The Ghanaian Infrastructure for Peace:
A Successful Grassroots Peacebuilding Process

Identifying the Local Actors and Elements of the Ghanaian Peacebuilding Process, and What Led to its Success and Set it as a Model for Countries with Similar Realities



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"Education is, quite simply, peace-building by another name. It is the most effective form of defence spending there is."

- Kofi Annan

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

Map of Ghana (Ghana 2019)

Acronyms

ACT 818 – National Peace Council Act of 2011

ADR – Alternative Dispute Resolution

AFCOPB – Africa Centre for Peace Building

CSOs – Civil Society Organizations

DPC – District Peace Council

DISEC – District Security Committee

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

GPI – Global Peace Index

IEP – Institute for Economics and Peace

IIAG – Ibrahim Index of African Governance

International Dialogue – International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

IPAC – Inter Party Advisory Commission

I4P – Infrastructure for Peace

KAIPTC – Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

MDGs – Millennium Development Goals

NCCE – National Commission for Civic Education

NDC – National Democratic Congress

New Deal – New Deal for the Engagement of Fragile States

NPC – National Peace Council

NPP – New Patriotic Party

PPI – Positive Peace Index

PI – Pillar I Security Dimension

PII – Pillar II Governing Dimension

PIII – Pillar III Social Dimension

RPC – Regional Peace Council

REGSEC – Regional Security Committee

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations

UNSG – United Nations Secretary General

WANEP – West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

Chapter I

I. Introduction

I.1 Overview

The Republic of Ghana is located in the tumultuous West African sub-region, where the country is surrounded by nations facing numerous conflicts rooted in a variety of sources. In May 2019, two French soldiers were killed in Burkina Faso during a French-led military operation, which aimed to rescue four tourists who had been kidnaped in Benin and taken by their captors through neighbouring Mali (Nir 2019). The sub-region has been home to instability and security challenges including, yet not limited to, Boko Haram attacks in the Lake Chad basin region, an emergency state in much of Burkina Faso, as well as kidnappings and extremist attacks in Niger, Benin and Togo (UN 2019).

Regardless of these circumstances, Ghana has been recognised as a stable democracy and a beacon of peace in the region. The country ranked 6 out of 54 African states on the 2018 edition of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)[1], with a score of 68.1 out of a 100 per cent. (IIAG, Ghana 2019) This score places the country second in overall governance performance in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with increasing improvements in overall governance trend of +0.35AAT since 2013 and 0.10 AAT[2] since 2008 (IEP, Global Peace Report 2018 2018). The nation also ranked 4th out of 44 Sub-Saharan African states on the 2019 Global Peace Index (GPI) generated by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), gaining one rank in comparison to the preceding year (IEP, Global Peace Report 2018 2018). The country is thus considered to have the highest level of peacefulness in the West-African sub-region. In 2018, Ghana was amongst three of the 14 West African states showing substantial sub-regional improvements in the domain of safety and security, with a 5.5 per cent increase and ranking of 41 out of 163 countries (IEP, Global Peace Report 2018 2018). Additionally, the country scored *high*[3] (2.96/5) on the 2018 Positive Peace Index (PPI) placing it 66 out of 163 countries, an index generated by the IEP. These rankings give an understanding of Ghana's performance in the world, making the nation a stellar

[1] A tool which monitors and measures governance performance in African countries, taking into consideration four categories : safety and rule of law (70.7%)*, participation and human rights (73.0%), sustainable economic (58.6%) , and human development (69.9%). *Ghana's 2018 scores (IIAG, Ghana 2019)

[2] See improvements 2013,

[3] on a scale of Very High (1), high(2.53), medium (3.29), Low(3.67), and Not included, (IEP, Global Peace Report 2018 2018)

performer in the issues of governance and peace in its region and sub-region. This prompts the inquiry why and how did the country become such a good performer.

In March 2011, the Ghanaian Parliament enacted a new bill which would institutionalise the nation's peacebuilding processes into an infrastructure for peace (I4P). Ghana is recognised to be a regional model in terms of peaceful democratic transition, since 1992 the nation has been able to elect new presidential representatives without an upsurge of conflict (van Tongeren, Creating infrastructure for Peace - Experiences at Three Continents 2012). The country's troubled past rooted in colonialism, military coups and dictatorial rule, as well as more recent conflicts related to civil and labour unrest, inter and intra-political party conflicts, land, religion, ethnic/identity conflicts including chieftaincy, laid the foundation for the upsurge of potential political unrest (van Tongeren, Creating infrastructure for Peace - Experiences at Three Continents 2012). Nevertheless, Ghana has been able to overcome these obstacles and conduct seven peaceful presidential elections from 1992 to 2016. This success can be attributed to the development of numerous mechanisms to build peace through mediation and conflict resolution.

I.2 Research question

In considering the previously stated information, this study aims to identify the components and sub-components of the Ghanaian I4P and their impact, a concept developed by John Paul Lederarch. The choice of the Ghanaian peace infrastructure is related to the successful development of the nation's infrastructure and the country's democratic stability in a tumultuous sub-region. Odendaal defined the case of Ghana as "a textbook example of a well-designed structure" (Odendaal, 2010). Hence, the following question will be investigated:

which local actors and elements of the peacebuilding process in Ghana led to its success and set it as a model for countries with similar realities?

This question will engender a greater understanding of how and why the Ghanaian peacebuilding process has been so effective to date. Success here will be defined as favourable or desired outcome to eliminate conflict in local communities and to establish lasting peace. This definition has been adapted for the purpose of this study. Via this question an understanding of how peacebuilding operates when actors from different levels of society are merged to create sustainable peace, the Ghanaian case demonstrates this particularity. The previously stated current state of affairs in the ECOWAS sub-region, is the reason why this question needs to be addressed. By addressing this

question this study will set a blueprint for how nations in the ECOWAS sub-region or other parts of Africa with similar realities can attain peace and stability.

I.3 Objective of the study

The aim of this thesis is to assess the Ghanaian infrastructure for peace as a whole, by providing an identification of its local actors and elements and by assessing the impact of its components as well as what allowed their success. This study, contrary to others previously produced will undertake a comprehensive understanding of the Ghanaian architecture by setting the subject within the wider peace, liberal peacebuilding, Ghanaian peacebuilding, and infrastructure for peace discourse. Aside from understanding where Ghana stands in this broad literature, this research will qualify Ghanaian conflicts in accordance with their typology as well as set the Ghanaian international peacebuilding influence, in addition to the I4P vision and components. Finally, the security, governing and social pillar sub-components will be investigated by assessing their role, objectives and impacts.

The novelty of this research lies in its comprehensive approach and the identification of the security, governing and social pillar components of the infrastructure. Numerous studies have been conducted on the security and the governing pillars, to the detriment of the social pillar which is often relegated under the governing pillar. Although, these two aspects of the architecture are essential, they do not provide a full understanding of how the population's desire is translated to the elite, and then how the elite strategy to implement peace is then translated to the local population. This study has for objective to determine how these elite mechanisms are able to translate the population's desire for peace into a peacebuilding strategy and then how is this strategy retranslated to the population in order to achieve the lasting peace the country has enjoyed. Addressing the social dimension of the architecture is seminal, due to its connecting nature to all the aspects of the architecture. Thus, the gap this thesis will be filling is to provide an understanding of the operation and interactions of the Ghanaian infrastructure for peace as a whole with its various components and sub-components, by analysing their content and determining their impact and the cause of their success.

By identifying the components of the Ghanaian peacebuilding structure and what led to its success, this study will determine a model specific to this case. This research does not aim to assess a general model transferable to other countries, however this study could be used as a model for countries with similar realities to develop infrastructures authentic to their cases.

I.4 Argument of the study

This thesis argues that to construct a successful peacebuilding infrastructure, Ghana tailored its architecture with a merged strategy from the Bottom up and Top down with local and elite participation and full ownership. The success of the Ghanaian peacebuilding infrastructure is rooted in the establishment of clear security guidelines to pursue the restoration of stability and peace in conflict and conflict-sensitive zones; the institutionalisation of its conflict resolution mechanism and the education of its population on peaceful methods of conflict resolution at different levels of society, with an emphasis on women and youth.

A number of approaches were developed by numerous actors including yet not limited to state security actors, the Ministry of Interior and Education, the National Peace Council and its regional and district equivalents, international and local Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the West African Network for Peacebuilding – Ghana (WANEP), the United Nations Development Program - country office Ghana (UNDP) as well as traditional leaders and chiefs. The diversity of actors and tailored approaches undertaken to build the Ghanaian process are the key proponents of its success. This thesis assembles these tailored approaches under three overarching pillars, which constitute the components of the infrastructure for peace and can be decomposed into subcomponents. The components consist of Pillar I: the security dimension (PI); Pillar II: the governing dimension (PII); and Pillar III: the social dimension (PIII). These pillars are each composed of subcomponents, which are for PI sub-component (4), prevention and control of small arms and light weapons, and promoting alternative livelihoods; PII sub-components (1) and (5), structures for peacebuilding and the resolution of conflict; and building capacity for national institutions to manage grievance and differences; and lastly PIII sub-component (2) institutionalising a culture of peace. These subcomponents will be analysed by assessing their stakeholders, elements, objectives, outputs and impact. A study of this nature offers an insight into the realities and dynamics of the construction of an infrastructure for peace.

I.5 Methodology

This thesis will undertake a qualitative approach, and the process tracing method will be used as the methodology for the analysis of the infrastructure. The nature of the implementation of the Ghanaian peacebuilding infrastructure is at the origin of this choice, because of the numerous steps undertaken in order to reach the result as it is known to date. The empirical nature of the study suits this choice as well. The traceability of the process via documents generated by the Ghanaian Ministry of Interior, the NPC, WANEP, numerous academics, the UNDP, the United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and interviews collected by the author from NPC officials and Ghanaian scholars further asserts this option.

This method explores the chain of events or decision-making process which allowed the initial conditions of the case to be translated into outcomes (van Evara, 1997). The cause and effect link which connects independent variables and outcomes is unpacked and spread into smaller steps. This method is relevant for the analysis of the components and sub-components of the peacebuilding process in Ghana because it permits the unpacking of each component and sub-component and allows the establishment of the connection between the components as well as sub-components and the outcome they produce. This will be assessed via each sub-component's stakeholders, objectives, outputs and impact. The assessment of components and sub-components (links) as well as processes (chain) makes this method ideal for this case study (van Evara, 1997). For this, data was collected through the means of desk research and from various primary and secondary sources. A review of primary and secondary sources included but were not limited to parliament, ministries and NPC documents, UNDP, WANEP and UNESCO reports, newspaper and academic articles, book chapters and remote interviews.

Chapter II

II. Literature Review and Concepts

II.1 Peace, Liberal peacebuilding, and Ghanaian peacebuilding

Peace is an aspect of human life which has transcended history, geographical delimitation, and societal organization. The concept of peace has numerous definitions, the Merriam-Webster defines the term as a 'state of tranquillity or quiet: such as freedom from civil disturbance or a state of security or order within a community provided for by law or customs' (Merriam Webster 2018). Scholars such as Johan Galtung, furthered the definition and transformed it into a concept, upon which policy officers, scholars and peace activists could build in order to achieve peace in places where it was lacking. He thus defines peace as, "the absence/ reduction of violence of all kinds. Peace is nonviolent and creative conflict transformation" (Galtung, Peace by Peaceful means: Peace and conflict, developement nd civilization 1996). With this binary definition two strands of peace will be further developed and will lead to a more conceptual approach.

