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Child Witches
and the State



The Role of Regime Type and Durability in the Rise of Urban Child Witchcraft Accusations in Africa

A Multiple Case Study of Angola, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ghana

MA Thesis Report

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Abstract

This thesis is in accordance with the requirements for the completion of the International Relations Master Program. First, the aim of this thesis was to test the existing theory that a failed or collapsed regime is a necessary component for the presence of a change in witchcraft victimology from elderly women to urban children. This was done by analyzing the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Angola, and Ghana. The second chapter illustrates the state of the art of literature regarding the theories underlying this research, alternative explanations for a shift in victimology, and type of regimes present in African states. The third chapter explains the between-case multi-criterial analysis conducted to ascertain each case's regime type and the presence (or lack thereof) of a shift in witchcraft victimology. The fourth chapter relays the results of the analysis where it was determined that out of the four cases, two were in accordance with the existing theory, and two refuted it. The fifth and final chapter concludes this thesis by critically examining the results and methodology and a conclusory statement claiming that a collapsed and failed regime is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the shift in victimology of witchcraft accusations from elderly women to urban children.





List of Abbreviations

CAR	Central African Republic
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EPCD	Education and Policy Data Center
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIPC	Ghana Investment Promotion Center
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IFHR	International Foundation for Human Rights
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
PwC	PricewaterhouseCoopers
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
UNHDP	United Nations Human Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization





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Introduction

Children are the living embodiment of the future, however what many fail to realize is that by the year 2050, every two out of five children will be born in Africa, equating to what UNICEF has deemed a future for humanity that is increasingly African (“Generation 2030” 7). While concerns of poverty and its reverberations in the Global South are being assessed by the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals to ensure a brighter future, many other life threatening socio-cultural variables are at play in contemporary African societies that have yet to be adequately addressed by policymakers and academics alike, impeding structural transformations that could stabilize future generations (UNDP 79-80). One of the more recent phenomenon posing a physical as well as psychological threat to the youth of African societies is a shift in victimization of those accused of being involved in witchcraft related practices, with urban children having become the newest targets of witch-hunts and the ostracism that accompanies its accusations (Snow 3; UNICEF “Children” 14). A child witch is often defined as a child between the ages of 0-18 who is suspected, accused, and labeled by their family and community as having engaged, or is engaging, in witchcraft and malevolent magic (UNICEF “Children” 14). Children across the African continent who are labelled as witches are in increasing danger of abuse, discrimination, torture, or death. These children and adolescents discarded from society resort to stealing, begging, or prostitution for survival at ages as young as five years old, for children are most vulnerable to being accused of being witches from the ages of three to ten (Mungai; UNICEF “Children” 16). Since the large-scale targeting of Africa’s urban youth is a recent occurrence, it is important to understand the driving mechanisms behind it before being able to effectively implement humanitarian counter-measures.

The emergence of the phenomenon of child witches in Africa has various contributing causes, all revolving around a change in the narrative of how children have come to be viewed (Itauma). This change, which began to take place in the early 2000s, coincided with several important occurrences that altered the perception of children and childhood in Africa. First, the creation and overt use of child soldiers in Central and West Africa created a communal fear of children that was previously non-existent (Molina 19). Second, the increase of urban street-children and orphans attracted public disdain since their presence represented the recent destruction of the familial structure brought about by the AIDS/HIV epidemic, civil war, and drought or famine (Snow 3-4; Adinkrah 743; Miguel 1156; Molina 19). Finally, platforms of



entertainment, mainly films and cinema commonly portraying children as witches, began serving as wide-spread protagonists in intensifying witchcraft beliefs and accusations targeting children within African communities (Riedel “Children in Africa” 32; Itauma). This combination of increased fear, resentment, and legitimized suspicion of children in many African societies produced an idea of a new paranormal threat in the 21st century that manifested itself in the form of child witches.

In the contemporary literature there is an eclectic collection of scholarly work on these contributing factors to the phenomenon of African child witches from a multitude of disciplines, amongst which include mainly theology, anthropology, sociology, ethnology, socio-economics, and others (Koning 160; Snow). Yet, the field of International Relations (IR) has remained rather docile on the subject; those who do engage on the matter tend to do so with a focal point of human rights and rights of the child under direction of International Governmental Organizations (United Nations) or Non-Governmental Organizations (e.g. Safe Child Africa), but seldom for political science motives (Snow 9). Therefore, to fully grasp the nature of the situation a multifaceted and holistic approach is needed, indicating a demand for increased research from an IR perspective. Discrepancies and lack of academic fervor on the matter has additionally led the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights to call for further empirical research into “its causes and effects in selected countries and local settings” (Hanson and Ruggiero 27; Adinkrah 750). Currently, there is a single dominating IR theory regarding African child witches adopted by scholars and policymakers alike, which claims that child witch accusations in urban contexts can only occur in regions of political collapse, where states are facing a crisis and potential failure (Cimpric 12; Molina 5; de Boeck 11; Snow 11; Adinkrah 743; Miguel 1156). However, a recent study of Nigeria illustrated that witch-hunts directed at urban children do not require such extreme social and political disarray to be present, but instead appears to also occur in less cataclysmic, weak states (Snow 2). Therefore, because of this recent contradictory development, the legitimacy of this theory has been called into question.

The subsequent research will henceforth contribute to the lack of empirical research by addressing the question of: how does regime type and regime durability influence the recent shift in victimology in African witch-hunts to urban children and adolescents? This thesis therefore aims to test the validity of the widely accepted theory that only collapsed and failed states produce the phenomenon of child witches since new contradictory evidence has come to



light. Answering this question will moreover assist in adjusting the scope of future research to be able to properly identify a fundamental set of indicators or influential factors to ultimately alleviate the dangerous problem facing Africa's future generations. Therefore the following thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter presents a literature review to establish both a theoretical foundation as well as an assessment of the current academic standing on the issue of influential factors that has contributed to the targeting of urban children as witches. The second chapter outlines the specifications of the research design, illustrating the methodology, variables, data, and sources of the research. The third chapter discusses the results of the multiple-case analysis conducted, examining the necessity of the "failed" component in the shift in victimization. The fourth chapter takes a critical look at the research performed and discusses the possibilities of how the conclusions drawn can be taken into account to further solidify and develop a base for future IR work on the subject of urban child witchcraft accusations. The fifth and final chapter of this thesis ends with conclusory remarks.





Chapter 1: Literature Review

This chapter discusses the state of the art of literature regarding the theories underlying this research, alternative explanations, and type of regimes present in African states. Thus, the following chapter contains three sections. The first section establishes a theoretical foundation in which this research is based by first elaborating on the failed state theory which prompted this research, followed by an explanation of the witchcraft paradigm surrounding the phenomenon, then a discussion of the scapegoating theory, and finally an analysis of the emergence of the ‘child witch’ is discussed. The second section then analyzes each existing explanation of witchcraft accusations (alternative to that being analyzed here of regime type and durability) in the themes of cultural, economic, and political inclinations to target urban children as witches. Finally, the third section explains the main existing regime types found amongst African states in order to properly identify and distinguish one regime type from another.

Section 1: Theoretical Framework

Failed States

The concept of a failed state and state failure began to gain academic and policy attention approximately two decades ago. Often the notion of a failed state adopts the western concept of a state, requiring first the definition of what a state is and secondly what it entails to have failed as a state. This research refers to the state as that which governs its people within its own internationally legitimized sovereign territory under a liberally democratic system of governance (Griffith et al. 228-229). This means that the state must fulfil the conditions of upholding civil and political liberties and services, encouraging political competition for all positions of government power by holding regular and fair elections, and providing functional public administration and institutions (Griffiths et al. 71). A failed state is thus a state that is unable to fulfil these conditions and no longer holds the monopoly of power. In the case of African states, by means of decolonization after World War II, the majority of fledgling states seceded under pre-established sovereign territories and with imported and foreign forms of state organization (mainly liberal democracy as described above), commencing their independence under artificial pretences (Griffiths et al. 229; Herbst “The Past” 252). African states were expected to utilize this grafted framework of liberal democracy, but often carried out forms of governance containing pre-colonial African tribal practices, two forms of statehood often do not coincide. This generally led to a slow rejection of the transplanted



statehood, manifesting itself as state failure (Herbst “Responding to State” 130-133; Chabal 67-70; Engelbert and Dunn 181-183). Thus, failing and failed states appear to be endemic throughout contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, with symptoms of poverty, civil conflict, and state repression culminating national social tensions that greatly contribute to the domestic paradigms that influence African societal relations.

Witchcraft Paradigm

An important social relation within and amongst African societies concerns that of witchcraft. This section therefore aims to establish the domestic context under which accusations of witchcraft are occurring. Witchcraft is defined as the use of mystical powers with either malevolent or benevolent intent. However, this research focusses mainly on those accused of malevolent forms of witchcraft, thus equating witches to antagonists who utilize these occult powers to bring harm upon others in “a matter of the most deadly seriousness” (Cohan 805; Camaroff and Camaroff 518-517; Adinkah 744). Societies of the sub-continent of Africa have an ancient history of witchcraft/occult practices and beliefs that studies across disciplines show are continuing to be upheld in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa as *explanans* for the hardships, struggles, and misfortune (death, illness, or poverty) that befalls them (Bruynell 400; Tebbe 187; Koning 160; Ashforth 5-6; Cohan 804). Given this ideological presence of witchcraft in daily African life, it can be deduced that contemporary African societies are operating within a ‘witchcraft paradigm’, meaning that societies are acting under a system of belief that justifies witchcraft as the source of their plights (Ashforth 5). This notion is supported by a research project conducted in 2010 by the PEW Research Center on Religion and Public Life in Sub-Saharan Africa. This report revealed that in half of the countries surveyed (19 in total), more than 40% of the population believed in witchcraft, reaching as high as 93% of the population in Tanzania (Liu 178). It is then, in this sense, logical that the overarching witchcraft paradigm throughout Africa is being utilized by societies to rationalize accusations of witchcraft as a defense mechanism against what is perceived as physical and non-physical threats to their wellbeing from child witches.

Rational-Choice Theory and Scapegoating

To avoid adopting a “heart of darkness” parochial discourse on Africa, this research paper instead utilizes the rational-choice theory to frame the role of reason behind the witchcraft paradigm in a rational repertoire. Therefore, within this framework it can be assumed that, of



those who accuse children of being witches, their “behavior is motivated by self-interest, utility maximization, or, more simply put, goal fulfillment” (Petracca 289). Additional to this notion of self-interested goal fulfillment, some researchers claim that witch-hunts have evolved as a means of rationalizing and regaining control over instances of conflict, loss, or social transgressions and punishing those seemingly responsible (Forsyth 337; Agrawal and Mehra 136). By implementing this discourse, this research effectively circumvents the Western inclination to presuppose the causal factor of the witchcraft paradigm to be a product of “superstition”, “underdevelopment”, or “disillusion” (Miguel 1158; UNICEF “Children” 9; Hanson and Ruggiero 7-8).

This research paper furthermore adopts René Girard’s scapegoat theory in addition to rational-choice theory to justify why vulnerable minorities in society are singled out as witches, particularly that of African urban children. A scapegoat is defined as an individual, or a minority group, that unjustifiably gets blamed, or persecuted, for the suffering in the lives of others, serving as a physical surrogate for the cause of their misfortunes (Adinkrah 750; Miguel 1154; Brighi and Cerella 12). Thus, what appears to be a unanimous *explanandum* (the scapegoat mechanism of urban children) throughout academic disciplines can be attributed to mounting social, economic, and physical distresses “devolv[ing] onto a single victim” through the act of expulsion of innocent targets in a real as well as symbolic way (Brighi and Cerella 12). To build onto this theoretical foundation, it is important to discuss the various social, economic, and political factors that influence shifts in witchcraft victimology.

Section 2: Alternative Explanations

Socio-Cultural and Socio-Economic Factors

Firstly, African socio-cultural tales of sorcery throughout history have often portrayed children as the key perpetrators of witchcraft (Schnoebelen 5; 15; 22). Among these cultural implications, many studies have found that children that display odd behavioral traits (speaks as an adult for example), are born with disabilities or deformities, or precociousness in any form is often seen by many African cultures as a sign of an older malevolent soul residing within the child and dictating its peculiar behavior, thus deeming said child a witch (Adinkrah 744; Schnoebelen 14; UNICEF “Children” 14). However, other studies argue that being a witch does not have to be something one is born with, it can be transferred from elderly witches (often



relatives) to children by special foods, drinks, or gifts containing a portion of their occult magic; ergo witch by association or contact (Snow 4; Adinkrah 745; UNICEF “Children” 19). According to these arguments, accusations of a child of being a witch are legitimate at any time since the power of witchcraft can be either inherent from birth or transferred by contact, rendering the ability to predict (and prevent) who is a potential victim highly improbable.

Moreover, changing familial structures in Sub-Saharan Africa have been recognized by scholars to be a significant underlying cultural and economic factor in the victimization of urban children. A combination of an increase of orphaned children (due to rapid deaths from HIV/AIDS), parents sending their children to live with kin in large cities and urban areas for higher prospects, and household income shocks pulling children out of school and into the streets has contributed to the dramatic increase in children living in urban streets (Snow 3-4; Adinkrah 743; Miguel 1156). This influx of children into urban areas can therefore be seen to have created a trifecta of anxieties within these regions that has prompted the scapegoat solution of witch-hunts. First, activities associated with street children such as stealing, drugs, and prostitution are seen in many African cultures as taboo for children, marking urban children as feared deviants and henceforth potential witches (Snow 4). Second, the overwhelming presence of street children is a constant social reminder of the changing familial structure illustrated above, eliciting angst from patriarchal societies based on family and community relationships (Hanson and Ruggiero 10). Finally, children cast out into the streets as proclaimed witches living amidst non-witch children has created an atmosphere of “fear and insecurity concerning witchcraft and witches, creating an ideal climate for witch hunts” (Adinkrah 745). It can therefore be deduced that the socio-economic factor of poverty driving flocks of children away from their families and into urban streets combined with the socio-cultural factor of fear of these children and disdain for their symbolism of the deteriorating conditions of familial structures creates the perfect storm for scapegoating these urban ‘pariahs’ as witches.

Additionally, urban areas have become more prone than rural villages to witchcraft accusations over the past few decades. Civilian accessible technological advances in twenty-first century Africa such as smartphones, laptops, and televisions have become widely associated with witchcraft dispersion. For example, Pye explains that the aforementioned witchcraft paradigm has adjusted to modern times, with electronic devices having become seen as the new tools, mediums, and carriers of occult practices and dispersion of belief systems (118-119; Itauma). Africans often believed that by migrating to the cities, they were distancing themselves from



the village witch and sorcerer and thus reducing the possibilities of harm (Geschiere 45). Yet, seeing how these electronic devices are more readily available in urban rather than rural settings, this new platform for occult practices has intensified the accusations of witchcraft in the heavily populated urban areas and has turned urban centers into witchcraft active zones, contributing to the dangers faced by urban street children.

Political Factors

When it comes to the political factors that influence the development of child witches there is a consensus amongst academics that the shift of victimization towards urban children was spurred by the “shocking” emergence of mass-armies of child soldiers, namely Laurent Kabila’s army during the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997 (Snow 5). According to anthropological and sociological studies, the appearance of armies consisting of child soldiers drastically altered the perception of children in many African societies, their existence sowing the seeds of fear of their power (both physical and magical) that blossomed into a widespread sense that children were something to be feared, not protected (Snow 5; Hanson and Ruggiero 10; Cahn 421; Schnoebelen 15). One study in 2003 showed that in the Central African Republic (CAR), at least two-thirds of the children enlisted were voluntarily recruited (Cahn 419). Those recruited (not forcefully kidnapped) were urban street children that either did not adhere to the traditional familial structures, were living in cases of severe poverty, or were living in environments of violent conflict (419). Therefore, it is evident that the political actors (then as well as now) exploit the socio-cultural and socio-economic situations of urban regions to maximize their goals, illustrating a trinity of interdependent contributing factors of the shift in scapegoat surrogates to urban children. Additionally, the lack of juridical infrastructure due to the cataclysmic political/social/economic crises in regions such as the DRC and CAR at these times equated to a context of political non-accountability for the protection and preservation of the rights of the child (Snow 2; Cahn 419-421).

Moreover, while some scholars believe that globalization has led to the modernization of those acting within the witchcraft paradigm (e.g. politicians, children, athletes being able to purchase magical powers), critics say that the link to globalization and modernization is inadequate to prove sufficient evolution (UNICEF 18). Regardless, evidence shows strong relations between esteemed pastors who can identify witches living among the innocent and African political leaders wishing to evade misfortune and willing to take advantage of a vulnerable minority



viewed as a burden by most (Snow 9). Politicians and preachers alike claim that Africans will not prosper “through an efficient education system, functioning infrastructure, equitable taxes, and other fruits of good government, but rather by driving off evil spirits”, creating an ideology that marginalizes the accountability of the State while legitimizing the targeting of urban children as the real threat to individual prosperity (7). Hence urban opportunities continue to create a situation where ‘children of risk’ become ‘children at risk’ of political exploitation through scapegoating (Hanson and Ruggiero 10).

Section 3: Regime Types in Africa

As mentioned previously, it was often thought to be common knowledge that the accusation of urban children as witches only took place in States of extreme political, social, and economic crises accompanying state failure and collapse. However, a new study by Snow in 2017 on Nigeria inadvertently found the existence of urban child witch-hunts in simply a weak – but not failed or collapsed – State, challenging the preconceived idea regarding the necessity of regime failure for the shift in victimology to urban children to take place (1; 2; 5; 11). Yet this inconsistency poses the new question of: to what degree does regime durability and regime type influence the scapegoating of urban children as witches? To briefly clarify, when discussing regimes this research refers to the basic notion of the prevailing system of rule or governance of the government in power within a region (Tebbe 185-86). First when looking at a State, it is necessary to discern the type of governing regime in question. Despite the proliferation of hybrid regime types in African states, the limitations of this thesis has caused this research to narrow its scope to that of the three main regime types present today: liberal democracies, anocracies, and authoritarian regimes.

Democracy

To first look at democracies, the aforementioned concept of a ‘liberal democracy’ is what is referred to when discussing democracies. In the constitutional language of many ‘democratized’ African nations, potential harm from the occult is perceived as a security threat to the individual person and therefore Africans believe that protection should be offered by the State (Tebbe 224). Yet, Western models of the liberal democratic State that were grafted into Africa after independence tend to marginalize the domestic importance of the witchcraft paradigm – which in some instances has led to scapegoating urban children as a social compromise between democratic norms and domestic traditional practices and beliefs (224-



225). However, democracies tend to possess the stable infrastructure needed to monitor and control the human rights conditions of children and elderly women as well as feeling the international pressure to adhere to Western norms, conventions, and values systems that often reprimand witch-hunts (Cahn 454). Additionally, Tebbe states that the willingness to overtly discuss and address issues regarding the occult and its effects on society is a more prominent characteristic of democratic African states, while Akin and Ade add that democracies are claimed to resonate the utmost commitment from the masses who promote legitimate stability (Tebbe 202-203; Akin and Ade 71). This consequently leads to the prioritizing of democratic practices over witchcraft practices in true liberal democracies. Therefore, democracies are viewed as being the most stable regimes since their desire to adhere to conditions for legitimacy produces a State that is more predictable, developed, and durable (Cahn 455; Sottilotta 2; Tebbe 188).

Anocracies

Secondly, anocracies, or “semi-democracies”, appear to be more common throughout African regimes in the form of patrimonialism. Patrimonialistic societies are those ruled by a system of governance based on reciprocity and rent-seeking behaviors in the pursuit of power, wealth, and influence through informal networks of patron/client relationships (Wai 32). Moreover, anocracies are regimes where democratic practices are held for international legitimacy purposes, but rampant corruption and rights violations negate these democratic characteristics in practice (34). According to research by Koning, patrimonialistic societies appear to also have a more prominent predisposition towards witchcraft (159). With failure to abide by the rules of reciprocity in providing protection from the occult comes public resentment that holds the potential to threaten the incumbent regime (Koning 170). The occurrence of urban child-witch accusations is thus more likely to be tolerated or understood by both civilian and government agents. Additionally, despite the presence of an infrastructural system, frequent State corruption renders its juridical, political, and public services incapable of adequately countering issues of occult violence against children or the elderly (Cohan 807; 823-825). However, with regards to regime durability, Arriola claims that the employment of patronage enables leaders to utilize State resources to facilitate intra-elite accommodation that in turn achieves a degree of regime durability, since elite conflict is a large stimulus to instability (1340-1341). With patronage reinforcing stability amongst elites, but corrupt practices undermining all means of infrastructure necessary to pacify violent occult accusations,



anocracies are stated to be fragile regimes that achieve semi-stability by means of effective durability.

Authoritarian

Finally, authoritarian regimes are a strongly centralized governing power that concentrates political authority within a power or organization that is not constitutionally accountable to the people (Griffiths et al. 18-19). Additionally, Chang et al. describes authoritarian regimes as “single-party, military, and personalistic” (6). As is the case with anocracies, patron-client reciprocity (or ‘big-man’ politics) is also often a dominant characteristic in African authoritarian regimes, where informal accountability and practices dominate (7). Moreover, authoritarian regimes often retract from its responsibilities to the public domain consequently failing to provide basic services and adequate infrastructure (Titeca and Herdt 213). The regime is considered then to be an archetypical ‘failed state’ (213). Furthermore, these regimes often operate in a state of existential crisis/conflict, and tend to act under the context of drastically altered perceptions of urban children as mentioned previously when discussing child soldiers. Authoritarian regimes function under the pretext of non-accountability to the people, putting regime survival and prosperity as the main priority, consequently willing to put children at risk to do so (Cahn 419). This change in how children are perceived alongside the augmented demography of urban children has in the recent past led to the increased persecution of urban children over other minorities amongst authoritarian regimes (Hanson and Ruggiero 10). Many Africans under authoritarian regimes also turn to scapegoating to relieve themselves of daily plights of poverty, political violence, and a “phantasmal vulnerability” felt from evil-doers within the community (Tebbe 224-225). Thus it has been illustrated that despite the difference in regime type and levels of durability in all three instances, the presence of using urban children as scapegoats for occult insecurities appears to remain a constant probable phenomenon throughout each regime type. Therefore, this research paper aims to concretely assess how regime type and regime durability influence the recent shift in victimology in African witch-hunts to urban children and adolescents.



Chapter 2: Research Design

This chapter further elaborates on the specifications of the research design that has been carried out for this thesis. First to be discussed is the design type, followed by the variables under analysis, then the sources used, before finally discussing the method of data collection, coding, and processing.

Design Type

Since there are multiple types of regimes and levels of durability that need to be analyzed, this research design has been structured to incorporate multiple case studies. The research design selected for this thesis is therefore a between-case multi-criterial analysis that takes a small-N approach to the case studies and criteria chosen. This means that the research possesses a qualitative foundation while independently analyzing a small selection of case studies (a total of four) and criteria (a total of three main criteria to determine regime type and durability) (Mahoney 387; George and Bennett 105). Each case study will fulfill one of the regime types on the spectrum previously illustrated alongside its null hypothesis in accordance to the existing theory that only failing/collapsed states victimize urban children. The first case study is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and will serve as a *control* case study, meaning a case study that fits the current theory and hypothesis of the presence of a failed/collapsed authoritarian state being a necessary component for the victimization of urban children (George and Bennett 180). The second case study is the Central African Republic, hypothesized to be a failing/collapsed authoritarian state that according to the theory has a null hypothesis that the victimization of urban children is present (“Comparative Analysis” 2017). The third case study is Angola, hypothesized to be a weak and semi-democratic state with a null hypothesis that the victimization of urban children is not present due to its status as weak and not failing (2017). Finally, the fourth case study is Ghana, hypothesized to be a stable democracy where the null hypothesis is that victimization of urban children is not present (2107). By analyzing each case study against the hypothesis of regime type and that only failing/collapsed states victimize urban children as witches, the validity of this preconceived theory is tested, ultimately answering the overall research question of how regime type and regime durability influence the recent shift in victimology across the African continent.



Variables

For the subsequent research, the *dependent* variable (or outcome) is the scapegoating of urban children as witches. The *independent* variables, which are the multiple criteria under analysis to determine regime type and regime durability, include the performance of state legitimacy, public services, and human rights and the rule of law (George and Bennett 102; “Indicators”). If a State fulfills all three criteria by possessing state legitimacy, having established and functioning public services, and upholds human rights and the rule of law, then the case is classified as a democracy. If only partial criteria are fulfilled, then the case is classified as an anocracy, or semi-democracy. Finally, if a no criteria are fulfilled then the case is classified as a failed or collapsed authoritarian state. These variables chosen can be criticized for being predominantly Western concepts of state performance, however, since these indicators are the most frequently used in international indexes, censuses, and surveys they provide the most current, accurate, and reliable information and therefore are utilized within this research. Due to the limitations of this thesis influencing feasibility of data collection and processing, the number of variables has been restricted to the previously mentioned three to ensure concrete and tangible results. Moreover, all case studies contain the *constant* variables (serving as parameters) of similar urban demographics (approximately 40% of total population), regional proximity (West/Central Sub-Saharan Africa), and religious diversity levels (50-70% Christian) (George and Bennett 102; “Angola”; “Central”; “Congo”; “Ghana”). By keeping these three variables constant, other exogenous influential actors have been further limited.

Data Requirements

When collecting, processing, and coding data, it is necessary to first establish a set of standardized questions to ask in each case study to ensure systematic data compilation that can be repeated or compared in other studies (George and Bennett 110). Therefore, for the purposes of this research, the main framework of questions will be categorized under two themes: regime type and durability, and urban children victims. The framework will consist of the following questions:



Regime Type and Durability

1. What is the status of the state's legitimacy?
 - a) Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?
 - b) Are there free, fair, and frequent elections?
 - c) Is there state corruption and political violence?
2. Are the public serves present and functioning?
 - a) How is the public health?
 - b) What are the enrollments rates of education systems?
 - c) Is there adequate infrastructure?
3. Are human rights upheld and the rule of law implemented?
 - a) Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld?
 - b) Is there an independent media source?
 - c) Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system?

Urban Children Victims

4. How many children have been accused of being witches in this region?
 - a) How many elderly women have been victimized?
 - b) Has the amount of urban child victims changed over the past 17 years?
 - c) Is there a clear pattern in frequency that correlates with changes in regime type and durability?

Data analyzed for this research was thus compiled to answer this framework of standardized questions in the pursuit of answering the overall research question. Additionally, scholars have identified that the shift in victimology has been taking place since the beginning of the twenty-first century (Schnoebelen 14; Snow 5; Koning 159). Therefore, due to the recent nature of the phenomenon, the majority of the data focuses on post- 2000 information, however earlier data is also taken into account since that information is necessary to be able to identify pre- and post- shift changes in both regime type as well as frequency of urban child witchcraft accusations. This therefore establishes a general 17-year timeline from which the variable data was collected.



Sources

The data collected to answer the previously stated questions and conduct the overall research is predominantly qualitative, with only limited quantitative data used for determining how many elderly women and children have been accused of witchcraft in the past two decades. This is due to the fact that reliable and accurate statistics, censuses, and monitoring of the quantity of accusations and victims against both target groups is widely recognized as unavailable, unrepresentative of the total amount of accusations since most incidents go unreported, and often lacking legitimacy (Riedel “Failing State-Interventions” 8; OHCHR “Witches in the”). Therefore, due to these limitations on quantitative availability, qualitative data is the primary source for this research. Such sources include (amongst others) surveys, policy statements, government declarations, annual reports, academic journals, and index results.

To avoid using biased data that maintained a fixed perspective or ideology, data was first collected from primary sources from both international and national sources. Publications by Western based organizations (e.g. the United Nations or Human Rights Watch) were utilized alongside those publicized by local government agencies and ministries of the DRC, CAR, Angola, and Ghana to ensure a holistic collection of data that would significantly reduce the possibility of biased results. For example, when collecting and coding data on the variable of state legitimacy in the DRC, documents containing information on election transparency were obtained from both the United Nations and CENI (the Independent National Electoral Commission of the DRC). These documents were then subsequently compared to check first, if the information given on the same topic was consistent, and second to ensure (especially if the information diverged) that both accounts would be present when coding the data to provide objective results. The focus on primary documents from a variety of sources additionally prevented the results from being the product of a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, where only evidence supporting the given theory was collected and coded thus producing findings that matched expectations instead of reality (Merton 195-196). When primary sources were unavailable, as was the case when searching for government publicized documents by the Central African Republic for example, secondary sources of mainly academic articles or other scholarly works were substituted. Additionally, secondary sources were also utilized as further supporting data in all cases.



Data: Collection, Coding, and Processing

Once the sources were identified, the first step was to collect as much data as possible for each variable of each case to be able to produce an accurate portrayal of the entirety of information available. These collections of works for each variable were then assigned relevance as being evidence of a sub-variable for each main variable as presented previously under Data Requirements, resulting in sections *Ia*, *Ib*, *Ic* and so forth. For example, all the sources under state legitimacy that discussed elections were placed under the first variable in section *Ib*. This extraction of relevant data from these sources while “indexing or categorizing the text in order to establish a framework of thematic ideas” is referred to as coding (Gibbs). Sources coded for one section would occasionally overlap in other sections, for example, election based violence would fall under sections *Ib* and *Ic*. In these instances, the original coding of each source would remain the same, with the appropriate information being represented in all appropriate sections to allow for full representation of data. The extensively elaborated table of grid-panels containing all the coded data from the sources utilized can be found in the first appendix of this thesis. This eclectic body of sources provides the holistic approach that many have claimed IR research in this field has lacked. Once the sources had been coded under the appropriate sections of the table, the final step was to process the data. This step included assessing, interpreting, and summarizing the coded data to determine the findings of the research. The coming chapter illustrates these processed findings under ‘Results’.





Chapter 3: Results

This chapter illustrates the results of the research carried out on the aforementioned case studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Angola, and Ghana. First, the results are given for each case study's independent variables of state legitimacy, public services, and human rights and the rule of law. Second, the results of the frequency of accusations of witchcraft against urban child and elderly women will be discussed. Finally, a brief conclusory summary of the findings will be given as a closing statement in response to the question of how regime type and regime durability influence the recent shift in victimology in African witch-hunts to urban children and adolescents. All results were obtained from the sources provided in the codified table of data found in the first appendix of this thesis.

3.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo

Variable 1: State Legitimacy

In the DRC, the State in large part lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This is first apparent when analyzing the level of confidence that the Congolese people hold in the State government and its Members of Parliament (MPs). It is clear that the public does not trust or grant the State any form of credibility since little to nothing has been achieved amongst MPs since the DRC's first ever successful elections in 2006. Since the promise of 'trickle-down democracy' has yet to be realized, the Congolese people are turning to informal economic and political systems for sought after immediate gains, effectively undermining the State and its institutions. This lack of rapport between MPs and their constituency and the sudden hyper-development of capitalism has led to chronic criminal engagements within State forces and a preference for the informal on all accounts. The formal image of a functioning framework of democratic governance is nevertheless actively maintained as can be witnessed by the adoption of a new constitution in 2006 that intended to publicly mark the return of legitimate rule of law, executive power, parliament, and separate judiciary to the DRC. However, these intentions did not last long or amount to tangible changes.

This can be seen in the unconstitutional postponement of elections in 2016, as illustrated by the work conducted by the Carter Center, displaying a dictatorial control on power. The DRC has only witnessed two election periods come to fruition throughout its independence, with its remaining history riddled with military *coup d'états*. The first, in 2006, was widely regarded



as free and fair which legitimately put the incumbent President Kabila in power. The second, in 2011, was declared as lacking credibility and exposed old habits of patronage networks and authoritarian procedures that called into question the DRC's democratic commitment. President Kabila nevertheless emerged victorious to serve a second term. As illustrated by Human Rights Watch (HRW), the current refusal of President Kabila to transfer power after having served two terms in office openly threatens the framework of consolidated peace and democracy the DRC has strived to maintain.

The overt disregard for constitutional rights and obligations in the present-day as well as during past election periods has led to political violence and conflict with the public. In 2006, despite the relatively peaceful elections, 23 or 24 (depending on the information source) people were killed by Congolese security forces after conflict broke out after the election results were announced. Again in 2016, 'dozens' of people were killed after protests calling for President Kabila to adhere to the constitutional mandate and step down. Moreover, apart from election violence, many characterize the Congolese State as governed by personal opportunism, equating the government to a predatory regime – typical of competitive authoritarianism to exploit its civilians for direct gains. Thus, the mélange of lack of public confidence, lack of electoral credibility and frequency, and extensive state corruption and oppressive violence against civilians significantly decreases the DRC's state legitimacy in both national and international perspectives.

