Decolonisation and the United Nations:
A Study of Shifting Intervention in the Congo and Southern Rhodesia

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Table of Contents

Introduction

The United Nations did not deploy a peacekeeping mission in Africa for a quarter of a century following its contentious intervention in the Congo in the early 1960s. Due to this lack of UN military intervention, much of the existing scholarship has overlooked the organisation's influence in the process of African decolonisation during the Cold War.[1] In contrast, this thesis comparatively examines the development of United Nations intervention in the Congo and Rhodesia from 1960 to 1980. During this period, the UN explored alternative means of diplomatic and economic intervention in Africa, notably through the organisation's first ever policy of mandatory economic sanctions implemented against Rhodesia's white minority government.[2] The shift in UN intervention policy was fuelled by developments within the organisation on the issues of self-determination, sovereignty and the wider 'internationalisation' of the decolonisation agenda.[3] This was not a period of non-intervention, but rather a time of complex reconfiguration for the organisation concerning its future role within the process of African decolonisation.

The Rhodesia Question was at the top of the UN agenda during this period of non-military intervention in Africa. The former colony of Southern Rhodesia became 'independent' as Rhodesia in 1965, following the Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).[4] The UDI initiated a constitutional crisis which developed as the last UN forces departed the Congo, where the organisation had launched its first large-scale peacekeeping mission in 1960. Following the contentious UN mission in the Congo, norms of sovereignty and

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[1] Scholarship has largely focused on the role of the UN in post-Cold War Africa, see J. Ododa Opiyo, "The Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy: The United Nations' Post-Cold War Experiences in Africa," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 12, no. 1 (2012): 61-81; John Terence O'Neill and Nicholas Rees, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005).

[2] Christopher J. Le Mon and Rachel S. Taylor, "Security Council Action in the Name of Human Rights: From Rhodesia to the Congo," *U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy* 10, no. 2 (2004): 209.

[3] Jan Eckel, "Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 1, no. 1 (2010): 127.

[4] Carl Watts, *Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1-2.

intervention were re-assessed as a debate took place on the organisation's future role in Rhodesia. Although no military intervention took place, the UN did authorise the use of force for the British government during the oil-related 'Beira Incident' in 1966, and itself invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia.[5] During this period, the UN also became the central platform through which the Afro-Asian bloc, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and other member states applied pressure on the illegitimate Smith regime and the British government on the Rhodesian Question.[6] When negotiations were finalised and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) intervened in 1980, the UN provided diplomatic, economic and logistical assistance to the process of Zimbabwean independence.[7] Thus, between the declaration of the UDI in 1965 and Zimbabwean independence in 1980, the Rhodesian Question held a central place on the UN's decolonisation agenda.

The research question of this thesis therefore asks; how did UN intervention develop within the process of African decolonisation during the 1960s and 1970s? In order to answer this question, the shifting interventionism of the UN is mapped out through the case studies of decolonisation in the Congo and Rhodesia. There has been a gap in traditional scholarship concerning the role of the UN in the process of African decolonisation, and thus through a comparative analysis of the Congo and Rhodesia, this thesis offers a contribution that furthers our understanding of the complex relationship between UN intervention and African decolonisation. This thesis also offers a contribution that moves beyond the traditional narrative of UN inactivity in Africa during the Cold War, and instead presents this period as one of profound institutional transition. With the absence of UN military intervention in Rhodesia, this analysis instead focuses on the organisation as a site for the internationalisation of the decolonisation agenda, as well as an actor in the implementation of mandatory sanctions and diplomatic pressure against white minority rule.[8] Through a comparative analysis of UN intervention in the Congo and Rhodesia, this thesis traces not only the development

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[5] Richard Coggins, "Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa," *Contemporary British History* 20, no. 3 (2006): 371-372.

[6] Wellington W. Nyangoni, *Africa in the United Nations System* (London: Associated University Presses, 1985), 159; Osita C. Eze, "OAU Faces Rhodesia," *African Review* 5, no. 1 (1975): 43-62.

[7] F. T. Liu, "The Significance of Past Peacekeeping Operations in Africa to Humanitarian Relief," in *Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 31.

[8] Le Mon and Taylor, "Security Council Action," 210.

of the organisation between 1960 and 1980, but also the wider global developments which impacted the process of African decolonisation during this period.

Historiography

Traditionally, studies of UN activity in Africa have been dominated by the framework of the Cold War.[9] Scholarship on the UN's role in Africa has tended to move sweepingly from the Congo mission in the early 1960s through to the accelerated rate of UN peacekeeping in the post-1990s era.[10] In reference to the intervening period, a number of scholars have characterised UN 'non-intervention' in Africa as simply a symptom of the 'paralysed' Security Council during the Cold War.[11] The continued dominance of this rather one-dimensional Cold War narrative in studies of the 1960s and 1970s, paired with the emphasis on UN peacekeeping in Africa in the post-1990s period, has meant that the organisation's non-peacekeeping involvement in African affairs remains significantly under-researched. For this reason, the existing scholarship lacks studies of UN involvement in the process of African decolonisation during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly on the alternative forms of intervention which developed in lieu of UN peacekeeping.

However, there has been a historiographical turn in recent scholarship which has sought to internationalise the study of African decolonisation.[12] As outlined in the work of Matthew Connelly

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9 Marrack Goulding, "The United Nations and Conflict in Africa since the Cold War," *African Affairs* 98, no. 391 (1999): 155-166; Mashudu Godfrey Ramuhala, "Post-Cold War Military Intervention in Africa," *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 39, no. 1 (2011): 33-55; Christopher O'Sullivan, "The United Nations, Decolonization and Self-determination in Cold War: Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-64," *Journal of Third World Studies* 22, no. 2 (2005): 103-120; Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

10 Adekeye Adebajo, "From Congo to Congo: United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa After the Cold War," in *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent,* ed. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (London: Routledge, 2004), 195-212; Norrie MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

11 Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 127; Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Regional Groups and Alliances," in *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations,* ed. Sam Daws and Thomas G. Weiss (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 219-220.