II.1.1 Peace, the absence of violence and the presence of cooperation and harmony

Galtung's binary definition allowed for the delineation of peace in two aspects, *negative* and *positive peace* (Galtung, Part One: Peace Theory 2015). Negative peace is "the absence of violence" (Galtung, Part One: Peace Theory 2015) and positive peace is "cooperation and harmony" (Galtung, Part One: Peace Theory 2015). Negative peace entails the "absence of direct, intended violence, acts of commission, but also of indirect structural violence by acts of omission, and by cultural violence, justifying one or the other" (Galtung, Part One: Peace Theory 2015). The concepts of negative and positive peace both have limitations and complications. Their longevity is essentially opposed; negative peace "uses a short-term time horizon, which reinforces a tendency to see the job as complete once the fighting stops" (Shields 2017). Positive peace, on the contrary uses a "long-term perspective" (Shields 2017). Peace is in essence a long-term goal.

Graeme Young argues that negative peace contains important ambiguities and is limited to armed conflict and finding the compromise between the competing interests of relevant powers. Thus, positive peace commonly inhibits the liberal peace process, because there is a failure to address the problematic reality between democratic and market based transitions and the association of local development with global security (Young 2010). Young sees the goal of conflict transformation as the establishment of positive peace which is an achievable objective and has

increasingly been implemented by the international community since the end of the Cold War (Young 2010). However, other scholars such as Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argued that the social harmony advocated by positive peace is an elusive goal, one which cannot be achieved by most societies emerging from civil war, due to the standard of peace attached to the concept of positive peace (Sambinis 2010). Consequently, if only positive peace is to be considered the sole proper way of achieving peace, societies which managed to eliminate violence and have not yet developed the mechanism necessary to achieve positive peace would not be considered at 'peace'. Doyle and Sambanis propose a standard of participatory peace, which they consider should rather be a combination of both negative and positive peace, a transitional concept rather than a binary static one. This can only be achieved by institutions argued Herman Schmid who stated that they are the relevant authorities in the international arena with the capacity to create the acceptable discourse in the field of peace research and thus define the rules in accordance with their interests (Schmid 1968).

Peace is a transitional ongoing and challenging process which requires the cooperation of multiple actors from international institutions, states, to individuals (Royce 2004). This conflict transformation approach is at the epicenter of the construction of the Ghanaian state as we know it today and at the core of this study.

II.1.2 Peacebuilding, a liberal approach to conflict resolution and state reconstruction

The conceptualisation of peace permitted the development of ventures such as peacebuilding. Johan Galtung pioneered the term "Peacebuilding" in his 1970s work, through which he called for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the "root causes" of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution. The concept only became familiar to the United Nations (UN) in 1992, when then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, defined the concept of peacebuilding through his *Agenda for Peace*. Boutros-Ghali, defined peacebuilding as the "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Nevertheless, in his definition Boutros-Ghali did not specify which actions ought to be taken in order to implement peace, thus scholars such as Haugerudbraaten criticised the definition of peacebuilding in his work *Peacebuilding: six dimensions and two concepts* by emphasising the lack of clarity of the given definition (Haugerudbraaten 1998). Additionally, he further developed upon the aim of peacebuilding which "is to create peace" (Haugerudbraaten 1998).

In 1995 the Secretary-General added a *Supplement* to his Agenda for Peace, a position paper which discussed the instruments developed for peace and security. The lack of clarity in the early approach of peacebuilding discourse also influenced the development of a pro-liberalisation rhetoric which dominated the field at the time (Paris 2010). A time when "democratisation and marketisation

were portrayed as almost magical formulas for peace in war-torn states" as stated by Roland Paris in his work *Saving Liberal Peacebuilding* (Paris 2010). Liberal peacebuilding emerged from the ashes of the Cold War and was strongly influenced by early peace scholars (Paris 2010). The core components of liberal peacebuilding are liberal democratic governing systems and market-oriented economic growth (Paris 2010).

The ideological shift which followed the Cold War led the UN to reassess its role as the guardian of international peace and security, by reforming its approach to peacekeeping operations (UN General Assembly 2000). In 2001, then Ghanaian Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote a report named *No Exit Without Strategy* which addressed the withdrawal prerequisites of peacekeeping forces and established the conditions which the agency must have addressed prior to its departure from the conflicted nation (Annan, No exit without strategy: security council decision-making and closer or transition of Uniteed Nations peacekeeping operations, 2001). The report emphasized upon building or strengthening governmental institutions in the countries of implementation (Paris 2010). This report would be seminal in the democratisation of the liberal peacebuilding rhetoric in post-conflict countries as it will set the organisation's approach to the conservation of peace and security in the world for decades to come. This approach faced numerous challenges, mainly related to the universal framework established to resolve diverging conflicts rooted in a variety of indigenous causes and societies. Paris argued that the goal of transforming post-conflict states into stable and thriving market democracies is desirable; nonetheless, the methods used for this transition are often problematic as they fail to consider the destabilising effects of these reforms on societies which lack certain prerequisites (Paris 2010).

Richmond and Mac Ginty, argued that some important critiques around the argument raised by the liberal peace theory are rooted in the contradictions built on dominant forms of peace-making (Richmond et Mac Ginty 2015). The simple desire for an international organisation located in the global north to transform conflicted societies into democracies is in itself a contradiction, because norm-generating institutions did not consult local entities to inquire about the type of system which would be most suitable for them (Richmond et Mac Ginty 2015). By excluding local entities from the generating and implementation process of liberal peace, institutions created an 'unequal peace benefitting the West/North" (Richmond et Mac Ginty 2015).

Authors such as Weinstein amongst others, argued that in some circumstances the conflicted states should be left alone to recover from their traumas and would be able to naturally reconstruct, as he believed that the liberal approach to peacebuilding would not succeed due to its interventionist nature. This was a more realist and negative peace approach to the issue of liberal peace (Weinstein 2005). Other authors also argued that peacebuilding was a form of western and liberal imperialism.

Roland Paris argued that it is "an enormous experiment in social engineering - an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other word, pacification through political and economic liberalisation" (Paris 2010).

II.1.3 Africa and Liberal peacebuilding

Olivier Richmond argued that promoting Liberalism or Neo-liberalism for the democratisation of African countries would cause numerous challenges, as the nations are neither fully democratic, nor liberal (Salih 2009, United Nations Development Program 2013). These conundrums were mainly related to the supposition of the pre-existence of essential aspects of liberalism on the continent, which would have facilitated its fluid introduction. This also led to an important disconnect with the political economy of African countries.

Mohamed Salih identified three major discrepancies in the application of liberal peace in African nations. The first relates to 'underplaying the entrenched tensions between liberalism and democracy in transition countries' (Salih 2009); the second is attached to the privilege put upon the liberal over the social; and the third is 'rendering politics subservient to the market' (Salih 2009). Western democracies were developed across the span of centuries and faced trials and challenges in order to become what they are known to be today.

African nations, on the contrary, did not have this capacity, as the concepts of liberalism and democracy were somewhat rapidly thrusted upon them post colonisation. The nature of the construction of many African states often lies in a colonial past, indigenous forms of governance and dictatorial rules. Such is the case of Ghana, where these realities created an unstable foundation for the implementation of concepts such as Liberal Peacebuilding. African nations must make a conscious effort to create a state of peace which would not only align with the liberal peace concept but also their nation's predicaments. This can process take decades in order to come to fruition and create a society with functioning institutions. Young argued that peacebuilders should refrain from introducing liberal reforms in a society until appropriate institutional foundations have been established (Young 2010). Nevertheless, some African nations were able to accomplish this goal and establish appropriate institutional foundations to support their peacebuilding efforts. Ghana's democratic construction and peaceful state is not only due to the stable foundation of its institutions, but most importantly to the will of the members of its society to not only come together to resolve conflicts, but also to build positive peace. By involving all the actors of its society, collaborating with external intervening entities, and addressing pre-existing traumas, Ghana was able to build a strong foundation for the construction of peace.

II.1.4 Peacebuilding in Ghana

The Ghanaian peacebuilding process is one which required numerous actors and began prior to the establishment of the UN and international institutions geared toward conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This is part of the reason why Ghana is a regional peace model, because the nation did not await for the inception of the peacebuilding concept to begin applying it. Prior to involving external actors to its peacebuilding process, Ghana developed a strong indigenous conflict resolution mechanism at a grassroots level and adapted its mechanism to its pre-existing realities (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). The process took different forms depending on the nature of the conflict and the region where it erupted. Essentially, conflict resolution and management are different from peacebuilding as they do not seek the same end. Conflict resolution aims to settle conflicts which already exist, and peacebuilding aims to prevent conflicts from erupting in the first place by engaging all stakeholders in the process to facilitate peaceful coexistence (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). Although, both concepts have diverging aims, in cases where conflicts are already present peacebuilding requires functioning conflict resolution mechanism to be implemented and in many cases in Ghana chiefs and local authorities are considered the first points of contact.

The peacebuilding process in Ghana often began with the disputing parties' desire to solve a conflict in which they were involved and calling for local authorities, chiefs who play an important role in the community specifically in areas where the state has little presence, to help solve the issue. (Pellow 2016) These conflict resolution mechanisms focus on the principles of cooperation, empathy, and sharing to deal with common conundrums which underline the essence of humanity (ubuntu) (Murithi 2006). The principals of African cultures are based on the essence of existence and being human as well as the interconnectedness of all humans (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). Thus, in the creation of their peacemaking mechanisms African societies incorporate these principals. Therefore, their peacemaking endeavours are influenced by the principles of inclusivity, reciprocity and a sense of shared destiny between people (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). Consequently, indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms provide a value system for giving and receiving forgiveness, due to the community's great emphasis on communal life (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012).

Indigenous conflict resolution in Ghana has well established traditional leadership and consultative structures and processes (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). This is evident in the numerous actors involved. Chieftaincy (chief) is the key institution for the resolution of conflict at the macro state level (regions /towns), represented among the Akans (found mainly in the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Central, Eastern and Western regions of the country) by the *Omanhene* (the paramount chief) the leader of the traditional state, followed by the *Ohene* (the divisional chiefs), and the *Odikro*

(head of the village) (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). At a micro level, the villages are composed of family groups or clan/lineages headed by the *Abusua panyin* (the family elder), which is distinct from the head of the household the *Ofiepanyin* (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). Another key actor of the process is the queen mother, who is in charge of conflict resolution from the *Omanhene* to the *Odikro* levels (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). Nevertheless, she is not the sole female head, the *Obaa panyin* is in charge of conflict resolution from the clan to the household levels (Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). This shows a certain inclusivity of female members of society, and their role as mediators is primordial and central to the mechanism. This indigenous process is weaved in the social fabric of the Ghanaian society.

In certain cases peacebuilding efforts can be traced back to the early 1920s, such is the case of the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict in the Volta region. (Yakohene 2012, Pellow 2016) In this case early peacemaking efforts were deemed unsuccessful due to the non-commitment of the different parties involved. Peacemaking efforts were present during the various types of governance the country faced; some of these efforts were undertaken under British colonial rule or during the military rule. (Yakohene 2012) Nonetheless, similar mechanisms could be found in the pattern used to resolve conflicts of a different nature. This shows the longevity of the peacebuilding in Ghana.

