

# The Dutch military mission in Uruzgan (2006-2010): *Vidi, veni, mansi et pecuniam solvi?*

(I saw, I came, I stayed and I paid?)

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A focus on the role of the military expenditures in the debate of parliament, using the case of the Dutch Uruzgan mission (2006-2010) to analyse three important monitoring phases.

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## Summary

This research is meant to show what role the military expenses played in the parliamentary debate about the Dutch Uruzgan mission (2006-2010). This research is not meant to give a judgement about the level of success of the Uruzgan mission. The goal is first to see if the costs of the military mission played a significant role at all and second to see if parliament had attention for the total costs of the mission. To find out the latter the concept of economic understanding, which derives from Stiglitz & Bilmes (2009), will be applied. The concept consists of a notion which is supported by a method of calculation that Stiglitz and Bilmes developed. Basically the goal of the notion of economic understanding is to indicate the impact of a military mission on society, the money spent on a military mission could have spent otherwise. The economic understanding of the costs is useful, but an uncommon way to look at a military mission. The latter, because the humanitarian goal should be leading and therefore the costs of such an operation is usually not questioned. The costs (financially and risk of casualties) of a military mission are a sensitive subject. A pure economic calculation of costs and benefits cannot be made for reasons of principal. When the decision is made to contribute, all means necessary will be allocated to make the mission a success.

A calculation of the total costs of the mission will clarify the economic understanding, because when the costs are clear you can comprehend what the financial impact of the mission was on Dutch society. The method to calculate the total costs is inspired by the article of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009). The latter have calculated the costs of the Dutch presence in Afghanistan from 2002-2011, this research will do so for the years 2006-2010. Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten also attempted the calculation method of Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008), this research will do the same for the period 2006-2010.

It is a qualitative research for which four years of parliamentary documents (reflecting the process of scrutinising the work of government by parliament) have been analysed for the cost aspect. Three crucial monitoring phases of parliament were discerned to be analysed; the beginning of the mission, the extension and the end. A short summation of each phase will be followed by a discussion on the basis of a few hypotheses.

No general conclusion(s) can be made on the importance of the costs of the military mission in the parliamentary debate about the mission in Uruzgan. The military expenses were just one aspect of the discussion in parliament. The general sense of the outcome of the analysis of the debate in parliament is that the cost aspect of the mission was important. This was especially made clear by the concerns of most political parties since the beginning until the end of the mission about the capacity of the military forces. Almost all political parties have discussed the military expenses on varying levels in each phase with the exception of *GroenLinks* (GL). The latter was against the mission from the beginning. D66 and SP had the same opinion, but did care for the military expenses. Especially SP developed a strong interest in the second and last phase.

For both government and parliament additional money for the military was not a difficult issue, the safety of the Dutch soldiers was their main concern and further a modest success of the mission was important. The military budget was topped up when necessary, especially in the beginning when the costs rose quickly. There is no indication that government could have better predicted the costs of

the military mission, because it was a hard mission in difficult circumstances which necessitated a flexible budget. The bottom line for the parliament and the government was that the budget of Defence should not be affected. Especially VVD, SGP and CU were pro-Defence. However the conclusion is that the government could make a better effort in being transparent about the total costs. Therefore a recommendation is done by this thesis which suggests that the government should obligatory supply parliament on a regular basis a kind of balance sheet which indicates an estimation of the total costs.

A precise calculation of the total military expenses of the Uruzgan mission was not possible, only an estimation could be given. The government claimed the total additional costs for the mission were € 1.617.528.000. According to this research it is safe to conclude that the total costs (including hidden costs) were around € 3,35 billion. This amount is an average based on the calculation of the total realised costs and the sum of the costs found in the parliamentary documents.

It is good to keep this amount in mind in combination with the other factors in the Frame of Reference<sup>1</sup> (FoR) that were considered in advance of the mission. The irreversibility of a mission once started, is a matter that reflects in the costs. It is a paradox, because national and international interests overlap: the contribution to Uruzgan was meant to benefit Afghanistan as well as the Netherlands. In the end it is important to not only look at the direct costs of a mission, but the total (hidden) costs, to be able to grasp the financial and economic effect of a mission for society. Transparency about the costs should be very important for the government: it increases the trust and understanding of the public for certain financial measures and economic consequences of a military mission.

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<sup>1</sup> Frame of Reference is a kind of checklist that the Dutch government uses as a basis to decide to participate in a mission. See also chapter 3.

## List of abbreviations

3D	Diplomacy, Defence and Development	OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
ADZ	Afghan Development Zones	OMF	Opposing Militant Forces
AIV	<i>Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken</i> (Translated: Advisory Council on International Affairs)	NRF	NATO Response Force
ANP	Afghan National Police	PvdA	<i>Partij van de Arbeid</i> (Translated: Labour Party)
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces	PvdD	<i>Partij voor de Dieren</i> (Translated: Party for the Animals)
AO	<i>Algemeen Overleg</i> , (standing) committee meeting	PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
CDA	<i>Christen Democratische Appel</i> (Translated: Christian Democratic Appeal)	PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
CoD	Chief of Defence ( <i>Commandant der Strijdkrachten</i> )	PVV	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i> (Translated: Party for Freedom)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy	RC-S	Regional Command South
COIN	Counterinsurgency	SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
CU	<i>ChristenUnie</i> (Translated: Christian Union)	SG	Secretary-General
CTU	Combined Team Uruzgan	SGP	<i>Staatkundig-Gereformeerde Partij</i> (Protestant Political Party)
D66	<i>Democraten '66</i> (Translated: Democrats '66)	SP	<i>Socialistische Partij</i> (Translated: Socialist Party)
FoR	Frame of Reference	SVL	Statistical Value of Life
G20	The Group of Twenty (largest economies)	TCN	Troop Contributing Nation(s)
GL	<i>GroenLinks</i> (Translated: Green Left)	ToN	<i>Trots op Nederland</i> (Translated: Proud of the Netherlands)
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism	TFU	Task Force Uruzgan
HGIS	<i>Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking</i> (Translated: Homogeneous Budget for International Cooperation)	UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
HQ	Headquarters	UCBO	<i>Uitvoering Crisisbeheersings-operaties</i> (Translated: Execution of military missions)
IED	Improvised Explosive Device	UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	VVD	<i>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</i> (Translated: People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, a liberal party)
MIVD	Military Intelligence and Security Service		
MoD	Ministry of Defence		
MoU	Memory of Understanding		
MP	Member of Parliament		
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization		
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization		
ODA	Overseas development assistance		

## 1. Introduction

The title of my research is my modern interpretation derived from *Veni, vidi, vici* (translated: I came, I saw, I conquered) an expression of Julius Caesar after a quick victory at the battle of Zela in 47 B.C. (Buzzi, 1974, p. 65). My altered version *Vidi, veni, mansi et pecuniam solvi?* is translated as follows: I saw, I came, I stayed and paid? The alteration of the original saying is meant to express the change of the total warfare paradigm since the end of the cold war. First 'I saw' (*vidi*) and then 'I came' (*veni*), because today we have the principle of sovereignty which is captured in the charter of the UN of 1945. An intervention in another country is only allowed with approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, & Pease, 2010, pp. 397-398). To place 'I saw' first reflects the initial distance and reflection needed before an intervention can be realised. *Vici* because in the past until the twentieth century wars were mostly interstate with an identifiable enemy, a clear battlefield and were about winning a war: defeating an enemy and in some cases seize or reclaim its possessions (Smith, 2008, pp. 5,271,272). Rupert Smith<sup>2</sup> claims that industrial war does not exist anymore, instead nowadays there are conflicts that continue (endless). This is reflected by *mansi et pecuniam solvi?* (Smith, 2008, pp. 5,19). The latter is reflecting the dilemma of a troop contributing nation (TCN) that is considering future possible costs financially as well as the wellbeing of their soldiers. A military mission always brings along risks and the planning during a military mission always needs revising given the situation of a conflict. The cost aspect of a mission is therefore interesting, as there seems little attention for or knowledge about what the costs are. It is important for the government to communicate well about the goal and costs of a military mission to assure the understanding of the public.

The focus in my thesis will be on three crucial moments in the process of monitoring by parliament (as they represent the public) about the costs of the Dutch military mission in the province Uruzgan of Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 until 1 August 2010. This mission was supposedly one of the hardest<sup>3</sup> and also the most expensive<sup>4</sup> military mission in Dutch military history. It was first planned to last two years until 1 August 2008, but was extended at the end of 2007 with another two years. The initially planned additional costs rose enormously from the initial € 380 million in 2006 to € 1,4 billion in 2010 and finally € 1,6 billion in 2011, these figures were made public by the Dutch government (WRR, 2010, pp. 50,51; Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, 2011a). An important question is then, as these figures do not reflect the total costs, what the total costs were of the military mission.

According to Beeres, De Bakker and Schulten (2009, p. 216) little attention seems to have been paid by the media and parliament to the financial aspects of the Uruzgan mission until 2008. If the public, the media and parliament would realise what the financial impact was of a military mission, perhaps

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<sup>2</sup> Rupert Smith is a retired British General. Industrial war is a total war (like WWI and WWII) in which the whole society is involved by mobilisation, turning a country in a war industry. The distinction between soldier and civilian fades. Due to technology by the industrial revolution, the destructive power of weapons made mass killing easy (Koch, 2009, pp. 16-22).

<sup>3</sup> This was expressed by Minister of Defence Van Middelkoop in 2008. Christ Klep (military historian) mentioned that the Uruzgan mission was the largest overseas contribution to an operation since 1945-1949 during the decolonisation of Indonesia (Klep, 2011, p. 9).

<sup>4</sup> Expressed by some Dutch newspapers *Volkskrant* (Bemmel, 2007) and NRC (NRC, 2007) and Belgian newspaper *De Standaard* (Dam, 2010).

there would be more attention for it from the beginning. It is important for the Dutch taxpayer to gain insight in how the decision-making about a military mission takes place and also how the process of monitoring by parliament went about the costs. The military part of the mission in Uruzgan is most interesting, because it has an effect on society: Dutch soldiers were dispatched abroad to use violence when necessary, ordered by government. And it is different from sending diplomats or aid workers abroad: soldiers have the duty to provide security and stability in order to create an environment where the aforementioned can work. In conflict soldiers risk their lives as they often work in the line of fire. Undoubtedly diplomats and aid workers face a similar risk as being seen as a target, but soldiers do so more directly.

Another factor which makes this case also interesting is the changing role of the Dutch military forces. The Dutch military has been restructured continuously since the end of the cold war (direct threat was gone, army was reduced) to fulfil its changing role with less people and (changing<sup>5</sup>) means. The military did not only face general budget cuts for the last twenty years, but also the consequences of the economic crisis since 2008<sup>6</sup> and the costs of the mission in Uruzgan. The financial aspect (*pecunia*) is an important variable for the existence of the military forces in times of a less prosperous economy. Reductions influence the political ambition of the Netherlands concerning international law and security. This thesis will not explore the consequences of the mission in Uruzgan for the Dutch military forces, but is important to keep in mind that military ambition and costs correlate.

Another aspect that will be explored in this thesis are the total costs of the mission. The government indicated with their official figures the additional costs of the mission. The latter means they indicate only the extra costs that were made for the mission besides the regular budget for the military. This thesis will try to give insight in the total military expenses of the mission in Uruzgan, by calculating not only the direct costs (for personnel, materiel), but also related hidden costs such as aftercare and training. The economic understanding of costs is a view which is derived from Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008). By calculating the total costs, this view will help with the comprehension of the financial impact of a mission and give insight that money spent on this mission could have spent otherwise (further elaborated in chapter 2). It is perhaps easy to conclude the latter with hindsight, but this thesis tries to plea for transparency in costs, not to judge that it was too expensive or to set a limit on military expenses. The idea is to comprehend the financial impact of a military mission on a nation. A comprehensive evaluation of the total costs of a military mission could possibly lead to better insights for a next mission.

In sum the main question of my thesis will be: What role did the (total)<sup>7</sup> costs of the Dutch military mission in Uruzgan (2006-2010) play for parliament at the beginning, extension and at the end of the mission?

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<sup>5</sup> Due to technology weapons have become more precise and powerful. There is a bigger reliance on airpower by Western forces (Shaw, 2008, pp. 81-83).

<sup>6</sup> The financial crisis started in 2007 in the US, banks began to fall, and the financial sector was faced with huge problems of viability. It became a worldwide economic crisis affecting the Netherlands in 2008. EUR 35 billion (20%) had to be cut back on government expenses (called Reconsiderations, in Dutch *Heroverwegingen*) by 2015, 20 working groups each with a policy theme were formed by ministries (Parlement.com, 2010a). See also <http://www.heroverweging.nl/achtergrond/>

<sup>7</sup> (Total) is placed between brackets, to indicate the following steps in the analysis, to see if parliament: 1) did discuss the military expenses at all and if the answer is yes: 2) to see if parliament did have an eye for the long-term costs (impact of the mission on society), i.e.: the total costs of the military mission according to the economic understanding.

Three crucial monitoring phases of the mission for parliament are discerned because they indicate moments where the course of the mission was decided and the costs should have been an important factor for the government and/or parliament.

To answer the main question the additional questions are:

- How is a military mission financed?
- Did the (total)<sup>8</sup> military expenses of the mission play an important role in the discussion in parliament? And why?
- For which political parties and in what circumstances did the (total) costs matter and why?
- What were the total (preparation, materiel, personnel, and aftercare) costs of the military mission in Uruzgan 2006-2010?
- Could the government have been more transparent on the (total) cost estimation of the mission?

Through qualitative literature research the information for this research will be collected from (news) articles, parliamentary documents (mainly dossier no. 27925) and books. The focus in the literature will only be on matters related to the budget of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) concerning the mission and to give a picture of the total costs of the mission. The military expenses that are included are all costs related to; personnel, materiel and (after)care. Burden sharing and capacity problems (related to personnel and materiel) do also relate to costs of a mission and will also be included if possible. The costs of police- and military training missions that also took place in Uruzgan are left out. This means a limitation of the research in order to keep the focus on the costs of the Dutch military engaged directly in the conflict not indirectly by training Afghan police or soldiers.

The structure of the thesis is such that in the second chapter the focus and basis for the analysis in the fourth chapter will be set out. In chapter 2 the economic understanding of costs will be further explained. The views of Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008) and a short review of the current literature from Canada, Germany and the Netherlands on the costs of military missions in Afghanistan will be given. Also a number of hypotheses based on the aforementioned are formulated and will be applied to the three crucial phases in chapter 4.

Subsequently in the third chapter a short background of the Dutch decision-making process about military missions will be given (§ 3.1). The Frame of Reference (FoR) that is used in the Netherlands as a guideline to decide to participate in a mission will be shortly explained. In § 3.2 the way international missions are financed will be described. This will give a better understanding of the composition of the budget of the mission. Also it will clarify the positions that political parties sometimes took, for example about the capacity of the military forces.

In the fourth chapter the three crucial phases of the mission will be analysed by applying the hypotheses from chapter 2. The process of monitoring of four years will be split in the three most important monitoring phases: the beginning (§ 4.1), the extension (§ 4.2.) and the end (§ 4.3) of the mission. This divide was chosen, because these three are the decisive phases when costs are most likely high on the agenda of the politicians. In § 4.4. two general hypothesis will be discussed which also cover the period outside (within the four years of the mission) the three crucial moments.

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<sup>8</sup> See footnote 7.

An overview of the estimated total costs of the military part of the mission will be given in chapter 5. This is important to understand what was spent in total and by which budget (MoD or HGIS<sup>9</sup>) for the economic understanding. Of course in the intermediate time between the crucial phases costs were discussed. These periods have also been analysed for this chapter to be able to calculate the total costs. Important source of inspiration for this chapter was the article of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009) who tried to calculate the total costs of the Dutch presence in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2011. Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten also did a calculation according to the economic approach inspired by Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008). I will also attempt to do this for the Uruzgan-mission from 2006-2010.

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<sup>9</sup> See § 3.2, a collective fund for ministries to improve international cooperation.

## 2. Framework for analysis: economic understanding

The economic understanding of costs will form the inspiration for the analysis of the three phases of the four year period that the mission lasted. The idea of economic understanding is derived from Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008). They have calculated the total costs of the American military mission in Iraq. With their calculations they tried to indicate the impact of the military mission on American society. This is a relatively new way to look at the economic effects of a military mission. With their book<sup>10</sup> Stiglitz & Bilmes wanted to raise awareness of the public for the fact that the money spent on the war could have been spent otherwise. Because parliament represents the public it is interesting to see how the Dutch parliament is aware of the costs of a military mission.

First the economic understanding will be elaborated and then a short background will be given on the literature that is available on the calculation of costs of military missions in Afghanistan. The literature is based on three articles about the military missions of Canada, Germany and the Netherlands. At the end of this chapter a number of hypotheses will be formulated for each crucial phase and also two general ones for the whole period of the mission. These hypotheses will be applied in chapter four.

### **Economic understanding**

The term economic understanding is actually derived from the Dutch article of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009, p. 221) about the calculation of the costs of the military mission in Afghanistan for the Netherlands. Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten used the term to describe the view of Stiglitz & Bilmes. The latter (2008, pp. 13-15) applied the economic understanding as a motivation to calculate the impact of the war in Iraq on the US. For Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008, p. 110) it is important not to question if a war influences the economy, but how much. In sum they state that war is not good for the economy. Basically the economic understanding is a different way to look at costs. It looks further: not just to conclude that something was expensive, but to look at the impact of the costs on society<sup>11</sup>. In short: the money could have been spent otherwise. It is used in this thesis not to give a judgement about the level of the costs, but to give an insight in the total costs of the Uruzgan mission (see chapter 5 for the calculation of an estimation) with a combination of how the costs of the mission were discussed in parliament in three important phases (see chapter 4). The costs for a military mission are hard to predict by definition, but it is important to take this fact into account from the beginning. For example a standard reserve (a percentage of the total budget) could be calculated in advance to cover the unforeseen expenses.

Once a mission has started it is very hard (if not impossible) for parliament to make the costs of a military mission the main issue for continuance. The reason for the latter is that parliament is mindful that they do not form a too great obstacle in the continuation of the military mission for which they have voted about and therefore in majority support. However transparency towards the public is necessary to understand the graveness of a conflict and the impact on society in terms of costs for the military (defence budget, effects on personnel and their environment) and government

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<sup>10</sup> They wrote a book *The three trillion dollar war: the true cost of the Iraq conflict* (2008). (Trillion in the US means a billion in Europe)

<sup>11</sup> Interesting is the site that Stiglitz & Bilmes mention in their book: <http://costofwar.com/> This site indicates by two counters the total direct costs of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan for the US (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008, p. 14).

finances. The three chosen phases to analyse the Uruzgan mission indicate crucial moments where it was possible to change the course of the mission: the beginning, the continuance and the definitive end. The economic understanding has been applied as a filter during the reading process and analysis of the parliamentary documents from 2006-2010. In chapter 4 the three phases will be analysed specifically with hypotheses which are formulated with the concept of economic understanding in mind. The goal is to see if the members of parliament (MPs) were aware or had knowledge of the financial and economic impact of the military mission on society.

### **Background: calculations for Canada and Germany**

In the literature about the costs of a military mission the book of Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008) is perhaps the most well known, because they calculated a staggering figure for the controversial war in Iraq. They estimated a total cost of \$ 3 trillion<sup>12</sup> for the American economy for the period 2003-2008. There are however other authors who wrote about costs and war, but few that came close to the envisioned scope of this thesis. With the latter the angle of the way parliament looks at the financial impact of a military mission is meant, to find out if the parliament was concerned about the total costs. The idea for this thesis started with the presumption that the government did not give a clear and complete overview of the costs of the military mission. However it is not very likely that the Dutch government was purposely withholding information<sup>13</sup>. To question what comprises the costs for a military mission is not common (to question the figures of government) and therefore has less attention. Therefore it is important to know if parliament handles its monitoring role well concerning the cost aspect of a military mission and if they pay attention to the total costs.

Two articles besides the one of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten came close to the subject of this thesis. One concerns the calculation of the total costs of the military mission in Afghanistan for Germany following closely the method of Stiglitz & Bilmes. The other concerns the costs for Canadian military mission in Afghanistan, with a focus on the incremental (additional) costs and an attempt to indicate the total costs.

Brück, De Groot and Schneider (2011) have calculated the costs of the German participation in the Afghanistan for three scenarios<sup>14</sup>. According to them the scenario in which German troops would stay in Afghanistan to 2016 (since 2001), was the most realistic of the scenarios. For that scenario costs were estimated to be between € 17 and 32 billion. These numbers indicate a broad range, which were explained because of a lot of uncertainties.

Brück, Groot, & Schneider (2011, p. 795) indicate there are three ways to analyse the costs of a military mission:

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<sup>12</sup> Based on the value of the USD in 2007. In the US it is \$ 3 trillion (twelve zeros), but in European standards (applied in this thesis) it is equivalent to \$ 3,000 billion (twelve zeros). Interesting comparative figures calculated by Nordhaus (2002) of the cost of war for America: WWII \$ 2900 billion (130% annual GDP), Vietnam \$ 500 billion (12% annual GDP), Gulf War \$ 76 billion (1% annual GDP). Nordhaus estimated (with the forecast approach) \$100-1900 billion for the US to have spent for the military in Iraq (e.g. including reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and macroeconomic effects) (Brück, Groot, & Schneider, 2011, p. 795)

<sup>13</sup> The Netherlands scored a 7<sup>th</sup> (Of 182 countries) place with an 8.9 (scale of 1-10) in 2011 of the Corruptions Perception Index <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/>

<sup>14</sup> First scenario: all troops withdrawn by the end of 2011, indicated as a not very realistic scenario and the other scenario: full engagement until 2020 (Brück, Groot, & Schneider, 2011, pp. 799,800)

- 1) Forecasting approach, which tries to indicate the costs before the war has started.
- 2) Ex post approach, it estimates the costs of going to war after the war has occurred.
- 3) Analysis of ongoing conflict, it uses the costs that are known to predict future costs. In recent times this method is applied the most in this field of research.

