	2	4%	[skipped]*	0	0%	0
	Coenradie	0	0%	0	2	11%	2
	Huygens	0	0%	0	3	17%	3
	Totaal	42	104%	20	17	100%	17
	<i>NRC</i>	De Jong	1	1%	0	1	2%
De Wit		31	43%	7	0	0%	0
Dam (?)		0	0%	0	0	0%	0
Chin-A-Fo		3	4%	0	38	78%	12
Müller		10	14%	3	7	14%	2
Van den Boogaard		18	25%	4	0	0%	0
Derix		4	5%	1	0	0%	0
Eijsvoogel		0	0%	0	2	4%	1
Brummelman		6	8%	1	1	2%	0
Totaal		73	100%	16	49	100%	15
<i>Trouw</i>	Rohmsen	9	16%	2	17	28%	4
	Marlet	34	62%	9	20	32%	5
	Nijhuis	13	23%	4	25	40%	7
	Totaal	56	101%	15	62	100%	16
<i>Vrij Nederland</i>	Ede Botje	8	89%	4	n.v.t.	0%	0
	Nijhuis	1	11%	1	2	25%	1
	Dam	n.v.t.	0%	0	6	75%	4
	Totaal	9	100%	5	8	100%	5
<i>Elsevier</i>	Vrijzen	6?	100%	5	0?	100%	0
	Totaal	6?		5	0?		0
<i>De Groene Amsterdammer</i>	Joeri Boom	20	100%	15	2	100%	2
<i>De Pers</i>	Arnold Karskens	8	100%	8	28	100%	15

*Skipped due to no confirmation of stay in Afghanistan

Appendix 10c Codebook – checklist for analysis

A Metadata of the article

Number	Name	Description	Values
1	Meta1	Paper	1 = NRC Handelsblad 2 = Volkskrant 3 = De Telegraaf 4 = Trouw 5 = Elsevier 6 = Groene Amsterdammer 7 = VN 8 = De Pers
2	Meta2	Author	Name of reporter:
3	Meta3	Type of reporter	1 = Embedded 2 = Non-embedded 3 = Mix
4	Meta4	Type of article	1 = News item or news story 2 = Report 3 = Background story or analysis 4 = Interview 5 = Profile
5	Meta5	Location of article (newspaper only)	1 = Front page 2 = (Foreign) section of the newspaper 3 = Accompanying magazine 4 = Independent magazine
6	Meta6	Headline	Headline:
7	Meta7	Date	Date of publication:
8	Meta8	Interesting details	Interesting details:

B Sources (basis: Van Klink, 2007:23-25)

Number	Name	Description	Values
9	Source1	Military source (ISAF, NATO or MoD)	0 = no 1 = yes
10	Source2	Representatives of Dutch organizations or governments	0 = no 1 = yes
11	Source3	Representatives of international organizations or governments	0 = no 1 = yes
12	Source4	Representatives of Afghan organizations or governments	0 = no 1 = yes
13	Source5	Afghan militant or religious leaders	0 = no 1 = yes
14	Source6	Taliban (leaders and fighters)	0 = no 1 = yes
15	Source7	Afghan population	0 = no 1 = yes
16	Source8	Experts (scientists and journalists)	0 = no 1 = yes
17	Source9	Unknown source	0 = no 1 = yes
18	Source10	Different source	0 = no 1 = yes

C Topics (basis: Van Klink, 2007:25-27)

Number	Name	Description	Values
19	Topic	Most dominant topic	1 = military actions and strategy 2 = daily life at the camp 3 = reconstruction (activities) 4 = violence 5 = Afghan society, culture and religion 6 = economics and business 7 = politics and law 8 = different

D Generic frames

D1 Episodic/thematic frame (basis: Pfau et al; 2004:82 and Van Klink; 2007:28/29)

Number	Name	Description	Values
20	ETFrame1	Focus on events or persons	0 = no 1 = yes
21	ETFrame2	Placing of events in a context (cultural, political or social)	0 = no 1 = yes
22	ETFrame3	Incorporation of historical sequence or causes	0 = no 1 = yes
23	ETFrame4	Incorporation of prognoses and consequences	0 = no 1 = yes
24	ETFrame5	Inclusion of statistics or analysis of experts	0 = no 1 = yes