12 Michael Collins, "Nation, State and Agency: Evolving Historiographies of African Decolonization," in *Britain, France and the Decolonization of Africa: Future Imperfect?,* ed. Andrew W.M. Smith and Chris Jeppesen (London: University College London Press, 2017), 31-32.

and Christopher Lee, developments beyond the Cold War narrative have allowed scholars to examine the wider global dynamics which shaped the decolonisation process in Africa.[13] This has been well met in the recent scholarship on the Congo, which has seen a re-examination of the Cold War dimensions of the crisis outlined in the earlier work of Stephen Weissman, Madeleine Kalb and Carole Collins.[14] Scholars such as John Kent, David Gibbs and Alanna O'Malley have argued that the misunderstanding of the Cold War in Africa has overshadowed analysis of other external interests in the process of Congolese decolonisation.[15] In looking beyond the East-West struggle, scholarship has now been able to examine the global dynamics of the Congo crisis through the interaction of actors such as the UN, colonial governments and the wider Afro-Asian bloc.[16] This movement mirrors the broader turn in scholarship toward the international dimensions of the decolonisation process, particularly through the role of international organisations, transnational actors and neo-colonial interests.[17] In taking off 'the Cold War lens,' scholars are now able to re-examine the process of African decolonisation beyond the binaries of the Cold War.

In contrast, less has been done within scholarship to address the international dimensions of the Rhodesian crisis.[18] Aside from a few notable exceptions, there has been limited re-examination in scholarship of the role of actors such as the Commonwealth, the OAU and the UN within the

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[13] Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 739-769; Christopher J. Lee, "Decolonization of a Special Type: Rethinking Cold War History in Southern Africa," *Kronos* 37, no. 1 (2011): 6-11.

[14] Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-64* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974); Madeleine G. Kalb, *Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa From Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982); Carole J.L. Collins, "The Cold War Comes to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo Crisis," *Journal of International Affairs* 47, no. 1 (1993): 243-269.

[15] John Kent, "The Neo-colonialism of Decolonisation: Katangan Secession and the Bringing of the Cold War to the Congo," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no. 1 (2017): 93-130; David N. Gibbs, "Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations, and the Congo Crisis of 1960-1: A Reinterpretation," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 1 (1993): 163-174; Alanna O'Malley, *The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo crisis 1960-64* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018).

[16] Alanna O'Malley, "Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations, 1960–1," *International History Review* 37, no. 5 (2015): 970-990; Timothy Scarnecchia, "The Congo crisis, the United Nations, and Zimbabwean nationalism, 1960-1963," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 11, no. 1 (2011): 63-86.

[17] Jessica Lynne Pearson, "Defending Empire at the United Nations: The Politics of International Colonial Oversight in the Era of Decolonisation," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no. 3 (2017): 525-549; Ichiro Maekawa, "Neo-Colonialism Reconsidered: A Case Study of East Africa in the 1960s and 1970s," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43, no. 2 (2015): 317-341.

[18] Carl Watts, "The Rhodesian Crisis in British and International Politics, 1964-1965" (PhD diss., University of Birmingham, 2006), 399.

process of decolonisation leading to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.[19] Much of the existing literature on the role of the UN in Rhodesia, such as that written by Leonard Kapungu and J. Leo Cefkin, was written in the initial period of historiographical attention during the 1960s and 1970s.[20] The majority of these studies frame the UN's role in Rhodesia in terms of international law, rather than in terms of intervention in the process of decolonisation.[21] Although there have been developments in recent scholarship on Zimbabwean decolonisation, little has been done to address the international dimensions of this process since the initial period of historiographical attention in the 1960s and 1970s.[22] In this way, the role of the UN in Rhodesia remains significantly under-researched, particularly on the alternative forms of intervention which were developed in the region between 1965 and 1980.

Therefore, there now exists an opportunity within scholarship to re-examine the role of the UN in Rhodesia in order to illuminate not only the organisation's shift in intervention, but also the interaction between the UN and other global actors on the Rhodesian Question. Reconsidering the Cold War period offers a means for addressing the lack of analysis on the international dimensions of the Rhodesian crisis, as well as providing an additional lens for the reinterpretation of decolonisation in the rest of Southern Africa.[23] Doing so through the framework of the UN also allows further connections to be drawn between the organisation and the process of decolonisation, particularly on issues such as human rights, anti-colonial nationalism and global North-South relations.[24] With the turn toward international history, scholarship now has an exciting opportunity

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[19] A few exceptions: Watts, *Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration;* Luise White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); and the Special Issue entitled "The Decolonisation of Zimbabwe," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no. 5 (2017).

[20] Leonard T. Kapungu, *The United Nations and Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1973); J. Leo Cefkin, "The Rhodesian Question at the United Nations," *International Organization* 22, no. 3 (1968): 649-669; *A Principle in Torment: The United Nations and Southern Rhodesia* (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1969).

[21] Ralph Zacklin, *The United Nations and Rhodesia: A Study in International Law* (New York: Praeger, 1974); Michael Stephen, "The United Nations and International Law: The Rhodesia Case," *Contemporary Review* 224, no. 1300 (1974): 239-243.

[22] Tinashe Nyamunda, "'More a Cause than a Country': Historiography, UDI and the Crisis of Decolonisation in Rhodesia," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 42, no. 5 (2016): 1005-1019.

[23] Lee, "Decolonization," 11.

[24] Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations," *Journal of World History* 19, no. 3 (2008): 252.

to address these gaps through the re-examination of the global dynamics within the process of African decolonisation.

Methodology

Through archival research, this thesis highlights the largely under-studied relationship between the UN and the process of African decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s. The primary focus of this thesis is on a selection of British government records, located at the National Archives in London. This selection of records concerns the internal correspondence of the Rhodesia Political Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as the department's contact with the United Kingdom Mission to the UN and the Cabinet Office. Dated between 1963 and 1972, these records reveal the extent of the tensions between British 'colonial' responsibility and UN special interest in Rhodesia. The records included in this analysis have been chosen as they evidence two particular discoveries; firstly the British government's internal recognition of Afro-Asian support for UN involvement in Rhodesia, and secondly the continued pressure within the British government to concede on allowing the UN a role in the region's affairs throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The re-examination of these documents in the specific context of UN involvement newly reveals the extent of the organisation's intervention in Rhodesia, as well as the depth of tensions between UN action and British government control.

This thesis follows the methodology of process tracing through the case studies of the Congo and Rhodesia. Process tracing allows for a greater understanding of the 'trajectories of change and causation' that affect the 'unfolding of events or situations over time,' in this case examined through the UN's shifting intervention within the process of African decolonisation.[25] Through examining the case studies of the Congo and Rhodesia this thesis leads with a comparative analysis, which allows for a longue durée approach to UN interventionism that tends to be lacking in traditional scholarship. This methodology also allows for the incorporation of international relations theory,

[25] David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 4 (2011): 823-824.

particularly in the discussion of the UN as an 'actor' within the process of African decolonisation.[26] As such, this thesis includes analysis of the collective role of the UN as an organisation, as well as of the platform provided by individual bodies such as the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Special Committee on Decolonisation. Specialised agencies are also discussed, such as with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee established for the observance of sanctions against Rhodesia. In this way, reference to the role of the UN includes analysis of its individual bodies and agencies, as well as of the organisation as a collective actor in the decolonisation process.