Variable 2: Public Services

When analyzing the public service domain in the DRC, it is apparent that public services are present and they are semi-functional – however it is not the State who has taken the responsibility for their operations, but community organizations instead. As a result of the State retreating from its public responsibilities, the World Health Organization (WHO) states that community households ultimately filled the vacuum by financing up to 70% (61% as stated by the DRC Ministry of Health) of the functioning of health zones while receiving no involvement in the management of said health services. According the DRC Ministry of Health (MoH), the primary source of finance for the Public Health Sector in 2014 was public households which contributed to 39% of the health sector, with the Public Health Administration contributing 37%. Additionally, the MoH states that since households are the primary financial mechanism, those who fall sick must spend past their capacity, resulting in



the impoverishment of that household. Hence, issues within public health include problems with MoH leadership, funding, human resources, coordination of donor interventions, and health supplies. Despite the increases in the share of government expenditure on public health to 15% in 2014, the majority of costs still remain household responsibilities.

Moreover, due to the retraction of the State from claiming accountability, non-governmental organizations and predominantly religious networks have also assumed the obligation of providing and maintaining education services and organizing the sector. Yet despite the absence of State involvement, both the Ministry of Education (MoE) and UNESCO report that when compared to similarly less-developed African nations, it out-performs its neighbors with a lower percentage of children who have never been to school. The latest primary school enrollment rates from 2013 were at approximately 103% (due to students repeating a grade), and secondary enrollment rates were between 38.3% (MoE) and 52.1% (UNESCO). Literacy rates amongst adults as of 2016 reached 77%. While not completely absent from the funding of the education sector, the State as of 2015 spent between 3.4% (MoE) and 2.29% (World Bank) of its GDP on public education, gradually increasing its expenditure since 2010. These improvements in education are widely acknowledged, and with particular attention to the achievement in girl-child education where the gender parity in primary school has reached perfect equality. Yet, despite these improvements, a distinguishing feature of a failed State is when the government withdraws from the public domain and is unable to provide basic public services such as education and health.

The infrastructure system in the DRC is one of the most challenged in the world, with the spending requirements for improvement amongst the highest in Africa. The usual approximate spending on infrastructure is 10% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – normal for Sub-Saharan African states – but the World Bank reports that the DRC will need to increase this amount to an improbable 75% of its GDP if it wishes to fulfill the recommendations of what its infrastructure ‘needs’. However, as PwC notes, the resource abundance of the DRC attracts significant Foreign Direct Investment for development funding, mainly from Chinese investors. Yet, despite these investments the DRC remains at the bottom of the Human Development Index with a score in 2015 of 176 out of 188 (equating to the 12th worst in the world). This score is reflective of the previous results illustrating that public services in the DRC are neither present, nor functioning in a democratic sense since the state revoked



responsibility and accountability for both the education and health sector effectively negating the existence of public services.

Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Despite the DRC's transition to democracy in 2006, human rights and the rule of law have been continuously violated by State actors, mainly the National Police and National Intelligence Agency. Chronic violations of human rights in the DRC are widely seen to have underlying roots in poor access to basic rights, local power struggles, and corruption on all institutional levels. Despite the State's willingness to improve the status of the situation and increase measures to adhere to (inter)national human rights treaties, the African Union's Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights cites the recurring conflict in the East as serving as a habitual deterrent. Therefore, due to this lack of a framework of rights, the African Union recognizes that harassment and arbitrary arrests of journalists, sexual violence, and media censorship are common characteristics of the Kabila regime. Additionally, Freedom House and the United Nations have recorded instances of civilian casualties, media shut-downs and harassment, and internet/text blockades having become an increasingly frequent occurrence when tensions and conflict arise between civilian and state forces. According to HRW, post-election protests led to 24 civilian casualties in 2006, 42 deaths in 2015 when Kabila first announced his intention to violate his two-term limit, and 66 deaths in 2016 when elections were postponed in addition to three opposition headquarters being set on fire by National Police forces.

Radio is the most accessible medium of information for the public, with more than 450 broadcasting networks in the DRC. Yet, over the years Kabila's regime has been increasing pressure to curb their independence. Whereas the Constitution of the DRC and national law explicitly provide freedoms of speech and press, these freedoms are seldomly upheld. Freedom House highlights that restrictive laws (for example defamation laws) also limit what the press can report and those who are critical or cover controversial topics are subject to harassment, threats, prosecution, or attacks. Furthermore, while improvements are being made by local journalists, they remain poorly trained, minutely paid, and face multiple restraints including corruption, arbitrary prosecutions, and persistent impunity of those committing rights violations. The media in all manifestations is therefore subject to constant oppression, content monitoring, and consequences for publishing criticisms.



A consistent problem that contributes to regular violations of human rights and the rule of law is the lack of accountability mechanisms for the main perpetrators of the Congolese security, police, and military forces. Historical neglect has deprived the DRC judiciary from adequate training, resources, and funding in an attempt to undermine its independence. However, reports by the African Union often emphasize that the DRC recognizes the issues with impunity and has recently been actively working to improve its judicial action against sexual violence to obtain justice for the victim. Yet the issue remains that the military of the DRC (FARDC) is the largest group of perpetrators of offences of sexual violence. HRW additionally notes that army commanders often either do not cease, cannot cease, or join in on the violations of human rights but subsequently deny responsibility for their brigade's actions when confronted. Therefore, the political will to fight impunity and corruption is present, but highly insufficient. Political will is moreover frequently hindered by interferences in judicial matters by the executive or military, leading to further impunity. Slow progress is being made in military judicial systems, however the impunity of high-ranking authorities remains a problem due to Congolese law hindering the prosecution of such authority figures. For example, the appointed judge must be a higher rank than he/she who is being prosecuted, a situation that only happens on rare occasions. Notwithstanding that progress has been made with low-ranking officers, those with higher authority remain untouchable. Regardless of these challenges, survey polls conducted by Vinck et al. highlight that justice and accountability remain viewed as necessary components for consolidating peace by DRC civilians and to be able to address the violated state of human rights and the impunity-prone rule of law currently residing within the DRC.

To briefly recapitulate, the regime type and durability of the DRC was hypothesized to be a failed and collapsed authoritarian regime. The analysis given illustrates that the criteria of State legitimacy, public services, and adherence to human rights and the rule of law are all unfulfilled in the case of the DRC, effectively classifying this case as a failed and collapsed authoritarian regime in accordance with the predicted regime type.

Child Versus Elderly Victims

The amount of urban children victims of witchcraft accusations compared to elderly women has changed over the past 17 and a half years in the DRC. A shift to children as opposed to elderly women as victims began in the 1990s and has taken root in the DRC with the number of cases having accelerated drastically over the decades. In 2009, reports by the UN Office of



the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that the abuse directed against children accused of witchcraft was only increasing, while reports of elderly women being targeted have decreased from public attention. This indicates that there has been a positive increase in the amount of child accusations and subsequent reports on the issue, with either a stagnant or decreasing amount of accusations against elderly women due to lack of reporting on this target group during the same time period.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the number one cause of homelessness amongst youth populations is claimed by Save the Children to be accusations of witchcraft that result in the rejection of the child from the home. Whereas estimates of how many children have been accused of being witches in the DRC vary significantly from sources to source, the majority consensus puts the minimum number of urban child witches in the tens of thousands (approximately 20,000). This is not to state that elderly women are not also victims of witchcraft accusations in contemporary DRC, but the primary target group is identified by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Save the Children, UNICEF, and SOS Children's Villages International as being urban children. Elderly women in the DRC were widely regarded as primary targets before 1990. However, the shift in victimology in this instance occurred simultaneously alongside technological advances and shifts in narratives regarding childhood, making witchcraft abilities more easily transferrable to vulnerable peoples, in this case from the elderly to children. Children are less capable of defending themselves and legally retaliating against their attacker, increasing their vulnerability levels past that of elderly women.

There appears to be little to no clear correlation or pattern between changes in regime durability/type and the shift in victimology. The DRC has witnessed only one regime since 2001, that under President Kabila. The shift in victimology to the urban child witches took place in tandem with emergence of the Kabila regime, which at that point in time was considered democratic, legitimate, and with public confidence. The change occurred during a period of democratic hope by the removal of Mobutu's authoritarian dictatorship. Despite the deterioration of state legitimacy, public services, and accordance with human rights and rule of law over the decades under the incumbent Kabila regime, the emergence and augmenting rate of accusations appears to be occurring independent of changes in regime type/stability. However, given this analysis, the null hypothesis of the shift in victimology to urban children being present can be accepted in accordance with the overall theory in question.



3.2 Central African Republic

Variable 1: State Legitimacy

Legitimacy of the State in the CAR from its citizens has been absent for decades. Since independence, the majority of the CAR's political repertoire reveals a history of military rule, with soldiers coming to power by brute force. This has in turn led to a constant state of political instability, economic uncertainty, and civil distrust of the government. The Bozizé regime¹ displayed a chronic and persistent lack of political will to implement peace agreements, to maintain control over rebel fighters, and to establish proper Disarmament Demobilization and Rehabilitation programs for youth fighters. This negligence not only led to the dismissal of recognition for the regime by regional leaders, but has also damaged the CAR's social fabric to the point where support was no longer viable and cyclical civil war prevailed. Another violent coup took place in 2013, replacing Bozizé with self-proclaimed leader, Djotodia. However, the increasing distance and resistance between the State and its citizens, and its ripple-effect of consequences, resulted in the relinquishment of power by Djotodia due to international pressures and the establishment of the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (RCPCA, 2017–2021). This Plan and resolution for peace was prepared by the CAR Government in collaboration with the United Nations. Three pillars support the peace plan, with the second being the renewal of a social contract between the State and its citizens, illustrating international recognition of the distinct need of the State to regain the confidence of its people.

Despite the disregard for formal methods of power transition, semi-frequent general elections continued to be held in 2005 and again in 2011. Yet, these elections were widely regarded by Freedom House, United Nations, and European Union as significantly fraudulent, exclusionary of opposition parties, and lacking transparency, being deemed neither fair nor free. This dedication to maintaining the appearance of the CAR's democratic framework displays the State's need for international legitimacy, but the simultaneous disregard of democratic practice indicates that this framework only serves as a democratic shell, filled with an incentivized winner-takes-all political culture. Since Djotodia relinquished power and was exiled from the country in 2014, general elections were scheduled and held in December 2015, yet regardless

¹ Bozizé took power in 2003 as a result of a violent *coup-d'état*, and ruled until 2013, when Djotodia took power in yet another violent coup, declaring himself leader.



of the perceived fair and free nature of these elections, the security, social, and economic situations remain volatile.

As previously illustrated, corruption and political violence remain rampant. Since violent coups have taken the place of formal government methods of transition of power, past and present regimes have manufactured a State characterized by institutionalized corruption, omnipresent mistrust, and nepotism. Each coup, coup attempt, and unfulfilled promise of the State stimulates rebellions and subsequent systematic violence against civilians perpetrated by both rebel fighters and State security forces. Hence, humanitarian crises and swathes of human rights violations have proliferated through the nation, often supported indirectly by neighboring military forces and politically by certain Presidents of the Economic Community of Central African States' member states. This support for undemocratic behavior in the CAR further condones undemocratic governance and consequential continued delegitimization of the State. Therefore, it can be deduced that State legitimacy in the CAR is severely lacking in both the national and international arenas due to the absence of a social contract, undemocratic practices of corrupt governance, and systematic political violence against civilians.

Variable 2: Public Services

The first indication of inadequacy of public services is apparent in the inexistence of a functioning Government website for the Central African Republic that provides the general public with information, reports, or other publications by their Ministries, Offices, and Commissions. Additional to this, personal enrichment has taken political priority over the delivery of public services, resulting in decades of neglect. The health system in the CAR is in a deteriorated (often referred to by the WHO as failing) state, owing to frequent looting of supplies, dislocation of human resources, and poor institutional governance. These problems are reflected in the status of public health. Documentation by the United Nations Development Program, WHO, and African Union portray the overall life expectancy to not exceed 45 years of age, with surveys showing that more than 30% of the population does not have access to safe drinking water/food/sanitation, and illustrations of the highest rate of HIV prevalence in its sub-region. It is recognized that the State has made progress (albeit inconsistent) since 1990 in the indicators of the Human Development Index of life expectancy, mean years of schooling, and infant mortality rates. However, this progress when analyzed in proportion to the overall parlous state of the health system, the unabating implementation of a level 3 national



emergency, and decrease in Gross National Income per capita of 39% between 1990 and 2015 render this progress substantially insufficient.

Alongside the health system, the education system also presents strong inadequacies. Political violence and corruption has led to the incapacity to mobilize domestic financial resources, administrative bottlenecks with staff, and blocked supply corridors due to relentless highway robberies. When turning analytical attention to enrollment rates of primary school students, during the latest year of data collection by UNICEF (2014), the enrollment rate reached for both boys and girls was 95%. This percentage then decreases to 24% in lower secondary school. The Education and Policy Data Center (EPCD) often attributes this disparity in transition rates to secondary school to income inequality, where only wealthy families can afford to continue their child's education. Additionally, the primary school completion rate by UNICEF for 2014 was 45% of enrolled students, and similar statistics showed that 68% of men and women between the ages of 15-24 had not completed primary education. This also supports the findings by EPDC that literacy rates amongst males (15+ years) was 49-51%, and amongst females (15+ years) 24-27%. Moreover, donor funding for the education sector reached 74% by the end of 2014, when at the beginning of the year it was estimated that donor contributions would reach no more than 58%, projecting the inability (and perhaps lack of will) of the State to efficiently allocate the proper resources for education with a dependence on donor aid.

The final sector under analysis of infrastructure also suffers from the consequences of chronic conflict, persistent instability, and a weakly institutionalized State. According to WHO and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports, vandalism and looting of State and donor provisions remains a serious challenge, with extreme poverty driving citizens to commit these destructive crimes. Moreover, the frequent forceful changes in government administrations often compels those leaving office to destroy State owned documents, buildings, and property, leaving the new administration stripped of any and all provisions down to basic office supplies. The self-preservationist characteristics of CAR regimes has left the State constantly inheriting degraded institutions, infrastructure, and public service systems, incapable of repairing or even maintaining these structures. Thus, it can be deduced that public services and systems are neither effectively present, nor functioning in the CAR.



Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Throughout the twenty-first century, State as well as non-State actors have violated human rights and the rule of law in the Central African Republic. During and post- *coup d'état* attempts, indiscriminate violence towards civilians would intensify into gross violations of human rights constituting torture, rape, extrajudicial killings, and recruitment of child soldiers. Yet, physical assaults are not the only rights violation, since the pillaging of villages during civil turbulence causes irreparable damage to personal properties. The UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) states that this deprives citizens of their fundamental economic and social rights, causing internal displacement of peoples and furthermore denying them their right to live in dignity. By mid 2017, the OCHA, UNICEF, and World Food Programme (WFP) estimated that approximately a quarter (23%) of the population was either internally or externally displaced, with 50% in need of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the United Nations publicized evidence in 2014 that suggested that both rebel and State forces violated international humanitarian law by engaging in crimes against humanity, demonstrating failure on all fronts to protect the citizens under the constitution of the Central African Republic.

Additionally, civil rights to speech and information are habitually infringed upon; Freedom House has reported numerous cases of total media blackouts that lasted for days, curfews set on radio broadcasts, and ceasing of newspaper publications causing presses to fall silent. This does not entail, however, that laws and decrees protecting freedom of the media have not been present in regimes over the past two decades. The 2005 Constitution of the Central African Republic, the Press Law that granted freedom of expression, and organizations like the High Communications Council are all examples of where private and public media had equal representation. Yet, as consequence of constant political instability, such efforts have been erected and demolished with the relentless revolving door of Presidential Administrations over the past few decades. Harassment and intimidation of journalists who report critically on the incumbent regime is not uncommon, but the looting of radio stations and press locations is a more frequent occurrence than violence against journalists.

The collapse of the judicial apparatus, rendering it existing but extremely fragile, signaled to many that impunity was a given and anything could be done to anyone without any lasting legal repercussions. The inability of the State to curtail incessant societal conflict, mob violence, and numerous prison breaks additionally fuels impunity and illustrates the collapsed



state of the judicial system as acknowledged by HRW, the OHCHR, and WHO. However, as part of the peace agreement reached in 2016 between the Government and the United Nations, the State did create a hybrid court (the Bangui Special Criminal Court) in an attempt to counter the rampant impunity and promote justice to serve the people of CAR. As opposed to zero criminal trials being held between 2009 and 2014, the month of August 26 - September 26 of 2016 witnessed 55 cases brought to and held in court as observed by HRW. Additionally, the State also requested that the International Criminal Court look into violations and open investigations regarding crimes that took place since 2012. Whereas these progressions are a start, 55 cases is a diminutive number in proportion to the violations of human rights and the rule of law that occur on a daily basis, with the vast majority continuing to go unpunished. Therefore, the political, civil, and economic rights of the CAR's citizens are not upheld with rampant impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes remaining a rife issue for State forces that has yet to be resolved.

To briefly recapitulate, the regime type and durability of the CAR was hypothesized to be a failed and collapsed authoritarian regime. The analysis given illustrates that the criteria of state legitimacy, public services, and adherence to human rights and the rule of law are all unfulfilled in the case of the CAR, effectively classifying this case as a failed and collapsed authoritarian regime in accordance with the predicted regime type.

Child Versus Elderly Victims

The amount of urban child victims of witchcraft accusations compared to elderly women has changed over the past 17 and a half years in the CAR. However, this change has been merely a slight increase in the number of urban children since approximately 2009, with the majority of victims being women. Whereas it is often noted in UNICEF reports that the CAR is an example of an African state where children are victims, children do not comprise the primary target group. Witchcraft in the CAR is regarded by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, UNHCR, and OHCHR to be a gendered human rights issue that effects mostly females who are disabled, poor, and elderly. Numerical data on the number of accusations against women or children is unavailable, since most reports disregard variances in victimology and provide only aggregate totals. However, numbers of accusations illustrated



per year in different reports equate the total to have accumulated to being at a minimum of in the thousands over the past 17 and a half years, with the majority being adult women².

There appears to be no clear pattern or correlation between changes in regime type/durability and changes the amount of urban child victims in the CAR. The CAR has witnessed a continuous cycle of instability and endless *coup d'états* for decades, with child-witch accusations emerging approximately around 2009, in the middle of Bozizé's decade long rule that lacked any State capacity and capability, not an uncommon characteristic for CAR regimes. This emergence is neither large enough to classify as a shift in victimology from elderly women to urban children, nor has the amount of cases against urban children increased with the degradation of the political, social, and economic situation in the CAR since its emergence. Thus it can be deduced that there is no clear pattern or correlation between regime type/stability and the amount of urban child victims in the case of the CAR. This conclusion therefore rejects the null hypothesis which stated that the victimization of urban children over elderly women is present since the CAR is a failed/collapsed state, not in accordance with the theory in question.

² For example, between 2010-2011 alone, 400 victims were reported by the UNHRC.



3.3 Republic of Angola

Variable 1: State Legitimacy

The deterioration of state legitimacy in Angola in combination with a restless population is what brought about regime change for the first time in 25 years, as of late 2017. Research conducted by the Christian Michelson Institute emphasized that the dos Santos regime held the belief that it won the elections in 1992 fairly and freely, thus granting it the right to rule indefinitely, regardless of shifts in popular opinion over time. To deflect attention from increasingly disaffected and restless civic societies, the post-Soviet trained President, dos Santos, often resorted to Stalin-inspired forms of propaganda to quiet the dissenting voices. Having been in power for decades, the robust dos Santos regime was widely recognized as a highly durable neopatrimonial regime, where the State's rent-management architecture consistently reinforced the regime's stability. Since 2002, the dos Santos regime began to consolidate its political power while exerting increasing control and authority over the entirety of its territory. However the centralization of power and handouts to those in favor of the single-party regime took priority over legitimization through inclusive governance and State development. This failure to provide socio-economic prospects is what ultimately broke the durable dos Santos regime in 2017; having been in power for 25 years under personal-rule of neopatrimonialism, research by the International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR) states that the dos Santos regime's stagnated economy, dependence on oil, and lack of economic diversification frustrated the growing urban youth populations who continued to be marginalized.

The limited version of democracy that did not influence the established role of regime power present in the dos Santos regime (that held regular general elections) was not threatened by a change in power at the hands of the people. The 2008 elections were largely deemed free and fair by independent observers, and the 2012 slightly more ambiguous. Yet, nevertheless the dos Santos regime emerged as the victor in both instances, further boosting the regime's official legitimacy. The elections in 2017 witnessed a transfer of power, but still to within the same MLPA party, from dos Santos to his Vice President, João Lourenço. Despite accusations that the election was fraudulent, the decision by dos Santos to voluntarily step down was a deliberate move on behalf MLPA party to silence critics of the regime since criticisms largely targeted dos Santos himself, not the party he represented. The court eventually ruled the 2017 elections results official. Therefore, the combination of holding frequent general elections,



peaceful transfers of power, and abiding by court proceedings on accusations of fraud supports that the State in Angola legitimately upholds a democratic framework, but the means of which this is accomplished is under neopatrimonial behavior and practices.

While elections tend to abide by democratic standing, the means by which the government handles civic unrest is often reported by HRW, Christian Michelson Institute, and IFHR as utilizing excessive force, arbitrary arrests, and violent intimidation. Many instances of national security or police forces wearing civilian clothing have been reported to systematically threaten and attack anti-government protestors in public and their private residences. Additional to civilian oppression, corruption is an active characteristic of the Angolan State. Angola in 2015 was rated at 161 out of 175 on the Corruption Perceptions Index, allocating it in the top twenty most corrupt in the world. The “missing millions” is another internationally known example, with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other Bretton Woods institutions all concerned about the mismanagement of oil/diamond revenue which has led millions of US\$ to go unaccounted for. Yet, despite State corruption, oppression, and government centralization, the Angolan system of patronage has not turned predatory, which is often the case with oil-producing states.

Variable 2: Public Services

Since the 27 year-long Angolan civil war ended in 2002, the health system and infrastructure has never quite recovered from the destruction and looting. Post-civil war health systems also witnessed large contributions from Angolan churches, particularly in rural areas. The 2015 report by the WHO showed that 36% of the population lives without access to the basic public services of clean water, hygiene facilities, health systems, or education. The Ministry of Health (MoH) provides higher percentages however, with 58% of the population not having access to healthy drinking water, and 47% not having proper sanitation facilities. Both sources however confirm that life expectancy is 51 years of age, with 15-29% of children under the age of five being acutely malnourished. According to the MoH, weaknesses in the health system include untrained staff, poor management, weak supply of water and energy to health centers and the general public, and poor response to health detriments. These are confirmed by the WHO. The State additionally prioritizes resource extraction and the maintenance of legitimacy over public service delivery and adherence to a social contract with its citizens.



When analyzing the education sector, Angola is often viewed as a country with a low ‘education for all’ status, ranking as the 9th lowest in 2012. However, the State has been making progress, as shown by the increase in gross enrollment in primary and secondary school in a two-year period, from 13.2% in 2014 to 97.5% in 2016. Additionally, according to the Angolan Ministry of Education (MoE), the primary school completion rates in 2011 (the most recent year of data collection) reached 57.1%, whereas the World Bank stated it to be 50%. This illustrates that Angola has yet to reach universal primary education, with the completion rates representative of below average scores for Sub-Saharan nations. Moreover, the rates of illiteracy amongst Angolans as of 2010 (again, most recent estimates) reached a general rate (15+ years) of 34% according to the MoE, and rates of 44% (male 80% and female 53%) in 2014 according to the World Bank. Moreover, the State expenditure as a percentage of GDP on the education sector in 2010 was 3.5%, below the average of 3.8% for the region.

The civil war in Angola severely damaged and deteriorated the majority of the transport infrastructure, with the last few decades witnessing large improvements in this sector, often financed by Chinese credit loans and investments. Yet, in the first decade of dos Santo’s regime, over 30% of total public investment went to rehabilitating transport infrastructure, making Angola the highest paying State on road infrastructure in Africa. Between 2009 and 2011, the State began investing more into public service delivery and infrastructure, financing a ‘significant increase’ in the number of public service institutions. However, budget oversight for infrastructure projects is usually non-existent and the rebuilding of infrastructure was not carried out with the population’s needs taken into account. Moreover, Corporate Social Responsibility programs, which by law require corporations to re-invest a percentage of their profits into social service delivery projects, are largely in charge of rebuilding the education and health systems. Some attribute this significant contribution by corporations as being due to the ‘incompetence’ problem amongst Angolan authorities. Therefore, public services are only partially present and only partially functional, with significant improvement needed.

Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Human rights as enshrined within the constitution are upheld to a selective extent by the Angolan State, while the rule of law encompassed by an existing judicial system is often subject to government interference that consequently undermines its efficiency in practice. According to the African Union, Angola is a lawful democratic state, with a constitution for the benefit of



the people. However, research from the IFHR shows that State forces often deliberately hinder, disband, or restrict civil society organizations in fear of a retaliation en masse, a possibility frequently demonstrated through civilian anti-government protests. Regardless, Angola has publicly committed itself to almost all international human rights treaties and international legal instruments, additionally having signed the Maputo Protocol, which takes into account the effective realization of all civil, political, social, and economic rights of all Angolans enforced by the national legal system and international legal instruments. Nevertheless, despite these efforts, HRW reports that police brutality and excessive use of force remain familiar occurrences to many in urban settings where demands for bribes, extortion, and confiscations of property are a common event. Political violence continues to take place even if demonstrations and protests are properly reported to authorities beforehand, carried out by security forces dressed as civilians. Moreover, a lack of updated and disaggregated statistical data hampers the efforts of independent monitoring organizations to reform the social and economic rights practices of the State.

The freedom of the press and speech are also valid rights under the Angolan constitution. However, the State employs several laws, stipulations, and strategies to circumvent full recognition of these rights. For example, an analysis by the Christian Michelson Institute revealed Angolan law restricts access to certain controversial information and events by deeming it classified information; in 2010 parliament passed a law allowing the arrest of anyone who insults the Republic of Angola; and buy-outs by the State of advertisers in local media and poor pay of journalists often influence the income of local journalists generally resulting in self-censorship. Freedom House, HRW, and IFHR claim that both State and private owned media sources are dependent on the regime, with the Internet having become a safe platform for expressing criticism of the regime, despite the limited reach outside of urban areas. Additionally, small independent media sources such as weeklies do exist, but their reach is limited, with only one major independent media source remaining open and circulating as of 2015. However, those who partake in the harassment, threat, and restriction of freedoms of journalists often receive impunity for their violations of these rights.

To ensure the fulfillment of the people's rights, the African Union has commemorated and documented the establishment of a multitude of judicial organs that administer justice in adherence to the Angolan Democratic State and the Rule of Law. These organs include the Courts (sovereign bodies serving justice for the people), the Office of the Ombudsman for



Justice (an independent public institution that ensures that rights, state judiciary practices, and public administration operate within the law), and the Office of the Attorney General (a State body that upholds the law with jurisdictional power and represents the State). Whereas these judicial systems and structural reforms are committed to the promotion and protection of human rights to consolidate peace and democracy, the practicality of these commitments have yet to be upheld. According to IFHR this is due to insufficient material and human resources that hinder and delay the deliverance of justice, consequently resulting in instances of impunity. Thus, commitment to and the establishment of judicial bodies and institutions to uphold the rule of law and monitor human rights is present in Angola, however the means to implement these systems are ineffectively weak and underdeveloped. Ultimately, human rights and the rule of law are in not upheld in practice.

To briefly recapitulate, the regime type and durability of Angola was hypothesized to be a anocracy, or semi-democratic regime. The analysis given illustrates that the criteria of State legitimacy is partially fulfilled, public services partially fulfilled, and adherence to human rights and the rule of law are unfulfilled in the case of Angola, effectively classifying this case as an anocracy, or semi-democratic regime in accordance with the predicted regime type.

Child Versus Elderly Victims

The amount of urban child victims of witchcraft accusations compared to elderly women has changed over the past 17 and a half years in Angola. Children began becoming victims of witchcraft in the late 1990s, with the increase in frequency over other target groups as early as 2008 having been noted by UNICEF and OHCHR as having become a normalized part of societal discourse. Numerical approximations of how many urban children have been victimized by witchcraft accusations in Angola is unavailable, however the amount of street children in urban areas are estimated to be in the thousands, with the majority of these children according to SOS Children's Villages International having been cast out of family homes due to witchcraft allegations. This shift in victimology has been described by the UNHCR as being epidemic, rampant, and a surge similar to what has been witnessed in the DRC. This phenomenon is most prevalent in urban capitals of various Angolan provinces, where street children are numerous. Urban children are said to be the main victims of such abuses, however elderly women are still regarded as the traditional victims and continue to be vulnerable targets,



but to a lesser extent than urban children. A clear shift in victimology from elderly women to urban children has therefore been established.

There appears to be no clear pattern or correlation between changes in regime type/durability and changes the amount of urban child victims in Angola. Since the early 1990s, when the dos Santos regime first took power until late 2017, the durable yet anocratic regime maintained a weak and fragile status, with shifts in victimology taking place regardless of consistency in regime type. This therefore equates to a lack of a clear pattern or correlation between regime type/stability and the amount of urban child victims in the case of Angola. The evidence provided therefore rejects the null hypothesis which stated that the victimization of urban children over elderly women is not present since Angola is classified as a semi-democracy. Due to the presence of a shift in victimology, this conclusion is not in accordance with the theory in question.



3.4 Republic of Ghana

Variable 1: State Legitimacy

Ghanaians perceive liberal democracy as the only acceptable form of governance and their dedication to democracy is what has largely contributed to its effective consolidation. Elites within the Ghanaian government have acknowledged that the most efficient and least costly manner of gaining political power is through democratic elections. A strong and dispersed dedication to maintaining peace and unity throughout Ghanaian society by regional leaders and religious figures has consequently fortified democratic behavior amongst civil society and government forces alike. Yet, since political power and all of its accompanying benefits are only obtainable through general elections, this has resulted in a proliferation of non-democratic practices such as vote-buying, defamation campaigns, and money politics. Nevertheless, the confidence in democracy emanating from both external (the Courts) and internal (the Church) bodies is what has significantly contributed to Ghana's political stability, durability, and ultimately the State's legitimacy on various accounts.

Ghana has had seven legitimate elections since the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1993, and three democratic changes from incumbent to opposition ruling party – therefore resulting in Ghana having successfully passed the two-turn test (TTT) of democracy, confirming Ghana's democratic consolidation. According to Afrobarometer survey results, political parties have equal opportunities to pursue votes within a relatively equal playing field. This ensures that election debates are mainly issue-based, translating into free and fair elections. However, civilian exit polls illustrated doubt concerning ballot secrecy. This is because campaign-strategies include convincing citizens that their ballots are not anonymous, creating obligatory sentiments amongst the public to carry out the reciprocation of vote-buying. While this clouds the elections' full transparency, an absence of legal accusations of fraudulence and the ability of civil society to holistically monitor the entire election attests to the confirmation that Ghana has witnessed successful free, fair, and transparent multi-party elections since 1993.

Yet despite Ghana's reputation as a democratic State, Afrobarometer results illustrate how accusations of narcotics trafficking, superfluous personal spending, and vote-buying have gained international attention and challenged its legitimacy. Additionally, the issue of corruption within the governing elites, judiciary, and bureaucracy of the acceptance of bribes



has increased the attention and monitoring of Ghana's Government practices. However, anti-corruption measures are often a large issue presented within campaign agendas, as was the case in the 2016 elections, where corruption and incompetency were overtly discussed. Post-elections, the defeated party openly testified to the legitimacy, credibility, in integrity of the victor and opposition party with confidence that the new Ghanaian Administration could root out corruption in the future. Despite ideological divergences, often the values and principles underlying both major parties converge on the topic of combatting corruption. Therefore, it has been demonstrated that the State holds the confidence and legitimacy of both the Ghanaian people and the international community by means of legitimate elections and public dedication to anti-corruption campaigns.

