



Universiteit Leiden

**The influence of the change in strategic culture on the
transatlantic security policies in the post 9/11 era**

A constructivist argument on the influence of change in strategic
culture on the transatlantic relationship in the first decade after 9/11

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Abstract

A research on the strategic culture and transatlantic security policies in first decade post-9/11. This thesis tries to answer the question to what extent the change in strategic culture and the resulting security policies of the EU and the US changed between 2002 and 2010; and how this shaped the transatlantic relationship in the post 9/11 era. The thesis concludes that there was a change in the strategic culture of the United States due to the external-shock caused by the 9/11 attacks on American soil; this shock was not experienced in the European Union. Hence, the security policies of the two powers on both sides of the Atlantic were not in line with one another in the period following 9/11. A decade later, the strategic culture of the United States shifted towards that of the European Union.

Table of contents

Abstract.....	1
Table of contents	2
List of abbreviations	3
1. Introduction	4
2. Literature review	7
3. Theoretical and conceptual framework	11
3.1 <i>Constructivist debate</i>	11
3.2 <i>Theoretical Framework: Strategic Culture</i>	12
4. Methodology.....	14
4.1 <i>Data selection</i>	14
4.2 <i>Content analysis</i>	15
4.3 <i>Documents United States</i>	16
4.4 <i>Documents European Union</i>	17
5. Analysis policy documents of benchmark 1.....	19
5.1 <i>The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002</i>	19
5.2 <i>The European Security Strategy 2003</i>	22
6. Analysis policy documents of benchmark 2.....	26
6.1 <i>The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2010</i>	26
6.2 <i>The European Common Foreign and Security Policy 2009</i>	28
7. Comparison analyzed policy documents	31
Conclusion.....	34
Bibliography	36

List of abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ERP	European Recovery Program
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
IR	International Relations
NSS	National Security Strategy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WOT	War on Terrorism
WWII	World War II

1. Introduction

On 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda launched an act of ‘propaganda by the deed’, to unite Muslims against the United States (US). The 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, which Cox (2012) called one of the greatest tipping points in recent international affairs, brought together various types of threats; from terrorism to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and ‘plugged power back into politics’ (Ferris, 2016). It resulted in the declaration of a ‘War On Terrorism’ (WOT) by the Bush administration. In the period following the terrorist attacks on American soil it seemed as if the ‘West’ joined together in a common struggle against the threat of international terrorism. Nevertheless, it is argued that the transatlantic relationship was in decline in the aftermath of 9/11, due to the diverging focus of the two powers as a result of a disagreement on appropriate policy because of a shift in identity (Kagan, 2004 and Peterson, 2006).

The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were certainly not supported by all European countries. It became clear that the decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic had different conceptions regarding the use of force. Since these debated interventions, there have been intense debates regarding the suitable course of action in for example Syria and Libya (Kaufmann and Lohaus, 2018). But to what extent was the transatlantic security relationship really challenged in the aftermath of 9/11 in light of disagreement on appropriate policy on both sides of the Atlantic; and how can this be explained? In addition, how did this policy take shape over decade following the attacks; and hence influence the transatlantic relationship?

For the purpose of this thesis, the transatlantic relation entails the relationship of the US and the member states of the European Union (EU). According to Welzel and Deutsch (2007), the shared values are deeply rooted in the cultures of both the EU and the US. The US and many European countries share a collective history when it comes to friendly and diplomatic relations. This transatlantic relation includes a large number of policy areas, such as humanitarian policy, economy, politics, peace and security.

The strong relationship between the US and Europe flourished after World War II (WWII). Ever since, the US and various European countries have been working together in the field of economy and security based on their shared values and strong economic and strategic ties (Riddervold and Newsome, 2018). The Americans lead the foreign missions in Iraq and Syria. Several European countries are part of this coalition; the EU also endorses the importance of this. However, the cooperation between the two superpowers has not always been self-evident. The US and the EU have a very different view on a wide range of issues; the EU has always been critical on the WOT after the 9/11 attacks. However, this critical view has never prevented the EU from supporting the US in the fight against terrorism.

The transatlantic relation served just about a textbook example of why security is not always a zero-sum game, indefinitely leading to the famous ‘dilemma’ (Cox, 2005). In the time following

WWII, the transatlantic relation could be characterized as a mutual dependence between the two. According to Baylis (2001), there is no other international security relationship so benign as the transatlantic cooperation. The two powers were bound to continue on the peaceful path they had followed for years because they were united through culture, economics, values and closely connected through a sophisticated web of institutions. This shaped the transatlantic relationship. But the relationship between the political elites on the two sides of the Atlantic is constantly evolving; some even state the two are increasingly growing apart. The post-Cold War era has been characterized by a great expansion of the international security agenda to incorporate various new security challenges that go beyond those that correlate with interstate warfare. Occasionally, these security challenges have put great stress on the transatlantic security relationship. The WOT and its armed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have especially proven contentious (Smith, 2018). This thesis focuses on the change in strategic culture in the first decade post 9/11; and analyzes how this influenced the transatlantic relationship. Was this really in decline after the attacks of 9/11.

To establish to what extent the transatlantic security relationship was converging or diverging in the aftermath of 9/11 in light of disagreement on appropriate policy on both sides of the Atlantic in the first decennium of this era, this thesis will study the language that is used in the American National Security Strategy (NSS) documents of 2002 and 2010, the European Security Strategies (ESS) of 2003 and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) document of 2009 in order to answer the following research question:

To what extent did the change in strategic culture and the resulting security policies of the EU and the US change between 2002 and 2010; and how did this shape the transatlantic relationship in the post 9/11 era?

This thesis extends on the existing argument reviewed in chapter two. The changes in the transatlantic security relationship in the post 9/11 era have been attempted to be analyzed by the various mono-causal theories of international relations (IR). Although both realism and liberalism lay out valuable angles of security, the theories fall short when examining the complex and volatile security and political narratives. Constructivism would be a valuable method to examine this question of the change in the security relation between the EU and US. However, the existing argument in regard to this topic in the field of constructivism made by Kagan (2003) is one sided and suggests a blind spot for some important variables within the field of constructivism. According to Norheim-Martinsen (2011), focusing on strategic narratives and content analysis as an essential part of a strategic culture can create possibilities for more fruitful comparisons between the EU and the US than the traditional strong/weak division. This thesis argues that the contesting arguments made by realists (calculations regarding threats, power and zero-sum) and liberalists (the regional challenges and institutional expansion of Europe) are not fully capable of explaining the changing transatlantic security partnership. A well-reasoned argument, based on social constructivism and strategic culture, is made in this thesis that will enhance the understanding of the transatlantic relationship in the post

9/11 era. The main focus is on how EU' and US' security policies have changed during the first decade of the 21st century; and to what extent that shows conversion or diversion of the transatlantic security relationship. This understanding is critical for a well-informed public debate and hence this thesis will help bridge the gap between academics and policy and will be practically relevant. The suggested external shock causing a change in strategic culture is a phenomenon which can occur in any time and place. Therefore, increased knowledge about the influence of strategic culture on security strategies of actors can add to the general theory of strategic culture and hence might reflect on a broader population of cases other than the transatlantic relationship. It might be a good starting point for new research on the topic of the direction of strategic culture of an actor after the initial external shock has passed. The strategic culture of the US suggests shifting towards the EU.

After the literature analysis in chapter two, chapter three lays out the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis after which the methodology is laid out and some context is given to the policy document. What follows is the analysis of the various policy documents, after which the argument is made that, during the first benchmark post 9/11, the difference in strategic culture between the US and the EU becomes clear in the policy documents. This thesis is built upon the idea of external shock changing the strategic culture of an actor, such as the 9/11 attacks did for the US, as explained by scholars such as Lantis (2002 and 2006) and Farrell (2001). These scholars state that a shock often is a "necessary condition for radical change...[shocks] undermine the legitimacy of existing norms, shift power within communities, and enable norm cultural entrepreneurs to construct a new consensus around alternative norms". The thesis continues by arguing that the two powers on both sides of the Atlantic have seemed to converge in 2010 due to the movement of the US towards the position of the strategic culture of the EU. The security policies of the EU and the US of the second benchmark are in agreement with one another on a lot of policy fields; and both label the transatlantic relationship as the 'cornerstone' of their policy.

2. Literature review

Exploring transatlantic problems is hardly new. This literature review starts by talking about this discussion of the transatlantic relationship, after which the origin and the development of strategic culture will be analyzed. What follows is a discussion on the main debate on strategic culture literature. Finally, continuity and change in strategic culture is debated.

