



Universiteit Leiden

**“Doubles Jeux”  
Intra-Allies Intelligence Operations  
in International Relations**

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## List of Abbreviations

AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labour - Congress of Industrial Organisations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DGSE	Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FLN	Front de Libération National
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IBM	International Business Machines Corporation
IC	Intelligence Community
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Agency
OAS	Organisation de l'Armée Secrète
OSC	Open Source Center
OSINT	Open Sources Intelligence
SDECE	Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence

## Introduction

In November 2015, Jonathan Pollard was set free from American detention. This former U.S. intelligence analyst had been condemned to life in prison in 1987 for spying activities against his nation. During the Cold War era, several intelligence officers betrayed their country in favor of the opponent bloc. Pollard however did not act for Soviet interests. American of Jewish faith, Pollard was accused of covertly working for the Israeli government. Even though Israel was one of the closest U.S. allies, Israeli intelligence services actively collected American classified information. These spying activities, comparable to betrayal, are common practices among even allied nations; when matters of intelligence are concerned, governments often disregard alliances. Indeed, the field of intelligence displays a structure in which conventional principles of international relations are set aside. William Stephenson, a Canadian officer working for the British intelligence portrays this obscure aspect of international relations in simple words: “This is the wonderful thing about espionage, nothing exists anymore”. Intelligence, whether it be espionage or covert operations, is not affected by legality nor legitimacy thus challenging the rules of international politics. Nation states operate in a Janus-faced relationship with one another, opposing official public relations yet undertaking secret operations. Following Sun Tzu’s precept “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles”<sup>1</sup>, governments engage in spying activities not only against their enemies but also within their own alliance. Given the value of a mutually confident relationship, it could be assumed that countries would not jeopardize such an asset. Yet, interaction between states often involves selfish activities. In the realm of international relations, governments usually give primacy to national stakes. Glenn Snyder, belonging to the realist theoretical school argues “States will act according to their interests, whether they are allied or not”<sup>2</sup>. As a matter of fact, countries having various incentives to take actions against their allies, often resort to intra-ally intelligence operations. These operations, conducted in secrecy, can have major impacts on international relations development and thus potentially affect friendly relationships.

**Research Question: In bilateral alliance relations, what role do intelligence operations against the second party play?**

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<sup>1</sup> Sun Tzu & Giles, 2000

<sup>2</sup> Snyder, 1997 p.9

This research question will be divided into three sub-questions:

- *Which reasons prompt partners to engage in intelligence operations?*
- *Do alliances produce conditions which facilitate such intelligence operations?*
- *Do intra-ally intelligence operations affect the bilateral relations in some way?*

In a first section, this thesis will introduce the concept of intelligence, present the academic literature concerning intra-ally operations and describe the chosen methodology. The second section will empirically study three cases of intelligence operations among allies. Finally, the analytical part will expose the findings and discuss their implications over the field of international relations. As this paper considers the use of intelligence among allied countries relationship, the analysis will focus on peace time intelligence addressing both foreign operations and domestic surveillance even though nowadays, the traditional Westphalian boundary dividing the two is getting increasingly blurred<sup>3</sup>.

There is a strong need to academically study intelligence stakes and their effects. As many authors have indicated<sup>45</sup>, historically little attention has been given to the study of intelligence especially by scholars of international relations. Furthermore, Martin Alexander considers intelligence towards allies as the “missing dimension in the missing dimension”<sup>6</sup>. This field of study has been neglected while a larger attention has been given to intelligence cooperation. The debate within international relations is far from thorough regarding intelligence; there is therefore an academic demand to determine what intra-ally intelligence is and what role does it play in the realm of international politics. However, the field of intelligence has witnessed a resurgence of interest since the Snowden leaks in 2013. Although many authors have analyzed this case in terms of privacy law and individual rights<sup>7</sup>, some scholars have used this example to address the topic of spying among allies<sup>8</sup>. The present thesis intends to follow this academic development by contributing to the study of intelligence within international relations. It will analyze operations among allies by engaging with the wide spectrum of intelligence activities. To effectively analyze the effect of intelligence operations in international relations, one must first adequately define the concept of intelligence.

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<sup>3</sup> Aldrich, 2012

<sup>4</sup> Alexander, 1998

<sup>5</sup> Scott & Jackson, 2004

<sup>6</sup> Alexander, 1998 p.2

<sup>7</sup> Granick, 2017

<sup>8</sup> Easley, 2014 ; Amusan & McHunu, 2015

## Thesis Framework

### Intelligence

Intelligence consists in the gathering and analysis of information for political purposes. Its process relies on the intelligence cycle; which representation can slightly vary depending on authors. Yet the overall concept usually remains the same. The Turkish military officers Aydin and Ozleblebici propose five main steps to depict this cycle<sup>9</sup>. First the *conceptual phase* is the realization that intelligence is needed, followed by a determination of what information is required. The second phase is *planning*. This phase aims to clearly assign objectives and instruct which type of source will be the most suitable to collect. The third phase is data *acquisition*. At this stage, intelligence officers seek and collect required information. The modus operandi chosen highly depends on aims assigned, the different types of source will be further developed in the forthcoming paragraph. Then comes the *analysis phase*. Raw information is often useless on its own, thus it needs to be analyzed in order to be exploitable. Information is verified via different sources, utilizing the knowledge of a wide range of analysts, each of whom are specialized in a specific field of knowledge<sup>10</sup>. As gathered information increases, the analysis phase largely separates the “noise” from relevant information. The final step is the *evaluation phase*. The fundamental purpose of analyzed information is to allow policy-makers and operational commanders to make more effective decisions<sup>11</sup>. Hence, this ultimate phase controls if the intelligence gathered is sufficient or if further operations are required.

Intelligence operations exploit a variety of methods to collect information, this paragraph will expand on the different sources available to agencies and explain their attributes. The collection of information can be achieved through several means, official or undercover, legal or prohibited. Firstly, intelligence agencies exploit open sources (OSINT). This source which has traditionally provided the greatest amount of information has recently been further enhanced with the rapid growth of the internet and social networks<sup>12</sup>. Information can also be gathered through Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The use of agents, romanticized in popular culture, represents a small but necessary part of the collection process. HUMINT is extremely polyvalent but sometimes uncertain. It can access information that no other tools can provide and analyze its content according to the context. However, recent technological

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<sup>9</sup> Aydin & Ozleblebici, 2015

<sup>10</sup> Soutou, 2014

<sup>11</sup> Aldrich, 2012

<sup>12</sup> Soutou, 2014

advances have moved the emphasis onto signal intelligence (SIGINT). Through SIGINT, information is collected via signals whether it be communication between two people or between electronic machines. As electronic devices are fully integrated into our societies, SIGINT offers an extensive amount of information at a low level of risk. Finally, photography reconnaissance also called imagery intelligence (IMINT) provides visual insight on objectives. This category of intelligence has historically mostly been gathered from the air. Thus, geospatial technologies have incredibly improved IMINT capabilities. As satellites are not limited to airspace sovereignty, they can access any part of the world equipped with sophisticated cameras able to provide high-quality imagery<sup>13</sup>.

Finally, intelligence agencies are not meant to exclusively be passive observers. Indeed, they usually include an action department which allows them to engage with “special activities”. These undercover missions are orchestrated to achieve specific strategic objectives without official links to the government. Secret services have an offensive purpose as well as a defensive one. On the offensive side they conduct missions such as assassination, propaganda diffusion or foreign agent recruitment. On a defensive level, agencies attempt to protect their information against foreign intrusion through counter intelligence activities. Intelligence operations thus offer a wide spectrum of possibilities which can be applied to different situations and on various targets, including allies.

### Literature Review

The concept of alliance is considered to be at the core of states’ relationships. According to the author George Liska: “It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name”<sup>14</sup>. Indeed, the competitive international context prompts states to collaborate with each other. Even though countries’ primary objective is to defend their own national interest, governments can prove willing to cooperate with their counterparts towards collective security. Stephen Walt describes alliances as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states”<sup>15</sup>. As a matter of fact, alliances are not necessarily enshrined by international treaties and have become increasingly informal, since many modern countries are not willing to endorse

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<sup>13</sup> Lever, 2012

<sup>14</sup> Liska, 1962, p.3

<sup>15</sup> Walt, 1987, p.12

their commitment with official pledges. Nevertheless, these silent engagements are still considered effective and binding by governments involved<sup>16</sup>.

According to the realist perspective, alliance formation is caused by the international balance of power<sup>17</sup> or the balance of threat<sup>18</sup>. The emergence of a powerful or threatening state, prompts third parties to balance against or bandwagon with the state in question. The international context being in constant evolution thus continually generates and breaks down alliances. Alliances are therefore primarily established for military reasons, to ensure the security of comprised nations. However, these relationships can also be forged and strengthened based on external features, such as common political values, shared history and cultural background. Indeed, countries displaying similar essential traits such as ideological beliefs are often drawn to ally with each other<sup>19</sup>. This mechanism was for instance illustrated by the Cold War international context, during which ideology dictated the tempo of international relations and the formation of large-scale alliances. Nowadays, allied countries regularly go beyond military aspects and display political, cultural and economic combined efforts<sup>20</sup>. Moreover, in this modern era, alliances tend to further integrate, leading countries to strong levels of joint institutionalization<sup>21</sup>. This process ultimately impedes the potential for relationships to collapse.

However, within an allied relationship, even though countries cooperate on multiple stakes, national interest still prevails. Governments thus engage in intelligence operations against each other to achieve their own ends. As previously mentioned, the academic community lacks a vast compilation of research regarding intra-ally intelligence operations, particularly under the perspective of international relations. Nevertheless, some authors have focused their work on this specific subject. Scholars such as Amusan and Mchunu have confronted intra-ally operations through the critical lens of international relations theories<sup>22</sup>. Using the leaks provided by Edward Snowden, these authors have analyzed the effects of the National Security Agency (NSA) spying operations over the relationship between the U.S. and Germany. Comparing realist, liberalist and constructivist frameworks, they stressed the relevance of national interest in world politics and more specifically in the field of espionage.

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<sup>16</sup> Walt, 1987

<sup>17</sup> Waltz, 1979

<sup>18</sup> Liska, 1962

<sup>19</sup> Walt, 1997

<sup>20</sup> Haglund, n.d.