The first chapter of this thesis deals with the shifting role of UN intervention in the early 1960s. This chapter examines UN intervention in the Congo and the precedents it set in the aftermath of the crisis. The second chapter then explores the development of UN intervention in Rhodesia from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s through two significant turning points, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the Pearce Commission. This chapter examines the enforcement of mandatory economic sanctions and the development of the UN platform as a site of diplomatic pressure on the illegitimate Smith regime and the British government. The third and final chapter then explores UN intervention through the Anglo-American negotiations of 1977, followed by a re-examination of the UN's role in the process of Zimbabwean independence between 1979 and 1980. The chronological structure of this analysis allows events to be traced through the Congo and Rhodesia, but also through the wider period of institutional transition within the UN during the 1960s and 1970s.

[26] Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "Political Approaches," in *Oxford Handbook*, 41-54.

Chapter One
The Congo Precedent

Between 1945 and 1960 over forty Asian and African countries with populations of some eight-hundred million, over a quarter of the global population at the time, gained their independence in what has been termed a 'Revolt against the West.'[27] This revolt had a profound effect on the decolonisation agenda at the UN, particularly as an Afro-Asian majority began to emerge in the early 1960s. The rise in Afro-Asian representation secured the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, known as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly in 1960.[28] At the sixteenth session in 1961, the Assembly then established the Special Committee on Decolonisation, which alongside the work of the Trusteeship Council cemented the decolonisation issue on the UN agenda.[29] The focus on decolonisation at the organisation was also strengthened by a number of global developments, such as with the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[30] Thus, by the early 1960s, the emergence of the Afro-Asian majority at the UN had initiated a period of reform for the organisation as well as for the global discussion on the future of colonial affairs.

It was in this period of reform that the UN deployed the United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, which constituted the organisation's first engagement in large-scale peacekeeping operations in Africa. In technical terms, the UN peacekeeping force achieved its objectives during its mission in the Congo.[31] The region's territorial integrity was maintained through the reintegration of the Katanga province in 1963, and

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[27] Adekeye Adebajo, "The Revolt against the West: Intervention and Sovereignty," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 7 (2016): 1187.

[28] A/RES/1514(XV), https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1514(XV).

[29] A/RES/1654(XVI), https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1654(XVI).

[30] Michael Adeleye Ojo, "The Role of the United Nations in Decolonisation in Africa, 1960-1973" (PhD diss., Howard University, 1974), 294.

[31] Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Affairs* 69, no. 3 (1993): 452.

political control was restored to the Central Congolese Government as UN forces left the region in 1964. However, the action taken during the peacekeeping mission damaged the credibility of the UN in the mid-1960s, both in Africa and on the global stage. Internally, the mission led to serious financial issues within the organisation in the mid-1960s.[32] Externally, the extended mandate of the UN peacekeeping force faced international criticism, particularly in response to the organisation's use of force during the 'reintegration' of the Katanga province.[33] In the aftermath of the crisis, important questions were asked concerning UN intervention, sovereignty, and the organisation's future role in Africa. Thus, the Congo crisis offers a lens through which to examine the evolution of UN intervention, as well as the organisation's role within the wider process of African decolonisation in the 1960s. This chapter gives a brief background to the crisis, followed by an exploration of the two themes of sovereignty and intervention in the Congo and the precedents these set for the future of UN intervention in Africa.

The Congo Crisis

Prior to independence, the Republic of Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) was ruled under the colonial power of Belgium. Under increasing pressure, the Belgian government announced the proclamation of the independent Republic of the Congo on June 30, 1960. However, within two weeks of independence, the Congolese government was faced with a nationwide mutiny within the armed forces, the secession of the southeastern province of Katanga and the military intervention of Belgian forces.[34] In the hopes of removing Belgian forces and ending the secession, the Congolese government made a swift request for UN military assistance. The telegram request from President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba framed the request in terms of the 'colonialist machinations' of the Belgian government and called on the UN to 'protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression.'[35] The Security Council's

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[32] Eşref Aksu, *The United Nations, Intra-state Peacekeeping and Normative Change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 100.

[33] O'Malley, *Diplomacy of Decolonisation*, 118-119.

[34] Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (London: Zed Books, 2002), 94.

[35] Security Council Official Records, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August, and September 1960, S/4382, 11.

response in mid-July 1960 then authorised UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to take the necessary steps to provide the government with 'such military assistance,' which resulted in the sending of a peacekeeping force thereafter.[36] From the beginning, the involvement of the UN force was framed around the colonial aggression of the Belgian state, as well as the protection of the territorial integrity of the Congolese state.

The Congo crisis led to a re-assessment of norms surrounding sovereignty and intervention. As the events in the Congo unfolded and large-scale UN peacekeeping was proposed, a number of challenges arose for the UN surrounding the issue of state sovereignty. As argued by Ramesh Thakur, within the UN Charter there exists an inherent tension between the 'intervention-proscribing principle of state sovereignty' and the 'intervention-prescribing principle of human rights.'[37] In the early 1960s, the UN's growing commitment to decolonisation, self-determination and the protection of human rights posed a significant challenge to the principle of state sovereignty. This challenge was extended due to the elements of the human rights agenda which separated the notion of self-determination from the concept of individual rights, instead associating it with sovereignty and the principle of non-interference.[38] As the situation in the Congo developed, the unprecedented nature of the UN mission led to a number of questions surrounding the tension between Congolese sovereignty and the UN mandate for intervention. As put by *The Times* in 1960, the crisis represented the practical and philosophical problems that 'nobody had yet thought through.'[39] In this way, the Congo crisis highlighted the tensions inherent not only in the UN Charter, but also from within the organisation in the early 1960s.

On the one hand, the organisation's commitment to decolonisation and self-determination mandated UN intervention in the Congo. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted in 1960 laid out the organisation's commitment to the Congolese

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[36] S/RES/143, https://undocs.org/S/RES/143(1960).

[37] Ramesh Thakur, "Humanitarian Intervention," in *Oxford Handbook*, 391.

[38] Roland Burke, "From Individual Rights to National Development: The First UN International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 1968," *Journal of World History* 19, no. 3 (2008): 276.