There is considerable disagreement among scholars regarding the question of the effect of 9/11 and the following WOT on the transatlantic relationship and the possible change in the suggested shared identities of the two partners. Most of these scholars can be divided into two camps: those who claim that 9/11 and the WOT did very little to the transatlantic relationship; and those who insist that these events irreversibly shook the foundations of the seemingly stable relationship. Cox, in his article *Too Big to Fail?* argues that both these camps exaggerate, nonetheless he does state that the transatlantic relationship was indeed weakened by the 9/11 attacks. The transatlantic relationship rests on a specific composition of interests, institutions and identities and looks like, what Deutsch (et al., 1957) halfway of the 20th century called, a 'pluralistic security community'. While certainly not all scholars who have written about this topic share the constructivist base of this 'security community' argument, they do agree that the Western order forms a social structure established on collectively shared norms and values which both creates and organizes the behavior of the US and the EU.

The various mono-causal theories of IR have tried to explain the changes in the transatlantic security relationship post 9/11. While realism and liberalism offer valuable angles of security, both fall short when examining the complexity of security and political narratives. Realism, although primarily concerned with security, is blinded by an overly state-centric perspective. This focus limits the idea of the EU as valuable actor in the transatlantic relationship and fails to account for the increasing relevance of non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations, which limits the methods of study. Critics claim that realism doesn't sufficiently explain national security policy patterns in a dynamic, modernized, international system (Lantis, 2002). In addition, it complies with a more exact positivist ontology. The emphasis of liberalists is on mutual effort, advancement and the expansion of ideas, and not really on the security aspects of the transatlantic relationship. In addition, both theories fail to take identity or culture into consideration (Ibidem).

The most important constructivist argument, when looking at the transatlantic relationship, is that American and European identities and cultures have developed in somewhat different ways. Because of this, the two have different understandings of threat and risk, and therefore, in certain situations choose different security policies (Weidenfeld, 2006). Kagan built his argument on constructivism. In his influential book *Of Paradise and Power*, which can be labeled as one of the most influential and eminent books in the field, Kagan argues that the opposing views of the US and the EU caused different outcomes and policies for the two. According to him, the US is orientated on war and military power, making it a Mars type of actor, where the EU is more focused on non-military

solution to problems, which makes Europe a Venus type of actor in world politics (Kagan, 2003). Kagan doesn't hold high hopes for the transatlantic cooperation in the future. However, his vision is very one sided and seems to have a blind spot for additional important variables within the field of constructivism, such as norms, values, identity and culture.

From as early as the sixth century BCE, when Chinese general Sun Tzu argued the importance of understanding one's enemies and cultural underpinnings of their military strategy (Tzu, 2016), the idea that culture could be an important part of national security and military strategy is stressed (Lantis and Fonseca, 2017). However, it wasn't until 1977 that political scientist Snyder introduced the idea of political culture into the security policy studies and with that developed the theory of 'strategic culture'. He did this in order to help clarify the nuclear strategy of the Soviet Union (Lantis and Howlett, 2016). Although various scholars were influenced by this idea of strategic culture, like Gray and Booth, it wasn't until the 1990's that strategic culture got interest on a large scale in the scholarly field. It was during this time that scholars broadly accepted the notion that the motivation of behavior of states was no longer exclusively influenced by the material world with its restrictions and opportunities, but also by their strategic culture (Glenn, 2009). New constructivist work in the post-Cold-War era accepted and promoted the relevance of "inter-subjective structures that give the material world meaning", this included culture, identity, norms and ideas on state behavior but also on international relations in general (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998, p. 679). This behavior eventually shapes states' identities (Barnett, 2011). Therefore, strategic culture can be defined as the socially constructed framework in which strategic discussion and choices are made. Strategic culture fits well within the constructivist ontology, as strategic culture is a socially constructed framework which focuses on the influence of normative and ideational factors on an actor's strategic decisions and behavior.

There is a lack in internal coherence between strategic culturalist which is confirmed by the large number of definitions (Lantis and Fonseca, 2017). Critics of strategic culture argue that a common definition should be developed during research in this field (Lantis, 2009). The lack of coherence is also illustrated by the debate within the field of strategic culture between Gray, who prefers an interpretivism approach, and Johnston, who prefers a positivist approach. It is a debate about the conceptualization of strategic culture. (Bloomfield, 2012). Johnston came up with three different generations of strategic culture. Although Gray (1999) argues that these generations overlap, this idea has since been accepted by most scholars within the field of strategic culture (Uzman, 2009). Johnston includes Gray in the first generation, as Gray argues that strategic culture should be seen as a context that both shapes behavior and is a constitutive element of that behavior (Gray, 1999). Johnston includes himself in the third generation. In comparison to the other two generations identified by Johnston, he describes this third generation to be "both more rigorous and eclectic in its conceptualization of ideational independent variables, and more narrowly focused on particular strategic decisions as dependent variable" (Johnston, 1995, p. 41)

The first generation provides a ‘holistic’ understanding of the concept of strategic culture as “a context out there that surrounds and gives meaning to strategic behaviour” (Gray, 1999, p. 50). According to Johnston, the first generation of strategic culture was “at the same time underdetermined and overdetermined” (Johnston, 1995, p. 33). By underdetermined he meant that those models lacked a sufficient amount of information in order to be able to conclude if a certain outcome was likely or not. He also found that “many models defined strategic culture, ostensibly an independent variable (something which caused outcomes), as including patterns of strategic behavior. This made the models tautological because strategic behavior was also usually treated as a dependent variable (an outcome)” (Bloomfield, 2012, p. 443). In other words, the separation of dependent and independent variables is seen as a near impossible task. By overdetermined he meant that those models suggested a complete explanation of the strategic behavior of states through the state's strategic culture. While, according to Johnston, there may be alternative causes for that behavior. Hence, they presented a “mechanically deterministic implication that strategic thought led consistently to one type of behaviour” (Johnston, 1996, p. 181). According to Johnston, strategic culture is either an independent variable or an intervening mechanism which clarifies states’ strategic behavior and policy (Johnston, 1995). In addition, the concept of strategic culture within this first generation is said to be rather static which makes it hard to use for cross-national studies (Lantis, 2009). Hence, this first generation is not suitable for the purpose of this thesis. The third generation provides a rather positivist view on the concept, emphasizing the interaction between strategic culture as an independent and strategic decision as a dependent variable, based on a list of competing intervening variables (Ibidem).

The second generation came up as reaction to the dangers of ending up with ‘caricatures of culture’. Johnston (1995, p. 39) states that this generation is based on “the premise that there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper motives for what in fact they do”. According to this generation, strategic culture didn’t have much effect on strategic behavior or policy (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). This second generation’s main focus is on the connection between military doctrine and contemporary societal norms. It doesn’t really take into account the historic context, while the other generations stress the importance of this. According to Johnston (1995, p. 39), this generation provides a critical view on the concept as a “tool of political hegemony in the field of strategic decision-making”. This approach to strategic culture research has not gotten much attention over the years and is also not relevant for this thesis.

This thesis will be based on the third generation strategic culture, in which the external shock of 9/11 caused a change in strategic culture of the US and influenced the security strategy of the country. Also, because of the lack of this external shock in the European Union, the strategic culture there didn’t experience a sudden change in strategic culture after the attacks of 9/11. In comparison to the first two generations, this third generation proves most suitable because of its capacity to:

[...] consider other aspects of state policy, not just those relating to military factors, which may be influenced by culture. This can involve an attempt both to widen the notion of security beyond

military matters and to investigate how such concerns are influenced by culture (Howlett & Glenn, 2005, p. 124).

In this thesis the complete security policies of the US and the EU will be analyzed, this includes more security matters than strictly military ones. Alternative variables, such as the change in presidents in the US and the expansion of the European Union, are therefore not taken into consideration when drawing conclusions.