<sup>21</sup> Walt, 1997

<sup>22</sup> Amusan & Mchunu, 2015

The academic debate attributes various motivations for these intelligence operations. Firstly, the concept of an allied relationship itself is often challenged. Even if countries are part of an alliance, their objectives may differ. As the French Colonel Pierre Le Goyet notes: “Interests are rarely identical in a coalition: each nation is concerned with its own protection above all else”<sup>23</sup>. From this perspective, being part of an alliance does not imply absolute trust, prompting countries to verify their ally’s objectives. Indeed, according to multiple scholars<sup>24</sup>, intelligence operations are in many cases used to determine the intentions of an allied government, especially its thoughts on the alliance development. This motivation, following the Russian proverb “Trust, but verify” (Доверяй, но проверяй) is increasingly salient when government leaders change; new priorities might be set, on a different agenda with a divergent foreign strategy<sup>25</sup>. Moreover, these national modifications which potentially challenge an alliance, be it current or prospective, can lead to national security concerns. In much the same way as one’s enemy, an ally country can be the source of unexpected developments, affecting the strategic alliance. Whether they are intended (such as calculated betrayal) or not (e.g. unexpected revolution) by the allied governments, these events may lead to the relationship deterioration, the alliance collapse and eventually hostility between former partners. These radical evolutions in an ally domestic politics can present a national security threat particularly dangerous as the ally in question was supposedly considered loyal<sup>26</sup>. Governments thus need to foresee such eventualities through intelligence practices.

Additionally, governments can find it crucial to spy on their ally for strategic prospects. Since alliances are primarily based on military collaboration, assessing a partner’s strength and weaknesses can be paramount to plan an effective strategy, especially in prevision of a joint war. For instance, the scholar David French analyzed British spying operations over the French society and military during World War I, due to Britain’s concerns of political instability and potential mutinies within its ally’s ranks<sup>27</sup>. In the same way, a country acquiring intelligence on an ally military capacity, condition and readiness can prove decisive for its own defense planning<sup>28</sup>. As countries face the rise of terrorism, large-scale monitoring of foreign citizens’ activities can also provide insights on potential non-state attacks. To this end, the implication of public and private sector companies has been paramount to collect a large quantity of information about citizens everyday habits<sup>29</sup>. This modern type of intelligence activity, heavily reliant on

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<sup>23</sup> Le Goyet, 1978, p.16

<sup>24</sup> Easley, 2014 ; Bitton, 2014 ; Amusan & Mchunu, 2015

<sup>25</sup> Easley, 2014

<sup>26</sup> Golan, 2011

<sup>27</sup> French, 1991

<sup>28</sup> Alexander, 1998

<sup>29</sup> Pétiñaud, 2014

new technologies such as cyber capabilities, has been analyzed by numerous scholars<sup>30</sup>. From an international relations perspective, the use of cyber intelligence has further challenged international law and transformed countries relationship as it significantly enhanced espionage possibilities, including over allies<sup>31</sup>.

Furthermore, an increasing attention has been given to espionage in the economic field. Economic espionage consists in targeting and acquiring valuable information from foreign companies or governmental entities<sup>32</sup>. This type of information is extremely valuable, as it is then exploited to strengthen a country's national economy. Hence companies, particularly the ones operating on strategic sectors, are considered key targets by intelligence agencies. To that end, allies often take part in economic espionage, considering that their collaboration does not encompass the economic field. Peter Schweizer has dedicated his book, *Friendly Spies*<sup>33</sup>, to espionage operations orchestrated by multiple countries against their American ally. According to the author, intelligence agencies colluded with national companies to enhance their capacities on the global market<sup>34</sup>. Moreover, Schweizer points out various opportunities provided by such intertwined relationship facilitating the development of intelligence operations against friendly countries. In that regard, Martin Alexander's work<sup>35</sup> also emphasizes the role of non-intelligence personnel such as diplomats, military attaché or industrial leaders. These indirect spies are numerous, as their official missions are at the essence of the countries' cooperation. Yet, the modus operandi employed by these personnel is not necessarily considered illegitimate. Udi Golan distinguishes two types of intra-ally espionage practices: passive and active<sup>36</sup>. Passive methods relying on non-invasive ways such as satellite photography, attachés' official work and information gathering through OSINT, are generally recognized legitimate. On the other hand, wiretapping, plane photography and the deployment of spies who actively seek confidential information are usually regarded illegitimate within an alliance. As a matter of fact, these intrusive means are the ones which, if disclosed, potentially imperil a friendly relationship.

However, the academic community holds different opinions regarding the effects of operations disclosure over the states' relationship. Some scholars argue that engaging in an espionage operation

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<sup>30</sup> Banks, 2017 ; Aghroum, 2012

<sup>31</sup> Pelican, 2012

<sup>32</sup> Danielson, 2009

<sup>33</sup> Schweizer, 1993

<sup>34</sup> Porteous, 1994

<sup>35</sup> Alexander, 1998

<sup>36</sup> Golan, 2011

against an ally does indeed jeopardize their bilateral relationship. Intelligence gathering is viewed as a trade-off, providing valuable information but potentially costing the current friendship<sup>37</sup>. According to these authors, disclosed operations would affect to some degree the bilateral relationship. Once based on trust, the alliance could no longer be considered genuine by the targeted government<sup>38</sup>. Other academics believe that these intelligence operations carry, to some extent, little risk even if disclosed. Indeed, the probability of escalation would be limited as the two countries are deeply tied to one another. Leaders of the offending country often hide behind “plausible deniability” while their domestic public opinion generally agrees with spying practices, particularly when they are linked to national security<sup>39</sup>. On the targeted side, governments usually forgive disclosed operations, fully aware that they often use espionage practices themselves. However, high costs of disclosure might be endured by the targeted country leadership. Indeed, a government victim of espionage by an ally might be perceived as weak by its own population. Furthermore, such a security deficiency could provide arguments to national opposition leaders, especially if their political message opposes the concerned alliance<sup>40</sup>. Consequently, governments that fall victim to friendly spying usually resort to diplomatic sanctions, such as declaring foreign officials *personae non gratae*, in order to display a strong posture towards their domestic public opinion as well as the international community. The scholar Leif-Eric Easley addresses this debate by focusing on the effect intra-ally operations have on trust and expectation within the alliance<sup>41</sup>. According to this author, two types of betrayal are possible. A “strategic defection” implies a government intent to actively harm its ally’s national interest. Alternatively, “political betrayal” does not necessarily affect national security but causes embarrassment to the targeted government.

This thesis will examine the practice of intelligence operations among allied countries, focusing on one specific alliance. The opportunity to extensively analyze operations involving the same alliance will allow to examine and compare their outcomes. The purpose of the final analysis will be first to consider different motivations which prompted intra-ally intelligence operations. It will build on previous scholars’ findings, particularly considering three variables: the geopolitical context, technological advances and economic prevalence. Second, the modus operandi will be examined to determine if the alliance did facilitate intelligence operations. The importance of shared institutions will be discussed as well as the significance of external factors displayed by many alliances. Third, the analysis will seek to

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<sup>37</sup> Pelican, 2012 ; Golan, 2011

<sup>38</sup> Amusan & Mchunu, 2015

<sup>39</sup> Easley, 2014

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

address the academic debate on the consequences of intra-ally operations. It will distinguish the repercussions of these operations depending on the timeframe. The analysis will also introduce the concept of intelligence operations reciprocity and its impact on alliances.

### *French-American Alliance*

This thesis will consider the French-American relationship as a traditional alliance combining multiple levels of shared interest<sup>42</sup>. This relationship represents a compelling case for analysis, since these two countries have been closely collaborating throughout their common history. Indeed, France and the U.S. have been allied since the American War of Independence against Great Britain. Following this joint conflict, the two countries have for the most part enjoyed quiet but peaceful relations (except for the Quasi-War) until the dawn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>43</sup>. During World War I, French-American military collaboration was renewed as Washington joined the Entente side in 1917 until the Central Powers defeat. In 1928 the two nations negotiated the Kellogg-Briand pact, by which several states pledged to resolve their disagreements and disputes without resorting to armed conflict. This pact was however short-lived as in 1939 the Second World War broke out. Joining the Allies side in 1941, Washington kept diplomatic relations with the German influenced Vichy government while officially recognizing the provisional government French Committee of National Liberation in 1943<sup>44</sup>. Following the Normandy landings, Washington eventually allowed French troops to liberate Paris. This gesture although mostly symbolic, manifested the U.S. concern for its ally's interest. Following World War II, France along with the whole European continent was left devastated. The U.S., having emerged as an occidental hegemon, provided financial subsidies to Western countries through the Marshall plan. As a result, France benefitted from a 2.4 billion dollar investment from the U.S. government<sup>45</sup>. This aftermath period also led Western countries to create strategic alliances ultimately leading to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Paris and Washington, both founding members were thus formally allied until the French president de Gaulle, through his "politique de grandeur", withdrew France from the treaty in 1966. Still, both nations maintained an informal alliance, primarily for the sake of a potential Soviet invasion<sup>46</sup>. Over

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<sup>42</sup> Treacher, 2010

<sup>43</sup> Liska, 1962

<sup>44</sup> Zahniser, 1975

<sup>45</sup> Magid, 2012

<sup>46</sup> Treacher, 2010

the following decades, France kept on collaborating with NATO and intervened under UN mandate alongside its American ally on multiple theaters such as Lebanon (1982) and Bosnia (1993). In 2009, the French government eventually decided to join back the transatlantic alliance. More recently, the two countries have been militarily cooperating in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and in the Sahel-Saharan strip.

Furthermore, Paris and Washington have displayed several common features, reinforcing their alliance. On a political level both countries have been ruled by close types of government throughout most of their shared history, encompassing republican regimes and democratic values. During the Cold War, France and Washington were part of the Western bloc, thus sharing its ideological doctrine. Economically, the U.S. and France have historically been liberal countries displaying extensive international trades with one another. Reaching \$139 billion in trade of goods and services in 2017<sup>47</sup>, their economies are deeply entwined, each of them representing a crucial commercial partner to the other. Finally, the two allies are deeply embedded thanks to several organizations and institutions promoting their bilateral relationship<sup>48</sup>.

Thus, the concept of alliance has been at the core of French-American international relations. Even if these two countries occasionally disagreed on critical stakes, they managed to keep a high degree of cooperation throughout their history. Yet, Paris and Washington have undertaken several intelligence operations against one another. This bilateral relationship thus provides a stimulating case to understand the role intra-ally operations play over international relations. This thesis will focus on the allies' relationship following the Second World War. Indeed, this period featured several operations which provided enough material relevant for the analysis. Moreover, most intelligence agencies still operating today were created at the dawn of the Cold War. As these intelligence agencies are numerous and differ in terms of method and mission, it is necessary to briefly present both countries' intelligence services before engaging in the study. This concise presentation will exclusively focus on agencies relevant for the thesis.