All three methods are based on estimations, the first and the third are most speculative, whereas the second could be more precise. Brück, Groot, & Schneider tried to provide a framework for other researchers to calculate the costs of a participation of a country in a military mission. However as they indicated themselves it is very hard to do because there a lot of uncertainties. The three methods described above each indicate a point in time from which one can calculate, there are pros and cons for each method. However still for each method the way one calculates may differ, because of uncertainty what to include and also because data may not be available or hard to specify, even for method two. Brück, Groot, & Schneider used the third method and combined it with parts of the methodology of Stiglitz & Bilmes. They used four categories for their calculations: 1) the costs of the MoD, 2) costs of other branches of government<sup>15</sup>, 3) the costs of financing the expenditures (e.g. loans, tax) and 4) the non-budget costs<sup>16</sup>. Brück, Groot, & Schneider had to use a lot of assumptions. The wages for example were hard to determine, therefore they used a figure of € 50.000 calculated in 2007 as an average cost for the employment of a soldier.

David Perry (2008, p. 724) (using method 3, and partly 2 for finished operations) has looked at the incremental costs of Canadian forces operations in Afghanistan in the period 2001-2013. Perry estimated the full costs of the mission for the period 2001-2009 to be CAD 11,2 billion and the incremental costs in comparison for that period CAD 4,8 billion. He estimated that the total incremental costs until 2011 would be CAD 5,6 billion (round). And the total incremental costs for all Canadian operations in Afghanistan would be CAD 7,5 billion from 2001 until 2013<sup>17</sup> with the scenario that forces are withdrawn in 2011 and force levels remain the same. (Perry, 2008, pp. 707-709). The full costs means the total costs that are related to execute an operation. The incremental costs are the total (additional) costs that are directly related to execute an operation, apart from the regular costs to maintain the military forces in Canada. Perry included in his calculation the repair and overhaul of materiel<sup>18</sup> for the incremental costs for the military to stay active until 2011, but he excluded redeployment.

The goal of Brück, Groot, & Schneider and Perry is to contribute to the public debate about the involvement in Afghanistan. The transparency of the costs of the participation is an underexposed part of that debate.

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<sup>15</sup> Divided in four categories: security (measures to be taken to improve German national security, increased terrorist threat due to participation), Foreign Affairs (measures to assure good relations with neighbouring countries of Afghanistan), development programmes and police training missions in Afghanistan) (Brück, Groot, & Schneider, 2011, pp. 797,798)

<sup>16</sup> These are costs that are not budgeted by the government but affect society: lost lives or injured soldiers (lost or less productivity) and medical costs that are not covered by government) (Brück, Groot, & Schneider, 2011, p. 799)

<sup>17</sup> Operation Athena (one of the seven operations in total) would presumably end on 31 July 2011. A percentage (7.3 %) of the incremental costs is calculated for fiscal year 2012/2013 to be able to calculate the repair and overhaul costs of materiel from Kandahar (Perry, 2008, p. 709).

<sup>18</sup> These figures were not made public, sometimes equipment is even returned to Canada, but the costs were unclear. Canadian Department of National Defence calculates an incremental cost and it is counted in the fiscal year when equipment is expected to return to Canada (Perry, 2008, p. 709).

A number of observations of both articles are interesting:

- Brück, Groot, & Schneider calculated a significant higher level of costs than the government of Germany had indicated. The German government indicated for 2010 that the participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) would cost € 1 billion. Brück, Groot, & Schneider calculated however that it would cost between € 2,5 and € 3 billion per year (Brück, Groot, & Schneider, 2011, p. 794).
- The Canadian military had faced budget cuts for over a decade. In Canada there is little discussion on the short-term financial implications and almost no long-term analysis on the impact for the defence budget. Perry indicated that the financial planning and funding of the Canadian government for military missions needs improvement and should focus more on the long term financial impact of the mission. The latter referring to the Defence budget as well as the budget for health care (veterans). The Canadian government indicated that the total incremental costs for 2001-2009 would be CAD 4,8 billion for all operations in Afghanistan. The Canadian government did not give an indication of the projected costs of the extension until 2011 (Perry, 2008, pp. 704,707,708). Perry attempted to calculate the total (indirect) costs, including health care costs (CAD 11 billion for 41.000 Canadian soldiers), the costs of shifting personnel and resources to send to Afghanistan and the procurement of material, but determined that the latter two figures were too hard to determine correctly (Perry, 2008, pp. 717-721).
- Brück, Groot, & Schneider and Perry stated that there was little discussion on the costs of going to war, and this was the same during the mission (Perry, 2008, pp. 703,704; Brück, Groot, & Schneider, 2011, p. 794). Perry shortly referred to the parliamentary debate on the issue of costs as “abysmal”. The Canadian government was dismissing substantive inquiries and did not correct inaccurate numbers in the media (Perry, 2008, pp. 706,707).
- Both stated that data formed a bottleneck; it was not available or not made public. Only through assumptions and careful predictions they were able or tried to calculate the total costs (Brück, Groot, & Schneider, 2011, p. 793; Perry, 2008, p. 704). Especially the expedited acquisition and wear down (depreciation) of materiel put the researchers in a difficult position to calculate. The effects on costs for health care also proved difficult to calculate. It was hard to calculate injury and disability as a direct result of a conflict but also indirect trauma like post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Also the effect of lost lives of soldiers had to be accounted for; the pension that would be paid to the partner who was left behind and compensation for family. The problems with these calculations were solved by using data from other research or older data or using similar data from another nation that was also recently military involved in Afghanistan.
- Brück, Groot, & Schneider did not fully apply the same method as Stiglitz & Bilmes, they left out the macroeconomic effects: e.g. the influence of the war on the oil prices and stock markets. Also they left out US specific topics like official veteran services and insurance premiums for contractors (Brück, Groot, & Schneider, 2011, p. 794).

We have now seen what problems the calculations of the costs for the German and Canadian military missions in Afghanistan entailed. The next article that will be discussed formed an important source of inspiration for this thesis. It is the article by Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009) on the total costs of the military mission in Afghanistan 2002-2011 for the Netherlands. They formulated their own

method to calculate the hidden costs and they tried to calculate the total costs following the method of Stiglitz & Bilmes.

### *The Netherlands: calculation of the costs for the military mission in Afghanistan 2002-2011*

According to Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009, p. 225) it is very hard to specify the costs that the MoD spends on military missions. The ministry only budgets the additional costs (see graph 1, § 8.1) for a military mission. Other 'hidden' costs are not included that would have been spent regardless of that specific mission. A lot of costs are hard to specify in the financial plans and annual reports of the MoD. There is no general consensus on what should be included to calculate the total costs of a military mission (Trommelen, 2011).

The 'hidden' costs mentioned above are described by Beeres, De Bakker and Schulten (2009, pp. 218,219) as follows:

- 1) Replacement of operational losses (e.g. loss of helicopter during the mission).
- 2) Extra money for replacements (wear down period of materiel was shortened).
- 3) Purchase of new means (e.g. the Bushmaster).
- 4) Money to do extra exercises (to keep the forces operable and ready).

As the book that Stiglitz & Bilmes wrote about the costs of the war for the US is such an important inspiration for others, I will briefly explain their method of calculation.

### Stiglitz & Bilmes method of calculation

The long term costs are also something to take into consideration when dealing with the total costs of a mission. Stiglitz & Bilmes have calculated the total costs of the US share in the war in Iraq. However they could not prevent that costs for the Afghanistan war were also included, because the MoD and the Department for Veteran Affairs did not divide their budgets over the Iraq and Afghanistan war. Stiglitz & Bilmes used two scenarios to estimate the costs: 1) most favorable and optimistic scenario: the US can retreat quickly, a minimum of possible costs is calculated 2) moderate realistic scenario: the US is involved for a longer period thus more extensive costs, but still not the complete costs. For example the costs for recovery of the military forces ('reset') were not calculated.

For both scenarios for 2003-2017 it was assumed that the level of US troops would remain the same. Stiglitz & Bilmes had to make a lot of assumptions and also for them information was hard to find, they faced similar problems as Brück, Groot, & Schneider and Perry did.

Four budget categories were distinguished by Stiglitz & Bilmes: 1) Money that was already spent on the war, 2) Future costs: all the costs that have to be paid as long as the war lasts and thereafter. These costs include redeployment, veteran costs, reset costs, replacement of materiel 3) Hidden costs and 4) Interest costs, the price of the money to be able to afford the war. Stiglitz & Bilmes calculated extensively, they even calculated the costs as a consequence of the war for other departments. Three billion US dollars, this figure was rounded, based on a moderate realistic

scenario: actually \$ 2,7 billion (total budgeted costs). The total economic costs would be \$ 5 billion, accounting for the financial effects on society (e.g. veteran care, loss of lives, oil prices) of the war (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008, pp. 26, 38-45).

Stiglitz & Bilmes indicated ten steps to calculate the total costs. Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009, pp. 222,223) summarised<sup>19</sup> these steps in a clear way by the following seven categories of costs;

- 1) Additional realised operational expenditures (military expenditures directly linked to the mission: personnel, fuel, ammunition etc.,
- 2) Other operational costs (these are the extra costs which are hidden in the budget(s): replacement of materiel). Category 1 and 2 together form the additional realised operational costs.
- 3) Future operational costs (direct and hidden costs to finish the mission: redeployment, recovering the military force ('reset' costs) to make it ready for deployment again),
- 4) Veteran costs (medical care during the war and after, reimbursements for unemployment and lost lives of soldiers),
- 5) Social costs (value of loss for society of the perished and wounded soldiers),
- 6) Interest costs for loans to finance the mission,
- 7) Macro-economic costs (effect of the military mission on oil prices)

Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten applied both methods (their own 'hidden costs' method and that of Stiglitz & Bilmes) to calculate the costs of the Dutch military mission in Afghanistan from 2002 until 2011. They used method 3 (see page 8), the analysis of an ongoing conflict. They expected the total additional costs (including their four categories of hidden costs) for that period to be around € 2 billion and the total costs to be around € 3,5 billion. When they applied the categorisation of Stiglitz & Bilmes they calculated € 2 billion.

In chapter 5 an attempt will be made to calculate the hidden costs according to the 'hidden costs' method of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten and to follow the calculation according to the seven categories of Stiglitz & Bilmes for the period 2006-2010 of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan.

There are three key variables that are of importance to understand the costs of a military mission in general: 1) predictability, 2) visibility of costs and 3) possible trap of costs. All three are interlinked, meaning that all three have an effect on each other. All these factors have been tried to be accounted for in the Dutch Frame of Reference (abbreviated: FoR) as will be discussed in chapter 3. The three factors will be used in the analysis of the three crucial moments in chapter 4 by integrating them in the hypotheses, which are formulated at the end of this chapter. The key variables are further explained below.

### Predictability and visibility

Predictability and visibility are very important for the estimation and respectively the calculation of the total costs. Both are important variables at the beginning and during the military mission for the process of monitoring by parliament.

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<sup>19</sup> Summarised as follows: 1-step 1; 2-step 2; 3-steps 4,6; 4- step 5; 5- steps 5,7,9; 6- steps 3,8; 7-steps 7,10

The second method to calculate the costs (ex post approach), mentioned earlier by Brück, Groot, & Schneider will be applied in chapter 5 as the Dutch participation in Uruzgan ended in 2010. Therefore the visibility aspect of the costs is important for the calculation.

In the first and second phase of the mission the prediction ability of the government of the costs were important. It will be interesting to see how much the government had to adjust the figures and how parliament reacted. The visibility of the costs will be a matter that is most important in the debate in parliament for all three phases as the ideal would be that the total costs, also the hidden costs, will be discussed in parliament. The monitoring task of parliament should entail that they wanted a complete and thorough overview of all costs of the military mission.

### *On the trap of costs: entrapment*

The term entrapment is an element related to the theory of groupthink<sup>20</sup>. In their book<sup>21</sup> Paul Bordewijk & Jouke de Vries (2009, pp. 12-14) mention entrapment as one of the possible reasons<sup>22</sup> for policy fiasco's. Entrapment means that the decision makers (in this case the government) realise that there is no way back from their decision: the project is too far in progress and therefore irreversible. It would be too expensive to stop because of how much is already invested. Entrapment can be observed when decision makers play down the negative signals, are overemphasizing the positive signals and are downplaying the alternatives. In other words: a path is chosen which along the way seems to be wrong, but it is impossible to return from that path. So the way forward would be to justify the choice and if necessary, to influence the flow of information. With regard to the scope of this research, it would be interesting to see if entrapment is observable in the parliamentary documents in the second phase (extension) of the mission. In this phase the mission was extended for another two years. The question that comes to mind is: Was the Netherlands trapped into an extension as a consequence of the military investments that had been made? The investments done in Afghanistan were not just on the military side, but also on development aid and reconstruction. The scope of this thesis is limited to the costs of the military mission and it is important to bear in mind the possibility that the costs of the military mission were not a crucial part of the discussion in parliament. It would be interesting to see how the extension was discussed in parliament, specifically on the strain (thus extra costs) it would put on the Dutch military force.

The insights of this chapter and the hypotheses set out below will be used in chapter 4 to analyse the economic understanding of the members of parliament by looking at the three phases of the mission.

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<sup>20</sup> Term was introduced by Irving L. Janis, an American psychologist who introduced it in 1972 in his book *Victims of groupthink*. It basically refers to a way a decision can be made: in a coherent group which tends to distance themselves from negative critique on its decision-making and therefore denies the critique or considers it too late. (Vries & Bordewijk, 2009, pp. 9,13)

<sup>21</sup> Bordewijk and De Vries have collected several Dutch policy fiasco's in their book, including a chapter on groupthink during the decision-making process about sending out Dutch troops (by Bertjan Verbeek) and a chapter on the decision-making process about how the Netherlands got involved in Srebrenica (by Bob de Graaff).

<sup>22</sup> The other ones are groupthink itself and tunnel vision (the latter and entrapment are derived from public administration), as Bordewijk & De Vries indicated all three are related and partly overlap, but do have to be treated separately (2009, p. 13).

As the three phases will form the structure for analysis in chapter 4, per phase a number of hypotheses will be applied.

*First phase: the beginning*

1. Political parties that had been in support of the mission from the start offered the least resistance to the estimation of the costs of the military mission.
2. Parliament was able to monitor the costs well: the members of parliament were eager to get transparent data of the government on the (total<sup>23</sup>) costs of the mission.

*Second phase: the extension*

1. Political parties that had been in support of the mission from the start offered the least resistance to the estimation of the costs of the military mission.
2. Parliament was able to monitor the costs well: the members of parliament were eager to get transparent data of the government on the (total<sup>24</sup>) costs of the mission.
3. Entrapment did occur due to the costly military involvement in Uruzgan. Another two years were necessary for the effectiveness of the mission, to complete the military work.

*Third phase: the end*

1. The costs were a crucial point for parliament to end (to not further support) the mission in 2010. The Dutch military capacity was too much impaired by the four year mission to continue any mission in Uruzgan.
2. Parliament was able to monitor the costs well: the members of parliament were eager to get transparent data of the government on the (total<sup>25</sup>) costs of the end of the mission.

*Two hypotheses for the period 2006-2010*

The periods in advance, in between or after the three crucial phases where the costs were also discussed are also important for this thesis to fully comprehend the importance of the (total) costs for parliament. Two hypotheses have been formulated to be able to briefly analyse the full four years to see if the cost aspect of the military mission had enough attention of parliament.

The two hypotheses that will be applied at the end of chapter 4 for the whole period of the mission are:

- The Frame of Reference fails on the cost aspect in the sense that it lacks in the requirement of an interim reflection moment by the government to give parliament a clear overview of the total costs and impact of the mission.
- The government kept the costs of the military mission intentionally low or vague because they were deemed of less importance. The general level of success (i.e. safety of soldiers and stability) of the mission was of paramount importance.

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<sup>23</sup> (Total) is placed between brackets to indicate the difference between the initial observation to see if the parliament did discuss the costs of the military mission and the further observation to see if they also had attention for the long-term costs: more specifically the total costs of the military mission according to the concept of economic understanding.

<sup>24</sup> Idem.

<sup>25</sup> Idem.

The framework for analysis has now been set for chapter 4. The subsequent chapter 3 will give insight about Dutch politics. It will clarify how a decision is made in the Netherlands for sending out troops for a military mission, the article 100 procedure and the FoR. And it will also give insight in how a mission is financed, this to better understand the background of the analysis in chapter 4.

### 3. Dutch decision-making process and financing of military missions

First a brief background will be given to understand the decision-making process to participate in an international mission. In § 2.2 it will be explained how a military mission is financed, so the analysis of the debate in parliament about the costs in chapter 4 can be better understood.

#### 3.1. The decision-making process

The Netherlands is a representative democracy and has a bicameral system (States General) consisting of the House of Representatives (*Tweede Kamer*- parliament, directly elected every four years) and the Senate (*Eerste Kamer*, indirectly elected through provincial councils every four years). The House of Representatives (further mentioned parliament) consists of 150 members of parliament and the Senate of 75. The focus in this thesis will be on the House of Representatives (parliament), because the senate is not directly involved in the decision-making process of international missions. They do get involved when budgets needs to be approved, however in this research the focus is on parliament and the government. The parliament has the task of co-legislation and scrutinising<sup>26</sup> the work of government. The Netherlands has in principle a dualistic system, because the States General (parliament and the senate) is independent of the government. There has been more discussion if the system has become more monistic, as party politics seems to have crossed the line of the relation between government and parliament: the parties that provide the Ministers versus the opposition. Also the coalition agreement is seen as a sign of an increasing monistic system. In the coalition agreement the most important issues to cooperate are determined between the political parties of government, to which the Ministers are bound (Neelen, Rutgers, & Tuurenhout, 2005, p. 14). Important matters of foreign policy are rarely part of detailed arrangement in the coalition agreement.

Parliament has Standing Committees (composed of members of parliament-MPs, proportional representation) on the major subjects and they prepare bills and have regular meetings. Relevant for this paper are the Standing Committees (further referred to as committee) for Defence and the one for Foreign Affairs (*Tweede Kamer*, 2011b).

#### Article 100 procedure and the Frame of Reference (FoR)

In the nineties the number of peacekeeping operations rose (Ministerie van Defensie, 2010a, p. 2). Especially after the failed mission in Srebrenica<sup>27</sup>, there was a need to improve the decision-making process about sending troops<sup>28</sup>. The FoR was introduced to parliament on 28 June 1995 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Van Mierlo (D66<sup>29</sup>) and Minister of Defence Voorhoeve (VVD<sup>30</sup>)

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<sup>26</sup> Instead of the word 'scrutinising' I will further use the words 'monitor' or 'process of monitoring' in this thesis to reflect the task of parliament to check the work of government.

<sup>27</sup> A (lightly armed) Dutch mission was part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 1994-1995 in Srebrenica (safe area), the enclave fell in 1995 and 7000 thousand of Bosnian Muslim men were killed by the Serbs, the Dutch could not do anything as the mandate did not allow them to and they were with too little men and had no (air)support (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, pp. 173,174; Soeters & van der Meulen, 2005, pp. 543-545)

<sup>28</sup> A motion was initiated and submitted by Van Middelkoop (CU, minister of Defence 2007-2010) - and supported by CDA, PvdA, D66, GL and SGP- to realise a formal right of consent for parliament, the motion was accepted (dossier 23 591) (*Tweede Kamer*, 1994). Eventually this lead to the realisation of the FoR.

<sup>29</sup> Dutch political party, a social liberal party, [www.d66.nl](http://www.d66.nl)

(Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, 1995). It included fourteen points to test future military missions to political and military criteria.

In 2001 the frame of 1995 was updated according to the lessons learned from Srebrenica. In conclusion the now ten points are about the political desirability (1-5) and the military attainability (6-10), no. 10 concerns the financial aspects<sup>31</sup> (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, p. 178; Europa NU, 2006). Christ Klep (2011, pp. 73,74) states that since the Srebrenica trauma, the Dutch parliament got more influence on the decision-making process concerning international missions due to the increased stress on the prevention of future failures.

In the 2009 version of the FoR the reference to public support was left out, it was decided that it was the task of the government to convince public and parliament. (Europa NU, 2006; Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, pp. 160,178,179). In 2009 the FoR was again updated with elements from development cooperation (Klep, 2011, p. 211; Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2009b).

To further integrate the decision-making about sending troops for military missions, article 100 of the constitution was renewed in 2000<sup>32</sup>. The article states that the cabinet has the obligation to provide information to parliament and senate in advance of a military mission about the application of or to put forces at disposal to maintain or improve international law, also when the military force will be used for humanitarian aid in circumstances of armed conflict. An exemption to this information obligation is when there are compelling reasons not to, but even then the States General must be informed as soon as possible. (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, p. 177).