Another significant theme within the field of strategic culture, is whether it is in fact static or dynamic. Although the focus of most studies within strategic culture is not on change but on continuity of the behavior of actors, there is a general consensus regarding the idea of external shocks causing change in an actor's strategic culture (Lantis and Fonseca, 2017). Snyder's definition of strategic culture in 1977 as "a set of semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns socialized into a distinctive mode of thought" influenced the tone for decades of studies in the field (Snyder, 1997, p. 8). However, more contemporary studies stress the dynamic qualities of strategic culture (Lantis and Fonseca, 2017). According to constructivist security studies, both strategic cultural orientations as well as security contexts are mutually constructive; and in some cases, can create ideational constraints for behaviors of states. According to Kartchner (2009), there is a set of conditions that can create an increasingly important role for strategic culture in state behavior. This, for example, includes cases "when there is a strong sense of threat to a group's existence, identity or resources, or when the group believes that it is at a critical disadvantage to other groups . . . when there is a pre-existing strong cultural basis for group identity . . . [and] when historical experiences strongly predispose the group to perceive threats" (Lantis and Howlett, 2006, p. 91). Strategic culture is shaped by a shared historical memory, various political institutions and multilateral agreements and hence security policies can change over time. Lantis (2002) states that these ideas, communications and behaviors shape identities and beliefs over time but that these can be fundamentally challenged due to the undermining of historical narratives when influenced by external shocks. Examples are dramatic events or traumatic experiences, such as the 9/11 attacks. Such an external shock damages the culture to create necessary responses to the given situation. This can cause short- and long-term changes in perspectives (*ibidem*). This thesis builds on this existing argument that external shocks can indeed cause strategic cultures to change and hence influence state behavior and policy in strategic documents. However, there is a gap in the literature in regard to what happens in the mid- to long term period after such a shock. After the strategic culture of an actor changes significantly due to such an external shock, does this strategic culture stay at this new state? Or does it slowly shift back to the pre-shock state of strategic culture? In this thesis, a single case will be analyzed, and this knowledge might reflect on a broader population of cases other than the case of the US. It might be a good starting point for new research on the topic of a shift of strategic culture after the initial external shock has passed.

3. Theoretical and conceptual framework

This section presents the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis. The framework forms the basis of the argument by discussing constructivism as an approach, and strategic culture as the applied theoretical framework.

3.1 Constructivist debate

The course of the transatlantic relationship post-9/11 and the WOT that followed have been subject to debate in the world of academia. An approach in trying to understand the influence of the suggested change in strategic culture after the 9/11 attacks on the transatlantic relationship fits within the argument of constructivism. This link between the strategic culture and constructivism is constructed by prioritizing the concepts of identity and culture (Fierke, 2013). Looking at world politics through a constructivist view, a structure is a collection of set principles and norms, which restrains the attitude of actors. Content analysis is often associated with constructivism and usually focuses on the construction of social realities through language and the use of language. From there it is only a small step to the proposition that researchers also construct a (social) reality through their specific use of language (Smith, 1998). For constructivism, an eminent question is in which ways a given action could, or could not, give structure to an actor (Kaufman and Dorman, 2011). Hopf (1998, p. 173) states:

Meaningful behavior, or action, is possible only within an inter-subjective social context. Actors develop their relations with, and understanding of, others through the media of norms and practices. In the absence of norms, exercises of power, or actions, it would be devoid of meaning. Constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions that will cause Others to organize that identity and respond to it appropriately.

When trying to analyze the transatlantic relationship through constructivism, it's important to consider the political identity and culture of the US and the EU; and investigate how this identity and culture influenced their behavior and with that their relationship. The big external shock of 9/11 fundamentally challenged the existing strategic cultures, especially in the US. Therefore, the Atlantic partners don't necessarily share the same preferences because of self-defined identities within the bigger international and transatlantic context in the post-9/11 era. This could be a reason for the two to be heading in diverging or converging directions. The effect of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was more ideational than material for the US. In a 2001 speech following the attacks, President Bush (2001, p. 1) claimed, "no civilized nation can be secure in a world threatened by terror". The 9/11 attacks caused the US to stress the importance of the terrorist threat to the free world. These attacks brought the matter of terrorism on the forefront of Western security thinking (Booth and Wheeler, 2013). Bush introduced the term Global War On Terror to address the countries' foreign policy on bringing down the existential threat of terrorism in addition to the militant organizations responsible for it. The cognitive shock of the American people caused the strategic culture of the US to change. In line with

the argument made by Lanis (2002, 2006 and 2017), Farrell (2001) and Fonseca (2017), this external shock, and resulting change in strategic culture, had effect on the security policy of the US.

3.2 Theoretical Framework: Strategic Culture

In the field of IR, the concept of strategic culture is increasingly being used. Although it is usually applied to states, it can also be applied to non-state actors (Lantis, 2006). Strategic culture provides an analytical lens through which to analyze the continuities and changes at the basis of international crises and the motivation of an actors actions. The underlying central assumption embedded within this concept is “the belief that traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and historical experience shape strategic behavior and actual policy making” (Toje, 2005, p.11). This is mainly the case in the context of trying to clarify “the distinctive strategic behaviors of states through reference to their unique strategic properties” (Lock, 2017, p. 3). Lantis (2002) gives us important concepts for the research on the transatlantic relationship and the culture of the US and the EU. The hypothetical basis of security policy is underlined as a product of political and strategic culture. This culture is represented in explanatory codes of language and symbolism and is a result of history and of geographical circumstances. Culture exists of a set of ideas, beliefs and values of individuals and of collectives and include ideas of the political world that decide which problems are identified and highlighted, in what ways these problems are seen and in what way they are dealt with (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). As stressed in the literature review, the curiosity of various constructivist scholars during the 1990s on the influence of cultural factors, norms and ideas on international security created a new interest in strategic culture (Lantis and Howlett, 2016). Strategic culture fits well within this constructivist ontology, as strategic culture is an analytical framework which focuses on the influence of normative and ideational factors on an actor’s strategic decisions and behavior. Constructivism gives an interpretation of culture as a system which is constantly changing though collective meaning to the studies of security. This system influences ideas, communications and behavior which evolve into policy (Hudson, 1997).

When analyzing the transatlantic relationship, the dominant culture within the US is expected to change due to the traumatic experience of the 9/11 attacks. This shock is expected to be much less significant within the EU and therefore the dominant culture would be expected to resist change. The 9/11 attacks could have fundamentally challenged the existing beliefs within the US and therefore undermine the historical narratives within the transatlantic relationship which could have caused the two powers to diverge during the first benchmark. Accepting the fact that strategic cultures are dynamic, as the external shock passes, the strategic culture could shift back towards its original state; or continue to shift in the direction it has been caused by the initial external shock. Because of the lack of literature on phenomenon, no hypothesis can be drawn upon the presumed direction of this shift. What follows is the question how this suggested change in strategic culture influenced the policy of

the countries, meaning the strategic decision-making in relative long-term contexts, for instance those strategic attitudes in national security strategy reports (Bloomfield, 2012).

Based on the theoretical framework above, one would expect that during the first benchmark, right after the 9/11 attacks, the transatlantic relationship was under pressure. Also, the use of the keywords is assumed not to be in sync between the policy documents of the first benchmark. Lastly, the tone of voice, topics and ideas are not assumed to be in sync between the policy documents of the first benchmark. This thesis aims to analyze what happened regarding these topics mentioned above during the second benchmark. Due to a gap in the existing literature, no expectations regarding this second benchmark can be made.

4. Methodology

4.1 Data selection

In order to come to a consensus to what extent the strategic culture and the resulting security policies of the EU and the US changed between 2002 and 2010; and how this influenced the transatlantic relationship, the most important sources to look at are relevant security policy documents. This because of the suggested influence of strategic culture on security policies of actors. The population of texts identified are the NSS documents of 2002 and 2010, the ESS of 2003 and the CFSP document of 2009. These documents serve as a tool to compare the security practices and identities of both transatlantic partners. Unfortunately, 2003 is the only year the EU published the ESS and in that year the Bush Administration failed to produce an NSS document, hence the 2002 NSS was identified as suitable alternative.

This first benchmark was chosen because the suggested external shock of 9/11 was still fresh at that point. The year 2010 is the second benchmark, almost a decade after the 9/11 attacks. The CFSP document of 2009 came out halfway 2010, at the same time as the NSS document of that year and looks at the same period. These documents will therefore serve as a good moment in time to compare their security practices and identities both to those of the first benchmark as well as to each other. These documents were chosen because they show how the countries narrate their identities across the internal/external division through the most crucial security- and foreign policy objectives and practices of the two powers in the given years.

Due to the special political circumstances in which the ESS of 2003 came about, its publication was followed by multiple analyses that compared it with the NSS issued by the Bush administration the year before. These political circumstances were exceptional due to the political pressure caused by the war in Iraq. It raises the question if the two documents are indeed comparable. This does seem to be the case as: “Christoph Heusgen, then Director of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, is reported to have said that the title and acronym of the ESS was chosen deliberately because comparisons with the US version were not only inevitable but also what the Member States intended” (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). The EU took the NSS as an example for their own strategy. The recording unit of the documents will be the whole text of all four documents. Although some chapters might be more relevant for comparing applicable policy objectives than others, the whole document will be analyzed. This method was chosen in order to take into consideration the tone of voice throughout the whole document. In addition, in order to determine the frequency of the chosen keywords in the documents, the whole document should be analyzed.