D2 Human interest frame (basis: checklist of Semetko and Valkenburg*, 2000:100)

Number	Name	Description	Values
25	HUMINFrame1	The story provides a human example or human face on the issue	0 = no 1 = yes
26	HUMINFrame2	The story employs adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy or compassion	0 = no 1 = yes
27	HUMINFrame3	The story emphasizes how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problem	0 = no 1 = yes
28	HUMINFrame4	The story goes into the private or personal lives of persons	0 = no 1 = yes

* The fifth element of analysis of Semetko et al concerning the character of visual information is excluded since the focus of this research is limited to text.

D3 Responsibility frame (basis: checklist of Semetko and Valkenburg*, 2000:100)

Number	Name	Description	Values
29	RESPFrame1	The story suggests that some level of gov't has the ability to alleviate the problem	0 = no 1 = yes
30	RESPFrame2	The story suggests that the government, an individual (or group of people in the society) is responsible for the issue*	0 = no 1 = Afghan organization or government 2 = Taliban 3 = Afghan militant or religious leaders 4 = ISAF/TFU 5 = Intenational government or organization 6 = Afghan population 7 = Combination of 1,2,3,4,5,6 8 = Other
31	RESPFrame3	The story suggests solutions to the problem	0 = no 1 = yes
32	RESPFrame4	The story suggests that the problem requires urgent action	0 = no 1 = yes

E Issue frames

E.1 Military frame (basis: checklist of Van Klink, 2007:32/33/De Geyndt, 2011:43)

Number	Name	Description	Values
33	MIFrame1	The story discusses the military strategy and tactics in the Afghan war	0 = no 1 = yes
34	MiFrame2	The story discusses the military organization and/or capacities/heroism of military personnel	0 = no 1 = yes
35	MiFrame3	The story discusses the professionalism of military material or advanced war technology	0 = no 1 = yes
36	MiFrame4	The story gives detailed descriptions of military actions or dangerous situations	0 = no 1 = yes
37	MiFrame5	The story discusses the Winning the hearts and minds strategy in the Afghan war	0 = no 1 = yes

E.2 Humanitarian frame (basis: checklist of Van Klink, 2007:33-35/De Geyndt, 2011:43)

Number	Name	Description	Values
38	HUMANIFrame1	The story discusses reconstruction activities of TFU or humanitarian relief by other parties in Afghan war	0 = no 1 = yes
39	HUMANIFrame2	The story discusses the costs of war and/or shows how (lives of) Afghan citizens are affected by the conflict in Afghanistan	0 = no 1 = yes
40	HUMANIFrame3	The story goes into (details of) civil casualties	0 = no 1 = yes
41	HUMANIFrame4	The story shows opinions of Afghan citizens about (parties in) the conflict in Afghanistan	0 = no 1 = yes

E.3 Frames - overview (basis: checklist of Van Klink, 2007:36)

Number	Name	Description	Values
42	Framestotal	Is there a dominant frame in the story?	0 = no 1 = Human interest 2 = Responsibility 3 = Military 4 = Humanitarian

F Tone, criticism and reflection (basis: Van Klink, 2007:36/37 and Aday, 2005:9)

Number	Name	Description	Values
43	Bias1	Tone* in headline about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community	1 = negative 2 = neutral 3 = positive 4 = non applicable
44	Bias2	Tone* in article about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community	1 = extremely critical 2 = critical 3 = neutral 4 = supportive 5 = extremely supportive 6 = non applicable
45	Bias3	Challenging the picture as drawn by the (Dutch) military; (Dutch) MoD; Dutch or international governments of the character and results of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community	0 = no 1 = yes 2 = non applicable
46	Bias4	Reflection on the limits of the profession of non-embedded war journalist in Afghanistan or references to censure or unavailable/limited sources	0 = no 1 = yes

*Tone refers to a type of reporting, which is either objective (neutral) or has (negative/positive) subjective, value-laden elements or shows signs of over identification with a party.