Variable 2: Public Services

The Ghanaian State's public services are present and functioning at a general capacity, with recognized room for improvement in reports by the Ghanaian Health Service. Public health services are most prominent and functional in urban areas, with peripheral rural provinces and urban-slum communities being marginalized and thus having fewer and poorer quality health facilities, and limited access to resources. The Ghana Health Service, UNICEF, and the United Nations recognize that the inefficiency of Ghana's health sector is further hampered by the mal-distribution of resources and limited funding, brain drain in specialized health staff, and centralized decision making. Moreover, the disease profile of Ghana portrays the highest threats to be predominantly communicable diseases, pregnancy conditions, and under-nutrition. Life expectancy at birth is 57.5 years of age, with the rate of mother-to-child transmissions of HIV/AIDS having declined significantly from 31% in 2009, to 7% in 2012, and remaining static at this level since. Where the Ghanaian Ministry of Health states that the allocation of funding to the health sector in 2014 (the most recent year of publications) has been admittedly lower than in previous statements, the overall commitment of the government to replenishing the depleted health sector has been increasing since 2010. Yet, other data provided by the World Bank and the UNHDP illustrates a decrease.

However, the expenditure on the education sector as a percentage of GDP has been reported by both the Ghanaian Ministry of Education and the PwC to have been at 8.2%, higher than other developing countries such as Kenya or South Africa. Moreover, in 2016 the net enrollment rate for primary school was 87% for males, and 88% for females. UNICEF states



the rate of survival from primary to secondary school as estimated between 2008-2012 to have been 72.2% of enrolled students. Data from 2016 shows that the survival rate of 2016 to have been 62%, making net enrollment rates for secondary school in 2016 54% for both males and females. The percentage of the population without an education according the Ghana Health Service has been decreasing steadily since 2003, encompassing 9.4% of males and 19.1% of females as of 2014. Finally, the literacy rates for the most recent year of 2010 was (15+ years) 78% for males and 65% for females.

The provision of Ghanaian infrastructure and transport sectors, according to research by the Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC), are dominated by the State who holds a monopoly on rail and water transport. Additionally, Ghana is the main hub for international air traffic into the rest of Africa. Ghana's investor attractiveness is significantly carried by the State's political stability, economic liberalism, and civil liberties that signal to investors that their interests and rights will be protected. However, the GIPC acknowledges that issues in the security sector remain a problem, with robberies and vandalism on the rise, raising concerns of investors. Ghana is undergoing an economic transition from agriculture-based production to an industry based on service delivery. Thus, the weakness of Ghana's customs' infrastructure of timeliness in tracking and tracing need to be addressed. However, unlike many African states, PwC and UNDP reports illustrate how the infrastructure network in Ghana spans the entire nation (albeit with greatest concentration of improvement in the South/West). Consequently, in comparison with other low-income African states, Ghana maintains an advanced infrastructural platform, yet the closer Ghana reaches to obtaining a middle-income status, the more fragile and weak their current structure appears in comparison with the new standing. Nevertheless, for their current standing, public services provided by the State are present and functioning in all sectors of the health, education, and infrastructure systems.

Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Afrobarometer research has shown that Ghanaian citizens display strong support for adherence to the rule of law and the accompanying human rights laws, with no exemption for State officials. Yet despite this unwavering support, reports by PwC and Amnesty International state that violations of human rights continue in Ghana. Poorly protected property rights are a result of corruption, the shackling of mental health patients is due to lack of mental health facilities, and discrimination against the LGBTI community portrays the weaknesses in the State's ability



to uphold human rights. However, the avid promotion and protection of civil liberties contributes to Ghana's status as least corrupt in the region, with survey results expressing the views of the public that the government must obey the law, and therefore citizens must obey the government. While there are sporadic reports of police brutality, negligence, and corruption, there is little evidence that State forces regularly violate the civil, economic, and political rights of the Ghanaian people.

There have been instances recorded by Freedom House, however, when State forces did limit the freedom of speech and information during election periods by confiscating journalists' equipment, limiting coverage of certain events, and selective violence against journalists. Ghana is usually viewed as having the most free environment for journalists and the media within Africa; however an incident in 2015 involving the death of a journalist exposed the tensions around the upcoming 2016 elections, instigating State-led attempts at media censorship and violence against journalists for the first time since 2000. Moreover, there are hundreds of television and radio news stations, with the majority being either private, community, or university owned, supporting that there are a multitude of independent media sources in Ghana. Yet, as the Ghana Integrity Initiative acknowledges, from the three pillars of open governance – citizen-centric services, transparent government, and innovation facilitation – the second pillar of transparency performs the weakest because of an absence of a Freedom of Information Law. Therefore, it is apparent that the environment in Ghana is one of general respect for human rights and civil liberties, however, violence against citizens and violations of these rights can occur under situations of political tension.

Alongside the strong support for human rights and the rule of law by Ghanaian citizens, additional Afrobarometer research shows that it has become engrained in the civic culture that the only legitimate ways of settling disputes is by the official avenues of the courts system. Mob-justice is widely rejected by the public and political vigilantes who target opposition party supporters should be held responsible for their crimes, regardless of their party allegiance. However, the Ghanaian Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection states that the current institutional framework is weak in effectively providing gender protection for harmful practices against women, and serving them justice when such practices occur. Nevertheless, after the incumbent NPP Administration's first few months in power, 53% of the general public regarded the government as performing fairly/very well. However, there is a growing sentiment amongst Ghanaians that the rule of law, upheld as it should be, is applied unequally, with



increasing impunity for State officials and the wealthy upper-class. While the government has taken strides to combat unlawful influence of status, international actors such as the US Department of State claim that impunity remains a problem with high-profile officials. Thus, as demonstrated, the rule of law and the upholding of human rights is engrained in the civic, political, and economic cultures of Ghanaian society, however it is recognized by both that national and international community that improvements can be made in institutional practices.

To briefly recapitulate, the regime type and durability of the Republic of Ghana was hypothesized to be a democracy. The analysis given illustrates that the criteria of State legitimacy, public services, and adherence to human rights and the rule of law are all fulfilled in the case of the Republic of Ghana, effectively classifying this case as a democracy, in accordance with the predicted regime type.

Child Versus Elderly Victims

The amount of urban child victims of witchcraft accusations compared to elderly women has changed over the past 17 and a half years in Ghana. The amount of child witchcraft accusations has increased over the period of this analysis, however, elderly women remain the primary victims who are banished to ‘witch camps’ on the fringes of society. Approximations vary per source, however the general consensus verifies that for every estimated 1.5 women in the witch camps throughout Ghana, there is 1 child. These figures often are reflected in numbers of 800 women and 500 children, or 1,000 women and 700 children, as portrayed in reports by SOS Children’s Villages International, United Kingdom Home Office, and ActionAid. However, this large population of children in these witch camps is often reported by UNICEF to be a result of either family members of elderly residents offering up a child as a care-giver, or sometimes when the child’s primary guardian was the accused and is banished alongside the elder. Thus the increasing amount of ostracized children is not a direct result of witchcraft accusations, but more of a parallel effect of the increase in accusations against elderly women. The victims therefore appear to be disproportionately elderly women in Ghana.

There appears to be no clear pattern or correlation between changes in regime type/durability and changes the amount of urban child victims in Ghana. Ghana has witnessed several successful democratic turnovers of power, multiple Presidential administrations, and a durable democratic civic and political culture over the past 17 and a half years. Despite a stagnantly



stable regime, the rate of witchcraft accusations increased over this period against elderly women and consequently urban children. This therefore equates to a lack of a clear pattern or correlation between regime type/stability and the amount of urban child victims in the case of Ghana. The evidence provided is therefore in accordance with the null hypothesis which stated that the victimization of urban children over elderly women is not present since Ghana is classified as a democracy, a conclusion that is also in accordance with the theory in question.



Chapter 4: Discussion

This chapter contains a closing discussion of the research presented in this thesis. Two sections are presented, with the first engaging in a critical examination of the methodology used as explained in the second chapter in tandem with speculations as to how said criticisms could have influenced the results provided. The second section determines this research's contribution to the academic community and discusses how the conclusions drawn from this thesis can benefit both academic and policy realms in practice.

Despite the efforts made to reduce exogenous influences on the results as outlined in the second chapter, there are however certain factors when carrying out the assigned methodology that inevitably contributed to the outcome of this research – namely data availability, coding selection process, and criteria selection. Starting first with data availability, whereas there was an abundance of information regarding the determined criteria for gauging regime type and stability, the data needed to determine the presence or absence of the dependent variable (shift in victimology) was significantly deficient. This is often due to underreporting of incidents and cases of accusations, limited and sporadic publications due to either security or resource issues, and a general lack of awareness of this issue hindering further academic and policy research. Despite that a large portion of the data was able to be obtained from legitimate sources, such as NGO field reports, United Nations statements, and annual government reports, the data continues to only represent limited and incomplete information, inescapably constraining the ability to produce exact outcomes. The overall unavailability of concrete, quantitative, and periodically reported data could have influenced the results by unavoidably formulating the conclusions as being founded on estimations, approximations, and inferences.

Second, selection coding was utilized to efficiently allocate appropriate evidence, both supportive and contradictory to the theory under scrutiny, as a way of filtering and condensing the mass amount of data to assist in effective research processing. However, by means of extracting only partial data from available sources, it can be criticized that a selection bias has taken place in accordance with the ordinal characteristics under analysis. By focusing on a pre-determined set of criteria, alternative information and evidence can be unintentionally disregarded and not properly represented. It could be additionally argued that the selective coding ignored alternative possible criteria of regime type and durability that would otherwise have resulted in differing classifications and subsequently in differing overall results.



Nevertheless, given the limitations of this thesis in comparison to the amount of data collected to ensure a comprehensive and unbiased accumulation of evidence, the possible absence and under-representation of data was unavoidable under the chosen design type.

Thirdly, the criteria selected to classify a case study's regime type and durability as discussed in the second chapter were mainly Western concepts of development, democracy, and durability. Despite the reasoning that these variables were used to parallel those widely utilized in academic and policy works (both Western and non), criticisms could nevertheless be made that keeping with this Western paradigm consequently influenced the resulting classification of regime type to ultimately corresponding with that which was predicted. African states span a wide and colorful spectrum of regime types, with hybrids being a common occurrence. Therefore, the adherence to a dichotomized spectrum of regime types and durability (democratic versus non, durable versus fragile) as has been done in this study could misrepresent the true typology of the regime in question in practice, further prompting criticism of the validity and accuracy of the conclusions drawn here. Moreover, the amount of variables under analysis – four main variables, with each main variable containing three sub-variables, equating to a total of twelve variables per case study – could be criticized as being unfeasible and too extensive, causing superficial coverage of each variable. Hence, additional to the research completed here, a within-case study (a more in-depth analysis of a single case) of either the CAR or Angola³ is recommended to provide further valuable academic insight into cases where either witchcraft accusations of urban children are expected but did not occur, or where accusations were not expected but were present nevertheless.

The findings presented in this thesis contribute not only to informing the academic arena on new developments on the issue, but simultaneously to informing the policy arena in International Relations (IR) as well. Starting with academia, this thesis' main contribution is the falsification of the previously accepted theory that State failure and collapse was a necessary condition for the shift in witchcraft victimology from elderly women to urban children. Since the Central African Republic as a failed and collapsed authoritarian State did not possess a shift in victimology, and Angola as an anocratic semi-democracy did, it can be deduced that this theory is invalid. Moreover, the finding that regime type and durability does

³ The results of these cases refuted the theory in question, prompting further research into these two cases in particular.



not play a necessary role in the shift in victimology allows future scholarly work to refocus its analytical lens on conditions that practically influence this phenomenon. By tightening the parameters of applicable alternative influences (poverty, predacious religious practices, evolving narratives of children, etc.), further academic endeavors will be more capable of accurately identifying a concrete set of causal factors of the shift in witchcraft victimology. Therefore, this research is relevant to academia because its findings will not only improve the accuracy, scope, and focus of future research on this topic, but also indicates that further research must be done to discover the true necessary conditions that produce this phenomenon in order to fully understand its manifestation in African societies.

These findings are also highly relevant for policy makers and IR in practice. Occult policies, legislation, and rehabilitation mechanisms that offer human rights protection against witchcraft abuses have remained an ineffective and unrealized issue within the political arena in the majority of African states. The findings of this thesis illustrate that this problem is not one restricted by regime type or bound to the territory under its control. Since this issue is not tethered to the characteristic of political (in)stability, the pursuance of democracy as a solution is no longer applicable, and therefore other means of combatting this phenomenon need to be considered. The parameter of failure once thought to contain this surge in occult abuses narrowed the scope of the search for this phenomenon, but since the scope has now been expanded to incorporate potentially any state, widespread preventative measures and awareness campaigns are more important than ever to stop the abuse and neglect.





Chapter 5: Conclusion

In conclusion, a phenomenon has emerged that threatens the lives of future African generations every day. A shift in victimology of witchcraft accusations from elderly women to urban children began to appear in the 1990s, captivating academic attention. Throughout the years of research, a theory developed stating that only collapsed or failed states engulfed by existential crisis or conflict bore witness to this phenomenon, making a failed/collapsed regime a necessary component to its existence. However, in early 2017, a study by Steve Snow on Nigerian ‘witch-busters’ (religious leaders who identify and reveal witches living within society) uncovered a contradiction to this theory. Nigeria, a weak but not failed state, was witnessing its own shift in victimology of witchcraft accusations. This provoked the scholarly need to test this dominant theory which subsequently prompted the question under analysis in this thesis of how regime type and regime durability influence the recent shift in victimology in African witch-hunts to urban children and adolescents.

The results of the case studies chosen concluded in a variety of outcomes, not all of which were in accordance with the main theory in question. Out of the four case studies examined, two were in accordance with the existing theory: the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Ghana. The results of the DRC case study classified its State as a failed/collapsed authoritarian regime, where a shift in victimology was present. The results of the Ghanaian case study classified its State as a liberal democracy with an absence of a shift in victimology. Yet, two case studies rejected the existing theory, with the Central African Republic classified as a failed/collapsed authoritarian state with an absence of a shift in victimology, and Angola being an anocratic semi-democracy with a shift in victimology present. Since not only one, but two cases analyzed rejected the previously assumed theory, it is evident that these results ultimately refute the validity of the theory that this research aimed to test. Therefore, it can be definitively concluded that a collapsed and failed regime is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the shift in victimology of witchcraft accusations from elderly women to urban children.

The research conducted here and the resulting theoretical falsification consequently call into question for the first time the presumptions of what the academic community thought it understood about the basic parameters of witchcraft accusations in African societies. This research therefore contributes to the academia on African witchcraft victimology by taking



away the false rudimentary framework that has inadvertently misguided the majority of contemporary research on this subject regarding the simple questions of when (durability of the regime) and where (type of regime) shifts in witchcraft victimology occur. With this more accurate perception that regime type and durability in reality hold a non-influential status, future research will no longer be conducted within these factors of limitation and can dedicate further efforts to identifying more explicit factors conducive to shifts in witchcraft victimology. In conclusion, the innovations and results drawn from the aforementioned analysis ultimately produce a need for scholars to re-analyze and rethink what has already been researched, with the knowledge that African witchcraft belief systems and practices are neither determined nor bound by the incumbent regime and the territory under its domain.







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1. Appendix: Table of Independent Variables

This appendix contains the collected and coded data for each case study that was analyzed and processed to conduct this research. First, the three main criteria and sub-criteria of regime type/durability (or independent variables) for each case study are presented in individual tables. Second, a table wherein data regarding child versus elderly women witchcraft accusations is presented for each case study.

1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

(Hypothesized Regime Type: Failed/Collapsed)

Null Hypothesis: Victimization of urban children is present.

Variable 1: State Legitimacy

1a. Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?

- “The Congolese narratives argue that the West does not want the Congo to be democratic and independent, and that western partners seek to maintain control over the country through trade, war and aid.” (de Goede 108).
- “By pointing to the West as the cause for the failures of the Congolese attempts to democratise and stabilise the country, the Congolese present themselves as being without agency as well.” (de Goede 108).
- “The outer framework of democracy is being constructed, but the inner workings of these institutions that depend on political subjectivities are being left untouched.” (de Goede 109).
- “The concept of a shell institution is therefore unfortunate, because it easily leads us to think of these newly formed state institutions as being empty shells, a framework on paper, a building, a budget, but little substance.” (de Goede 110).
- “Below the institutional level of these empty shells reside local agencies that shape hybridity. This is a site of struggle, a site of resistance, and a site of consumption.” (de Goede 110).
- “The framing of voter-MP relations in paternalistic terms and the subsequential emphasis on clientelist practices of accountability stresses a tension between formal and informal practices of accountability.” (de Goede 125).
- “...it is not merely political elites that prefer a weakly institutionalised state, civil society and the population in general often actively evade and undermine the state too.” (de Goede 126).
- “The implicit argument of these studies is that the choice to opt for the informal instead of the formal is due to the failure of the formal.” (de Goede 126).
- “The centralisation of governance and the bureaucracy of the process paralyses a response from the authorities concerned, and the net effect is that little to nothing is being achieved through the formal procedures of MPs constituency work.” (de Goede 128).
- “The failing practice of formalised constituency work and the inability to actually bring MPs and their electorate together in a meaningful discussion shows there is a lack of formalised rapport between MPs and their constituency.” (de Goede 128).
- “Instead of seeking to be better informed, or to better inform the public about parliamentary actions, and instead of striving to make formal procedures respond better to the needs of the general public,



both electorate and MPs prefer to resort to the informal, thus continuing these informal practices in parallel to the new and ill-functioning practices of democratic governance and democratic representation.” (de Goede 128-129).

- “These informal practices then substitute the formal procedures because they deliver what the formal practices fail to deliver... The formal procedures are nevertheless nominally maintained to keep up the infrastructural and institutional framework of democratic governance.” (de Goede 129).

- “But mutual preference does not lie in the improvement of formal relations and state-society relations, nor in the improvement of formal procedures and practices, or in state building.” (de Goede 129).

- “What both MPs and electorate pursue is an informal and personal relation of direct redistribution and direct political gain.” (de Goede 129).

- “What we see here are local convivial agencies that avoid formal democratic procedures to maintain informal practices within the framework of democratic governance and democratic representation.” (de Goede 129).

- “In other words, they expected that democracy would mean more redistribution, the trickling down of wealth to their communities. However, they complain that they see little of their MPs after the election campaign, and that little to nothing is being delivered.” (de Goede 130).

- “In the Congo it is generally assumed that MPs are more concerned with their own interests than with those of their electorate or the general population. MPs themselves are aware that they can indeed not live up to the expectations of people.” (de Goede 131).

- “...citizens may be as little interested in the institutionalisation of governance, each for their own reasons, as elites are.” (de Goede 136).

- “Moreover, the institutions designed to safeguard [the 2011 voter] integrity, notably the CENI and the Supreme Court, lack credibility in the eyes of many Congolese.” (The Carter Center 67).

- “We suggest, however, that its more recent problems and criminal activity are much more a product of the behaviour of the DRC’s neighbours and of transnational organisations than of any problem endemic to the Congo itself.” (Mullins and Rothe 97). *[this quote illustrates that the people’s lack of confidence in the government is due partially to the colonial legacies and partially to the hyper-development of capitalism that led to chronic criminal engagements]*

- “‘The state is dying but not yet dead’ and ‘the state is so present, but so useless’ are also commonly heard refrains. These popular sentiments, inexorably expressed in all of the country’s languages by the poor and the well-to-do, have been described by development experts and political scientists as state failure.” (Trefon 9).

- “The adoption of the new Constitution, December 2005 and the organization of presidential and legislative elections in 2006, crowns the process of democratization and the return of the DRC to the rule of law with an executive power, a parliament and a separate judiciary.” *[originally in French]* (World Health Organization 4).

- “In 2016, authorities failed to hold constitutionally mandated elections set for November, and President Joseph Kabila overstayed his term in office. The developments prompted violent protests, and the consequent suppression of human rights groups, citizens’ movements, and journalists.” (Freedom House 2017).



Ib. Are there free, fair, and frequent elections?

- “But it is nevertheless an extreme case, with no other African democracy coming even close this level of fragmentation.” (de Goede 138).

- “The country now appears to be ruled by what is in effect a dominant party that is perhaps instable internally, but that controls power in an according to some almost dictatorial manner.” (de Goede 139).

- “...the use of the family analogy in the case of the AMP does not concern the population and its relation to their political leaders, but the formation of a ruling coalition from a fragmented political sphere under the leadership of the President as the political father-chief... i.e. President Kabila.” (de Goede 144).

- “...the 2011 electoral process was very controversial. It created more problems than it was able to contribute towards the consolidation of peace and democracy in the country; it actually represented a movement backward in comparison to the achievements of the 2006– 2007 elections.” (Koko 535).

- “[political elites] shared intransigence with regard to a possible adjustment of the electoral calendar related more to their refusal to own up to their responsibilities (in this case, failures) than to a genuine commitment to giving the country and its people an opportunity to have free and fair second post-transitional elections that could contribute towards the consolidation of peace and democracy.” (Koko 535).

- “The flawed 2011 electoral process thus brought back the contentious issue of the very legitimacy of the ruling elite (albeit with a lesser degree of gravity), the question considered to be at the root of the country’s crisis.” (Koko 535).

- “While the delayed elections and rumours of a third term for President Joseph Kabila undermined those processes, the political agreement signed on 31 December 2016 between Congolese socio-political stakeholders to hold elections for a new president before the end of 2017 is one hopeful indicator that the DRC may yet find its way without a return to conflict.” (Koko 537).

- “...despite the success of free and fair elections in 2006, patronage networks and authoritarian procedures, rather than democratic institutions based on the rule of law, characterize the regime.” (Matti 44).

- “Administered by an independent electoral commission established by the transition government, the elections [of 2006] were declared to be free and fair.” (Matti 46).

- “The electoral commission had said last month that the presidential vote could not take place until April 2019 at the earliest, and the opposition had warned that the population would “take matters into its own hands”. (Ligodi and Mwarabu 2017).

- “Supporters of Bemba set re to the Supreme Court in late November as they protested [the 2006] election results, alleging fraud in the counting process.” (Social Education Staff 26).

- “Forty-five acts of election-related violence were documented by the United Nations in advance of the Nov. 28, 2011, elections. These incidents were linked directly to the elections and targeted political parties, especially parties among the opposition; journalists; and human rights defenders.” (The Carter Center 46).

- “The Carter Center released a statement on Dec. 10 concluding that these results lacked credibility because of significant problems reported by observers during tabulation. Problems ranged from



general disorganization and related loss of results to the tampering of results forms by voting center officials.” (The Carter Center 55).

- “Despite the mounting pressure, Kabila has shown no sign that he is preparing to step down or allow for a peaceful, democratic transition.” (Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 15).

1c. Is there state corruption and political violence?

- “contrary to the expectations of the Congolese and aid donors alike, Congo’s decentralization has produced a distinct *worsening* of the quality of its governance.” (Engelbert and Mungongo 6).

- “Congolese decentralization reforms have been accompanied by an increase in predatory extraction, provincial centralization of power, unbridled lack of accountability, and widespread rent seeking by provincial elites.” (Engelbert and Mungongo 6).

- “[decentralisation reforms] dis- counted the coexistence of formal and informal ruling institutions, and the immunity of the latter to decentralization’s accountability and transparency mechanisms, allowing for the continuation of top-down extractive gover- nance.” (Engelbert and Mungongo 6).

- “Second... Congolese decentralization was predicated upon an erroneous diagnosis of Congo’s previous gover- nance failures... without identifying the generalized nature of the instrumentalization of sovereignty by officeholders at all levels of the state.” (Engelbert and Mungongo 6-7).

- “Among its failures, decentralization has (1) increased the degree to which the state extracts the resources and incomes of its citizens; (2) fostered provincial centralization at the expense of local governments; (3) produced largely unaccountable provinces gov- erning with little transparency; and (4) served the material interests of pro- vincial administrators instead of those of citizens.” (Engelbert and Mungongo 9).

“Indeed, as De Goede observed as early as 2007, ‘[t]he challenge for the Congo is to undergo a process of democratisation with leaders [who] prefer a non-peaceful and non-democratic political-economy’, leaders who have few incentives to transform the existing corrupt and criminalised political system into a democratic one.” (Koko 536).

- “While the [2006] elections were generally peaceful, the afternoon of the presidential runoff saw an outbreak of violence between Bemba’s militia and Kabila’s Presidential Guard... The resultant confrontation left 23 people dead and 43 wounded.” (Matti 46).

- “The regime clearly fits the conditions of a competitive authoritarian regime: while meaningful competition exists, this is violated to such an extent that the political playing field becomes heavily tilted in favor of the incumbent.” (Matti 49).

- “Dozens died in protests against Kabila’s refusal to step down at the end of his constitutional mandate last December.” (Ligodi and Mwarabu 2017).

- “According to Human Rights Watch, at least 24 civil- ians were killed, and many others were injured by Congolese security forces in the weeks following the announcement of election results.” (The Carter Center 46).

- “In the meantime, [in 2008] the government has negotiated an agreement with DfID, which has volunteered to pay the insurance of all primary school pupils. However, the Ministerial letter remains silent about this, and conse- quently some government agents continue to collect insurance fees in schools.” (Titeca and de Herdt 227).



- “The only certainty is that personal opportunism governs [public administrators’] actions. It is for this reason that administrative service providers in Congo are perceived as unmanageable, undisciplined, mercenary, corrupt and, quite simply, useless.” (Trefon 13).
- “The resource rich country is also facing serious economic challenges, due in part to widespread corruption, a reluctance to invest in a country amid a political crisis and with an uncertain future, and lack of transparency of Congolese government finances, including the state mining company.” (Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 13).



Variable 2: Public Services

2a. How is the public health?

- “This article has shown how the retreat of the state has not led to a vacuum, but rather to the filling of this public arena by a range of other actors, who play a crucial role in the provision of public services. Non-state actors, and particularly religious networks, stepped in to provide educational services and continued organizing the sector.” (Titeca and de Herdt 230).
- “Left to fend for themselves, public servants are, likewise, worried about how they will cope after retirement ... based on what they can see from their predecessors, those that have no family to depend upon fear they will either become beggars or die.” (Trefon 17).
- “The number of Health Zones increased from 306 in 1985 to 515 in 2003.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization 6).
- “However, the functioning of the health system remains hampered by a number of problems with the leadership of the Ministry of Health, the funding system, the community participation, human resources, supply system essential drugs, and the coordination of donor interventions.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization 6).
- “Although contributing up to 70% to the financing of recurrent functioning of the health zones, the community is not involved in the management of health services.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization 6).
 - “This table shows that curative care in Hospitals and Health Centers has been financed in the aggregate at USD 625,662,749, or 44% of current expenditure, of which 15% came from the Public Administration, 10% from businesses, 61% from households and 14% Rest of the world.” [*Translated from French*] (Ministry of Public Health 40).
 - “With regard to the purchase of pharmaceutical products, the funding was 184,157,332 USD or 13% of current health expenditure of which 97% was financed by households and 3% by the Government.” [*Translated from French*] (Ministry of Public Health 40).
- “More than 60% of the structures hospitals belonged to the private sector (private sector denominational and business).” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization 8).
- “With the progressive disengagement of the state, a private for-profit sector, has developed these recent years” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization 8).
- “Demographic Survey Reports Infant-Juvenile Mortality Index, 142 Deaths per thousand live births” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization 9).
- “International donor support for programs health and HIV / AIDS, including humanitarian projects, was estimated at 117 millions of dollars (US \$ 2.3 / inhabitant), in 2003, and has steadily increased, reaching a estimated at \$ 302 million (US \$ 4.3 / inhabitant) in 2006. Projections for years 2008, 2009 and 2010 show a trend towards the reduction of ODA and are \$ 251,249 million and \$ 226 million respectively.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization 12).
- “In 2008, there is a reduction in terms of both absolute than relative. Indeed, the amount allocated to the health sector is about 70 million of dollars. This sum represents only 2.5% of the [State] budget.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization 12).



- “Despite some progress made in the development of the DRC's health system, great challenges remain and constitute a handicap to a better performance of the health system.” *[translated from French]* (World Health Organization 33).

- “Its share of public expenditure reached 16 % in 2014 as against 8% in 2000 and 4% in 1990, thus demonstrating the growing priority attached to education by the DRC government. The health sector has also been a focus of keen attention by the government which is making efforts to achieve the commitments made by African Heads of State in Abuja to allocate (15% of their national budgets).” (ACHPR 10).

- “The direct payment scheme for households is the main mechanism for financing of Services and Health Care in the DRC in 2014. Its resources have contributed health financing of USD 553,245,808, or 39% of the DCS. This leads households to spend often beyond their capacity resulting in the impoverishment of the population that falls ill.” *[Translated from French]* (Ministry of Public Health 36).

2b. What are the enrollments rates of education systems?

- “... in comparison with many other African or less-developed countries, the DRC has a much lower percentage of people who have never been to school ... it certainly performs better than average in terms of this indicator of education.” (Titeca and de Herdt 221).

-[Note that data for statistics are not available for each year, making data slightly sporadic and difficult for comparison between actors, however the most recent reports and figures are utilized]
The Education and Training Sector Strategy report of 2015 produced by the DRC's four Ministries of Education claims that the enrollment rates for primary school grew from 90% in 2007 and 107% in 2014 (the latest year of data collection for the sector) with female enrollment rates from 44.8% to 47.3% (“Stratégie sectorielle” 22).

- UNESCO Institute for Statistics presented similar statistics for 2008 being at 102% and later rising in 2012 to 104% (UNESCO 2017).

- Additionally, the enrollment rates for secondary school were approximately 38.3% in 2012/2013 (with enrollment of girls between 30-40% of total percentage) (“Stratégie sectorielle” 26).

- The UNESCO Institute for Statistics shows that as of 2013 the gross enrollment rates for secondary school was at 52.12% (2017).

- The World Bank produced data for tertiary enrollment rates of 2012 at 7% (4% of females and 9% of males) (The World Bank), whereas the UNESCO Institute for Statistics shows the gross rate of enrollment to be 9.97% for 2012 (2017).

- Adult literacy rate, 15+ years, (%) as of 2016 was 77% (66% of females and 89% of males) (The World Bank).

- However the Freedom House states “Given its low literacy rates and deep poverty, the population [of the DRC] relies largely on radio broadcasts to receive news.

- The “Expenditure on education as % of total government expenditure (%)” in 2010 was 29% (The World Bank). *[the latest estimates on expenditure spending]*

- “The Constitution of the DRC stipulates in Articles 43 and 44 that every individual shall have the right to school education which is provided through national education and provides for a specific programme for the eradication of illiteracy considered as a national duty. It specifies in Article 45 that education is free and that every individual shall have access to national educational establishments according to their capacities without any discrimination as to their place of origin,



race, religion, sex, political or philosophical opinions, physical, mental or sensory state. These constitutional provisions establish the principle of equality of opportunities, free access and non-discrimination in the area of education and training.” (ACHPR 34).

- “Among the strides chalked in the country, mention should be made of the improvement in the area of girl-child education where the parity index is almost consistent (perfect equality) at the primary school level.” (ACHPR 71).

2c. Is there adequate infrastructure?

- “An archetypical characteristic of 'failed states' is their retreat from the public domain and more particularly their inability to provide basic public services.” (Titeca and de Herdt 213).

- “... the state has to a large extent retreated from its basic functions ... Education is one of them: by the year 2000, public financing of education in the DRC had virtually ceased.” (Titeca and de Herdt 214).

- “Real expenditure per pupil dropped from US\$159 in 1982 to and finally to around \$4 in 2002 (Table 1). Teachers' salaries dropped from \$68 to \$27 per month between 1982 and 1987, reaching an absolute minimum of \$12.90 in 2002 (Titeca and de Herdt 221).

- “Despite the collapse in public financing, between 1987 and 2007 the total number of pupils doubled.” (Titeca and de Herdt 221).

- “... by the end of the twentieth century, the education sector in DRC could indeed be called 'privatized', both because most schools were run by non-state actors and because most of the finance came from parents themselves.” (Titeca and de Herdt 223).

- “not only does the ‘Convention’ of 1977 signal that one of the crucial assets to organize the sector ... is in the hands of the churches, but from the mid-1980s onwards the state's material contributions to the sector also evaporated and were soon deemed insufficient even to guarantee the most basic tasks related to the function of keeping overall oversight and ‘organizing’ the sector.” (Titeca and de Herdt 223-224).