Regarding the U.S., 17 intelligence agencies are grouped in a so-called Intelligence Community (IC). This community, constituted in 1981, answers to the executive power and ultimately to the U.S. president. Among them, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) presides over foreign intelligence gathering, especially focusing on HUMINT through its National Clandestine Service<sup>49</sup>. This agency

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<sup>47</sup> Embassy of France in the United States, 2018

<sup>48</sup> United States Embassy, 2015

<sup>49</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2011

formed in 1947 also enjoys an Open Source Center (OSC). OSINT is collected as well as produced by this center to be disseminated as misinformation<sup>50</sup>. Another branch of the IC is the NSA. Originating from a decoding military unit, the NSA was officially created in 1952<sup>51</sup>. Exclusively focusing on SIGINT, the NSA similarly to the OSC, collects information as well as produces deceptive material<sup>52</sup>. Finally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), formed in 1908, seeks to counter criminal activities, terrorist attacks and intelligence operations targeting the U.S.<sup>53</sup> Primarily operating on a domestic level, the FBI also enjoys extraterritorial prerogatives, thus maintaining several offices around the world.

On the French side, the *Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage* (SDECE) was created in 1945. Firstly, placed under direct authority of the president, the SDECE supervision was later transferred to the Ministry of the Armed Forces; this agency however, was not in charge of military intelligence. Tasked with civilian intelligence the SDECE was also in charge of counter intelligence missions. In 1982, the SDECE was replaced by the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* (DGSE). This agency followed the assignments attributed to its predecessor except for counter intelligence activities which became the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure* (DGSI) prerogative.

Through the French-American alliance, both countries' intelligence services have cooperated on many occasions, particularly since the rise of Islamist terrorism in the Western sphere of influence<sup>54</sup>. Even if France is not a member of the U.S. lead "Five Eyes" (a strong cooperative intelligence partnership encompassing the U.S., United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) it is however part of its less famous enlarged version named the Nine Eyes which includes four additional European states<sup>55</sup>. Still, as the following case studies will demonstrate, the French and American intelligence agencies have also conducted operations against each other's country.

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<sup>50</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2011

<sup>51</sup> Center for Cryptologic History, n.d.

<sup>52</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2011

<sup>53</sup> Laub, 2017

<sup>54</sup> Belkin, 2018

<sup>55</sup> Pétiniaud, 2014

## Research Design

### 1) Methodology

The academic community must be cautious when analyzing intelligence, as this field of study contains multiple methodological issues. The main difficulty related to intelligence study is its inherent nature of confidentiality. Information is rare and difficult to obtain as only declassified documents are made available to the public. The author Martin Alexander further explains that intelligence operations among allies usually do not leave any written record or take an extraordinary amount of time to be declassified<sup>56</sup>. Indeed, revealing such activities could jeopardize the alliance in question. Moreover, academics need to constantly question their sources, whether they are interviews, memoirs or even official data<sup>57</sup>. This issue is not specific to the study of intelligence but is undeniably exacerbated in this field. Indeed, the lack of quantity and variety of sources hinders a thorough but necessary fact checking process concerning relevant information. Regarding the reliability of a source, the scholar Scott points out that when it comes to intelligence, information is only made publicly available when and because those controlling the information want us to know it<sup>58</sup>.

As a result, methodology is limited in this study. Scarcity of data reflects the fact that many intelligence operations have not yet been declassified. Therefore, a quantitative analysis relying on statistical variables will likely be inaccurate. However, although intelligence information is rare, some operations have been thoroughly described as they got declassified over time. Considering the methodological limits and the approach this paper intends to undertake, an empirical analysis based on qualitative case studies will be carried out. The case study methodology will allow to consider singular intelligence operations and undertake in depth analysis aiming to draw theoretical conclusions on the field of international relations. As the scholar Erik Dahl points out, case study is a pertinent method in the study of intelligence, allowing to qualitatively analyze an operation while going beyond the risk of inducing theoretical arguments from mere anecdotes<sup>59</sup>. This analysis, focusing on the French-American alliance, will examine intra-ally operations set in three different contexts and periods. These within cases will thus display diverse variables such as geopolitical setting, technological tools and alliance evolution leading to different outcomes. To this matter, the method of process tracing will be adopted providing an

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<sup>56</sup> Alexander, 1998

<sup>57</sup> Scott & Jackson, 2004

<sup>58</sup> Scott & Jackson, 2004

<sup>59</sup> Dahl, 2017

adequate middle ground between a historical approach and an international relations perspective<sup>60</sup>. This research design will allow to draw causal inferences considering the operation itself as well as the preceding and following international contexts. Ultimately, the thesis objective will be to enable the identification of core principles regarding intra-ally intelligence operations, expand previous findings and build new arguments.

## 2) Case Studies

Three operations will be analyzed within the French American alliance:

- 1) First, the involvement of the CIA in the Algerian War of Independence will be considered. As part of a bipolar geopolitical setting in the after-war period, the U.S. have been implicated in multiple ideological covert operations. Whether it be in Latin America, Asia or the Middle East, anti-communist operations have been undertaken by Washington. In Algeria, the CIA has taken part in the revolutionary conflict, sometimes against the French government.
- 2) The second case study will examine French spying operations over U.S. companies. In the 1980's several employees working for IBM, Texas Instrument and Corning Glass acted as sources for the DGSE. This economic spying taking place on the French territory was dismantled by a joint CIA-FBI counter-espionage operation. This case will among other things, allow to explore the crucial nexus between intelligence and economy.
- 3) Finally, the NSA's global monitoring of telecommunication will be analyzed through the scope of the French-American alliance. Documents revealed by Edward Snowden and Wikileaks will demonstrate intelligence practices shift to a mass surveillance era. It will provide multiple examples of modern intelligence features and their impact on alliances.

These three cases have been selected, according to the data available and with the intention to represent multiple aspects of intra-ally intelligence practices. Motivations as well as means employed were specific to each case. Additionally, since these three intelligence operations have been disclosed in different ways, targeted governments have therefore used distinctive approaches to handle the subsequent repercussions and their effects on the bilateral alliance.

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<sup>60</sup> George & Bennett, 2005

### **3) Sources**

To support the thesis arguments, these three intelligence operations will be analyzed through multiple sources. In terms of primary sources, the National Security Archive has made many American declassified documents available online. This vast collection will provide several reports originating from intelligence agencies which will be used for the first two cases. Regarding the third case, Edward Snowden has proceeded to reveal NSA's activities leaking official documents to newspapers. Specific journals such as the Guardian, der Spiegel and le Monde have worked closely with Snowden's team to accurately publicize the revelations. Moreover, Wikileaks have brought to public knowledge multiple U.S. official intelligence documents. This organization has published in 2015 numerous briefs revealing the NSA spying activities over the French government. This set of sources, will provide direct evidence of the French and American intelligence activities. Additionally, memoirs and interviews of former intelligence officers will be used to provide first-hand insight over governmental spying activities. These primary sources will also be backed by secondary ones. Indeed, numerous academic writings developed by scholars, some of them having access to restricted documents and enjoying contacts with intelligence officers, will support this research. Such variety of sources will allow to accurately consider the three aforementioned case studies.

## CIA Implication in the Algerian War

This first case study will analyze the implication of American secret services in the Algerian War. It will discuss the relevance of ideological features motivating allies to undertake intelligence operations against each other. Additionally, it will demonstrate how military and political collaboration can be exploited to support intra-ally intelligence operations. Finally, this case study will explain the impact such intelligence operations can have on the ally and its population's beliefs.

Following the end of World War II, the international community was divided between two main factions. On one hand Western states were led by the U.S. in a liberal oriented union. These countries, militarily bounded by NATO, followed the Truman Doctrine seeking to contain Eastern expansion. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and its satellite states, depicted as the communist bloc, formed a strategic alliance within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Similarly to the NATO coalition, the Warsaw Pact consisted of a mutual defense agreement between the signatory states. Hence, during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, both coalitions sought to expand their influence. More specifically, Washington and Moscow engaged in indirect confrontations trying to promote their own political ideology. In this bipolar context, the two superpowers used various tools against each other such as proxy wars, propaganda, economic warfare and technological arms race. Moreover, during the Cold War, each superpower targeted its counterparts as well as neutral countries through intelligence operations in order to promote their ideological prospects. As a matter of fact, the CIA undertook several operations among others in Iran, Cuba and Argentina<sup>61</sup>. According to the National Security Council Directive, the CIA was meant to “Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to communist control to achieve dominant power in a free world country”<sup>62</sup>. In that respect, the American superpower did not solely seek to influence ideologically opposed nations but also countries part of its own bloc. In Europe, the fear of communism prompted NATO to secretly organize stay behind networks in several non-communist countries. These units, in case of a Soviet invasion, were intended to hinder the enemy's breakthrough, act as resistance groups and ultimately prepare a potential counter attack. In Italy, the stay behind network “Gladio” led to numerous polemics when revealed to the public's knowledge. Indeed, beyond the Soviet threat, the CIA employed these secret units to influence national and European

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<sup>61</sup> Barnet, 1980 ; Forsythe, 1992

<sup>62</sup> Office of the Historian, n.d.

policies<sup>63</sup>. The French situation was also considered crucial by the CIA. In the immediate post war period, communist parties were significantly growing in the French political landscape<sup>64</sup>. Consequently, American services through NATO created a French stay behind network in collaboration with the SDECE. Additionally, in its fight against the communist nemesis, Washington was specifically concerned by the French status as a colonial power.

Since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, France had acquired many territories around the globe creating a worldwide empire. Algeria, conquered in 1830, benefited from a special statute which, distinctively from other colonies, made it an actual part of the French territory. In this regard, France having incorporated Algeria for more than a century, shared close ties with the region. Numerous colonists, coming from the French metropolis and Mediterranean Europe, had settled in Algeria forming the “Pieds Noirs” community. However, following the second World War, colonies around the world started to contest European domination. These movement striving for independence were strongly bolstered by the post-war international context. Indeed, both blocs’ superpower promoted the principle of self-determination, thus weakening the international stance of colonial powers<sup>65</sup>. In fact, France had lost its Indochina colony in 1954 to Việt Minh insurgents backed by the USSR. On the same year, the crippling French empire started to face independence movements in Tunisia and Morocco (both countries became sovereign in 1956). This international context prompted Algerian rebels to launch their fight for independence on September 1<sup>st</sup> 1954. Three insurgent factions opposed the French regime: the *Mouvement National Algérien*, the *Parti Communiste Algérien* and the *Front de Libération National* (FLN). The latter one, through terrorism, guerilla warfare and diplomatic actions, ultimately took the lead among Algerian rebels.