Appendix 10d Codebook – definitions of variables

A Metadata of the article [skipped]

B Sources (basis: Van Klink, 2007:23-25)

<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Includes</i>
9	Source1	Military source (ISAF, NATO or MoD)	Low and high ranked combat and non combat ISAF and NATO personnel; representatives of Dutch Ministry of Defense (minister, spokespersons and other employees)
10	Source2	Representatives of Dutch organizations or governments	Persons aligned to the Dutch government (Prime Minister, ministers, Members of Parliament) or Dutch organizations and NGO's (f.e. CORDAID)
11	Source3	Representatives of international organizations or governments	Persons aligned to international organizations (f.e. United Nations), and international NGO's (f.e. Amnesty International) or non-Dutch and non-Afghan governments (f.e. President of the United States or Pakistan)
12	Source4	Representatives of Afghan organizations or governments	Persons aligned to the national Afghan government (President, ministers, Members of Parliament); local Afghan government (Governor or policemen) or Afghan organizations and NGO's (f.e. AIHRC)
13	Source5	Afghan militant, religious and tribal leaders	Afghan militant, religious and tribal leaders (f.e. warlords like Mohammed Khan, mullahs and Jirga-delegates)
14	Source6	Taliban (leaders and fighters)	(Ex-) Taliban leaders and fighters
15	Source7	Afghan population	Afghan civilians who are not aligned to an official organization (elders, shopkeepers, medical personnel of hospitals, teachers, cap drivers, farmers, fixers, patients in clinics, etc.)
16	Source8	Experts (scientists and journalists)	Afghan and international scientists, journalists, magazines, thinktanks (f.e. Senlis)
17	Source9	Unknown source	Articles with an unknown source
18	Source10	Different source	Expats (f.e. Dutch or American citizens living and working in Afghanistan)

C Topics (basis: Van Klink, 2007:25-27)

Number	Name	Description	Includes
19	Topic	Most dominant topic	
		1 = military actions and strategy	Non-reconstruction activities outside the camp (f.e. convois, patrols, operations and fights, bombardments, defusing of IED's); military strategy and tactics (f.e. evaluations of military strategy or change of command)
		2 = daily life at the camp	Activities and life of the military at the base (f.e. descriptions of the base and its facilities; people who are working on it; camp rules/protocol and visits of Dutch officials, journalists or artists/entertainers)
		3 = reconstruction (activities)	Reconstruction of Afghanistan in general (f.e. social-economic progress or development of infrastructure) and reconstruction activities by the army (f.e. building roads, prisons, hospitals and schools; training of agents; meetings with locals about reconstruction), and by Afghan/ international organizations and NGO's (f.e. programs of UN, CORDAID and the Afghan government)
		4 = violence	Sources and consequences of violence (f.e. threats, attacks, bombardments and kidnappings) for the military and civilians; descriptions of 'enemies' and victims of violence
		5 = Afghan society, culture and religion	Descriptions of Afghan society and explanations of (practices related to) culture and religion; life of Afghan citizens; reintegration of Afghan emigrants; opinions of Afghan citizens about ISAF or the war in Afghanistan
		6 = economics and business	Descriptions of the economic situation in Afghanistan (f.e. economic progress; employment); doing business in Afghanistan (f.e. shopkeeping); commodities and livelihoods (f.e. opium farming)
		7 = politics and law	International politics (f.e. visits of heads of state to Afghanistan; tops about Afghanistan or Dutch politics concerning Afghanistan), Afghan national politics (f.e. national elections and jirgas) and Afghan local politics (f.e. ruling of Governors); division of power between Afghan officials and non-officials (like militant leaders) and the importance of tribes; practice of Afghan law.
		8 = different	Live, work and experiences of correspondents themselves

D Generic frames

D1 Episodic/thematic frame (basis: Pfau et al; 2004:82 and Van Klink; 2007:28/29)