II.2 Infrastructure for Peace: a local and national approach to peacebuilding

Infrastructure for Peace is a concept coined in the 1980s by John Paul Lederach in his book *Building peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997). This concept theorised a process which was already in action yet was not assembled into one umbrella term. I4P used the experiences of local and national peace processes as well as the use of committees in peace negotiation as a basis for the theorisation of the concept (van Tongeren, Creating infrastructure for Peace - Experiences at Three Continents 2012). This section will essentially focus on this concept, its components, and its application to the case of Ghana as well as assess the literature gap in regards to the Ghanaian components. This concept is the most appropriate to analyse the Ghanaian peace infrastructure because of its framework; Ghana's multi-layered, multi-actors and well-developed process strongly reflects the infrastructure for peace model.

II.2.1 A disputed definition

In February 2010, a high-level multi-party panel assembled for a workshop which led to the conception of a broad definition of the term. I4P is thus defined by Paul van Tongeren as a "network

of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society" (van Tongeren, Creating infrastructure for Peace - Experiences at Three Continents 2012). However, this definition is not agreed upon by all scholars and actors, which adds to the difficulty of determining the components of peace infrastructures. The UNDP defines I4P as "a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society" (United Nations Development Program 2013). This more comprehensive definition of I4P will be used for the study. Nonetheless, this is not the only term used to describe this concept; certain authors have used names such as *peace support structures, peace and dialogue structures, and architecture for peace* (Kotia et Aubyn 2013). The term architecture for peace can also be found in this thesis, and will be referring to peace infrastructure.

II.2.2 Structural and long-term measures

The concept of I4P requires the development of structural and long-term measures, on a multi-level in order to build lasting peace and prevent conflict. According to van Tongeren pioneering countries establishing I4P based their success on four approaches: *Top-down and Bottom-up Approach, Involvement of the Government, Key Components and Elements of an I4P, No uniform model, but many manifestations* (van Tongeren, Creating infrastructure for Peace - Experiences at Three Continents 2012). Bottom-up and Top-down approaches refer to frameworks which were either established with the individuals at the epicenter (Bottom-up) or institutions (Top-down). Functioning and successful I4Ps have been developed in regions or districts and could be transferred elsewhere, due to their conception on local customs and practices (van Tongeren, Creating infrastructure for Peace - Experiences at Three Continents 2012, Aubyn 2019). The involvement of the government, refers to the importance of governmental presence within an I4P. Nonetheless, this presence can be problematic as it limits the legitimacy of the I4P. Alternatively, in certain cases this could fuel more conflicts. Governmental involvement could be sought after the initial development of the I4P with a bottom-up approach. Key components and elements of an I4P, refers to the crucial and functioning elements of an I4P. The previously stated definition assembles these elements into one intertwined infrastructure. The diversity of the network calls for a number of elements to connect with one another. This illustrates that a successful I4P requires time. No uniformed model, but many manifestations, refers to the necessity for authenticity and design of the I4P by the stakeholders themselves or in close collaboration with the main stakeholders. Numerous countries have established infrastructures for peace, a few successful ones are South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Costa Rica.

II.3 Constituents of Infrastructure for Peace

In his work *Creating Infrastructures for Peace - Experiences at Three Continents*, Paul van Tongeren identified eleven components of I4P based on the study of two pioneering countries' policy documents, Ghana and Kenya (van Tongeren, Creating infrastructure for Peace - Experiences at Three Continents 2012). This section will aim to expose the different components identified by van Tongeren.

II.3.1. van Tongeren's components of peacebuilding

Ghana's peace infrastructure was institutionalised through the ACT 818, of the National Peace Council in 2011. This infrastructure was constructed on a number of components and sub-components. Components will here be defined as constituent parts and sub-components as components that are part of larger components (Merriam Webster 2018). By analysing numerous peacebuilding infrastructures van Tongeren was able to identify twelve common components and categorised them as follows: peace committees, national peacebuilding platform or forum, conflict analysis and early warning & response system, peace building support unit, a bill on Infrastructure for peace, building national capacities for peace, involvement of insider mediators, traditional perspective on conflict resolution, promotion of a shared vision of society and a culture of peace, peace education, budget, establishing, implementing, and monitoring an I4P. These components and sub-components can be considered processes, which will here be defined as a series of actions or operations leading to a desired end. In this case, national peace and stability.

II.3.2 Security, governing, and social dimensions: the three pillar components

For this study the previously listed processes will be assembled under three pillar components: the security, governing and social dimensions and five sub-components consisting of the following: "1) Structures for peacebuilding and the resolution of conflicts; 2) Institutionalising a culture of peace; 3) Strengthening the media as a space for public conversations and debates on the salient issues of the day, so that all voices could be heard; 4) Prevention and control of small arms and light weapons, and promoting alternative livelihoods; 5) Building the capacity for national institutions to manage grievance and differences" (Kan-Dapaah 2006). These Ghanaian goals embody most of van Tongeren's twelve components; out of consideration for the scope of this study some were discarded and others were merged. van Tongeren's investigated components are the following and considered sub-components in this study: peacebuilding support unit, conflict analysis and early warning response system, building capacities for peace, and peace education. The titles of some of van Tongeren's components simply reflect the essence of the names of certain sub-

components used in this thesis. The efficiency of these sub-components is only relative to their authenticity in relation to the infrastructure of implementation. Another essential aspect is related to the design of the infrastructure, which must be done by local stakeholders and elements in collaboration with external stakeholders.

This chapter established the key concepts behind this research. It assed that the literature on the topic focuses on negative and positive peace, liberal peacebuilding, African peacebuilding, Ghanaian peacebuilding and the creation and success of infrastructure for peace. Additionally, the literature on Ghanaian peacebuilding focuses on specific national conflicts and their management as well as the NPC's inception, shortcomings, challenges and recommendations for the future. However, the literature fails to analyse the content of these infrastructures and what permitted their success. Thus, the gap this thesis will be filling is to provide an understanding of the operations and interactions of the Ghanaian infrastructure for peace as a whole with its various components and sub-components, by analysing their content and determining their impact and the cause of their success.

Chapter III

III. The Ghanaian Infrastructure for Peace

III.1 Ghanaian conflicts: theory, causes and typology

Conflict is a natural aspect of society, which has led to the creation and destruction of numerous civilisations. It often occurs over a variety of issues ranging from values, scarcity, status, and differences among individuals, groups and countries (Yahaya 2016, Osei-Hwedie et Rankopo 2012). It is common for people not to be acquainted with the fact that Ghana has and is facing numerous conflicts. It is therefore crucial to set the foundation of Ghanaian conflicts, in order to better comprehend the reasoning behind Ghanaian citizens and government's necessity for the development of an infrastructure for peace.

III.1.1 Conflict theory

Steve Tonah argues that conflict has a dual conceptual role because of its nature (Tonah 2016). It can be a source of preservation or degradation of the status quo, but it can also lead a fragmented society to create new alliances by attempting to understand the other conflicting parties involved. This brings a certain cohesion and/or integration to the society. Conflict can thus become a means to foster communication between societies via mediation efforts (Tonah 2016). Social inequalities are believed to be the root causes of conflicts for conflict theorists (Tonah 2016). These inequalities are often fuelled by dominant power relations regulating how resources or power is distributed amongst the members of a community. Conflict theory often brings insight into the nature of a society by focusing on the structure, actors, their thoughts, as well as their actions (Tonah 2016). Internal societal weaknesses are reflected through most conflicts in Africa, which political actors easily exploit to their advantage (UNDP 2012).

By studying the Ghanaian infrastructure for peace this study will provide a greater conflict centred understanding of its society, actors, and their motivations. Ghanaian conflicts are integral to the nation's peacebuilding initiatives, they contain elements specific to the countries' realities. The construction of national peace is based on these conflicts, they determine which type of mechanism would be best to resolve them. Therefore, it is seminal to determine which type of conflicts affect Ghana in order to understand why its conflict resolution mechanism was built as such (Yahaya 2016).

III.1.2 Causes of Ghanaian conflicts

Ghana's deep historical colonial roots left a legacy of policies which established structures that deepened mistrust and tensions between ethnic groups (UNDP 2012). Divide-and-rule policies created a certain assurance for colonial administrators against the menace of insurrection; by focusing the attention of different ethnic groups upon one another, these groups were too pre-occupied with fighting each other rather than dethroning the coloniser (UNDP 2012). African societies were thus socially engineered with simmering inter-ethnic tensions (UNDP 2012). Some residue from these tensions can still be found in many African conflicts today. These pre-existing conditions set the base upon which current independent African states were built.

Contrary to its neighbours, Ghana, has not experienced a nation-wide civil war in recent years. Nonetheless, the nation has faced a variety of communal conflicts that often tend to be contained to their place of origin. The Ghana conflict map demonstrates that the northern part of the country has a disproportionate share of conflicts in comparison to the southern part; this can be attributed to numerous factors. The lack of employment opportunities, poverty and marginalisation are considered triggers of violence in this region, yet they are not the sole cause of this disparity (UNDP 2012). Ahmed Baba Yahaya, argues that some of the country's visible implications of sporadic violent interactions lie in grief, hatred, destruction of lives and properties and in the polarisation of communities (Yahaya 2016).

Furthermore, there are multiple plausible threats to Ghanaian peace, security and development. Ahurso and Gebe, argue that the nature of certain institutions, identities and differences are often complementary and contradictory at once (Ahurso 2016). This conflicting duality can undermine viable development, governance and security in Ghana (Ahurso 2016). Therefore, dysfunctional politics are one of the country's most plausible threats to security, governance and development. Some conflicts have involved more than just the communal stakeholders, and such is the case of the Dagbon crisis (West Africa Civil Society Institute; Stockholm International Peace Reasearch Institute; 2011). The Ghanaian state has been involved in this conflict through the influence of political actors and successive governments for political interests (West Africa Civil Society Institute; Stockholm International Peace Reasearch Institute; 2011). This represents a shortcoming in the influence of national actors in communal strife. Political interests in the conflicts should be carefully investigated in order to reduce its effects on traditional institutions (West Africa Civil Society Institute; Stockholm International Peace Reasearch Institute; 2011). By utilising communal conflict to promote political interests, political actors risk the potential re-escalation of the conflict (West Africa Civil Society Institute; Stockholm International Peace Reasearch Institute; 2011).

These communal conflicts affect the stability and development of the regions, which creates a spill over and affects the development of the nation as a whole. The main causes or types of Ghanaian conflicts are boundary, chieftaincy, ethnic, land ownership, mineral resources, political violence and religious disputes.

III.1.3 Typology of Ghanaian conflicts

In an effort to identify conflict hotspots and with the aim of establishing key guidelines to help conflict analysis and to develop the appropriate response, the NPC in collaboration with the UNDP, established a 'Ghana Conflict Map' (UNDP 2012, Assiminu 2019). This conflict map categorises the country's 87 conflicts (see appendix A) into seven types of conflicts and locates them onto an interactive map of the country.[4] See *Table 2. conflicts and mediation efforts in Ghana 2019* for the classification of the conflicts in accordance with their types. Chieftaincy, land ownership and boundary conflicts scored the highest numbers with 39, 24 and 10 conflicts respectively. Ethnic, religious, mineral resources and political conflicts scored the lowest numbers with five, five, two and one conflicts respectively.[5] The nation currently has 57 conflicts in a state of crisis and 30 in a state of outcome /resolution.[6] These social conflicts often have inter-related roots, making them complex to classify. This very precise understanding of the conflicts Ghana faces, allowed it to construct a very unique and tailored national peace process initiative. Allowing the nation in collaboration with numerous local, national, and international actors to better target their peacebuilding strategy and thus giving them the chance to be more effective. This is the reason why Ghana possesses a wide and targeted infrastructure for peace, because it was built in accordance with its local conflicts and realities. Therefore, it is necessary to determine what each conflict corresponds to, in order to understand why certain mediation efforts were used in some cases.