[39] SOAS, University of London Archives, [hereafter SOAS]: CMBS/01/A/23/05, "U.N.'s Giant Task in the Congo," *The Times,* August 31, 1960.

independence process. In the words of the declaration, the UN had an obligation to aid the Congolese peoples and their 'inalienable right' to exercise 'their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory' against Belgian aggression. This obligation was further justified by the Security Council's recognition of UN action as an effective contribution to the 'maintenance of international peace and security,' a mandate outlined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[40] Due to these factors, the crisis was seen as an important moment in the process of global decolonisation, one that mandated a new era of UN intervention. On the other hand, this new era also brought with it a number of challenges surrounding the parameters of UN intervention. The realities of the Congo crisis stretched the mandate originally provided by the UN Charter and the Security Council in July 1960, and in turn, complicated the UN's commitment to the protect the 'territorial integrity' of the Congolese state. The unprecedented nature of the crisis created divisions within the Afro-Asian bloc between the Brazzaville (Monrovia) Group, who tended to adopt pro-western positions, and the more radical Casablanca Group, over issues of sovereignty, intervention and the parameters of the UN mandate the Congo.[41] These were the debates that rose in prominence in the 1960s and that continued to shape the UN's evolving role in the decolonisation process.

The tensions surrounding the issue of sovereignty were extended due to the secessionist conflict which arose during the Congo crisis. In particular, the secession of Katanga under President Moïse Tshombe from 1960 to 1963 challenged the norms surrounding state sovereignty at the UN. The peacekeeping mission entered the Congo with the consent of the host state, however, this consent was complicated by the proclamation of the newly 'independent' Katanga in July 1960. From this point onward, the intervention of UN forces into Katanga was seen to breach what Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu terms the 'holy-trinity' of UN peacekeeping; consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force.[42] Scholars such as Norrie MacQueen even go so far as to state that the nature of the Congo crisis made the principle of host state consent 'largely irrelevant when the identity, even the existence, of the 'host state' was frequently problematic.'[43] In this way, the development of the

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[40] S/RES/145, https://undocs.org/S/RES/145(1960); Chapter VII of the UN Charter, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html.

[41] Eze, "OAU Faces Rhodesia," 51.

[42] Sidhu, "Regional Groups," 220.

[43] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, 40.

secessionist conflict in the Congo forced the organisation to re-assess its mandate for intervention, which saw the principles of 'all-party' consent and impartiality largely set aside by the UN peacekeeping force. The precedents that arose surrounding sovereignty and consent, particularly those set in Katanga, would go on to inform the mandate for future UN intervention in Africa.

As the Congo crisis escalated, norms surrounding intervention and the use of force were also re-assessed. Although ONUC was not the UN's first peacekeeping attempt, it did represent the first large-scale use of military force within a peacekeeping mission. The escalation of civil war and the secession of Katanga presented the organisation with unprecedented challenges, which in turn, extended the mandate of the peacekeeping force. What Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis term the 'Katanga Rule' developed during the early stages of the crisis, which allowed peacekeepers to use force in self-defence 'both of peacekeeping troops and of the mission.'[44] As the peacekeeping force came under increasing attack in Katanga in 1961, norms surrounding the use of force were redefined by the organisation. The use of force to suppress the Katangan secession, and thus for purposes other than self-defence, represented a significant shift in the organisation's approach to peacekeeping intervention.[45] The escalation of force in Katanga quickly became a matter of concern for the international community, as well as for the permanent members of the Security Council. Thus, as the Congo crisis unfolded, norms of intervention and the use of force were actively reshaped both on the field and within the organisation.

The extension of the UN mandate became increasingly contentious as the crisis intensified. The escalation of force following a number of significant events, such as the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba and the development of operational attacks in Katanga, polarised the debate both at the organisation and within the international community. For some, the Security Council's extension of the peacekeeping mandate following Prime Minister Lumumba's assassination in 1961 was seen as a positive step, one which would limit the escalation of civil war in the Congo.[46]

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[44] Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "Peacekeeping Operations," in *Oxford Handbook*, 333.

[45] Aksu, *United Nations*, 122.

[46] The Security Council resolution of February 1961 urged UN forces to take all appropriate measures, including 'the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort,' S/RES/161, https://undocs.org/S/RES/161(1961).

However, contention grew as the peacekeeping mandate was continually extended beyond the language of the UN Charter. Following ONUC Operations Rumpunch and Morthor in Katanga in 1961, opposition to the UN's use of force rose to its peak as the debate on sovereignty and intervention in Katanga was once again renewed.[47] The escalation of language in late 1961 signalled a shift following the death of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and under his successor U Thant, which allowed 'vigorous action' to be taken to ensure the ending of the Katangan secession in January 1963.[48] Although the peacekeeping mission succeeded in its objective to reintegrate Katanga, the force's seeming contravention of the principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force was criticised by a number of UN member states, as well as the wider international community.[49] Thus, as norms of intervention and the use of force were re-assessed during the Congo crisis, so was the mandate for future UN intervention in Africa.

The Aftermath of the Crisis

The Congo experience emphasised the significant role of the UN in Africa, however, it also led to a questioning of the organisation's future role in the region. Although in technical terms the mission achieved its objectives, its legacy was damaged by the chaotic political situation left in the region following the UN's departure in June 1964. The coup staged in 1965 by Mobutu Sese Seko and backed by the United States set in place the next three decades of dictatorial political rule in the Congo.[50] These developments led to a questioning of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, particularly concerning the organisation's capabilities within the process of African decolonisation. The UN mission outlined the inherent difficulties of managing a large-scale peacekeeping force and balancing the objectives of Western nations and the Afro-Asian bloc against the backdrop of the Cold War.[51] The mission also outlined the inherent tension in the UN Charter between the norms of sovereignty, human rights and intervention, particularly in the context of inter-state and secessionist

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[47] Nzongola-Ntalaja, *Congo*, 114.

[48] S/RES/169, https://undocs.org/S/RES/169(1961).

[49] O'Malley, *Diplomacy of Decolonisation*, 3.

[50] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, 54-55.