4.2 Content analysis

The documents will be subjected to content analysis. According to Halperin and Heath (2017, p. 345) “content analysis involves the systematic analysis of textual information”. It is an unobtrusive method of collecting data and by using this method researchers can reduce bias. Obstructive methods, such as interviews and surveys, are prone to the ‘Heisenberg Effect’, this is the inclination for people to change their behavior when they know they are being observed. In addition, people can be expected to participate in all forms of interviews with biases and prejudices. But researchers join into interviews with certain biases and prejudices which can distort the process just as well (Halperin and Heath, 2017). However, there are also limitations to content analysis. These limitations primarily lie in its descriptive nature. Content analysis can only create data that allows for inferences and consequently reduces the ability to generalize the theory.

According to Alvares-Benito and Inigo-Mora (2009), the effects of political communication are not important if the audience of that communication is not receptive. As Fierke states “Language use is part of acting in the world” (2013, p. 179). If it wasn’t for language, it would be impossible to communicate with one another, give content to objects or acts, determine personal thoughts or declare emotions. Accordingly, this thesis will not only take into account the content and historical context of the messages in the primary sources, but also the intended audience, channel and connection to other texts and events. Although, as will be shown, all documents have a specific audience, they are easily accessible to the public.

The research question suggests a causal inference, in which there apparently is a causal cause of X , the 9/11 attacks, which supposedly causes Y , change in the transatlantic security relationship in case Z , the post 9/11 era (Mahony, 2015). Strategic culture is the mechanism (M), because a change in this increases the likelihood of X indeed causing Y . The causal line will therefore be as follows: $X \rightarrow M \rightarrow Y$. In order to determine whether this is indeed the case, I will analyze to what extent the security objectives of both the United States and the European Union have changed between 2002 and 2010, when looking at the NSS documents of 2002 and 2010, the ESS of 2003 and the CFSP document of 2009. The tone of voice and the use of words will be analyzed to determine if there was indeed a change in strategic culture. In order to determine whether or not the relationship was in decline, a set of rules was developed to ensure the reliability of the coding. The data will be analyzed in both a quantitative and qualitative manner and involves identifying themes that arise from the data. The objects of the qualitative observation will be latent content, the focus will therefore be on meaning, motives and purposes of political action embedded within the various policy texts. One indicator of identity or culture shift is the language adopted in official rhetoric (Halperin and Heath, 2017). The data will also be analyzed in a quantitative manner. The criteria used to measure the change are to look at the frequency of certain chosen keywords. When analyzing the number of times these words are used in the various documents, the different lengths of the policy documents will have to be taken into consideration. The keywords were chosen through a selection from the four policy

documents used in this paper by manual reading and coding by relevance to security, identity, culture; and to frequency. The keywords identified during this process are: *war(s)/warfare*, *Preempt/preemption/Preemptive(ly)*, *friend(s)/allies/ally/partner(s)*, *enemy/enemies*.

4.3 Documents United States

The policy documents looked at for the United States are the NSS reports published in 2002 and 2010. These documents showcase the most crucial security- and foreign policy objectives of the country in the given years. The NSS documents are supposed to be published every year to communicate the strategic vision of the government to Congress. In addition, the audience of the NSS documents include the citizens of the US and foreign governments (Snider, 1995). Although the US government is obligated to publish an NSS report every year, looking at the published NSS documents it becomes clear that these reports are consequently submitted past the deadline or not at all (US Department of State).

Evidently, these reports need to be observed in the context of the period they were published in. The NSS reports of 2002, published right after 9/11, and 2010, published almost a decade after these attacks. These moments will be the benchmarks in time to compare whether or not US foreign policy objectives and the identity changed or if a continuity can be observed in the given period. These NSS reports are outputs of internal policy discussions and agreement of the presidents and their administrations and will serve as primary sources for breaking down US foreign security policy objectives and identities. The NSS reports are public, therefore it is interesting to analyze what the White House wants the world to read and know.

According to Gupta (2008, p. 182), the 2002 NSS, "...represents a set of foreign policy guidelines outlining a new phase in US foreign policy that would henceforth place a greater emphasis on military pre-emption, military superiority, unilateral action, and a commitment to 'extending military democracy, liberty, and security to all regions.'" The timing of the 2002 NSS was particularly important. The US was still processing the devastating 9/11 attacks. Various policy analysts looked at this NSS as a way of determining the direction of the security and defense policy of the United States to the renewed terrorist threat. What this NSS of 2002 suggested was that there was an acknowledged need for the US to deter and defend against threats like terrorist attacks, rogue states and proliferation of WMD's. According to Gaddis (2002, p. 51) "The first major innovation [of the 2002 NSS], is Bush's equation of terrorists with tyrants as sources of danger, an obvious outgrowth of September 11". This assertion of belief that terrorists are the greatest threat to the national security of the US, created a shift towards the concept of military preemption. This was seen by many of these analysts as an uncompromising departure from previous American defense and security policies; and hence a great shift in strategic culture (McGuire, 2009; Gaddis 2002). Laying the 1999 NSS of the Clinton administration next to this 2002 Bush NSS, the differences are revealing. The Bush NSS puts forward

three tasks: "We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent" (Bush, 2002). The three goals the Clinton administration set in the NSS of 1999 were "To enhance America's security. To bolster America's economic prosperity. To promote democracy and human rights abroad" (NSS, 1999, p. iii). Even comparing these, the NSS of 2002 is notably more forceful than the NSS of 1999 (Gaddis, 2002). This thesis builds upon this belief that there was indeed a shift in strategic culture as a result of the attacks of 9/11.

According to Snider, the NSS documents are broadly accepted as valid for effective political discourse on issues affecting the nation's security, as "the Congress and the Executive need a common understanding of the strategic environment and the administration's intent as a starting point for future dialogue" (Snider, 1995).

4.4 Documents European Union

For the purpose of this thesis, the European side of the transatlantic relationship is represented as the European Union. Unmistakably, the various countries on the European continent have different goals and visions when it comes to their foreign security policy objectives and their identity. However, the twenty-five countries in the Union did come to a consensus on a common foreign and security policy as presented in the ESS in 2003, titled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'. The ESS analyses and defines the security environment of the European Union and identified essential security questions in addition to political suggestions for the Union and will serve as a main source from the first chosen benchmark in time. This ESS was only published once but did serve as a conceptual framework for the CFSP, which has been published annually from 2009 onwards. This CFSP document came out at the same time as the NSS document of 2010 and serves as a good comparison on the other side of the Atlantic. These documents are a valuable public source of information regarding the common foreign and security policy, measuring of activities and views and showcasing the main choices of the Union in the given years. The audience of the documents are primarily the governments of the countries of the European Union and US officials. In addition, the audience of the ESS and CFSP documents include the citizens of the European Union and additional foreign governments.

The political circumstances in which the ESS of 2003 was constructed were exceptional due to the political pressure caused by the war in Iraq. According to Andersson et al. (2011, p. 18) "... surely the most obvious factor behind the initiation of an ESS process was the US invasion of Iraq, sparking a crisis in Europe and testing the coherence of the EU". The invasion caused a deep and unexpected perception of crisis. This caused fractures between the EU members but also between the EU and the US. After the Iraq crisis, it was widely recognized within the EU that the lack of a shared threat assessment had a negative effect on the relationship between the various European countries and hence created a sharp division within the EU. As a result, the EU leaders assigned the High Representative

for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, to draw up a security strategy for the European Union. The ESS was presented in order to restore harmony within the Union and to declare some sort of unity with the US (Ward and Hackett, 2003). The ESS stresses four main threats to the Union's security: failed states, organized crime, WMD proliferation and strategic terrorism (European Union, 2013). This agenda matched the US's strategy. According to Ward and Hackett, the political inspiration of the ESS was indeed partly to reduce the transatlantic divisions. The US officials saw the ESS as a gradual shift of the position of the EU towards the US. However, although the EU's position in the ESS may indeed agree with the US when it comes to the most important security threats, the policy conclusions emphasized in the ESS are unmistakably 'European' (Ward and Hackett, 2003).