Moreover, chieftaincy issues are the most prevalent conflicts faced by the country and correspond to succession rules to skins, practices and processes. They tend to be more prevalent in the south of the country than in the north, however northern conflicts are considered more violent (Tonah 2016). The political structure of a number of post-colonial traditional Ghanaian states emanates from chieftaincy (Yahaya 2016). In cases where the chiefs were at the centre of the conflict, absent or judged to be partial, other conflict resolution means were used, such as the Ghanaian justice department. The issue with the use of the court of law to resolve conflicts is, as a

[4] See – link to the Ghana Conflict Map with narratives
[5] see Table 2.
[6] see Appendix A

body in charge of deliberating upon who is right or wrong in the conflict, the court can be an inadequate institution to implement peace. This 'winner takes all and loser receives nothing' approach furthers the animosity between the conflicting parties, and does not promote healthy relationships. Furthermore, conflict resolution is about nullifying a conflict and suppressing a gap between the involved parties (Yahaya 2016). The case of the Winneba chieftaincy dispute illustrates this dilemma. The dispute involved the Ghartey and Ayirebi-Acquah royal families and the Otuano Kingmakers, the families argued over appointment succession rights (National Peace Council 2019). They called upon the court to decide who should have the right to determine who could be the next chief of Winneba. The court's decision determined that "no other family in the Effutu traditional area has the customary right to enstool or destool the *Omanhene* of Winneba except the Otuano Royal House" (Yahaya 2016). This verdict was not accepted by all parties and the conflict remains unresolved and in a state of crisis.

To remedy to this stalemate and foster peace and security to the Effutu traditional area, the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism has been determined as a way forward by Ahmed Baba Yahaya for the resolution of the conflict (Yahaya 2016). ADR, are processes used within or outside courts and tribunals to resolve or determine a dispute. This term is used as a means to describe adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory processes, which may produce binding or non-binding decisions. ADR includes processes such as evaluation, arbitration, negotiation, mediation, case appraisal history and customs of the people (Yahaya 2016). The process is a way to seek non-conventional peaceful methods of resolving conflicts by using a cost effective way to satisfy all parties in ways which will preserve healthy relations post settlement (Yahaya 2016). Chieftaincy conflict resolution is supposed to be dealt with by the National House of Chiefs, which is mandated by the constitution and successive governments to manage and resolve conflicts. Understanding chieftaincy conflicts is comprehending one of Ghana's biggest stalemate.

Land disputes are considered inter-ethnic conflicts over control, access and ownership of land. The Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict is the prime example of a multi-stakeholder land ownership dispute, involving not only local but also international actors. The conflict involved the Ghanaian Justice Department, the League of Nations prior to its dissolution, the UN, WANEP, religious representatives, traditional representatives, the NPC, the House of Chiefs, Regional Security Committees (REGSEC), District Security Committees (DISEC), as well as the military and police at various periods of the conflict (Kwaku Mbowura 2016). The conflict erupted several times over the century in 1923, 1980, 1983, 1990, 2003, and 2004 (Yakohene 2012). The Ghanaian court of law made four consecutive rulings on the matter in favour of the Nkonya people, rulings which the Alanvayo people rejected (Yakohene 2012). The use of the judicial systems did not reconcile the

issue; the arbitral rulings only rekindled it and thus hindered the peace process instead of enforcing it. The various mediation efforts employed to resolve this conflict did not lead to its resolution, the conflict remains in state of crisis to date.

Ethnic conflicts are delineated into two sorts, intra and inter-ethnic conflicts. They are cultural conflicts, which makes them difficult to solve due to their affiliation to the social fabric of a group and threat to their existence or survival (UNDP 2012, Assiminu 2019). Inter-ethnic conflicts are mostly encountered in the north and intra-ethnic in the south due to the higher homogeneity of ethnic groups in the south (Tonah 2016). The Nawuri (the autochthones) – Gonja (the immigrants) conflict is an inter-ethnic conflict, which was located in the Kpandai. The dispute found its roots in colonial amalgamation polices introduced in 1932, where the Nawari (the autochthones) lost their autonomy and were made subordinate to the Gonja (the immigrants) (Ladouceur 1981). This Policy was part of the British colonial government's efforts to rationalize pre-existing political and social structures for administrative purposes. In doing so they created an imbalance between the two parties in their favour in order to better control the area. Cletus Kawku Mbowura, argued that two intellectual discourses emanated from this intervention in the eruption of the conflict (Kwaku Mbowura 2016). The first accuses the colonial enterprise as the sole responsible for the inter-ethnic issues faced in Northern Ghana and the second, which is more nuanced, acknowledges the role played by the colonial powers; nevertheless, economic and social factors were considered dominant causes of the outbreak (Kwaku Mbowura 2016).

Additionally, the nation is dealing with boundary, mineral resources, and religious conflicts which are less prevalent yet still important. Boundary conflicts are related to disputes over the limitation of land. Mineral resources conflicts are inter-ethnic disputes over mineral resources on land. Religious conflicts relate to disputes between different denominational religious groups over citing of mosques or other aspects (UNDP 2012, Assiminu 2019). The data collection for this section faced some limitations as the ministry of interior's Ghana Conflict Map website became inaccessible during the redaction of this analysis.

Table 2. Conflicts and mediation efforts in Ghana (2019)

Conflict Types	Number of Conflicts
Boundary	**10**
Chieftaincy	**39**
Ethnic	**5**

Land Ownership	**24**
Mineral resources	**2**
Political Violence	**2**
Religious	**5**
TOTAL	**87**
Conflict Status	
Outcome/ Resolution	**30**
Crisis	**57**
Source: Ghana Conflict Map as of April, 9th 2019	

Mediation Efforts
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
District Security Committee (DISEC)
House of Chiefs
Inter-Party Advisory Commission (IPAC)
Legal Court System
Military Detachment
National Security Council
National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE)
National Peace Council (NPC)
Police
Regional Security Committee (REGSEC)
Religious Body

Traditional Leaders

The previously mentioned conflicts display the use of some of Ghana's 13 mediation efforts.[7] The use of these methods is often merged and adapted to the nature of the conflict. Traditional forms of conflict resolution methods preceded these modern forms of mediation efforts; in northern Ghana customs relating to the earth had an important role in maintaining the peace (UNDP 2012). However, in recent years these indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms have lost their power, in part because people are choosing to use the judicial system in order to resolve their disputes (UNDP 2012). This section has established the theory, causes, and typology of Ghanaian conflicts; this is the foundation of the Ghanaian infrastructure for peace because it determines the resolution mechanism necessary to build it. In conjunction with this, the architecture evolved in a pro liberal peacebuilding international sphere.

III.2 International peacebuilding policy foundation

The Ghanaian peace infrastructure was developed in an international context which was essentially led by liberal peacebuilding initiatives. The failure or fragility of certain initiatives prompted the international community to revise its approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding, in order to adjust it to the needs of the local populations and the scope of the conflicts they faced.

III.2.1 International security and development policy influence

In this manner, the Ghanaian peace process is therefore not a standalone initiative; external actors and policies influenced it. The early 2000s was a time for a number of UN conferences and summits, which focussed on the establishment of new global partnerships to reduce extreme poverty and address the state of security in the world. From these meetings emerged the Millennium Campaign which established the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[8] The attainment of these goals was assessed by the UNSG Kofi Annan in his report *In Larger Freedom*, where he set an agenda for achievable sets of proposals on development, security, human rights and UN reform (United Nations 2019). The report delineated twenty first century threats to collective security and addressed various ways to resolve them, one of them being mediation (Annan, Freedom from fear:

[7] see table

[8] 1. Eradicate extreme poverty, 2. Achieve Universal primary education, 3. Promote gender education, 4. Reduce child poverty, 5. Improve maternal health, 6.Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 7.Ensure environmental sustainability, 8.Global partnership for development (United Nations 2019)

towards development, security and human rights for all 2005). This has influenced the way many nations and civil society organisations addressed conflict resolution thereafter and such is the case of Ghana. Mediation has an important role in the Ghanaian peacebuilding infrastructure, it is an essential method used by the involved stakeholders to reach the desired outcome of peace (Assiminu 2019). Various mediation and negotiation techniques are used by the NPC, with an emphasis on shuttle diplomacy, using workshops and roundtable discussions held behind closed doors, as well as any other means available (Assiminu 2019).

UN initiatives were not the sole elements to influence the Ghanaian process; other development enterprises emerged with a focus on fragile states. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), The international Dialogue for Peacebuilding Forum (International Dialogue), the 2010 Dili Declaration on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and the 2011 Monrovia Roadmap were all initiatives which led to the establishment of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile states (New Deal). The New Deal was meant to deliver change by addressing "how" things were done to support conflicted and fragile countries' transitions, by fostering collaborative and tailored approaches (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding & Statebuilding 2019). Ghana's participation to this process in addition to the UN initiatives set the international context which influenced the institutionalisation of the Ghanaian peacebuilding infrastructure. The international community's desire to expedite development for all nations forced it to acknowledge and take into consideration fundamental disparities between countries. This led them to adjust their goals to the reality of the world they were forging policies for, by putting the affected countries at the forefront of the policy-making agenda. This approach can also be witnessed in the way Ghana developed its national peace infrastructure, by focusing on the affected population and putting their input at the centre of the construction of the infrastructure.

III.2.2 Ghana's international peacekeeping and peacebuilding influence

Although this international context influenced Ghana's peacebuilding infrastructure process, the nation has also been an international influencer in regards to peacekeeping and peacebuilding contribution and training, not only by participating in the establishment of the AAA, but also by being one of the top ten troop contributing nations to the UN peacekeeping contingent, with a total of 2,749 personnel as of June 30, 2019 in 9[9] different peacekeeping missions (United Nations 2019). The country not only contributes contingent troops, but also police, expert on mission as well as staff officer (United Nations 2019). Additionally, the country's participation in UN peace endeavours is not recent and can be traced back to 1960's in then Congo and today's DRC, with the organization's

[9] UNMISS, UNFIL, MONUSCO,MINUSMA, UNDOF, MINURSO, MINUSCA, UNAMID, UNISAF

very first peacekeeping mission where it introduced the police (United Nations News 2019). Ghana was the first country to deploy a brigade of troops in the Kassai after the killing of President Patrice Lumumba (United Nations News 2019). Today, the country does not limit itself to contributing troops; it also has an international peacekeeping training centre in the capital city, Accra. The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) prepares future UN peacekeepers for service by educating them in three key domains: peace operations, conflict management as well as security studies. The centre has trained 15,000 women and men and is considered a global training centre for various peacekeeping aspects (United Nations 2019). This centre has thus made the country a mentoring nation in this regard. Via its training efforts, Ghana has been influencing other nations contingent troops perception of peacekeeping, conflict management as well as peacebuilding, as some UN mission's mandates go further than just keeping the peace. Thus, Ghana's national peace expertise is translated at an international level, by providing this service for UN peacekeeping troops.