Two letters from the government to the parliament are necessary according to article 100. The first is a letter of notification, which explains that the government is doing research if a certain mission is feasible. When the results are clear the parliament will be informed by the article 100 letter which states the position (decision) of the government following the points of the FoR. After consultation with parliament, after which support of the majority is desirable, the government will go through with the decision (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, p. 179). It is important to notice that article 100 does not give parliament formal co-decision, but it requires an active role of government to inform parliament and the senate (Klep, 2011, p. 81). So it is not necessary for the cabinet to formally request permission of the parliament for sending troops for a military mission (war of choice<sup>33</sup>). In reality the government will only present a decision about a military mission to parliament which will most likely have the support of the majority<sup>34</sup>. Klep states that dualism is in danger when parliament

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<sup>30</sup> *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, translated: People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, a liberal party, [www.vvd.nl](http://www.vvd.nl)

<sup>31</sup> A short version of the Frame of Reference 2001: 1) Reasons for participation: international law, human rights, assisting with humanitarian aid, 2) Political aspects; political desirable and attainable? 3) Mandate: mandated by UNSC?, 4) Participating countries, 5) Influence of the Netherlands on decision-making on mandate, execution and duration, 6) Attainability: from military and political perspective, 7) Risks: preparation and anticipation, 8) Suitability and availability, 9) Duration of participation and terms of replacement: end date must be clear, extension means a new decision. 10) Financial aspects (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, p. 178; Europa NU, 2006; Ministerie van Defensie, 2009e)

<sup>32</sup> All the defence articles were amended: article numbers 97-100 and 102, [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com)

<sup>33</sup> The obligation that the government has to inform parliament concerns international military operations that are not all related obligations (such as NATO) and are the voluntary choice of the Netherlands (Klep, 2011, p. 81).

<sup>34</sup> In the past the Netherlands in the last two decades have refused a few missions like Sierra Leone and Nagorno Karabach (South Caucasus) due to practical reasons (risks, costs, lack of reliable partners) (Klep, 2011, p. 93).

has the right of consultation, because it would be more difficult for them to be objective (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, p. 186).

Next a short background will be given about the financial position of the MoD and how international missions are financed in the Netherlands. This will give a better insight in the role of the MoD in the discussion about the military expenses of the mission in parliament.

### 3.2. Financing of military missions

The budget of the military changed since the nineties from 2,5 % of the GDP to 1,4 % of the GDP in 2010 (Wijk, 2010, p. 454; De Bakker, Westerink, & Beeres, 2008). The MoD has been facing problems with their financial management, this presupposes capacity problems. Ever since 1991 the MoD was not completely living up to the standard of the Court of Audit (Court of Audit, 1994; Court of Audit, 1992). The management of materiel by the MoD was not in order and the MoD informed parliament limitedly and not all of the set objectives were reached. It is the ministry with the most problems with their financial management according to the Court of Audit in 2010<sup>35</sup> (Court of Audit, 2011; Court of Audit, 2008). The aim of the MoD is to have the financial management in order in 2012 and management of material in 2014 (Court of Audit, 2012).

The budget for the ministry of Defence is decided in a coalition agreement and agreed upon in the national budget (*Rijksbegroting*) where the military missions are budgeted in chapter X article 20. The division of money is decided by the Ministry itself within the lines of the coalition agreement, explained in a Defence memorandum and letters to parliament (De Bakker, Westerink, & Beeres, 2008, p. 14). Before 1992 the expenditures for defence had increased. Since 1993 the growth has stopped, because of the end of the cold war the size of the army could be reduced and also because of problems with budget deficits causing reorganisations and further cutbacks (De Bakker, Westerink, & Beeres, 2008, p. 13).

The total budget of the MoD in the last years was around € 8 billion<sup>36</sup>, of which around 13 % (in 2010) is not earmarked. The latter is important as the peacekeeping or stabilisation missions are partly financed from this not earmarked part. The expenses for military missions are calculated for each mission and are apart from the normal Defence budget. The gross share of the budget for military missions is financed from the HGIS<sup>37</sup> fund (further explanation below). In case of a UN mission, the UN can compensate the budget of the MoD (De Bakker, Westerink, & Beeres, 2008, pp. 40,45,48,49; Ministerie van Defensie, 2010c, p. 186).

#### HGIS

The *Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking* (HGIS) was founded in 1997. It is a collective fund for foreign expenditures of several Ministerial departments (Hoffenaar, March 2009). It is a separate budget construction of the government, intended to intensify international cooperation and dialogue between the government departments. It is an important instrument for foreign policy.

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<sup>35</sup> It is a High Council of State, which is independent of the government. Its task is to check the government's revenues and expenditures and to check whether central government policy is implemented according to plan (Court of Audit).

<sup>36</sup> In 2012 the total expenditures for the MoD are expected to be € 7.866.348.000, [www.rijksoverheid.nl](http://www.rijksoverheid.nl), *Brochure kerngegevens Defensie 2012*

<sup>37</sup> Translated: Homogenous Group for International Cooperation

There are two categories of expenditures within HGIS: Official Development Assistance<sup>38</sup> (ODA) and non-ODA. Military missions are non-ODA (Tweede Kamer, 2010f).

The ministry of Defence uses funds of the HGIS to finance international missions. The additional costs for military missions are financed by HGIS. The additional costs (e.g. allowances, transportation) are directly related to the execution of a military mission. Costs like spare parts and the bombs that F16s use are covered by HGIS (Klep, 2011, p. 165). Redeployment costs and extra military personnel that are necessary for a military mission are also funded by HGIS. However not all costs of a military mission are covered by HGIS, costs such as new or replacement of (worn down) materiel are paid by the budget of the MoD (Klep, 2011, p. 46), such costs are seen as regular operational costs. However the cost for transport, repairs and maintenance of that materiel are financed from HGIS.

The development costs (humanitarian aid, supporting governance, CIMIC) will be left out. The goal is to gain a better insight of the costs of the military part of the Uruzgan-mission: costs that were covered by the Dutch Defence budget and HGIS fund. Training of Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) are not included in this research, because these costs concern security sector reform (funded by MFA) and is not a pure Dutch military activity. Training of ANP was mostly done by partners like UNDP, US and Germany and therefore has been left out (Tweede Kamer, 2006a).

Burden sharing is also an aspect of military expenses that is relevant, because it is a way to relief the costs.

#### NATO: Burden sharing in Uruzgan

The NATO, of which the Netherlands is a member, states a guideline for defence expenditures of 2 % of GDP a year. De Bakker, Westerink and Beeres (2008, p. 49) estimated in 2008 that in 2011 1,3 % of the GDP would be spend on Defence. The Netherlands are currently below that guideline, in 2011 it was 1,4 % of the GDP. With the budget cuts that the ministry of Defence are faced the percentage is most likely to stay below 2% in the near future (NATO, 2012).

In principle the NATO uses the principle of 'costs lie where they fall'. NATO does know common funding (all members contribute for an activity that they all support), consisting of three budgets of which the military budget is relevant for this research (Homan, 2006, pp. 20,27). The NATO Resource Policy and Planning Board decides about what is commonly funded, they use criteria. (NATO, 2010). The criteria for the military budget that qualify for common funding are in short: the deployed theatre headquarters (HQ) and critical theatre-level enabling capabilities for NATO-led operations and missions and NATO's integrated command structure, NATO's integrated command structure and the overarching elements of the NATO-wide communications and information systems. The funding and contribution of military personnel is a nation's responsibility (NATO, 2006, p. 5).

Now the background is given for how the decision is made to start a military mission and how it is financed, it is time to find an answer to the main question. In the next chapter the three crucial phases will be analysed.

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<sup>38</sup> It originates from OECD DAC, see for more information <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf>

## 4. Analysis of the three crucial phases in the process of monitoring by parliament

First a short summary of the Uruzgan mission will be given in order to better understand the background and importance of the mission. In the three paragraphs that follow for each phase first a short chronological review will be given. This will give an impression of how the government informed parliament about the costs of the military mission and how these costs were discussed by parliament. After the review of a phase an analysis will be given by applying the hypotheses as described in chapter 2. At the end of this chapter (§ 4.4) the two hypotheses which apply to the whole period of the mission will be discussed.

### Dutch participation: taskforce Uruzgan (TFU), ISAF-III

The war in Afghanistan started in October 2001 by the US, supported by the UK, as retaliation (Global War on Terrorism- GWOT) for the 9/11 attacks earlier that year. It was meant to realise stability and democracy in Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by removing the Taliban regime (which supported Al Qaeda). The OEF was supported by an UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate based on self defence. All NATO countries were in support of the US (charter article 5<sup>39</sup>). The Netherlands got involved in the OEF since 2001 mostly by giving logistical support and with Special Forces in 2005/2006 and got involved in ISAF (which was mandated by the UNSC) since 2003 (Klep, 2011, p. 238; Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, 2011a, p. 18).

NATO (ISAF) and the US tried to control the whole of Afghanistan by expanding the ISAF mission, because the resistance of the opposing militant forces (OMF<sup>40</sup>) was still strong in the area around Kabul. ISAF would slowly take over the presence of OEF and was extended in four stages: to the north (I Dec. 2003-June 2004), west (II May-Sept 2006), south (III mid 2006<sup>41</sup>) and east (IV end of 2006).

It is important to mention, because of the positive experience, that the Netherlands were previously engaged with ISAF in Afghanistan: in Baghlan (northern province) they had the lead of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT<sup>42</sup>) from 5 July 2004-1 October 2006. They were mainly occupied with reconstruction and good governance, a combination of military presence and civilian experts (Klep, 2011, pp. 17,20). The timing was such that stage III of the ISAF-expansion would provide the choice of a province. A fact-finding team (mid-2005) went to Afghanistan, to help decide which province would be chosen before the notification was sent to parliament. Kandahar was already chosen by Canada and Helmand by the UK. Day Kundi and Nimroz were considered, but eventually Uruzgan was chosen (see map 2, §8.3). The security situation was bad in South-Afghanistan and it was the part with the poorest people. Uruzgan had an estimated population of 290.000 people and has a tribal culture. The main threat in Uruzgan was posed by the Taliban, with a hard core of estimated 300-350

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<sup>39</sup> Basically means that an attack on one NATO-member is seen as an attack on all NATO-members.

<sup>40</sup> Consists of Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin, also Uzbekistani and Chechnyans (Tweede Kamer, 2004 , p. 4; Tweede Kamer, 2008a, p. 58)

<sup>41</sup> ISAF south region consisted of 6 provinces: Zabol, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand, Nimroz and Day Kundi

<sup>42</sup> Through PRTs NATO wanted to support reconstruction and development in cooperation with national and international actors to secure the reconstruction and development. <http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html>

men and also a large group of supporters (Klep, 2011, p. 22; Tweede Kamer, 2006a; Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie, 2005).

### The crucial phases

Four years of parliamentary documents will be reviewed to see what role the (total) military expenses of the mission played in the process of monitoring. Three Balkenende-cabinets<sup>43</sup> were involved during the Uruzgan mission. Only during two cabinets (II and IV) the three most important phases of the mission took place and these phases will be analysed concerning the financial aspects of the military mission. The views of MPs and mostly of the Ministers of Defence and sometimes Foreign Affairs will be described. The chronological review of the debates in parliament and updates by government that took place will give an impression about the interaction between government and parliament. The interaction is of importance, because it indicates how and what information was shared about the costs. The latter is necessary information for the analysis with the hypotheses.

The periods of the three crucial phases were determined by using the date of the first notification until the date of the vote in parliament. This was different for the last phase where the period was marked by the start of the discussion of another extension (possibly in another form) until the fall of the cabinet.

#### **4.1 The beginning (16 June 2005-2 February 2006, Balkenende II)**

Balkenende II consisted of CDA, VVD and D66. Minister of Defence was Henk Kamp (VVD), Minister of Foreign Affairs Ben Bot (CDA) (Parlement.com, 2006a).

The time that it took from the first notification to parliament (16 June 2005 first notification) until the article 100 letter (22 December 2005 vote by parliament) indicates that the government had six months (minus two recesses) to well prepare the mission on paper.

D66 (Boris Dittrich, chairman) took a clear position half December 2005, this was even before the article 100 letter came out. D66 had indicated that they would not support the mission. This brought the cabinet in an uncomfortable position as D66 was part of it<sup>44</sup>, it threatened the necessary unity of the government (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, pp. 181,182; Parlement.com, 2006;2007;2010; Klep, 2011, p. 23). The reason that D66 was against the mission had only partly to do with the costs, it was not directly named as the main reason. They thought that the mission would not achieve lasting results considering the effort needed. D66 was criticized by other political parties for their position, they basically labelled it as reckless, because no discussion had taken place in parliament

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<sup>43</sup> The following cabinets under Minister-President Jan-Peter Balkenende (CDA:Christian Democratic Appeal): Balkenende II (2003-2006), Balkenende III (2006-2007 transition minority cabinet consisting of CDA and VVD, because D66 stepped out) and Balkenende IV (2007-2010) (Parlement.com, 2006;2007;2010). Ironically the start and the end of the Balkenende cabinet had to do with a military mission. The first cabinet Balkenende in 2002 began thanks to the fall of the cabinet called cabinet Kok II (PvdA, D66 and VVD, 1998-2002) under Minister-President Wim Kok (PvdA) due to the NIOD report about Srebrenica (Rood & Doolaard, 2010, November, p. 567; Wijk, 2010, p. 454). The fall of the last Balkenende cabinet (IV) was due to a possible new military mission in Uruzgan. NIOD stands for: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (<http://www.niod.knaw.nl/default.asp>)

<sup>44</sup> Two D66 Ministers were in cabinet Pechtold (Government Reform and Kingdom Relations) and Brinkhorst (Economic Affairs, also second Vice-Premier) and a State Secretary Van der Laan (Education, Culture and Science).

yet. It was a political game that D66 played, they even threatened with the fall of cabinet, a risk they took to show that a small party could exert influence, however they could not form a strong coalition with the *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA)<sup>45</sup> (Parlement.com, 2006a; Dimitriu & Graaf, 2010, p. 429; Tweede Kamer, 2006c).

The article 100 letter came out on 22 December 2005, it indicated an intended participation, and a decision would be made after the debate with parliament. The reason that it was not a decision yet was because of the position of D66 (Tweede Kamer, 2005; Klep, 2011, pp. 24-26). There was some confusion in parliament whether there was a decision or an intent to participate. Minister-President Balkenende persevered that there was no disagreement within the government and that the letter of 22 December indicated a decision. The government (including the two D66 Ministers) repeated its decision (intent) to contribute to the military mission in a short letter of 27 December 2005 that was requested by parliament. The Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) let the parliament know by an affirmation of 27 January 2006 (answering written questions of parliament) that the government intended to participate in the ISAF-mission (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2005). Later on Mr. Bakker (MP of D66) said that parliament including himself was to blame for politicizing the whole discussion by looking more at the procedural site (did government take a decision or not) than to focus on the contents of the mission.

In the article 100 letter of 22 December it was indicated that the goal of the mission was to improve stability and security by increasing the support of the local people (winning hearts and minds) for the Afghan authorities. In total 1400-1600 soldiers, six F-16's, six Apache helicopters were committed to the mission. If it turned out after the start of the mission that more troops were necessary, NATO would arrange this. The motivation for the mission was that it would both benefit Afghanistan as well as the Netherlands, as the goal was to clear out terrorism. The risks of the mission were deemed to be considerable, but acceptable. Offensive military action (to improve security) would probably take place. The Dutch military was able (well trained) and equipped to carry out the mission. The Netherlands was assured of support when needed of lead nations (especially US) of neighbouring provinces (Helmand: UK, Kandahar: Canada, Zabol: US). The financial costs for the mission of two years were estimated to be between € 280 and € 320 million including redeployment. Common funding of NATO was mentioned, but it was not clear yet how much. In this regard it was indicated that the airbase of Kandahar would be funded by NATO. Additional costs for the extension of the use of six F-16s and the move from Kabul to Kandahar and two extra F-16s would be € 24 million to be paid from HGIS (Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie, 2005).

The only moments when the positions of the political parties became clear about the mission was in advance of the article 100 letter by the position that D66 took and during the meeting (*Algemeen Overleg-AO*) of the committees for Defence and Foreign Affairs<sup>46</sup> followed by the plenary sitting<sup>47</sup> of 2 February 2006. In preparation of that committee meeting written questions of parliament were

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<sup>45</sup> The intention of D66 was to convince PvdA (Labour Party) to say no to the mission, but they failed. Eventually Dittich (D66) stepped down on 3 February 2006 because of this failure (Parlement.com, 2006a; Dimitriu & Graaf, 2010, p. 429; Tweede Kamer, 2006c).

<sup>46</sup> In these specialised committees representatives (MPs, spokespersons on the subject) from several political parties are seated, they discuss with each other in separate meetings (apart from parliament) with respect to the content. When a subject needs more clarification an *Algemeen Overleg* is planned: the Minister/State Secretary which is responsible is asked to take part in a meeting. [http://www.tweedekamer.nl/images/factsheet\\_TK\\_vergadert\\_\(150\\_dpi\)\\_118-180348.pdf](http://www.tweedekamer.nl/images/factsheet_TK_vergadert_(150_dpi)_118-180348.pdf).

<sup>47</sup> Debate of the chairmans of the political parties with the government and the (whole) parliament is present.

answered and a public hearing took place. Neither did clarify a position of a political party about the costs of the military mission. The 190 written questions that were answered by government on 27 January 2006 did not, according to the rules of procedure, indicate which political party asked which question. Questions were mainly asked about the attainability of the mission, the term of two years was questioned, about contributions of other countries (burden sharing) and the mandate (use of violence) and troop strength (enough?) The answer was that 1200 soldiers were enough and NATO could send extra support and the US (OEF) could also lend support. The mission would be a two year commitment to NATO and they would look for the succeeding lead nation. The government gave parliament a realistic view of the mission. They indicated that there would not be any significant results after two years, but an improvement in governance, police and army should be possible. For parliament (health) care of soldiers and materiel were also matters of concern. The questions of parliament concerned a wide spectrum (attainability and risks), but not so much directly related to the costs of the military mission. Twenty questions<sup>48</sup> concerned burden sharing in the form of providing security and logistical support. One question (no. 183) concerned common funding by NATO (Tweede Kamer, 2006a).

In the public hearing (a meeting convened by parliament with experts and persons involved) of 30 January 2006 pro- and opponents were heard. Concerns about the attainability of the mission were expressed, but none were directly related to the costs (Parlement.com, 2006b; Tweede Kamer, 2006b).

The most interesting part of this phase was the committee meeting of Defence and Foreign Affairs that took place on 2 February 2006 at which after in a plenary sitting the parliament voted. A majority (127 of 150) voted for the ISAF mission in Uruzgan starting on 1 August 2006 until 1 August 2008. The parties that were pro were: CDA, PvdA, VVD, LPF, CU, SGP and against: D66, GL, SP (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, p. 184). The CDA, SGP and VVD were positive from the start about the mission, but the PvdA and CU initially had some doubts about the attainability. D66<sup>49</sup> (an adamant “no”, based on practical arguments), SP and *GroenLinks* (GL)<sup>50</sup> were clearly against, for them the combination of fighting and rebuilding was not acceptable. However GL and SP awaited the discussion in parliament to strengthen their “no” to the mission. GL, SP, D66 did not form a strong coalition, GL and SP even criticized D66. Costs were not the main reason for D66, SP and GL to not support the mission, but the costs were part of their reasoning as they thought the money could be better spent otherwise. D66 indicated that it was not convinced by other parties, the mission would fail in its design and set up and would increase risks. Nonetheless now it appeared the mission would take place, they would support the soldiers. D66 was criticized a few times (by SP, GL, SGP, LPF, MP Nawijn, and MP Wilders) for their early/divided position about the mission.

For CDA, SGP and LPF common funding was important. The VVD, LPF, SGP, MP Nawijn<sup>51</sup> and CU seemed most concerned with the finances of the mission and the burden for the military. The PvdA also had concerns about military capacity: the helicopter/transport availability was an important

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<sup>48</sup> Concerned the following question numbers: 15,67,130, 170,171, 178, 17, 177, 33 ,18 ,23 ,29 ,95 ,112, 132, 133, 134, 173, 176, 172

<sup>49</sup> D66 had supported all previous missions in Afghanistan also the one where special forces were sent to help OEF

<sup>50</sup> SP (Socialist Party) never had support any mission in Afghanistan, *GroenLinks* (Green Left) supported the ISAF missions in north- and west-Afghanistan.

<sup>51</sup> Former member of LPF (left in 2004), who kept his seat in parliament  
<http://www.parlement.com/9353000/1f/j9vvh5i95k8zxl/vhnnmt7lkh3r> .

issue. Aftercare was important for the PvdA (main focus point), VVD, CDA, MP Nawijn, D66 and CU. The VVD (Mr. Van Baalen) pleaded that damaged or lost military materiel should not burden the budget of Defence. He requested Minister Kamp (MoD) to arrange a structural solution of financing lost materiel before 1 June 2006, the Minister promised to follow up. LPF (Mr. Herben) had objections about the nature, size and duration (he said 2010 more likely) and the costs (€ 340 million would not be enough) of the mission. D66 (Mr. Bakker) said there was a small chance of success for the mission, because of the corruption and the limited financial means. CU (Mrs. Huizinga-Heringa) was glad that VVD and LPF talked about the loss of materiel and the budget of Defence, the necessity to make available structural funds would be preferable as CU had earlier proposed during a discussion about the budget of the MoD, but was rejected (also by VVD). SGP (Van der Staaij) agreed with CU that there should be a structural solution for military materiel that is lost so replacement could take place quickly.