The CFSP was a result of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009. Just like the ESS, the CFSP got published in order to set up a foreign policy agenda for the European Union, but the CFSP was much more extensive than the ESS was. The 2009 CFSP came out in 2010; and includes information up until publication in 2010. The year 2010 was a milestone for European foreign policy with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the founding of the European External Action Service. The Council of the European Union emphasized that it became clear once more why the Union needs a European foreign policy in the first place. The CFSP mentions that the Union is increasingly facing inter-connected threats such as terrorism, proliferation, failed states, organized crime, regional conflicts in addition to security threats related to climate change and disruption to energy supplies (Council of the European Union, 2011).

Seeing as these European documents are comparable in function, these are also accepted as valid for effective political discourse on issues affecting the security of the actor.

5. Analysis policy documents of benchmark 1

5.1 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*

As mentioned before, it is of great importance to understand the contextual situation the various policy documents came out in. The NSS of 2002 came out in September of that year, about a year after the 9/11 attacks and the start of the WOT, but pre-Iraq war (Booth and Wheeler, 2013). The document identified terrorism as the greatest source of threat to the security of the country. This threat was suggested to come from two sides: terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, which emerged due to the miseries and suppressed groups within weak states, and those states that want to develop WMD's. The fundamental goals of the United States, as given by Bush in this NSS, are peace, prosperity and liberty (NSS, 2002).

When analyzing the document, the aggressive, realist tone of it becomes evident. In line with Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, in which great powers pursue global hegemony as a way of increasing their security and freedom of action, the policy in the NSS of 2002 was influenced by a desire to expand US hegemony and spread democracy (Mearsheimer, 2001). Words such as 'evil', 'war', 'enemies of civilization', 'balance of power' and 'rogue states' are a clear evidence of this hawkish tone. Some of the above words were recognized as keywords and will be emphasized further on in this - and the next - chapter. Another example of this tone is part of a speech given by Bush just three days after the 9/11 attacks; and copied in the NSS document:

[...] Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing (Bush, 2001).

The NSS suggest that the answer to these attacks, and rid the world of that evil, would primarily be strong military power. It emphasized the goal to prolong the strength of the American military and "disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances" (NSS, 2002, p. 5). In other words, the focus of the repercussions of the terrorist attacks and other threats is by strengthening their military and conducting military actions. While the document mentions that the United States will strive to do this with support of the international community, they make a very clear statement that they would "not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country" (NSS, 2002, p. 6). In order to deal with the current security threats at the time, preemptive methods are proposed. Bush's administration officially advocated preemption to address the threat stateless and militant terrorist groups posed. Preemption is a controlling strategy in which one assumes the adversary will use force and therefore chooses to deal with the problem before it becomes a crisis. Preemption will guide an

irrevocable move from peace to war, despite the enemy's actual intentions (Freedman, 2003). Although preemptive measures had been conducted before, the way in which the US' military shaped it in this period was a new form of preemption. Where preemption had been introduced in connection with the danger which WMD pose, US threats suggest additional considerations. For instance, no preemptive action was suggested against North Korea, who also possessed WMD's. The preventive case against Iraq was based, for legal and political reasons, on its noncompliance with United Nations (UN) resolutions (Freedman, 2003). Preemptive actions were also presented as the solution to bring peace and stability to certain regions in the world; and with that combat terrorism.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively (NSS, 2002, p. 15).

Another key focus of the US reflected in the NSS document is the threat of WMD's. Where the threat during the Cold War was from by the Soviet Union, the threat in this day and age came from rogue states and terrorists (NSS, 2002). Proactive counterproliferation efforts are promoted to combat WMD and the US will not let their enemies strike first. According to the US, the situation they found themselves in, justified the use of these preemptive tactics (NSS, 2002). The Bush administration stated that they felt preemptive strategies were a necessary change in the countries' method of warfare as the nature of the threats was also evolving. Where deterrence was a successful tool during the Cold War, this was no longer effective in the new fight against global reaching terrorism:

But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations (NSS, 2002, p. 15).

In the thirty-five-page document, another focus in trying to deal with the sensitive security issues throughout the world is on the importance of friends and allies. This cooperation with allies can be done either through bilateral agreements or through cooperation in the various international institutions. The international institution mentioned most prominently in the document is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the strongest of the world. Emphasized is that NATO needs to be drastically reformed. It links the transatlantic relationship to their relationship through NATO. It suggests that the challenges to come for the transatlantic partners should be prepared for through cooperation within NATO. This suggests that the US prefers NATO alliances regarding particular missions, affairs or concerns over the broad and continuous transatlantic relationship. The relationship between the US and their allies in the sphere of security is primarily focused on military force (NSS, 2002).

Throughout the NSS, the US makes clear that it feels that their military power and military involvement abroad is some sort of proof or symbol of their alliance with their friends. The NSS document emphasizes the necessity of American rule as an undisputed aspect of the US' foreign policy. The document doesn't shy away from making clear that they are not afraid to use force to defend both themselves and their allies and friends. When reading through the document, there lies great emphasis on 'us' versus 'them'. This is expressed through words such as allies, friends and enemies, which were chosen as keywords. The keywords *friend(s)/allies/ally/partner(s)* were used a total of forty-seven times in the NSS document of 2002. The words *enemy/enemies* are used a total of twenty-six times (NSS, 2002).

Although the primary focus is indeed on strong military power, the NSS serves us with some alternatives. Firstly, it mentions the importance of disrupting the money streams of terrorist organizations, but also mentions that this will only be successful if the various regions help achieving a cumulative effect. In addition, it is stated that effective public diplomacy and better integrated intelligence services could potentially help reach the goal of disrupting and destroying terrorist organizations. But it is not more than mentioned, as very little attention is focused on those methods (NSS, 2002).

The document doesn't shy away from emphasizing the leading role of the US. The Bush administration stresses that: "the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence" (NSS, p. iv). The NSS document is based on this perception that the country is at a superior position in comparison to all other countries in the world. The countries' approach in this NSS document has been constructed by a belief in American exceptionalism: a belief that its political and moral values are superior to those of any other country or region in the world and hence justifies its position of leader. For example, its proclamation that it is not afraid to act alone if needed is something only someone who sees themselves as being superior over others would say. This feeling of 'superiority' has given the US a sense of responsibility in the world. For instance, the need to spread democracy, and a belief that its behavior is truly in the interests of the whole of humanity. The Bush administration stresses the importance of promoting democracy in various regions of the world. The NSS emphasizes that the US has a responsibility to do this, either by democracy formation or by helping newly formed democracies. In this document, the Bush administration makes a link between democracy and security in their anti-terrorist policy, which suggested democracy as a crucial condition for the creation of security. It is stated in the NSS that in order to guarantee the security of the people of the US, the country should promote democracy throughout the world. This is also mentioned as a justification to act preemptively. Intervention is presented as the solution to bring peace and stability to certain regions in the world; and with that combat terrorism (NSS, 2002). They use this belief of being a 'great power' to justify the use of both their technological as well as material power and hence created a national security culture that privileges a strong military response. This military response has become the go-to strategy for the US as superpower to resolve problems on the international stage. The attacks

of 9/11 made the US willing to use its military power preemptively against, what they perceive to be, their biggest threats.

In conclusion, according to the Bush administration, terrorism is the biggest source of threat to the national security of the US. The document presents detailed solutions to the threats laid out. The Bush administration uses a hawkish tone of voice and a realist view in the NSS document of 2002. What becomes evident, is the self-defined identity of the US being the greatest power of them all. This idea of enjoying a superior position within the bigger international and transatlantic context can serve as an explanation for the security strategy of the country.

5.2 The European Security Strategy 2003

The ESS came out in December of 2003 and was based on the NSS documents of the United States (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). After the events of 9/11, in combination with the mutual differences within the European Union in regard to the Iraq crisis, the EU acknowledged the need of having a common strategy. This document marked the Unions coming of age as a strategic, important actor, planning to comprise and communicate its ambitions to evolve into one and also to be recognized as such. In other words, the EU recognized the importance of acting as one. It is recognized as the first broad form of communication of the Union's wish to become a security actor, creating a status symbol in itself (Briljavac, 2011). The document joyfully labels Europe as a successful peace project by stating that "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free", and takes pride in and credit for having created "a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history" due to for instance its enlargement policy (ESS, 2003, p. 1).