Number	Name	Description	Includes
20	ETFrame1	Focus on events or persons	A case study or event oriented report (versus a general/abstract context)
21	ETFrame2	Placing of events in a context (cultural, political or social)	Putting events in a larger context, either cultural (f.e. cultural practices in Afghan society like arranged marriages or wearing a burka); political (f.e. the influence of Afghan politics on the performance of ISAF) or social (f.e. the influence of Afghan tribes)
22	ETFrame3	Incorporation of historical sequence or causes	Discussion of the history of events or historical influences and causes (f.e. the different phases of 30 years of war in Afghanistan)
23	ETFrame4	Incorporation of prognoses and consequences	Discussion of possible outcomes of issues (f.e. the consequences of demobilization of the Dutch military or the outcome of elections)
24	ETFrame5	Inclusion of statistics or analysis of experts	Incorporation of interviews, analyses or quotes from experts like journalists or researchers; statistics or results from reports

D2 Human interest frame (basis: checklist of Semetko and Valkenburg*, 2000:100)

Number	Name	Description	Includes
25	HUMINFrame1	The story provides a human example or human face on the issue	Incorporation of roles, acting or experiences of specific persons
26	HUMINFrame2	The story employs adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy or compassion	Descriptions of persons, their feelings (like fear, sadness or pride) and experiences (like fighting, facing death, parting, loss or humiliation) which generate compassion or sympathy with readers
27	HUMINFrame3	The story emphasizes how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problem	Descriptions of the impact of positive and negative events or experiences (like conquer, devastation, violence or stress) on lives and emotions
28	HUMINFrame4	The story goes into the private or personal lives of persons	Descriptions of family, relationships or other details of the private life of military or citizens

* The fifth element of analysis of Semetko et al concerning the character of visual information is excluded since the focus of this research is limited to text.

D3 Responsibility frame (basis: checklist of Semetko and Valkenburg*, 2000:100)

Number	Name	Description	Includes
29	RESPFrame1	The story suggests that some level of gov't has the ability to alleviate the problem	Descriptions of (the possibility) of measurements by a certain actor which might positively influence the issue or the problem
30	RESPFrame2	The story suggests that the government, an individual (or group of people in the society) is responsible for the issue*	Attribution of responsibility or guilt for a certain problem or issue to a certain person, group or combination of groups
		1 = Afghan organization or government	
		2 = Taliban	
		3 = Afghan militant or religious leaders	
		4 = ISAF/TFU	
		5 = International government or organization	
		6 = Afghan population	
		7 = Combination of 1,2,3,4,5	
		8 = Other	
31	RESPFrame3	The story suggests solutions to the problem	Descriptions of solutions to problems or issues (f.e. military actions, negotiations or amnesty, reconstruction, education or contesting of corruption)
32	RESPFrame4	The story suggests that the problem requires urgent action	Descriptions of serious consequences when a problem or issue is not addressed (f.e. increase of violence or corruption)

E Issue frames

E.1 Military frame (basis: checklist of Van Klink, 2007:32/33/De Geyndt, 2011:43)

Number	Name	Description	Includes
33	MIFrame1	The story discusses the military strategy and tactics in the Afghan war	Descriptions of the general military approach, strategy and tactics in the Afghan war
34	MiFrame2	The story discusses the military organization and/or capacities/heroism of military personnel	Descriptions of the training, knowledge, experience, professionalism or heroism of the military personnel
35	MiFrame3	The story discusses the professionalism of military material or advanced war technology	Descriptions of fighting material like helicopters, F16s, unequipped aircraft, tanks, guns or supportive material and equipment of the military
36	MiFrame4	The story gives detailed descriptions of military actions or dangerous situations	Descriptions of military actions like patrols and flights or dangerous situations like fights, attacks and threats or devising of IED's
37	MiFrame5	The story discusses the Winning the hearts and minds strategy in the Afghan war	Descriptions of activities of the military in line with the Winning the hearts and minds strategy like seeking cooperation with (representatives of) Afghan population or efforts for reconciliation

E.2 Humanitarian frame (basis: checklist of Van Klink, 2007:33-35/De Geyndt, 2011:43)