### Washington and the FLN

Washington, even though promoting self-determination around the world also supported the weakened European colonial powers to prevent additional countries from falling under the communist sphere of influence. To this matter, the Algerian conflict was considered paramount by Washington State Department. As a matter of fact, the U.S. officially supported French war effort providing weapons and

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<sup>63</sup> Ganser, 2006

<sup>64</sup> Perlman, 2018

<sup>65</sup> Maatoug, 2006

military vehicles to be engaged in Algeria<sup>66</sup>. However, the Algerian conflict outcome was uncertain and in Washington's view could have potentially led to the rise of an Algerian communist government. To that end, the State Department, while openly supporting its French ally, used covert means to secure its ideological objective.

American secret services had been concerned about French Algeria since the outbreak of the war. Indeed, several, CIA documents reported the evolution of the conflict and its implications over the Algerian region as well as in the French metropolis<sup>67</sup>, particularly analyzing French communist parties and USSR stance<sup>68</sup>. In the event of an insurgent victory, Washington's private objective was thus to secure the rise of an ideologically moderate government<sup>69</sup>. Consequently, in 1956 American officials started meeting moderate FLN representatives. These meetings, in the first place notified to the French government, were then concealed from the ally's knowledge<sup>70</sup>. As the conflict was gradually growing in intensity, Washington could not afford to openly meet its official ally's enemy. The author Ranelagh describes this U.S. policy in the following words: "In the intervening years, the CIA has become the other voice of U.S. foreign policy, frequently talking to people the State Department finds it difficult to talk to"<sup>71</sup>. The CIA thus established close ties with FLN leaders despite the French-American alliance. This intimate relationship was particularly exemplified by the case of Frantz Fanon. A French philosopher originating from Martinique, Fanon strongly defended the Algerian autonomist cause and displayed acquaintances with several FLN officers and leaders. When he was diagnosed with cancer, Fanon was flown to Washington and treated at CIA expense<sup>72</sup>. After his death in 1961, CIA officers accompanied his body to Algeria and attended his funeral<sup>73</sup>. Washington, having such ties with the Algerian rebels and anticipating the scenario of a French defeat, would have been contradictory to the American open diplomacy and an intolerable stance for Paris. The CIA implication with the FLN however, did not stay confined to negotiations and further expanded over the years.

Indeed, the American intelligence agency gradually supported the Algerian rebel group through various means. It first provided financial assistance to the FLN using the American Federation of Labour - Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO). This organization, tied to Algerian labor unions,

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<sup>66</sup> Horne, 2002

<sup>67</sup> CIA, 1956a ; CIA, 1956b

<sup>68</sup> CIA, 1956c

<sup>69</sup> Lefebvre, 1999

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ranelagh, 1986, p.20

<sup>72</sup> Ranelagh, 1986

<sup>73</sup> Lefebvre, 1999

funneled funds to the FLN<sup>74</sup> from 1957, until the end of the war five years later<sup>75</sup>. Additionally, the American intelligence agency indirectly promoted Algerian independence. According to the scholar Jeffrey-Jones, “the CIA secretly organized an education voucher grant program for students who had been expelled from French universities for engaging in Algerian nationalist activities”<sup>76</sup>. This covert operation of influence thus supported the Algerian cause in the heart of the French territory. Finally, in its ideological struggle against communism, the U.S. felt compelled to provide weapons to the Algerian rebels. Indeed, the FLN, aware of its crucial position, exploited the Cold War context to maximize support from both superpowers. On one hand, the FLN heavily advertised in the West that communist countries were providing arms to their cause. One of the FLN leaders Fehrat Abbas, notified the Occidental bloc that Algerian rebels were forced to request this Eastern support. He later reinforced this warning in the New York Times, stressing that these arms deliveries would soon be considerably increased<sup>77</sup>. Building on this strategy, FLN representatives at the United Nations stated that their movement needed armaments no matter their provider; even though they would prefer an agreement with Western countries, they were still waiting for any propositions<sup>78</sup>. The United States were stranded in a complex situation weaving between official and personal interests. Having its hands tied by the French alliance, Washington had to officially refuse the FLN demand for weapons; the CIA however, was able to discreetly operate. Once again, U.S. intelligence services proceeded where public diplomacy had to back off; the CIA thus managed to deliver weapons to FLN fighters via different routes such as Tunisia and Turkey<sup>79</sup>. Ultimately, historians agree on the fact that the FLN had only few links to the communist ideology. This rebel group was first and foremost a nationalist movement<sup>80</sup>, it did however play its hand rightfully in the Cold War bipolar context to obtain support from both blocs.

### *The CIA and French Separatists Acquaintance*

Throughout the Algerian conflict, the CIA did not solely undertake operations involving the FLN. Indeed, a report from the Swiss intelligence services revealed that American agents were closely linked to French separatist movements<sup>81</sup>. After de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, Paris started to publicly consider the

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<sup>74</sup> Connelly, 2002 ; El Mechat, 2013 ; Wall, 2006

<sup>75</sup> Barnet, 1980

<sup>76</sup> Jeffrey-Jones, 1989, p.124

<sup>77</sup> Horne, 2002

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Lefebvre, 1999 ; El Mechat, 2013

<sup>80</sup> Horne, 2002

<sup>81</sup> Swiss Intelligence, 1962

possibility of an independent Algeria. These considerations led to the emergence of several rogue groups which sought to keep Algeria under French control. In 1961, four French generals organized a putsch in the colonial capital Algiers. This coup d'état ultimately failed as de Gaulle benefitted from popular support among civilians and militaries<sup>82</sup>. Concurrently, the *Organisation de l'Armée Secrète* (OAS), composed of civilians and former French soldiers, some of them part of the French stay behind network<sup>83</sup>, strove to obstruct the French government's intentions over a free Algeria as well as secure safety for the "Pieds Noirs" community<sup>84</sup>. Operating in secrecy this rebel organization challenged the French authority through large-scale terrorism<sup>85</sup>. The OAS, considered a criminal organization, was thus tracked down by French authorities in metropolis and Algeria.

Despite Paris's opinion, the U.S. had common interests with these separatist groups. From the American perspective, keeping Algeria under pro-Occidental administration was considered one of the safest ways to contain communism in the region<sup>86</sup>. These concurring objectives led the State Department to collide with these French rebels. As a matter of fact, one of the putschist generals, Maurice Challe, had been in contact with CIA officers before his coup. General Challe, through his position as commander in chief of a NATO headquarter, was used to work with American agents. Exploiting this relationship, the CIA, when aware of his intentions, asserted him that Washington would recognize the putschists in the days following their coup<sup>87</sup>. This relationship was further exhibited the day of the putsch as the U.S. military attaché in Paris had flown to Algiers on that specific date. Additionally, the transmitter station used by the putschists to contact Paris was the one of the American General consulate in Alger<sup>88</sup>. Whether the U.S. pledge to support the coup was genuine or not remains unknown as the generals' putsch rapidly failed. Still, this secret assurance encouraged separatists to take actions against the French government.

Furthermore, the CIA, displayed close ties with the OAS. Indeed, it was in Washington's interest to temper the Algerian conflict. Putting an end to the independence war and OAS actions would allow the Algerian and "Pied Noirs" communities to reconcile, and ultimately favor the emergence of a FLN moderate branch. To that end, American agents met both FLN and OAS leaders in order to organize pacification meetings in June 1961. On the OAS side, Chevallier, Gardes and Susini were contacted; the

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<sup>82</sup> Horne, 2002

<sup>83</sup> Cogan, 2007

<sup>84</sup> Branche, 2007

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Swiss Intelligence, 1962

<sup>87</sup> Swiss Intelligence, 1962 ; Pesnot, 2001

<sup>88</sup> Swiss Intelligence, 1962

latter one being hosted since several weeks in the U.S. Consulate General in Algiers<sup>89</sup>. On the other side, FLN leaders Farès and Mostefaï, backed by Fehrat Abbas, were present. These meetings, while not resulting in an agreement, managed to obtain a cease fire between both factions<sup>90</sup>. Regarding the French-American relationship, these meetings concretely display the CIA close connection with separatist and rebel groups. One could indicate that these contacts were used to an end serving French interests, namely the pacification of Algeria; yet, the whole process, involving two factions, both enemies of the French government, was set up without Paris' knowledge let alone its approval.

### *Conspiracy Theories*

It is necessary to stay circumspect when analyzing the CIA involvement in the Algerian War. Indeed, American ties with separatist groups have led to several baseless accusations from the French side. Officials and newspapers have denounced this relationship and attributed criminal acts of the OAS to Washington's hand<sup>91</sup>. These actions included sabotage and assassination attempts, notably against de Gaulle, whose relationship with the American administration was ostensibly unfriendly<sup>92</sup>. On the opposite side some authors have attributed de Gaulle rise to power to Washington and its intelligence agency. According to this theory, the fragile French political landscape stemming from the Algerian situation could have led the communists to power. The CIA, willing to prevent this scenario at all cost, would have putatively intruded in French affairs. Using the French stay behind network, American agents would have actively influenced French politicians to secure de Gaulle access to power<sup>93</sup>. Yet, these theories lack concrete evidence and most likely fall into the realm of speculation<sup>94</sup>. According to scholars these different conspiracy theories showing inconsistencies might have various origins. Whether they were part of a Soviet disinformation campaign<sup>95</sup> or stemming from the French disillusion as a result of their empire unravelling against rebelling colonies<sup>96</sup>, these theories demonstrate the phantasmal mindset surrounding the field of intelligence. On an international relations level, these conspiracy theories acted

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<sup>89</sup> Swiss Intelligence, 1962

<sup>90</sup> Fernand, 1967

<sup>91</sup> Jeffreys-Jones, 1989

<sup>92</sup> Cogan, 2007

<sup>93</sup> Meyssan, 2001

<sup>94</sup> Cogan, 2007

<sup>95</sup> Lefebvre, 1999

<sup>96</sup> Jeffreys-Jones, 1989

as a catalyst and expanded the detrimental effect which the CIA's acknowledged link, with rebels and separatist groups, had on French popular opinion and governmental policies.