[51] O'Malley, *Diplomacy of Decolonisation,* 186.

conflict in Africa. As Hammarskjold predicted in 1960, UN action in the Congo was of decisive significance not only for the future of the organisation, but also 'for the future of Africa.'[52]

The events of the Congo crisis influenced the development of the decolonisation agenda across the African continent during the 1960s. Alongside the Algerian War of Independence and the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa, the events of the Congo crisis brought African affairs to the centre stage of international diplomacy in the early 1960s.[53] The confluence of these events demonstrated to the world the inherent struggle between the principle of self-determination and the continuation of colonial power in Africa. Although some have framed the increased international attention to African affairs as a direct result of Cold War fears, the 1960s saw a much wider internationalisation of the decolonisation agenda.[54] As a result, this period saw the Afro-Asian bloc increasingly using the platform of the UN to criticise Western imperialist policies in Africa. This enhanced the organisation's legitimacy as a forum for the discussion of norms of international relations, as well as its legitimacy as an actor in managing the process of African decolonisation. Important questions were now being asked concerning the future of peacekeeping and post-colonial development in Africa.

Importantly, the Congo crisis also had a significant effect on the British decolonisation process. Although the primary focus was on Belgian colonial power, Britain's colonial interests in Africa were also raised at the UN during the crisis. Following the British government's invocation of the 'wind of change' in 1960, the Afro-Asian bloc used the events in the Congo as an opportunity to put pressure on the commitment made toward decolonisation.[55] Due to the changing international climate of the 1960s, this pressure was one of a number of factors which worked to delegitimise the continuation of the British Empire. This pressure only grew as the crisis went on, particularly from within the halls of the UN and the OAU. By 1968, all of Britain's remaining colonies in Africa,

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[52] SOAS: CMBS/01/A/23/05, "United Nations Action on Congo Situation," Release 29/60, United Nations Information Centre For the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands, July 26, 1960.

[53] Eckel, "Human Rights," 127-128.

[54] Eckel, "Human Rights," 128.

[55] O'Malley, *Diplomacy of Decolonisation*, 20-21.

except for ‘self-governing’ (Southern) Rhodesia, were granted independence. As Jan Eckel has argued, this ‘colonial turnabout’ was in part due to the international criticism levelled at British policy during the Congo crisis, as well as the changing international climate of the 1960s.[56] In this way, the internationalisation of the decolonisation agenda had a clear impact on British colonial policy in Africa. The fact that this criticism was channelled through the organisation also set a precedent for the future relationship between the British government and the UN concerning colonial affairs.

However, the Congo crisis also led to increased opposition to the UN from within the British government. During the crisis, the British government frequently expressed its concern that UN action in the Congo could ‘set a precedent’ for future intervention in African affairs.[57] This concern was no doubt centred in Southern Africa, a region in which intervention was seen to be damaging to British economic interests.[58] The escalation of force taken by peacekeepers during the Congo crisis also provided opponents of UN intervention further justification to criticise the organisation’s competency and to block any future peacekeeping missions in Africa. This was a position that the British and French delegations developed in response to the escalation of force in the Congo and then maintained at the UN for much of the 1960s. When it later came to the discussion of Rhodesian affairs, the British position was bolstered by the French delegation’s continued abstentions on Security Council votes on the grounds that Rhodesia was ‘beyond the competency’ of the UN.[59] In this way, the events of the Congo crisis also provided some degree of justification for European opposition to UN action in the mid-to-late 1960s. As the principles of intervention were reconfigured in the following years, the memory of the crisis continued to play into the narrative of those who opposed the extended involvement of the UN in African affairs.

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[56] Eckel, “Human Rights,” 128.

[57] The National Archives, Kew [hereafter TNA]: DO 168/69, Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary, the Vice President of Tanganyika and the Prime Minister of Uganda, January 23, 1963.

[58] Watts, “Rhodesian Crisis,” 104.

[59] Joanna Warson, “Beyond Co-operation and Competition: Anglo-French Relations, Connected Histories of Decolonization and Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1965-80,” *Historical Research* 88, no. 242 (2015): 760.

In summation, the Congo crisis led to a re-assessment of the norms of sovereignty and intervention, as well as a questioning of the role the UN was to play in the future of African decolonisation. As the organisation's first large-scale use of military force within a peacekeeping mission, ONUC demonstrated the limitations of military intervention to the international community. The development of the peacekeeping mission also highlighted the tension in the UN Charter between the 'intervention-proscribing' principle of state sovereignty and the 'intervention-prescribing' principle of human rights.[60] The precedents which developed during the crisis informed how the UN approached the process of decolonisation, as well as how colonial powers worked to oppose extended UN intervention in African affairs. Other developments that occurred during the crisis, such as the internationalisation of the decolonisation agenda and the strengthening of the Afro-Asian bloc, reinforced the organisation's commitment to the African decolonisation process. In this way, the Congo crisis laid the foundations for the shift in UN intervention in the mid-1960s.

As the next chapter will explore, the Congo crisis also provides valuable insight into the role of the UN within the 'Rhodesian Question.' Through the Congo crisis and the changing climate of the early 1960s, the British government was forced to recognise the international opposition to the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia. The crisis also set a precedent for continued UN involvement as a platform of pressure on the British government, as well as confirming the organisation's commitment to decolonisation across the African continent. Following the Congo crisis, the future of Southern Rhodesia was raised to the top of the decolonisation agenda at the UN, and the British government placed at the centre of the Afro-Asian pressure for majority rule independence. The next chapter of this thesis integrates the precedents set by the Congo crisis with the unfolding of events in Rhodesia, particularly concerning the extension of diplomatic and economic intervention by the UN. In tracing decolonisation through the 1960s, this thesis presents a more interconnected history of UN intervention in the African decolonisation process.

[60] Thakur, "Humanitarian Intervention," 391.

Chapter Two

The UN and Rhodesia: Alternative Intervention

The Rhodesian Question was at the top of the UN agenda for much of the 1960s and 1970s. With the closing of the Congo crisis, international attention turned to the fate of Rhodesia and the preservation of white minority rule in Southern Africa.[61] Following the announcement of the UDI in 1965, the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Afro-Asian bloc acted to ensure Rhodesia's place on the UN agenda, as well to place pressure on both the British government and the illegitimate Smith regime on the issue of majority rule independence.[62] During this period, alternative forms of UN intervention developed through the introduction of mandatory economic sanctions, the escalation of diplomatic pressure and the questioning of Britain's primary responsibility for the territory.[63] A number of factors ruled out the possibility of a UN peacekeeping force in Rhodesia, however, what emerged in its absence was indicative of shifting UN interventionism during the 1960s and 1970s. In this chapter, a brief background is given on the colonial history of (Southern) Rhodesia and the development of British responsibility there. Using British archival sources, this chapter then examines how UN intervention shifted through the two significant turning points of the UDI and the Pearce Commission between 1965 and 1972.