Minister Bot (MFA) indicated that NATO was working on a revised common funding system, the matter had been brought up by the Netherlands in NATO meetings every time. Of the EU, 25 countries contributed financially and/or militarily, this could be seen as burden sharing of the EU and also of burden sharing by NATO members. He also said that the Netherlands was one of the largest contributors, this was because the Dutch army was well trained and had done good work in the past. Minister Kamp (MoD) also reassured any worries, indicating that the care for soldiers in advance of, during and after the mission would be well arranged. As of 2007 the costs of aftercare would be made clear separately on the financial plan of the MoD. Minister Kamp admitted that the budget of the MoD did not offer the necessary space to quickly replace lost materiel for the coming two years. He would try to find a structural solution with the Minister of Finance.

Minister-President Balkenende said at the end of the committee meeting (2 February) that broad support from parliament was clear and that the mission would take place<sup>52</sup>. Balkenende responded to criticism of SP about D66 position that there is dualism and the cabinet was united since the decision on 22 December 2005 (Tweede Kamer, 2006b; Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, pp. 183,184; Tweede Kamer, 2006c).

### Analysis

1. *Political parties that had been in support of the mission from the start offered the least resistance to the estimation of the costs of the military mission.*

First of all it has to be recognised that in this phase the costs did not change yet as the mission had to even start. The government only gave an indication of the additional costs of the mission. In this phase it does not seem that parties that were in support of the mission were doubtful about the estimation of the costs of the military mission. However there was doubt about the capacity of the military. The opponents of the mission D66, GL and SP were most skeptical about the format (fighting and rebuilding) of the mission, not about the estimation of the costs specifically. D66 did mention the limited financial means. However it can be deduced that they thought that the whole effort (including the cost aspect) should not go through. Interestingly

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<sup>52</sup> Since the beginning there was no majority of public support for the mission, also during the mission the number of opponents only slightly increased, this was the first time in Dutch military history that public support was low in advance and during the mission, see also graph 2 (§ 8.3) (WRR, 2010, p. 52; Klep, 2011, p. 124).

enough the LPF was correct about two things: 1) that € 340 million would not be enough and 2) that the mission would last until 2010.

So the first hypothesis is only partly supported in the sense that parties (CDA, PvdA, VVD, LPF, SGP and CU) that were in support of the mission were concerned about the capacity of the military (therefore also the costs to reach or maintain that capacity), but nevertheless were reassured by the government. CDA, PvdA, CU, SGP, LPF and VVD all thought that a structural solution should be arranged to assure that the MoD could cover the costs of lost or damaged materiel. Burden sharing was important for CDA, SGP and LPF. Aftercare which indicates a sense for the total costs of the military mission was important for the PvdA (main focus point), VVD, CDA, D66 and CU.

2. *Parliament was able to monitor the costs well; the members of parliament were eager to get transparent data of the government on the (total<sup>53</sup>) costs of the mission.*

In the article 100 letter the government did try to give a realistic view of the mission. It was described as a mission that would involve (acceptable) risks and would not yield great results. Through the normal procedures such as the written questions and the public hearing, the committee meetings and the plenary sitting with the government it was possible for parliament to find out if the estimation of the costs of the military mission were in the right direction or complete. Several parties expressed concerns about the financial burden of the mission for the Dutch military. However they were not very critical to ask on what grounds the government based its cost estimation. Nor did they question if the estimation would cover the total costs of the military mission. CU, VVD and LPF did foresee problems with the financing of materiel (they stated that the Defence budget should not be affected) and they were satisfied with the answer that Minister Kamp would find a solution with the Minister of Finance. As was mentioned before the aftercare was mentioned as a concern, but the political parties were also satisfied with the answer that it would not form a problem. As this phase covers the period before the start of the mission it is logical that parliament was less critical about the costs.

Outside the determined period of this phase (June 2006) a specific example of extra costs is important to mention and the reaction of parliament. A fast track procedure was realised to assure the acquirement of a new vehicle to be used in Uruzgan: the Bushmaster. The Bushmaster is a vehicle that improved the security of the soldiers as it could better resist IEDs. Twenty five of them were bought, they were ordered on 23 June and delivered on 1 September 2006 (Ministerie van Defensie, 2006c). In an update letter of 1 September 2006 the government explained to parliament that these Bushmasters would be financed from the additional € 25 million that was assigned to the MoD by the Ministry of Finance. Nobody in parliament questioned the acquirement. In this case the acquirement of Bushmasters was initially, but deemed necessary. Therefore money was made available and it was not a problem for parliament. The government was transparent about it and the necessity of the acquirement was clear for parliament: to improve the safety for the Dutch soldiers (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2006).

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<sup>53</sup> See note 23.

This hypothesis is partly supported, because the parliament expressed their concerns about the capacity and therefore the cost aspect. On the other hand they were not so eager in this phase (mission was not even started) to question the costs and the find out what the total costs were. Parliament was easily assured by the government.

#### 4.2 Extension (29 June 2007 – 20 December 2007, Balkenende IV)

The final cabinet Balkenende IV consisted of CDA, PvdA and CU. The Minister of Defence was Eimert van Middelkoop (CU), State Secretary of Defence was Cees van der Knaap (CDA) until 18 December 2007 when Jack de Vries (CDA) followed him up. Minister of Foreign Affairs was Maxime Verhagen (CDA) (Parlement.com, 2010a).

It took about three months (minus a summer recess of 8 weeks) to come to a decision about the extension, it was a postponed decision, at first the decision should have been made in the summer of 2007<sup>54</sup>. This period is marked by the first notification on 29 June until 20 December when it became clear that there was a majority for the extension.

On 29 June 2007 the government gave the first notification to parliament about investigating the possibility of an extension of the mission in Uruzgan after 1 August 2008 (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2007b). Minister Van Middelkoop (MoD) had indicated in interviews the same day that the Netherlands would stay if a second country (besides Australia) would contribute. He gave the impression that the Netherlands was willing to continue the mission although it would make new budget cuts of the MoD necessary to be able to pay the extension. The latter indicated a capacity problem. The Minister endured a lot of criticism from parliament for his remarks. For parliament all options (to stay, a smaller contribution, to leave) had to be considered. And the remarks could be interpreted by NATO as such that they did not have to find a successor to replace the Netherlands. The latter was especially a concern for VVD, PvdA, GL and SP. In reaction to what Van Middelkoop had said GL said that the mission had become too much about fighting and therefore the financial and materiel side of the mission were more important. (Klep, 2011, pp. 50, 52-53; Nu.nl, 2007b; ANP, 2 July 2007; Nu.nl, 2007c).

On 2 July a meeting took place of the committees of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Minister Van Middelkoop started with an apology for the misconception that the media presented, it seemed like he had hinted at an extension while this was under investigation. The VVD (MP Boekstijn) was in favour of an extension and supposed that, instead of cutbacks, more money should go to the MoD. SGP (Mr. Van der Staaij) agreed with the latter. VVD also expressed concerns about helicopter capacity, this was shared by CU (Mr. Voordewind). The PVV (Mr. Wilders) supposed that money for Development Cooperation should be used for the Dutch military forces. MP Eijsink (PvdA) requested an explanation for the overspending budget, she requested a specification. Also she brought the aftercare of the veterans under the attention. Minister Van Middelkoop promised to follow up and he would give a specification of the costs of the mission and said that additional costs would be paid

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<sup>54</sup> In an update of 23 March 2007 it was indicated that the cabinet would decide in the summer if the Netherlands would continue their contribution after 1 August 2008 (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2007a).

from the HGIS fund. The costs of the wear down of material were for the budget of the MoD. The US had extended the period of the helicopters with six months and the Minister hoped that thereafter with consultation of NATO-partners the logistical problems would be solved (Tweede Kamer, 2007b).

An extra update was requested during the committee of Defence and Foreign Affairs on 2 July. Among the request for more information was the request of MP Eijnsink (PvdA) who wanted clarification about the overspending of the budget concerning the military aspect of the mission. The update was given to parliament in a letter by the Ministers on 24 August 2007. It included among others an overview of the costs of the mission. It was indicated that the mission in total still would cost € 580 million<sup>55</sup>, excluding the costs for redeployment. For the first time a table was given which specified the costs as of March 2007 (see table 2A, §8.1). The largest costs were formed by the following four; reimbursements (€ 153,4 million), nutrition (€ 71 million), transportation (€ 140,2 million) and materiel (€ 50,6 million) (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2007c; Tweede Kamer, 2007b).

On 11 September 2007 a request from NATO was received to stay active in Afghanistan after August 2008 (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2007d). Minister Van Middelkoop spoke out a week later<sup>56</sup> in public that if the Netherlands wanted to continue military active on the same level (and thus to be able to realise the extension), that the current budget of Defence would be insufficient (De Pers, 2007). He later uttered the same concern again during a debate in November<sup>57</sup>. Again this indicated a capacity problem of the military forces.

By a motion (31200, no. 16) of CDA (Mr. Van Geel) of 20 September 2007 the ministry of Defence received € 50 million for 2008 and the same amount for 2009, to be invested for replacements (*vervangingsgelden*) of materiel, the so-called *Van Geel-gelden*. VVD also indicated that they wanted to see the budget of MoD increased with € 100 million. The SGP (Van der Vlies) submitted a motion (31200 no. 36) requesting government for a structural solution for the budget of MoD. (ANP, 2007a; Ministerie van Defensie, 2009f; Tweede Kamer, 2007c).

An update letter was sent to parliament on 24 September 2007. It was indicated that there was insufficient air transport, so the Netherlands had hired extra capacity from the civilian sector, costs (not indicated) were covered by the estimated budget. Since 1 February 2007 the Netherlands had to contribute personnel (20-40, no costs indicated) to the NATO headquarters (HQ) in Kabul (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2007e).

On 28 September parliament was informed that an additional 80 soldiers (two platoons) would be sent to Uruzgan on request of the commander of TFU, because of the worsened security situation

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<sup>55</sup> In short an impression of the timeframe in which the costs rose: 22/12/2005: €280-320 million, 18/4/2006: € 380-410 million, 20/10/2006: € 510-540 million, 23/3/2007: € 550-580 million, 24/8/2007: € 580 million

<sup>56</sup> This was on *Prinsjesdag* (18 September 2007), a day on which the government present its budget plans for the coming year. He explained that the mission in Uruzgan was already comparable to three operations on the lower spectrum of violence (De Pers, 2007).

<sup>57</sup> Minister Van Middelkoop (CU) held a speech at a debate on 12 November 2007 organized by a newspaper called *Reformatorisch Dagblad*. He disagreed with the then current ambition level and explained that the mission in Uruzgan was already comparable to three operations on the lower spectrum of violence (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007h). The ambition level of the military as of 2006 was: one mission in the higher violence spectrum with a duration for a year and simultaneously three missions on a low level of the violence spectrum, meaning in total 2400 soldiers permanently stationed abroad (Ministerie van Defensie, 2006a).

around Deh Rawod. This temporary employment would be paid by the HGIS-budget (no costs indicated) (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007g).

The 20th of November State Secretary Van der Knaap announced that ten extra Bushmasters were necessary; five for Uruzgan, four to keep as provision and one for training in the Netherlands (lack of training capacity was extended, now in total there were three). Total costs € 8,5 million, of which the major part would be paid from the budget of Defence and € 0,7 million (transport costs) by HGIS. Of the 23 Bushmasters that were used in Afghanistan two were destroyed and another two were heavily damaged, leaving 19 operational. Also a Patria armoured vehicle was destroyed. (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007i).

A motion (31200 X, no. 68) of CU (Voordewind) about the financing of worn out materiel was dissuaded by Minister Van Middelkoop (CU) on 27 November 2007. The motion was modified for the third time to be able to get support from CDA and PvdA. It was now formulated in a general manner, requesting that government should search for an adequate way of financing the needed materiel. The motion was put to vote on 4 December and was accepted (Tweede Kamer, 2007d; Nu.nl, 2007d).

Through an article 100 letter on 30 November 2007 the cabinet expressed their decision, they wanted to extend the mission in Uruzgan for two years, from 1 August 2008 until 1 August 2010 with the Netherlands still as lead nation. A few NATO members<sup>58</sup> had promised a contribution in Uruzgan, which was important to be able to continue: the number of Dutch soldiers could be reduced with 1000-1100. At that time there were 1655 Dutch soldiers present in Afghanistan, of which 1300 in Uruzgan (the rest in Kabul and Kandahar). The extended mission would contain considerable risks, but these were considered acceptable. Already 12 Dutch soldiers had lost their lives. The government all in all concluded that since the first article 100 letter a substantial start had been made with the return of security, local government and the rebuilding of Uruzgan. Continuation of the mission was mainly grounded upon the same reasons as the previous article 100 letter. Another reason was destruction of capital if the Dutch would leave per 1 August 2008. The expectations for rebuilding were kept modest. It was acknowledged in the letter that the extension would take a heavy toll on the Dutch forces, however the extended mission as a lead nation would comprise a smaller Dutch contribution by transferring some tasks<sup>59</sup> to other NATO countries, the security chain would stay in Dutch hands. To make the military contribution possible the budget in the spring had to be adjusted and the Dutch contribution to the tenth rotation of the NATO Response Force (NRF<sup>60</sup>) had to be partly reduced at the beginning of 2008 and NATO had agreed with this. The MoD would also take measures to make sure to be able to continue the mission, it was not mentioned how. Concerning the finances of the mission it was stated that the additional costs would be paid from HGIS, but the budget of the MoD had also been affected amongst others due to the wear down of materiel. The additional costs of the extension would be € 540 million (€ 270 a year, including reimbursements, transportation, nutrition, ammunition and € 20 million for extra spare parts). The contribution of

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<sup>58</sup> France, Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic. Also non-NATO member Georgia wanted to contribute (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2007f).

<sup>59</sup> Slovakia and Czech Republic would take over surveillance of two Dutch military encampments Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod. France, Hungary and Slovakia would also train ANA (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2007f, p. 33).

<sup>60</sup> NRF started in 2004 and was fully operational in 2006, it comprises a multinational rotational force (every 6 months, as of 2012 6-12 months) consisting of air, land, maritime and Special Forces that NATO can deploy quickly worldwide. Please see for further reading: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49755.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm)

partner countries would probably lead to a reduction for the Netherlands of € 15 - € 20 million, this was not accounted for yet, in the spring this would be clarified. The HGIS budget had been increased with € 250 million for four years by the coalition agreement of this cabinet (see table 2B, § 8.1). The letter also stated the importance of costs that are manageable and predictable. Procedures and methods were improved to make this possible. The costs of the mission would be monitored and periodically updated (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2007f). It was also announced that another extra € 100 million (so-called *Bos-gelden*<sup>61</sup> - PvdA) would become available for the budget of the MoD. The € 100 million would be evenly spread over 2010 en 2011, to be used for replacement investments. In total the extension would cost € 640 million (€ 540 million + €100 million *Bos-gelden*). The first two years of the mission (2006-2008) had cost € 680 million (€ 580 million + € 100 million (Van Geel-gelden)). The grand sum of the total mission of four years add up to € 1,3 billion (HGIS and partly extra budget MOD) this is exclusive the redeployment costs (from HGIS fund) which were estimated to be € 115 million (Ministerie van Defensie, 2009f; Ministerie van Defensie, 2007j).

On 7 December 2007 a public hearing was planned in preparation of the committee meeting of Foreign Affairs and Defence of 17 December and the plenary sitting on 18 December. The military labour unions (AFMP/FNV, ACOM, VBM/NOV and FVNO/MHB) were also heard. AFMP/FNV and VBM/NOV were against the mission and worried about the declining Defence budget. ACOM also worried about the Defence budget, but had no opinion about extension. FVNO/MHB thought that the Dutch capacity was not so bad and also had no opinion about the costs (Tweede Kamer, 2008c).

The committee for Foreign Affairs, in reaction to the article 100 letter of 30 November, had 577 questions (!) for the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defence and for Development Cooperation, they were answered on 14 December 2007. It was not indicated (rules of procedure) who asked the questions. A 125 questions<sup>62</sup> (22% of the questions) were directly related with the military expenses. The rest of the questions were mostly about agreements about the mission, development issues and security. It goes too far to discuss the contents of all of the 125 questions. The questions were mostly about materiel, personnel, contribution of NATO partners and consequences of the extension for other missions. The most important questions for this research in terms of the predictability of costs and to keep them manageable were; 555, 561, 563, 564 and 572. Question 555 requested a guarantee that the additional costs would not be paid by the budget of MoD. The answer was that HGIS would foresee in the additional costs and redeployment. Measures had been taken to increase the budget for Defence, € 842 million (€ 500 million by government to be created by Defence itself and € 143 million from HGIS and € 200 million *Van Geel-* and *Bos gelden* from public funds) in total<sup>63</sup>. Question 561 asked if unforeseen costs were calculated, the answer was that any additional costs would be paid from HGIS. Question 563 was aimed to know how sure the conviction was that the costs for the extension were predictable and controllable. The answer was that the planning of the budget was improved and based on earlier experience of the current mission. The money that was made available by the *Van Geel-* and *Bos-gelden* would be enough to ensure the replacement of materiel. Question 564 asked for a specification of HGIS peacekeeping expenditures for ISAF III, in

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<sup>61</sup> Wouter Bos, Minister of Finance and Vice-President 2007-2010, PvdA [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com)

<sup>62</sup> The questions were scanned for three catchwords: *defensie* (defence), HGIS, *bijdrage* (contribution), and *financ* (to catch all words with finance and financing etc.). Only the questions related to the military budget, materiel or burden sharing were selected.

<sup>63</sup> This sum is not entirely correct in my opinion as of the € 500 million half was for HGIS. Which would make the total sum for the extra budget for Defence € 592 million (842-250).

total the expenditures for 2007 were estimated to be € 246 million (table 2C §8.1: five largest amounts: allowances € 76 million, transport € 43 million, materiel € 33 million, food € 32 million, € 23 ammunition). Question 572 was about where the extra money would come from if necessary. This would be reflected in the spring of 2008, when budgets are checked. Another question (no. 575) requested a clarification of the expenses of the mission for each Ministry (Dutch: *departement*) (see table 2C, §8.1). This was not a clear answer to the question as only the total additional costs were indicated and the *Bos- and Van Geel gelden*, no clear specification (Tweede Kamer, 2007f).

A committee meeting (AO) took place on 17 December 2007 by the committees of Foreign Affairs and Defence with the three Ministers concerned. SGP (Mr. Van der Staaij), CU (Mr. Voordewind), VVD (Mr. Van Baalen), CDA (Ms. Van Gennip), and PvdA (Mr. Van Dam) were positive towards an extension of the mission. They were concerned about the capacity of the military force and wanted a clarification of the finances. For CU and PvdA aftercare was also an important subject and they supported more burden sharing, the PvdA specifically did this by welcoming the contribution of the other five<sup>64</sup> countries. GL (Ms. Peters) criticized the PvdA as their decision was already clear and that their questions were redundant. SP (Mr. Van Bommel) certainly did not support the extension, but also worried about the capacity of the forces due to the cuts in operational costs. VVD (Mr. Van Baalen) made clear that overspending and the crashed helicopters e.g. should be financed from HGIS or public funds. He also said that the operational capacity of training the military should not suffer from the expenses made for the mission. Extra money should be made available by the Minister of Finance, the military should not cannibalise itself. CU, CDA, PvdA, VVD submitted a motion (31200-X, nr. 68, 27 Nov. 2007) which indicated that continuation of the mission should not be at the cost of the budget of the MoD. PVV (Mr. Wilders) concluded a lack of solidarity by NATO, now they had not found succession<sup>65</sup>. PVV was still hesitant to support the extension, at least they wanted the Dutch role to be more proportional in comparison with other countries with an average of 300 soldiers. Also D66 (Mr. Pechtold) mentioned the lack of burden sharing by other NATO-countries. D66 questioned the capacity (affected by reorganizations) of the military forces, he wanted to know what the military vision was behind the enlargement of the PRT. The SGP and D66 acknowledged that if the Netherlands would leave Uruzgan that it would be a form of destruction of capital (Tweede Kamer, 2008a).

The Minister Van Middelkoop indicated that after the extension 17.000 Dutch soldiers would have served in Uruzgan. The continuation of the mission would be possible with a smaller Dutch force thanks to contribution of partner countries. Concerning materiel, the *Bos-gelden* had added an extra € 100 million to the Defence budget. For two years the total additional costs would be € 540 million to be paid from the HGIS fund. In case of the necessity of extra finances, the Minister of Finance would be asked to make more money available. As of 2009 already a structural € 25 million had been made available to the budget of Defence to maintain the operable capability. The Minister of Defence was convinced that the Dutch military would be capable and the mission fully financed. For the aftercare of soldiers there was a good programme and enough money available. Interesting is that Minister Van Middelkoop stated that it was the first time in history of the expeditionary force that the operable capability is recognized as a financial problem during the consideration of an

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<sup>64</sup> France, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Georgia (Tweede Kamer, 2008a).

<sup>65</sup> Former minister of Defence Kamp claimed he had a confirmation letter of NATO that they would take care of succession of the Netherlands in 2008. This letter was not released. SG NATO De Hoop Scheffer stated that NATO had never looked for succession in a closed meeting on 10 Dec. 2007 (Tweede Kamer, 2008a).

extension of a mission. He explained this phenomenon from the nature and size of the mission. Attention had been paid to the operable capability in the article 100 letter. The Minister even stated that the capacity of the military in 2010 would be at the same level of 2006 (Tweede Kamer, 2008a).