### *Connection Between U.S. Operations and the Alliance*

As demonstrated, CIA implication during the Algerian War is well detailed and documented. The American agency had contacts with and supported the FLN rebels, as well as French separatist groups. Washington, following its national interest, overlooked its alliance for the sake of global war against communism. During the Cold War context, ideological objectives dictated superpower's agenda above all else including the interest of their own coalition. The presence of an alliance affected the conduct of these intelligence operations in two ways. On the American side, the alliance created an ambiguous position for the State Department having to play an international "double jeu". Indeed, the American administration was arming its French ally during the conflict while, at the same time, publicly supporting the principle of self-determination<sup>97</sup>. This ambiguous position, deriving from the friction between public and private objectives, prompted Washington to make use of its intelligence services. On the other hand, the bilateral alliance allowed the U.S. to bolster its intelligence operations. As both countries were closely tied on a military level, the CIA used common institutions such as NATO to easily meet French separatist officers. In fact, military personnel are often employed by intelligence agencies to undertake operations against their allies<sup>98</sup>. Moreover, the CIA made use of unions developed by free labor organizations over the Western bloc. Integrant part of the Occidental ideology, these unions were seen as auxiliaries promoting democracy against the communist ideal<sup>99</sup>. Thus, the AFL-CIO enjoyed a fully established network over U.S. allied countries. In this case, the Algerian connection allowed the CIA to indirectly support the FLN.

Ultimately, Washington's implication in the Algerian War had long term impacts on the alliance. Indeed, the CIA operations, both proven and speculated, led the French government to distance itself from Atlanticism. Confronted by American hegemony, de Gaulle had the ambition to recover French autonomy and prominence in the international landscape. The French Republic through de Gaulle's "politique de grandeur" left NATO in 1966 and acquired nuclear weapons in 1968 thus ceasing to depend on American defense. Moreover, alliances have a restricting power on participating countries, limiting

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<sup>97</sup> Lefebvre, 1999

<sup>98</sup> Alexander, 1998

<sup>99</sup> von Bülow, 2013

their opportunities to have outsider partners. This is a consequence of governments being compelled to follow the alliance direction and their allies' positions<sup>100</sup>. The French president's ultimate objective was thus to refuse the Cold War bloc logic to open the possibility of cooperation with both sides. Undeniably, the Algerian episode played a significant part in this disunion, deeply altering the French American alliance.

Finally, one last factor should be analyzed concerning the CIA involvement in the Algerian conflict, namely the presence of oil in the Saharan desert. Indeed, since 1952, the American administration had interest in Algeria's hydrocarbon potential<sup>101</sup>. The CIA was therefore tasked to evaluate possible prospects in the region and the French position regarding Saharan oil fields<sup>102</sup>. These espionage operations were aimed at evaluating the possibilities for American companies' part of the "seven major" oligopoly to step foot in Algerian desert and access its precious black gold. This surveillance, which kept going after the independence war<sup>103</sup>, proved effective as by the end of the 1960's most companies operating in the Algerian desert were Americans<sup>104</sup>. The U.S. intelligence services were thus used as a platform boosting American companies in the international market. Indeed, intelligence agencies are a tool often used by governments for economic purposes particularly on strategic sectors such as hydrocarbons. The following case study will present such an operation orchestrated by the DGSE on three American multinationals.

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<sup>100</sup> Chun, 2000

<sup>101</sup> Cantoni, 2016

<sup>102</sup> CIA, 1957

<sup>103</sup> CIA, 1970

<sup>104</sup> Cantoni, 2016

## French Economic Espionage

This second case study will focus on economic espionage. It will discuss the crucial nexus between a nation's economy and its intelligence activities. Moreover, the upcoming analysis will provide the opportunity to develop the concept of counter intelligence operations aimed at preventing economic espionage and their effects on international alliances.

The Cold War antagonism and its inherent ideological opposition gradually diminished in the 1980's eventually ending with the collapse of the USSR. During this period, states relationships ceased to be dictated by the bipolar ideological logic, thus shifting governments' priorities to economic stakes<sup>105</sup>. The essence of state power itself transitioned from armed capacity to economic security<sup>106</sup>. In a globalized capitalist world, military confrontation was replaced by economic competition<sup>107</sup>. The competitive nature of the international system forced national companies to keep a high level of secrecy concerning their activities and relative advantages. These features, representing extremely valuable information to competitors, were targeted by private actors as well as governments. Indeed, by the end of the Cold War, as nations increasingly considered their economy as a feature of power, governments put an emphasis on developing and promoting their industries. Following this national concern, intelligence services devoted their skillsets to support public and private companies. Such a strategy was particularly exploited by countries displaying close ties between the state and its industrial sector<sup>108</sup>. Intelligence agencies thus targeted economically leading countries and their major companies, often disregarding other international relations features such as alliances.

Economic espionage corresponds to the illegal theft of information, with the objective to enhance domestic companies and ultimately a country's economic security<sup>109</sup>. Economic espionage is exclusively performed by state actors contrarily to industrial espionage which is perpetrated by companies<sup>110</sup>. According to the FBI<sup>111</sup>:

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<sup>105</sup> Sulick, 2013

<sup>106</sup> Nolan, 2000

<sup>107</sup> Poteat, 2001

<sup>108</sup> Porteous, 1994

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Mindstar, 2016

<sup>111</sup> FBI, n.d.

Economic espionage is foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. government or U.S. corporations, establishments, or persons, designed to unlawfully or clandestinely influence sensitive economic policy decisions or to unlawfully obtain sensitive financial, trade, or economic policy information; proprietary economic information; or critical technologies. This theft, through open and clandestine methods, can provide foreign entities with vital proprietary economic information at a fraction of the true cost of its research and development, causing significant economic losses.

Indeed, economic espionage can prove extremely costly to the targeted country. Even though data is difficult to acquire, some investigations claim that American companies have lost \$45 billion in 1994 due to economic espionage<sup>112</sup>, this figure amounted to between \$225 and \$600 billion in 2017 only considering intellectual property theft<sup>113</sup>. On the perpetrator side, economic espionage can prove extremely profitable. As Martin Alexander notes, citing himself the Count de Marenches, former head of the French SDECE “In any Intelligence Service worthy of the name you would easily come across cases where the whole year's budget has been paid for in full by a single operation”<sup>114</sup>. Certainly, such operations can provide extensive indirect revenues through the improvement of national economies. Economic espionage being a relatively low-risk practice thus displayed an attractive risk-benefit ratio<sup>115</sup> which prompted many governments to spy on their competitor's economy.

### *French Services Target the U.S.*

As a matter of fact, the U.S. has been particularly targeted by these intelligence operations. American companies, being considered leaders in several fields, have whetted many foreign powers lust. Surprisingly, these spying operations have not originated from U.S. strategic adversaries but rather from their allies such as Israel, South Korea and France<sup>116</sup>. Indeed, alliances are often challenged when economic interests are at stake. Intelligence agencies and by extent their government consider that a bilateral security agreement is confined to strategic matters; countries should not be expected to collaborate on other fields including economic and technological stakes<sup>117</sup>. The SDECE, in accordance with this argument, had approximately 20 percent of its agents targeting occidental countries with a

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<sup>112</sup> IOSS, 1996

<sup>113</sup> The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017

<sup>114</sup> Alexander, 1998

<sup>115</sup> Poteat, 2001

<sup>116</sup> Clarke & Johnston, 2007

<sup>117</sup> Schweizer, 1993

focus on technological intelligence collection<sup>118</sup>. Furthermore, the French intelligence agency established a specific bureau specialized on economic espionage. This entity called Service 7, considered the U.S. economy as its principal target. In its intelligence collection process, the Service 7 thus employed various offensive means, such as wire-tapping, document stealing and penetration agents, against American companies and their businessmen visiting France<sup>119</sup>.

In 1981, the new head of French intelligence services Pierre Marion, decided to modernize the SDECE and consequently to reorganize its structure. Marion's intentions were to include more civilians into a service traditionally militarized as well as to bring an increasing focus on economic and technological spying operations. Hence, a new group called "Planning, Forecasting, Evaluation" was assigned with economic missions. According to Peter Schweizer, this unit had a specific plan of action regarding future operations<sup>120</sup>:

1. That the French intelligence service create a systematic method for monitoring foreign corporate representatives visiting Paris. This would include not only electronic surveillance but also bag operations. The plan called for the recruitment of honorary correspondents from among the staff of several Parisian hotels frequented by Western business executives.
2. That foreign French agents in Western countries "focus further" on economic and technological information as opposed to "general political intelligence." The paper noted specifically the value of seeking out "non-classified technical information overseas." Such information could be extremely helpful, and its procurement was unlikely to cause a diplomatic incident if detected.
3. That the intelligence service, through the use of overseas agents, actively seek out proprietary information that would be helpful to specific French companies.

Following its predecessor tradition, this unit particularly relying on scientific attachés abroad, principally targeted American industries with a focus on high tech companies' research and development sectors<sup>121</sup>. Consequently, the DGSE (having at the time replaced the SDECE) undertook long term operations against major American companies such as International Business Machines Corporation (IBM).

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<sup>118</sup> Schweizer, 1993

<sup>119</sup> Nolan, 2000

<sup>120</sup> Schweizer, 1993

<sup>121</sup> CIA, 1991

## *Focus on American Champions*

The American multinational IBM, developing computer soft and hardware, possessed headquarters in several countries including France. On an international level, IBM was among others in competition with the French nationalized Compagnie des Machines Bull. The international market in which these companies were operating, and Bull's competitive backwardness, prompted the French government to undertake spying operations against its direct competitor. This information collection was intended to fix Bull's deficiencies against the American giants. The French secret services thus orchestrated several operations against this American firm, particularly relying on eavesdropping and discreetly breaking in visiting managers' hotel room<sup>122</sup>. IBM, which eventually became aware of these spying activities, had very limited leverage to counter such intelligence gathering. The company's encrypted messages were cracked by the French while building awareness among its staff was far from sufficient. However, the American company would at times make use of DGSE "ears" to its own advantage. To that end, IBM sent intended misinformation from New York headquarters to its Paris office. The American firm would thus fool French services and Bull company, making them believe erroneous information. When aware of their mistake, French spies would then remain doubtful about future intelligence veracity<sup>123</sup>.

More specifically, in 1987, the DGSE decided to undertake a large-scale operation against three American companies considered leaders in their own fields. IBM and Texas Instrument were found key targets regarding computer technology, Corning Glass was chosen as leader in the field of fiber optics<sup>124</sup>. These American multinationals presented an additional advantage, namely possessing a foothold on the French territory. Hence, during the months following this planning phase, the DGSE recruited several French employees within the three companies' France based offices, whom would focus on the acquisition of secret information. This economic intelligence had once again the indirect purpose of enhancing French companies' competitiveness. In IBM particularly, the DGSE enjoyed informants in managerial positions which allowed the French agency to access "everything from strategic business decisions, financial information, and bids on contracts to high-tech research"<sup>125</sup>. As large numbers of documents were collected, the operation considered successful continued for several months. In 1989 however, multiple events raising American suspicion led to an extensive counter intelligence operation.