- Despite that the DRC Constitution states: “Education is free in public institutions for the various teaching orders” and “The State and other public authorities have the obligation to create and to ensure the proper functioning of public institutions to education and instruction of youth” and “The state and other public authorities have the duty to create preconditions and public institutions that guarantee children's education” most fees are paid by parents and infrastructure organized and administrated by the Church (D.R.C. Const. art. VI and VII).

- “To ensure that every citizen has access to education and to guarantee quality education, the State established a network of primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions. Initiatives by the private sector come to support this network to the extent that the educational sector is in the hands of State authorities which control all the institutions and determine the operational rules.” (“Stratégie sectorielle” 33).

- The total percentage of GDP spent on education in the DRC in 2010 was 1.5%, 2011 was 2.0%, 2012 was 1.8%, 2013 was 2.0%, 2014 was 2.0%, and 2015 was 3.4% according to the DRC's official 2016 report from the Education and Training Sector Strategy (“Stratégie sectorielle” 33).

- These figures are *higher* than what the World Bank data shows for select years of available data for the DRC within this timeline, with the WB showing the years 2010 as 1.6%, 2013 as 2.245%, and 2015 a 2.291% (“Government Expenditure”).



- According to the DRC's National Agency for the Promotion of Investment's latest data release in 2016, "we can see slow growth in investments of the Investment Code sector against a sharp increase in investment in the mining sector. Mining investments are made in the DRC by more than 80% by subsidiaries or branches of foreign companies" ("Volume of Foreign" 2016).

- the same data also reveals that the total annual FDI for the DRC reached a peak in 2012 (\$USD 6.5 billion), but since has drastically decreased each year to a total in 2015 of \$USD 1.8 billion, this is problem considering that the opening sentence on the report reveals that "The economic growth of a Nation depends directly on the degree of investment achieved." ("Volume of Foreign" 2016).

- According to the DR Congo's National Agency for the Promotion of Investment the rate of unemployment for the DRC has been on the decline since 2011 when the rate was 51.4% until 2015 with a rate of 43% ("Economic and Social" 2016).

- "However, weaknesses continue to characterize the mobilization of domestic revenue (public revenue excluding grants of 13.9% on average in percentage of GDP against 21.1% for Sub-Saharan Africa), the level of reserves (2 months' autonomy for 5.2 for Africa), access to job market (especially for youth and women), the quality of infrastructure." ("Economic and Social" 2016).

- "*The Democratic Republic of Congo has immense potential but remains a risky investment location. Main hurdles include pervasive poverty, political turmoil, security issues, vast land area and inadequate infrastructure.*" (PwC 31). Opening sentence for the PwC's report on DRC infrastructure.

- "Over 90% of exports are in the form of extracted commodities. This fragility was exposed in 2009 when a crash in commodity prices coincided with an escalation in conflict in the eastern region, revealing the country's dependence on external demand and financial flows." (PwC 32).

- "High political risk has severely undermined prospects for diversified growth, while protection of property rights is hampered by dysfunctional public administration. Furthermore, enforcement of the complex legal code is selective." (PwC 32).

- "The DRC has a low HIV/Aids infection rate as years of war and little infrastructure development have restricted human movement and the spread of the virus." (PwC 33).

- "The Government has ambitious plans. While less than 10% of the population has access to electricity today, the Government has set an ambitious target to provide electricity to 60% of the population by 2025. The first step in achieving this goal is the construction of the Grand Inga dam, which will produce about 40 000MW at a cost of US\$80 billion." (PwC 33).

- "The USD 73 million grant, approved by the World Bank in 2014, was cancelled on July 25th 2016 ... The withdrawal of the World Bank clearly shows the deficits of the project and should be a warning for other investors." (BankTrack 2017).

- "last year [2016] the World Bank said it had suspended funding after the presidency took control of the project, raising transparency concerns.." (Reuters 2017).

- "The DRC is one of the most infrastructurally challenged countries in the world. Ground transportation has always been difficult and the country's vast geography, low population density, extensive forests, and criss-crossing rivers further complicate the development of infrastructure networks." (PwC 34).

- However "Since 2006, there has been a large upswing in external financing commitments from OECD and non-OECD partners. For example, **a major new financing agreement signed with**



China promises US\$3 billion, primarily for road and urban infrastructure projects.” (PwC 34).

- “Recently, the [domestic company] acquired nine locomotives to revive the rail sector in the southern region. In addition, the company is planning a new acquisition of 47 locomotives by 2015 under World Bank funding.” (PwC 36).

- “The country has secured major development funding as well as an infrastructure-for-minerals deal with China. Private enterprise is also playing a role, with mining companies also investing in roads.” (PwC 36).

- “Congo (Democratic Republic of the)’s HDI value for 2015 is 0.435— which put the country in the low human development category—positioning it at 176 out of 188 countries and territories.” (UNDP 2).

- However, the DRC’s indicator scores have gradually improved over the past 25 years in the categories of:

Life expectancy at birth (1990: 49 years and 2015 was 59.1)

Expected years of schooling (1990: 6.8 years and 2015 was 9.8)

Mean years of schooling (1990: 2.3 and 2015 was 6.1)

HDI value (1990: 0.356 and 2015 was 0.435)

(UNDP 3).

- “This total spending requirement is high in absolute terms and even more so relative to GDP (figure 10). At close to \$5.2 billion, in absolute terms, the spending need for infrastructure is among the highest in Africa. Relative to the size of the DRC’s economy, the spending amounts to a staggering 75 percent of 2006 GDP. This is by far the highest burden of infrastructure spending for any African country, and is substantially higher than the average of low-income, fragile states. Investment alone would absorb around 57 percent of GDP. To put this in perspective, one of the highest levels of infrastructure investment observed in recent economic history has been in China which dedicated 15 percent of GDP to infrastructure investment during the mid-2000s.” (Foster and Benitez 23).

- “Notwithstanding the incomplete data, it is clear that as of 2006 the DRC’s spending on infrastructure covered little more than 10 percent of its needs ... The relatively modest figure of \$700 million a year nonetheless represents a substantial 10 percent share of the country’s 2006 GDP.” (Foster and Benitez 24).

- “Although spending looks small relative to the country’s infrastructure needs, when expressed as a percentage of GDP it is actually close to the average spending on infrastructure that is observed across Sub-Saharan Africa. The problem, however, is that the DRC’s infrastructure needs are substantially greater than those of other African countries.” (Foster and Benitez 24-25).



Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law

3a. Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld?

- “Due to the repression of opposition figures, the lack of power invested in the judiciary, and the targeting of media freedom, the Kabila regimes do not meet the minimal requirements for democracy.” (Matti 42).
- “After Etienne Tshisekedi’s self-proclamation as president, security forces surrounded his residence in Limite, Kinshasa. Since December 2011, he has been under de facto house arrest.” (The Carter Center 47).
- “In addition, since 2000, the United Nations Mission in the DRC, MONUC headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations United Nations, works for the gradual restoration of peace and the rule of law in the country.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization 20).
- “The DRC’s immense natural resources have fuelled conflict rather than development. Human rights abuses and banditry deter economic activity...” (PwC 33).
- “In January, violent protests erupted in several cities in response to a draft electoral bill that would likely have delayed elections and allowed Kabila to overstay his second term. Amid a police crackdown that left at least 42 people dead, the government shut down several radio and television outlets. In the protests’ wake, authorities also cut text messaging services and internet access until early February, and blocked access to social media sites until early March.” (Freedom House 2016).
- “The National Intelligence Agency (ANR) and National Police (PNC) are the principal perpetrators of such harassment and interference, with at least 22 documented cases in 2015.” (Freedom House 2016).
- “Intimidation from the authorities in the form of arbitrary arrests and detention is not uncommon in the DRC. Journalists are often held without charge, at times beyond the 48-hour limit on warrantless detention stipulated by Congolese law.” (Freedom House 2016).
- “Acts of sexual violence continue to be one of the characteristics of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in the East of the country.” (ACHPR 7).
- “The DR-Congo is making significant efforts to implement the rights guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, its action is confronted with a number of difficulties related basically to the recurrence of armed conflicts in the East of the country.” (ACHPR 7).
- “In future, the Government intends to popularize the various formulated and ratified legal instruments, including the Maputo Protocol, through real communication with all segments of the population, given the fact that numerous studies have shown that one of the major obstacles to the promotion of the rights of women in the DRC is truly the poor knowledge of the laws and concepts relating to gender.” (ACHPR 72).
- “Journalists and media outlets face censorship and harassment from government officials, members of the security forces, and nonstate actors, though the little- used internet remains unrestricted.” (Freedom House 2015).
- “A number of journalists were arbitrarily detained while covering protests in Kinshasa at which participants called for President Joseph Kabila to step down, as constitutionally mandated, at the



end of his second term. There were also reports of media workers being beaten by security forces during the demonstrations, during which dozens of protesters were killed.” (Freedom House 2017).

- “In August 2016, the electoral commission announced that planned presidential elections would be postponed, sparking outrage among Kabila’s political opponents and civil society groups. The subsequent government crackdown exacerbated already repressive conditions for journalists; severe pressure to limit critical coverage of the political situation and the activities of the opposition left little space in which to conduct normal journalistic activities.” (Freedom House 2017).

- “However, a more discriminating look at DRC’s conflict landscape reveals a series of intertwined causes that have been poorly considered and remain irresolute: ethnic identity, disputes over land, traditional authority, local power, poor access to basic rights and corruption at all institutional levels.” (García-Mingo 216).

- “With their programmes, their aim is to inform Congolese women about their rights and strategies to protect themselves. AFEM-SK is also devoted to lobbying for women’s rights and training rural women in political participation, media literacy and peace-building processes.” (García-Mingo 216).

- “Apart from their physical bodies, identity, self and personhood are strategic targets of war – but they are also the locus of political will. Even though many Congolese women have been insulted, tortured, raped, injured and threatened, they have not rested in silence.” (García-Mingo 220).

- “The deadliest crackdown was during the week of September 19, 2016, when many Congolese took to the streets to protest the electoral commission’s failure to announce presidential elections, 90 days before the end of Kabila’s second term, as required by the constitution. Security forces responded with excessive force, killing at least 66 people and setting at least three opposition party headquarters on fire.” (Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 10).

- “Hundreds of opposition leaders and supporters, human rights and pro-democracy youth activists, and peaceful protesters were arbitrarily arrested and detained [in 2016]. Many were held in secret detention for weeks or months, without charge and without access to their families or lawyer. Others were put on trial on trumped up charges. In July, unidentified armed men shot and nearly killed a judge in Lubumbashi who refused to hand down a ruling against opposition leader and presidential aspirant Moïse Katumbi.” (Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 11).

- “Authorities have also prevented international and Congolese journalists from doing their work, including by arresting them, denying access, or confiscating their equipment and deleting footage ... The following month, the Reuters correspondent was unable to renew his Congolese visa ... Human Rights Watch senior researcher in Congo was also barred from the country in August 2016 (Human Rights Watch “Special Mission” 12).

- “The mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1925 (2010).” (United Nations “MONUSCO at a Glance”).

- “MONUSCO’s priorities are therefore structured around the support to the political process (including support to the 31 December 2016 political agreement), towards the holding of elections; and support to the protection of civilians and human rights.” (United Nations “MONUSCO at a Glance”).

- “Human Rights
Main perpetrators

- State agents: 61% (including 1.176 victims of extrajudicial killings)
- Armed groups: 39%” (United Nations “MONUSCO at a Glance”).



- “Challenges for Human Rights
- Lack of accountability mechanisms for members of the Congolese defense and security forces
- Lack of confidence in State institutions
- Deficiencies of the judicial system
- Non-execution of sentences
- Little or no compensation to victims
- Delay in the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms
- Insufficient enforcement of Laws against sexual violence.” (United Nations “MONUSCO at a Glance”).

3b. Is there an independent media source?

- “In power, the Kabila government has applied subtle pressure to curb the constitutionally embedded freedom of expression and freedom of press upon which Congolese media independence is built.” (Matti 46).
- “Intimidation and arrest have been used to hinder criticism of the Kabila regime; there have been a number of cases of assault, murder, and threatened rape.” (Matti 48).
- “Although the constitution and various laws provide for freedoms of speech, information, and the press, these guarantees are seldom enforced.” (Freedom House 2016).
- “Press freedom remained severely restricted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2015.” (Freedom House 2016).
- “The only independent radio network with nationwide reach, Radio Okapi, is funded by the United Nations and Switzerland-based Fondation Hironnelle.” (Freedom House 2016).
- “Conditions for the press in the Democratic Republic of Congo remained poor in 2014. A journalist was killed for the first time in more than six years, and restrictive laws were frequently used to prosecute journalists in connection with their work.” (Freedom House 2015).
- “Press freedom is severely restricted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Journalists and media outlets who challenge powerful figures or cover protests and other controversial events run the risk of prosecution, harassment, and attack, including by members of the security services.” (Freedom House 2017).
- “Despite the improvement of the Congolese media scene, local journalists are badly trained and poorly paid. Media have to face economic constraints, corruption, lack of training, and persistent impunity of war crimes.” (García-Mingo 219).
- “As noted in *Reporters Without Borders’ 2015 Report*, the DRC government has shown a growing fondness for censorship. Many media have been closed and several journalists arbitrarily arrested, and the Burundian journalist Egide Mwemero has been detained arbitrarily since October 2015.” (García-Mingo 219).
- “For our case study that is focused on radio broadcasting, it is important to bear in mind that radio is the most widespread medium and their use has greatly increased. There were twenty radio stations in the DRC in 1996, but the number today is 450.” (García-Mingo 219).
- “The value of community radio stations to promote peace and development in Congo is recognized in the Charter of Community Radio Stations, which states that community radio stations should be free and independent, serve and respond to the needs of the community, respect human dignity, reject all forms of discrimination, be non-profit, help the state while still being



independent, be transparent in its organization, planning and financing, and show solidarity with other community radios and institutions of the DRC.” (García-Mingo 219-220).

- “In a country with limited means of telecommunication, radio programs were, unsurprisingly, the primary source of information for the respondents.

- Fifty-four percent of respondents listened to the radio on a daily basis.

- For 67 percent, it was the primary source of information, followed by family and the community in general (23%).

- Most respondents trusted the radio moderately (27%), a lot (26%), or extremely (5%), although fewer believed journalists were moderately free (24%), very free (16%), or extremely free (3%) to report on social and political issues.” (Vinck et al. 63).

3c. Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system?

- “Because of historical neglect, the infrastructure of the judicial system has collapsed with judges and other legal practitioners lacking resources including basic legal texts ... In 2004 the administration devoted a mere 0.6 percent of the total budget to the needs of the judicial system.” (Matti 47).

- “Unlike the direct infringement of press freedom, the government works to undermine the independence of the judiciary indirectly through depriving it of adequate funding.” (Matti 48).

- “The government’s control over the courts hinders impartial adjudication of cases against journalists, and verdicts often reflect political biases.” (Freedom House 2016).

- “Thus, disciplinary and judicial measures have been enforced on regular basis against perpetrators of sexual violence ... Furthermore, prospective candidates for enlistment into the security agencies are properly subjected to background checks in order to disqualify persons who have committed serious human rights violations and offences against international humanitarian law.” (ACHPR 8).

- “The DR-Congo has a national strategy to fight against sexual and gender-based violence (SNVBG) comprising five components. The component “fighting against impunity” is intended to develop the capacity of the judicial apparatus and to design a criminal policy on sexual violence with a focus on victims’ rights, improve access to justice, provide reparation for victims through justice delivery and ensure the effective implementation of the 2000 laws on sexual violence.” (ACHPR 8).

- “Since its creation in 2003, the FARDC has been one of the main perpetrators of documented sexual violence in Congo. Army commanders have frequently failed to stop sexual violence and punish those responsible. These crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law, and some constitute war crimes ... the sheer size of the Congolese army and its deployment throughout the country make it the single largest group of perpetrators. FARDC soldiers continue to commit gang rapes, rapes involving injury and death, and abductions of women and girls.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 21).

- “Senior officers and commanders in the Congolese army who did have authority over the soldiers and who were responsible for having put them in Kabare with no provisions and food, abdicated responsibility for the unruly brigade.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 32).

- “Armed group leaders and other officers responsible for grave abuses were integrated into the FARDC without any vetting, thereby promoting those with known track records of human rights abuses, including rape, into senior command positions. Attempts to prevent and punish sexual violence by members of the Congolese army as part of security sector reform have been insufficient. The government has also lacked the political will to fight corruption. Embezzlement of



the vast sums of money set aside for the process has undermined the effort. When corruption has been uncovered—as was the case for General Sunglanga Kisempia, the former chief of staff of the Congolese army—the government has failed to arrest and prosecute those responsible.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 40-41).

- “The military justice system has made some—limited—progress in bringing ordinary soldiers to account for their sexual crimes.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 45).

- “But military justice has entirely failed to address the criminal responsibility of high-ranking officers, including their command responsibility. The most senior officer held to account for crimes of sexual violence in the Kivus has been a captain— no major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, or general has been prosecuted.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 45).

- “As a result of the efforts to strengthen the judiciary and the 2006 sexual violence law, the military justice system is now dealing with a higher number of sexual violence cases; the same is true for the civilian courts.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 46).

- “Progress in the military justice system has been somewhat slower than in the civilian judiciary, but still noticeable compared to 2003, when one rape conviction of a low-ranking soldier in Bukavu was seen as exceptional.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 46).

- “Despite these important advances, the military justice system remains a weak institution. To date, only a small fraction of the total number of acts of sexual violence committed by soldiers has been prosecuted and ... No senior military figure has been prosecuted for sexual crimes, and command responsibility is rarely the subject of investigations by military prosecutors.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 47).

- “Congolese law hinders the prosecution of senior officers, as the sitting judge in a court martial must have a higher rank than the defendant. As a result of this law, many judges cannot try higher-ranking officers; they would have to transfer the case to a different court where the judge has a higher rank, which seems only to happen rarely.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 48).

- “The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, after a visit to Congo in April 2007, concluded that interference by the executive and the army in judicial proceedings was “very common” and that Congo’s judicial system was “rarely effective... with human rights violations generally go[ing] unpunished.” (Human Rights Watch “Soldiers Who Rape” 48-49).

- “An overwhelming majority of respondents surveyed in eastern Congo believed accountability is necessary to achieve peace (82%), with four out of five respondents (85%) affirming the importance of holding those who committed grave crimes accountable.” (Vinck et al. 61).

- “Most respondents believe that among those who should be held accountable are militia leaders (56%), militias more generally (44%), Rwanda or the Rwandan government (36%), Uganda or the Ugandan government (23%), the Congolese government (17%) and the Congolese National Army (13%).

- Most respondents wanted to see those who committed grave crimes punished (69%), put in jail (34%), or tried by a court of justice (25%). Few respondents supported forgiving perpetrators of these crimes (7%) or giving them amnesty (6%).” (Vinck et al. 61).

- “In sum, although justice was a relatively remote priority for respondents, they nonetheless saw accountability as necessary to achieve a lasting peace.” (Vinck et al. 63).



1.2 Central African Republic (CAR)

(Hypothesized Regime Type: Failed/Collapsed)

Null Hypothesis: Victimization of urban children is present.

Variable 1: State Legitimacy

1a. Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?

- “In March 2013 a coalition of rebel groups – Séléka – led a violent coup in the Central African Republic (CAR), ousting the former President François Bozizé from ten years in power and instating the new President Michel Djotodia.” (Herbert et al. 2). *[The work by Herbert et al. was a primary source written and published by the European Union]*

- “Michel Djotodia (from UFDR) is currently the leader of Séléka, and now is the self-proclaimed President of CAR.” (Herbert et al. 4).

- “However, ECCAS failed to monitor the implementation of the agreement (ICG 2013), and regional powers did not prevent the Séléka coalition from seizing power thereafter. This is attributed to Bozizé’s reluctance to implement the agreement, and also to regional players losing confidence in Bozizé.” (Herbert et al. 6).

- “Widespread road banditry has led to the displacement of population in Northern CAR and to refugee flows from Northern CAR to refugee camps in the South of Chad.” (Herbert et al. 9).

- “The conflict and coup precipitated a humanitarian and economic crisis, and increased CAR’s already fragile dependence on the international community.” (Herbert et al. 10).

- “A key objective of the 2008 Inclusive Political Dialogue (herein referred to as ‘the Dialogue’) was to start a process and design a plan of action to implement the 2008 peace agreement ... Negotiations were held between the government, the rebel groups and the mediator to decide on the composition of the Preparatory Committee, one year in advance. The conference was more inclusive with rebel group members taking part in the Preparatory Committee, and as final participants.” (Herbert et al. 12).

- “During the Dialogue, Bozizé agreed to form an inclusive consensus government, hold free and transparent elections, install a follow up committee, and create a truth and reconciliation commission. The follow up committee was to be composed of the former and current presidents Patassé, Kolingba and Bozizé. Surprisingly, civilians and armed oppositions were not included in this committee (Mehler 2009; ICG 2008). This meant that former presidents who presided over the country during serious and systematic human rights violations would be in charge of following up on the implementation of the peace process.” (Herbert et al. 13).

- “Bozizé became increasingly isolated and ‘paranoid’ (ICG 2013), losing support from his allies, the population at large, and, significantly, from his two prime sources of support – the Chadian President Débe, and the international community.” (Herbert et al. 13-14).

- “The promises made during the National Dialogues, the peace agreements and through the DDR project, raised the expectations of the rebel groups and of the population at large. President Bozizé’s failure to comply with various aspects of the 2007 peace agreement is widely cited as a key factor supporting the most recent coup, as claimed by the group Séléka itself.” (Herbert et al. 19).

- “The country is also politically unstable, corruption and highway robbery are rife and the economic climate is uncertain, attracting little foreign investment.” (Kah 41).



- “The disarmament of the fighters had been planned since the agreements of Libreville in 2007 and 2008, but this was never implemented due to the lack of political will of the Bozizé regime.” (Kah 49).
- “From 2013, child soldiers roam the streets and communities have lived in distrust and revenge because of past grievances” (Kah 54).
- “In a country where the state has faced serious challenges in extending its authority even to cover the capital Bangui, and where coups have been the order of the day for many years, the situation descended into internal conflict in 2013, pitting Muslims (Seleka) against Christian (anti-Balaka) populations.” (Karlsrud 47-48).
- “Although there is no large-scale fighting and only little open warfare, one can rightly say that few regions of the CAR are really secure and that in fact the majority of the territory is in a permanent state of insecurity.” (Spittaels and Hilgert 41).
- “The neglect of these armed groups, the failure to implement recommendations emanating from the political dialogue, and the failure of different DDR programmes that did not offer alternatives to young fighters are some of the factors that prompted the relapse of the country into civil war.” (Vlavanou 320).
- “President Djotodia’s lack of control over the Séléka fighters led to his dismissal by regional leaders ... They lost all legitimacy with the public and the support of international actors.” (Vlavanou 322).
- “Several factors pushed the Séléka coalition to relinquish power. It encountered resistance from the local population but it was also a fragile coalition led by a weak leadership.” (Vlavanou 324).
- “The National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (RCPCA, 2017–2021) prepared by the Government with the United Nations and donor counterparts prioritizes three pillars:
 - i) peace, security and reconciliation;
 - ii) renewing the social contract between the state and its citizens; and
 - iii) ensuring economic recovery and the revitalization of the productive sectors of the Central African Republic” (World Food Programme “Central African Republic” 5).
- “For most of the time since the independence gained in 1960, the Central African Republic was ruled by soldiers who came to power by force of arms. Frequent and violent regime changes contributed to the institutionalization of corruption and nepotism, and violations and abuses of human rights, including repression of freedom of expression of political opinions and ideas. Successive governments neglected or simply failed to deliver services to the citizenry in an insatiable pursuit of personal enrichment. Political leaders, as well as their families and cronies, were involved in embezzlement of public funds, mismanagement of public corporations and illegal exploitation of precious minerals and other natural resources, while the vast majority of the people lived in abject poverty.” (OHCHR 9).

1b. Are there free, fair, and frequent elections?

- “In 2007, HRW reported that the previous decade had seen at least ten coup attempts; there have been many more during the last six years. Coups have typically been supported by external powers – with Chad and France key countries playing active roles in supporting military coups in CAR.” (Herbert et al. 7).



- “State fragility in CAR has incentivised a ‘winner-takes-all’ political culture ... systematic impunity for human rights violators, especially those in the state security forces, means that citizen trust in the state is low.” (Herbert et al. 7-8).
- “In 2005, Bozizé stood in the presidential elections, but Patassé was excluded from standing. This triggered widespread discontent and rebellion among Patassé’s followers. Some heavyweights of Patassé’s political class were included in Bozizé’s government, but the general Patassé camp remained excluded.” (Herbert et al. 12).
- “Numerous rebel movements also claim to put local and national grievances on the agenda; these are heard and therefore seem to address the issues better than [political] parties.” (Mehler 116).
- “Parties and rebel movements therefore compete to a certain extent, but political parties lose out in the course of war and in peace processes, not least because they are no longer regarded as the main actors by international mediators.” (Mehler 116).
- “It is doubtful whether rebel movements do any better than parties at representing group interests. They may get more or less voluntary popular support at times, but they cannot be held accountable by the local population they claim to defend; elected members of parliament at least face the destiny of not being re-elected.” (Mehler 135).
- “Perceived as illegitimate from the start, Bozizé’s presidency was marked by violence which catalysed the formation of the largely Muslim rebel coalition Séléka.” (Pailey et al. 6).
- “Amidst mounting international pressure and diplomatic negotiations, Djotodia resigned on 14 January 2014 and was exiled.” (Pailey et al. 7).
- “The last coup, staged in March 2013 by the Séléka coalition rebel group, unfortunately pushed the country into greater chaos than had any previous coups. The Séléka rebels launched an offensive on the capital, Bangui, on 22 March 2013, setting up a new regime with self-proclaimed President Michel Djotodia. The coup sparked extensive looting and the destruction of public and private property in Bangui. A few months later, the new leader had been forced to resign from power after losing control over his rebel group, pitching the country into a renewed cycle of violence.” (Vlavonou 319).
- “The CAR has often experienced a violent change of governments. The CAR has had several rebellions and coups since its independence (in 1960), sometimes with the help of France or neighbouring countries like Chad; however, none of the previous coups or rebellions in the country ushered in violence of the magnitude or protraction currently seen.” (Vlavonou 319).
- “Another Inclusive Political Dialogue was held from 8 to 20 December 2008 in Bangui, as an attempt to overcome the CAR’s recurrent instability. However, the inclusive government was never established, the 2011 elections were marked, according to observers, by significant fraud, most essential reforms included in the political dialogue were never implemented and, because of the combined efforts and power of rebel groups, DDR programmes have never seen the light of the day.” (Vlavonou 319-320).
- “Additionally, pending [2015] elections have resulted in continued insecurity and violence in some areas and this may continue especially if all stakeholders are not satisfied with election results. While it is hoped that the elections will lead to greater stability and a cessation of violence, other possible outcomes and the potential impact on [education] programme implementation should be considered.” (UNICEF 17).



- “When presidential and legislative elections originally scheduled for August 2015 were postponed, severe inter-militias and inter-communal violence erupted in Bangui and other strategic cities. The Transitional Authorities, along with the international community, set up a new electoral calendar which includes Presidential elections at the end of December 2015. Against this background, escalated violence and subsequent population displacement are expected around election time, further restricting movements on supply routes.” (World Food Programme “Regional optimization” 3).

- “Although the French Sangaris force and the United Nations peacekeeping mission ... have made progress in restoring security since 2014, and a new president and national assembly were elected in March 2016, the security situation remains volatile.” (World Food Programme “Central African Republic” 3).

1c. Is there state corruption and political violence?

- “The CAR state is weakly institutionalised with poor security and high vulnerability to rebellion and coup. In this way, the state fails to protect the security and welfare of civilians from violence and poverty.” (Herbert et al. 7).

- “From 2004 to 2008, CAR was dominated by a wave of conflict and attempted coups. Systematic violence against civilians was perpetrated by the state security forces, and by rebels and road bandits, particularly in the north-east” (Herbert et al. 12).

- “**The period around the delayed 2011 elections saw more violence.** NGO Amnesty claims that as much as two thirds of the country was beyond the control of the government, with thousands forced to flee due to armed attacks.” (Herbert et al. 13).

- “The similarities of the 2003 and the 2013 coups are stark. Both involved violent coups, unleashing humanitarian and economic crises and a wave of human rights violations. Séléka combatants were also involved in massive looting in Bangui as well as in most CAR cities. Both coups were supported militarily by Chadian forces and politically by ECCAS Presidents.” (Herbert et al. 15).

- “The same elite who become government ministers today are rebels tomorrow fighting against the government and the state and going free. It is also difficult to explain the impunity with which successive governments privatise the state and its resources to members of their ethnic group or to a few privileged ones to the extent that, after their defeat, the next government is held hostage by ethnic loyalties and previously privileged groups.” (Kah 50).

- “The country experienced a fairly successful democratic transition in the early 1990s, but a mixture of basic state fragility and mismanagement led to widespread violence only a few years later.” (Mehler 119).

- “The CAR is an example of a transition that was perverted by the undemocratic behaviour of democratically elected rulers (similar to Congo-Brazzaville). President Patasse’s governance style included widespread mismanagement, self-enrichment, the buying of MPs and the exclusion of formerly privileged groups. These activities formed the background for mutinies (1996/7), coup attempts (2001/2), and the successful rebellion (2003).” (Mehler 122).

- “The CAR thus faces a continued crisis of representation, and both peace and democracy have suffered from the recent devaluation of political parties and the militarisation of politics. Security concerns are also among the main reasons cited for a repeated delay in organising elections due in 2009 and not fixed yet by October 2010. The CAR seems on a path towards complete informality in representing social interests.” (Mehler 135).



- “The most recent crisis began in 2013 with the Séléka power grab, which “marked a fundamental reversal of CAR’s traditional political landscape” with a minority Muslim population taking over the mantle of power for the first time since independence. Largely politicised by ethno-religious differences involving two major factions – the predominantly Muslim Séléka coalition of rebels and majority Christian militias calling themselves Anti-Balaka – the crisis very quickly morphed into sectarian violence with both sides enlisting foreign mercenaries from countries such as Chad and Sudan.” (Pailey et al. vi).

- “Therefore, increased violence in the CAR is a function of “political opportunism and an omnipresent feeling of mistrust of the foreigner, set against a background of poverty and lack of opportunities” where ‘foreignness’ has been exploited for political gains.” (Pailey et al. 8).

- “Unfortunately, in their race to power, Séléka – composed predominantly of Muslim men from the CAR, Chad and Sudan – abandoned their political claims. They looted, raped, robbed, killed, and destroyed public and private property and facilities, particularly Christian churches.” (Vlavonou 321).

- “Instead of addressing the serious issues arising within the coalition, on 13 September 2013 Interim President Djotodia opted to dissolve the Séléka group that had helped him to power ... After the formal dissolution of the coalition, the security situation in the country spun out of control and retaliations against members of the coalition began.” (Vlavonou 322).

- “In the Central African Republic, for example, the former president, François Bozizé, used the ICC to physically remove a political foe: Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He used the court as an international legal lasso.” (Hillebrecht and Straus 176).



Variable 2: Public Services

(CAR Government websites provided no information or publications on this matter. Publications from the Ministry of Health or Education were not found, thus consequently all information was obtained from Western sources.)

2a. How is the public health?