On the 18th of December 2007 a plenary sitting took place to vote in parliament. SP, GL, PVV, D66 and *Partij voor de Dieren* (PvdD<sup>66</sup>), did not support the extension, but a majority did: VVD, PvdA, CDA and SGP, the mission would continue until 2010. The SGP was assured that the military forces would not be cannibalised. D66 would not support the extension, due to the lack of trust in the outcome of the mission, not a grocery list with some extra finances and another partner country could convince them. D66 indicated a lack of military presence: the ink spot could not be extended (see map 1, §8.3). These problems could not be solved with a solid budget for the mission only.

Minister of Defence Van Middelkoop (CU) was pleased that parliament almost unanimously agreed with him that the operable capacity of the military should not be impaired by the extension. Also worries about the aftercare (PvdA) of the soldiers were appreciated but unnecessary as there was enough budget. The mission would be financed solidly and completely. On 20 December a motion<sup>67</sup> of SP that supposed the end of the mission per 1 August 2008 was denied, this was a reaffirmation for the government that the extension was definite (Tweede Kamer, 2007e; Ministerie van Defensie, 2007k; Tweede Kamer, 2008b).

### Analysis

1. *Political parties that had been in support of the mission from the start offered the least resistance to the estimation of the costs of the military mission.*

The VVD and SGP supported the extension and wanted additional money for the Dutch military. Ms. Eijsink of the PvdA, the party which was also in favour of the extension, was the first Member of Parliament to ask for a cost specification. For the PvdA aftercare was a prominent subject. The CDA realised extra money for the budget of the MoD for two years: the so-called *Van Geel-gelden*. Later on the PvdA by the *Bos-gelden* realised an additional € 100 million. The SGP wanted to see a structural solution. Eventually the CU had submitted a motion (in a general sense) in which it requests government to find a way to finance the worn out materiel of the military. Until it had the support of the CDA and PvdA it had to be changed three times. The Minister of Defence (CU) even had dissuaded the motion. The SGP, CU, VVD, CDA and PvdA were positive about an extension although some doubts had to be taken away. The PvdA had concerns about aftercare, the capacity of the military force and the finances of the mission. CU was also concerned about aftercare. CU, PvdA and D66 were proponents of more burden sharing.

Only VVD and PVV talked about alternative financing, the VVD thought that HGIS or public funds should finance more of the military expenses. The PVV thought that the development budget could be used for financing the military mission. They wanted a more proportional, thus smaller role for the Netherlands in Afghanistan.

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<sup>66</sup> PvdD (translated: Party for the Animals) was founded in 2002 and is focused on the well-being of animals, at the time had two seats in parliament ([www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com))

<sup>67</sup> Motion 27925, no. 282, it was supported by PvdD, PVV, D66 and GL and MP Verdonk (Tweede Kamer, 2008b).

CU, CDA, PvdA, VVD together submitted a motion which stated that the continuation of the mission should not take place at the cost of the Defence budget.

D66 as an opponent of the mission determined a lack of burden sharing. However D66 stated (together with SGP) that leaving Afghanistan would mean a destruction of capital. GL thought that the format of the mission to them had become about fighting and therefore resulted in concerns about materiel and money. They did however further not make a point about the costs. D66 made a similar point about material and money by mentioning the metaphor of a grocery list. The end justifies the means, but for the opponents of the mission this was not true.

Eventually SP, GL, PVV, D66 and PvdD did not support the extension, the majority did: VVD, PvdA, CDA and the SGP. As an explanation for their position D66 indicated that “a grocery list” would not solve the main problem of the mission that the goals and the means did not match.

This hypothesis has been proven to be partly false, especially PvdA proved to be critical on the costs. They had a focus on aftercare and were the first political party to request a cost specification. Other parties that were pro from the beginning were also partly critical when it came to the capacity of the military force. The military forces should not be “cannibalised”, the CU, SGP and VVD were most adamant about that.

Interesting was that the SP (as an opponent) in the period for the first time also expressed concerns about the capacity of the military. GL did not indicate any concerns about the cost aspect of the military mission.

2. *Parliament was able to monitor the costs well; the members of parliament were eager to get transparent data of the government on the (total<sup>68</sup>) costs of the mission.*

In the article 100 letter the government indicated that predictability and manageability of the costs of the military mission were important. Procedures and methods were improved. This indicates a lesson learned by government, it was a matter that deserved more attention and improvement (more transparency).

Parliament was able to monitor the costs, but they did not take the opportunity or did not demand more clarity from the government. However parliament seemed to have more interest in the cost aspect of the mission. 577 written questions were submitted. In comparison to the start of the mission (190 questions of which a few were about common funding) now there were more questions (125) directly concerning the financial aspect of the mission. The aforementioned five highlighted questions in particular indicated a greater attention for the cost aspect. The questions covered aspects like the calculation of unforeseen costs, the predictability and controllability of the costs and where extra money would come from. It reflected an urge of parliament to monitor the costs better. Also the remark by Minister Van Middelkoop that the operable capability was recognized as a financial problem underlines the latter.

In the updates that the government gave numbers were given of extra Bushmasters, of extra personnel. Sometimes figures were mentioned and it was clarified from which budget it was paid from, but quite often it was not clear. For example a vague statement of government

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<sup>68</sup> See note 23.

that indicated that the MoD would also take measures to assure its ability to continue the mission should not be satisfying for parliament. However the Minister of Defence kept on promising that the capacity of the military would not diminish, there would be enough money or at least made available. Although it was made clear that the extension would take a heavy toll on the military, the concerns of parliament stayed.

As mentioned above only the PvdA directly asked government for a specification and parliament did receive an overview (table 2A, § 8.1). For the extension the government was able, due to experience, to indicate a more accurate figure.

So this hypothesis is partly supported, parliament was able to monitor the costs of the military mission, however was perhaps satisfied too soon with the reassurance by government that costs would be covered. Parliament did express concerns, but did not make a big issue about the costs. The importance of the total costs is expressed by parliament by concerns about aftercare and the capacity of the military. The latter indicating a concern about the long term effect of a military mission. Especially the PvdA kept on making a case for the importance of aftercare. Parties like the VVD, SGP, CU, CDA, and PvdA were all concerned about the military capacity. The Defence budget had to be topped up several times and it had to reorganise its budget to be able to continue the mission see table 2B (§ 8.1).

The government could have been more transparent: in their updates figures were mentioned, but not always complete (in the sense of covering the total costs) excluding aftercare. The way the government presented the information in the cost specification did give an insight in the costs. However it indicated the additional costs (for HGIS) not the costs for the Defence budget and excluding the redeployment costs.

3. *Entrapment did occur due to the costly military involvement in Uruzgan. Another two years were necessary for the effectiveness of the mission, to complete the military work.*

The fact that government itself indicated as one of the reasons for continuation that it would be destruction of capital if the Netherlands would leave Uruzgan partly affirms the hypothesis. Even SGP (proponent) did mention it and even D66 as an opponent of the mission thought so.

The main reason for the extension was of course the fact that NATO did not find a country that was prepared to take over the leading role of the Netherlands. The military mission thus far had been a heavy burden for the military forces, from the beginning capacity problems came up in parliament or in the media. The Minister of Defence himself even admitted the capacity problems, however these could be solved by extra money that seemed always to be made available. In the sense that entrapment occurred and that the government was downplaying the signals (doubts about capability of the Dutch forces) is also partly true. The capacity problems were clear, these were not denied but constantly resolved. Truth was that there was no chance of pulling out of the mission without suffering harm to the Dutch reputation and that of NATO. The general sense is that with regard to the military side of the mission the positive signals were not overemphasized. The concerns expressed by parliament about the capacity of the military forces were taken seriously even the Minister of Defence admitted his own concerns. The realistic modest goals of the mission, as set out in the article 100 letter, would not create false expectations. The general idea in parliament (with pro- and

opponents) seemed to be that the Netherlands were doing a good job there, they had appreciation for what the soldiers did. The discussion was more about the format (fighting and rebuilding) of the mission, the burden (capacity of personnel and materiel) for the military. With the latter the proportion of the part that the Netherlands played in Afghanistan compared to other NATO-countries is implied as well. The PVV specifically referred to the latter and did not support the extension. Burden sharing was mentioned by a few political parties (D66, CU and PvdA). The mission was hard up to then 12 soldiers had lost their lives, the future of the military forces was important for most political parties as well as the aftercare of the soldiers. All in all the parliament was convinced that the Netherlands could continue another two years in Uruzgan, partly to do with the investments done so far. The latter of which the costs for the military mission (no direct visible results) formed a subordinate role in comparison to the development costs (for the visible/lasting results), the overall motive to continue was reputation.

The majority of parliament supported the extension, but the main reason was not because the costs of the military mission had to be worthwhile. The costs to maintain the military capacity were a great concern, as a lead nation in the circumstances of Uruzgan it depended on a good military representation. The mission as a whole, including development cooperation had to succeed, in that sense entrapment occurred. If anything at all the costs for the military mission had formed an obstacle for the extension. It was overcome by adding money, a self-sustaining cycle. As mentioned before the end (completing a four year mission with some lasting modest results in Uruzgan) justified the means. So this hypothesis is partly supported, as the costly military involvement had to be continued to be able to extend the mission. Withdrawal was not an option.

#### **4.3 The end (14 April 2009 – 20 February 2010, Balkenende IV)**

This phase differs from the first and second. This was a phase where actually no decision was taken by government, but an earlier decision about the end of the mission in 2010 was reaffirmed. A discussion of ten months was unleashed (since 14 April 2009) because some MPs (especially Pechtold, D66, also Van Bommel, SP) were uncertain if the government would keep its promise to not extend the mission again. It ended with the fall of cabinet on 20<sup>th</sup> of February 2010.

Already on 28 March 2009 SG of NATO De Hoop Scheffer said in an interview in a newspaper that he hoped a contribution in another form would be possible. The article also stated that the cabinet had left the option open to remain military involved in Afghanistan in some form (Eijvoogel & Koning, 2009).

A meeting of the committees (AO) of Foreign Affairs and Defence took place on 14 April 2009 with the three Ministers. Mr. Pechtold (D66) wanted to know when it would become clear that the Netherlands would leave Uruzgan and who would be the next leading nation, PvdA (Ms. Eijnsink) wanted to know too. For the CDA (Mr. Haverkamp) it was clear that the mission would end in 2010. GL (Ms. Peters), SP (Mr. Van Bommel) and PvdA (Ms. Eijnsink) wanted clarification about the number of soldiers, then up to 2000 while originally estimated to be 1650. For the PvdA the mission should

end in August 2010. Mr. Boekestijn (VVD) praised the government that no costs were spared on the safety of the Dutch soldiers and to let them stay in armoured residences (Kamp Holland was attacked with missiles 6 April 2009). Mr. Voordewind (CU) wanted to know if the Netherlands were pressured during the Afghanistan conference<sup>69</sup> in The Hague to stay in Uruzgan. Minister Verhagen answered that the Netherlands were not requested nor pressured for another extension. The Minister of Defence answered that the number of soldiers was around 1850 (1400 in Uruzgan, 350 in Kandahar, 100 in Kabul), 300 more than initially envisioned and would be temporarily up to 2000 around the summer. A new article 100 letter (as requested by SP and D66) for the 76 extra commando's and marines was not necessary as the mandate nor the rules of engagement had changed. D66, PvdA and GL all wanted further explanation about the number of soldiers in the form of a letter (Tweede Kamer, 2009a).

The Minister of Defence Van Middelkoop gave, as a follow up to the last committee meeting (14 April), an update about the number of soldiers in Uruzgan as well as an update of the costs of the mission. In May 2009 1950 soldiers would be active for ISAF, due to a contribution to ISAF HQ this number would reach 2000 at the end of the summer (August-October 2009). At the beginning of 2010 the number would drop back to 1850 soldiers and this number probably would be maintained until redeployment. Table 2D (see §8.1) shows the extra expenditures of the budget of the mission from 2008-2010. The numbers are not specified very well, like the amounts with a minus (Ministerie van Defensie, 2009a).

MPs Poppe and Van Bommel (both SP<sup>70</sup>) submitted questions in writing about the costs of the mission to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Reason for these questions was an article by Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten<sup>71</sup> (2009) in the yearbook 2009 of the Willem Drees<sup>72</sup> foundation. The authors of the article claimed that the additional costs from 2002-2011 are more likely to be € 2 billion (around € 700 million more) and that in order to calculate the real total costs (€ 1.4 billion according to the authors of the article) this amount should be added times 2,5 meaning € 3,5 billion. Van Middelkoop answered on 29 May that the amounts that he communicated were correct. The last figures dated from 13 March indicating a total of € 1.311 billion additional costs (directly related to the execution of peacekeeping operations) and would be financed by HGIS. The Minister would not change his way of reporting the finances of the mission to parliament, the changed circumstances had resulted in a few amendments of the budget (Tweede Kamer, 2009b; Klep, 2011, p. 223).

The 15<sup>th</sup> of June 2009 the Minister of Defence reacted by letter to the request of the committee for Defence for his response with reference to the article by Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten. Minister Van Middelkoop stated that the costs were made clear by making an divide: the additional costs (reimbursements, nutrition, transport, expenses directly related to the mission) of the mission would be paid from the HGIS budget, other costs (regular management, maintaining and preparing the forces, costs that are permanent) would be paid by the Defence budget. The Minister stated that the

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<sup>69</sup> 31 March 2009 (NRC Handelsblad, 2009a)

<sup>70</sup> Earlier, on the 28th of November 2008 two MPs of the SP (Poppe and Van Velzen) submitted a motion, during the treatment of the budget for the MoD, in which they requested that the Court of Audits (*Algemene Rekenkamer*) should investigate the total costs of the mission in Uruzgan. The motion was rejected on 2 December, however it was supported by the SP, GL, PvdD and PVV (Tweede Kamer, 2008e; Tweede Kamer, 2008f).

<sup>71</sup> This article was also used in this research to calculate an estimation of the total costs of the mission (see chapter 5).

<sup>72</sup> Important Dutch statesman (-1971 PvdA) 1886-1988, see <http://www.parlement.com/>

Defence budget had been compensated such as in the case of the acquirement of Bushmasters and also by the *Van Geel-* and the *Bos-gelden*. Parliament was constantly informed about the finances in the regular updates. Minister Van Middelkoop underwrote the conclusion of the article that the economic understanding of the costs is important in the decision to undertake a mission, but that the total costs are not important in that decision as the large part of the costs (personnel, materiel) would be made anyway apart from any military operation (Ministerie van Defensie, 2009c).

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of June the State Secretary of Defence De Vries informed parliament by letter that 14 more Bushmasters were needed, € 14,2 million would be paid from the Defence budget and € 3,4 million (transport, maintenance) by HGIS. An option for another eight Bushmasters was taken (Ministerie van Defensie, 2009d). The committee for Defence had reacted to the letter of the State Secretary De Vries (CDA) with additional written questions about the acquirement of extra Bushmasters which the State Secretary answered on 30 June. He defended the quick acquirement of the Bushmasters without consulting parliament because of the urgency. The budget of Defence would be compensated when needed with replacement investments. In total 71 Bushmasters and one vehicle for education had been acquired, four of them were lost and thirteen damaged (of which six could be repaired) (Tweede Kamer, 2009c).

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 2009 a meeting took place with the committees. VVD (Mr. Boekstijn) and PVV (Mr. Brinkman) asked the Minister of Defence if there were enough Bushmasters. The SP (Mr. Van Bommel) thought that the reaction of government with regard to the article by Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009) was not sufficient, the total costs were still unclear. SP requested the Minister of Defence to provide an overview of the total costs including the aftercare of soldiers. PvdA (Ms. Eijssink) again expressed concerns about the budget for aftercare (784 claims known) and its open-endedness<sup>73</sup> and wanted a specification of the costs and what it covered. In this respect she also referred to the article of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009), for the definition they used for aftercare. Mr. Pechtold (D66) asked what the plans were after 2010, as Australia could not take on the role of leading nation. Also he indicated that the government was late with informing parliament about the extra acquirement of Bushmasters, there seemed no urgency to inform parliament. He also doubted the use of Bushmasters after the end of the mission. The PVV was against the leading role of the Netherlands in Uruzgan and wanted to know if the successor was already known. Minister Verhagen (CDA) stated that it was clear that the Netherlands would end its leading role in August 2010, the government had not received another request with respect to Afghanistan, and NATO would take care of succession. Minister Van Middelkoop answered Ms. Eijssink (PvdA, mentioned 80 wounded so far) that the open-endedness of the budget for aftercare of veterans would not be changed. The decision about vehicles was up to the commander in Uruzgan. Van Middelkoop admitted that the parliament was informed too late about the acquirement of another fourteen Bushmasters. He also said that the government had been transparent about the costs and they were specified (Tweede Kamer, 2009d).

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2009 the State Secretary De Vries informed parliament that another 14 Bushmasters and extra spare parts were needed, it would cost the Defence budget € 10,9 million. Transport, maintenance and repair would cost € 1,4 million and would be paid from HGIS. In total 62 Bushmasters and a vehicle for practice had been acquired, in total € 62,5 million for the Defence

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<sup>73</sup> One time a figure of € 53 million was once mentioned in December 2008 (Tweede Kamer, 2009d)

budget and € 8,7 for HGIS (Tweede Kamer, 2009e). The now extra 14 Bushmasters would make the total of 76 Bushmasters. The other nine special Bushmasters with detector-arms for IEDs (which would make the total 85) were not counted in, they were part of the counter IED plan presented on late 13 March (27925 nr. 330).

The three Ministers gave parliament an interim evaluation on 11 September 2009 of the Dutch contribution to ISAF of 2008. This document is not available on the internet (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2009c). The committees of Foreign Affairs and Defence had some written questions about the interim update, the three Ministers answered by letter on 28 October 2009. There were sixteen wounded soldiers in 2008 of which nine would have permanent injury. About the air transport capacity it was said that an extra plane (KDC-10) would be bought as well as two extra C-130s, also 500 flight hours were available of the SAC C-17<sup>74</sup> project. There was still a lack of strategic air transport which might be hired through civilian capacity. No costs were mentioned (Tweede Kamer, 2009i).

On 30 September 2009 during an emergency debate about the future Dutch engagement in Afghanistan took place. The direct cause for the debate were the mixed statements of the involved Ministers in the media. It started by Minister Verhagen (CDA), he stated that the Netherlands could not leave yet, vice-president Bos (PvdA) said August 2010 would be the end of the mission, and Minister Van Middelkoop (CU) first was pertinent about leaving now saw possibility to stay, so did Minister Koenders (Development Cooperation, PvdA). The Minister-President was being criticized (e.g. by GL, VVD, D66, SGP) for his lack of leadership to keep unity. Motion no. 360 (accepted, except by PvdA) by SGP with support from D66, VVD and *Trots op Nederland* (ToN) requested clarity from the government before 1 March 2010 about the Dutch involvement in Afghanistan after 2010. The PvdA with CU had put forward a motion (no. 361, accepted except by CDA, SGP) in which they urged the government to uphold its promise to leave Uruzgan as of 1 August 2010. Minister-President Balkenende reaffirmed that the Netherlands would leave Uruzgan, the mission would end on 1 August 2010. No request from NATO was received for an extension. Mid-November the plans of redeployment would be communicated to parliament (Tweede Kamer, 2009f; Tweede Kamer, 2009g).

12 November 2009 a meeting (AO) took place with the two committees and the three Ministers. So far 21 Dutch soldiers had lost their lives. Minister Van Middelkoop stated that the Dutch military forces were not cannibalised, the ambition level could be maintained. MPs Haverkamp (CDA), Van Bommel (SP) and Ten Broeke (VVD) were unhappy with the statement that Minister Van Middelkoop gave in an interview<sup>75</sup> in which he stated that the average MP was not aware of what the Netherlands did in Afghanistan (Tweede Kamer, 2009h).

Minister Van Middelkoop talked during a committee meeting (AO) of 9 December about the lessons learned of 2008 and mentioned that almost 20.000 Dutch soldiers had served in Afghanistan so far. He also said that the mission was a heavy burden for the Dutch military, but had not affected the military nor its ambition in an inescapable way (Tweede Kamer, 2009j).

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<sup>74</sup> Strategic Airlift Capacity a project by NATO, a pool of 3 C-17s, C-17 is a type of aircraft used for transport. [http://www.defensie.nl/luchtmacht/internationale\\_samenwerking/strategic\\_airlift\\_capability/](http://www.defensie.nl/luchtmacht/internationale_samenwerking/strategic_airlift_capability/)

<sup>75</sup> Newspaper *Reformatorisch Dagblad*

26 January 2010 a meeting (AO) took place with the two committees of Foreign Affairs and Defence with the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation. The VVD (Mr. Nicolai), PVV (Mr. Brinkman), GL (Ms. Peters) and D66 (Mr. Pechtold) wanted to know when parliament would be informed about the Dutch presence after August 2010, no answer was given (Tweede Kamer, 2010a).