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<sup>122</sup> Nolan, 2000

<sup>123</sup> Schweizer, 1993

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

## Economic Counter Espionage

Counter intelligence consists in the gathering of information about hostile intelligence endangering national interests. Its objective is to neutralize these foreign activities and prevent future intrusions<sup>126</sup>. Often described as an art rather than a science, counter intelligence is an intuitive field in which officers must constantly stay skeptical in front of information<sup>127</sup>. To be successful against espionage threats, counter intelligence relies on numerous steps. Firstly, the intelligence service is required to notice and acknowledge that a foreign intrusion is ongoing. This realization can come from various leads such as empirical indications, defecting agents or outside informers also called “snitches”. The intelligence threat then needs to be clearly identified and precisely assessed in order to address it with the most effective counter measures. Counter intelligence personnel need to gather evidence of intrusion to substantiate their operations and eventually confront their perpetrator. Finally, the agency must find a suitable way to prevent such deficiencies in its intelligence security system.

In the specific domain of economic espionage, counter intelligence operations present additional challenges. Indeed, companies victim of economic espionage are rarely willing to discuss the matter. These firms usually consider that espionage disclosure would represent a detrimental publicity. The company’s reputation would be undermined potentially affecting its prosperity<sup>128</sup>. Moreover, companies are often reluctant to reveal being targeted by foreign economic espionage. Often, the cost-benefit analysis of retaliation compels them not to take action, as they attribute significant value to their relationship with the spying country and its market opportunities. They are therefore unwilling to jeopardize their prospects abroad<sup>129</sup>. On a prevention level, deterrence of further intrusion is complex as economic espionage is often perpetrated by friendly countries. Consequently, targeted governments usually adopt a stance preserving their diplomatic relations<sup>130</sup>, discarding strong retaliation sanctions which would have refrained foreign governments from planning further spying activities. Finally, the scholars Grabiszewski and Minor have analyzed that legal measures designed to prevent economic espionage are not necessarily effective<sup>131</sup>. On the contrary, their findings show<sup>131</sup> that regarding countries which display a high level of research and development, laws protecting from economic espionage are counterproductive as they would paradoxically increase spying activities against companies. Their study

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<sup>126</sup> Moravej & Díaz, 2007

<sup>127</sup> Redmond, 2010

<sup>128</sup> IOSS, 1996

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Nolan, 2000

<sup>131</sup> Grabiszewski & Minor, 2019

however does not address cases in which foreign governments were found to have assisted these spying activities. For these numerous reasons counter intelligence, intended to protect domestic companies from economic espionage, is a complex task which ultimately requires political will to be truly efficient.

Nevertheless, in 1989 the American counter intelligence operation was successfully conducted. Awareness of the French spying activity originated from different anecdotes. Initially, one of the IBM moles located in Nice attempted to mail sensitive documents to a French competitor<sup>132</sup>. The package, which recipient's address had come of, was returned to the IBM office where staff members eventually discovered its secret content. Managers quickly alerted the FBI of their findings<sup>133</sup>. Moreover, one of the DGSE agents having drinking habits, mentioned his covert activities to an American friend<sup>134</sup>. The latter shared this information with the CIA station chief in Paris who decided to undertake a quiet investigation. His suppositions were then confirmed by security officials of the three companies who themselves had suspicions about several employees. These discoveries led American services, with the assistance of the targeted companies, to discreetly gather proofs until the French spying operation ins and outs were discovered. American counter intelligence services decided to follow through their operation with interrogations. When several spying employees came to visit the U.S. the FBI seized the opportunity to directly confront them. Originally denying FBI accusations, the employees inevitably confessed when American agents displayed their detailed array of evidence<sup>135</sup>. When contacted by Washington, French officials responded in a similar way: after denying its involvement for two weeks, the DGSE privately recognized its participation in the operation to CIA officials. Regarding repercussions, on company's level employees involved were naturally fired. However, concerning international relations, economic espionage usually does not impair strategic alliances.

### *Spying and Disclosure Effects on Alliance*

Fundamentally, an alliance is considered more valuable by targeted governments than engaging in retaliation measures against the spying country. In this specific case, France had privately recognized its involvement and apologized to officials. This operation thus did not lead to further actions by the U.S. Moreover, American officials were reluctant to proceed to sanctions as they were fully aware that their own intelligence agencies were undertaking the same type of economic espionage including against

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<sup>132</sup> Murray, 2014

<sup>133</sup> Rost & Glass, 2011

<sup>134</sup> Schweizer, 1993

<sup>135</sup> CIA, 1991

France. As a matter of fact, four years following this case, an American economic espionage operation, targeting a French official, was dismantled<sup>136</sup>. The American personnel involved were simply expelled without any ensuing sanctions from the French side. This time however, Paris publicly denounced Washington for spying on an ally. According to some French officials, the trust essential to any bilateral relationship had been abused by the United States<sup>137</sup>. This hypocritical posture had traditionally been avoided as allied countries preferred to deal with these situations privately considering their international reputation, diplomatic relations, and domestic popularity. However, in the beginning of the 1990's, publicly denouncing the perpetrator became an increasing trend in counter intelligence practices including from the U.S. This new strategy might, to a certain extent, have stemmed from the Soviet Union collapse. Indeed, during the Cold War, allied countries excluded public denunciations for the sake of solidarity against the Soviet bloc. Without this common enemy however, Western governments ceased to passively accept intelligence operations coming from allies<sup>138</sup>.

As demonstrated, economic stakes were at the core of espionage practices between France and the U.S., particularly since the end of the Cold War. Technological advances have provided the field of espionage unique opportunities, such as sophisticated eavesdropping, but also new challenges. In the contemporaneous state of intelligence operations, cyber capabilities and progress in telecommunications has allowed agencies to spy on an extensive number of targets around the world. Large-scale monitoring of citizens and governmental entities has become usual in modern intelligence practices. As a matter of fact, the organization WikiLeaks and former NSA employee Edward Snowden have revealed such activities coordinated by U.S. intelligence against several countries, including their close allies. The last case study will examine this contemporary practice and its relation over the French U.S. alliance.

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<sup>136</sup> Weiner, 1996

<sup>137</sup> Dely, 1995

<sup>138</sup> Porteous, 1994

## NSA Mass Surveillance

This last case study will present the intelligence practice of mass monitoring. It will focus on the NSA activities since 2000 describing the increasing significance surveillance took in intelligence activities. This case study will address stakes involving both mass monitoring and specific eavesdropping on foreign officials, their implementation and their implications over the alliance.

At the dawn of the third millennium new threats started to appear prompting governments to adjust their international priorities. Radical Islamism, which took shape in an international jihad, menaced Occidental societies. This threat was highlighted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks which deeply shook public opinion and forced Western governments to cooperate in a global war against terrorism. Through this common objective, France and the U.S. collaborated tightly, except over the 2003 Iraq War. As France rejoined NATO in 2009, both countries militarily intervened side by side in the Middle eastern region. Moreover, intelligence agencies cooperated on counter terrorism operations, sharing their information regarding potential threats. To counter this terrorist menace, French and American intelligence agencies relied on several means, including secret mass surveillance techniques which monitored citizens, both within their territory and abroad. This surveillance however, exceeded its alleged original aim, leading to mass leaks intended to expose these activities to the general public. Disclosed by so called “whistle blowers”, whose endeavor can more specifically be defined as *parrhesia*<sup>139</sup>, several documents mostly originating from the NSA, shed light on the colossal scope of the monitoring. These revelations challenging individuals’ privacy, public liberties and the conduct of democracy have shocked public opinion leading to various polemics over intelligence agencies’ prerogatives and public oversight. On the level of international relations, various leaks revealed U.S. spying activities against its allies. Several countries close to Washington such as Brazil, Japan and Germany have been targeted by this large-scale monitoring. Likewise, the French ally has not been spared, as its citizens, companies and officials were steadily being spied on by the NSA.

However, an American surveillance program targeting foreign leaders including its allies was not particularly new. Indeed, the U.S., with the assistance of the other Four Eyes, had run a mass surveillance program targeting Europe among others since the 1960’s<sup>140</sup>. This program, called Echelon, relied on

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<sup>139</sup> Lyon, 2017

<sup>140</sup> Jacquet, 2016

listening stations which recorded through SIGINT collection any phone call, fax and email transmitted by citizens around the world<sup>141</sup>. Gathered data was then sent to the NSA where supercomputers would analyze them looking for specific key words<sup>142</sup>. This operation discovered in the 1990's set the basis for following programs more pervasive and powerful. Indeed, the NSA's future version of mass surveillance was unmatched in terms of scale, and the sheer variety of methods intended to exploit and collect hitherto tremendous amounts of data.

### Large-Scale Monitoring

Consistently enhancing its capacities in terms of data collection and analysis, the NSA has relied on diverse methods to develop a constant watch over American citizens as well as foreign populations around the world. To obtain a worldwide coverage, the NSA made use of the Five Eyes community to reach distant parts of the globe. Indeed, the United Kingdom represented a useful entry gate to the European continent. The British intelligence agencies thus directly spied on neighboring countries, such as France, sending their findings to the NSA. On the other side of the globe, New Zealand also proved to have a valuable geographic position. In charge of Pacific islands, the New Zealander agency targeted among others French Polynesia, once again with the support of the NSA.

To extend its coverage, the NSA did not solely rely on foreign intelligence assistance but also on private companies, most of them being based in the U.S. Multinationals such as Google, Facebook or Skype, holding an extraordinary amount of information on their customers, represented an extremely valuable database for the surveillance mission. Through the program PRISM launched in 2007, the NSA sought to acquire these multinationals customers' data. These companies, which collaborated either voluntarily or under the rule of law<sup>143</sup>, were also targeted through covert means by the NSA in order to extricate the largest amount of information possible. For instance, the intelligence agency had infiltrated data transfer between Google and Yahoo, even though these companies were already collaborating, thus providing legal and illegal intelligence to American analysts<sup>144</sup>.

Additionally, breaking into national phone networks has been an essential part of the NSA surveillance program. This method was made available using technical information covertly gathered

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<sup>141</sup> Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System, 2001

<sup>142</sup> Poole, 1998

<sup>143</sup> Pétiniaud, 2014

<sup>144</sup> Wright & Kreissl, 2013

from cell phone companies. In 2012, the NSA had managed to infiltrate in 70% networks worldwide, 40% of phone communications in the French territory were being monitored<sup>145</sup>. As a matter of fact, leaked documents revealed that in a one-month period, the NSA captured up to 70 million phone datasets solely in France<sup>146</sup>. Key words potentially interesting to the NSA triggered the broadcasting of voice or text communications which were then sent to the American agency for deeper analysis. In term of telecommunication, NSA's mass surveillance network also took advantage of undersea fiber-optic cables. These cables carrying information across the world represented an abundant source of intelligence exploited by many secret services. American and British services benefitting from a valuable strategic location tapped directly or indirectly the cables which provided additional information from the five continents.