- “The health situation in the Central African Republic has deteriorated as a result of the multiple crises affecting the country. The HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Central African Republic, together with seriously worsening living conditions and the parlous state of the health system (owing to pillaging and staff dislocation) are some of factors that explain the worsening rates of neonatal, infant and maternal mortality.” (World Health Organization “Country Cooperation”).
- “To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, the Central African Republic must address the following challenges:
 - . 1) poor governance;
 - . 2) high maternal mortality (882 per 100 000 live births in 2015) and morality in children under 5 (130.1 per 1000);
 - . 3) the high prevalence of communicable diseases, specifically malaria and diarrhoeal diseases, and of noncommunicable diseases such as high blood pressure and diabetes;
 - . 4) the failing health system, specifically in terms of governance, supply of medicines (major gaps), facilities and human resources; and
 - . 5) health-sector financing, which remains strongly dependent on external aid and is poorly coordinated, thereby limiting its efficiency and effectiveness.” (World Health Organization “Country Cooperation”).
- “Support is being provided to the Central African Republic in the following areas: ... strengthening institutional governance and making technical assistance available through the Ministry of Health, operationalizing health districts, strengthening capacity to manage the district and regional health teams, and organizing the monitoring and evaluation of service delivery in health facilities at health-district level ... strengthening institutional governance and making technical assistance available through the Ministry of Health, operationalizing health districts, strengthening capacity to manage the district and regional health teams, and organizing the monitoring and evaluation of service delivery in health facilities at health-district level.” (World Health Organization “Country Cooperation”).
- “More than 30% of the population is food insecure and does not have access drinking water, hygiene and sanitation.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 4).
- “L3 emergency level (IASC Level 3 Emergency) was declared in December 2013 and continued at three times until mid-June 2015.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 4).
- “The CAR has made progress, albeit inconsistently, in the area of reduction of under-five mortality (0 to 5 years) ... estimates also show that the infant mortality rate (risk of death of a child aged 0 to 1 year) decreased by 17% from 115 ‰ in 1990 to 96 ‰ in 2015. Between 2012 and 2015, under-five mortality increased by 7.8%, from 129 ‰ in 2012 to 139 ‰ in 2015. For the same period, the Infant mortality increased by 5.5%, from 91 ‰ in 2012 to 96 ‰ in 2015.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 16).
- “Since the beginning of this millennium, the prevalence of malaria remains stationary in the population of children aged 0 to 5 years. This prevalence increased from 32% in 2012 to 25.7% in



2014 ... The lowest prevalence (22%) was recorded in children. In hospitals, malaria continues to be one of the most important causes of consultation, hospitalization and death.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 17).

- “In 2015, HIV prevalence was estimated at 4.1%, but remains the highest of the sub-region in the age group 15 to 49 years. This estimate shows a decline of 2% in 10 years compared to MICS3 data coupled to HIV serology. The rate of new HIV infections is also in drop.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 18).

- “Between 1990 and 2015, Central African Republic’s HDI value increased from 0.320 to 0.352, an increase of 10.1 percent. Table A reviews Central African Republic’s progress in each of the HDI indicators. Between 1990 and 2015, Central African Republic’s life expectancy at birth increased by 2.5 years, mean years of schooling increased by 2.1 years and expected years of schooling increased by 1.9 years. Central African Republic’s GNI per capita decreased by about 38.9 percent between 1990 and 2015.” (UNDP 2).

- “The 4.4 million inhabitants have a life expectancy of 45 years.” (African Union 6).

2b. What are the enrollments rates of education systems?

- “The escalation of inter-community violence in Bangui that began 26 September 2015 and resulted in insecurity throughout the country impacted the launch of the official school year on 21 September.” (UNICEF 7).

- “UNICEF placed orders for textbooks and school materials to ensure materials would be available for distribution as part of the Back to School Campaign in September 2015. Unfortunately, distribution was temporarily suspended due to an escalation of violence four days after the official launch of the academic year, resulting in a disruption of the return to school and a blocked supply corridor due to border closures.” (UNICEF 8).

- “Government budget constraints and administrative bottlenecks such as government reshuffling, including a change of the Minister of Education (there have been three Ministers over the past year) and key staff members, and continuing insecurity have delayed the start of training.” (UNICEF 8).

- “Additionally, in November 2015, UNICEF, the MoE and the Education Cluster conducted an informal survey to assess the number of schools open after the increased insecurity slowed the return to school. This survey revealed that on average, approximately 74% of schools surveyed were functioning ... which is a dramatic increase from the previous year when it was estimated that only 35% of schools were open.” (UNICEF 9).

- “The pupil to classroom ratio in the targeted provinces is estimated at 87:1.” (UNICEF 9).

- “It is expected that ... the ratio of pupils per textbook will substantially decrease from the current national ratio of ten students per textbook to approximately two students per French and Mathematics textbook.” (UNICEF 10).

- “As part of this process, PCAs valued at US\$7.9 million dollars were signed with both international and national partners, which were identified in close cooperation with the MoE through a transparent and participative selection.” (UNICEF 16).

- “the education sector in CAR is heavily centralized at the national level. Key decisions are made in Bangui and disseminated in a slow and untimely manner which can lead to poorly implemented policies and programmes. Education authorities in areas outside of Bangui often feel that their voice is not heard or the realities on the ground are not considered at the national level. Teacher salaries are paid in Bangui which results in high teacher absenteeism in classes for days or even



weeks during the school year, which significantly impacts the quality of teaching and learning.” (UNICEF 17).

- “The Central African state’s capacity to mobilize domestic financial resources is under extreme duress due to the ongoing crises ... In January 2015, based on the most optimistic scenario described in the transition plan, only 58% of the overall amount was to be covered by donor contributions. However, throughout the year, the donor component has increased from 58% to 74%.” (UNICEF 21).

- “... it is notable that approximately 25% of youth have no formal education and 42% of youth have attained at most incomplete primary education, meaning that in total 68% of 15-24 year olds have not completed primary education in Central African Republic.” [data set of 2012] (EPDC 2014).

- “... Figure 4 shows that approximately 37% of boys of primary school age are out of school compared to 47% of girls of the same age.” [data set of 2006] (EPDC 2014).

- “Nearly 66% of female youth of secondary school age are out of school compared to 42% of male youth of the same age. For youth of secondary school age, the biggest disparity can be seen between the poorest and the richest youth.” [data set of 2006] (EPDC 2014).

- “In Central African Republic, the gross enrollment rate in primary education is 95% for both girls and boys combined. This decreases to 24% in lower secondary, with a student transition rate to secondary school of 52%.” (EPDC 2014).

- “the primary completion rate is 45% ... suggest[ing] that the country has yet to achieve universal primary education.” (EPDC 2014). [this does not match the previously stated percentage of 68% having not completed primary school?]

- Male literacy rates of 15+ years is between 49-51% ; for females of the same age categories is between 24-27% (EPDC 2014).

2c. Is there adequate infrastructure?

- “Many CSOs emerged in 2003, spurred by the coup and the incapacity of the state to respond to the basic needs of the population in terms of agriculture and social services.” (Herbert et al. 5).

- “In the domain of infrastructure, the road network of the country is not regularly maintained and some communities suffer a chronic shortage of drinking water.” (Kah 41).

- “Although the country is scarcely populated, it is tormented by a multitude of armed actors. These belligerents use their weapons for a diversity of reasons but they have one thing in common: each of them would be a weak opponent for any well-organised state, but then this is exactly what the country lacks.” (Spittaels and Hilgert 3).

- “The *coupeurs* attack transports and travellers using the Central African Republic’s dilapidated roads.” (Spittaels and Hilgert 15).

- “Because of the chronic instability, neither economic transformation nor democratic political transition has been realised. The World Bank suspended its budget support in late 2010 and, despite having substantial natural resources, the CAR has not managed to reduce poverty.” (Vlavinou 319).

- “State institutions are weak and the conditions of extreme poverty that prevail in rural areas are not favourable to reinsertion, especially when opportunities to live by the gun are numerous.” (Vlavinou 324).



- “the transitional national government remains fragile: 2 successive governments in 2014. State institutions must be strengthened at the national and provincial levels, and overcome many challenges related to good governance because the latter are at the origin of many ills such as insecurity, corruption and malfunction of public services.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 4-5).

- “**Absence / dismantling of state services (health, education, water, security, justice)** : the absence of state services and institutions in the most regions remains a barrier to people's access to basis and the establishment of the rule of law. The dysfunction of the registers Registration Restricts Birth Registration and Carding national identity, which could, in the long run, increase the number of stateless.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 5).

- “This situation has been exacerbated by the current military-political crisis which has led to massive destruction of infrastructure and looting of equipment and office furniture, biomedical equipment and other equipment, including much has been provided by development partners. 80% of rolling stock allocated to health facilities in the hinterland has been affected by acts of vandalism.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 12).

- “Two thirds of CAR’s population has no access to health care, mostly due to lack of medication. 80% of the country’s health workers are estimated to be displaced; 50% of 117 assessed health facilities have been looted.” (OCHA 4).

- “Around 97% of the road network is not paved and subject to degradation during the rainy season from May to November.” (OCHA 10).

- “The security situation can and does change rapidly as was demonstrated in September and October 2015 when renewed violence in Bangui and other hotspots resulted in mass population displacement, disruption of school openings and destruction of infrastructure.” (UNICEF 17).

- “Central African Republic’s HDI value for 2015 is 0.352— which put the country in the low human development category—positioning it at 188 out of 188 countries and territories.” (UNDP 2).

- “Transporting goods from and to the CAR is extremely costly and slow ... basic goods are considerably more expensive in the CAR than in the nonlandlocked neighboring countries.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 9).

- “The condition of the classified paved road network is below the level of comparable peer countries: 62 percent is in good or fair condition in the CAR versus 80 percent in fragile states ... This divergence in the quality of paved and unpaved roads can be partially explained by the fact that 75 percent of the resources of the Road Fund—most for routine maintenance—are directed to the primary network, which is almost totally paved” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 11).

- “After years of decline, the CAR’s air transport traffic and connectivity are recovering ... Despite the recent turnaround, capacity and connectivity remain low in relative terms due to poor infrastructure and small market size. Of the 42 airport platforms, only four runways are paved.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 16-18).

- “The water potential, however, is worrisome, as the volume of water in these basins has declined steadily from year to year. The quality of surface water is also deteriorating, especially that from



the rivers, springs, ponds, and traditional wells that provide drinking water to around 70 percent of the population.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 18).

- “If one considers that only 10 percent of the water coming from wells and boreholes is safe, only 14 percent of the rural population has access to safe water versus 61 percent in urban areas.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 20).

- “Years of sociopolitical crisis in the CAR have left the power infrastructure in an embryonic state. Total installed capacity in the CAR is 39 MW, one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. But the limited infrastructure available is decaying due to scarce maintenance and needs to be completed refurbished. Half of the assets are more than 30 years old.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 24).

- “The limited availability of power translates into poor access to electricity. As of 2009 only 1 percent of the CAR’s population had access to electricity compared to 33 percent in low-income countries.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 25).

- “On average a staggering 50 percent of the generated power in the system has been lost every year since 2006. Around 35 percent of the power is lost due to nontechnical factors such as theft.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 26).

- “The CAR’s infrastructure spending needs, at 17.5 percent of GDP (using 2009 GDP), are among the average level for Central African countries and lower than comparable fragile states.” (Domínguez-Torres and Foster 35).

- “The physical state of the country’s judicial system is disastrous. As the Seleka moved out of the northeast in December 2012, its fighters stripped regional courts of furniture and fixtures, burned or destroyed court documents and stole court vehicles. Today, judicial staff lack vehicles and basic office supplies. They are irregularly paid and payments outside of Bangui are not possible because the banking system has collapsed.” (Human Rights Watch 75).



Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law

3a. Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld?

- “Post-coup, Séléka rule was marked by gross human rights violations against Christians and Muslims, although Christians were disproportionately targeted.” (Pailey et al. 6).
- “As Djotodia’s power and influence waned, anti-Séléka sentiments gained traction leading to the formation in September 2013 of Christian Anti-Balaka militias – previously private security groups of villagers comprising farmers equipped with machetes and handmade shotguns – who targeted not only Séléka but also Muslim civilians and pastoralists who were accused – rightly or wrongly – of being Séléka loyalists and allies.” (Pailey et al. 6).
- “Anti-Balaka gained the upper hand by taking over Séléka-controlled territory and targeting Muslims in a violent “spree of rape, torture, and extrajudicial executions” that international human rights organisations declared the ethnic cleansing of Muslims.” (Pailey et al. 7).
- “The *coupeurs de route* (‘road-cutters’) or *zaraguinas* are bands of road bandits ... *Coupeurs de route* often make use of extreme violence. Not solely do they loot the convoys they attack, they sometimes kill their victims and they regularly take hostages for ransom.” (Pailey et al. 15).
- “On 24 March 2013, the Séléka rebel coalition led by Michel Djotodia seized power in the CAR. This episode occasioned a general state of lawlessness, including incidences of looting, extortion, arbitrary arrests, torture and summary executions. The situation has continued to deteriorate...” (Vlavonou 320).
- “The centralisation of power in the capital city and the neglect of the hinterland have formed part of the reason why people take up arms, in a context where one fights to have access to political and economic resources.” (Vlavonou 324).
- “Michel Djotodia’s disbanded coalition has committed human rights violations on civilians and has provoked retaliation from vigilante groups. The so-called anti-balaka are themselves committing human rights violations and targeting Muslims.” (Vlavonou 324).
- “**Armed conflicts** : despite the cessation of hostilities agreement negotiated at Brazzaville, armed groups and factions of certain groups continue to carry out attacks on the civilian population, including displaced. Serious violations of human rights are reported in all areas where there are clashes, cycles of attacks and retaliation between groups forging alliances and counter alliances for the control of natural resources, political positioning, control of the territory, etc.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 5).
- “In the Central African Republic, women play a very important role in family economics and agricultural production. However, the context sociocultural is also marked by a high prevalence of mutilation female genitalia, early marriages and women's exposure to violence, especially in areas affected by armed conflict where the sexual assault was massive and spared neither minor nor older women, with serious consequences for all plans: psychological, economic and social.” [*translated from French*] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 22).
- “9 of 10 communities throughout the affected areas in Bangui and north-western CAR reported security incidents during the last 3 months; 32% of respondents participating in a Protection Cluster survey reported a risk of rape while fetching wood or water.” (OCHA 4).



- “Renewed fighting between various armed groups since September 2016 has caused new population displacements; 23 percent of the population remains displaced as of August 2017.” (World Food Programme “Central African Republic” 1).
- “In 2013, a coup involving intense sectarian violence led to 1.2 million people being displaced and a 36 percent collapse in GDP, which intensified gender and age inequalities. Conflict and displacement resulted in over 60,000 cases of gender-based violence in 2015, including 29,000 cases of sexual violence.” (World Food Programme “Central African Republic” 3).
- “In all, [by mid 2017] about 23 percent of the population is displaced either within or outside the country. Fifty percent of the population was in need of humanitarian assistance.” (World Food Programme “Central African Republic” 3).
- “Moreover, on 3 June 2015, the authorities promulgated a law creating a Special Criminal Court to investigate, prosecute and try crimes resulting from serious violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law, notably war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, committed since 1 January 2003.” (OHCHR 20-21).
- “... criminal penalties remain for incitement to ethnic or religious hatred and for the publication or broadcast of false information that could “disturb the peace.” In 2006, the government generally respected these new laws—a noticeable improvement from the previous year, when the security forces arrested, detained, and threatened journalists.” (Freedom House 2007). *[2006 was the only year that held a ‘partly free’ status]*
- “After Michel Djotodia, the Séléka leader, was installed as president that month, the security situation deteriorated and human rights abuses increased.” (Freedom House 2014).
- “In September and October, the editors of three Bangui-based dailies were extrajudicially detained and interrogated for publishing stories that were critical of CEDAD’s activities. Two of the three papers subsequently issued retractions, and Nouradine warned media outlets that journalists accused of publishing “mendacious allegations” against the state would be jailed.” (Freedom House 2014).
- “More extreme forms of censorship also occurred. With the deployment of French troops in early December, the country experienced a total news blackout for several days, as broadcasts were halted and the presses fell silent. An escalation in the violence in late December brought a second, partial blackout, as virtually all newspapers in the capital ceased publication on December 20. Most print media had not resumed operations by year’s end, and a general curfew forced radio stations to end broadcasts by 6:00 p.m.” (Freedom House 2014).
- “... also commends the courageous efforts of MINSUCA in promoting civilian protection against the abuses being perpetrated by the armed and self-defense groups, in conformity with its mandate.” (Kodjo).
- “Many civilians had their property pillaged and homes destroyed, and were thus deprived of their economic, social and other fundamental human rights. Hundreds of thousands were internally displaced, while others fled to neighbouring countries. Civilians were too often denied access to humanitarian assistance and the ability to live in dignity.” (OHCHR 9).
- “However, as of December 2012, the figures for Child recruitment and other abuses have increased sharply. In 2013, the Secretary-General of the United Nations reported in his report that both Seleka and Anti-Balaka were recruiting and using systematically children and felt that this concerned “Several thousand children”. In addition, many incidents were not documented and reported due to lack of access and limited control capabilities of the protection agencies of the child. Before the conflict, UNICEF estimated in 2000 18 the number child soldiers in CAR. In



September 2015, the agency believed that up to 10,000 had been recruited from armed groups.” (Child Soldiers International 20). *[translated from French]*

- “It is important to note that the Central African Armed Forces / FACA as such did not recruit children during the crisis because they were dissolved following the seizure of power by the Seleka.” (Child Soldiers International 20). *[translated from French]*

- “Successive constitutions have had little impact on the country’s politics ... This has prevented the emergence of effective constraints against abuses of power by political leaders, including united action by citizens when their rights are transgressed.” (du Plessis, Jansen, and Siebrits 20-21).

- “A preliminary report of the commission, which was submitted to the United Nations in June 2014, found that ample evidence exists to prove that individuals from both sides of the conflict have perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity, as well as war crimes’ (Muna 2014:26). Evidently, the constitution had failed to protect the citizens of the CAR. This confirms the very limited value of such documents when governments and citizens refuse to adhere to their stipulations.” (du Plessis, Jansen, and Siebrits 22).

3b. Is there an independent media source?

- “Several independent newspapers publish sporadically and are critical of government policies and official corruption. However, broadcast media are dominated by the state and offer little coverage of opposition activities.” (Freedom House 2003).

- “Central African Republic’s rating improved from Not Free to Partly Free as a result of positive change in the environment for the media following the government’s adherence to, and enforcement of, the new Press Law and constitution passed in 2005 respecting freedom of expression and decriminalizing libel.” (Freedom House 2007).

- “The same month, President Bozize dissolved the executive board of the newly created High Communications Council in what appeared to be an attempt to strengthen the government’s control of the media regulatory body. However, in July the president agreed to pass a new decree mandating parity between representatives of the private and public media within the council, a move supported by local journalists’ organizations.” (Freedom House 2007).

- “Private newspapers, including five dailies published in French, once offered generally competing views on politics; after the Séléka takeover, however, the diversity of the CAR’s media landscape became decidedly more muted.” (Freedom House 2014).

- “The state owns Radio Centrafrique and a television broadcaster, both of which have traditionally reflected predominantly progovernment views. However, alternatives—including Radio Ndeke Luka, international broadcasters such as RFI and Voice of America, and a number of community radio stations—are available.” (Freedom House 2014).

- “Persistent insecurity in Central African Republic makes reporting very difficult. Journalists self-censor in order to avoid intimidation and harassment, as well as legal cases filed in response critical reporting.” (Freedom House 2017).

- “Intercommunal clashes took place during the year, and while some stations were looted or otherwise saw operations disrupted, no journalists were killed. In October, attackers looted a radio station in Kaga Bandoro amid a deadly attack on the town by Séléka militants.” (Freedom House 2017).

- “Separately, in February, security agents confiscated journalist Prudence Yamete’s video recorder as she was covering activities at a polling station in the capital during the year’s general elections” (Freedom House 2017).



- “Christophe Gazam Betty, the communication minister appointed after the Seleka takeover, banned the media from talking about Seleka’s actions, notifying them that every report needed authorisation by his office and reminding the state media that they were required to support government policy under an existing decree.” (International Media Support 8).

- “As in much of sub-Saharan Africa, radio is the most popular and most important medium. There are four types of stations: state-run, independent/private, confessional/religious, and community totalling some 20-30 stations in total ... Most of these stations began in 2007- 2008 with state radio and Radio Ndeke Luka the only stations available prior to that.” (International Media Support 11).

- There are only several independent media broadcast sources (radio being the primary source of information given the illiteracy rates) that exist in the CAR, mostly created by either INGOs or NGOs; the majority have “ ... not been independent vis-à-vis the government.” (International Media Support 14).

3c. Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system?

- “The new government inherited a broken justice system, unable to investigate and prosecute those responsible for grave crimes.” (Human Rights Watch 75).

- “Moreover, as mentioned above, the composition of the coalition was not homogenous (Chadian soldiers, bandits, etc.), which meant that the rebels were not constrained by any official governmental regulations and, in their position of power, they felt that they could do whatever they wanted to whomever they wanted, transforming the CAR into a lawless state that they could no longer govern.” (Vlavourou 322).

- “the collapse of the apparatus judicial system - existing but extremely precarious - across the country reign a general feeling of impunity. The shortage of trained staff, the lack of protection of court officials, weak institutions, pressures and corruption are all factors that hinder actions in justice.” [translated from French] (World Health Organization “WHO’s Cooperation Strategy” 5-6).

- “Faced with an overwhelming number of serious violations committed within the territory of the Central African Republic, the response of successive governments has often been highly inadequate and impunity has prevailed. This impunity has been a major factor fuelling the cyclical armed conflicts.” (OHCHR 20).

- “However, in recent years, the authorities of the Central African Republic have taken some important steps in the fight against impunity. In particular, they requested the ICC to open an investigation into the crimes committed in the Central African Republic since 1 August 2012, in addition to the investigation that they had also solicited on crimes committed in 2002 and 2003.” (OHCHR 20).

- “Notwithstanding the adoption of the national DDRR strategy in October 2016 and recent progress on security sector reform, including the adoption of the national security policy, significant challenges remain. An immediate priority should be the development of a nationally owned vetting process that includes human rights background checks, including in the context of integration of demobilized armed group elements.” (OHCHR 21).

- “Also expresses deep concern about the devastating consequences of these violent actions on the fragile stabilization process in the country, and the cohesion between the communities within the CAR and the already dire humanitarian situation in the country.” (Kodjo).



- “Welcomes the establishment of the Bangui Special Criminal Court, which is expected to promote justice for the people of the CAR and fight impunity in the country, as part of the promotion of healing and national reconciliation in the CAR.” (Kodjo).
- “The extensive violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law continued unabated throughout the country, in a climate of near total impunity.” (OHCHR 16).
- “The armed conflict provided an environment in which perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence enjoyed unbridled impunity as a result of dysfunctional or collapsed institutions.” (OHCHR 17).
- “This link with conflict may be evident in the profile of the perpetrator (often affiliated with a State or non-State armed group), the profile of the victim (who is frequently a member of a persecuted political, ethnic or religious minority), the climate of impunity, which is generally associated with the collapse of the State...” (OHCHR 206).
- “The perpetrators of sexual violence still enjoy almost total impunity in a country where judicial, security and political institutions have been, even at the best of times, ill-equipped to deal with an avalanche of conflict-related sexual violence.” (OHCHR 208).
- “In Bangui, the State often failed to adequately curtail societal and mob violence, notably after January 2014, when the ex-Séléka retreated from the capital. As the violence by anti-Balaka groups spread, civilians became increasingly involved in attacks and mob violence reached unprecedented levels, with Muslims being killed and their bodies mutilated in broad daylight in the city centre, in total impunity. The whole period was also marked by numerous prison breaks, which the State was unable to prevent.” (OHCHR 246).
- “As stated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “hybrid courts can have a positive impact on the domestic justice system of post-conflict States so as to ensure a lasting legacy for the rule of law and respect for human rights”. However, this requires an unfailing commitment on the part of the national authorities and adequate support from international partners so that the Special Criminal Court can contribute to build the capacity of the overall national judicial system...” (OHCHR 293). [It has yet to do so]
- “The conflict in the Central African Republic has been marked by near-total impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity by various parties, leaving civilians across the country without justice for the many atrocities they have endured.” (Human Rights Watch 75).
 - “Rather than facing justice, the perpetrators of atrocities are too often rewarded for their unlawful conduct with promotions, including in the government and army – what some refer to as “the impunity bonus” (prime à l’impunité).” (Human Rights Watch 75).
- “No criminal trials were held between 2009 and 2014, demonstrating how the judicial system struggled before the Seleka coup ... in a country marked by widespread sexual violence, there have been only three trials for rape since 2015 ... A second criminal court session ran from August 26 to September 26, 2016, with 55 cases heard including charges such as murder, rape, pillage, conspiracy to commit a crime and illegal possession of weapons. While a start, these 55 cases will not begin to address the serious and widespread crimes that have been committed over the past three years.” (Human Rights Watch 76).



1.3 Republic of Angola

(Hypothesized Regime Type: Anocratic)

Null Hypothesis: Victimization of urban children is not present.

Variable 1: State Legitimacy

1a. Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?

- “For dos Santos and his allies, parliamentary opposition is not the major concern. Rather, the MPLA fears popular mobilization, especially in Luanda’s vast shantytowns. Public-spirited critics of the regime hope that the civic route will prevail and point to the inclusive ideas articulated by those activists now under arrest.” (de Oliveira).

- “In addition, there is a relatively closed, authoritarian, and self-confident political elite in Angola, which believes it possesses political legitimacy by having won the liberation struggle, by having won “the imperialist incursion and civil war imposed on it by UNITA, apartheid South Africa and the USA”, as well as having won the elections in 1992. It believes it has the right to rule the country, without the interference of contending social forces, organised as civil society organisations, opposition parties or otherwise.” (Amundsen and Abreu 2).

- “In sum, the Government’s approaches to civil society organisations are blurred, to put it mildly. There is a tradition of supervision, restriction and control (demonstrated among other things through the proposed new legislation on associations), but there is also a willingness to let NGOs implement some forms of service delivery and poverty alleviation (social projects within the parameters of government regulation). And, in some ministries there is a more accommodating and open attitude towards NGOs.” (Amundsen and Abreu 8).

- “The tendency of by some ministries and government agencies to control the NGOs is not general. Some ministers and MPLA party members are directly hostile to civil society and their activities, but others are rather open to civil society organisations and their engagement.” (Amundsen and Abreu 44).

- “To deflect attention from a grow- ing chorus of disaffected citizens, President José Eduardo dos Santos, a Soviet- trained oil engineer who has been in power for 41 years, uses propaganda reminiscent of Russia’s Stalinist period.” (de Morias 47).

- “With Dos Santos having been put forward as the symbol of peace and stability, anyone who dares to criticise him is branded as ei- ther ungrateful or an enemy of peace and stability. These accusations are commonly used to discredit critical voices.” (de Morias 47).

- “With Dos Santos set to retire in September, the state media is frenetically building a per- sonality cult around his anointed successor, the Soviet-educated João Lourenço.” (de Morias 48).

- “Nevertheless, in the age of the internet, Dos Santos is losing control over the flow of information. His personality cult may yet find itself on shaky ground. De Carvalho’s comments inspired a torrent of memes against him and about the air Angolans breathe. Humour has become a power- ful tool of subversion, easily disseminated through everyday interactions.” (de Morias 48).

- “Despite this restriction on freedom of expression, the internet and social media have become important alternative vehicles of expressing dissenting opinions. Since early 2011, a non-partisan youth movement inspired by the Arab Spring and organized via social media has organized a series of protests against rampant corruption, widespread poverty, lack of access to social services and the increasing restriction of freedom of expression under President Dos Santos’ rule.” (Human Rights Watch 5).



- “Human Rights Watch research indicates that the purported police investigations had failed to result in any prosecutions of those implicated in violence against protesters. This was despite victims having filed numerous complaints with the police regarding excessive use of force at demonstrations, death threats via phone and text messages, abductions, and raids on private residences to beat protesters and ransack documents. On the contrary, victims and independent observers of acts of violence during anti-government rallies told Human Rights Watch that police agents deliberately remained passive towards the aggressors and failed to provide protection to peaceful protesters.” (Human Rights Watch 12).
- “The MPLA state's dependence on the Western-controlled coastal oil industry, as well as the party's urban bias, also contributed towards the sidelining of the countryside by policymakers.” (de Oliveira 290).
- “In this context, overt coercion is rarer than weary acceptance or even support for the MPLA, with party membership having increased from about 60,000 to 4 million between 1990 and 2004, in a country of some 16 million people (de Oliveira 293).
- “Despite this impressive trajectory, Angola struggles to translate high oil rents into improved socioeconomic prospects for a large part of the population.” (Niño and le Billon 86).
- “Although such failures could have caused the demise of the MPLA, economic and political reasons converge to explain this regime’s durability. The rent management architecture in Angola is designed to reinforce the stability of the regime. Local content provisions in the oil sector as well as an array of other nonoil service provision contracts are leveraged to reward companies owned by groups and individuals with links to the regime, leading to domestic accumulation by empowering allies, co-opting potential contenders, and marginalizing opponents.” (Niño and le Billon 86).
- “Since 2002 the Angolan regime has moved on from the challenges of survival based on military strength and petroleum revenues. The Angolan state now exerts its authority over its entire territory, though with centralized political control, with MPLA legitimacy and resource extraction in mind, rather than with a public service delivery and social contract ethos.” (Niño and le Billon 87).
- “The strength of the Angolan state, however, remains (precariously) based in the centralized control and limited handouts of a party-state, rather than on the legitimacy of inclusive governance or the effectiveness of a developmental state.” (Niño and le Billon 87).
- “Strong oil revenues and access to diverse sources of (oil-backed) finance have resulted in a high degree of autonomy and self-confidence for the Angolan state. Reinforced by a vast security apparatus, undisputed authority resulting from its military victory over UNITA and the historical dividend of having been the leading independence party, the MPLA-led Angolan state can be described as robust from a durability and authority perspective. Several factors, however, severely test this apparent robustness, including an aging ruler controlling a highly centralized neopatrimonial regime; the frustrated aspirations of the urban youth; and a combination of oil dependence, stagnant economic diversification, and rising indebtedness.” (Niño and le Billon 92).
- “Resources were concentrated on a so-called ‘national bourgeoisie’ of mostly urban party loyalists, to the detriment of the majority of Angolans.” (Pearce et al. 146).
- “In the wake of the Arab Spring in early 2011 ... severe repression on the part of the regime prevented them from gathering more than a couple of thousand demonstrators in the streets of the capital, the revús extended the boundaries of Angola’s public space and were a further expression of social discontentment and regime fatigue.” (Pearce et al. 147).



- “As was discussed earlier, however, it is unlikely that the oil companies will fund programmes that aim to empower civil society, or even to build one, as it is almost entirely absent from the political scene in Angola. The companies do not want to go against the interests of the government, their partner in business.” (Tallio 403).

- “Ms. Pillay [the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights] referred here to the growing discontent observed within the Angolan youth, who did not hesitate to take the streets since early 2011 to demand social justice, good governance and fair redistribution of the benefits of the exploitation of natural resources.” (Masuku et al. 9).

Ib. Are there free, fair, and frequent elections?

- “While engaging with a limited version of democracy that does not tamper with the established mode of exercising power (mirrored in the increasing pluralism within the MPLA itself), the MPLA has deepened the ‘confusion between party, state and administration’” (de Oliveira 293).

- “The regime’s landslide electoral victory in 2008 — 82 % of the votes in a peaceful election deemed fair by observers - was followed by a new, markedly presidentialist constitution in early 2010, according to which the president will be indirectly elected by the National Assembly. This allows President dos Santos a further decade in power.” (de Oliveira 293).

- “The MPLA was able to survive and come out of the challenging years of the 1990s as a prosperous and unchal- lenged ruling party, whose official legitimacy was boosted through two rounds of elections, in 2008 and to a lesser extent in 2012.” (Niño and le Billon 87).

- “Dos Santos’s stepping down constituted a major challenge to the MPLA’s critics, since much of the political and civic opposition to the regime had centred its discourse on the president and his direct allies.” (Pearce et al. 150).

- “Elections were held on Wednesday 23 August 2017. Five parties even- tually ran against the ruling MPLA.” (Pearce et al. 151).

- “The electoral campaigning remained biased in favour of the incumbent party, as had been the case in 2008 and 2012.” (Pearce et al. 151).

- “On 3 September the leaders of the four established opposition parties— UNITA, CASA-CE, FNLA and PRS—issued a joint statement rejecting the provisional results announced by the CNE on the grounds that the elections had been conducted in an unconstitutional manner” (Pearce et al. 152).

- “It alleged ‘the disappearance of ballot boxes, the emer- gence of new ballot boxes, the disappearance of votes,’ and the illegal par- ticipation in the counting process of individuals who were not accredited to do so.” (Pearce et al. 153).

- “The four opposition parties contested the result in the Constitutional Court on the grounds that due process had not been followed in the count, but on 8 September the court rejected the suit and declared the results official.” (Pearce et al. 153).

- “This unexpected reversal, which came after three weeks of combative rhetoric on the part of both leaders, prompted sharp criticism from civil society and in online media that the opposition leaders had effectively legitimized a fraudulent election by backtracking on their earlier resolve to boycott parliament.” (Pearce et al. 154).



1c. Is there state corruption and political violence?

- "... the grievances of many Angolans, until recently manageable, have come into the open. Keen in recent years on putting up a more technocratic face, the MPLA regime has responded by massively increasing repression." (de Oliveira).