The 9<sup>th</sup> of February 2010 the government sent a notification to parliament in which they stated that the Netherlands would end its mission in Uruzgan on 1 August 2010. However Minister-President Balkenende received from the SG NATO Rasmussen a formal request on the 4<sup>th</sup> of February (asked for by Verhagen on 3 February) to stay in Afghanistan and to contribute to ISAF in a smaller and shorter form between 1 August 2010 and 1 August 2011: training of Afghan security forces and transition of responsibilities to the Afghan authorities. The government indicated that they would research the possibilities according to the FoR. On the 18<sup>th</sup> of February 2010 an emergency debate (proposed by SP) took place about the political situation concerning the decision-making about Uruzgan. The direct motivation was again the different views that were given in the media by persons of cabinet. Vice-president and also Minister of Finance Mr. Bos (PvdA) claimed on the 11<sup>th</sup> of February in a TV-programme *Pauw & Witteman* that he did not know that there was a request from NATO to further contribute to Afghanistan. Minister Verhagen (CDA) stated that he was informed. Especially minister-president Balkenende and vice- premier Bos (PvdA) were criticized by all parties, clarity was requested. Especially vice- premier Bos (PvdA) was blamed by GL and SP for opportunism<sup>76</sup> and ambiguity, because in his role in the cabinet he left all options open. It was a vigorous debate, where Mr. Van der Vlies<sup>77</sup> (SGP) as the veteran of parliament and chairperson of parliament Ms. Verbeet were troubled by the way the members of parliament spoke and sometimes did not follow the rules of procedure. On 20 February 2010 cabinet Balkenende IV fell, because of the disagreement about the possible extension in another form in Uruzgan. The PvdA pulled out of the cabinet which meant the end of Balkenende IV, the cabinet had a departing status (Tweede Kamer, 2010d; Tweede Kamer, 2010e; Tweede Kamer, 2010c; Tweede Kamer, 2010b).

### Analysis

1. *The costs were a crucial point for parliament to end (to not further support) the mission in 2010. The Dutch military capacity was too much impaired by the four year mission to continue any mission in Uruzgan.*

In this last crucial phase it became clear that most political parties wanted clarity about the mission, if it would definitely end or would be continued in a different form. For some parties it was very clear that the mission should end in 2010: for the CDA, PvdA and CU. The VVD, ToN, D66, PVV and GL kept on demanding clarity from government, the three latter parties opposed to the extension. It seemed like that the parties (especially the opponents of the mission, SP and D66) were searching for a definitive breakthrough to end the mission, therefore more attention was paid by parliament to the numbers (and therefore the costs) of the mission. First there was a special interest that GL, SP and PvdA showed for the number of soldiers which is interesting. Eventually D66, PvdA and GL requested the Minister of Defence a further specification. Especially

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<sup>76</sup> In the run up to the campaign of local elections of 3 March 2010 Bos (PvdA) held strongly the position that the mission should not be extended as it was a compromise at the cabinet formation in 2007 to allow a first extension, but no further: a promise to the PvdA supporters <http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/Politiek/258447/Bos-wil-deze-week-Uruzganbesluit-Verhagen-sceptisch.htm>

<sup>77</sup> He was in parliament for 29 years (1981-2010), unique in present time in the Netherlands. (<http://www.parlement.com/>)

interesting in this last crucial phase was the interest that the SP<sup>78</sup> showed for the total costs of the military mission with reference to the article by Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009). After the Minister of Defence had given an overview of the costs in a table the SP requested twice clarity about the total costs (including aftercare) of the mission with reference to the aforementioned article. Also the PvdA with concerns about the open ended (thus unknown) budget of aftercare referred to that article, thus indicating the worry about the nontransparent costs. D66 was irritated that the Minister of Defence had informed parliament too late about the quick acquirement of 14 Bushmasters and wondered about their use after the end of the mission. The latter could be interpreted as such that the D66 thought that the acquirement of these extra Bushmasters was wasted money, unless there was a plan for their further use or resale. Not much later (about two months) another 14 were acquired.

In sum a few parties (especially opponents of the mission and also the PvdA which was a previous proponent) showed more attention for numbers (implying costs) of the mission. It was the SP which had an eye for the article of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten and therefore the total costs of the mission. Previously the SP had showed some interest for the costs of the military mission. It is to my opinion very striking that the other parties did not also make a bigger point of the total costs as the article could have stirred more up discussion in parliament. Only the PvdA mentioned the article in relation to aftercare.

The costs were one of the crucial factors for the definite end of the mission in Uruzgan. This hypothesis is therefore partly supported. The costs of the military mission formed a small part of the total build up resistance of a mission which was initially planned to last two years. A climate had grown which made clear that enough was enough. The political tensions in the cabinet played also a crucial factor, besides the fact that the mission in the same size and format would not have been possible to continue: political support and will in parliament were gone as well as in the government. Besides the financial aspect (affected capacity of military forces, economic crisis) the emotional (public opinion, lost lives of soldiers) and political (national prestige, power politics: tension CDA-PvdA) factors were decisive for the disunity in the government and therefore the end of the military mission.

2. *Parliament was able to monitor the costs well: the members of parliament were eager to get transparent data of the government on the (total<sup>79</sup>) costs of the end of the mission, the redeployment.*

Parliament was able to monitor the costs well, but not all political parties made a lot of effort to ensure that they got the data they needed. The Minister of Defence gave on his own initiative an overview of the costs, but not at the request of parliament. This table was nontransparent, the categories were not specified and figures not explained, but it did not spark a discussion in parliament. The article of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten did, the SP was the party who discussed the matter of total costs most prominently and clearly in this last crucial phase of the military mission. The SP had sent written questions with reference to the article. However the Minister of

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<sup>78</sup> On 26/10/2006, MP Van Bommel (SP) already asked if there was a limit to the costs (Tweede Kamer, 2006e).

<sup>79</sup> (Total) is placed between brackets to indicate the difference between the initial observation to see if the parliament did discuss the costs of the military mission and the further observation to see if they also had attention for the long-term costs: more specifically the total costs of the military mission according to the concept of economic understanding.

Defence responded that he had informed parliament correctly and fully concerning the costs and that he would not change the reporting method. The committee for Defence of parliament also requested the Minister to respond to the article. The Minister again reacted in the same way he answered the written questions. This time he added that the economic understanding is important, but that it was important to understand that a large sum of the costs of the military mission would be made anyway, as regular costs to maintain the military forces. It was clear that Minister Van Middelkoop was not impressed by the article, by his remark on economic understanding and the role of total costs in the decision-making process for a military mission he created a paradox. As he did not report the total costs, it remained unclear, so he did not help to improve the notion of the economic understanding. The Minister was unwilling to change his way of reporting. As his reaction was a written statement no direct discussion took place. SP was still not satisfied with the reaction of the Minister to the article and demanded a complete overview of the total costs including aftercare. The PvdA was also interested in the latter and wanted to know how much would be spent on it. No other political party made a remark about the (total) costs. Only D66 was slightly irritated that the government had informed parliament so late about the acquirement of the Bushmasters.

Parliament could have monitored better as sometimes costs were not specified as in the interim update of 11 September 2009 where no figures were mentioned about the costs of extra air capacity. Only the SP (as an opponent of the whole mission) took up the leading role in this phase questioning the total costs. Also the PvdA was interested in the total costs by their focus on aftercare.

In contrast to the other parties (with the exception of the PVV) the VVD seemed like the only party who was concerned if enough money was spent on safety measures like the acquirement of Bushmasters. In other words it encouraged spending in that sense.

In this phase there was no transparency about the costs of the end of the mission, redeployment costs were also not made clear, no questions were asked by parliament about this. The redeployment costs were first estimated to be € 115 million<sup>80</sup> in November 2007 and June 2008. Eventually in November 2009 and April 2010 it was indicated that it would cost € 229 million. Only since April 2010 did the political parties (D66, PVV, SP, CU, CDA, VVD and PvdA) started to express concerns and/or asked questions about the redeployment costs. This indicates a relatively late interest of parliament for the redeployment costs.

The attempts of the SP (and the PvdA for a small part: on aftercare) to get clarification on the total costs failed. This phase was clearly marked by a political crisis, the focus became more about political issues instead of the mission itself at the end.

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<sup>80</sup> € 115 million was indicated (an estimation based on fifth/twelfth part of the yearly costs for the military mission) in the second article 100 letter of 30 November 2007 (27925 no. 279) (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2010).

Next two hypotheses with reference to the whole period of the mission<sup>81</sup> will be discussed, which will go into the importance of economic understanding, the visibility, predictability and entrapment of costs. The role of these factors will be analysed by looking at the process of monitoring by parliament and the Frame of Reference.

#### 4.4 Two hypotheses for the whole period of monitoring by parliament

The first hypothesis covers the visibility and predictability of the costs and the economic understanding.

*The Frame of Reference fails on the cost aspect in the sense that it lacks in the requirement of an interim reflection moment by the government to give parliament a clear overview of the total costs and impact of the mission.*

During the whole mission the involved Minister of Defence gave parliament regular updates in which sometimes numbers of personnel and materiel were indicated and the costs were mentioned and also clarifying by which budget it was paid (HGIS or Defence budget). It is quite hard to have a clear overview of the total costs of the mission when there is no regular overview in the form of a balance sheet where in several categories the costs are specified. The government provided the parliament only five times an overview of the costs (the first even on request of parliament), which did not always give a clear overview of what the costs entailed exactly. And it was focused mostly on the additional costs and not the total costs. The costs for the Defence budget were not made very clear, the additions to the budget were indicated, but it was not specified exactly how much was spent of the regular Defence budget in relation to the Uruzgan mission. Especially the figures for aftercare (what, how much and for how many) were impossible to determine. The minister of Defence promised more transparency about the aftercare budget, but eventually preferred to keep it open-ended. In sum the feedback of government to parliament on the total costs of the military mission could improve.

##### Recommendation

As a recommendation, in the FoR an additional request could be inserted concerning the financial aspect which requires the government to give parliament a full update of the total costs in one table which is understandable. This table can be presented in the article 100 letter as a first indication and thereafter updated regularly. It would help with the economic understanding and therefore would be a valuable addition when a military mission is considered. The information should be presented in a table according to the following format:

- Numbers: First an overview with numbers should be given, to give insight how many soldiers and materiel would be/have been involved (and affected). This gives insight in the scope of the mission.

Then for four categories the cost are indicated or estimated. Through footnotes further explanation can be given if necessary.

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<sup>81</sup> A comprehensive summary of the Dutch parliamentary documents (dossier 27925, 2006-2010) in English is on request available at the author of this thesis.

- Personnel:
  - All related costs to personnel: Training costs, wages, reimbursements, food, clothing etc.
  - Aftercare: an indication of the costs of treatments so far and an update on the budget of aftercare.
- Materiel: Indication of material that is used, indication of (future) acquirements (with explanation), transport costs of materiel, all repair and maintenance costs, spare parts, replacement costs and fuel.
- Burden sharing: indication of what is done in cooperation with NATO and/or partner countries.
- Redeployment costs, this can be indicated at first as a rough indication, but as the end of the mission comes closer it should be more accurate.

\*Footnote area: Separate from the table in footnotes, explanations and any possible (upcoming) problems should be indicated for each (sub)category, e.g. shortages for personnel.

An example of this kind of balance sheet can be found in § 8.1, table 2E.

Instead of making a constant divide between HGIS and the Defence budget, the costs should be reflected in this order in total. As a comment to the table sheet it can be indicated what part of the total costs is paid by HGIS and what part is paid by the Defence budget and what had to be additionally financed and how. This way of reporting would help parliament (and the public) to have a clear overview of the costs and it obligates the government to be transparent and to have a good financial accountability during a mission. When should government give this update? This depends on the period of the military mission, but it would be a good reference point to give an update each half year. As was indicated before a military mission is hard to budget because of the risks involved, but by giving a regular financial update an additional insight can be given on the development of the mission. The latter because this information combined with the experience from the field can help form an impression of the total military work that is done during a mission. As the economic understanding indicates it is important to realise the impact of a military mission on a TCN. If the latter is known it also easier to put the goal of the military mission in perspective, it is better to know what the costs of a military mission are in total than to undermine the importance of the costs. Once the total costs are publicly known, the government has to try harder to convince the public of the purpose of the mission, which would not be a bad trend. However interestingly in times of an economic crisis it is harder to convince a critical public than in prosperous times. Because when people are in a less fortunate position they tend to be less able to reason or to put other higher goals (e.g. international law, democratisation) in perspective<sup>82</sup>. The focus is then more on the national wellbeing, discontent may arise among the public when they see that a large amounts of money is spent on a military mission which is not in their direct best interest.

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<sup>82</sup> In a research performed by Clingendael among 1500 persons entitled to vote, most (more than half) wanted to cut back more on Defence, other subjects that were mentioned by most (more than half) were development cooperation and the EU. The VVD and CDA voters were against further cutbacks, the left parties (PvdA, SP, and GL) were pro. (Koele, 21 August 2012)

That lessons were learned is proved by some changes that have recently been made in HGIS for the financing of military missions initiated by two motions<sup>83</sup> of parliament, meant to prevent that MoD is cannibalising itself. As of 2013 some measures will be taken to make it possible for the MoD to claim more costs (linked to a military mission) as additional from HGIS. For example as of 2013 it is possible to claim from HGIS the costs for specific preparation, special materiel and as of 2014 aftercare (by determining a tariff per soldier) for a military mission (Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, 2012). Another change in financing a military mission will be realised as of 2014 by the coalition agreement of the cabinet Rutte-Asscher. As of 2014 a new budget 'International Security' will be managed by the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (MFA). It will be financed by a reduction of the HGIS budget (article 20) of the MoD of € 250 million each year as of 2014 (PvdA en VVD, 2012). This means that the MoD and MFA will have to cooperate more closely, what this means for the process of monitoring and the effectiveness of financing of military missions remains to be seen<sup>84</sup>.

The second hypothesis covers the entrapment (downplaying negative signals, emphasizing positive signals), the predictability and visibility of the costs.

*The government kept the costs of the military mission intentionally low or vague because they were deemed of less importance. The general level of success (i.e. safety of soldiers and stability) of the mission was of paramount importance.*

The sense that prevails after reading four years of parliamentary documents about the military mission in Uruzgan is that money was a concern for parliament relatively speaking, but not the main one: the success (result) of the mission was. The cost aspect sometimes came up (e.g. capacity of the military: materiel), but it never formed a great obstacle for the continuation of the mission or direct reason for upheaval. The Ministers of Defence constantly reassured any concerns about the capacity of the military forces and the costs of the mission by referring to the HGIS budget or by the fact that the government just added money to the HGIS and Defence budget. This sense of easiness (expressed by MPs as "blank cheque" or "grocery list") of spending by the government could be halted when the government has to provide a regular clear overview in the form of table 2E (§8.1). Parliament would be better able to monitor the costs and it would be easier for them to follow the trend of the total costs.

The idea that the government tried to lead the attention away of the costs of the military mission is partly supported because of the lack of clear overviews they gave of the total costs of the mission. The fact that the Ministers of Defence (first Kamp, later Van Middelkoop) themselves brought up the issue of capacity problems (negative signals) in the media followed by reassurances (downplaying) given to parliament indicates a conflict of interest. The latter can be explained by the fact that a Minister has to follow the unity of policy, as this guarantees the stability of government. On the other hand a Minister wants to defend his own ministry (maintain the support of his civil servants

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<sup>83</sup> Motion by Knops (CDA)/Ten Broeke (VVD) (parliamentary document 32 733 no. 12, 6 June 2011) and a motion by Aasted-Madsen-van Stiphout (CDA)/Ten Broeke (VVD) (parliamentary document 30139, no. 69, 18 February 2010 ) (Tweede Kamer, 2011a)

<sup>84</sup> The Netherlands Court of Audit will do research on this matter.

[http://www.rekenkamer.nl/Nieuws/Nieuwsberichten/2012/11/Onderzoek\\_naar\\_de\\_budgettaire\\_gevolgen\\_van\\_de\\_nieuwe\\_beleidsvoornemens\\_voor\\_ontwikkelingssamenwerking](http://www.rekenkamer.nl/Nieuws/Nieuwsberichten/2012/11/Onderzoek_naar_de_budgettaire_gevolgen_van_de_nieuwe_beleidsvoornemens_voor_ontwikkelingssamenwerking)

and military personnel), which in the case of the MoD had faced a lot challenges (budget cuts) since the end of the cold war. This conflict of interest refers to the entrapment (covering up negative signals) that happened, however not related to the costs of the military mission at the beginning as nothing was spent yet. The chairman of D66, Dittrich, literally indicated in the important debate (2 Feb. 2006) where the decision was made for the start of the mission that "the train was already riding"<sup>85</sup>, meaning that the decision would be obviously positive, there was no way back. The latter, because the decision period of the government took so long that the expectations of the NATO-countries were so high (especially the UK) that the Netherlands could not have said no. According to Dittrich both Minister Kamp (VVD) and Minister Bot (CDA) had earlier indicated certain objections concerning the mission in interviews, the PvdA also had a few objections. Now these objections seemed to have gone overboard. There was a concern about the attainability of the mission and the emphasis should be on rebuilding and not fighting and the distinction between ISAF and OEF was important (Tweede Kamer, 2006c; Trouw, 2006).

Once the mission started the concerns about the military capacity, as was indicated by the hypothesis concerning entrapment for phase two, kept coming up during the whole mission. The government was entrapped from the beginning by the fact of their commitment to the NATO mission. And when the mission was started the financial aspect of the military mission started to form an obstacle instead of a factor for entrapment, see the explanation in §4.2 hypothesis 3.

A short overview of the contradictions of what the government said and what went on concerning capacity problems from the beginning of the mission until the end of the mission will be given:

#### *Minister Kamp*

On 2 February 2006 Minister of Defence Kamp indicated that the Uruzgan mission fitted within the ambition level of the Dutch military. He admitted that the budget of the MoD did not offer the necessary space to be able to quickly replace lost materiel for the coming two years. He would try to find a structural solution with the Minister of Finance (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, pp. 183,184; Tweede Kamer, 2006b). Minister Kamp had indicated on 23 August 2006 that the military budget could not be further cut back if the government wanted to maintain the same ambition level (Tweede Kamer, 2006d). On 31 January 2007 Minister Kamp indicated that there were no problems in response to a concern expressed in a newspaper<sup>86</sup> that Defence had financial problems due to the Uruzgan mission (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007a).

#### *Minister Van Middelkoop*

On 16 April 2007 Minister Van Middelkoop responded to questions of the standing committee for Defence, in response to earlier answers of his predecessor Kamp of late 31 January, about problems with the budget of the MoD. On 2 June 2006 the *Prinsjesdagbrief 2003*<sup>87</sup> was updated called 'New balance, new developments' (*Nieuw balans, nieuw evenwicht*). Minister Van Middelkoop stated that these measures (rearrangement of budget) were not directly related to

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<sup>85</sup> In reference to the entrapment theory an expression is translated from Dutch of a "passed station" (a train has already left the station). It indicates that once a train is set in motion and has passed a station it cannot go back.

<sup>86</sup> Newspaper *Telegraaf*, article was published on 11 January 2007 (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007a)

<sup>87</sup> Translated: Prince's day letter, which is an explanatory memorandum of the Defence budget for 2004, it explained the military vision (five policy priorities) as Defence was faced with budget cuts (Moelker, Noll, & de Weger, 2009, p. 133; Ministerie van Defensie, 2003).

the finances of the mission in Uruzgan (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007b). On 19 April 2007 there were several media (amongst others *Elsevier*, weekly magazine) that indicated that personnel was demoralized and materiel worn out. Newspaper *Telegraaf* had published secret documents (risk-analysis) of Defence which sketched the problems of a possible extension in Uruzgan (Benneker, 2007; Nu.nl, 2007a). On 20 April Minister Van Middelkoop reacted that this secret document was not an indication that the mission would be extended and said there were no unsolvable problems with materiel or personnel (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007c). On 25 April Van Middelkoop stated that there should be no surprise<sup>88</sup> (as it was a large mission) about the problems of materiel, these have been reported to parliament and had been solved. And it was repeated by Minister Van Middelkoop that the leaked inventory list connected to a future possible extension and was not related to the current mission (Tweede Kamer, 2007a). More dissatisfaction was heard in the media on 25 May 2007 (newspaper *NRC Handelsblad*) that the mission would cost € 800.000 per day, and that the costs had doubled since the beginning. MP Van Gennip (CDA), said that the extra costs would not be a reason to pull out of the mission. MP Boekstijn (VVD) indicated that it could be expected that the costs would be higher and even thought that total costs of € 700 million would be more realistic (Schaaf, 2007). And also on 6 June 2007 an article of the newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* had the title (freely translated) "Armed forces cannibalizes itself", it basically stated that in order to be able to afford the mission the armed forces had to cut back more. The latter was concluded after a secret note got out revealing cuts in military materiel (Leopard tanks and *pantserhouwitsers*<sup>89</sup>). The ambition level would be in danger (Klep, 2011, p. 165; Derix & Müller, 2007). The latter did not cause the government to react directly. Soon afterwards on the 29<sup>th</sup> of June the notification for a possible extension was given, the entrapment of the costs was discussed in §4.2 hypothesis three. On the day of the notification of the extension Minister Van Middelkoop had indicated and later also apologised for the fact he had given the impression of an upcoming extension. He had indicated that it was only possible by burden sharing (a second country that would assist the Netherlands in Uruzgan) or by budget cuts of the Defence budget. Twice (18 Sept. and 12 Nov. 2007) Van Middelkoop had indicated that the then current budget of Defence would not be enough to maintain the ambition level nor the extension. On 17 December 2007 however Van Middelkoop indicated that the capacity level of 2010 would be the same as it was in 2006. On 2 July 2008 MP Eijssink (PvdA) had the impression that the government applied too much flexibility concerning extra military capacity, almost like requesting parliament for a blank cheque. Van Middelkoop replied that there was no blank cheque, the flexibility was an indicator of what the Netherlands is willing and capable to do, with common sense (Tweede Kamer, 2008d). In the last phase of the military mission again Van Middelkoop said that the ambition level had not been affected on 12 November 2009. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of November Van Middelkoop indicated that there were problems with personnel, but these would be addressed and that the military capacity of materiel would not be affected.