The ESS is in agreement with the NSS of 2002 in regard to the threat global terrorism poses to national and global security, when stating that this threat is indeed great and should not be underestimated. The document emphasizes that terrorism is a threat to human lives, causes large costs for countries and undermines its openness and tolerance. In addition, terrorism increasingly poses a strategic threat to the European continent because the terrorist networks are well-armed, well-resourced and are willing to go to extreme violent lengths to cause large numbers of casualties (ESS, 2003). However, in contrast to the NSS, the ESS suggests different strategies to challenge that threat. When focusing on the settlement of disputes, the ESS stresses the importance of doing this in a peaceful manner while the NSS suggests military solutions. In addition, the document emphasizes the importance of collaboration through international institutions with the aim to collectively challenge the global fight against terrorism, as the EU feels "There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own" (ESS, 2003, p. 13). What becomes clear when reading through this document, is the progressive rhetoric advertising harmony, peace, international collaboration and international

institutions. The focus is more of the future, not so much on fixing what happened in the past. This stands in sheer contrast with the negative, hawkish tone of the NSS of 2002.

When looking at the frequency of the keywords *war(s)/warfare* in this document in comparison to the NSS document of 2002, the following observation can be made (taking into consideration that the ESS document consists of fourteen pages and the NSS document of thirty-one pages): the words *war(s)/warfare* are only used six times in the ESS document; and in four of these cases the word was used in the context of the Cold War. In the NSS document, the word ‘war’ is used thirty-nine times; nine of which were used in the context of the Cold War, World War or the Gulf War. Even when taking into consideration that the NSS document is a little over double the length of the ESS document, this is a significant difference because in the NSS it was used thirty times in thirty-one pages and in the ESS two times in fourteen pages. This is an apparent exemplification of both the discrepancy in the use of language in the two documents as well as the US’ and EU’s view on the world at that time. For instance, the EU held back from labeling the actions against the global threat of terrorism a ‘war’ on terror (Kaunert and Léonard, 2018). In fact, ‘War On Terror(ism)’ doesn’t get mentioned once in the ESS document, while in the NSS document this gets mentioned eleven times. It becomes evident that the ESS avoids explicitly appealing to the use of force (ESS, 2003).

Another difference in view between the two documents is in regard to the amount of responsibility taken when analyzing terrorism as a whole. Where the NSS clearly talks about ‘us’ versus ‘them’, the ESS recognized that it isn’t only a target of global terrorism, but that the EU is also a base of terrorism: “Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium” (ESS, 2003, p. 3). This ‘us’ versus ‘them’ sentiment is emphasized in the NSS document with words such as allies, friends and enemies. As mentioned before, the keywords *friend(s)/allies/ally/partner(s)* were used a total of forty-seven times in the NSS document of 2002, in the ESS document of 2003 these words are only used six times. The keywords *enemy/enemies* are used a total of twenty-six times in the NSS document but isn’t used once in the ESS document. This is still a big difference when taking into consideration that the NSS document is a little over twice the length of the ESS document and suggests that the EU isn’t focused as much on this ‘us’ (friends/allies) versus ‘them’ (enemies) sentiment. Also, the ESS document approaches terrorism in a different way. The EU focusses much more on the core causes of terrorism, again accepting their own role in this, and analyzing the complex constructions making terrorism possible and emphasizing their priority to prevent further terrorism. The quote taken from the ESS document below clearly showcases this:

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society. (ESS, 2002, p. 3).

This stands in sheer contrast with the US’ vision to fight it preemptively. The keywords *Preempt/preemption/Preemptive(ly)* are used a total of seven times in the NSS 2002 document, while it

does not get mentioned once in the ESS document of 2003. The reason why the US responds to terrorism this way is because they believe that the threat terrorism poses is purely military and therefore should be combated with military means. The content of the ESS is not in line with this approach to terrorism when it states that “none of the new threats is purely military: nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (ESS, 2003, p. 7). A mixture of economic-intelligence-, police-, judicial-, military- and additional instruments is proposed. In addition, the European Union stresses the importance of the humanitarian side, such as the situation of the inhabitants of those regions, when fighting terrorism; and that countries involved in this should comply with the ‘rule of law’ (ESS, 2003).

What becomes clear when analyzing the ESS document, is the wish of the European Union to act together with other countries and organizations. The Union makes clear that the chances of success are greater when joining forces. The ‘motto’ of the ESS seems to be ‘effective multilateralism’. This effective multilateralism is seen as a means to provide the foundation for an international order. In order to reach this, there needs to be a rule-based international order, effective international institutions and a more powerful international society. In 2002, the French prime minister Lionel Jospin stated that "Our conception of the world aims at building a more balanced international community, a safer and fairer world. This conception is based on a multilateral approach" (Jospin, 2002). This suggests the EU's displeasure with the US' growing unilateralism. As the ASIL Annual Meeting program states in their description for their panel in 2002 stated that American foreign policy has been "decidedly unilateral in recent years" (Alford and O'Connell, 2002). Although the dominant position of the US as a military actor is acknowledged, it is also frowned upon when the ESS states that “no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own” and suggests to “share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (ESS, 2003, p. 1). The emphasis is on the fear of the US acting alone as hegemon of the world. Although in the document the critical role which the United States plays within the international system is acknowledged, it states that the US cannot, and should not, be the sole dominator. This seems like a direct response to the part in the NSS 2002 document where the Bush administration states the country will not shy away from acting alone if support stays out (NSS, 2002). In the ESS, the transatlantic relationship is labeled as irreplaceable, and is said to strengthen the international community as a whole (ESS, 2003). In the NSS document, this transatlantic relationship was solely mentioned in relation to NATO.

In conclusion, the ESS is a document with a liberal view. It showcases quite an absolutist idea of security, where the EU seems to expect security to be an achievable state. The importance of harmonious disputes resolutions and of international collaboration is stressed throughout the document. Not purely military instruments, but a mixture of various instruments, such as economic- intelligence- judicial-, political diplomatic- means is suggested. The document puts an emphasis on spreading good governance, in particular rule of law, the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy in general. The EU's strategic culture is based on a broad vision of security and on a multilateral and

internationally legitimated attitude to threats. It recognizes complexity, its own responsibility, trade-offs and interconnections. As mentioned before in the theoretical framework, these values, attitudes, patterns of behavior and experiences shape strategic behavior and actual policy making (Bloomfield, 2012).

6. Analysis policy documents of benchmark 2

6.1 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2010*

The NSS document of May 2010 was the first one of the Obama administration. The focus of the policy document, to large extent, was on durable solutions to the threat of terrorism, focusing on post-conflict stabilization and on sustainable development. The fundamental focus of the US was not only on peace, prosperity and liberty, but also “[a]n international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges” (NSS, 2010, p. 7).

Throughout the 2010 document, Obama stresses the difference in approach of his administration from that of his predecessor. Obama emphasized diplomacy and a multilateral approach rather than a unilateral approach. This multilateral approach is intended to face challenges such as insurgency, violent and destructive extremism, but also to end the threat of WMD, fight climate change and maintain global growth. In line with the 2002 NSS, the promotion of American values is advocated; and an additional clause was added to stress the importance of never compromising these values, not even when it concerns the security sphere. This clause is added to take a stance against several incidents under the Bush administration during the war in Iraq and in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. In both cases, disproportionate torture of detainees was recorded. In this clause it is advocated that, if force is indeed a necessary instrument, it ought to be used in a way that reflects these American values and hence increases the legitimacy of the country. On his second full day in office, Obama gave orders to close the detention center in Guantanamo Bay (although did not succeed), prohibited the use of disproportional interrogation techniques, such as torture, and to close down the undisclosed network of CIA prisons. He also openly opposed the decision of the Bush administration to use force against Iraq in 2003; and refocused on the complex and lingering conflict in Afghanistan (Gray, 2011). A quote from the 2010 NSS which makes the change in attitude clear is the following: “Over the years, some methods employed in pursuit of our security have compromised our fidelity to the values that we promote and our leadership on their behalf” (Obama, 2010). The language of the 2010 NSS is less hawkish, less provocative, less direct and less piercing than that of 2002. A big change in rhetoric is that there is no longer talk of a ‘War On Terror(ism)’, but a war against a specific network: Al-Qaeda. In the 2010 document, president Obama makes clear that “this is not a global war against a tactic—terrorism or a religion—Islam. We are at war with a specific network, al-Qa’ida, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, and partners” (NSS, 2010, p. 20).

What becomes clear is that the 2010 NSS is much more positive on peacekeeping. It is labeled as one of the key global challenges. Another new focus in the 2010 document is the pursuit of justice. Although, the NSS of 2010 still talks about wanting to defeat Al-Qaeda, this is stressed to be done through justice and not, as the 2002 strategy promoted, by combating them with purely military means. According to the 2010 NSS document, military power will still be relevant as an answer to

these challenges but, in contrast to the 2002 document, alternative instruments such as development, diplomacy in combination with the rule of law are viewed as complementary or even substitutional methods to reach that goal.