In 1923, the territory known as Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed by the United Kingdom as a self-governing colony. In 1953, Southern Rhodesia was then merged with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, also known as the Central African Federation (CAF). The Federation lasted until the end of 1963, following which Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became independent as the nations of Zambia and Malawi. On November 11, 1965, Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front government announced the UDI to the world.[64] This illegal declaration evolved from a dispute between the British and Rhodesian governments over the conditions of

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[61] Nyamunda, "'More a Cause," 1011.

[62] Eze, "OAU Faces Rhodesia," 46-47.

[63] Nyamunda, "More a Cause," 1007.

[64] Watts, *Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration,* 1-2.

independence, resulting in Prime Minister Ian Smith's unilateral break from the United Kingdom. After the announcement of the UDI, the United Kingdom, the UN and the Commonwealth deemed these actions illegal and later declared the situation in Rhodesia a threat to international peace and security.[65] The next fifteen years were characterised by a pattern of failed negotiations and escalating conflict, until finally in 1980 the transition occurred from Rhodesia to an independent Zimbabwe.

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence

The issuance of the UDI in November 1965 marked one of the most significant turning points for UN involvement in Rhodesia. The UDI not only forced the British government's recognition of the UN's role in the region, but it also initiated a pattern of increased diplomatic and economic intervention. However, in the months leading up to the declaration, the government of the newly-elected Prime Minister Harold Wilson deliberated over the possibility of UN involvement in Southern Rhodesia. On the one hand, the narrative built in the aftermath of the Congo crisis that the UN neither had the competence nor the authority to intervene in the region's 'internal' affairs protected British interests.[66] The British government recognised that to concede on UN involvement would not only undermine its position on primary responsibility, but would also set a worrying precedent for the organisation's involvement in Southern Africa.[67] On the other hand, it had become increasingly untenable to maintain the position that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was not one of international concern. Having ruled out the possibility of British military intervention, the government recognised that much of the demand for effective action was in support of UN involvement in the region.[68] The question for the British government became how to appease the international community and demonstrate effective action, whilst also opposing UN military intervention in Southern Rhodesia.

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[65] Nyamunda, "More a Cause," 1008.

[66] Elaine Windrich, *Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 37-38.

[67] Watts, "Rhodesian Crisis," 106.

[68] Coggins, "Wilson and Rhodesia," 367.

The British government built its opposition to UN intervention in Southern Rhodesia in the aftermath of the Congo crisis. During this period, the government worked to consolidate the Congo-era narrative that Southern Rhodesia did not fall within the 'United Nations' sphere of competence.'[69] The limitations of the UN mission in the Congo worked to bolster the British government's claims that the organisation neither had the authority nor the competence to intervene in Southern Rhodesia's 'internal' affairs. Thus, in 1962, the government strongly opposed the General Assembly's declaration of Southern Rhodesia as a 'non-self-governing territory' and the characterisation of the British as the 'administering authority' in the region.[70] The government also opposed the General Assembly's declaration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia as a 'threat to international peace and security' in 1963, a precedent which had allowed for the escalation of external intervention during the Congo crisis.[71] It was through this opposition that the government hoped to forestall UN involvement in Southern Rhodesia, particularly through the narrative that the organisation was neither competent nor had the authority to interfere in the region's 'internal' affairs.

As well as a protection of its colonial responsibility, British opposition to UN involvement was also seen to protect the government's wider interests in Southern Africa. In the early 1960s, any action taken by the British government on Southern Rhodesia was seen to have a considerable impact on the survival of white minority rule in Southern Africa. As Carl Watts suggests, the government was concerned that any admission of UN competence to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia would 'embolden' the Afro-Asian bloc to press for UN action against the apartheid regime in South Africa.[72] The introduction of UN sanctions against South Africa would have constituted a considerable threat to Britain's economic interests in the region, which were already under strain due to the dissolution of the Federation in 1963.[73] Setting a precedent for UN intervention in Southern Africa was inimical to Britain's colonial interests in the region, as well as to its position of

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[69] Watts, *Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration*, 7.

[70] A/RES/1747(XVI), https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1747(XVI).

[71] A/RES/1889(XVIII), https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1899(XVIII).

[72] Watts, "Rhodesian Crisis," 104.

[73] Coggins, "Wilson and Rhodesia," 366.

opposition built in the aftermath of the Congo crisis. In this way, the British opposition to UN involvement, and to its 'primary responsibility' in Southern Rhodesia, worked to protect the government's wider interests in the early 1960s.

Thus, in the months prior, the British government held a number of discussions on the course of action it was to take in the event of a UDI. Amongst discussion of military intervention, economic sanctions and diplomatic action, Wilson's Cabinet was forced to consider the possibility of UN involvement in Southern Rhodesia. Although Britain's position on UN incompetence served its interests in terms of responsibility and precedent in Southern Africa, it became increasingly difficult to block external involvement in the region as the UDI drew closer. The efforts of the General Assembly and the Special Committee had been effective in presenting the situation in Southern Rhodesia as a threat to international peace and security, and in turn, had drawn in support for the organisation's involvement in the event of a UDI.[74] The perceived strength of the UN's role in colonial affairs, even with the legacy of the Congo crisis, encouraged support for its involvement in Southern Rhodesia. This is reflected in the public position on the UDI, as in a poll taken of the British public in October 1965, over sixty-three per cent wanted the matter to be taken to the UN.[75] Having ruled out the possibility of British intervention in the region, the government recognised that much of the demand for effective action included UN involvement in the region.

Although the possibility of 'handing over' the region to the UN was ruled out, the British government considered a number of policies which would appease the demands for UN involvement. At a meeting of the British Cabinet Office Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC) in May 1965, it was determined that the government should bring the issue of Southern Rhodesia to the Security Council if the UDI was to occur.[76] This was a significant turning point for the government as if the issue was brought to the Security Council, it would have to abandon its position that neither the government nor the UN had to right to intervene in the region's 'internal'

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[74] Cefkin, "Rhodesian Question," 657.

[75] National Opinion Poll Bulletin, Special Supplement 1, Rhodesia (October 1965), as quoted in Watts, "Rhodesian Crisis," 102.

[76] TNA: CAB 148/18, O.P.D.(65) 24, Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meeting, Minutes of the 24th Meeting, May 5, 1965.

affairs. In September 1965, the British Foreign Office recognised exactly that, stating that bringing the UDI to the UN 'shall in fact have conceded our stand on competence,' and that although 'this does not mean that legally the UN could then claim to play a part in any subsequent constitutional negotiations … politically it will make it more difficult to argue that HMG have the sole responsibility in any subsequent constitutional negotiations.'[77] The significance of the UDI forced the government to recognise the authority of the UN, as bringing the situation in Southern Rhodesia to the Security Council was deemed the most favourable policy option. In this way, the UDI weakened the government's stance on UN competence, as well as its own parameters of responsibility in Southern Rhodesia.