So did the government intentionally keep the estimation of the military costs low or vague? Based on the analysis of four years of parliamentary documents it is possible to say that the government did

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<sup>88</sup> Information about capacity problems of the MoD were leaked and published in a newspaper *Telegraaf* of 19 April 2007 (Tweede Kamer, 2007a)

<sup>89</sup> This is an all terrain vehicle which is part of the mechanised brigade and is equipped with armament of which the main weapon is the 'howitzer' (a short cannon).

try to downplay the effect of the Uruzgan mission on the military capacity. The impression I have is that the government did not want to inform the parliament more than necessary, thereby affirming this hypothesis. They did this by constantly waving aside concerns (sometimes caused by the Ministers of Defence) of parliament and referring to the HGIS budget or the temporary solutions of adding money. No costs were spared to provide the best security for the Dutch soldiers (e.g. project Counter IED € 78,6 million<sup>90</sup>, armoured containers for soldiers to stay in), parliament did not have major objections except that some (especially VVD) even wanted to spend more. The general level of success of the military mission was clearly the most important, the realistic and modest goals for the mission were set out to be fulfilled with the least casualties on the Dutch and Afghan side. The results of the mission should outweigh or compensate the total Dutch effort. The Dutch military formed a prerequisite for rebuilding and to fight terrorism. Commitment to the mission therefore meant that necessary means had to be made available for the military to create and maintain the right environment. That the Dutch military struggled to fulfill its role is clear. The fact that Minister Van Middelkoop did not want to change his way of reporting about the finances of the military mission underlines the hypothesis. The political parties besides SP and PvdA did not pressure him to do so, by which the nontransparent method of reporting costs was maintained.

Concerning military capacity it is hard to say if the government was right by saying that it was not affected by the Uruzgan mission. What was the basic capacity of the military before the start of the mission and what was the capacity at the end of the mission? Has the military capacity changed throughout the mission? And did it result in a negative, positive or neutral sum of the capacity in comparison with the start of the mission? Anyway the outcome of the latter, at what cost? This research cannot give an answer to all these questions. Although it was indicated by Minister Kamp from the beginning that the military was able and well equipped for the task, it soon turned out that this was not completely true. Fact is that additional money (for the Defence and HGIS budget), personnel and materiel were needed to continue the mission, especially in the beginning and that the extension also meant a heavy burden for the military. This research cannot reveal the total financial impact of the Uruzgan mission on the capacity of the Dutch military, however it can give insight in the total costs. Therefore in the next chapter a calculation of the total costs will be attempted for the Uruzgan mission 2006-2010 using the method of Stiglitz & Bilmes and of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten.

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<sup>90</sup> Plan was presented on 13 March 2009. This among others included the acquirement of Bushmasters which could help detect IEDs, protection for *Fennek*-vehicles (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2009a).

## 5. Calculation of the total costs of the Uruzgan mission

Now the three phases have been analysed, it is time to try to make a balance of the total costs. An estimation will be given of the total costs of the mission for the period 2006-2010, as not all the figures for the calculations were available or impossible to determine at all. As explained in chapter 2 the method that Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009) used for the Dutch presence in Afghanistan from 2002-2011<sup>91</sup> by identifying the hidden costs will be applied first. Then a similar, but a more extensive method (summarised in seven categories) that is developed by Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008) will be applied.

### Estimation of costs

Up to now the Uruzgan-mission is the most expensive mission in Dutch military history, an amount of € 1.4 billion was indicated by government in 2010. In 2011 this amount was corrected in the end evaluation to € 1.6 billion<sup>92</sup> (WRR, 2010, pp. 50,51; Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, 2011a). Besides the mission in Iraq<sup>93</sup>, the mission in Afghanistan was the hardest the Dutch military fought since the Korean War in the fifties (Wijk, 2010, p. 454; Dimitriu & Graaf, 2010, p. 429). The mission in Afghanistan had a big impact on the Defence materiel (intensive use and extreme climate) and personnel (high pressure, risks, rotations) and provisions (ammunition, parts etcetera). It is interesting to know what the real total costs were of the mission, if there is a large difference between the figure I calculate and the figure that the government had communicated.

As was made clear earlier the costs for the mission were divided in two budgets: 1) HGIS for additional costs related to the mission and 2) the budget of the MoD for the regular costs independent of the mission.

The definition of what the total costs are, is not clearly defined as the Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009) have indicated. An estimation will be given of the total costs including the hidden costs of the mission 2006-2010. The hidden costs which burden the Defence budget, apart from the regular budgeted additional costs are according to Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten (2009, pp. 218,219) divided over four categories. For each category the costs are indicated which apply for the Uruzgan-mission:

- 1) Replacement of operational losses. From 2006-2008 € 105 million (costs of 2 Chinooks and 1 Apache) was added to the budget of Defence. And as of 2009 € 25 million was structurally added to the budget of Defence to compensate the loss of materiel (Ministerie van Defensie, 2006b).
- 2) Extra money for replacements (wear down period of materiel was shortened), for a period of four years 2008-2011 an extra € 200 million<sup>94</sup> was assigned, which means € 150 million for the period 2008-2010.
- 3) Purchase of new means (for example the Bushmaster), € 25 million was added once to the Defence budget in 2008 to accomodate for the Bushmasters. In total 85 were bought, a Bushmaster seemed to cost around € 1 million each. Also armoured containers were bought and

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<sup>91</sup> The Netherlands were active in ISAF since 2002 (Ministeries van Defensie, van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Algemene Zaken, 2011)

<sup>92</sup> Both amounts consisted of HGIS and the regular budget from the ministry of Defence, see table 3A and the end evaluation from 2011.

<sup>93</sup> SFIR: Stabilisation Force Iraq, Dutch contribution lasted from July 2003 until March 2005

[http://www.defensie.nl/landmacht/onderwijs/werkstukken\\_basisvorming/irak/betrokkenheid\\_van\\_nederland](http://www.defensie.nl/landmacht/onderwijs/werkstukken_basisvorming/irak/betrokkenheid_van_nederland)

<sup>94</sup> Two times € 100 million was granted for 4 years (two times 2 years), the so-called *Van Geel-* and *Bos-gelden*, for further explanation see chapter 4, page 26 and 28.

special materiel to detect IEDs: the counter IED plan of € 75,6 million (including 9 of the 85 Bushmasters) was made available by the Defence budget. Also separate of the Counter IED plan jammers were bought which costed the Defence Budget € 26,7 million And for the protection of the *Fennek* vehicles € 3,6 million was paid by the Defence budget (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2009a). According to Beeres, De De Bakker & Schulten in total circa € 170 million (it is not clearly indicated for which period exactly) was spent to acquire extra materiel for safety measures. The figures on which they based this amount could not be completely retraced. However this figure is not certain and it is unsure if it covers the Uruzgan period, I will use it for the calculation. It is quite presumable that the figure is correct, given all the safety measures that were taken during the mission (Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2006; Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie, 2006).

- 4) Money to do extra exercises (to keep the forces operational and ready). Two times € 30 million for 2008 en 2009 were added to improve the operational standby.

In total according to the calculations of De Bakker, Beeres & Schulten the measures to supplement the budget of the MoD from 2006-2010 were € 560 million<sup>95</sup>. The costs of the mission in Uruzgan from 2006-2010 that were planned as additional costs are € 1.299.358.000 (see table 1A). In total the additional costs (2006-2010) plus the hidden costs (€ 560 million) add up to € 1.859.358.000 to be considered as the total additional realised operational costs in Uruzgan 2006-2010 (Beeres, De Bakker, & Schulten, 2009, p. 222).

The Netherlands had agreed an Memory of Understanding (MoU) for support with several partner countries in Afghanistan for which the Netherlands received financial compensation. In 2008 and 2009 the Netherlands therefore received respectively € 6.3 (2008) and € 16.5 (2009) million, in total € 22.9 million (rounded), see table 1A (Ministerie van Defensie, 2010d; Ministerie van Defensie, 2009b).

**Table 1A:** Overview budget of the MoD for the Uruzgan mission 2006-2010

#### Expenditures MoD

Amounts x € 1000 Peace and stability in Afghanistan	Realisation 2006	Realisation 2007	Realisation 2008	Realisation 2009	Realisation 2010	Total 2006- 2010	Budget 2011
ISAF phase III	€ 143.943	€ 232.566	€ 285.600	€ 315.607	€ 203.698	€ 1.181.414	€ 188.000
ISAF Redeployment					€ 64.146	€ 64.146	€ 90.000
National Contribution ISAF					€ 4.754	€ 4.754	
ISAF (general)	€ 751					€ 751	
ISAF PRT	€ 11.306	€ 1.346				€ 12.652	
ISAF (F16 detachment)	€ 21.396	€ 14.245				€ 35.641	
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 177.396</b>	<b>€ 248.157</b>	<b>€ 285.600</b>	<b>€ 315.607</b>	<b>€ 272.598</b>	<b>€ 1.299.358</b>	<b>€ 278.000</b>

<sup>95</sup> €105 million(2006-2008)+ € 50 million (2x € 25 mln: 2009 and 2010)+ € 150 million (2008-2010)+ € 25 million (2008)+ €170 million (period not exactly known)+ € 60 million (2009 and 2010)

### Income MoD

Amounts x €1000	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
ISAF phase III			€ 6.330	€ 16.546		22.876

Source: Ministerie van Defensie (MoD), 2011- Annual report 2010 of the national budget (Ministerie van Defensie, 2011)

To indicate an estimation of the total costs, including salaries and depreciations of materiel a method is used that the Minister of Defence Kamp introduced in 2004: to multiply the total additional costs with a ratio of 2,5<sup>96</sup>. In table 1B for each year the total additional costs have been multiplied by 2,5. The method with the factor of 2,5 has been applied, because it was too hard and too labour intensive to really calculate the total costs. Another reason for this method is because there is no agreement on what really should be included in the total costs. So a compromise has been made by the calculation of the total costs resulting in a rough indication (Beeres, De Bakker, & Schulten, 2009, pp. 219,220).

**Table 1B:** Additional costs of the MoD 2006-2010, calculated to total costs

	Budgetted	Total additional expenditures* (x €1000) according to the MoD in the annual reports of the national budget (realization)	Total costs (multiplying the costs in the second column times 2,5)
2006	24.500	177.396	443.490
2007	149.300	248.157	620.393
2008	197.640	285.600	714.000
2009	270.000	315.607	789.018
2010	278.210	272.598	681.495
<b>Totals</b>	<b>919.650</b>	<b>1.299.358</b>	<b>3.248.396</b>

\*= This includes: ISAF (general/*algemeen*), ISAF PRT, ISAF/F16-detachment and ISAF Phase III) (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007d; Ministerie van Defensie, 2008; Ministerie van Defensie, 2009b; Ministerie van Defensie, 2010d; Ministerie van Defensie, 2011)

This would mean that the grand total of the four year Uruzgan mission is around € 3.248.396.000 (see table 1B) plus € 537,1 million (€ 560 million that was extra invested - € 22.9 million income of the MoU of ISAF III), thus the total becomes **€ 3.785.469.000**. In comparance, Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten had calcuted an estimation in 2009 that the total of additional Defence-expenses of the Dutch presence in Afghanistan would be € 2 billion based on the years 2002-2011. The figure of round € 3,8 billion is still incomplete as I made a strict divide to only calculate the costs between 2006-2010, for 2011 also a part of the expenditures and compensation for the mission went on for 2011 and 2012 for redeployment.

De Bakker, Beeres & Schulten (2009, p. 221) also referred to the method that Stiglitz & Bilmes (2008) applied to calculate the total costs of the US mission in Iraq. Stiglitz & Bilmes' definition of the total costs is based on an economic understanding of costs, as explained earlier in chapter 2 (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008, p. 13). The calculation method of Stiglitz & Bilmes has been summarised by Beeres, De

<sup>96</sup> To present the total costs of an international mission is too labour intensive, although it was done for the ISAF mission in 2002 and 2003 (Beeres, De Bakker, & Schulten, 2009, pp. 219,220).

Bakker & Schulten in seven categories as they had applied it for the period 2002-2011. For each category a calculation for the period of the Uruzgan-mission will be explained;

- 1) Additional realised operational expenditures. These are military expenditures that are directly linked to the mission: materiel, transport, personnel and accompanying costs like allowances. Applied to the Uruzgan mission this would be the total HGIS costs.
- 2) Other operational costs (these are the extra costs which are hidden in the budget(s): replacement of materiel).

Category 1 and category 2 together form basically as I conclude the total additional realised costs in total € 1.859.358.000.

- 3) Future operational costs (direct and hidden costs to finish the mission: redeployment, recovering the military force ('reset' costs) to make it ready for deployment again). This category is hard to specify in this case as the additional money that was added to the budget of Defence are included in the amount that was calculated by the first two categories: such as replacements, additional money for extra practises and operational losses and also the redeployment ( € 64 million round see table 1A). The redeployment costs are already included in the amount of the additional realised costs of category 1 and 2 combined.
- 4) Veteran costs: the costs for medical care during the mission and also the costs of medical care for the soldiers after the mission has ended; reimbursements for unemployment and lost lives, medical rehabilitation. This category is very difficult to specify as the costs for the aftercare that is related to Uruzgan was not specified<sup>97</sup> in the parliamentary documents. The budget for aftercare was left open-ended (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007k). The reimbursements for unemployment and for lost lives were also not mentioned in the parliamentary documents and are also hard to calculate.
- 5) Social costs. This category tries to calculate the value of loss for society of the perished and wounded soldiers. Stiglitz & Bilmes had calculated that a human live was worth \$ 7.2 million dollar in 2008 (Statistical Value of Life-SVL). Brück, Groot & Schneider (2011, p. 799) indicate a different value € 2.05 million, the lowest figure of three European studies they found about the appreciation of a life. For this category, for principal reasons the total costs of the consequences of the mission for wounded and perished soldiers are not calculated. It is hard (if not impossible) to express the economic worth of a human being according to De Bakker, Beeres & Schulten and I agree. For the Netherlands a consequence of the mission was around 140 wounded soldiers and 25 soldiers who lost their lives (Icasualties.org, 2010; De Pers, 2010).
- 6) Interest costs for loans to finance the mission. I follow the presumption of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten, because they presume that the Netherlands did not have to loan money to finance the mission so the interest was zero.
- 7) Macro-economic costs. This is a category that Stiglitz & Bilmes calculate as the war in Iraq would have supposedly led to an increase of oil prices. For the Uruzgan-mission it is very hard to determine the macro-economic costs, it is too labour intensive. Category 7 will not be calculated as I am not able to calculate the macro-economic costs related to the Uruzgan-mission. Most likely there were no macro-economic costs. Also Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten did not calculate

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<sup>97</sup> An estimation of € 8.5 million for 5400 soldier a year is given for expenditures on care during the mission and aftercare, see the end evaluation of 23 September 2011 of the mission (Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, 2011a, p. 94).

the macro-economic costs for the period 2002-2011 (Beeres, De Bakker, & Schulten, 2009, pp. 223,224).

This means that the calculation in the style of Stiglitz & Bilmes did not add any value with respect to the calculation of the total costs: no different outcome compared to the method of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten of the total costs. The use of the factor 2,5 introduced by Minister Zalm<sup>98</sup> covers mostly the hidden costs that Stiglitz & Bilmes wanted to show with their method. However the method of Stiglitz & Bilmes is more comprehensive, which is understandable as the US was for more involved in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan as the initiator. The financial and economic impact on the US is therefore also larger.

In the end evaluation of the mission Uruzgan 2006-2010 that came out on 28 September 2011 the costs were also reviewed. Two tables (see 3A and B) from the evaluation are showed here to indicate the amounts that were used in the evaluation. Minus the € 50 million of the *Bos-gelden* for 2011<sup>99</sup> the total costs are according to table 3A € 1.567.528.000,-. Table 3B shows a specified overview of the costs and also some income of the Uruzgan-mission, in total € 1.226.543.000,-. The latter amount does differ from the amounts mentioned in table 1A which mentioned a total additional costs of € 1.299.358.000,- a difference of € 72.815.000,-. This difference can be explained by the fact that the income of the ISAF III mission (€ 22.9 million) has not been abstracted in table 1A and also other costs such as ISAF (general), ISAF PRT and ISAF (F-16 detachment) in total € 49 million have been included. So the difference of € 73 million (round) is partly solved by abstracting € 23 million (round) of ISAF III income and the other ISAF costs that I did include in total of € 49 million (round), leaving an unexplained € 1 million.

**Table 3A:** Overview of the total expenditures for the Dutch participation in Uruzgan 2006-2011

Amounts x € 1000,-	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
<b>HGIS</b>							
HGIS MoD	143.943	232.566	279.270	299.151	272.598		1.227.528
<b>HGIS total</b>							<b>1.227.528</b>
Additional budget to regular budget MoD	55.000	50.000	105.000	80.000	50.000	(50.000*)	340.000
<b>Total</b>							<b>1.567.528</b>

\* € 50 mln of *Bos-gelden* are excluded

Source: Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, (2011a, p. 81) ,  
(adjusted total because amount HGIS MFA is excluded in this version)

**Table 3B:** Overview of the expenses and income of HGIS MoD ISAF 2006-2010

HGIS, chapter X, article 20 Peacekeeping operations	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
Allowances and pension contributions	44.337	73.229	81.267	95.301	54.309	348.443
Personnel costs	14.446	41.610	45.961	41.902	28.701	172.620
Materiel expenditures	2.235	6.469	8.003	7.480	5.618	29.805

<sup>98</sup> Minister of Finance and Vice-Premier (VVD) 2003-2007 ([www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com))

<sup>99</sup> *Bos-gelden*: € 50 million for 2010 and € 50 million 2011, as I calculate the costs for 2006-2010, the contribution for 2011 is left out.

Maintenance	13.151	22.035	26.588	33.394	31.247	126.415
Transport	47.316	41.228	49.903	60.253	30.865	229.565
Infrastructure	8.636	13.892	20.992	16.527	13.227	73.274
Data and communications	3.154	4.756	2.829	2.757	3.994	17.490
Fuel, oil and lubricants	2.081	5.227	12.732	15.396	9.206	44.642
Ammunition	7.530	21.003	33.610	21.732	12.420	96.295
Other expenditures	1.057	3.130	3.716	20.865	13.112	41.880
<b>Expenditures ISAF stage III</b>	<b>143.943</b>	<b>232.579</b>	<b>285.601</b>	<b>315.607</b>	<b>202.699</b>	<b>1.180.429</b>
<b>+ National contribution to ISAF staff Aug. 2010- Dec. 2010</b>					<b>4.754</b>	<b>4.754</b>
<b>+ Expenditures RDTF</b>					<b>64.146</b>	<b>64.146</b>
<b>- Income ISAF stage III</b>			<b>6.330</b>	<b>16.456</b>		<b>22.786</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>143.943</b>	<b>232.579</b>	<b>279.271</b>	<b>299.151</b>	<b>271.599</b>	<b>1.226.543</b>

Amounts x € 1000,-

Source: Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, (2011a, p. 82)

Apart from all the calculations I have added up all the amounts that were mentioned in the parliamentary documents for the period of 22 December 2005 until 28 Sept. 2010 concerning the military expenses. I was curious the find out if the outcome would be near the total additional costs that the government had communicated to parliament first € 1.2 billion (round, in 2008) and later € 1.4 billion (in 2010). I have summed up a total of € 1.741 million for HGIS and € 1.109 million for the budget of Defence. In total € 2.850 million (€ 2,9 billion round), see table 4 for the calculation. It is hard to say if all these expenses of Defence were directly related to the Uruzgan mission, some investments were already planned, but were expedited. However the outcome is remarkable as the HGIS costs are higher than the government had indicated. How this is possible is not exactly clear.

**Table 4:** Costs divided by budget based up on figures from the parliamentary documents (late 2005-2010)

HGIS Amount in € millions		MOD Amount in € millions	
4	Additional costs: security measures	25	First acquisition of 25 Bushmasters
6	140 extra staff needed for Dutch lead RC-S	105	Structural solution loss of materiel spread over 2006-2008
250	2007: coalition agreement (half of € 500 million)	50	Structural addition each year of € 25 million for operational material losses: 2009, 2010
580	Total additional costs 2006-2008 including use of F16s	116	Additional security measures
0,7	Transport, maintenance 10 Bushmasters	114	140 extra staff needed for Dutch lead of RC-S
540	Total additional costs 2008-2010 including use of F16s	250	2007: coalition agreement (half of € 500 million)
60	Money for preparations 2008 and 2009 ( <i>gereedstellingsgelden</i> )	150	<i>Van Geel- gelden</i> (€ 100 million, 2008, 2009) + one time <i>Bos-geld</i> (€ 50 million, 2010)
211	RDTF	7,8	10 Bushmasters
0,5	Transport, maintenance 13 Bushmasters	143	Article 10.01 HGIS unforeseen costs non-ODA
2,7	Counter IED plan	13	13 Bushmasters
2,6	Jammers	78,6	Counter IED project (€ 27,6 million spent)
2,6	protection <i>Fennek</i> vehicle	27,6	Jammers
76	Extra additional costs	3,6	protection <i>Fennek</i> vehicle
3,4	Transport, maintenance 14 Bushmasters	14,2	14 Bushmasters
1,4	Transport, maintenance 14 Bushmasters	10,9	14 Bushmasters
1740,9		1108,7	

Source: chapter 4 and the intermediate periods between the crucial phases. For a complete overview of how these amounts were retrieved from the parliamentary documents you can contact author of this thesis.