Another example of the change in attitude towards the manner in which to deal with terrorism is the fact that the keywords *Preempt/preemption/Preemptive(ly)* weren't used in the 2010 document, while they were used seven times in the document of 2002. The focus in the 2010 document is once more on deterrence and prevention instead of acting preemptively as the quote below suggests:

To this end, we will place renewed emphasis on deterrence and prevention by mobilizing diplomatic action, and use development and security sector assistance to build the capacity of at-risk nations and reduce the appeal of violent extremism (NSS, 2010, p. 46).

While Bush made it very clear in the 2002 NSS that the US will not hesitate to act alone, in the NSS of 2010 the rhetoric is different. In a speech in 2009, Obama stated that “no one nation can meet the challenges of the 21st century on its own, nor dictate its terms to the world” (Obama, 2009). An example of the increased emphasis on cooperation with allies is the increase in the frequency of the keywords *friend(s)/allies/ally/partner(s)*, where these were used forty-seven times in the 2002 document, this number increased to 124 in the 2010 document. Even when taking into consideration that the earlier document consists of less pages, this is still a significant difference. In contrast the use of the keywords *enemy/enemies* decreased from twenty-six to seven, especially taking into consideration that the latter document is longer than the former, this is a telling difference. Apparently, the rhetoric of the NSS has become less focused on ‘us’ versus ‘them’ during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Hence, the NSS of 2010 is more comparable with the ESS of 2003 than the NSS of 2002 regarding this point. In other words, the US in 2010 seems to move towards the EU’s vision in 2003. Also, the relationship with European allies is labeled as the cornerstone for further engagement of the United States with the rest of the world, as well as an incentive for international action (NSS, 2010). This wasn't mentioned as specific in the NSS of 2002.

Although the 2002 NSS already emphasized the importance of engagement in the international system, this is even further stressed in the 2010 document. In the 2010 document, the US mentions it wants to actively participate in international institutions and international relationships and cooperate more with its allies.

Engagement is the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders. It is, quite simply, the opposite of a self-imposed isolation that denies us the ability to shape outcomes. Indeed, America has never succeeded through isolationism (NSS, 2010, p. 11).

But it is also emphasized that many of these institutions need to be reformed and strengthened because at this time they often are inefficient in signaling and addressing new threats. It states that the US should engage more in these international institutions because they are the means through which international standards are set, meetings are facilitated, and friendly associations are made. The Obama administration

emphasized that it doesn't want to keep using international institutions on a primarily ad hoc basis, but want to really get involved (NSS, 2010).

But there are also still obvious continuities in the 2010 policy of the US (NSS, 2010). For instance, threats and strategies identified in the earlier document are still prominent in the latter. Obama confirms that the US is at war by stating that "we are fighting a war against a far-reaching network of hatred and violence" (NSS, 2010, p. 4). However, the keywords *war(s)/warfare* are used a total of forty-one times, of which seventeen were in the context of 'Cold War' or 'World War'. Comparing this to the NSS of 2002, where these words were used a total of thirty-nine times, of which nine in that same context, there is actually an absolute decrease in the frequency of these keywords. Considering the earlier document consists of thirty-one pages and the latter of fifty-two, the relative decrease is even larger.

The quote from Obama (2009) stating that "no one nation can meet the challenges of the 21st century on its own, nor dictate its terms to the world.", discards the idea that the US is superior to the rest and thus the idea that it can act alone. This suggests a change in the strategic culture of the country, as there is a clear difference in values, attitudes and patterns of behavior. Apparently, the historical experiences, such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reshaped the strategic behavior of the country and hence influences the actual policymaking. This NSS doesn't promote military power as the advised solution for the global threats and challenges, but instead looks at cooperation, diplomacy and the rule of law as possible instruments to reach those goals.

6.2 *The European Common Foreign and Security Policy 2009*

The European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of 2009 came out in June of 2010, at the same time as the NSS document of 2010, by the Council of the European Union. It was the first ever annual report from the High representatives, after they got appointed as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon,

In continuity of the ESS of 2003, the CFSP stresses that at the top of the European Union's agenda are still the topics of proliferation and disarmament of WMD, counterterrorism, climate change and energy security. Also, in line with the ESS document, in regard to the military policy, is that the emphasis is on preventing terrorist attacks. They believe this goal can be reached through preventing radicalization and recruitment of possible future terrorists and preventing terrorists from getting funds (CFSP, 2010).

Another continuity is that the CFSP emphasizes the importance of the transatlantic relationship. This document focuses on that relationship even more and states that the transatlantic relation is the cornerstone for the CFSP document (CFSP, 2009). The US used that same metaphor of 'cornerstone' to describe the transatlantic relationship in the NSS of 2010. The EU and the US released a joint

statement in June 2009, which provided the transatlantic framework for collaboration on counterterrorism, which was based on the set of shared values, the rule of law, international law and human rights. This joint statement was a direct result of Obama's call for the closure of Guantanamo Bay, which was welcomed with open arms by the EU. The quote below is taken from the CFSP document and suggests that a collective sense of direction between the EU and the US is necessary in order to collectively tackle the current challenges. The joint transatlantic agenda is more extensive than ever and the ties between the two powers is said to be very important:

Our ties with the US remain as important as ever. In most cases, engagement from both sides of the Atlantic is indispensable to tackling today's challenges, but that can only be achieved where there is also a shared sense of direction (CFSP, 2009, p. 52).

The values, attitudes regarding counter-terrorism and disarmament and patterns of behavior of both the US and the EU have increasingly converged. Hence, this sense of direction seems to have converged since the first benchmark (CFSP, 2009).

The CFSP stresses the importance of cooperation through international institutions as they believe that "Global challenges require global solutions" (CFSP, 2009, p. 24). Engaging in international institutions, such as the UN and NATO, creates a more productive multilateral global order. This focus is even more visible than in the ESS document. The importance of cooperation with allies has not changed significantly when comparing the ESS document with the CFSP document. A way of measuring this is looking at the frequency of the keywords *friend(s)/allies/ally/partner(s)*. Although the frequency of these words increased from six to thirty-nine, these numbers are relatively comparable when considering the ESS document consists of fourteen pages and the CFSP of eighty-four pages. In line with both the ESS document and the NSS of 2010, the CFSP stresses the importance of a more effective multilateral global order. In continuity of the ESS, the keywords *enemy/enemies* are not mentioned a single time in the CFSP (2009).

The focus in the CFSP is still very much on conflict prevention and it emphasizes the role diplomatic mediation and monitoring missions can play in this. Because the focus is on prevention, it makes sense that, just like in the ESS document, the keywords *Preempt/preemption/Preemptive(ly)* are not used in the CFSP document. In fact, the focus is not so much on war but on peacekeeping, human rights and development. This is in line with the objectives of the ESS document. The keywords *war(s)/warfare* are used a total of seven times in the CFSP document, where this was six (of which four in the context of Cold War) in the ESS document. Taking into consideration the varying lengths of the two documents, the relative frequency of the words decreased (CFSP, 2009).

When looking at the values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, achievements and historical experiences, the EU seems to have a continuing strategic behavior which is shown in the policymaking. A lot of continuities can be observed, which suggest a stable strategic culture.

7. Comparison analyzed policy documents

When comparing the two policy documents of the US, the observation is that the country changed its strategic vision and choices on a number of policy areas. First of all, where the 2002 document suggested acting preemptively, the 2010 document promotes prevention and deterrence. Secondly, the former document had a more realistic focus on strong military power influenced by a desire to expand US hegemony and spread democracy, where the latter one stressed the importance of diplomacy and of post-conflict development and stabilization. The NSS of 2002 focuses on power derived from its unparalleled military strength. The means in their strategy include a preemptive war, unilateral action and cooperation with the willing, rather than on traditional alliances, such as the transatlantic relationship, and institutions, such as NATO. Also, in the 2002 NSS the focus was on combating terrorists in the WOT; in the 2010 document the importance of durable solutions and the use of various instruments to win the fight against terrorism is stressed. Another shift in focus is that in 2002 international organizations were viewed more as possible ad hoc solutions where in 2010 there is a lot of talk on reform of the existing international organization in order to make optimal use of these key institutions. Also, the 2010 document suggests a renewed focus on the transatlantic relationship, even calling it the cornerstone for further engagement with the rest of the world. In addition, where the Bush administration advocated the promotion of democracy, the Obama administration suggests the most effective way to promote their values is to live them (NSS, 2010). This suggests a less offensive realist view in which great powers pursue global hegemony as a way of increasing their security and freedom of action (Mearsheimer, 2001). The 2002 document viewed terrorism as the main source of threat to the national security while in the 2010 document there is more emphasis on other threats. However, counterterrorism continued to be among the most important priorities in the NSS of 2010. Lastly, the realist, unilateral, hawkish and military focused 2002 NSS stands in sheer contrast to the countries' 2010 document, which stresses the importance of the rule of law, international cooperation, diplomacy and conflict prevention. The 2002 NSS advocated predominantly hard-power tools, the 2010 document includes soft-power tools to the mix. Looking at world politics through a constructivist view, a structure is a collection of set principles and norms, which restrains the attitude of actors. This collection of set principles and norms has changed in the period between 2002 and 2010. It can be concluded that the strategic culture of the United States shifted quite drastically in the period between 2002 and 2010 when looking at the policy documents influenced by this strategic culture. The attitude, patterns of behavior and values of the US have shifted, and this shaped the strategic behavior and actual policy making.