III.3 Ghanaian I4P vision and components

In 2006, The Ministry of Interior of Ghana issued a document which established the foundation for the 'National Architecture for Peace in Ghana' in coordination with UNDP (Ahurso 2016). Via this document the ministry was able to set a sustainable conflict resolution mechanism which would allow it to address the numerous conflicts faced by the nation in a quick and timely manner. They set a national vision to "have a country characterised by a dynamic environment where people can engage in their lawful activities confident that the institutions, mechanisms and capacities for mediating differences and grievance are effective and responsive" (Kan-Dapaah 2006). To attain this goal they set six specific policy objectives [10] which were embodied in a single one: to "enable and facilitate the development of mechanisms for cooperation among all the relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding in Ghana by promoting cooperative problem solving to conflicts and by institutionalising the processes of response to conflicts to produce outcomes that lead to conflict transformation, social, political and religious reconciliation and transformative dialogues" (Kan-Dapaah 2006).

[10] The six objectives were as follows: "1. To harmonise peace building activities in Ghana through networking and coordination; 2. To strengthen the capacity of peace building institutions and practitioners; 3. To increase awareness of the use if non-violent strategies in responding to conflicts in Ghana; 4.To develop national and inter-group understanding about the values of reconciliation, tolerance, trust and confidence building, mediation and dialogue as responses to conflict. 6.To build the capacity of chiefs, women and youth groups, civil society, community organizations public institutions and other groups to participate meaningfully in promoting and maintaining peace in the country." ((Kan-Dapaah 2006)

III.3.1 Pillar components and constituents

The Ghanaian peacebuilding infrastructure was established in an international context that fostered country-owned and led peacebuilding initiatives. This only further encouraged the nation to build upon its pre-existing local peacebuilding initiatives to generate a process it possessed and developed from beginning to end, only using external aid as assistance and not as the primary manufacturer of their national peace process. The infrastructure is thus composed of the following processes: 1) a local desire for a conflict resolution mechanism; 2) indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms; 3) a national desire for a conflict resolution mechanism; 4) the 2006 vision for the national architecture for peace in Ghana; and 5) The National Peace Council ACT 818 of 2011.

The country's safety and public order is managed by the Ministry of Interior which issued the peacebuilding framework and gives it its legitimacy with the approval of the Cabinet (Kan-Dapaah 2006). In order to achieve its goals, the ministry delineated five sub-components of the infrastructure: "1) Structures for peacebuilding and the resolution of conflicts; 2) Institutionalising a culture of peace; 3) Strengthening the media as a space for public conversations and debates on the salient issues of the day, so that all voices could be heard; 4) Prevention and control of small arms and light weapons, and promoting alternative livelihoods; 5) Building the capacity for national institutions to manage grievance and differences" (Kan-Dapaah 2006).

For clarity and greater comprehension of the infrastructure sub-components have been allocated to the corresponding overarching pillar components. The Security dimension is composed of, but not limited to, sub-component four; the Governing dimension is composed of, but not limited to, sub-components one and five; and the social dimension is composed of, but not limited to, sub-components two and three. By assembling similarly themed sub-components it will be possible to better assess the infrastructure as a whole. Nonetheless, some sub-components of the infrastructure will not be assessed such as sub-component three of the social dimension, a focus will be set on sub-component two.

III.3.2 Ghanaian I4P framework

The previously identified components and sub-components can better be understood and visualised in *Figure 1. The Ghanaian Infrastructure for Peace Framework.* This figure portrays the correlation between the different components as well as the various steps undertaken in order to achieve this infrastructure. *Table 1. Legend of the Ghanaian Peace Framework* explains the nature of each element and indicates the type of interactions between the different levels of the framework.

The international realm influences the infrastructure in various ways, through monetary development aid, assistance with the elaboration of peace education curricula, aid in the development of a structure for conflict resolution, assistance with the elaboration of a national institution dedicated

to the management of peace and conflict and many other aspects. Nevertheless, the international realm remains an influencer and not the primary manufacturer of the infrastructure, in many ways it is crucial to its development. Indigenous conflict resolution mechanism are traditional conflict resolution mechanisms which deeply influenced the modern conflict resolution architecture recently developed and are an integral aspect of the I4P. The national processes permitted the elaboration of the infrastructure; causal relations connect them because one process allowed the establishment of the other. Pillar components interact with one another, and they are not isolated; the security pillar (PI) interacts with the governing (PII) and the social (PIII) and vice versa. PI provides security for PII, NPC and Ministry officials as well as for CSOs and humanitarian convoys intervening in conflict zones (Aubyn 2019). For PIII, PI security providers (the police) create a relationship with the local communities via community policing; this initiative helps to educate the population on the effects of conflict (Aubyn 2019). PII only begins its work when PI security providers have secured the area (Aubyn 2019). PII works in collaboration with PIII stakeholders: the NPC, WANEP, the Media and the Ministry of Education, they join forces with the aim to create a culture for peace at different levels of education (Robiolle-Moul 2013). The infrastructure and its stakeholders are set into a larger national and international environment that has impacted its development. The investigation of specific aspects of both environments, such as conflict, is key to understanding why the infrastructure was established.



Figure 1 The Ghanaian Infrastructure for Peace Framework

Source: Generated by the author based on interviews and literature

Table 1 Legend and conceptual Framework of the Ghanaian Peace

Symbols	Concepts	
International Realm & actors	**International Realm**	The international realm represents the numerous external actors intervening in the architecture. It involves international and multilateral organizations, CSOs and foreign ministries of foreign affairs. The international realm is not limited to the above-mentioned actors, but it counts numerous others.
Processes	**Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms**	Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms represents the various traditional conflict resolution mechanisms present in the country.
Pillars	**National Processes**	National processes consist of various procedures undertaken by the nation to construct the architecture.
Causal relations	**Pillar Components**	Pillar components are the overarching themes representing the content of the architecture.
Influence **Interaction**	**Sub-components**	The sub-components are the constituent parts of pillar components.
Source: Generated by the author based on Figure 1		

This chapter determined that the causes and different types of Ghanaian conflicts are the foundation of its I4P, because it permitted its actors to develop a conflict resolution mechanism which most efficiently work towards establishing peace in the country. Additionally, it demonstrated Ghana's participation to reshaping the international community's approach to peacebuilding by shifting the discourse on whom forges peacebuilding policies and how. Furthermore, it also showed how the country's national peace expertise is translated at an international level by training UN peacekeeping troops. Lastly, this chapter established the conceptualised of the Ghanaian I4P, through its vision, components and framework.

Chapter IV

IV. Sub-components: Stakeholders, Objectives, Outputs and Impact

The Ghanaian peace framework is a comprehensive apparatus, which takes into consideration a number of actors and elements, varying from the police, traditional leaders, to the National Peace Council. This apparatus was set with the aim of forging a nationally led conflict resolution mechanism; an assessment of the country's necessities via conflict mapping allowed peace actors to determine the appropriate tools necessary to remedy to its conflicts. Essential aspects of the Ghanaian peacebuilding infrastructure are the security, governing, and social pillar components, which are comprised of sub-components. This section will investigate these sub-components; (4) prevention and control of small arms and light weapons, and promoting alternative livelihoods; (1) structures for peacebuilding and the resolution of conflicts; (5) building the capacity for national institutions to manage grievance and differences; and (2) institutionalising a culture for peace. Their stakeholders, elements, objectives, outputs and impact will be analysed. *Figure 2. The Ghanaian Peacebuilding pillars framework* displays the relationship between each aspect of the pillar and *Table 3. Ghanaian Peacebuilding pillars framework legend* explains their meaning.



Figure 2 The Ghanaian Peacebuilding Pillars Framework

Due to the word limitation of this thesis, the integrity of the Ghanaian peace infrastructure will not be assessed. Instead, a focus will be set on essential aspects of this one without which the infrastructure would not function.

Table 2 The Ghanaian Peacebuilding Pillars Framework legend

Legend	Pillars conceptual Framework	
Sub-components	**Pillar**	Pillar, corresponds to the overarching component addressed in the section either security, governing or social.
Causal relations	**Sub-components**	Sub-components are the contents of the pillars.
Impact	**Stakeholders / Elements**	Stakeholders are the different actors involved in the process and considered crucial for the success of the established goal. Elements are specific documents essential to the establishment of the infrastructure.
	Objectives	Objectives are sets of achievable goals established by stakeholders or elements.
	Outputs	Outputs are activities or reports produced by the stakeholders with the aim of achieving the set of objectives
	Impact	Impact consist of the results or lack thereof achieved by the outputs.

IV.1 Pillar I, Security dimension

The security dimension is a strategic aspect of the Ghanaian peace infrastructure as this pillar permits the work of other dimensions of the infrastructure and ensures the safety of intervening peacebuilding actors and local populations.

IV.1.1 Security dimension subcomponent and stakeholders

This overarching pillar is composed of sub-component four, *Prevention and control of small arms and light weapons, and promoting alternative livelihoods.* This sub-component is the basis for the pacification of an area of conflict; by addressing this the Ghanaian peace infrastructure aims to create a negative peace in order to make way for positive peace. To achieve this goal in the outburst

of conflict, law enforcement services are often the first to intervene to quell the violence. These stakeholders are responsible for the stabilisation of conflict zones and the establishment of the first contact with the local populations, in order to set the first stage of conflict transformation, which consist of containing and stopping the violence or preventing it from emerging. The main actors of this pillar are the police and the military. The operatives of national security which include the regional and district security committees or units are also essential actors of this dimension; however, they will not be analysed in this thesis.

IV.1.2 Police and military objectives and outputs

The police and the military are respectively dependent on the Ghanaian Ministry of Interior and Defence and receive their command from these institutions. This means that the first stage of conflict resolution requires an elite intervention in order to pacify the conflicting parties. External third-party intervention is considered a good way of mediating conflict; in this instance the enforcement nature of the stakeholders can immediately bring violence to a halt in fear of judicial or military reprimand. The police's objective is to maintain public order and internal security (Aubyn 2019). By intervening in conflicts, the police are able to work towards achieving these objectives. For the achievement of these objectives, the police accomplish a number of outputs that are determined at the regional police command. The regional police command is composed of assembled district and divisional police commands, who determine which outputs must be done by whom for each district and division. In the eventuality that the conflict is too large and unmanageable for the regional police command, the police headquarters in Accra can step in and increase the capacity of the latter.

Moreover, there are instances where military deployment has been required, specifically when the police cannot contain the violence in a conflict area and needs consolidation (Aubyn 2019). This is when the military intervenes in internal security matters to reinforce the police capacity when the situation reaches a heightened level and is no longer manageable by police forces already deployed (Aubyn 2019). According to the Ghanaian constitution, the military's role is to defend the nation against external threats and maintain territorial integrity. Most Ghanaian conflicts include both police and military intervention.

The Police generate a variety of outputs, which consist of reducing tensions, patrolling, creating an environment conducive to dialogue and negotiations, keeping the peace, providing security and escort services for government officials and stakeholders involved in the dialogue process, and establishing checkpoints for the prevention of the transportation of arms or other weapons into conflicted areas. The police accomplish these goals via physical presence day and night to ensure security and the setup of police checkpoints at the main points of entry of conflicted areas

(Aubyn 2019). The patrol of affected zones is part of a greater initiative, which consists of community policing. Community policing aims to sensitise and educate local populations on the effects of conflict, the use of the Ghanaian legal system for the resolution of conundrums, and the importance of maintaining peaceful coexistence and tolerance amongst communities (Aubyn 2019).