Number	Name	Description	Includes
38	HUMANIFrame1	The story discusses reconstruction activities of TFU or humanitarian relief by other parties in Afghan war	Descriptions of reconstruction activities by the army (f.e. building roads, prisons, hospitals and schools; training of agents; meetings with locals about reconstruction), and by Afghan/international organizations and NGO's (f.e. programs of UN, CORDAID and the Afghan government)
39	HUMANIFrame2	The story discusses the costs of war and/or shows how (lives of) Afghan citizens are affected by the conflict in Afghanistan	Descriptions of consequences of the war for the daily life of Afghan citizens (lack of employment and safety; loss of family, injuries)
40	HUMANIFrame3	The story goes into (details of) civil casualties	Descriptions of civil casualties due to fights, attacks or bombardments
41	HUMANIFrame4	The story shows opinions of Afghan citizens about (parties in) the conflict in Afghanistan	Descriptions of opinions of Afghan citizens about parties (f.e. ISAF, NATO, Afghan government, Taliban or international community) in the Afghan war

E.3 Frames – overview (basis: checklist of Van Klink, 2007:36) [skipped]

F Tone, criticism and reflection (basis: Van Klink, 2007:36/37 and Aday, 2005:9)

Number	Name	Description	Includes
43	Bias1	Tone* in headline about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community	Positive or negative opinionated statements or value laden comments in the headline of the article about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community
44	Bias2	Tone* in article about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community	Positive or negative opinionated statements or value laden comments in the article of the article about TFU/the Dutch government; ISAF/NATO in general or the international community; indications of identification with one party (use of the first person plural in case of the military; focus on one point of view and lack of hearing of both sides)
45	Bias3	Challenging the picture as drawn by the (Dutch) military; (Dutch) MoD; Dutch or international governments of the character and results of the involvement in Afghanistan of TFU/ISAF/NATO or the international community	Contradicting or questioning the pictures or explanations by the (Dutch) military; (Dutch) MoD; Dutch or international governments of events in Afghanistan (f.e. the actions or progress of ISAF, or the validness of outcomes of elections)
46	Bias4	Reflection on the limits of the profession of non-embedded war journalist in Afghanistan or references to censure or unavailable/limited sources	Mentions of censure/inspection or review of articles or requests to transfer certain messages; limited sources or limits in execution of the profession of journalist

*Tone refers to a type of reporting, which is either objective (neutral) or has (negative/positive) subjective, value-laden elements or shows signs of over identification with a party.

Appendix 10e Reliability of frames - results of factor-analysis

Pattern Matrix^a

	Factor				
	1	2	3	4	5
The story discusses reconstruction activities of TFU or humanitarian relief by other parties in Afghan war	,994	,201	,167	,019	,027
The story discusses the winning the hearts and minds-strategy in the Afghan war	,440	-,102	-,092	,225	,018
The story discusses the costs of war and/or shows how (lives of) Afghan citizens are affected by the conflict in Afghanistan	,077	,860	-,150	,084	-,418
The story emphasizes how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problem	,071	,825	-,127	-,062	,101
The story provides a human example or human face of the issue	-,038	,624	,350	-,330	,468
The story goes into the private or personal lives of persons	-,081	,594	-,015	,004	-,081
The story employs adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy or compassion	-,025	,411	,044	,148	,100
The story goes into (details of) civil casualties	-,176	,285	-,015	,198	,088
The story shows opinions of Afghan citizens about (parties in) the conflict in Afghanistan	-,030	,276	,182	,031	-,246
Placing of events in a context (cultural, political or social)	,134	,053	,724	-,206	-,022
Incorporation of historical sequence or causes	-,109	,079	,445	,098	-,102
Inclusion of statistics or analysis of expert	-,035	-,086	,431	,097	-,060
Focus on events or persons	,192	-,120	,421	,095	-,097
Incorporation of prognoses and consequences of events	,013	-,036	,304	,145	-,085
The story suggests solutions to the problem	,119	-,008	,094	,718	,049
The story suggests that some level of gov't has the ability to alleviate the problem	,061	,063	,321	,679	-,053
The story suggests that the government, an individual (or group of people in the society) is responsible for the issue	,106	,027	-,073	,516	,018
The story suggest that the problem requires urgent action	-,072	,153	,166	,388	,001
The story discusses the military strategy or tactics in the Aghan war	-,020	-,298	-,127	,336	,254
The story gives detailed descriptions of military actions or dangerous situations	-,097	,000	-,152	,152	,588
The story discusses the military organization and/or capacities/heroism of military personnel	,102	,001	-,258	,023	,549
The story discusses the professionalism of military material or advanced war technology	-,018	-,056	-,310	,028	,463