This chapter has made clear that it is difficult to oversee the total costs, let alone calculate them precisely. However it is possible to carefully state based on the calculation (€3,8 billion round) and the total amount found in the parliamentary documents (€ 2,9 billion round) that the total amount is most probably near the average of these two amounts: € 3,35 billion. To put this amount in perspective the total expenditures for the MoD for the period 2006-2010 for each year was respectively:

	<b>Defence budget*: total expenditures MoD (round figures)- Amounts are in € billion</b>	<b>Defence budget** - total expenditures on article 20, military missions (in Dutch abbreviated UCBO) -Amounts are in € millions</b>	<b>Defence budget**, article 20, specifically spent on ISAFIII – Amounts (rounded) are in € millions</b>
2006	8.1	316,4	368,9
2007	8.4	303,8	252,5
2008	8.5	328	285,6
2009	8.7	360.1	315,8
2010	8.5	318,3	272,7
<b>Total €</b>	39,2 billion	1.9 billion (round)	1.5 billion (round)

Source: <http://www.rijksbegroting.nl/> - extracted from chapter X from the *\*slotwet* (final budget bill) for each year, *\*\*jaarverslag 2010* (annual report) and *jaarverslag 2011\*\** (annual report)

## 6. Conclusion

The main goal of this research was to find out what role the military expenses played in the debate in parliament about the Uruzgan mission with a focus on three important phases (beginning, extension and end) of the process of monitoring. To answer this question the concepts of economic understanding, the predictability, visibility and entrapment of costs were used. Three crucial phases were chosen to analyse due to the attainability of the research. Four years of parliamentary documents were scanned on the aspect of military expenses, from the beginning until the end of the mission. Therefore the three phases do not give a complete picture of the discussion in parliament about the costs, but they do give a good indication of the positions of the political parties when the cost aspect was most likely high on the agenda. The proceedings of committee meetings and debates and sometimes a news item gave a clear insight in the positions of the parties on the military expenses of the mission and of the relation between parties.

### *The role of the costs and economic understanding*

It is important to determine that no general conclusion(s) can be made on the importance of the expenses in the overall debate about the mission in Uruzgan in parliament. The military expenses were one aspect of the discussion in parliament, another large part was formed by the central goal (stabilisation of Uruzgan) of the mission. The general sense of the outcome of the three phases is that the cost aspect of the mission was considered fairly important by parliament. This was especially made clear by the concerns of most political parties about the capacity of the military forces from the beginning to the end of the mission. It was expressed several times by various parties that the MoD should not cannibalise itself. The capacity problems caused concerns about personnel (number of rotations, aftercare enough?) and materiel (enough?). These concerns are related to resources and money, it indicates the reason why the costs were important for parliament, thereby also considering the effect of the mission on the military.

The concept of economic understanding was introduced to find out if parliament did care about the total costs, if they also had attention for the long term financial and economic effects of the military mission.

It was clear from the start which parties would not support the mission; D66, GL and SP. All the political parties whatever their standpoint however appreciated the work of the military. Most parties had showed at various degrees concerns about the finances of the military part of the mission. GL was the exception, because they were mostly concerned about rebuilding and human rights. D66 and SP had accepted that the mission became reality, they both did care for the costs of the mission. SP expressed their concern about the costs stronger than D66. SP did so especially in the period of extension and at the last crucial phase. In the second phase of the extension the SP had submitted a motion stating that the Court of Audit (*Algemene Rekenkamer*) should investigate the costs of the mission. This motion was rejected, which is remarkable. As it was an opportunity to thoroughly investigate if the finances were correct, only SP, GL, PVV and PvdD supported it. I would have expected that also PvdA (with a strong focus on aftercare) and D66 (pointed out the lack of finances) would have supported this motion, I do not have an explanation for this. The SP had attention for the total costs in the last phase, because they brought the article of Beeres, De Bakker

& Schulten to the attention of the government. Also the PvdA requested the government to give more clarity on the costs of aftercare in reference to the article.

#### *Extension: entrapment of commitment*

For parliament the costs of the mission were a concern, but they never made a problem about extra costs because they wanted the mission to succeed. Because no succeeding lead nation was found by NATO, an extension was necessary.

The main concern of parliament was the safety of the Dutch soldiers, the risk of casualties was kept to a minimum. The safety measures such as the acquirement of Bushmasters, the armoured containers confirm the risk aversion. With the aspect of risk reduction also comes the matter of success of the mission (results of rebuilding Uruzgan), which was of course the overall concern of parliament and the goal of the government. With the best security measures and materiel for the Dutch soldiers, the public and parliament could be more assured that the mission could be a success. Especially because it was a risky mission where military offensive operations would take place and attacks by OEF (with IEDs) were common. As mentioned before the mission was hard and expensive, taking a heavy toll on the military forces. The main reason for the extension phase exemplified the need for a sort of forced continuance of success, because there was no succeeding lead nation. One of the significant arguments mentioned by government in the second article 100 letter was that the investment done in Uruzgan would be lost (“destruction of capital”) if the Netherlands would leave after two years. This argument was supported by D66, SGP and does partly answer the main question. However some resistance by some political parties was also noted. At a certain point the PvdA (Ms. Eijssink) even mentioned the word “blank cheque” and D66 (Mr. Pechtold) used the term “grocery list”. These words refer to the way the government added money with a certain ease to the budget for the mission (for extra personnel or material) to be able to continue it. The flexibility however was deemed necessary by all (government and parliament), because the security of the Dutch soldiers was of the greatest importance in order to assure a certain success of the mission.

#### *The information from the government*

The way parliament was informed about the costs was sometimes hard to follow, the government was not very specific about the numbers and seemed somewhat reserved with giving overviews of the costs. The fact that two budgets were used for financing the mission did not help with a clear overview either.

At first an estimation was given by the government of the total additional costs to be between € 280 and € 320 million, this became eventually € 580 million for the first two years. The cost estimation of the extension was more accurate, € 540 million for two years. There is no reason to assume that the costs were estimated at the low end by the government to prevent objection by the majority of parliament. The mission was ‘hard to sell’ as the public support for the mission was quite low from the beginning. In the article 100 letters government kept the expectation levels of the mission moderately, it was presented as a risky mission. The cost estimation that government gave is as what can be concluded from the parliamentary documents as realistic as possible. That the costs soon rose can be explained from the fact that it was a large and comprehensive mission where offensive action regularly took place. The climate and circumstances in Uruzgan caused a faster wear down of materiel and security measures (e.g. acquirement of Bushmasters) had to be taken to maintain the

safety of the Dutch soldiers. Minister Van Middelkoop remarked in 2009 (third phase) that he agreed with one of the conclusions of the article by Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten, that the total costs do not matter so much as long as the economic understanding of the costs are considered in the decision-making process. However Minister Van Middelkoop did not show economic understanding in his reporting to parliament. The predictability of costs of most military missions (especially with a high possibility of offensive action and security risks) will always be hard to predict. If Minister Van Middelkoop had been more transparent on the costs during the mission by giving updates in the format of the recommendation (table 2E) it would give a more complete picture. It would be easier to have an economic understanding during the mission instead of only after the end of mission when all the definite numbers are clear. The government should put more effort in being transparent on the military costs as it will create goodwill at parliament and more understanding from the public. The impression that remains after having read four years of parliamentary documents and financial plans is that the government was not so transparent and did try to downplay the negative signals of the costs. On the other hand parliament itself could have demanded more transparency and regular clarity. There was a mutual understanding between parliament and the government that the mission had to be a success. None of the political parties would want to obstruct the mission too much, because there was a majority who kept supporting it. The objections towards the mission (D66, SP and GL) were mostly about the combination of fighting and rebuilding and sometimes about the size of the Dutch participation in other words burden sharing (PVV, LPF, CDA, SGP, D66, PvdA and CU).

The total costs of the mission were hard to calculate precisely despite following the method of Stiglitz & Bilmes and Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten. Choices had to be made of what to include and the figures were not presented on a silver platter. On the basis of the overviews in the parliamentary documents it was hard or sometimes impossible to specify the exact military expenses. Remarkable is that the mission was financed by three Ministries; of Finance, of Defence and of Foreign Affairs. All three added money to the mission or in the case of the MoD even had to create money (€ 500 million) by selling property and materiel to partly finance HGIS article 20 and its own organisation. The MFA would supplement HGIS when necessary (for the rebuilding part) and the Ministry of Finance added a few hundred millions (e.g. *Van Geel-* and *Bos-gelden*) to the budget of MoD and also millions to the HGIS budget article. In this thesis the contribution of Foreign Affairs to HGIS is left out to just focus on the military expenditures.

It is hard to truly determine what the total costs were from an economic understanding as Stiglitz & Bilmes suggest, some of the seven categories were not possible to calculate: far too extensive (and therefore too labour intensive) to calculate for the Dutch military contribution in Uruzgan. Therefore the method of Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten to calculate the total costs was applied. That the total costs of the mission were more than € 1,6 billion (total additional costs) as the government had indicated was sure. The total costs that I calculated of € 3,8 billion (round) is probably also not quite correct, but it is more within the distance of the € 2,9 billion (round) that I summed up from the parliamentary documents. The average of both amounts is € 3,35 billion. Aftercare is the largest part of the costs which could not be clearly specified for Uruzgan. The costs of the normal effort (e.g. training) that the MoD had to deliver for Uruzgan were impossible to determine and were calculated by using the factor 2,5 that Minister Zalm had introduced which Beeres, De Bakker & Schulten indicated.

### *About the article 100 procedure*

An interesting insight came up when I saw how the procedure of the article 100 worked. The role of parliament is clear in the decision-making process of a military mission: it has no co-decision, but they have to be informed by the government. From the beginning of the mission the majority of the political parties were very adamant that none of them should state a strong 'premature' position until the day of the plenary sitting when the vote takes place. Of course political parties form their opinion in advance, while they are awaiting the decision of government, they do their research. Perhaps some hesitant parties will form their opinion further during the committee meetings (AO's) where they will gather extra information, but they also have a principal position. Parliament clearly wanted to show its strength (dualism) in this case and to claim that they do have the ability to say "no" to the mission. In short there is a kind of tension that clings to the article 100 procedure as it pretends that parliament has a say while it in fact does not have (unless there is a majority of course). Parliament has a passive role in the sense that they have to wait until the government presents a decision. In principle the government will never present a mission impossible to parliament to prevent political consequences as they are held politically responsible. A military mission will be presented in a format which will satisfy the majority of parliament, a calculated way of thinking by government. This could be seen as a form of entrapment. It makes it rather impossible for the opposition to form a majority. The only job for parliament to do is to monitor, to tick the boxes of the FoR and to say yes or no and to make sure that agreements from the FoR are followed. Therefore the course and the costs of the mission are the most important part that parliament can monitor and political parties can exert their power.

### *Recapitulation*

What is most important and what I have tried to indicate in this thesis, with the idea of economic understanding, is the realisation that a military mission has a larger impact than it would initially appear on society. The mission in Uruzgan had consequences for national (fall of cabinet, around 20.000 soldiers involved) and international (prestige) politics, and for the MoD (acquisition of experience, its capacity). In the economic sense the consequence was that the money spent had to come from some budget (MFA, Ministry of Finance and MoD). The latter means simply that money spent for this mission was not available for other purposes. The impact that a mission has on a soldier's life is not measurable in currency for reasons of principle. However the economic understanding by Stiglitz & Bilmes does raise awareness as they did try to calculate the social costs. A fact is that the MoD has been affected by the mission in Uruzgan, therefore extra investments by the Ministry of Finance and the MoD itself were needed. For the sake of transparency it is important to see how the chosen representatives of the public discussed the costs in general and specifically the total costs of the military mission.

It is important to keep in mind that the idea behind economic understanding is not a matter of stopping a mission when the costs become too high. When a commitment to a military has started you cannot bail out when it becomes too expensive in terms of money, especially not when you are involved as lead nation. The FoR in combination with the article 100 procedure form a good basis for the government to make a decision and for parliament to monitor the mission. That costs turn out to be higher should not be a surprise and the government should be as transparent as possible about it.

*Vidi, veni, mansi et pecuniam solvi?* The answer to this rhetorical question would be yes, it is however important to keep in mind that the effect of a mission cannot only be measured by the costs expressed in Euro's. Soldiers who deal with PTSD and families of soldiers that served in Uruzgan are also affected. And the mission did not only had an impact on the Netherlands, but also in Afghanistan. An economic understanding and therefore more transparency of the costs can help with lessons learned for future missions. It can create a better understanding by the public, because the government has to explain the costs better so parliament can better understand and monitor them. The recommendation done for more regular updates in the format of table 2E would be a step forward.

In a world of interwoven international relations there is a lot more consideration going on than just *vidi, veni, mansi*. The FoR covers all aspects, this research focused just on one: *pecuniam*: an estimation of the total costs of € 3,35 billion. What would be interesting for further research is the effect of this mission in combination with the Future Police Survey (report on the policy options for the defence system in the future 2020-2030) and the new round of cutbacks (since 2010, € 1 billion by cabinet Rutte) on the military forces and their participation in future missions. And also the change by the creation of a new budget 'International Security' that will be in effect as of 2014 by the cabinet Rutte-Asscher. It remains to be seen if the Netherlands can maintain its ambition level and keeps its versatile expeditionary military force when warfare and the international power balance are changing.

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## 8. Appendix

### 8.1 Budget of the MoD and HGIS

**Table 2A:** First cost specification of the additional costs as of March 2007

Kosten ISAF Stage III -Costs ISAF Stage III, situation of March 2007	Stand per maart 2007
<i>Omschrijving</i>	<i>Totaal</i>
Vergoedingen en toelagen -allowances and compensations	153,40
Lokale inhuur personeel - local hire of personnel	3,00
Kleding -clothing	5,60
Voeding -food	71,00
Personeelszorg -care for personnel	7,00
Personele voorbereidingsuitgaven -preparation costs of personnel	0,40
Materiele voorbereidingsuitgaven - preparation costs for materieel	2,20
Brandstof -fuel	12,00
Transport	140,20
Materieel -materieel	50,60
Afrondingskosten bij terugkeer -wrap up costs at return	14,80
Huisvestingskosten -accommodation costs	18,00
Infrastructuur -infrastructure	12,50
Telecommunicatie -telecommunication	17,60
Overige uitgaven -additional expenses	4,70
Munitie -ammunition	29,30
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>542,30</b>
<b>Kosten ISAF F16 -Costs of ISAF F16</b>	<b>38,00</b>
<b>Totaal (excl. redeployment)</b>	<b>580,30</b>

Bedragen in miljoenen euro's -Amounts in millions of euros

Source: Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (2007c)

**Table 2B<sup>100</sup>:** HGIS budget 2008-2011, article 100 letter 30 November 2007

Amounts in € million	2008	2009	2010	2011
Size of HGIS	195,5	195,5	195,5	195,5
Intensivation of coalition agreement (€ 250 million)	25,0	50,0	75,0	100,0
Available	220,5	245,5	270,5	295,5
- Other operations	-60,0	-50,0	-50,0	-50,0
- Continuation of ISAF	-270,0	-270,0	-270,0	
+ HGIS-means art. 10, nominal and unforeseen (Spring note 2008) (€ 143 million)	72,5	47,5	22,5	
Shortage(-) or surplus(+)	-37,0	-27,0	-27,0	245,5
+ expected returns of participation partner countries	pm	pm	pm	
Interim change of means of intensivation of the coalition agreement (Spring note 2008)*	pm	pm	pm	pm
Saldo	0	0	0	pm

\* Size of the interim change of means, dependent among others on the returns of the participating partner countries

Source: Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie, voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (2007h, p. 39)

Balkenende IV- In the coalition agreement for 2007-2011 € 500 million was planned spread over four years for Defence to spend on peacekeeping operations, for the HGIS-budget. In 2008 € 50 million, 2009 € 100 million, 2010 € 150 million and in 2011 € 200 million, this was part of the intensivation of the active role of the Netherlands in the world (CDA, PvdA, ChristenUnie, 2007). The actual financial planning was different, € 500 million had to be funded by the MoD itself by selling property and materiel. Half of the €500 million would go to HGIS (peacekeeping operations and the rest to MoD (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007e; Ministerie van Defensie, 2007f; Klep, 2011, pp. 50,207; De Bakker, Westerink, & Beeres, 2008, pp. 14-15).

<sup>100</sup> Article 10.01 € 142,5 (2008-2010) of HGIS compensates for developments in wages and prices and also unforeseen costs within the whole non-ODA side of HGIS (Tweede Kamer, 2007f).

**Table 2C:** Overview of the budget of HGIS and the addition to the budget of Defence

**Question 564** (14 December 2007, 27 925 no. 287)

**Verwachte realisatiecijfers 2007:**

**HGIS- Expected realization of 2007**

Vergoedingen en toelagen - allowances and compensations	76
Lokale inhuur personeel - local hire of personnel	2
Voeding - food	32
Personeelszorg (inclusief nazorg) care for personnel (including aftercare)	8
Personele voorbereidingskosten - preparation costs of personnel	1
Materiële voorbereidingskosten - preparation cost for materiel	1
Brandstof - fuel	5
Transport, waarvan € 3 miljoen met eigen middelen - transport, of which € 3 mln of own resources	43
Materieel - materiel	33
Afrondingskosten - wrap up costs at return	1
Huisvestingskosten - accomodation costs	9
Infrastructuur - infrastructure	3
Telecommunicatie - telecommunication	5
Overige uitgaven - additional expenses	4
Munitie - ammunition	23
<b>Totaal Total</b>	<b>€ 246 million</b>

The F16 detachment of € 16 million is included. In total the expectation for 2007 is € 270 million, because of the extra € 20 million that is added to compensate for the spare parts and worn out materiel.

**Question 575** (14 December 2007, 27 925 no. 287)

	Defence budget	
	HGIS- execution of peacekeeping operations	Regular Defence budget
<b>Current mission:</b>		
- Additional costs	€ 580 million	
-Motion <i>Van Geel</i> (addition to Defence budget: 2008 € 50 million, 2009 € 50 million)		€ 100 million
<b>Extension:</b>		
- Additional costs	€ 540 million	
- <i>Bos-gelden</i> (addition to Defence budget as of 2010 € 50 million, 2011 50 million)		€ 100 million
- Redeployment	€ 115 million	
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 1.235 million</b>	<b>€ 200 million</b>

Source: Tweede Kamer (2007f)

**Table 2D:** Extra expenditures (€ millions) for the mission in Uruzgan 2008-2010

	2008	2009	2010	Total
Materiel expenses	3	3	- 5	1
Expenses on personnel	3	17	- 10	10
Hire		21	15	36
Transport	3	18	8	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>76</b>

Source: Ministerie van Defensie (2009a, p. 4)

**Table 2E:** Example of the balance sheet by which the government should report to parliament regularly (every six months) about the estimation of the total costs during the mission.

Figures concerning personnel and materiel	Numbers
<b>Personnel</b>	
Number of soldiers (indicating per area where they are placed) currently employed –reference date	
Number of soldiers that have been employed in total so far	
Indication of the average rotation period (in months)	
Number of soldiers that lost their lives	
Number of soldiers that are wounded (indication of severity...)	
<b>Materiel</b>	
Number of vehicles employed (indicated for each general category: planes, UAV, terrain vehicles etc.) ....	
Vehicles that are lost	
Categories	Costs in € million
<b>Personnel</b>	
Transportation	
Reimbursements and compensations	
Clothing	
Food	
Local hire of personnel	
Accommodations	
Care for personnel during the mission	
Aftercare	
Preparation costs (training)	
<b>Materiel</b>	
Preparation costs	
Newly acquired vehicles:.....	
Newly acquired aircrafts: .....	
Hire of materiel: ....	
Costs of repair and spare parts....	


Fuel	
Transportation of materiel in total:	
Telecommunications	
Ammunition	
F16	
<b>Burden sharing</b>	
Expenses shared with NATO	
Expenses shared with partner countries	
<b>Redeployment costs</b>	
Transport of materiel	
Cost for personnel	
Materiel expenses	
Hire	
<b>Other costs</b>	
Infrastructure	
<b>Total</b>	€

**Table 5: Estimation of costs for redeployment, 2010**

Application of the RDTF	€ 86 mln
Transport costs (by land, sea and air)	€ 57 mln
Maintenance and repairs of used materials	€ 77 mln
Use of F16s (protection)	€ 9 mln
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 229 mln</b>

Source: Ministry of Defence (2010b, p. 4)

**Graph 1:** Additional costs for military missions (*crisisbeheersingsoperaties*) in EUR million




Source: Beeres & De Bakker, 2010, p. 40

Following peaks are caused:

1993: UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) in Bosnia, 1996 IFOR in Kosovo, 1999 SFOR in Kosovo, 2003/2004 SFIR (Stabilisation Force Iraq) and 2005-2007 the operations in Afghanistan (including operations to support the US in OEF and the ISAF mission) (Beeres, De Bakker, & Schulten, 2009, p. 41; Klep, 2011, pp. 15,18).

## 8.2 Public opinion

**Graph 2:** Monitor public opinion by the Dutch MoD, July 2010




Source: Ministry of Defence (2010e, p. 7)

The trend shows that over the years there is a slight decrease in the number of supporters and a slight increase of opponents.

### 8.3 Maps

**Map 1:** Overview in Uruzgan of the ink spot method in 2007 and 2008



Source: Klep, Uruzgan (2011, p. 9)

**Map 2:** First NATO-ISAF Placemat of Afghanistan, January 2007



Source: NATO ([http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat\\_archive/isaf\\_placemat\\_070129.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat_archive/isaf_placemat_070129.pdf))