Comparing the two European cross-benchmark documents, the large number of continuities between the ESS-document of 2003 and the CFSP document of 2009 are evident. Many of the same policy issues are addressed in both documents. The same objectives regarding the importance of conflict prevention and diplomacy, human rights, cooperation through international institutions, development and the rule of law are stressed. An area which gained some interest in the latter

document is the transatlantic relationship. The importance of this relationship gets emphasized substantially more than in the ESS-document. This is in line with the increased interest of this relationship between the US and the EU in the NSS-document of 2010, in comparison to the NSS document of 2002. It seems as if the strategic culture of the European Union has barely changed in the period between 2003 and 2010. Most noticeable is the increased emphasis on the importance of the transatlantic relationship.

When comparing the two documents of the first benchmark, the multilateralism of the EU stands in big contrast with the unilateralism of the US. The EU has developed a clearly defined strategic culture. As mentioned, strategic culture can be defined as the socially constructed framework in which strategic discussion and choices are made. The EU advocates long-term strategies with the goal of conflict prevention and combating terrorism. For this goal some instruments are mentioned, such as trade, diplomacy and cultural contacts. The US, on the other hand, has defined another strategic culture. The US advocates the use of military strength in order to combat terrorism and prevent conflict. The US continuously emphasizes its hegemonic role on the world stage. As a great power, the US sees its political and moral values as superior, and these should therefore be shared with the rest of the world. When comparing these documents, it becomes clear that the different strategic cultures of the EU and the US have resulted in competing approaches in combating terrorism. When looking at the external security of the two, the most obvious difference is the willingness to use force. The US openly admits its willingness to use its military power preemptively in order to combat terrorism and WMD. The EU makes no such suggestion and emphasized the importance of collaboration through international institutions in order to collectively fight against terrorism. The ESS is a document with progressive, peaceful rhetoric, where the NSS of 2002 uses hawkish, conservative rhetoric. While the NSS stresses threats such as terrorism and rogue states with a possibility of getting their hands on WMD, the ESS focuses on WMD as such, along with other threats. One could argue that Americans focus on threats, the EU focuses on challenges. Their strategic choices are a reflection of their strategic culture. In line with the argument made by Lanis (2002, 2006 and 2017), Farrell (2001) and Fonseca (2017), the external shock, and resulting change in strategic culture, had effect on the security policy of the US.

When comparing the two documents of the second cross-benchmark, quite some similarities can be found. For instance, while Bush refusing to sign the Kyoto protocol caused some tension between the US and the EU back in 2001; and marked a significant divergence between the views of the two powers on how to deal with the climate change problems, the increasing focus on climate change and the aim to slow down global warming in the NSS document of 2010 can be seen as the two increasingly converging in regards to the topic of global warming. Another similarity is that both the CFSP and the NSS emphasize the importance of the transatlantic relationship, and even use the same metaphor of 'cornerstone' for this relationship. Both powers also stress the importance of cooperation through international institutions. Both documents talk about the threat of terrorism and of WMD's. The

suggested solutions discussed in the documents are also in line with one another and both the EU and the US suggest a multilateral approach to face these challenges. The importance of diplomacy, the rule of law and cooperation is emphasized. These instruments are also suggested for other important issues on the agenda's, such as fighting climate change and maintaining global growth. The strategic behavior and actual security policy of the EU and de US has converged in first decade following the 9/11 attacks. This is a representation of their strategic culture, which albeit suggest being more alike than during the first benchmark.

Conclusion

In order to answer the identified research question: to what extent did the change in strategic culture and the resulting security policies of the EU and the US change between 2002 and 2010; and how did this shape the transatlantic relationship in the post 9/11 era?, this thesis began by emphasizing the shared identity and culture between Europe and the United States on which the transatlantic relationship was built. It continued by pointing out that the 9/11 attacks did indeed cause an external shock which changed the strategic culture of the United States. This shock was not experienced as such in the European Union, hence the strategic culture of the EU suggested not to have experienced a big change as a result of 9/11. As a measurement of that strategic culture, various policy documents of the US and the EU were analyzed. The documents were chosen from two pinpointed benchmarks: one right after 9/11, when the external shock was still fresh, and the second benchmark almost a decade after the 9/11 attacks.

Based on the observed policy documents and the chosen research design, the security strategies of the EU and the US in the period directly after the attacks of 9/11 and the following WOT were predominantly not in agreement with one another. The US suggested acting preemptively and stated not to be afraid to act alone if help stayed out. The EU, on the other hand, emphasized the need to stand united and indirectly emphasized their fear of the US using their hegemonic position to act alone. As stated before, the multilateralism in the ESS of 2003 stands in contrast with the unilateralism of the 2002 NSS. The transatlantic relationship was challenged because their security strategies were not in sync. Therefore, during the first benchmark the transatlantic relationship was weakened based on the security strategies of the US and the EU. When analyzing the relative frequency of the chosen keywords, tone of voice, topics and ideas, the same conclusion can be drawn. The US and the EU used completely different rhetoric in their documents and the choice of words was not at all in sync. The 'us' versus 'them' rhetoric was evident in the NSS document, while this did not come forward in the ESS document. Also, where the NSS talks about preemption as a genuine option, the EU emphasized the importance of conflict prevention. Hence, the conclusion is drawn that the use of the keywords, tone of voice, topics and ideas are not in line with one another between the policy documents of the first benchmark.

What can be concluded when comparing the two policy documents of the second benchmark is that the general strategies of the US and the EU are compatible with one another. Both the US and the EU stress the importance of cooperation through international institutions, emphasize the threat of terrorism and WMD's and suggest a multilateral approach of diplomacy, the rule of law and cooperation to face those challenges. In addition, the importance of their relationship is made clear. This suggests a shift of some sort, seeing as the two documents of the first benchmark were not so much in agreement. As argued, this shift has been one of the strategic culture of the US, seeing as the 2009 document of the EU is, in many ways, a continuity of that of 2003. The strategic culture of the

US has shifted towards that of the EU in the first decade of the 21st century. This shift of strategic culture in the mid- to long term period after an external shock is an interesting topic for further research. Because no policy documents of pre-9/11 were analyzed, it's impossible to draw conclusions on whether or not this was a shift back to the pre-shock state, or not. There is a clear gap in the literature in regard to this phenomenon. The security documents published in 2010 indeed suggest a more shared strategic culture and a stronger transatlantic security relationship than the documents of the first benchmark do.

As Gaddis stated, the US did indeed experience a shift in strategic culture due to the 9/11 events (Gaddis, 2002). As a result of the 9/11 attacks, the strategic culture of the US experienced a sudden shock. In the following years, the strategic culture of the US suggests shifting towards that of the EU. The documents of the second benchmark suggest a shared vision and a strong focus on the transatlantic relationship and that this relationship was converging. What can be concluded is that there is a noticeable change between the two policy documents of the United States of 2002 and 2010; while more continuities than changes can be observed between the two documents of the European Union.

The EU and the US must keep up their efforts to come to a common perception of threats and responses in relation to countering international terrorism; as well as the other identified threats. They share a history of the closest cooperation, and, as suggested in the documents of the second benchmark, only if they act together can these threats be adequately combated. Their strategic cultures, and the transatlantic security relationship, need to converge in order for them to effectively address the threats identified; terrorism being the biggest. Cultural theories help explain time lags between structural change and alterations in state and non-state behavior. A change in strategic culture can account for seemingly 'irrational' behavior of actors. However, there is a gap in the literature when it comes to the movement of the strategic culture of an actor after the external shock has passed. Culture is clearly a factor in contemporary international security policy, but research still needs to be done on its depth and width of influence.

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