The announcement of the UDI on November 11, 1965, initiated a new era of UN involvement in Rhodesian affairs. At the request of the British government, the Security Council met to discuss the matter and swiftly issued a resolution condemning the UDI and calling upon all member states not to recognise the 'illegal racist minority regime.'[78] From this point onward, the organisation became inextricably tied to the discussion of Rhodesian affairs, as well as to the question of Britain's primary responsibility in the region. As Luise White argues, Britain's international authority became 'nested' in the UN in the aftermath of the UDI.[79] Through the UDI, the British government also shifted the discussion from the General Assembly to the Security Council, and in turn, secured the place of the Rhodesian Question at the top of the UN agenda.[80] In this way, the UDI represents one of the most significant turning points not only in the history of Rhodesia, but also for UN involvement in the region. In bringing the situation in Southern Rhodesia to the Security Council the government was forced to drop its position that the region was not a matter of international concern and, in doing so, opened up the future of Rhodesia to the international community.

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[77] TNA: CAB 148/22, O.P.D(65) 132, Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meeting, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Annex II: Immediate Action in the U.N: Note by the Foreign Office, September 21, 1965.

[78] S/RES/216, https://undocs.org/S/RES/216(1965).

[79] White, *Unpopular Sovereignty*, 128.

[80] David A. Kay, "The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations Political Process," *International Organization* 21, no. 4 (1967): 800.

Following the announcement of the UDI, much of the decolonisation effort became centred within the halls of the UN. The Security Council increasingly became the platform through which Afro-Asian representatives expressed their opposition to the UDI, and in turn, called on the United Kingdom to take action to ensure the end of the rebellion. A number of African representatives called on the United Kingdom to use force to do so, whilst others such as Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah called on the UN to authorise African states, or possibly the OAU, to 'intervene militarily to suppress the rebellion' in Rhodesia.[81] As Ghana had been one of the most significant troop contributors to the peacekeeping mission in the Congo, this call for African-led intervention was seen to be grounded in recent precedent. However, with the British government's continued rejection of military intervention, international pressure increased for the British government to detail its alternative plan of action in Rhodesia. Criticism that had arisen of the government during the Congo crisis was once again deployed, particularly on those actions which contravened the 'wind of change' rhetoric of the early 1960s. At the UN, the Afro-Asian bloc accused the British government of being willing to use force in its recent interventions in Cyprus, Kenya and Aden, but not against its 'kith and kin' in Southern Rhodesia.[82] In light of these pressures, and the international outcry surrounding the UDI, the British government was forced to consider alternative action in Rhodesia.

However, the most significant result of the UDI was the introduction of UN sanctions. More so than any other development, the introduction of sanctions solidified the organisation's place in Rhodesian affairs. Shortly after the announcement of the UDI, the Security Council called upon member states to do their utmost to 'break all economic relations' with Rhodesia, including an 'embargo on oil and petroleum products.'[83] Then, in December 1966, the Security Council extended this recommendation and imposed its first-ever policy of mandatory economic sanctions, which came to form the basis of the UN involvement in Rhodesia.[84] The extension of the sanctions policy was secured by the international pressure placed on the British government to take action to end the

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[81] Kwame Nkrumah, "Call for Action in Rhodesia: Nkrumah's Address to the National Assembly, Accra, November 25, 1965," in *Rhodesia File* (London: Panaf Books, 1976), 114.

[82] White, *Unpopular Sovereignty*, 113.

[83] S/RES/217, https://undocs.org/S/RES/217(1965).

[84] S/RES/232, https://undocs.org/S/RES/232(1966).

rebellion in Rhodesia, particularly from within the Afro-Asian bloc. Through breaking off diplomatic relations with the British government and petitioning support from the Commonwealth nations, African representatives assisted in securing the implementation of mandatory economic sanctions.[85] These efforts were further reflected in the extended sanctions policy, as eight African amendments were added to the 1966 Security Council resolution, including a ban on the supply of oil and oil products to Rhodesia.[86] Thus, the extension of UN sanctions reflected the efforts of those who worked to oppose the illegitimate Smith regime. This development also reflected the deepening of UN intervention in Rhodesian affairs in the mid-1960s.

Furthermore, the introduction of mandatory sanctions also furthered Britain's recognition of UN authority on Rhodesian affairs. As a result of the UDI and the bringing of the Rhodesian situation to the Security Council, the British government could no longer hold its earlier position that Rhodesia did not fall within the 'sphere of competence' at the UN. The real impact of this authority was shown in 1966, during what became known as the 'Beira Incident.' In early April, the British government was forced to seek Security Council authorisation to prevent, by force if necessary, the arrival of vessels in Beira believed to be carrying oil for Rhodesia.[87] The port of Beira, located in Portuguese Mozambique, had previously been the main sea outlet for land-locked Rhodesia. However, under the conditions of the oil embargo introduced in 1966, the vessels were deemed a threat to the peace.[88] The Security Council responded swiftly, issuing a resolution which gave the British the authority to prevent the arrival of the vessels by the use of force 'if necessary.'[89] This resolution was the only instance in UN history, after Korea but before Iraq, in which member states authorised the use of force on behalf of the UN.[90]

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[85] According to Richard Coggins, a total of nine African states broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom as a result of the government's inaction; Coggins, "Wilson and Rhodesia," 371.

[86] Kay, "Politics of Decolonization," 801.

[87] *Principle in Torment*, 47.

[88] Nyangoni, *Africa in the United Nations*, 119.

[89] S/RES/221, https://undocs.org/S/RES/221(1966).

[90] Aksu, *United Nations,* 60.

In the end, the vessels departed without discharging the oil and action was not taken by the British government. However, the 'Beira Incident' remains a clear example of how economic intervention increased the authority of the UN on Rhodesian affairs. The British government's request for an emergency meeting of the Security Council in mid-1966 further enforced the Council's ultimate authority on the sanctions policy implemented against Rhodesia.[91] Contrary to the narrative that the Security Council was 'paralysed' during the Cold War, the 'Beira Incident' demonstrates the Council's maintained authority and mandate for action over those events which constituted a threat to international peace and security.[92] The wider limitations of the sanctions policy, particularly concerning those member states which continued to trade with Rhodesia in the late 1960s, forced the British government to turn towards the UN. This can be seen in the extension of sanctions and the creation of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee in 1968, which solidified the authority of the Council on the enforcement of sanctions and further secured the situation in Rhodesia on the Council's agenda.[93] Thus, the introduction of sanctions furthered not only UN involvement in the region, but also increased pressure on the British government and the economic survival of the illegitimate Smith regime, both significant steps in the decolonisation process.