This large-scale monitoring objective was twofold. First, the NSA genuinely used this mass surveillance to safeguard American territory against potential terrorist attacks. To that end American services spied on several countries, including their allies, who could have unbeknownst to them been harboring threatening individuals<sup>147</sup>. As foreign countries shared this concern, their intelligence services considered such monitoring legitimate and collaborated with the NSA towards this common security goal. For instance, the French DGSE, which also engaged in surveillance operation over its citizens, although in a smaller scale than the U.S., traded selected information with the NSA<sup>148</sup>. Moreover France, which also enjoyed strategic access to underwater communication cable<sup>149</sup>, increasingly shared valuable intelligence with the Five Eyes community. Allegedly, this collaboration, codenamed "Lustre", was at times made without the French government's knowledge<sup>150</sup>.

Nevertheless, the scale and means used by the NSA suggest that Washington had other objectives in mind. Indeed, through this mass monitoring, the NSA also targeted several foreign companies' communications as part of a broader economic espionage strategy. American spying focused particularly but not exclusively on strategic sectors. For example, oil companies such as Brazilian Petrobras and French Total, as well as Thales, a French armament company, were all subjected to economic espionage by the American agency<sup>151</sup>. U.S. officials denied this aim and justified the NSA practices as part of the surveillance program safeguarding national security. According to an NSA spokeswoman, the agency

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<sup>145</sup> Gallagher, 2014

<sup>146</sup> Follorou & Greenwald, 2013

<sup>147</sup> Banks, 2017

<sup>148</sup> Wright & Kreissl, 2013

<sup>149</sup> Tréguer, 2017

<sup>150</sup> Follorou, 2013

<sup>151</sup> Wright & Kreissl, 2013 ; France 24, 2013

would only monitor companies exhibiting anomalous activities potentially threatening to U.S. national security<sup>152</sup>. This justification is to the least doubtful as the U.S. Trade Representative itself requested American intelligence agencies to provide information on foreign companies<sup>153</sup>. Moreover, as detailed in documents provided by Wikileaks, the NSA was explicitly tasked to collect intelligence on French companies' economic activities<sup>154</sup>. Whether it was the final objective, or an auxiliary mission, Washington thus exploited this mass surveillance network to provide valuable advantages to American industries. This argument is further strengthened by the specific eavesdropping undertaken by the NSA against economic and political officials abroad.

### *Eavesdropping on Officials*

Alongside its indiscriminate large-scale monitoring, the NSA targeted specific officials which would unknowingly provide valuable intelligence. Around the world, the NSA eavesdropped on numerous political officials including 35 world leaders<sup>155</sup>. Regarding France, targets top list encompassed high rank businessmen, several ministers and diplomats as well as French presidents<sup>156</sup>. This monitoring essentially relied on the targets' phone communications. Indeed, according to leaked documents, the NSA list of French personalities was tagged along with their personal or working phone numbers. As a matter of fact, many French politicians, including presidents, made public appearances using their personal phones rather than recommended secured ones. This type of OSINT was probably exploited by the NSA which concluded that French personalities were easily exposed to phone tapping<sup>157</sup>. Monitoring cell phones presented an additional advantage as extracting the victim's private information further allowed the NSA to extend its list of valuable targets. The contacts found in one cell phone led to other numbers which were subsequently added to the priority list if determined worthwhile<sup>158</sup>.

Moreover, the NSA had particular interest in communications related to French foreign policies. To this end, the American agency had broken the secured network connecting French ministry of Foreign affairs to its embassies and consulates around the world<sup>159</sup>. Using spyware, the NSA obtained access to

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<sup>152</sup> France 24, 2013

<sup>153</sup> Wright & Kreissl, 2013

<sup>154</sup> NSA, 2012a

<sup>155</sup> Ball, 2013

<sup>156</sup> Wikileaks, n.d.

<sup>157</sup> Jacquet, 2016

<sup>158</sup> Ball, 2013

<sup>159</sup> le Monde, 2013

the French foreign offices' computer data and private telecommunications<sup>160</sup>. As one would expect the French delegations present in the U.S. territory were subject of focused attention. The French embassy in Washington was wiretapped which provided the NSA with full knowledge on Paris's strategy in the U.S. Using the same technique, the American intelligence agency spied on French representatives at the United Nations under operation "Blackfoot". This codename probably originated from the Indian tribe originally named by French settlers or could have derived from the Algerian community "Pieds Noirs"<sup>161</sup>. Through this global monitoring of French officials, the NSA provided Washington with crucial intelligence. American decision makers, aware of the French agenda over crucial stakes, were thus constantly in an advantageous position to protect their national interest.

The multiple stakes drawing NSA's attention over French officials' communications can be classified in two main groups: politics and economics. Firstly, the NSA monitored several conversations between French officials regarding national and international political stakes. As part of a strong alliance with France, the U.S. felt compelled to spy on its counterpart's consideration over the relationship. Whether they were matters of bilateral agreements, prospects of cooperation on theatres of operation<sup>162</sup> or joint conduct of international peace talks<sup>163</sup>, Washington was willing to be one step ahead of French diplomats. By the same token, French communications regarding their own government's diplomatic agenda were deeply scrutinized by the NSA. Even if these stakes were not directly impacting the U.S., Washington was thus aware of France's international priorities<sup>164</sup>, its relationship with other countries<sup>165</sup> and with international organizations<sup>166</sup>. As might have been expected, Washington had an interest in issues usually considered under U.S. leadership, such as the global financial system<sup>167</sup> or the situation in the Middle Eastern region<sup>168</sup>.

Secondly, such as the large-scale monitoring of foreign companies, this eavesdropping method focused on economic purposes<sup>169</sup>. The NSA collected information which provided Washington with valuable insights on French prospects in terms of international agreements with third countries<sup>170</sup> and on

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<sup>160</sup> Follorou, 2013a

<sup>161</sup> Bourdier, 2013

<sup>162</sup> NSA, 2010

<sup>163</sup> NSA, 2011b

<sup>164</sup> NSA, 2012c

<sup>165</sup> NSA, 2011a

<sup>166</sup> NSA, 2006

<sup>167</sup> NSA, 2008b

<sup>168</sup> Chapuis, 2011

<sup>169</sup> Wright & Kreissl, 2013

<sup>170</sup> NSA, 2011a

a domestic level regarding expected policies for the French economy<sup>171</sup>. As French economic opportunities over the world could potentially hamper American companies, the NSA surveilled Paris's activities supporting national companies, especially in emerging countries such as Brazil, China<sup>172</sup> and French-speaking Africa<sup>173</sup>. Finally, it is interesting to note that through such extended insight on its allies, Washington often attempted to exploit national and regional divisions<sup>174</sup>. Indeed Washington, aware of political disagreements within a government<sup>175</sup> or between nation states<sup>176</sup>, was able to support groups sharing American's opinion over critical stakes, thus promoting its national interest.

These numerous eavesdropping however, were not unnoticed by America's allies and most of French officials were to some extent conscious of NSA intelligence gathering. Diplomats, being at the forefront of any country's spying activities, are generally aware of representing key targets to their host country's intelligence agency. They therefore are instructed to act and communicate with precautions<sup>177</sup>. French presidents themselves were informed of American intelligence practices. As one of the Wikileaks documents revealed<sup>178</sup>, in 2010 the NSA intercepted a communication in which the French president complained to its ambassador in Washington about Americans spying on French diplomatic communications. Apart from yet another proof that the NSA monitored countless information between France and its American embassy, this interception reveals that French leaders were conscious about some of the American intelligence practices, years before they were revealed to the public.

### *Disclosure and Mitigated Repercussions*

The revelations disclosed by Snowden and the organization Wikileaks regarding NSA activities led to various debates in the media and among the public at large. Regarding targeted governments, many officials, even if previously aware of such practices, probably did not expect the colossal scale on which the NSA was operating. Hence, targeted politicians' reaction oscillated between feigned surprise and genuine shock. As a matter of fact, U.S. allies reacted differently to the disclosure. Germany was the most vehement in its denunciation against Washington. Angela Merkel having her personal phone been

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<sup>171</sup> NSA, 2012b

<sup>172</sup> NSA, 2011a ; Chapuis, 2011

<sup>173</sup> Piel & Tilouine, 2016

<sup>174</sup> Chapuis, 2011

<sup>175</sup> NSA, 2008a

<sup>176</sup> NSA, 2012d

<sup>177</sup> Golan, 2011

<sup>178</sup> NSA, 2010

tapped on, condemned American practices qualifying them as unacceptable and potentially harmful for their bilateral relationship. However, most other countries simply settled for cautious criticism against NSA activities, many of them alike to France, making sure to avoid a shift of the debate towards their own domestic intelligence service practices<sup>179</sup>. Indeed, large-scale monitoring and eavesdropping were not unique to U.S. intelligence. As a former French Foreign Ministry stated: “Let’s be honest, we also listen. Everyone is listening to everyone.”<sup>180</sup>

In France, both the President and Foreign office minister denounced Washington’s spying activities against allies<sup>181</sup>. As a condition to maintain their close relationship, Paris publicly requested a full disclosure on NSA activities against France and proofs of their ending. Waiting for these guarantees, the French government threatened to suspend negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership<sup>182</sup>. Regarding these negotiations and following the European Commission Vice President statement: “We cannot negotiate on a large trans-Atlantic market if there is the slightest suspicion that our partners are spying on the offices of our chief negotiator”<sup>183</sup> the talks were put on hold; discussions however resumed shortly after<sup>184</sup>. In the end, the lack of strong measures against American espionage from Europe in general, and France in particular, stemmed from the governments’ will to prevent the situation from further escalation<sup>185</sup>. Targeted governments had to publicly display firmness towards their public opinion particularly as their own citizens had also been victim of NSA monitoring<sup>186</sup>. However, in the short term, European countries relationship with the U.S. has been hardly affected by Wikileaks and Snowden revelations<sup>187</sup>.

As illustrated by this case, the development of new technologies has allowed intelligence agencies to engage in increasingly large-scale monitoring of foreign population and officials even part of their own alliance. This attribute, currently dominated by the NSA, is at the heart of contemporary competition on 5G technology. China, with its leader in telecommunication Huawei, is now challenging American hegemony. Reaching markets all over the world, Chinese infrastructures are potentially laying the foundation for wide-ranging cyber espionage<sup>188</sup>.