- "About a month earlier, a tussle between police and followers of a Christian sect in Huambo Province led to violence on a massive scale. The event is still shrouded in mystery: Luanda has refused to allow an independent investigation of the incident, despite international demands (including from the UN) that it do so. But the account offered by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, the main opposition party, suggests that as many as 1,080 people were murdered after members of the sect killed between four and nine police officers." (de Oliveira).

- "The MPLA is a formidable machine that is still relatively cohesive: Angola's security sector expenditure is larger than that of Nigeria and South Africa combined, and the armed forces, intelligence services, and police remain loyal to the president." (de Oliveira).

- "'The missing millions' is a familiar concept for informed Angolans, and also the World Bank, IMF and other international actors have raised concern about the problems of management of government revenues in Angola. Some observers are claiming that all state income is accounted for and made transparent through the National Bank and the budget process, but others are arguing that large parts of the Government's income, in particular from the oil and diamonds sector, are still unaccounted for." (Amundsen and Abreu 11).

- "... civil society organisations can exercise some pressure on the Angolan government by repeatedly asking for information, figures and analyses, assess the accuracy of information and make inquiries about discrepancies." (Amundsen and Abreu 12).

- "The government has responded to those protests – despite their relatively small scale – with excessive use of force, arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, obstruction and intimidation of journalists and other observers. Increasingly the security forces have used unnecessary lethal force against protesters and organizers." (Human Rights Watch 5).

- "The main perpetrators of violence during protests have been groups of armed individuals, who act with complete impunity, and appear to be security agents in civilian clothes. Since March 2012, the threats and armed attacks against protest leaders by these plainclothes security agents – who are known in Angola as "caenches" ("muscle men") or "militia" – have increased and appear to be systematic. They included attacks against protesters in their private residences, abductions, and possible enforced disappearances." (Human Rights Watch 5).

- "In addition to the unresolved Cabinda conflict, the armed forces and the police have been used in the violent deportation of tens of thousands of illegal migrants, mostly from the DRC ... allow[ing] the government to demonstrate its ruthlessness when challenged." (de Oliveira 293-294).

- "the state simply does not have the manpower to cope with the expansion of statist tasks implied in the ambitious reconstruction blueprint. Incompetence, and not just corruption, is an important part of the story." (de Oliveira 295).

- "Even at the 2002—4 height of international criticism of oil sector corruption in Angola, the enthusiasm of foreign oil investors, as well as their home governments, never wavered. Angola's woes remained a niche concern in the mainstream media. Yet there was enough momentary unease with the quality of Angola's governance to create a quasi-consensus amongst prominent Western states and the Bretton Woods institutions that a donors' conference should be postponed until the Angolan government could explain the whereabouts of missing oil revenues and commit itself to implementing some of the reforms put forward by the IMF." (de Oliveira 300).



- “However, it is noteworthy that Angola’s system of patronage has not been predatory or incompatible with the emergence of an efficient and productive sector, which has been the case in many other oil- producing countries.” (Niño and le Billon 87).
- “Lourenço’s assertiveness emerged sooner than expected ... within less than two months, Lourenço had dealt major and seemingly irreversible blows to the Dos Santos circle.” (Pearce et al. 157).
 - “He closed down GRECIMA, a propaganda bureau at the presidency that for years had funnelled tens of millions of dollars in contracts to a company, Semba Comunicação, owned by two of Dos Santos’s children.” (Pearce et al. 158)
 - “He quickly replaced Dos Santos’s central bank governor by a respected former central banker and used the pretext of a Swiss criminal investigation to fire the Dos Santos-linked presidential economic adviser, ushering in a politically robust replacement who will de facto oversee the economic and finance ministries from the presidency.” (Pearce et al. 158)
 - “In Angola, such moves are unprecedented and have been enthusiastic- ally welcomed by numerous constituencies ... This support was apparent not just from traditionally critical corners of society but also from inside the MPLA, where the desire for renewal and the offloading of responsibilities for the country’s dismal situation was partly associated with cutting the interests of the Dos Santos circle down to size. However, three obstacles were said to stand in the way of Lourenço’s reforms.” (Pearce et al. 158).
- “The situation is paradoxical and is likely to stay that way: Angola ranks 161st out of 175 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index and the redistribution of wealth is almost non-existent: though GNI per capita is US\$5,170, the country ranks 149th in the Human Development Index” (Tallio 404).
- “Human Rights Watch and other organizations have documented the immense scale of corruption and financial mismanagement in Angola since the civil war; at the same time, millions of impoverished Angolans have been deprived of access to basic social services.” (Human Rights Watch 7).
- “According to most of the interlocutors met by the Observatory delegation, corruption is an alarming scourge in Angola, and is highly evident within the public administration – government, judiciary, police – and the private sector – in particular within the extractive industries.” (Masuku et al. 9).
- “As seen above, endemic corruption is another scourge of the justice system in Angola, which is the reflection of a more generalised phenomenon observed within various spheres of the soci- ety. Corruption within the judiciary contributes to the lack of confidence in this sector and, in a context where access to legal aid remains the exception, discourages victims of human rights violations from addressing their grievances before national Courts.” (Masuku et al. 12).



Variable 2: Public Services

2a. How is the public health?

- “About 36% of the population currently lives below the poverty line and has limited access basic public services (water, sanitation, energy, health, education and housing).” (World Health Organization 12).
- “Childhood diseases account for most infant and child mortality...” (World Health Organization 14).
- “Chronic malnutrition affects about 15.6% of Angolan under-five children. It is considered a secondary cause of mortality in two out of every three deaths within this age group.” (World Health Organization 15).
- “Communicable diseases still account for more than 50% of deaths recorded within the population. The situation is worsened by the high prevalence of malnutrition among under-five children and the exponential increase in recorded cases of chronic non communicable diseases” (World Health Organization 15).
- “Increased mortality from road accidents is a cause for concern. It is now the second cause of death in the country, aggravated in large part by alcohol and drug abuse, which also fuel the increase in cases of violence (especially domestic violence) in the country.” (World Health Organization 15-16).
- “Angola 2025: The main objectives of this strategy are to eliminate hunger and extreme poverty and reduce development disparities between the various regions of the country. The major guidelines of this national strategy include: public policies to eradicate hunger and reduce poverty as a degrading social ill, and the control of disease and illiteracy as barriers to socio-economic development. These are determinants that have a clear impact on the health status of the population and, consequently, on the socioeconomic development of nations” (World Health Organization 16).
- “Over the last five years, the neonatal mortality rate declined to 42/1000 live births; the infant mortality rate was 116/1000 live births while under-five mortality was 195 /1000 live births” (World Health Organization 20).
- “Immunisation coverage also improved, rising steadily from 81% in 2009 to 93% for Penta 3 in 2013, and from 79% to 91% for measles during the same period (World Health Organization 20).
- “According to the survey on malaria indicators conducted in 2011, prevalence fell from 21% in 2006, to 13% in 2011, representing a 30% decline” (World Health Organization 20).
- “The efforts made by the Government of Angola have facilitated the implementation of strategies to eradicate poliomyelitis. The country has not recorded any case of polio since July 2011. Similarly, leprosy has been eliminated as a national public health problem since 2005, and there has been a reduction in the maternal, infant and child mortality rates. Furthermore, immunization has improved with a steady increase in coverage.” (World Health Organization 25-26).
- “With regard to the attainment of MDG 6, the Government invested heavily in HIV, malaria and tuberculosis, and also in mobilizing the Angolan Armed Forces for public health activities, particularly HIV prevention through a successful country-wide prevention programme.” (World Health Organization 26).



- “The child population (under five years of age) is 20% of the total population. The population less than 15 years of age is about 47% and 49% in urban and rural areas, respectively.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 22).

- “The average life expectancy at birth in Angola is currently estimated at 52 years and 51 for men and 53 for women.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 22).

- Corroborated by the WHO that states the life expectancy to be 51 (World Health Organization 26).

- “Nationally, only 42% of the population use an appropriate source of drinking water.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 24).

- “With regard to sanitation, only 53% of the aggregates have some type of toilet in home. The proportion of families with a toilet at home is higher in urban areas (74%).” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 24).

- “The Nutritional Survey in 2007, revealed that 8.2% of children under five years suffered from acute malnutrition and 29.2% had a moderate chronic malnutrition situation.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 24).

- “The prevalence of HIV infection in Angola is estimated at 1.98% in the population sexually active.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 29).

- “1. Limited number of skilled professionals;
2. Weaknesses in the management of services;
3. Weak supply of water and energy, to health facilities and population;
4. Poor sanitation of the environment;
5. Poor response to the social determinants of health.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 75).

- “Churches played a core role in health provision, especially in rural areas ... The health centres run by religious organisations became an integral part of the health landscape in Angola.” (Tallio 392).

- “In the aftermath of the war, the health system in Angola had to recover from destruction and neglect. Sixty-five per cent of the infrastructure had been destroyed, and much equipment was either broken or stolen; what remained was ill-maintained and could provide only a very low quality of health care.” (Tallio 395).

- “In 2007, government expenditure on health reached 5 per cent of total government expenditure, far below the southern African average (10.3 per cent) and the African average (9 per cent)” (Tallio 396).

- “Public sector health care expenditure has suffered a reduction, partly due to the international financial crisis which has had a negative impact on the country. The 2009 budget appropriation has been reduced by 30%, rendering unviable the fulfillment of some of the intermediate goals which had been set for that year. Initially estimated at 8.38%, the health budget dropped to 6.39%. The overall health budget dropped from 3.2% to 2.38%. The table below provides a breakdown of budget appropriations between 2004 and 2009.” (ACHPR “Implementation of the” 39).

2b. What are the enrollments rates of education systems?

- “In the education sector, UNESCO rates Angola as a country with a low Education for All Development Index (EDI), placing it in the 111th position out of 120 countries in its 2012



Education-for-All rankings, with a value of 0.685 and a gender-specific EFA index of 0.734” (World Health Organization 12).

- “As for literacy and education, statistics show that over 76% of households in the urban environment and 55% in rural areas, have access to the school within a radius of 2 km from their residence. About 29% of children They have to travel daily over 2km to attend school. In general, 34% of the population [in] Angola is still illiterate. In rural areas, this proportion reaches more than 70% of the population, double the that takes place in urban areas.” *[translated from Portuguese]* (Ministry of Education 23).

- “With regard to education, net attendance rate in education is 76% nationally. At girls enter school with the correct age (55%) and a higher percentage than boys (49%), which contributes to a higher incidence of primary education for girls. Consequently, 62% of women complete primary, compared to 50% of men.” *[translated from Portuguese]* (Ministry of Education 23).

- In 2011, the net enrollment rate for primary education was 84% (male 95% and female 73%) (The World Bank “Education Statistics”).

- Primary completion rate for the same year was overall 50% (male 63% and female 36%). (The World Bank “Education Statistics”).

- According to the Angola Ministry of Education, the completion rate was 57.1% (Ministry of Education 38).

- In 2010, net secondary enrollment rates were 12% (male 14% and female 11%). (The World Bank “Education Statistics”).

- As of 2014, the adult literacy rates, 15+ years (%) were overall 66% (male 80% and female 53%). (The World Bank “Education Statistics”).

- The government’s expenditure on education as % of GDP in 2010 was 3.5 , below average for Sub-Saharan Africa of 3.836% in 2010 (The World Bank “Education Statistics”).

- And in 2010 as total government expenditure (%) was 8.7% (The World Bank “Education Statistics”).

- The repetition of a grade from primary school was rated by the World Bank at 13% (2014 “National Education”) and the Ministry of Education at 21% (2010).

- “The gross enrolment rate in primary and secondary schools rose from 13.19 per cent in 2014 to 97.5 per cent in 2016.” (UNCRC 11).

2c. Is there adequate infrastructure?

- “There was no institutional continuity in the civil service, courts, or the armed forces; bar the oil industry, all sectors of the fairly diversified late colonial economy perished immediately or were soon suffocated by socialist planning.” (de Oliveira 290).

- “Defence expenditure actually increased 2.5 times between 2005 and 2009, at first sight a dubious allocation of resources. . . the maintenance of one of the largest and most competent armies in sub-Saharan Africa is explained by the fact that it had become central to the exercise of power in Angola and the broader region” (de Oliveira 292).

- “The government's sensibility and the population's needs were aligned on this early emphasis, which resulted in unambiguous successes such as the rebuilding of much of the coastal and



highlands road networks. But general reconstruction expenditure (as well as that for the 2010 Africa Cup which Angola hosted) has taken place through questionable procurement processes and in the absence of budgetary oversight. Quality control was non-existent, and construction companies appointed on account of their insider status rather than on the basis of merit or cost effectiveness.” (de Oliveira 294).

- “However, average Angolans have not been the target of much government expenditure since 2002.” (de Oliveira 295).

- “... the health budget increased considerably, from 153 million kwanzas in 2009 to 346 million in 2014. It also shows a significant increase in the execution of the general State budget (GSB) from 65% in 2009 to 91% in 2013, stemming from the growing absorption capacity of the health sector.” (World Health Organization 8).

- “However, persistent problems, such as the poor quality and limited supply of human resources needed for the implementation and management of programmes, as well as the non-transfer of financial resources to the primary level, could undermine the steady improvement of execution capacity.” (World Health Organization 8).

- “The following results were achieved in each sector during the 2009-2011 period[:]

- There was a huge increase in the student enrolment in non- university establishments (15%); an improvement in the gross enrolment ratio (29% in 3 years); an increase in the number of classrooms (9%); rapid growth in higher education student enrolment (68%) and teaching staff (21%); and a surge in the number of internal scholarships (200%) and external scholarships (21%)” (World Health Organization 5).
- “There has been a significant increase in the number of rehabilitated and newly-built health posts and centres, and in activities relating to continuing education, supervision of health units, monitoring of activities and presentation of results” (World Health Organization 6).

- “The health system in Angola is based on the Primary Health Care and Hospital Assistance Programme, which covers health services from the community level right up to a more complex level.” (World Health Organization 22).

- “The health needs and problems currently encountered by the NHS relate mainly to: (i) insufficient coverage and poor maintenance of health centres; (ii) poor referral and counter-referral system between the three levels of the NHS; (iii) limited human resources and health technicians, in quality and quantity, and poor distribution of personnel in rural and peri-urban areas; (iv) weaknesses in the health management system, including the information, logistics and communications systems; (v) scarcity of financial resources and poor financing model; and (vi) limited access to safe drinking water, sanitation and energy.” (World Health Organization 22).

- “The country is still experiencing a quantitative and qualitative shortage of human resources in health.” (World Health Organization 51).

- “The network delivery of health care from the National Health Service consists of 2,356 units health, and 1,650 health centers, 331 health centers, 43 maternal and child health centers, 165 hospitals local, provincial hospitals 25, 20 central hospitals and 83 non-typeable units” [*translated from Portuguese*] (Ministry of Health 33).

- “There is an asymmetric distribution of human resources in Angola, with an excessive focus on large urban centers. With the initiative of expanding the training of doctors, by creating



five new Schools of Public Medicine in Cabinda, Malanje, Benguela, Huambo and Huila, will be enhanced the profile of human resources in Angola.” [translated from Portuguese] (Ministry of Health 33).

- “Angola’s transport infrastructure suffered extensive damage during the civil war years, with destruction and neglect leading to the closure of most of the road and rail networks. However, over the last decade, the Angolan authorities have undertaken huge investments in the rehabilitation of the road, railway, port and air infrastructure, most of it financed by Chinese loans and credit lines that are transforming the country’s infrastructure.” (Dionisio 1).

- “Specifically, the level of public spending for roads and bridges has amounted to US\$12.7 billion in the last decade, or over 30 per cent of total public investments. Angolan authorities also expect to spend US\$22.6 billion during 2013-2025 in the construction of new roads and the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing ones. This makes the country one of the highest spenders on road infrastructure in Africa.” (Dionisio 1).

- “Angola has three railway systems run by public companies which ... is extremely important as a means to reach the interior of the country, as the inland towns and cities have been cut off from the developments that have been taking place in the coastal regions for many years.” (Dionisio 2).

- “In particular, the Port of Luanda is the main route for international trade, handling over 80 per cent of Angola’s imports. It is also the main center for ongoing food product import operations, the energy industry and general-cargo and container operations. As a major transit port not only for Angolan goods but also for the DRC, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Luanda is one of the fastest-growing ports in Africa. This growth created handling constraints leading to port congestion for both general cargo and container traffic.” (Dionisio 2).

- “Angola’s main international airport is located in Luanda and is served by several international and regional airlines ... The international terminal of the Luanda airport was renovated in 2010 before the African Cup of Nations, which was hosted by Angola.” (Dionisio 2).

- “Angola’s HDI value for 2015 is 0.533— which put the country in the low human development category— positioning it at 150 out of 188 countries and territories.” (UNDP 2).

- “Between 2000 and 2015, Angola’s HDI value increased from 0.391 to 0.533, an increase of 36.4 percent.” (UNDP 2).

- “Between 1990 and 2015, Angola’s life expectancy at birth increased by 11.5 years, mean years of schooling increased by 0.6 years and expected years of schooling increased by 7.6 years.” (UNDP 2).

- “Due to a lack of relevant data, the MPI [Multidimensional Poverty Index] has not been calculated for this country.” (UNDP 5).

- “Infrastructure needs to be (re)built: roads, schools, health centres, as well as the educational and health systems, and private companies are largely in charge of this process, in particular implementing entire areas of public health through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes.” (Tallio 389).

- “Named ‘angolanizacao’ (Angolanisation), and started in 1982, it aims at strengthening the national economy, with the oil sector as trendsetter. Most of the components are standard: the hiring of Angolans, vocational training programmes, preference for purchasing national goods and services, and so on. One aspect is of particular interest for our research: the obligation by law to re-invest a portion of profits in social projects.” (Tallio 392).



- “Every enterprise has to spend annually US\$1 million for every 100,000 bpd produced. Esso, for example, spends US\$15 million per year, including US\$6.5 million as their angolizacã o obligation.” (Tallio 392).



Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law

3a. Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld?

- “In addition to the historical and structural factors described above that are inhibiting to civil society organisations in Angola, there is also a deliberate government policy of restricting the room for manoeuvre and the possible political impact of civil society organisations.” (Amundsen and Abreu 6).
- “Angola is a lawful democratic State, resting on the will of the people, the Constitution and the law, the separation of powers and interdependence of functions, national unity, freedom of expression and a pluralist political system, and on a representative and participatory democracy.” (ACHPR “Implementation of the” 5).
- “Under the implementation of the recommendations relating to the ratification of international legal instruments on human rights, Angola has demonstrated its commitment to adhere to almost all international treaties” [*translated from Portuguese*] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 11).
- The implementation of the Charter and the Maputo Protocol takes place under the execution of public policies, taking into account the commitments made at national and international level, to create necessary conditions for the effective realization of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of all Angolans, enshrined in the Angolan legal system and international legal instruments of Human rights.” [*translated from Portuguese*] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 15).
- “The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights published in 2014, 2000 copies of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights which is being distributed and disseminated in seminars and other activities of the Intersectoral Commission for the Preparation of National Reports on Human Rights (CIERNHD) and under the Provincial Committees on Human Rights.” [*translated from Portuguese*] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 15).
- “To address overcrowding in prisons and improve living conditions of the prison population, the Angolan state has been implementing a set of combined measures, legislative, judicial and administrative level...” [*translated from Portuguese*] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 20).
- “In all the country's prisons inmates have guaranteed three daily meals, medical care and treatment that in addition to the network of prison hospitals, health centers and medical posts of establishments is complemented by public hospitals.” [*translated from Portuguese*] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 20).
- “The restrictions referred to in Article 19 of the Covenant requires, like other legal frameworks that the offender (journalist or not) answer a criminal case for defamation, insults or slander in accordance with paragraph 3 and 4 of Article 40 of the CRA and 407 ° and 410 Articles of the Criminal Code, plus the ability to account for disciplinary and civil proceedings.” [*translated from Portuguese*] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 25).
- “We think that the imposed restriction is intended to protect the particular interest of offended, then I do not understand how there can be interest of the state to violate or restrict the right to freedom of expression.” [*translated from Portuguese*] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 25).
- “Despite these many health problems, services, particularly reproductive health services, are seldom available to girls. The lack of accessible health facilities, and lack of money for transport,



medical treatment and drugs has meant that the health status of survivors of sexual violence is often poor.” (Denov 826).

- “...in Angola, when entering and attacking a settlement, older women and women with young children were left behind while men were captured and killed and children aged ten and above were targeted and abducted.” (Denov 817).

- “The lack of updated and reliable social statistics and disaggregated data has undermined independent monitoring of Angola’s policies and practices affecting social and economic rights, and efforts at reform.” (Human Rights Watch 11).

- “Most street traders Human Rights Watch interviewed in Luanda live in informal settlements, in neighborhoods that lack basic services, such as access to running water, electricity and basic sanitation. Seventy-five percent of Luanda’s population today lives in informal and peri-urban settlements (*musseques*) with little or no legal protection of tenure, which makes them vulnerable to forced evictions.” (Human Rights Watch 12).

- “Street traders in Luanda experience daily roundups by police and fiscals who routinely use excessive force and subject traders to humiliating and degrading treatment. They also regularly confiscate goods and extort bribes. Such violence and public humiliation, often inflicted in view of numerous witnesses, includes beatings with batons and other objects, kicking, slapping, and punching, resulting in injuries including bruises, swollen arms, legs and faces.” (Human Rights Watch 18).

- “Many street vendors told Human Rights Watch that pregnant women, girls and women carrying small babies on their back are rarely spared from beatings. The fact that pregnant women and those carrying their babies are usually slower in running away during a crackdown makes them more vulnerable to beatings. There were unconfirmed accounts of pregnant street vendors having miscarriages as a result of beatings.” (Human Rights Watch 19).

- “Despite the adoption, in 2010, of a Constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms and despite the establishment of institutions mandated to promote and protect them, the socio-political context in Angola is still marked by political and economic patronage, marginalisation of the opposition, lack of transparency and accountability, widespread poverty, inequalities, endemic corruption, impunity and the volatile situation in the Cabinda province. In such a context, human rights defenders advocating for the respect of the rule of law, good governance and accountability, are facing various forms of hindrances.” (Masuku et al. 7).

- “Widespread poverty, huge disparities, demolitions, forced evictions and corruption in Angola have been denounced by several international human rights agencies, including the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights” (Masuku et al. 9).

- “Despite an apparent willingness of the Angolan authorities to uphold their human rights commitments and obligations, human rights defenders operating in this country are facing various forms of hindrances to their effective capacity of action, resulting in particular not only from the weaknesses of the legal and institutional human rights framework, but also from the lack of political will to permit dissenting voices.” (Masuku et al. 15).

- “While most of the demonstrations were announced in advance to relevant authorities, in accordance with the law, demonstrators met by the Observatory reported having witnessed or having been severely beaten by police forces and brought to police stations injured. Demonstrators



also reported the presence of armed men in plain clothes who were allegedly helping the police to attack demonstrators.” (Masuku et al. 30).

- “The repression increased in 2012, in the pre-electoral context.” (Masuku et al. 30).

- The Angolan Government and the United Nations report back to each other on the status of women/child/human rights on a regular basis with recommendations, improvements, and questions with the Angolan Ministry of Human Rights and official Angolan Government websites providing links to this information on the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights website:

<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=Sp&CountryID=5>.

3b. Is there an independent media source?

- “Although the Angolan law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, at times the government restricted these rights in practice and media and journalists practices self-censorship. Both radio and print media have criticized the government openly and at times harshly, and there has been an increased media attention on the upcoming elections, corruption, economic mismanagement, and opposition politics. Even when the government continues to limit access by independent journalists to certain events and officials, in particular through the law that permits the government to classify information, there have in contrast to earlier years been no reports lately that journalists have been investigated, harassed or imprisoned.” (Amundsen and Abreu 30).

- “The private media are self-censored (except for a few weekly opposition magazines that are publishing editorials and comments of a very political nature, including accusations of individual ministers and other elite persons). The private media are indeed un-professional and sales-oriented (publishing gossip and scandals with little substantiation and research). Foreign journalists must receive authorization from the Ministry of the Interior to meet government officials or to travel within the country.” (Amundsen and Abreu 30).

- “The media landscape is mostly dominated by state-owned media. Angola only has one daily newspaper, the state-owned Jornal de Angola, also known as “the Pravda” for its rabid defence of the regime. The private media sector is dominated by outlets owned by ministers, generals and other high-rank- ing MPLA officials, thus making the internet the only forum for freedom of expression in the country.” (de Morias 48).

- “Nevertheless, frequent threats of criminal defamation lawsuits by senior officials have considerably contributed to self-censorship.” (Human Rights Watch 11).

- “Journalists have been regularly arrested, detained, and questioned by the authorities while trying to cover the protests in Luanda and elsewhere over the past year [2012].” (Human Rights Watch 9).

- “The growth of print media outlets (and from late 2008, TV Zimbo) is an important development in this regard even if their quality is often disappointing. However, the salient characteristic of this period is not the MPLA’s acceptance of dissenting views, but rather its consistent penetration of civil society organisations and professional associations, often dependent on the largesse of presidential foundations, achieving de facto political control while extolling their pluralism.” (de Oliveira 293).

- “... both state and private media are controlled by the regime...” (Pearce et al. 152).

- “Today, human rights defenders and journalists remain vulnerable. They continue to work in an environment where they face regular judicial and administrative harassment, threats and various forms of restrictions to their freedom of association, expression and/or assembly, in particular when they raise concerns over “sensitive” issues such as govern- ance, access to justice, corruption, forced displacement and evictions, exploitation of natural resources or the situation in the Cabinda



province.” (Masuku et al. 31).

- “The impunity enjoyed by those responsible of acts of harassment and intimidation further contribute to this situation of vulnerability.” (Masuku et al. 31).

- “In a context where the State owns the unique daily newspaper, national television and radio, independent media, not affiliated to the Government, are facing difficulties in reaching a wide and diverse audience, in particular outside Luanda.” (Masuku et al. 24).

- The media has had a “not free” status under the Freedom House “Freedom of the Press” index for the past 16 years, even since the end of the civil war in 2002 (Freedom House).

- “While some journalists practice self-censorship when reporting on sensitive issues, the private print and broadcast media are generally free to scrutinize government policies. However, coverage at state-owned outlets favors the ruling party. The government has reportedly paid journalists to publish complimentary stories and has discouraged advertisers from buying space in independent newspapers, thus threatening their financial viability.” (Freedom House 2003).

- “Laws regarding state security and insult hamper the free activities of the media. In 2010, the parliament passed a new state security law to replace a 1978 law, known as Article 26, which the government often used to imprison opposition journalists and activists. While the new law represents an improvement, it still allows for the detention of persons who “insult” the Republic of Angola or the president in “public meetings or by disseminating words, images, writings, or sound.”” (Freedom House 2014).

- “The government has used these laws to harass members of the independent media, with journalists William Tonet and Rafael Marques de Morais facing regular pressure for their efforts to expose corruption and human rights violations.” (Freedom House 2014).

- “The government both owns and keeps tight control over the largest media outlets in the country ... Nevertheless, several independent weeklies are critical of the government” (Freedom House 2014).

- “Conditions remained poor in 2014, which was marked by defamation cases against journalists and the closure of one of the country’s last remaining independent newspapers.” (Freedom House 2015).

- “Angola enacted a freedom of information law in 2002, ostensibly granting citizens access to government-generated documents. However, accessing information remains extremely difficult in practice for independent journalists and news organizations without government ties, and key parts of the legislation, such as the creation of a monitoring commission, have not been implemented.” (Freedom House 2015).

- “While harassment, intimidation, and imprisonment of journalists were less common in 2014 than during the previous year, coverage of sensitive subjects like antigovernment protests, human rights violations, or corruption among government officials remains risky.” (Freedom House 2015).

- “No journalists were known to have been murdered in 2014.” (Freedom House 2015).

- “Denial of state and private advertising as a method of pressuring independent news outlets continues to be a problem.” (Freedom House 2015).



- “Online sources are becoming increasingly important sources of critical news, though not many people have internet access outside of urban areas.” (Freedom House 2016).
- “The government prevented independent journalists and members of civil society from investigating a botched police operation that reportedly led to a massacre in Huambo province in April.” (Freedom House 2016).
- “In Angola, the sudden closure of *Semanário Angolense* by its unknown new owners in 2014, and its failure to recommence publication in 2015, leaves *Folha 8* as the country’s only remaining private, independent newspaper with significant circulation.” (Freedom House 2016).

3c. Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system?

- “International treaties can and has been applied directly to the Courts Angolan whether the Constitutional Court whether the courts Commons.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 11).
- “Meanwhile, in Angola there is the Ombudsman, which is a public entity, independent, which aims to defend the rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens ensuring, through informal means the justice and legality of public administration.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 15).
- “A set of organs ensure and administer justice in Angola, taking place the nature of the Democratic State and of Law: Constitutional Court, Supreme Court; Provincial Courts; Municipal courts; Military courts, the Court of Auditors.” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 21).
- “The Angolan Constitution guarantees the rights of all citizens to not be arrested or put on trial except in accordance with law, the defense, the appeal and to legal representation, assuming innocence until the final judgment of conviction sentence (Article 67 of the CRA).” [translated from Portuguese] (ACHPR “Sixth and Seventh” 21).
- “With a view to ensuring compliance with Human Rights principles, the President of the Republic has delegated powers to:
 - The Ministry of Justice, which has jurisdiction over the Provincial Human Rights Committees;
 - The Secretariat of State for Human Rights, which implements human rights policies in general.” (ACHPR “Implementation of the” 10).
- “Under the judiciary, human rights issues are handled by the following institutions:
 - The Courts – sovereign bodies administering justice in the name of the people.
 - The Office of the Ombudsman for Justice – a public and independent institution which protects human rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens. It uses informal means to ensure that justice is served and that public administration operates within the law.
 - The Office of the Attorney General – a State body whose function is to represent the State, namely in the exercise of criminal justice and as guardian of the rights of individuals. It upholds the law while exercising jurisdictional powers and overseeing criminal proceedings, including compliance with sentences.” (ACHPR “Implementation of the” 11).
- “In its Electoral Manifesto and Government Program (2012-2017), the MPLA committed to prioritize its actions towards consolidation of peace and strengthening of democracy, with particular attention being given to structural reforms within the judiciary and promotion of human rights” (Masuku et al. 8).



- “However, these commitments are yet to be upheld and seen in practice.” (Masuku et al. 8).

- “Most of the interlocutors met during the mission of the Observatory described the [judiciary] sector as one subjected to political interference; obstructed by a lack of proper knowledge and reference to national and international human rights laws and treaties in force; suffering from a lack of sufficient material and human resources and one afflicted by endemic corruption.” (Masuku et al. 12).

- “The lack of appropriate material (obsolescence of the infrastructures, lack of means of transportation or communication) and human (lack of prosecutors and judges, lack of sufficiently qualified personnel, in particular on national and international human rights law) resources also contribute to the inefficiency of the Angolan judicial apparatus. These obstacles result in the considerably long delays in the finalisation of judicial cases, a situation that is even worse in the provinces.” (Masuku et al. 12).



1.4 Republic of Ghana

(Hypothesized Regime Type: Democratic)

Null Hypothesis: Victimization of urban children is not present.

Variable 1: State Legitimacy

1a. Does the government in power hold the confidence of the people?

- “Ghana has been identified as one of the few countries in Africa where democracy has recorded some remarkable progress” (Akin and Ade 69).

- “However, some political observers lay claim to the fact that Ghana, since the beginning of the present Republic, has remained politically stable and made some surprisingly remarkable progress which put the country on the path of democratic consolidation.” (Akin and Ade 70).

- “Ghanaian masses have consistently demonstrated complete confidence in democracy and accepted it as the only legitimate way to rule. The political elite in the country too have learnt to abide by the regulations guiding the practice of democracy while election has been acknowledged as the only means of getting access to power.” (Akin and Ade 71).

- “Furthermore, the political sophistication demonstrated in Ghana after the sudden death of president Atta Mill in 2012 was another evidence of the love and resilience of Ghanaians for democracy” (Akin and Ade 71).

- “Furthermore, the way and manner the supporters of the NPP and NDC in Ghana were appeased to shun election violence during the 2008 presidential election debacle was an evidence of the level of political sophistication of the Ghanaian masses.” (Akin and Ade 71).