To support this endeavour the police creates a partnership with local CSOs, which can be comprised of chiefs, religious leaders, assembly members, and youth or women groups. Their joint aim is to pursue the peace agenda in the area. However, the longevity of this initiative is short term as the police's role remains to stabilise the area for peace workers to intervene, thus reducing its impact (Aubyn 2019). By creating these partnerships, the police solidify their presence and trust within the communities. Additionally, the police engage in dialogues with conflicting parties and the local populations to find a peaceful solution to their disputes. The decision to have a dialogue set between conflicting parties takes place at the strategic levels. The regional commander, his or her deputy, government officials such as the municipal, district chief executive and regional ministers and sometimes government officials from the capital including the Minister of interior or his/her deputies are the actors capable of initiating these dialogues (Aubyn 2019).

Furthermore, the police also assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as partake in intelligence gathering in the affected areas. For humanitarian delivery assistance, the institution helps to secure convoys and humanitarian personnel, to reach people in zones of conflict or displaced. Some of the organisations the police escorts are the Red Cross, the Ghana National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO) as well as other CSOs or humanitarian agencies both local and international (Aubyn 2019). In order to prevent the eruption of more confrontations the police also does intelligence gathering to aid mediators' work (Aubyn 2019).

The military's outputs during these types of missions are similar duties to those performed when deployed on UN peacekeeping operations, as well as those performed by the police in this instance (Aubyn 2019).

IV.1.3 Police and military impact

The impact of police work in conflicted areas varies. The presence of the police in certain conflicted zones prevents the re-emergence of conflict and deters potential attacks on vulnerable groups and civilians (Aubyn 2019). Nonetheless, often times conflicting parties defy these efforts. Such was the case for the Gusheigu political conflict, which has roots in both chieftaincy and political conflicts (UNDP 2012). This instance displayed the fact that even when the police are involved, conflicts can continue and degenerate. Today the conflict is considered to be in a state of crisis. (See appendix A) The deployment of the military deeply affects a conflict in Ghana, as their presence calms the local population as well as the troublemakers (Aubyn 2019). Ghana's previous

violent military rule left marks on the population, which still fears the military and their potential return to power.

Relevant data concerning the current situation of conflicts in Ghana became unavailable during the redaction of this thesis, due to the dysfunction of the Ghana Conflict Map narrative website. This lack of data hindered the proper analysis of the impact of both the military and the police. Aside from this set back, data collection for this section was complex, as Ghanaian law enforcement services do not openly provide information about their impact on conflict management strategies.

IV.2 Pillar II, Governing dimension

The governing dimension is the epicentre of the Ghanaian peacebuilding infrastructure. This pillar helps to facilitate all the peacebuilding ventures in the country and to set the national vision for Ghanaian peace. The governing dimension and the institutionalisation of the infrastructure is what sets Ghana apart and makes it an example to other nations in the West African sub-region and in on the continent. Ghana's governing peace body is an apparatus that aims to be inclusive of all the members of its society to help it reach its ultimate goal to bring positive peace in all its regions.

IV.2.1 Governing dimension subcomponent and stakeholders

This dimension is composed of two sub-components. Sub-component one is *Structures for peacebuilding and the resolution of conflicts,* and sub-component five is *Building the capacity for national institutions to manage grievance and differences.* The combination of these two sub-components gave birth to the National Peace Council, the main stakeholder of this pillar. The NPC is an institution that provides the nation with the capacity to manage its grievance and differences. It also is in charge of establishing other national structures for peacebuilding and resolution of conflicts at a regional and district level. The NPC is supported by parliamentary ACT 818 and responds to the Ministry of Interior (Shale 2017). To facilitate its outreach in the country's 16 administrative regions or provinces and 216 districts, the institution is composed of Regional Peace Councils (RPC) and District Peace Councils (DPC). These three levels of Peace Councils represent the three levels of governance in Ghana. The governing body is composed of 13 eminent members drawn from various groups in the society, with one representative from each religious body[11], two people nominated by the president (of which one should be a woman), two other persons nominated by identifiable groups

[11] Catholic Bishops Conference, Christian Council, Ghana Pentecostal Council, National Council for Christian and Charismatic Churches, Ahamadiya Muslim Mission, Al-sunnah Muslims, Tijaaniya Muslim Group, practitioners of African traditional religions

and one representative of the National House of Chiefs (The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana 2011). RPC's and DPC's follow the composition of the NPC, with 13 members as well (Assiminu 2019). The NPC's structure aims to be inclusive and representative of the Ghanaian society. Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of the NPC and its actors and table 3 determines the signification of each symbols of the framework.

Table 3 Legend and NPC Framework

Symbols	
Parliament and ministry	**Reporting lines**
Councils	**Causal relations**
Executive Secretariats	**Interactions**
Direct subordination	*Source: Generated by the author based on Figure 3*

Figure 3 The National Peace Council's Framework

Source: Generated by the author based on Act 818


Parliament
Ministry of Interior
National Peace Council
(NPC)
National Executive Secretary
2 persons nominated by identifiable
8 Religious representatives
2 persons nominated by the president, one must be a woman
Regional Peace Councils
(RPC)
Regional Executive Secretary
2 persons nominated by identifiable
8 Religious representatives
2 persons nominated by the president, one must be a woman
District Peace Councils
(DPC)
District Executive Secretary
2 persons nominated by identifiable
8 Religious representatives
2 persons nominated by the president, one must be a woman

IV.2.2 NPC objectives and outputs

The NPC was established in August 2006 via a government decision, and it became a legal body in 2011 with ACT 818. The objective of the NPC is set by ACT 818, "the Council is to facilitate and develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, resolution and to build sustainable peace in the country" (The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana 2011). For this, the NPC is mandated to achieve nine functions that will here be summarised into five key functions. The NPC must 1) Harmonise and co-ordinate the national peace and conflict resolution mechanisms; 2) Educate Ghanaians on skills and values to foster sustainable peace; 3) Improve national capacities for conflict resolution and management by strengthening its mechanisms; 4) Increase awareness on non-violent conflict resolution strategies; 5) Perform any functions to reach its objective (The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana 2011).

To align with this mandate the Council, developed activities that would allow it to cover mediation, reconciliation, peace education, good offices, capacity-building, networking and resource mobilization (Awinador-Kanyirige August 2014). In 2013, in coordination with the UNDP the Council developed a five year *National Strategic Plan 2013-2017* with the aim of articulating the Council's priorities with the purpose of facilitating the implementation of its mandate (Chinbuah 2013). The NPC's activities regarding the attainment of its objective are the following: (Shale 2017)

Launch a peace fund;

- Create capacities for NPC and RPC staff on management, prevention, dialogue and mediation of conflicts;
- Set a focus on training special peace actors such as religious and traditional leaders for capacity-building in conflict management and resolution mechanisms;
- Develop strategies and modules for conflict mediation;
- Engage peace stakeholders (the Electoral Commission, the National Media Commission, National Commission for Civic Education, the Police, CSOs and the media) in the election pacification process before, during and after elections;
- Host community meetings with chiefs and their people on peaceful election process;
- Host forums for traditional and religious leaders, community based, CSOs, and constituency–level party representatives on elections;
- Further religious tolerance dialogues in the furthest five regions
- Develop peace promotional messaging programmes on T-shirts, banners and other items;
- Broadcast peace advertisements on the internet, the radio and television;

- Implement and develop national dialogue and advocacy programmes;
- Develop a national early warning systems (EWSs);
- Procure ICT equipment to DPCs.

The NPC set out to accomplish these activities and was able to do so however the body also faced some shortcomings. The following section assesses the impact of the NPC.

IV.2.3 NPC impact

Authors such as Emmanuel Wekem Kotia and Festus Kofi Aubyn, have argued that the NPC's contributions have halted Ghana from plunging into deeper conflicts (Kotia et Aubyn 2013). The existence and work of the institution is to acclaim for the peaceful democratic transition the country has been experiencing in the last two elections in 2012 and 2016 (Kotia et Aubyn 2013, Shale 2017). This was made possible by the consistent work of the institution, via the previously listed activities.

The harmonisation and coordination of the peace mechanism has led to national peace and stability (Shale 2017). This was done by developing training manuals on mediation strategy with technical support from the Institute of Development Studies and financial support from the UNDP and USAID (Shale 2017). The national capacity to manage conflict through conflict resolution and management mechanisms has been improved (Shale 2017). By collaborating with the UNDP, the institution was able to render 7 out of 10 RPCs functional, develop a five-year strategic plan, establish a structured intervention approach for both the NPC and CSOs, and publish four quantitative and qualitative analysis studies (UNDP 2019). On a) *capacity needs assessment of Ghana's peace infrastructure at the national leve*l, b) *communication strategy*, c) *Mapping Conflict in Ghana,* d) *baseline report on the role of civil society in conflict prevention, particularly the level of participation of woman and Youth* (UNDP 2019). These studies are crucial for the NPC in determining the country's necessities and how to asses them. Nonetheless, DPCs remain dysfunctional bodies. The UNDP also trained 13 NPC board members and 10 key staff as well as 103 members of RPCs in conflict mediation, negotiation and dialogue, to provide them with the proper capacities (UNDP 2019, Shale 2017).

Ghanaians' behaviour regarding the respect of diversity, tolerance and positive attitude about peace has changed and is more prone to implementing these values (Shale 2017). This was made possible by fostering peace education programmes at all levels of society. Ghana's 4th position out of 54 African states on the IEP GPI displays that the country generally enjoys a state of peace and tranquillity even before and after presidential and parliamentary elections (IEP, Positive Peace Report 2018 2018). The governing body developed innovative peace-messaging and media broadcast

methods during the 2016 elections which effectively and efficiently propagated their peace initiatives; they made use of electronic and media advertisement, jingles, billboards and in certain regions door-to-door peace campaigns (Shale 2017). The comprehensive elaboration of this initiative prompted its success.

The NPC also developed a National Early Warning Systems (EWSs) and established situation rooms in three cities (Shale 2017). The two EWSs, National Elections Early Warning Systems (NEEWARGS) and Regional Election Early Warning Systems (REEWARG), aim "to serve as platforms for the development of responses to latent and manifest conflict situations" (Shale 2017). These infrastructures have been instrumental in helping relevant bodies and peace actors determine appropriate responses to various conflict typologies through their recommendations (Shale 2017). The situation room in Accra is "a mechanism for real-time information exchange for rapid response to conflict situations during the 2016 elections" (Shale 2017); and was part of two other situation rooms set up in Kumasi and Tamale (Shale 2017).

The strengths of the NPC can be found in its design with its members, decentralised structure and the incorporation of other peace actors. Its weaknesses lie in the part time nature of its board; the exclusion of underrepresented groups such as women and youths; the underdevelopment of coordination and reporting systems between peace actors of the peace architecture; the subordinate status of the NPC to the Ministry of Interior; and lastly the duplication of the advisory structure of NPC in the form of the Peace Support Unit (Shale 2017). Regardless of these weaknesses the governing dimension is still capable of sustaining its self by aiming to fulfil its mandate.

These results demonstrate that determining the baselines of a country is crucial to the elaboration of a sustainable infrastructure for peace. By doing this, the governing dimension was able to implement appropriate measures to respond to the issues faced by the country. In assessing the country's baselines and developing solutions, the nation thus created a countryowned and led infrastructure for peace. Considering that the NPC was only established in 2006 and legalised in 2011, the record of accomplishments of the institution shows that, although the organization is still struggling with funding, training, implementation and operation, it is already accomplishing its objectives. By addressing its current shortcomings and with more time, funding, and assistance the organisation will in the future be able to create sustainable peace in all regions of the country.