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

Appendix 10f Reliability of frames - results of reliability-analysis

1 Episodic thematic frame

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,660	,661	5

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Focus on events or persons	1,5761	1,568	,447	,216	,591
Placing of events in a context (cultural, political or social)	1,3478	1,550	,477	,250	,576
Incorporation of historical sequence or causes	1,6685	1,665	,401	,182	,613
Incorporation of prognoses and consequences of events	1,5815	1,698	,330	,118	,647
Inclusion of statistics or analysis of experts	1,7391	1,713	,415	,175	,608

2 Human interest frame

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,728	,726	4

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
The story provides a human example or human face of the issue	,9022	,974	,575	,372	,632
The story employs adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy or compassion	1,4185	1,272	,407	,189	,725
The story emphasizes how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problem	1,0598	,920	,584	,385	,627
The story goes into the private or personal lives of persons	1,3315	1,086	,520	,281	,666

3 Responsibility Frame

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,698	,696	4

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
The story suggests that some level of gov't has the ability to alleviate the problem	1,7120	,949	,616	,447	,541
The story suggests that the government, an individual (or group of people in the society) is responsible for the issue	1,2554	1,317	,399	,164	,684
The story suggests solutions to the problem	1,5815	,966	,568	,429	,575
The story suggest that the problem requires urgent action	1,7609	1,167	,373	,159	,703

4 Military frame

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,635	,643	5

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
The story discusses the military strategy or tactics in the Aghan war	,7772	1,070	,445	,217	,553
The story discusses the military organization and/or capacities/heroism of military personnel	,9348	1,154	,508	,371	,525
The story discusses the professionalism of military material or advanced war technology	,9674	1,234	,457	,333	,554
The story gives detailed descriptions of military actions or dangerous situations	,9293	1,192	,447	,279	,554
The story discusses the winning the hearts and minds-strategy in the Afghan war	,8913	1,420	,137	,092	,700

5 Humanitarian frame

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,410	,408	4

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
The story discusses reconstruction activities of TFU or humanitarian relief by other parties in Afghan war	,9239	,989	,028	,053	,544
The story discusses the costs of war and/or shows how (lives of) Afghan citizens are affected by the conflict in Afghanistan	,9728	,704	,407	,184	,130
The story goes into (details of) civil casualties	1,0978	,963	,149	,112	,412
The story shows opinions of Afghan citizens about (parties in) the conflict in Afghanistan	,9511	,724	,363	,170	,181

Appendix 10g Frames and reporter status - Results of MANOVA-test

Descriptive Statistics

	Type of reporter	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
EpisodicThematicTotal	Embedded	1,3103	1,48880	87
	Non-embedded	2,4706	1,27791	85
	Mix	3,3333	1,43548	12
	Total	1,9783	1,53629	184
HumanInterestTotal	Embedded	1,1839	1,14657	87
	Non-embedded	2,0353	1,33137	85
	Mix	1,0833	1,37895	12
	Total	1,5707	1,31632	184
ResponsibilityTotal	Embedded	1,7816	1,00493	87
	Non-embedded	1,6824	1,14655	85
	Mix	2,1667	1,11464	12
	Total	1,7609	1,08007	184
MilitaryTotal	Embedded	1,6437	1,28477	87
	Non-embedded	,1529	,36207	85
	Mix	,6667	,98473	12
	Total	,8913	1,19156	184

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Dependent Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	Noncent. Parameter	Observed Power ^b
Meta3	EpisodicThematicTotal	81,449	2	40,725	21,033	,000	,189	42,065	1,000
	HumanInterestTotal	34,213	2	17,107	10,946	,000	,108	21,892	,990
	ResponsibilityTotal	2,537	2	1,269	1,089	,339	,012	2,177	,239
	MilitaryTotal	96,194	2	48,097	53,202	,000	,370	106,403	1,000

b. Computed using alpha = ,05