- “... a survey conducted by Skanning across the countries in sub-Saharan Africa shows that the Ghanaians are the most satisfied with the growing level of their democracy in Africa” (Akin and Ade 71).

- “Nonetheless, some anti-democratic behaviours like vote buying or money politics are still common phenomenal in Ghana. Some politicians in the country believe that Parliamentary primaries are won by the highest bidders.” (Akin and Ade 71).

- “As a means of preserving the peace, unity and tranquility which relatively exist in Ghana, leaders of faith based organizations and civil society groups regularly adopt various peacekeeping initiatives ... they usually emphasise the fact that Ghanaians have more to gain staying together than when the country is fragmented. This peace effort is usually intensified across the country during electioneering campaign. This has to a large extent, helped to keep peace and unity in the country.” (Akin and Ade 72).

- “This is why the World Bank, in its 2009 World wide governance indicators, reported that Ghana has achieved significant progress on all dimension of governance assessed, including accountability, political stability and governance effectiveness which are elements of democratic consolidation.” (Akin and Ade 73).

- “Although, it is not yet eureka in Ghana, the country is still struggling with some anti-democratic practices such as executive recklessness, abuse of power by political elites, vote buying, money politics and campaign of calumny among others which the political elite in the country need to address. Nevertheless, when compared with other democracies in Africa, one may conclude that Ghana is experiencing a period of political freedom which makes it an example of working democracy that is setting the pace for other countries in Africa.” (Akin and Ade 75).



- “Although it is not possible to generalise from the one example, Ghana provides a particularly favourable context for democracy promotion measures. Therefore, if policy performance is poor here, it is argued that it is unlikely to be better elsewhere in Africa in places where the political environment is less conducive to external democracy promotion.” (Crawford 572).

- “Worst of all, the NPP [in 2007] appeared more and more to be disregarding the public and taking the electorate for granted. During the election year, the government purchased presidential airplanes, dismissed the concerns of local fishermen about poaching by foreign trawlers, and stubbornly refused to reduce the price of petroleum despite the fall in the world- market price of crude oil in the latter part of the year.” (Gyimah-Boadi 140).

- “Until Akufo Addo’s presidency in 2017, it had been mythologised that in order to win an elections in Ghana, a presidential candidate had to have the name, ‘John’. The challenge that Akufo Addo faced, because of his name, is encapsulated in a comment that an observer made: ‘And if you are a superstitious person, Ghanaians have elected only Johns as president since our return to democratic rule. But Nana Addo is not a John, unlike Mahama’” (Kwarteng 59).

- “Both the Court and the Church pressured the state to maintain a level playing ground. Their major concern was the ‘ghost register’, as opposition groups complained about the names of dead persons on the register. The Supreme Court ruled that the Electoral Commission has a duty to compile a credible register.” (Kwarteng 63).

Ib. Are there free, fair, and frequent elections?

- “Elections are keenly contested because the two parties have almost equal strength. For instance, in the 2008 presidential run-off election, the NDC won 50.22 per cent while the NPP had 49.77 per cent. Similarly, the NDC got 50.70 of the total votes cast in 2012 presidential election while NPP got 47.74 of the total votes” (Akin and Ade 72).

- “Despite the robust party system however, the two major political parties in Ghana have been challenged for the way and manner they raised their campaign funds ... What made this allegation more popular is the failure of the two political parties to submit their audited financial records to the country’s Electoral Commission as demanded by the constitution” (Akin and Ade 72).

- “Ghana, in the Fourth Republic has had seven successful general elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016) including three democratic change of party in government.” This allows them to pass the two-turn test (TTT) of democracy (Akin and Ade 73).

- “Of note, 44 percent of Ghanaian Afrobarometer Round 5 survey respondents expressed concern about electoral intimidation. The 2008 election, which received high marks from election observers after a second round run-off and a razor-thin margin of victory for the opposition NDC, nonetheless had pockets of electoral fraud, violence, and intimidation.” (Ferree and Long 632).

- “Although Ghana prohibits accompanied voting and has adopted techniques for ensuring ballot secrecy, competitive pressures coupled with pervasive expectations of patronage create incentives to work around these practices.” (Ferree and Long 632).

- “We also use additional data from a 2008 exit poll conducted in Ghana to show that doubts about ballot secrecy cluster by polling station and constituency, suggesting that these perceptions are rooted in an underlying, common, community-based source. Finally, we show that perceptions of ballot secrecy correlate with several measures of campaign intensity, evidence that these perceptions reflect deliberate efforts by parties to convince voters that their ballots are not secret ... If voters believe outside actors can determine how they vote, then accepting a gift bears a burden of reciprocation.” (Ferree and Long 643-644).



- “Mills’s inauguration signified Ghana’s second peaceful transition of power from incumbent party to opposition. In parliamentary elections held concurrently with the first-round presidential contest on December 7, the NDC won 114 of the 230 seats to the NPP’s 107. These exceptional events have confirmed Ghana’s place as a beacon of hope for democracy in Africa.” (Gyimah-Boadi 138).
- “The [2008] electoral playing field was generally level, and the parties pursued their campaign objectives with little hindrance. Most parties had developed and publicized their manifestos, helping to make the elections relatively issue-based.” (Gyimah-Boadi 142).
- “in the context of a hotly contested election, the major parties enjoyed relatively equal opportunities to pursue votes.” (Gyimah-Boadi 142).
- “Ghana transitioned from decades of political instability in the immediate post-independence era to a decade of a stable quasi-military experiment (1982-1992) and then to a stable multi-party democratic rule from 1993 to date.” (Abdul-Gafaru 87).

1c. Is there state corruption and political violence?

- “The opposition NPP claimed that the president’s gesture was meant to woo the chiefs who were very influential in their respective domains to mobilize votes for the president and his party (Abdulai, 2014). This kind of political corruption is one of the things that can engender slow death to democracy.” (Akin and Ade 71).
- “The high rankings of Rwanda, Ghana and Mali are a reminder of the democratic achievements in many parts of Africa.” This refers to Gilley’s ‘Legitimacy scores, mid to late 2000s, 0 to 10, all countries’ table on page 696, placing Ghana (score 6.00) as the second most democratic African state, behind Rwanda (6.11). (Gilley 696).
- “The government’s reputation was also tainted by allegations of narcotics trafficking, highlighted by the 2007 conviction and imprisonment in the United States of ruling-party parliamentarian Eric Amoateng and the botched investigation into cocaine scandals involving senior police officers” (Gyimah-Boadi 140).
- “The perception of corruption also dogged the Kufuor government. Reports of extravagant expenditures abounded...” (Gyimah-Boadi 140).
- “Outgoing president Kufuor refused to declare a state of emergency in the face of looming violence in NDC strongholds, and he urged the presidential candidates not to take to the streets but rather to accept the authenticated results of the elections and to rely on the courts to redress outstanding grievances.” (Gyimah-Boadi 145).
- “Ghana’s civil society—including religious, secular, and professional organizations, as well as think tanks and civic-advocacy bodies—acting individually and in groups, was strong and savvy enough to monitor the entire electoral process from beginning to end, thereby enhancing its transparency. Civil society’s interventions, along with media vigilance, helped to keep the campaign issue-based and peaceful.” (Gyimah-Boadi 145).
- “Some eminent diplomats, including the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, cautioned the government that such a restraint on the media would be a violation of UN principles. Annan, a Ghanaian citizen, further advised that the government should not ban the social media on the day of election, in order not to create any wrong impression that the Electoral Commission and the Inspector General of Police were colluding to rig the 2016 elections.” (Kwarteng 63).



- “Though it is hard to conclude that there is an ideological convergence between the radical NDC and the conservative NPP, it can be concluded that there is complementarity of elite values among Jerry Rawlings and Akufo Addo. Both leaders campaigned against corruption within the NDC in the 2016 elections. After Akufo Addo [of NPP] was installed as president, Jerry Rawlings publicly stated that he respects the new President’s ‘principles’ and ‘values’, as well as his anti-corruption credentials.” (Kwarteng 64).

- “Rawlings stated that Akuffo Addo is not corrupt, when testifying to the integrity and credibility of Akufo Addo. Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings, the wife of the NDC’s founder, told voters to root out the NDC in 2016 because of corruption. Rawlings, himself, did not endorse Mahama for a second term. The former first family tagged the NDC leadership as incompetent and corrupt, and did not publicly support the NDC retaining power in 2016.” (Kwarteng 64).

- “During the 2012 election dispute, Akufo Addo chose the ‘rule of law’ in Court, instead of the ‘rule of the mob’ on the streets. He was accordingly rewarded in 2016.” (Kwarteng 65).

- “Despite being touted as a vibrant emerging democracy in Africa and rated as a full democracy by the Freedom House, corruption is endemic in Ghana.” (Nsia-Peptra 62).

- “The mischaracterization has masked the exploration of the correlation between Ghana’s “democracy” and its endemic corruption despite the numerous scholarly works.” (Nsia-Peptra 62).

- “Ghana’s democracy is flawed with illiberal practices such as monetized politics, winner take-all politics, vote buying, electoral frauds and violence, political vigilantism, judicial corruption and selective justice, and a lack of punishment of the politically connected corrupt persons. These illiberal practices are incompatible with democratic ideals of rule of law and accountability and perpetuate corruption. The recent revelations of corruption involving officials in governance, judiciary, bureaucracy and their cronies in the private sector are clear manifestations of Ghana’s failure in fighting corruption.” (Nsia-Peptra 63).

- “The judiciary is corrupt, and some magistrates receive bribes and set criminals free. In 2015, the celebrated under-cover journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas exposed 34 judges involved in corruption by accepting and making demands for bribes to throw away cases including robbery, murder and corruption.” (Nsia-Peptra 69).



Variable 2: Public Services

2a. How is the public health?

- “The study has shown that only 35% of the health centres in Ghana [in 2008] are efficient and even though this findings is perfectly inline with other findings from other developing countries particularly from Africa...” (Akazili et al.).
- “Huge gaps in geographical access to quality health care exists throughout the country due to rural-urban differences, poor distribution of health facilities and mal-distribution of health staff with rural and urban slum communities having disproportionately poorer access to quality health care.” (Ghana Health Service “National Health” 15).
- “Poor communication and community participation in health care, poor quality of health care delivery in the health facilities, inefficiency in resource utilisation and centralized health sector decision making are key factors that have been identified to perpetuate this inequity.” (Ghana Health Service “National Health” 15).
- “The poor are marginalized in society are most affected due to inadequate strategies to ensure financial protection for them. The currently available strategies, which include the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP), are limited in offering complete protection for all the poor and marginalized.” (Ghana Health Service “National Health” 17).
- “Persistently high neonatal, infant and maternal morbidity and mortality, especially at health facility level has been the bane of the health service currently and demands a review of the current state of proven interventions to address gaps and challenges identified. High numbers of malaria cases are reported by health facilities despite the roll of out of interventions over the years and declining community level prevalence. Access to HIV treatment and TB cure rates also need to be improved.” (Ghana Health Service “National Health” 23).
- “Ghana is in a health transition with regards to disease burden. Ghana has attained Lower Middle Income Status with diseases associated with life style and behavior fast replacing the traditional diseases from infections and malnutrition.” (Ghana Health Service “National Health” 30).
- “The private sector and NGOs, including the Christian Health Association of Ghana, provide over 40 per cent of health care in Ghana, especially in the rural areas.” (World Health Organization 3).
- “Life expectancy at birth is 57.5 years on average (55.4 years for men and 59.6 years for women). Ghana is experiencing an epidemiologic transition with an increasing prevalence of noncommunicable diseases.” (World Health Organization 3).
- “The major causes of child mortality include malaria, diarrhoea, and upper respiratory infection” (World Health Organization 3).
- “HIV infection, hypertension, diabetes mellitus and road traffic accidents are major causes of mortality in adults” (World Health Organization 3).
- “The burden of vaccine-preventable diseases is declining.” (World Health Organization 6).
- “Human resources for health development remain a critical issue for quality health service delivery.” (World Health Organization 8).
- “The disease profile is characterized by high levels of communicable and pregnancy-related conditions and rising noncommunicable diseases rates resulting from the unfavourable



socioeconomic and sociocultural environment. The disease pattern continues to be dominated by communicable diseases, under-nutrition and poor reproductive health. The health sector is under-funded, and there is low human resource capacity because of the emigration of health professionals.” (World Health Organization 9).

- “Public spending as a % of GDP (2007-2011*) allocated to: health 2.7” (UNICEF).

- “Total expenditure on health as % of gross domestic product (2012): 5.2” (Ghana Health Sector “2017” 19).

- “Total expenditure on health as % of gross domestic product (2007): 8.8” (Ghana Health Sector “2011” 15).

- “The calculation shows that the relative allocations to the health sector are significantly lower than previously presented. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that government’s commitment to health has been increasing over the past 5 years” (Ministry of Health Ghana 20).

- However, the UNDP shows a continuing decrease since 2010, as does the World Bank (UNDP; The World Bank “Current Health”)

- “According to the UNAIDS report on the global AIDS epidemic 2013, the risk that a woman living with HIV would transmit the virus to her child was 31% in 2009. This risk declined to only 7% in 2012, but has since been stagnant at this level.” (Ministry of Health Ghana 36).

2b. What are the enrollments rates of education systems?

- “Youth (15-24 years) literacy rate (%) 2008-2012*, male 88.3
Youth (15-24 years) literacy rate (%) 2008-2012*, female 83.2” (UNICEF).

- Adult Literacy Rates, 15+ years, (%) 2010: Male: 78; Female: 65 (The World Bank “Education”).

- “Primary school participation, Net enrolment ratio (%) 2008-2012*, 83.9 male
Primary school participation, Net enrolment ratio (%) 2008-2012*, 84.8 female” (UNICEF).

- “Primary school participation, Survival rate to last primary grade (%) , 2008-2012* 72.2, admin. data” (UNICEF).

- Primary Completion Rate (2015): Male: 101; Female: 101 (The World Bank “Education”).

- “Secondary school participation, Net enrolment ratio (%)2008-2012*, 48.1 male
Secondary school participation, Net enrolment ratio (%)2008-2012*, 44.4 female” (UNICEF).

- Net Enrollment, Primary (%) (2016) – Male: 87; Female: 88 (The World Bank “Education”).

- Net Enrollment, Secondary (%) (2016) – Male: 54; Female: 54 (The World Bank “Education”).

- “Public spending as a % of GDP (2008-2010*) allocated to: education 8.2” (UNICEF)

- Percentage of Population with no Education:

2003 – Male: 17.6; Female: 28.2

2008 – Male: 13.3; Female: 21.2

2010 – Male: 18.7; Female: 27.9

2014 – Male: 9.4; Female: 19.1 (Ghana Health Service “Facts and Figures 2017” 14; Ghana Health Service “2011” 11).



- “Complementary Basic Education (CBE) programme provided access to 182,652 out-of-school children over the last four-years (2013/14-2016/17). The CBE recorded a cumulative completion rate of 67 percent of which 92 percent have transitioned to the formal school system;

- commenced work on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of 76 dilapidated school structures and 80 kindergarten blocks for primary schools;
- commenced the implementation of the Free SHS Programme in September by absorbing all fees approved by GES Council for 353,053 first year students and also released subsidy for continuing students in Senior High Schools” (Ghana Ministry of Finance 8).

- “The growing workforce is well-educated by sub-Saharan standards and nearly 54% of the population has at least secondary education. Government expenditure on education – 8.2% of GDP – is higher than in Kenya or South Africa.” (PwC 45).

2c. Is there adequate infrastructure?

- “Ghana has had a four-decade long experience of decentralization reforms, and has also experienced one of the fastest growth rates of urbanization in Africa during the last three decades.” (Abdul-Gafaru 84).

- “However, as cities have grown in both population and area, they have been less successful at providing basic services to local residents. Between 2000 and 2010, there was an increase in the proportion of households without any toilet facility in all city size groups.” (Abdul-Gafaru 84).

- “Importantly, because of the winner-takes-all character of Ghanaian politics, each ruling coalition is characterised by a high degree of vulnerability in power, leading to the politicisation of public institutions. In this context, patronage-based appointments in Ghana has become a norm; every transition of power is accompanied by the removal of a significant number of senior public servants perceived to be associated with the previous regime.” (Abdul Gafaru 87).

- “the findings here suggest that given the constraints imposed on subnational authorities from the centre, governance reforms that focus exclusively on the micro-environment (or within-city political dynamics) will have little chance of success in terms of improved service delivery for urban populations.” (Abdul-Gafaru 101).

- “One of the challenges facing the health care delivery system is the management of resources especially human resource ... With regards to distribution of the available human resource, there is a great inequity to the disadvantage of rural and deprived areas.” (Ghana Health Service “National Health” 18).

- “The country’s economy is dominated by agriculture and the service sector which contribute 42% and 38% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) respectively... Poverty levels in Ghana decreased from 51.7% in 1991-1992 to 28.5% in 2005-2006. Extreme poverty has also declined from 36.5% to 18.2% over the same period.” (World Health Organization 2).

- “Collaboration between the MoH and partners in health development in Ghana is a major reason for successes achieved in the health sector.” (World Health Organization 11).

- “Ghana’s HDI for 2015 is 0.579. However, when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 0.391, a loss of 32.5 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices.” (UNDP 4).



- “The breadth of deprivation (intensity) in Ghana, which is the average deprivation score experienced by people in multidimensional poverty, is 45.4 percent.” (UNDP 6).
- “The provision of infrastructure and operations in all modes of transport in Ghana are dominated by the state. Except in the case of road transport, the public sector has been heavily involved in operations in all modes and has monopoly over rail and inland water transport.” (GIPC).
- “On the whole, traffic densities are low, except in the large cities of Accra and Kumasi, where peak hour densities are relatively high. The intention is to have many of the existing highways tolled and private-sector participation in road construction and ownership” (GIPC).
- “There are firm plans by the Government to develop the rail network more extensively to handle up to handle up to 60% of solid and liquid bulk cargo haulage between the ports and the interior and /or the landlocked neighbouring countries to the north of Ghana and elsewhere.” (GIPC).
- “Plans are far advanced to privatize the State-owned Ghana Railways Corporation (GRC) through concession and to provide much greater capacity for rail haulage of containers and petroleum products. Government also has plans of linking the suburbs of Accra to the central business area by rail and also links the north to the south to serve the landlocked countries north of Ghana” (GIPC).
- “The country is at the hub of an extensive international (and national) airline network that connects Ghana to Africa and the rest of the world. Most major international carriers fly regularly to Kotoka International Airport (KIA) in Accra, the main entry point to Ghana by air.” (GIPC).
- “However, for the state of Ghana’s rural economy could simply be described as underdeveloped and unstructured, with poverty being a crucial issue. Ghana Statistical Service (GSS, 2000, 2007), in its review of poverty trends in the country since the early 1990s, argues that poverty in Ghana is predominantly a rural phenomenon.” (Mensah et al. 510).
- “The proportion of households that receive water through public sector infrastructure such as pipe-networks for in-housing plumbing, public stand pipes and even protected wells (boreholes) remains very low.” (Mensah et al. 510).
- “[the results] suggest that the impact of access to water on household’s economic welfare is largely dependent on the level of the household’s private capital endowment, whereas access to public transport and electricity has a positive and significant effect for all households, irrespective of endowment in private assets.” (Mensah et al. 514).
- “Ghana’s investor attractiveness is buoyed by its political stability (one of Africa’s most stable governments), economic liberalism, abundant natural resources and diverse economy.” (PwC 43).
- “On the downside, critical limiting factors are the rising tax burden, weak rule of law, as well as the country’s growing fiscal deficit.” (PwC 43).
- “Civil liberty improves Ghana’s investment attractiveness, as does its legal and regulatory framework, which the World Bank/IFC’s Doing Business Projects rates highly in sub-Saharan Africa for protecting investors’ rights and interests.” (PwC 44).
- “However, despite its political stability and fairly favourable business environment, security remains an issue. Violent crime has grown in frequency over the past years and armed robberies have occurred in expatriate residential areas.” (PwC 45).
- “Ghana’s most pressing challenge lies in the power sector, where the lack of reliable power is a major constraint to economic growth. Due to rising demand and problems with the reliability of



hydroelectric supply, the country is increasingly reliant on expensive oil-based generation.” (PwC 45).

- “Ghana is currently undergoing a transformation from an agriculture- based economy towards one that is industry and services based. Oil and gas are playing a role of growing importance in this transition.” (PwC 46).

- “However, agriculture is still a vital sector in Ghana and provides employment for more than half of Ghanaians.” (PwC 46).

- “Important weaknesses remain in infrastructure, timeliness and tracking and tracing [of customs]. Although the efficiency of Ghana’s customs clearance procedures (speed, simplicity and predictability of formalities) is not exceptional (103rd), it has improved consistently since 2007.” (PwC 46).

- “Ghana has an advanced infrastructure platform when compared with other low-income countries in Africa. But as it approaches the middle-income threshold, Ghana will need to focus on upgrading its infrastructure indicators in line with this benchmark. Like electricity, infrastructure presents a major constraint to growth.” (PwC 46).

- “Unlike in many other African countries, Ghana’s infrastructure backbone covers the entire national territory and helps to integrate its different regions. However, the distribution of infrastructure networks generally reflects the spatial distribution of economic activity, with a greater density of transport, power, and information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure in the south and southwest of the country than in the north.” (PwC 46-47).

- “Ghana’s railways network is insignificant and appears to be largely neglected. It currently handles less than 2% of freight and passenger traffic. Rail infrastructure is concentrated in the south and was designed to transport export commodities. The network forms a triangle that links Accra-Kumasi- Takoradi, and currently only the Western line (Kumasi-Takoradi) is partially operational.” (PwC 47).

- “Roads carry 95% of passengers and 98% of the country’s freight ... Although rural road quality is remarkably good, the physical extension of the rural network appears inadequate. Urban congestion remains a particular problem in the main centres.” (PwC 48).



Variable 3: Human Rights and the Rule of Law

3a. Are political, economic, and civil rights upheld?

- “The Government has also ruled out the use of high tariffs to protect domestic industries.” (PwC 44).
- “Still, the middle- class population, with per capita consumption levels of US\$4-20 per day, presently constitutes only 19.8% of the total population.” (PwC 44).
- “Civil liberty improves Ghana’s investment attractiveness, as does its legal and regulatory framework, which the World Bank/IFC’s Doing Business Projects rates highly in sub-Saharan Africa for protecting investors’ rights and interests.” (PwC 44).
- “Property rights are poorly protected and corruption persists due to overall weakness in the rule of law. Still, Ghana suffers less from corruption than other countries in the region, and among the least of all 10 countries survey in this report.” (PwC 44).
- “The strong support for the rule of law and the belief that the president is law-abiding are consistent with the findings of previous Afrobarometer surveys in Ghana. In each survey round since 2005, substantial majorities have expressed the views that Parliament ought to monitor the president, that the president must obey the laws, that citizens must obey the government, and that the president never or rarely ignores the laws or Parliament” (Dumenu and Armah-Attoh 4).
- “Moreover, most Ghanaians say a wealthy person can probably pay a bribe or use personal connections to get around legal obligations. Large majorities see it as “somewhat likely” or “very likely” that a rich person could use bribes or personal connections to avoid going to court (83%), avoid paying taxes (84%), or register land that does not belong to them (88%) (Figure 5). In contrast, about one-third of respondents say it is likely that an ordinary person could do the same.” (Dumenu and Armah-Atto 6).
- “The Minister of Finance has not yet established the levy to fund mental health services, provided for in the Mental Health Act. Some provisions in the Mental Health Act presume the incapacity of persons with psychosocial disabilities, limiting their ability to make decisions about where they live and what treatment they receive, and undermining their rights under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” (Human Rights Watch “Ghana Should Implement”).
- “Despite important progress, conditions in psychiatric hospitals and prayer camps have not significantly improved since Human Rights Watch extensively documented a range of abuses in 2012. Psychiatric hospitals remain overcrowded and unsanitary.” (Human Rights Watch “Ghana Should Implement”).
- “Violence against women and girls remained rife, with nearly 10,000 cases reported to the Ghana police Domestic Violence Support Unit in 2012. Violence against women was thought to be under-reported, and not adequately addressed by the authorities.” (Amnesty International “Annual Report”).
- “Sexual activity between consenting adults of the same sex remained a crime under Ghana's Criminal Code. Violence against people suspected of same-sex relationships continued.” (Amnesty International “Annual Report”).
- “Over the past decade, Ghana has made progress in the advancement of gender equality and empowerment of women in political, economic and social spheres.” (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 5).



- “Concerns were raised around unfair trials and poor prison conditions for people on death row, as well as the shackling of people with psychosocial disabilities. LGBTI people continued to face discrimination, violence and police harassment.” (Amnesty International “Ghana”).

3b. Is there an independent media source?

- “Ghana’s status declined from Free to Partly Free due stepped-up attempts to limit coverage of news events and confiscation of equipment; increases in violence directed at journalists by the police, the military, political party members, and ordinary citizens, including the first murder of a journalist in more than 20 years; and continued electricity outages that impaired media production and distribution.” (Freedom House 2016).

- “Ghana’s reputation as one of the freest media environments in sub-Saharan Africa was tarnished in 2015 by a series of physical attacks against journalists, often by state officials, as well as by intensifying legal and financial pressure on reporters and media outlets.” (Freedom House 2016).

- “According to the African Media Barometer, a joint project of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) foundation and the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), in 2016 there were 58 authorized television operators in Ghana and 481 FM radio stations, of which 31 were state-owned, 345 were private, 79 were community-owned, and 21 were operated by universities.” (Freedom House 2017).

- “Dozens of newspapers, including 2 state-owned and 3 private dailies, publish regularly. Use of the internet is growing, with about 35 percent of people accessing it in 2016.” (Freedom House 2017).

- According to Freedom House reports, Ghana maintained that status of “Free” from 2001 up until 2015, when in 2015 the impending elections sparked reactions of attempted censorship and violence against journalists (Freedom House).

- “Judging from the scores measuring performance in the three pillars of open governance, Control and Oversight stands out as the best performing part of Ghana’s open governance regime, while transparency is the weakest. The poor performance in transparency is due largely to lack of a Freedom of Information Law.” (Ghana Integrity Initiative 10).

- “The overall performance standards is not impressive. There are still many gaps in many areas of Ghana’s open governance regime which need to be addressed by updating existing legislation, enacting new ones and creating the necessary supporting institutions to ensure that legislation is enforced in practice to achieve the desired goals.” (Ghana Integrity Initiative 3).

- “While these gaps persist in Ghana’s open governance regime, it does appear that the country may not have the political appetite to undertake reform measures to improve the situation. This is because in spite of eagerly signing on to become a member of the Open Government Initiative (OGP) in 2011 it does not show sufficient enthusiasm that it will carry through the programme. It has a National Action Plan on the OGP initiative but the cabinet has not yet approved it, raising questions over how deep the commitment is.” (Ghana Integrity Initiative 3).

3c. Do violations of rights get punished by an official judicial system?

- “The Ghanaian judiciary has demonstrated its autonomy and impartiality over the years through some politically sensitive landmark judgments which it has delivered, in some cases against the ruling party.” (Akin and Ade 74).

- “Consequently, the constitutional paradigm in which the national laws and court systems are regarded as the only avenues for settling disputes between political and civil disputants is now ingrained in Ghanaians civic culture.” (Akin and Ade 75).



- “Unfortunately, the Ghanaian constitution permits the president to appoint the serving Judges of the highest court to serve on Public Boards ... One can say unequivocally that this development can compromise the independence of the judiciary especially, on cases which involve the executive arm of the government.” (Akin and Ade 75).

- “Effective combat of corruption requires that offenders, irrespective of their social status or political affiliation, be exposed and severely punished. That almost never happens in Ghana. Allegations of corruption involving high-level public officials and co- horts of the ruling party usually go unpunished.” (Nsia-Pepra 69).

- “According to Afrobarometer’s latest national survey, Ghanaians overwhelmingly reject both mob “justice” and the lawless activities of political vigilante groups. An overwhelming majority of Ghanaians call for vigilantes to be prosecuted, irrespective of their political-party affiliation.” (Appiah-Nyamekye and Armah-Attoh 1).

- “Most Ghanaians believe it is “wrong and punishable” for party vigilantes to attack government appointees whose appointment they disagree with (88%), to lock up government offices to protest unfulfilled expectations of employment (87%), and to destroy state property (91%).” (Appiah-Nyamekye and Armah-Attoh 2).

- “Eight of 10 Ghanaians (81%) say citizens should always rely on the police to deal with suspected criminals. About one in seven (15%), however, think it is sometimes acceptable for citizens to administer instant “justice” – a view that is shared by 39% of residents in the Upper West and Northern regions.” (Appiah-Nyamekye and Armah-Attoh 2).

- “After a few months in office, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government gets fairly positive marks for how it is handling illegal activities of political-party vigilante groups. A slight majority (53%) of Ghanaians say the government is performing “fairly well” or “very well” on the issue. However, one-third (34%) of citizens rate the government’s efforts negatively.” (Appiah-Nyamekye and Armah-Attoh 6).

- “The 2017 Afrobarometer survey in Ghana suggests that citizens value and insist on the rule of law in the country but see important inequities in how the law is applied.” (Dumenu and Armah-Attoh 1).

- “Nine in 10 Ghanaians (90%) say it is important for citizens to obey the government in power regardless of whom they voted for ... Furthermore, Ghanaians overwhelmingly endorse the legitimacy of key state enforcement agencies. Large majorities “agree” or “strongly agree” that the police always have the right to demand that people obey the law (88%), that tax authorities have the right to make people pay taxes (87%), and that the courts have the right to make decisions that people must always obey (78%).” (Dumenu and Armah-Attoh 2).

- “While Ghanaians support the rule of law and say the president respects and obeys the laws and courts, there is a widespread – and growing – belief that laws are not applied in an equitable manner. Two-thirds (67%) of Ghanaians say officials who commit crimes “often” or “always” go unpunished; only about one-quarter (24%) think ordinary people get away with crimes.” (Dumenu and Armah-Attoh 4).

- “Over-time trends show that public perceptions of unequal treatment have been increasing (Figure 4). Between 2008 and 2017, the proportion of respondents who say that officials “often” or “always” escape punishment for crimes rose by 39 percentage points. Similarly, the perception that people are treated unequally under the law grew by 29 percentage points.” (Dumenu and Armah-Attoh 5).



- “Ghanaians clearly believe in the rule of law and in the president’s respect for democratic practices enshrined in the law. However, they increasingly see the law as being applied unequally, giving unfair advantages to officials and the wealthy.” (Dumenu and Armah-Attoh 6).
- “Court procedures were long and slow. Access to legal aid was limited or non-existent and some prisoners spent years waiting to be tried. Prisons were overcrowded and failed to provide inmates with basic services, including medical care.” (Amnesty International “Annual Report”).
- “The government continues to promote equitable access to Justice through the Judiciary. In this direction, there are Human Right Courts that support GE and WE issues. In addition, the Judiciary has established two Gender-based and Sexual Offences Courts to expedite the adjudication of cases of violence and abuse. There is also the Legal Aid Scheme which facilitates access to justice for persons who are unable to afford justice.” (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 9).
- “Stereotypes and harmful practices continuously affect the protection of women and girls. In this respect, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) has played a major role since its establishment in 1993. CHRAJ has sustained a vigorous campaign against all aspects of injurious and dehumanizing cultural practices such as female genital mutilation, widowhood rites, forced marriages, ritual servitude, and maltreatment of women accused of witchcraft, as well as other violent practices that subject women and the girl child to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and acts that detract their dignity.” (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 10).
- “Weak accountable governance: Existing governance institutions and democratic structures are weak in gender and social protection. It is not clear how gender equality and social protection are accounted for in governance and democracy. The greatest threats to good accountable governance come from corruption, violence, especially violence against women and girls and poverty. All of these undermine transparency, security, participation and fundamental freedoms.” (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 18).
- “Women have limited access to justice: weak legal frameworks, poor institutional infrastructure, non-compliance, lack of knowledge about service delivery points, inadequate legal aid scheme and personnel worsen women’s access to justice. These continue to limit progress towards the empowerment of women in Ghana, and results in failure to attain the required gender justice and human development targets.” (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection 17).
- “Access to justice remained limited, especially for people from low income or marginalized backgrounds. The Ghana Legal Aid Scheme suffered from funding shortages; just 23 lawyers offering legal aid were available to the country’s population of more than 28 million people.” (Amnesty International “Ghana”).
- “The government took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security forces or elsewhere in the government, but impunity remained a problem.” (US Department of State 1).
 - “Police brutality, corruption, negligence, and impunity were problems. While the constitution and law prohibit such practices, there were credible reports police beat, raped, and otherwise abused suspects and other citizens. There were delays in prosecuting suspects, reports of police collaboration with criminals, and a widespread public perception of police ineptitude.” (US Department of State 5).
- “While the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, it was subject to unlawful influence and corruption. Judicial officials reportedly accepted bribes to expedite or postpone cases, or to “lose” records.” (US Department of State 5).