IV.3 Pillar III, Social dimension

The previously cited pillar dimensions are the most researched aspects of the Ghanaian peace process, specifically the governing dimension. The importance of the governing dimension

overshadows the social aspect of the architecture, which often gets relegated and merged with the governing dimension. However, this should not be the case as the social dimension is an integral aspect of the infrastructure, since, Ghanaians deeply value their culture and beliefs. This is visible in the members selected for representation at the NPC, they are a reflection of the society. This makes the NPC board the custodian of Ghanaian identity. Thus, the social dimension is the not only the reflection of the Ghanaian culture but also link between the institutional and the grassroots levels of the Ghanaian infrastructure for peace. This pillar is the strategic tool that translates the elite vision of national peace into a tangible aspect of the lives of everyday Ghanaian citizens in peaceful and conflicted areas. This dimension is less centralized than the other pillars and merges many social aspects of the infrastructure.

IV.3.1 Social dimension subcomponent and stakeholders

This pillar is composed of two subcomponents. Sub-components two *Institutionalising a culture of peace;* and three, *Strengthening the media as a space for public conversation and debates on the salient issues of the day, so that all voices could be heard.* This section will primarily look at subcomponent two, with a focus on peace education. Peace education is believed to be the best means to transform a population's perception of conflict resolution and transformation. By educating its citizens at every stage of life to use peaceful means to avoid or remedy to conflict, the Ghanaian I4P is creating sustainable peace because it is tackling the perception of the root cause of conflicts which are the people. This influences the way they will address conflicts in the future and thus construct their societies. Peace education also empowers the population to be able to act appropriately in conflict situations, by providing them the appropriate tools to address issues directly affecting them. When a population is involved in the pacification of its conflicted areas through negotiation, mediation, and conflict transformation it is less likely to relapse into conflict.

To carry out this task, the Ghanaian I4P uses a number of stakeholders from all levels of society. The main stakeholders of this subcomponent are the NPC, the Ministry of Education, WANEP-Ghana, the National Commissions for Civic Culture (NCCE), academia and local CSOs. These stakeholders are responsible for forging an appropriate peace education curriculum for different actors of the society and administering them. Their work is accomplished conjointly, as their success can only be reached if they cooperate.

IV.3.2 Objectives and outputs of joint peace education stakeholders

The joint objectives of the previously mentioned stakeholders are to promote peaceful coexistence and non-violent conflict resolution in communities (Addae-Mensah 2012). This will create an environment of tolerance, economic and cultural development as well as international cooperation (Robiolle-Moul 2013). An emphasis is set on the youths, in order to create a society with

these specific characteristics. Peace education in Ghana was initiated by WANEP-Ghana in the early 2000, prior to the inception of the NPC. The CSO, in collaboration with the Curriculum Research and Development Division (CRDD) of the Ghana Education Services, launched the peace education programme, which had for output a "peace education manual". This manual contained material and strategic information concerning the methods to implement peace. The implementation of the peace education programme occurred in two stages: 1) Integrative peace education structures, and 2) independent peace education structures. Stage 1 is the fusion of peace education program in pre-existing approved education curriculum (Addae-Mensah 2012). Stage 2 involved the conscious development of a separate subject dedicated to peace education (Addae-Mensah 2012). Peace education was not limited to classrooms; sensitisation workshops for communities, churches, mosques, political parties and the media were also orchestrated. In 2010, the Africa Centre for Peace Building (AFCOPB) also orchestrated peace clubs, initiatives where youths are trained on the ideology of peace via projects, which include essay and debate competitions, UN peace day celebrations workshops and seminars on the MDGs, annual national peace awards, and community based projects (Africa Centre for Peacebuilding 2019). The NPC also administered peace education workshops to various political party members during the 2016 elections (Assiminu 2019). They also developed a voters' education program, which they administered to 50 communities, 20 CSOs and 20 religious groups in targeted conflict hotspots (Shale 2017).

IV.3.3 Impact of joint peace education stakeholders

Peace education has been successful in Ghana; nonetheless, the country's lack of funding and trained personnel to properly assess the needs, which restricts the program's capacity. Therefore, the application of the program is currently limited to conflict zones. The impact of WANEP's peace education program led the Ministry of Education to revise the syllabi of five (5) subject areas in primary and post primary school levels in the country (Addae-Mensah 2012). The AFCOPB established 9 peace clubs which changed the attitudes and behaviours of 1,100 student members (Addae-Mensah 2012). The changes in the Ghanaian culture of peace are slow; however, with the work of the NPC and other CSOs seem promising.

This chapter was able to demonstrate that the Ghanaian peacebuilding infrastructure is a comprehensive and efficient apparatus. Although it is still facing many shortcomings, the inclusion and collaboration of numerous peace actors, the detailed construction of the infrastructure, as well as the ownership of the Ghanaian people and government is at the origin of this infrastructures success. This affirms that the success of an infrastructure for peace lies in the establishment of clear guidelines for security, the institutionalisation of a conflict resolution mechanism, and the education of its population on the issues of peace, diversity and conflict management. The sustainability of the

Ghanaian peace is due to the comprehensive implication of local, national and international peace actors as well as, the interaction between the different sub-components of the infrastructure.

Chapter V

V. Conclusion

The aim of this study was to assess the Ghanaian infrastructure for peace as a whole, by providing an identification of its local actors and elements as well as by assessing the impact of its components and sub-components in addition to what allowed their success. The novelty provided by this research lies in its comprehensive approach and the identification of the security, governing, and social pillar components of the infrastructure. The particularity of these dimensions in this context is that they must work jointly in order to deliver the sustainable peace desired, because the proper operation of the infrastructure is dependent on the interconnectedness of these pillars. In identifying the components and cause of the success of the Ghanaian peacebuilding structure this thesis determined a model specific to this case. Nonetheless, it set a blue print for future research for cases with similar realities. However, this research has no aim to establish a general model transferable to other countries. Ghanaians' ownership and pride in the peace their country enjoys is a key aspect of its success. Thus, if a nation with similar realities wishes to reuse this model for themselves, they must set an emphasis on their population's desire to construct one.

Consequently, this thesis argued that to construct a successful peacebuilding infrastructure, Ghana tailored its architecture with a merged strategy from the Bottom-up and Top-down approaches with local and elite participation as well as full ownership. To answer the research question, which local actors and elements of the peacebuilding process in Ghana led to its success and set it as a model to countries with similar realities; this study traced the process from the conceptualisation of peace, liberal peacebuilding, African peacebuilding, Ghanaian peacebuilding, infrastructure for peace, as well as Ghanaian conflict theory, causes and types. It also established the international peacebuilding policy foundation which influenced the infrastructure, as well as the Ghanaian I4P vision, components, and framework. Lastly, this thesis answered the research question by determining which local actors and elements led to the success of the process.

The evidence showed that for the security dimension the police, military, and operatives of the national security which include the regional and district security committees or units are the actors which permitted the success of the security pillar component. For the governing dimension the NPC and its regional and district equivalents, are at the source of the pillar's success. Finally, for the social dimension the NPC, NCCE, the Ministry of Education, WANEP-GHANA, academia and local CSOs are responsible for the success of the pillar.

This thesis was able to establish the gap in the current Ghanaian peace literature, which was the lack of a comprehensive understanding of operations and interactions of the Ghanaian I4P with its various components and sub-components and to fill it. Additionally, it demonstrated Ghana's participation in reshaping the international community's approach to peacebuilding by shifting the discourse on whom forges peacebuilding policies and how. Furthermore, it displayed how the country's national peace expertise is translated at the international level by training UN peacekeeping troops. Finally, the study concludes that its success lies in the establishment of clear guidelines for the security, institutionalisation of a conflict resolution mechanism, and the education of the population on the issues of peace, diversity, and conflict management. The sustainability of the Ghanaian peace is due to the comprehensive implication of local, national, and international actors as well as the interconnectedness between the different subcomponents of the infrastructure.

Further, research could be done on the components and sub-components of the international realm of the Ghanaian infrastructure for peace.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Ghanaian conflicts

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
	Name	**Type**	**Status**	**Location and Region**	**Mediation Effort**
1	**Abefiti-Hwehwe Nkawkaw**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Nkawkaw, Eastern	DISEC, Military detachment, REGSEC
2	**Ablekuma-Oblogo**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Ablekuma, Greater Accra	Legal Court System, Police
3	**Abuakwa**	Boundary	Outcome/ Resolution	Abuakwa, Ashanti	House of chiefs, Police
4	**Adaklu-Anyingbe**	Boundary	Outcome/ Resolution	Adaklu, Volta	House of chiefs, Legal Court System
5	**Adoagyri Sekyikrom**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Adoagyiri, Eastern	Concerned Citizens Association
6	**Aflao**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Aflao, Volta	House of chiefs
7	**Afram plains north and south**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Afram plains, Eastern	REGSEC
8	**Agbobloshie Conflict**	Boundary	Crisis	Accra, Greater	Police, REGSEC

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
				Accra	
9	**Agona Swedru**	Land Ownership	Outcome/ Resolution	Agona Swedru, Central	House of chiefs, Legal Court System
10	**Akropong**	Ethnic	Outcome/ Resolution	Akropong, Eastern	House of chiefs, REGSEC
11	**Akumanda**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Akumanda, Ashanti	DISEC
12	**Akwamufie succession conflict**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Akwamufie , Eastern	DISEC,House of chiefs, REGSEC
13	**Alanvayo Nkonya**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Alanvayo, Greater Accra	DISEC, House of chiefs, Legal Court System, NPC, Police, REGSEC, Religious Body, Traditional Leaders
14	**Amanfrom**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Amanfrom Dispute, Greater Accra	House of chiefs
15	**Anloga**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Anloga, Volta	Military detachment, Police
16	**Anloga/ Aflao**	Boundary	Crisis	Aflao, Volta	Legal Court System

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
17	**Ashaiman conflict**	Political Violence	Crisis	Ashaiman, Greater Accra	Police, REGSEC
18	**Bawku**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Bawku, Upper East	DISEC, House of chiefs, Legal Court System, NPC, Police, REGSEC, Religious Body
19	**Berekum**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Berekum, Brong-Ahafo	House of chiefs, Legal Court System, Police, REGSEC, Religious Body
20	**Bimbilla Ethnic**	Ethnic	Outcome/ Resolution	Bimbila Road, Bimbila, Ghana, Northern	Concerned citizens Association, DISEC, Military detachment, REGSEC
21	**Bortianor Conflict**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Bortianor, Eastern	House of chiefs, Legal Court System
22	**Buipe Chieftancy**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Buipe, Northern	DISEC, Legal Court System
23	**Bunkpurugu Yooyuo**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Bunkprugu Yooyuo, Northern	DISEC, House of chiefs, REGSEC, Traditional Leaders
24	**Chereponi**	Boundary	Crisis	Chereponi, Northern	Police, REGSEC

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
25	**Dansoman Dispute**	Chieftaincy	crisis	Dansoman, Greater Accra	House of chiefs
26	**Dawhenya Conflict**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Dawhenya, Greater Accra	Legal Court System
27	**Diaso**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Diaso, Western	Legal Court System
28	**Drobo and Japekrom**	Land Ownership	Outcome/ Resolution	Drobo, Brong-Ahafo	Legal Court System, Police
29	**Ebubonko**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Cape Coast, Central	House of chiefs, Religious Body
30	**Egyambra Chieftaincy Conflict**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Egyambra, Western	House of chiefs
31	**Ejura**	Religious	Outcome/ Resolution	Ejura, Ashanti	Religious Body
32	**Elubo Chieftancy Conflict**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Elubo, Western	House of chiefs, Legal Court System
33	**Enchi Chieftancy**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Enchi, Western	House of chiefs
34	**Enyan Denkyira**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Enyan Denkyira, Central	House of chiefs, Legal Court System
35	**Gbane**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Gbane, Northern	ADR