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<sup>179</sup> Hayes, 2014

<sup>180</sup> Collomp, 2012

<sup>181</sup> Wright & Kreissl, 2013

<sup>182</sup> Spiegel, 2013

<sup>183</sup> Reding, 2013

<sup>184</sup> Wright & Kreissl, 2013

<sup>185</sup> Collomp, 2012

<sup>186</sup> Pétiniaud, 2014

<sup>187</sup> Chapuis, 2011 ; Steiger, Schünemann, & Dimmroth, 2017

<sup>188</sup> Shoebridge, 2018

## Analysis and Discussion

*Which reasons prompt partners to engage in intelligence operations?*

Within any alliance, two countries are entitled to security cooperation. However, as demonstrated over the three cases studied, a government's objectives are not necessarily concurrent with the ones of its ally or with the existence of the alliance itself. Even if strategic concerns are usually shared by allied countries, when their interests diverge, national primacy takes precedence over the alliance. Over the time frame studied, three main variables have had a strong effect on motivations, leading to intra-ally intelligence operations.

First the presence of a common enemy, even if resulting in strong cooperation between allies, has also prompted governments to engage in intelligence operations against their partner. This "need to verify" among allies already analyzed by the academic community<sup>189</sup>, was indeed paramount in the French-American relationship. Whether it be the communist threat or global war against terrorism, these grand strategic features have led Washington to covertly work against Paris. During the Algerian War, the CIA secretly supported groups against the French ally for ideological motives; regarding the NSA, large-scale monitoring of French citizens was considered necessary to assess potential threats against national security. Paradoxically, these global threats at the core of the alliance existence have been the reasons provoking one of the allies to undertake covert actions against its counterpart.

Second, technological advances have over time provided intelligence agencies with increasing tools allowing to expand their coverage and the amount of intelligence collected. Eavesdropping, as well as large-scale monitoring, have risen in intelligence practices and are now fundamental in any agency. These new methods thus allowed secret services to collect a wide variety of intelligence faster and at lower risk. As a matter of fact, the DGSE heavily relied on eavesdropping to spy on American companies based in France and their visiting staff. Furthermore, intelligence agencies, through refining of modern techniques, have acquired the capacity to collect an extensive amount of intelligence, monitoring any information accessible, only determining its potential value afterwards<sup>190</sup>. Indeed, NSA's mass surveillance did not solely consider security concerns such as terrorism but also a broad variety of geopolitical stakes. Understandably, intelligence about an ally's domestic politics, international

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<sup>189</sup> Bitton, 2014 ; Amusan & Mchunu, 2015

<sup>190</sup> Wright & Kreissl, 2013

diplomacy or strategic prospects represents valuable information in the realm of international relations, allowing a country to anticipate foreign developments and thus adapt its strategy accordingly<sup>191</sup>.

Finally, the special status of economy in intra-ally intelligence practices examined by several authors<sup>192</sup>, holds true for the French-American relationship. Indeed, as economy increasingly became part of a nation's attribute of power, intelligence agencies developed lucrative operations. The three cases studied in the present thesis involved in one way or another economic stakes. At the heart of the IBM operation, economic stakes were also at play behind the CIA involvement in Algeria. Additionally, the NSA mass surveillance program, as well as its targeted eavesdropping, were expected to collect a large amount of economic intelligence. This economic motivation ultimately springs from the fact that alliances are meant to stay confined to strategic stakes. Such bilateral collaboration does not inherently apply to economic stakes, leading allied countries to become competitors. This antinomic relationship eventually leads governments to engage in intelligence operations over their strategic ally then representing an economic adversary.

*Do alliances produce conditions which facilitate such intelligence operations?*

At the core of any alliance, countries are willing to cooperate on specific stakes, primarily on security. Through this cooperation, military personnel from both countries are often in contact, particularly if transnational institutions such as NATO shape the alliance. This connection, intrinsic to a security partnership, also facilitates intra-ally spying activities through private association with the foreign intelligence agency and its personnel. This feature was displayed during the Algerian War, as the CIA exploited its close contact with French military officials, and again over the NSA mass surveillance operation in which the DGSE took part. This data sharing, which could potentially be considered as part of collaboration activities under the alliance, would eventually be regarded as a foreign intelligence intrusion if proven that the French government was deliberately kept unaware. Such a conduct would further raise the question of intelligence agencies entitlement to autonomy and fuel the debate about the extent of government control required over such agencies.

Other institutions which promoted synergy between groups from allied countries also represented convenient platforms to undertake intelligence operations. As described, the link between the AFL-CIO

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<sup>191</sup> Easley, 2014

<sup>192</sup> Schweizer, 1993 ; Alexander, 1998

and its partners abroad have been exploited to support the CIA activities in Algeria. Furthermore, alliance external factors such as an economic partnership play a significant role in intra-ally espionage. Indeed, this cooperation entails domestic companies to develop an enduring relationship with the allied country. Such association generally leads multinationals to build foreign branches in the host country and to commit their personnel to regular visits. These factors present unique opportunities for hosting countries to engage in economic espionage. Such a beneficial context was notably exploited by the DGSE against several American companies with the intention of enhancing the French economy. This specific feature of economic espionage is further highlighted by the nature of countries targeting the U.S. economy, the most aggressive ones being Washington's allies<sup>193</sup>.

Finally, a strong alliance produces deep partnership on several level which governments highly value. Countries targeted by intelligence operations are thus unlikely to challenge the alliance in case of operation disclosure (this latter point will be further developed in the forthcoming paragraph). To that matter, intelligence agencies consider allies as targets carrying low risk of escalation contrarily to neutral countries which could potentially engage in retaliation measures.

*Do intra-ally intelligence operations affect the bilateral relations in some way?*

Interestingly, the victim country's intelligence agency, and therefore its government, even though not knowing specifics, were generally aware of being targeted by covert activities from their ally. Therefore, disclosure rarely came at a surprise but rather performed as a confirmation. In the short term, governments willing to preserve their alliance primarily needed to cope with their own public opinion and maintain their standing among the international community. As scholars have previously analyzed<sup>194</sup>, governments thus engaged in public denunciation and limited diplomatic measures, but, rarely pursued sanctions against the perpetrator or genuinely questioned their alliance. Government officials usually stayed pragmatic and cost benefit considerations prompted them to preserve their valuable partnership anyway.

In the long term however, these operations might have played a significant role in grand politic dynamics. Following the Algerian War, de Gaulle withdrew from NATO through his "politique de grandeur" stemming from his distrust towards the U.S. Likewise, the contemporary debate, challenging

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<sup>193</sup> Clarke & Johnston, 2007

<sup>194</sup> Easley, 2014

the relevance of transatlantic alliances such as NATO, exhibits a lack of trust between Occidental countries which repeatedly spied on each other. Naturally, intelligence operation disclosure is not the sole justification which strained bilateral relationships. While correlation is established between disclosure and the weakening of an alliance in the long term, further research needs to be undertaken to demonstrate their intuitive causality. Still, the lack of trust resulting from disclosure, spreading within public opinion as well as among the highest sphere of governance, undoubtedly played a significant role in the relationship evolution<sup>195</sup>.

Moreover, the scholar Porteous argues that the global economic shift in international politics might have a long-term effect on alliances<sup>196</sup>. Indeed, countries operating as strategic allies also behave as adversaries on an economic level. This antinomic relationship is particularly displayed in the realm of economic intelligence as agencies often target friendly countries. Intelligence agencies would have to fluctuate between cooperation on a strategic level and confrontation over economic stakes. Intelligence communities might thus be drawn to follow international realignment from ideological blocs to economic collaborators. These trends could reorganize international order, as strategic and intelligence alliances would follow economic cooperation with an emphasis on regional collaboration.

Finally, the French-American relation demonstrate that in the field of espionage, reciprocity might play a significant role. If a targeted government is itself undertaking intelligence operations against the perpetrator, the consequences of discovery are consequently smaller than if one country is unilaterally spying on its counterpart. Indeed, regarding small scale economic espionage operations, discovery has often been kept private and has not resulted in consequent alteration of the relationship. Since both countries were spying on each other, the practice was considered acceptable. However as observed, U.S. operation in Algeria as well as its contemporary unique surveillance program which eavesdropped French top officials, created an unbalanced position, presenting an unmatched intelligence advantage enjoyed by one of the allies. These situations, manifestly lacking operational reciprocity, are the ones which affected the relationship in the long run. As one of the allies holds intelligence supremacy, the other might feel threatened and thus compelled to step back from the alliance.

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<sup>195</sup> Easley, 2014

<sup>196</sup> Porteous, 1994

## Conclusion

Intra-ally intelligence operation is a common feature in the realm of international relations. Even if countries highly value their privileged relationship, national interest is every nation's primary concern. Consequently, governments take part in a "double jeu", combining cooperation with their allies, while at times, undertaking covert operations against them. Thus within bilateral alliances, intra-ally intelligence operations play diverse roles. Through these operations, governments seek results which would be unavailable by official means, even with an allied country. These specific motivations, prompting such operations, are numerous, encompassing domestic security, international politics and particularly economic stakes. These objectives are thus determined by the geopolitical context as well as technological tools available to intelligence agencies. Indeed, the increasing ability to collect large amounts of information has prompted agencies to extensively monitor allied leaders and their population. Furthermore, the alliance itself sets conditions which to some extent facilitate intra-ally operations. Indeed, ties intrinsic to any alliance, often reinforced through institutionalization, are exploited by intelligence agencies to achieve their ends. Regarding the potential effects these operations have on alliances, it is necessary to distinguish short and long term repercussions. Measures quickly following disclosure are rarely substantial and are generally addressed to preserve the victim government's reputation. However, spying on an ally might in the long term weaken the bilateral relationship. Indeed, disclosed operations impair the trust inherent in any collaborative relationship and undermine them; potentially resulting in an eventual collapse of the alliance. Finally, relationships are likely to be further strained if one of the allies exploits a disproportionate advantage over intelligence operations.

This thesis extends the academic literature on intra-ally intelligence, presenting an additional case-study, namely, the French-American alliance. This specific relationship has provided insights which strengthened previous findings and sought to suggest additional explanations regarding the field of intelligence. In this regard, the concept of intelligence reciprocity among allies should be further expanded. Future studies should thus focus on this specific issue. Furthermore, as mentioned, additional research should attempt to determine to which extent did the disclosure of intra-ally operations strain bilateral relationship. Several variables will probably be at play, such as the alliance necessity considering international context, the personal relationships between leaders, reciprocity in intelligence operations and perhaps most importantly, public opinion directly following disclosure and its impact on following elections. Indeed, such disclosures potentially have the power to shift the political consensus in an electorate against continued alliance.

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