1.5 Evidence of Shift in Victimology

DRC

Are children victimized as witches?

- “Unfortunately, in Kinshasa children are often accused of witchcraft and they are blamed for the family’s tough living conditions. Such accusations often drive children away from their homes and into the streets.” (SOS Children’s Villages International “Kinshasa”).

- “The information and analyses presented are all drawn from various research studies as well as from the experience our programme has gained through the reunification and reintegration of almost 2,000 children in the cities of Kinshasa and Mbuyi-Mayi.” (Molina 5).

- “In September 2004, a brutal example of violence against children took place in the town of Mbuyi-Mayi. Small-scale miners successfully encouraged the population to hunt down and kill street children. At least 16 children were killed in horrific circumstances, burned alive, stoned, their throats slit, or knifed to death. Dozens more were wounded and hundreds fled the town to hide in the bush. According to a report from the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, some of the victims were scarcely 10 years old. Reunification programmes supported by Save the Children have shown that a large number of these children had been rejected by their families, accused of witchcraft.” (Molina 20-21).

- “Since the early 1990s, particularly in large towns, accusations have shifted to children, the number of such allegations skyrocketed, and the subsequent treatment has become increasingly violent.” (Schnoebelen 14)

- “Advocates estimate that more than sixty percent of the 25,000 street children in Kinshasa have been kicked out of their homes due to allegations of witchcraft, “making it the number one cause of homelessness among youths.”” (Schnoebelen 14-15).

- “The Minister of Social Affairs estimates that there might be as many as 50,000 children being held in churches—often in dismal conditions—as they await exorcism.” (Schnoebelen 15-16).

- “In the context of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, decades of war have led to the breakdown of family and social networks, contributing to the increase in witchcraft accusations against children.” (Schnoebelen 4).

- “According to available sources and our own information, thousands of children accused of witchcraft have been thrown out of their homes and are currently living in the streets of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).” (Cimpric “Children Accused” 14)

- “Reports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suggest that most of the 25,000 – 50,000 children living on the streets of the capital, Kinshasa are there because they have been accused of witchcraft and rejected by their families. In 2009 The Committee on the Rights of the Child noted that in the DRC “violence against children accused of witchcraft is increasing...” (OHCHR “Witches in the 21st”).

- “Cases of children being harmed, abused or killed as a consequence of witchcraft allegation practices have been documented mainly in countries in Africa and concern Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania.” (Hanson and Ruggiero 5).



- “The rise of the phenomenon of child witchcraft in central Africa, in particular the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is, according to de Boeck, also due to changes in the concept of childhood.” (Hanson and Ruggiero 10).
- “A recent survey [in 2017] of 1,000 pastors in Kinshasa, DRC, found that 70 per cent of respondents knew at least one child aged five or under who had been abused as a result of witchcraft accusations.” (Howe et al. 4).
- “Unicef estimates that there are 20,000 children living on the streets of Kinshasa alone as a direct result of such accusations.” (Howe et al. 8).
- “In Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, accusations are mostly levelled against children. NGOs in the city estimate that as many as two thirds of all of the city’s tens of thousands of street children have been chased away from home due to witchcraft allegations.” (Dörrie).

Are elderly women victimized as witches?

- “Fabrice and his friend did not mention the classic ingredients of African Pentecostal witchcraft such as “tradi- tion” (biloko ya bakoko), “the village” (mboka), “féticheurs”, “the elderly” or nkisi (power objects used by witch doctors); rather they used analo- gies with American society to explain Kinshasa’s spiritual insecurity. And technology was central: television was the theme of the pamphlet, while smartphones and the Internet dominated our conversations.” (Pype 118).

CAR

Are children victimized as witches?

- “Cases [of child accusations] have also been reported – although in lower numbers – in Douala, Cameroon (Pilot, 2004), in the Republic of the Congo, between Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire (Yengo, 2008; Makulo, 2005) and in the Central African Republic (CAR).” (Cimpric “Children Accused” 15).
- “Hundreds, or even thousands, of children and elderly people – women in particular – have been accused of being witches in CAR. Belief in witchcraft is widespread in the region, but accusing children is a more recent development.” (Bannor-Addae). [*published in 2009*]
- “Cases of children being harmed, abused or killed as a consequence of witchcraft allegation practices have been documented mainly in countries in Africa and concern Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania.” (Hanson and Ruggiero 5).
- “Anti-witchcraft violence is therefore social (and gender) domination as well as social coercion. Indeed, some social groups seem to be more vulnerable to violence than others. Marc Augé (1976) had already pointed out that, although anyone can be suspected of witchcraft, the accusation usually focuses on the poorest people, especially women. It is as if some social actors – old widows without families, disabled people and, increasingly, abandoned children – embody the failures of their community.” (Cimpric “Kill the Witch” 128).

Are elderly women victimized as witches?

- “In the Central African Republic, since the beginning of 2001, around thirty people suspected of involvement in “suspicious” deaths have been accused of witchcraft and lynched.” (Cimpric “Children Accused” 13). [*It is assumed that these 30 “people” are adults, and not children, for otherwise it would have been specified as such*]



- “There is little data to document witchcraft accusations in CAR – so UNICEF is gathering comprehensive information on the issue to support advocacy work and help stop these serious human rights violations against women and children.” (Bannor-Addae).
- “It is noteworthy that the [2012 EU annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy] report also mentions witchcraft practices in two countries but not related to children, in particular Tanzania (in relation to the killing of elderly women), and the Central African Republic (as a general human rights issue raised during the political dialogue meetings)” (Hanson and Ruggiero 26).
- “UNHCR indicated that between 2010 and 2011, around 400 victims of witchcraft accusations were reported. It recommended the reinforcement of prevention and response mechanisms to effectively address violence against women, with the assistance of the international community; and increase sensitization campaigns with the local authorities and judiciary to fight violence resulting from witchcraft accusations as well as traditional practices and socio-cultural factors which endanger women and girls in particular.” (UNHRC “Compilation Prepared” 6).
- “Although the number of incidents is likely to be higher, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights documented 45 cases of human rights violations related to witchcraft accusations during the reporting period. Women, the elderly, children, and people with disabilities are common targets of witchcraft accusations, which have resulted in detention, torture, or death.” (USCIRF).
- “In the Central African Republic (CAR), many of the accused elderly women are languishing in various jails. The interim president of that country who herself is a woman was in 2014 quoted as saying that, “in CAR witchcraft is real. Some 60 percent of female prisoners were sent to jail for witchcraft”” (Eboiyehi 248).
- “HRD recorded 32 cases of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment against persons accused of practising witchcraft. This affected 85 victims, including at least 30 women, one boy and five girls, and resulted in 12 deaths and severe injuries. The majority of victims were elderly, widows, persons with disabilities or persons who do not have strong support in the local communities.” (OHCHR “Report on the Situation” 17-18).
- “Meanwhile, in areas of the Central African Republic and Angola it is again mostly old women who are accused, even though there are increasing reports of child accusations in the former.” (Dörrie)
- “By contrast, the Central African Republic has kept its colonial-era law and, contrary to some other African states, is making frequent use of it. According to a study by UNICEF, about 25% of all cases brought to court in the capital Bangui and 80-90% of all cases in rural areas are witchcraft-related. 70% of all prisoners in Bangui central prison are incarcerated because of witchcraft accusations.” (Dörrie).

Angola

Are children victimized as witches?

- “Children in Angola also face the possibility of witchcraft allegations and the “surge in persecutions of children” has been attributed to 27 years of war in Angola.” (Schnoebelen 16).
[published in 2009]
- “The practice of witchcraft allegations against children is particularly rampant in Zaire, Uige and Luanda provinces, where many of the accused end up on the streets.” (Schnoebelen 16).



- “Accused children have been subjected to much the same abuse that those in the DRC have suffered; two cases involved a mother using chlorine bleach to blind her daughter and a father injecting his son’s stomach with battery acid in attempts to exorcise them.” (Schnoebelen 16).
- “Community child protection committees have been established in Zaire province and a shelter for abandoned children run by the Catholic Church and the NGO Crianca Futuro operates in Mbanza Congo, 50 miles from the DRC border. Despite these positive developments, children continue to be accused and subjected to ill-treatment.” (Schnoebelen 17).
- “In the context of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, decades of war have led to the breakdown of family and social networks, contributing to the increase in witchcraft accusations against children.” (Schnoebelen 4).
- “More recently, in Angola, “where children were accused of transforming into animals and eating crops during the night, ‘scientific analysis of the situation at the time revealed that there was poor crop yield due to late rains.’” (Schnoebelen 5).
- “In 2005, three adults were found guilty of child cruelty after abusing ‘Child B’ for months for being a witch. Abuse included cutting her on the chest with a knife, beatings, kickings, starvation, and rubbing chilli peppers into her eyes. Child B and one of the women, who claimed to be her mother, arrived to England in 2002 as Angolan refugees.” (Schnoebelen 30).
- “A case in point is the current ‘epidemic’ (as it is usually framed in the local media) of child sorcery accusations in Luanda, related to both an idea of a corrupted use of ndoki knowledge and a heightened sense of insecurity and paranoia in the particularly harsh context of the city’s neighborhoods.” (Rio, MacCarthy, and Blanes 96). *[published in 2017]*
- “... in the Palanca neighborhood of Luanda, child sorcery accusations, although not new in local history, have been object of the ‘social construction of a problem’ (2008: 31) that involves traditional authorities, the state and concurrent institutions, and local media, within a progressive narrative that invokes the deconstruction of the traditional familial model, the consequences of war, the perils of urban life and economic crisis” (Rio, MacCarthy, and Blanes 96).
- “Likewise, child sorcery accusations also become part of the same discourse of abjection. In one such example, in early 2008, several news pieces circulated in the local media concerning how members of a Catholic congregation rescued several children in the Palanca who had been beaten and abandoned by their parents, accused of sorcery. One of the Catholic nuns involved in the rescue, sister Rita, declared to the local media that what was beneath such phenomena was “social disorder and extreme poverty, and the main victims are the children” (Rio, MacCarthy, and Blanes 96).
- “Many more [children accused of witchcraft] are living in the streets of Mbanza Kongo, the capital of Zaïre Province, Uíge and Luanda in northern Angola.” (Cimpric “Children Accused” 14-15).
- “Cases of infanticide are also reported among the M’bali in Angola, where the birth of twins represented a disaster for the whole country, and the children were therefore killed” (Cimpric “Children Accused” 32).
- “In Angola, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has called for “immediate action to eliminate the mistreatment of children accused of witchcraft.” (OHCHR)
- “Cases of children being harmed, abused or killed as a consequence of witchcraft allegation practices have been documented mainly in countries in Africa and concern Angola, Central African



Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania.” (Hanson and Ruggiero 5).

- “Around 140,000 children in Angola have been orphaned due to AIDS. The total number of orphans in Angola is as high as 1,500,000. During the civil war, an estimated 700,000 children lost either one or both their parents. 100,000 children were separated from their families as a result of the war. It is not uncommon in Angola for children to be abused, abandoned or even killed for imagined acts of witchcraft. Thousands of Angolan children roam the streets of Luanda and other major cities. Some have been banished from their homes, while others have lost their parents in the war or because of AIDS.” (SOS Children’s Villages International “General”).

- “Witchcraft is a belief that is widespread in Angola and neighbouring countries. It is valued as part of the Bantu cultural tradition and traditional beliefs. In the past, adults and some children were accused of witchcraft, but from the end of the 1990s in provinces of northern Angola an unusual number of children were observed living on the streets having been thrown out by their families. It was reported that most of the children had been accused of witchcraft, either by their parents, extended family, neighbours, pastors or soothsayers” (UNHRC “Promotion and Protection” 14).

- “After a child accused of witchcraft was stabbed to death in 2000, Government officials and Save the Children Fund rounded up 432 street children and reintegrated 380 of them with relatives.” (UNHRC “Promotion and Protection” 15).

- “Whilst not a phenomenon reported throughout the country, children accused of witchcraft are a cause for concern...” (UNHRC “Promotion and Protection” 14).

Are elderly women victimized as witches?

- “Like the DRC, elderly women in Angola were traditionally “vulnerable to accusations of witchcraft and subsequent abuse,” including beatings, expulsion or death.” (Schnoebelen 16).

- “Meanwhile, in areas of the Central African Republic and Angola it is again mostly old women who are accused, even though there are increasing reports of child accusations in the former.” [published in 2013] (Dörrie).

Ghana

Are children victimized as witches?

- “A phenomenon that has increasingly affected girls and women, especially those from poor, rural areas, is the branding and persecution of females as witches. This can affect babies as young as one month old. The baby, child or woman is accused of employing witchcraft to cause a death or illness, or even a business failure or financial difficulties, and is physically brutalised, tortured, abandoned or killed. In northern Ghana, there are so-called “witch camps” where these women take refuge, never to return to their communities. Around 1,000 women and 700 girls are estimated to be living here.” (SOS Children’s Villages International “Tamale”).

- “Based on the author’s review of Ghana’s newspapers of the past 2 decades and electronic news media over the past 5 years, there appears to be a diminution in witchcraft accusations against women while accusations against children appear to be on the rise.” (Adinkrah “Child Witch Hunts” 750).

- “... Children in Ghana currently do not have the support from advocacy groups to champion their cause in the same way that elderly women have from women’s groups.” (Adinkrah “Child Witch Hunts” 750).



- “The camps, which are home to around 800 women and 500 children, offer poor living conditions and little hope of a normal life.” (ActionAid 3).

- “Around 700 women and 800 children live in the Gambaga camp and five other camps across northern Ghana and they are virtually cut off from the outer world” (United Kingdom: Home Office 14).

- “Often women who are banished to the camps are „given“ a young child – perhaps a grandchild and almost always a girl – to help look after them. This happens in cases where the families of the accused still want to support them but cannot protect them in their own community. In other cases, where the accused woman is living with a child in her village – for example an orphaned grandchild – the child is also banished to the camp.” (United Kingdom: Home Office 14).

- “This orphanage, built in a typical northern Ghanaian style of a ring of small rooms linked by short fences has around 32 children ... This center managed by catholic nuns, can as well be called Ghana’s ‘child witch camp’ ... According to the managers of the orphanage, at least half of the children were abandoned due to witchcraft accusation.” (Igwe “Child Witches”).

- “Very little is known about this ‘home’ in Sang where children accused of witchcraft or of being ‘agents’ and instruments of the devil are taken care of. The children are from a day old to sixteen years.” (Igwe “Child Witches”).

- “Children are among those who populate the witch camps in the Northern Ghana. These children are not at the sanctuary because they were accused of witchcraft. They are at these shelters because their mothers or grand mothers were accused.” (Igwe “From Children”).

Are elderly women victimized as witches?

- “In northern Ghana, women accused of witchcraft are banished and forced to live in “witch villages” in dehumanizing conditions” (Cimpric “Children Accused” 13).

- “In Ghana it is thought as many as 2,000 accused witches and their dependents are confined in five different camps. Most of the camp inmates are destitute, elderly women and some have been forced to live there for decades.” (OHCHR).

- “While witches are perceived to be predominantly elderly and female, Akan witch beliefs and those of other ethnic groups acknowledge the existence of child witches” (Adinkrah “Child Witch Hunts” 744).

- “Females were disproportionately the victims of witch homicides in the cases surveyed ... The results of this study reveal a greater vulnerability of poor elderly women to witchcraft accusations and lethal attacks ...” (Adinkrah “Witchcraft Accusations” 339; 345).

- “This tendency for the killer to be the younger party stems from the notion that witches are disproportionately elderly.” (Adinkrah “Witchcraft Accusations” 340).

- “In contrast to a small number of academic studies on aging, gender, and witchcraft accusations, there are hundreds of articles printed and reproduced through national and international media on the plight of women, mostly older women, attacked, banished, and murdered as witches.” (Crampton 202).

- “Rather than focus on witchcraft accusations as an older woman’s rights problem, a more useful approach may be to address harmful accusations as a form of elder abuse that disproportionately impacts women.” (Crampton 209).



- “Though both men and women can be accused of witchcraft, the vast majority are women, especially the elderly.” (ActionAid 8).
- “The six ‘witch camps’ of Gambaga, Kukuo, Gnani, Bonyase, Nabuli and Kpatinga are located close to or even within ‘ordinary’ towns or villages and all are in remote areas of northern Ghana.” (ActionAid 4).
- “Most accused witches were older women, often widows, who were accused by fellow villagers of being the cause of difficulties, such as illness, crop failure, or financial misfortune. Persons suspected of witchcraft were also killed in recent years.” (United Kingdom: Home Office 18).
- “The camps have existed since the 19th century and population estimates vary wildly between 2000 and 6000 women and children.” (Stromberg 2).
- “Though witch is often thought to refer to women in particular, there is no inherent gender of witchcraft. Some respondents felt that witches were more commonly women. However, when asked to clarify, this view was often supplemented by the caveat that women are more often victims of accusations, thus more frequently associated with witchcraft. Though some individuals did argue that women are predisposed to seek and engage in witchcraft this was not a consistent view.” (Roxburgh 896).
- “In parts of northern Ghana, elderly women can be accused of witchcraft and branded as witches or purveyors of social ills that befall their families or villages. Elderly women who are accused and labeled as witches may be removed by NGOs and government representatives to “witch camps” to ensure their safety and protection from families and communities’ inhumane and degrading treatment.” (Sossou and Yogtiba 424).

General evidence:

“Accusations of witchcraft are often directed at children considered difficult or different; at least fourteen of the forty-seven children involved had “some degree of disability, imperfection or blemish.” The nationality of families and children involved were: Mauritius, Tanzania, Burundi, DRC, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Caribbean, South Asian, and White English.” (Schnoebelen 30-31).





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2. Appendix: Interview Transcript with Mr. Itauma

Name: Sam Ikpe Itauma
 Position: CEO and President of 'Child Rights And Rehabilitation Network' (CRARN)
 Date/Time: 19 May 2018, 13.00 CST
 Duration: 46 minutes

*Was audio-recorded with consent from the interviewee for transcription purposes.

Church: Before we start, is it alright with you if I audio-record our conversation for transcription purposes for my thesis?

Itauma: No, no it is no problem, I probably am going to record it too.

Church: Alright, so do you know what my thesis is about, first of all?

Itauma: Yes.

Church: Yes. Okay good. So pretty much I'm trying to test to see if the increase in child witchcraft accusations only takes place in collapsed and deteriorated states, and failed states, or if it can also occur in semi-democratic and democratic states.

Itauma: My country –

Church: I'm sorry, your country, which one?

Itauma: My country, Nigeria, is a democratic state and would have had had this issue, going on there. So, it does not exempt any state in Africa at the moment. Except one country that was recently divided. It was a country that was recently divided in Africa, I'm trying to get the name, but I know that that is the only country – I'm going to check that later and let you know – the name of the country. Sudan and South Sudan.

Church: Okay, Sudan and South Sudan, yes, that's the most recent nation state that has been created, yes.

Itauma: Yes, so that is the only state at the moment in Africa that, where we are yet to see the issue of witchcraft, where children are being labeled with witchcraft, in that country. That is the only country at the moment in Africa that I can say we no record of it. That does not mean that it is not there, so that goes a long way to tell you that in every part of Africa we have issues like that. In Cameroon, which I have been there, I have witnessed it we have issues like that. Nigeria, Chad, Congo DR, CAR, all of these countries we have this issue, even in some of the countries we have issue where the government believes that people are witches and sanction those who are believed to be witches. And to stop them from practicing an existent witchcraft issue. Like recently the outgoing president, Jon[athan] government, was believed to go against people who were said to be witches so you understand that kind of suspicion that in some of the government believe that witchcraft exist. And a lot of them first still believe its prevalent, so you definitely realize that people there are going to suffer the impact.

Church: So you don't believe that regime type or government type would essentially have as big of an influence as just the presence of a belief system itself?



Itauma: Well my understanding is that the system of government at the moment in Africa does not change the perception of witchcraft, especially as long as those governments and religious practices are there. There is actually no country in Africa where religion is not practiced, so ... [inaudible].. a modern religion like Islam or Christianity the most, and I also understand that Christianity is a religion that really hyped much on this witchcraft issue, so there is no religious country that does not consider or witness the issue of witchcraft abuse or torture.

Church: And if I may ask, so I agree with what you say, but do you believe that there is a particular type of victim of witchcraft accusations for example, from what I've read in my studies the typical victim would be elderly women within society that would be accused of witchcraft more frequently than any other type of person. Do you believe that children are becoming more commonly accused or is there another victimology present?

Itauma: I understand that children at the moment are vulnerable instead of people, but witchcraft abuse started with the elderly who are about the age of 70 upward, but today I consider those from 65 – those with 65 years of age are also beginning to get the impact. Especially those who have poverty, lived and are effected by poverty, you know, are actually the ones affected. But children from my understanding in my country in Nigeria for instance, child witches started in early 2000. So, before then we didn't have anything like child witches we had issues involving elderly people who are stigmatized, tortured, and abused. But from 2000 we begin to have issues with a connection with children, but since then that has not departed, it is ongoing and I say it is unabated even though the government has enacted laws to prohibit that we still have issues of witchcraft. And my belief is that people need orientation, people need enlightenment, people need to be very careful of saying education, in this context because to enlighten is actually different from being educated. So you have people who are educated but believe in witchcraft, you have actual doctors, lawyers, people who have PHD, that believe in witchcraft. When I was schooling, I was, in the time of school, my, an initial friend of mine who was doing his PHD, was a PHD candidate, I was doing BA, so we happened to meet on the same boat where we were traveling back home. So he complemented me on my work, but told me that he heard of my interview but all of what I was saying was false, and I asked him what was the false aspect that he got? It was for me to stand on television and say that witchcraft is not real, [mixed and maxed] my insincerity. You know, so he even told me that I should stop preaching against a witchcraft belief otherwise there is going to be someone who is pissed that I mound the podium to preach and somebody's going to stone me.

Church: Oh no... But I do understand, I also agree that there is a difference between education and enlightenment, often people say education is the problem but it's not the particular problem. If I may circle back to another question, you said that since the early 2000s has been when children have been the victims of witchcraft, do you have any professional idea as to why this could be started in 2000, why it happened then?

Itauma: A simple reason to, that is... We had people, some religious persons, filmmakers who came out with a particular theme. This theme portrays children to be witches, the theme portrays how children torture their parents, how children man-handle their parents and dehumanize them in the coven. In particular, it is due to them, such themes were distributed in the whole country, given that it was a kind of home-made movie, everyone likes to watch home-made movie, you know, so watching those themes changed the narrative of the witchcraft belief. It made a consequence now, given that fact that witchcraft is no longer the issue of elderly people, it is now involving children. Children are having the issue of HIV/AIDS, coming to decimate parents, and allow children to become orphans, you find the



same thing in orphanages, children find themselves on the street. They are actually vulnerable because more often than not, when they are asked questions, of their involvement in witchcraft, and they deny it, they are going to be beaten. So once a child is beaten, and he accepts that I'm a witch, he actually does not have any platform to denounce that. Because, sometimes, those who accept that they are witches, they believe that if they accept being a witch they are definitely going to be treated with some sort of leniency, or be pardoned. You know, because as long as they keep denying that they are not witches, they are going to continue to receive the torture, they are going to be beaten, you know, until they finally concede, that, Oh I'm a witch. So it was in that kind of period that we started having children being labelled as witches. I was taking the [notion] that these kind of themes, they just music, and preaching that came out in that period that really portrayed children to be witches.

Church: Okay, so that is a different angle than what I have mostly been seeing within the research that I've been looking at – for often times they will say that the early 2000s is the time when child soldiers became a large phenomenon in many African countries so that changed also the narrative of the way children are seen. Would you agree with that as well, or have any opinion on that?

Itauma: Well it depends actually on the country. Depends largely on the country and the specific region, what exactly took place given that period, but my understanding is that African countries we do share cultures or we share religion and we also share some social phenomenon. For instance, the theme, the movie that I am talking about is not only watched in Nigeria, it is watched everywhere in Africa and these religious preachers who center their preaching mostly on witchcraft, they do travel a lot to different African countries. They even travel to European countries to sell themselves, to sell their religion, to sell their beliefs, to sell their teachings. So they preach out to people and sell their movies, they also have their preaching recorded in different videos and you have them on Youtube. And they spread them. Especially in this era of social media now. There is no limit, no bound to that. So during that period, my strongest belief is that such a belief must have been spread to different countries despite the regime that was there at the moment, of whether there was a war, or peace, does not stop people from buying movies, does not stop people from accessing Youtube, does not stop preachers from going to those countries and putting out their preachings. So churches and groups of people going to see that create those teachings. So whether you have collapsed civil states or democratic state does not hold any water, it does not mean anything, it does not make any difference. So if you say that maybe a country where there was a war, actually that is, we have many countries where there has been war but you don't have witchcraft going on there. You have some countries where there is no war and you have witchcraft going on there. For instance, I don't see, I don't know if there is a war in Papua-Guinea. But there is witchcraft going on there in Papua-Guinea. Papua-Guinea it's not Africa, it's not, so we have things like that also in countries like, different countries. I would not say that it's only Africa alone that we have this issue. In the UK, right now there is a witchcraft issue going on there. The government in the UK is seriously tackling this issue and if you look at it closely you will see the nexus of African people who are living in Britain and are coming from Africa to Britain and having a connection with their home country and some of them even have to consult the, what they call ju-ju black magic, you know, understand the concept or the prevalence of witchcraft that are threatening them directly or indirectly. Some of them who bring close relation to the Britain from Africa, it tends to be those children or person as involved in witchcraft practice, so you can still see the connection has not been severed from Africa.



Church: I also have read that, actually I think I read about mostly Angolans, who would travel to the UK and as a diaspora community, and then as a consequence of that, that's where the witchcraft beliefs in the UK stemmed from.

Itauma: I think I have seen that – this is like that – prevalence in the United Kingdom. Like I said we have a democratic state in the United Kingdom, and that's not really Africa. You have a good [angles] between Africa and the UK relative to witchcraft issue that is going on there. Good news is that if a government is tackling those issues, in Africa, given that some of the politicians – did I say some? No a lot of politicians – believe in witchcraft.

Church: So, do you think that laws could help stop the abuses and the violations of child and human rights in this area? Do you think preventative laws can help?

Itauma: Law can help, but law does not stop it. You can put in one kind of law you can put in even if the law would trigger capital punishment, that does not stop witchcraft. What actually stops witchcraft is the enlightenment of the community, to teach of mentality of the people the involvement of the government – let me say for instance. The biggest [time I have ever concerned] children in flocks, was when the government had put out a commission to investigate witchcraft in my State, Nigeria, in the part of the state in Nigeria. That was the biggest moment we reconciled, we reunited children, and I would say in flocks. That amount has never been before that time and after that period. So you see children, the parents, flocking in coming to feed their children. Letting us, you know, persuaded us to give them their children. Why? Because it's all government involved. The government was announcing the issue and the radio – the commission – let me put it that way, the commission that the government set up was announcing the witchcraft information activities in the radio which the local community actually listened a lot, the radio. And TV discuss about it, and I will say, that some of the commission issue was streamlined and were broadcast in real life, you know in real-time. They were broadcasting in real-time and people became aware of government's involvement a lot in that period. So it started in the government talking about it, condemning it, and children who were in our cinema in that time, we in fact were actually looking for more chance, looking for more staff to get involved in the process of reconciling children because reconciling children or sometimes give up to two weeks to educate a parent and make them sign different papers involved before they can pick up their children. And for us to go there, the community, and look at where those children are going to be staying. And even going there to visit the children once the children get back home. So, it actually was a lot of [tax road] because we had other things at that moment to handle. We were also given the commission report, compiling reports to give to them, so you understand the situation became that when it was an extra job for us to reconcile, a better chunk of the children were going home. And before then, a law was in place, the law was in place but people did not come this far to pick their children. But once the commission setting and begin to make broadcast on TV and radio, people were gripped with the fact that oh the government is involved. So if imperative measures are going to be taken, so let's get involved, let's pick my children. I will say less actual children were rescued during that period, more children were reconciled during that period. So the government involvement, the announcement of the activities of the witchcraft commission were actually a part of enlightenment. The greatest enlightenment campaign that we have ever witnessed, was at that time. Our own campaign I will say did not create that impact as the commission that was set up by the government.

Church: Okay, so it was more of an impact movement because it came from the government itself.



Itauma: Of course it came from the government, because here the government is [*picking*], and they understand that the government meant business and that the government was going to come down heavily if people stigmatized children as witches, so whatever they were doing come and pick up their children and we had a lot of volunteers that that time who were telling us where children were hiding. Where children were being kept secretly in churches, warehouses, to identify such children and brought to us. In fact some of the prayer houses deliberately who were keeping those children for I would say as a cash cow. Release those children! You know, I reconciled with the parents because some time they give their children treatment by carrying out deliverance on the children and those children were really in that prayer house for more than 6 months sometimes a year and they could even transfer them, they would live there, but go to other churches because the parent believed that oh the preacher or prophet was not able to deliver in that very prayer house so denounce it, and need to transfer them to a different powerful place, a place they believed more powerful than that. So in that process we had a lot of children coming out on the street but going back to their parents. When government is involved, the narrative changed. That is what I would say, but it is actually very difficult to get the government involved. But I would say that in my own state for instance the government had been involved but the problem is the politicians working with the government, they are worshippers of all these churches. They are worshippers of these preachers. So they protect the preachers and they believe that our campaign, our activities, is [*immunable*] to what the preachers are saying. And they see us as enemies at the same time, working against the preachers. We are not enemies we are also part of a – to build a community and a mission.

Church: So do you think that the ... (*loss of connection*) ... Oh I'm sorry we lost connection there for a moment. But I think I only have two more questions, you answered a lot in between your answers. One of them being that do you think there is a higher prevalence of child accusations in urban areas or rural areas? or does it matter?

Itauma: It really doesn't matter. But if you look at it critically, the urban area is where you have a lot of vulnerable children ... (*loss of connection*) ... to help them in handling different domestic choice. So you have a lot of vulnerable children drifting to the urban area, so in this case once they are identified as being vulnerable, they are targeted by these preachers, witchcraft preachers. They target them easily, especially in prayer houses in the church. I would say during prayer stations like, morning prayer, what you call? Prayer night, prayer night is a religious prayer moment which normally takes effect from evening from like 7 o'clock in the morning... (*loss of connection*)... so that is going to be able to have all these children stigmatized. But it doesn't really say that it is more of the urban area, but to a better extent that could be the case.

Church: Thank you, sorry for the connection loss. Finally, you were talking about how you, for example in the early 2000s, this perception and the narrative of children changed due to this film theme that came out, and you said that due to technology this narrative spread, if I understood it correctly, and it spread easier, do you think that there is a particular point of origin where this belief started from and then spread?

Itauma: My understanding is that witchcraft beliefs are practiced the most where modern day Christianity, the Pentecostal Christianity, is prevalent. It is everywhere in Africa. Well you have to look at those aspects, despite the fact that our technology has enhanced this situation, but the origin of child witchcraft comes from, I would say it comes from a Pentecostal movement. Because during the – I remember when I was a youngster, and I do anything that is delightful to my dad, he would call me a witch, you know. Back then calling me a witch was



a kind of praise, oh you've done very well, you are a witch. So, that was not a stigma. It wasn't a stigma it was a sort of a praise. Thank you for what you have done, you are a wizard, oh what you have done is so awesome and marvelous. So in my days, but and I look at that very retrospectively if my dad had told me today that I was a witch, then I would have been ... (*loss of connection*) ... 1999, then by 2000 children were already on the street, children were already let loose in the woods, you know, so it actually comes from those preachings, those Pentecostal preachings, then technology was deployed to spread those beliefs.

Church: Alright so it was more the Pentecostal preaching that was then facilitated by the technological advances?

Itauma: I would say that here and there Pentecostal movements are responsible for the child witch phenomenon.

Church: Alright well thank you, you have answered a lot of my questions – and more – so thank you for agreeing to meet with me and have this interview.

(Exchanges of pleasantries and goodbyes)