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
36	**Gbawe Anyaa Weija Land Conflict**	Boundary	Outcome/ Resolution	Gbawe, Greater Accra	Missing data
37	**Gomoa East-Nyanyano**	Boundary	Crisis	Nyanyano, Central	Legal Court System
38	**Gomoa Fete**	Boundary	Crisis	Gomoa Fete, Eastern	House of chiefs, Legal Court System, Police
39	**Grabodo Dispute**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Grabodo, Western	Concerned Citizens Association, DISEC, House of chiefs
40	**Gushiegu political**	Political	Crisis	Gushiegu, Northern	REGSEC
41	**Gwira Chieftaincy**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Gwira, Western	House of chiefs, Legal Court System
42	**Hohoe**	Ethnic	Crisis	Hohoe, Volta	Military detachment, NPC, REGSEC
43	**Jamasi**	Ethnic	Outcome/ Resolution	Jamasi,Ashanti, Eastern	House of chiefs, Police
44	**Juaso**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Juaso, Ashanti	House of chiefs
45	**Koforidua Religious**	Religious	Outcome/ Resolution	Koforidua, Eastern	DISEC, REGSEC

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
46	**Koforidua Juabeng**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Koforidua, Eastern	DISEC, House of chiefs, REGSEC, Traditional Leaders
47	**Konkoma**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Konkoma, Volta	
48	**Kpandai Inter-Ethnic**	Land Ownership	Outcome/ Resolution	Binda - kete-krachi road, kapandae, Northern	DISEC, Military detachment, REGSEC
49	**Kubekrom No. 2 conflict**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Kubekrom, Greater Accra	Police
50	**Kumfoeku Shama land Dispute**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Shama, Western	DISEC, Legal Court System, Police
51	**Kwabeng**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Kwabeng, Eastern	House of chiefs, REGSEC
52	**Kwado Bofuor**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Kwado bofuor, Volta	House of chiefs, Legal Court System, Police
53	**Madina Zongo**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Madina Zongo, Greater Accra	Legal Court System, Police
54	**Mankessim**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Mankessim, Central	House of chiefs, Legal Court

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
					System, Police
55	**Nadowli**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Nadowli, Upper West	House of chiefs, Legal Court System, REGSEC
56	**Namolgo and Tindongo**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Namolgo, Upper East	ADR
57	**Ndronan**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Ndronan, Eastern	DISEC, House of chiefs
58	**Nkenkenso**	Land Ownership	Outcome/ Resolution	Nkenkenso, Ashanti	DISEC,House of chiefs
59	**Nkwanta North**	Boundary	Crisis	Nkwanta, Northern	DISEC, Military detachment, Police, REGSEC
60	**Nkwanta South**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Nkwanta, Volta	Concerned Citizens Association, Legal Court System, REGSEC
61	**Nsawam Zongo**	Religious	Outcome/ Resolution	Nsawam, Eastern	REGSEC
62	**Nsoatre**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Nsoatre, Brong-Ahafo	House of chiefs, Legal Court System, Police
63	**Nungua**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Nungua, Greater Accra	Legal Court System

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
64	**Odumase-Krobo**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Odumase-Krobo, Eastern	House of chiefs, REGSEC, Traditional Leaders
65	**Owabi**	Land Ownership	Outcome/ Resolution	Owabi, Ashanti	DISEC,House of chiefs
66	**Pedu**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Cape Coast, Central	House of chiefs, Legal Court System, Religious Body
67	**Peki**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Peki, Volta	Legal Court System
68	**Peki /Tsitoe**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Tsitoe, Volta	DISEC, House of chiefs, Legal Court System, Military detachment, Police, REGSEC, Religious Body, Traditional Leaders
69	**Princess Town Chieftaincy**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Princess town, Western	House of chiefs
70	**Saamang**	Mineral ressources	Crisis	Saamang, Eastern	DISEC, Legal Court System, Military detachment, Police

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
71	**Sefwi Wiawso Chieftancy Conflict**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Sefwi Wiawso, Western	Legal Court System
72	**Sekondi Conflict**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Sekondi, Western	House of chiefs
73	**Suhum Islamic Sec Sch**	Religious	Outcome/ Resolution	Suhum, Eastern	DISEC, REGSEC
74	**Sukusuku Chieftaincy Conflict**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Sukusuku, Western	House of chiefs, REGSEC
75	**Supomu Dunkwa - Beposo conflict**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Beposo, Western	DISEC, House of chiefs
76	**Sogakope Land**	Land Ownership	Outcome/ Resolution	Sogakope, Volta	Legal Court System, Police
77	**Takoradi Chieftaincy**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Takoradi, Western	House of chiefs, Legal Court System
78	**Tamale Changli Choggu Gumbihini**	Boundary	Crisis	Tamale, Northern	DISEC, Police, REGSEC
79	**Teleko Bokazo Land Dispute**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Teleko Bokazo, Western	DISEC
80	**Wallembelle**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Wallembelle, Upper West	Legal Court System, REGSEC,
81	**Wenchi Chieftaincy Dispute**	Chieftaincy	Outcome/ Resolution	Wenchi, Brong-Ahafo	DISEC, House of chiefs, Legal Court System, Religious

Ghanaian Conflicts (2019)					
					Body
82	**Wenchi Religious**	Religious	Outcome/ Resolution	Wenchi, Brong-Ahafo	DISEC, Legal Court System
83	**Winneba**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Winneba, Central	House of chiefs, Police, REGSEC, Religious Body
84	**Yayawso-Yawtana**	Mineral ressources	Outcome/ Resolution	Yayawso, Eastern	DISEC, Police, REGSEC
85	**Yendi**	Ethnic	Crisis	Yendi, Northern	House of chiefs, NPC, Police, REGSEC, Religious Body
86	**Yeji**	Chieftaincy	Crisis	Yeji, Brong-Ahafo	House of chiefs, Legal Court System,
87	**Yikene Sirigu**	Land Ownership	Crisis	Yikene, Upper East	Legal Court System
	Source: Ghana Conflict map as of April 9th 2019. *This data was collected prior to the dysfunction of the website*				

Appendix B: List of conflicts with the use of police as mediation effort

Conflict name, typology, status

1) Ablekuma-Oblogo, land ownership, crisis
2) Abuakwa, Boundary, outcome/ resolution
3) Agbobloshie conflict, Boundary, crisis
4) Alanvayo Nkonya, land ownership, crisis
5) Anloga, Boundary, outcome/ resolution
6) Ashaiman conflict, political violence, crisis
7) Bawku, chieftaincy, crisis,
8) Berekum, chieftaincy, outcome/ resolution
9) Chereponi, boundary, crisis
10) Drobo and Japekrom, land ownership, outcome/ resolution
11) Gomoa Fete, boundary, crisis
12) Jamasi, Ethnic, outcome/ resolution
13) Kubekrom No.2 conflict, land ownership, crisis
14) Kumfoeku Shama land dispute, land ownership, crisis
15) Kwado Bofuor, chieftaincy, crisis
16) Madina zongo, land ownership, crisis
17) Maukessim, chieftaincy, outcome/ resolution
18) Nsoatre, chieftaincy, outcome/ resolution
19) Peki/Tsitoe, land ownership, crisis
20) Saamang, mineral resources, crisis
21) Sogakope land, land ownership, outcome/ resolution
22) Tamale Changli Choggu Gumbinini, boundary, crisis
23) Winneba, chieftaincy, crisis
24) Yendi, Ethnic, crisis

Typology in numbers: (6) Boundary, (6) Chieftaincy, (8) Land ownership, (2) Ethnic, (1) Mineral resources, (1) Political violence.

Appendix C: List of conflicts with the use of military as a mediation effort

Conflict name, typology, status

1) Abefiti-Hweh Nkwakaw, land ownership, crisis

2) Anloga, Boundary, crisis
3) Bimbila Ethinic, Ethnic, outcome/ resolution
4) Hohoe, Ethnic, land ownership, outcome/ resolution
5) Kpandai Inter-Ethnic, land ownership, outcome resolution
6) Nkwanta North, Boundary, crisis
7) Peki/Tsitoe, land ownership, crisis
8) Saamang, mineral resources, crisis

Typology in numbers: (2) Boundary, (3) Land ownership, (2) Ethnic, (1) Mineral resources.

Appendix D: List of conflicts with the use of the NPC as mediation efforts

Conflict name, typology, status

1) Alavanyo-Nkonya, Land Ownership, crisis
2) Bawku, Chieftaincy, crisis
3) Hohoe, Ethnic, crisis
4) Yendi, Chieftaincy, crisis

Typology in numbers: (1) Land Ownership, (2) Land ownership, (1) Ethnic.

Appendix E: Interview questions for Semefa Asiminu – NPC

General information:

- **Date of the Interview:** Friday, January 25th 2019 - 11:30 GMT / 12:30 GMT+1
- **Format:** Conference call
- **Name:** Ms. Semefa Asiminu
- **Position:** Senior administrative manager at the NPC

General information about the research:

Topic: Identifying National Components of Infrastructure for Peace

Case Study: The Ghanaian peace infrastructure: Using Paul van Tongeren's components of I4P

RQ: *Which local actors and elements of the peacebuilding process in Ghana led to its success and set it as a model to countries with similar realities?*

Identifying National Components of Infrastructure for Peace

Ghanaian Peace Infrastructure : Pillars of Peacebuilding				
	Pillar One: **Security Dimension**	**Pillar Two:** **Governing Dimension**	**Pillar Three:** **Social Dimension**	**Pillar Four:** **International Dimension**
	Components of Peacebuilding Pillars			
Title of the components	*Peacebuilding Support Unit*	*Building National Capacities for Peace*	*Peace Education*	*Insider Mediator*

2) What are the key elements of the Ghanaian peace infrastructure?
3) How does the NPC proceed to build national capacities for peacebuilding?
4) Is there a specific type of peacebuilding framework with which the NPC functions?
5) Is there a specific type of traditional conflict resolution mechanism used in Ghana or applied by the NPC?
6) How does the NPC builds national capacities for peace?
7) What type of relations does the NPC entertain with regional peace councils?
8) What type of relations does the NPC entertain with organisations such as WANEP and the UNDP?
9) How has the NPC's work influenced peace in Ghana? In addition, through which parameters is the NPC capable to measure the impact / success of their work?
10) Does the NPC help in the establishment of peace education? If so how is this done and has it been institutionalised?
11) On the security aspect how does the NPC collaborate with national security organisation (Police, Military) to ensure that, they establish a state of peace in a way, which would make it lasting?

Appendix F: Interview questions for Festus K. Aubyn, PhD – KAIPTC

General information:

- **Date of the Interview:** Thursday, May 23rd 2019 - 06:20 GMT / 07:20 GMT+1
- **Format:** E-mail correspondence
- **Name:** Dr. Festus K. Aubyn
- **Position:** Research Fellow at Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

Questions:

1) What is the role of security providers in the Ghanaian peace framework
2) Who are the main stakeholders?
3) What activities do they perform?
4) What is the role of the military in the Ghanaian peacebuilding infrastructure?
5) Who leads peace education in Ghana?
6) How does the collaboration of all the stakeholders influence the peace education?
7) What are the constraints to peace education?