In summation, the UDI was one of the most significant turning points for UN involvement in Rhodesia. The UDI forced the British government not only to recognise the role of the organisation within the region, but also to concede on the notion of UN incompetence built up in the aftermath of the Congo crisis. Similarly to the UN mission in the Congo, the UDI also demonstrated the tension between British colonial rule and the organisation's commitment to decolonisation. The efforts of the UN, and particularly the Afro-Asian bloc, to bring international attention to the situation in Rhodesia meant that the British could no longer renege on its responsibilities in the region. The movement of the situation in Rhodesia from the General Assembly to the Security Council, the mandate created on the enforcement and policing of sanctions, and the emboldened position of the Afro-Asian bloc ensured that the Rhodesian Question remained on the UN agenda for the next fifteen years.

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91 *Principle in Torment*, 47.

92 Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World,* 127.

93 In May 1968, the Security Council extended sanctions to include the import and export 'of all commodities' into and from Rhodesia and established a Security Council Committee to observe the implementation of those sanctions, S/RES/253, https://undocs.org/S/RES/253(1968).

The Pearce Commission

A second significant turning point for UN intervention came with the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals of 1971 and the subsequent sending of the Pearce Commission to Rhodesia in 1972. The renewal of the Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations provided an opportunity for further UN involvement in Rhodesia, as well as for the renewal of the debate on Britain's primary responsibility for the region.[94] The conditions of the settlement proposals also provided an opportunity for increased Afro-Asian opposition to the Anglo-Rhodesian cycle of negotiations, particularly from those who continued to demand majority rule independence. In this way, the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals and the sending of the Pearce Commission offer a site of analysis through which to examine not only the process of decolonisation, but also the furthering of UN involvement and its impact on British government policy in the early 1970s.

Much like the UDI, the mandate for the Pearce Commission developed during a period of intense debate on the Rhodesian Question. In the late 1960s, the Smith regime cut its remaining ties to the United Kingdom through the proclamation of a republic constitution. Enacted in 1969, the new constitution restricted rights for the African population even further and, in turn, worked to weaken the Anglo-Rhodesian relationship.[95] The failure of the British government to act against these measures led to increased criticism at the UN, evidenced in the Security Council resolution in 1970 condemning Rhodesia's 'illegal proclamation of republican status' and reaffirming the primary responsibility of the British government to enable the 'people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.'[96] As developments were made toward renewed settlement negotiations in 1971, tensions escalated between representatives at the UN and the newly-elected Conservative government under Prime Minister Edward Heath. UN representatives, and particularly those from within the Afro-Asian bloc, recognised that any negotiations which did not include Zimbabwean political groups would fail to secure the necessary conditions of majority rule

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[94] Luise White, "'Normal Political Activities': Rhodesia, the Pearce Commission, and the African National Council," *Journal of African History* 52, no. 3 (2011): 321.

[95] Nyangoni, *Africa in the United Nations*, 138.

[96] S/RES/277, https://undocs.org/S/RES/277(1970).

independence. Thus, with the renewal of Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations, tensions between British responsibility and UN special interest in Rhodesia reached new heights.

At the first stage, the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals of 1971 were met with significant opposition at the UN. The White Paper produced from the negotiations between Ian Smith and British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Alec Douglas-Home was widely denounced at the organisation, as well as by Zimbabwean political groups, on the grounds that the proposals did not provide for the condition of majority rule.[97] The principle of 'No Independence Before Majority Rule,' known as NIBMAR, was at the heart of the Afro-Asian bloc's position on Rhodesian affairs in the early 1970s. The General Assembly was particularly strong in its condemnation, issuing a resolution opposing the proposals which, if implemented, would 'entrench the rule of the racist minority regime' and 'perpetuate the enslavement of the African people of Zimbabwe.'[98] Much like in the aftermath of the UDI, the General Assembly led the opposition against the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals with the hopes of building further opposition from within the UN and the wider international community. In this way, the announcement of the proposals provided an opportunity for the UN to reaffirm its opposition to any settlement which did not fulfil the commitment toward majority rule independence.

In addition to the content of the settlement proposals, the conditions for their enactment also came under fire at the UN. One of the most significant conditions of the White Paper was the sending of the British-led Pearce Commission to Rhodesia, in order to 'test' how acceptable the settlement proposals were 'to the population of Rhodesia as a whole.'[99] What became known as the 'Test of Acceptability' was to be carried out by Lord Edward Pearce under the auspices of the British government, and so both its validity and impartiality were of immediate concern at the UN.[100] A further issue of concern was centred on the logistical issues associated with testing the Rhodesian

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[97] Nathan M. Shamuyarira, "Rhodesia After the Pearce Commission Report, 1972," *African Review* 2, no. 4 (1972): 469.

[98] A/RES/2877(XXVI), https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2877(XXVI).

[99] *Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971).

[100] Windrich, *Britain*, 186-187.

population ‘as a whole,’ particularly in the context of the region’s colonial history. Representatives expressed their concerns that British control over the Commission may impact the voting, and that in turn, intimidation may play a significant role in the Test of Acceptability.[101] Without any external observation, the results of this test lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. In this way, the conditions for ‘testing’ the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals were of as much contention as their content at the UN.

Much like in the aftermath of the UDI, the announcement of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals provided an opportunity for the closer alignment of Zimbabwean leadership and the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN, particularly on their joint commitment toward majority rule. The announcement of the proposals sparked political opposition in Zimbabwe, seen in the reactionary formation of the African National Council (ANC) under Bishop Abel Muzorewa in December 1971.[102] With the exile of a number of political parties, former leaders of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) joined forces with Bishop Muzorewa to streamline the opposition to the proposals and to reaffirm their demands for majority rule independence.[103] In response to these developments, the UN was revived as a platform for the voices of the Zimbabwean independence struggle. In December, the Security Council made the decision to invite Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU) to appear before the Council to express their views on the settlement proposals.[104] Then, in February 1972, the Security Council invited Bishop Muzorewa to address the organisation on the ANC’s commitment to the independence process.[105] In this way, the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals catalysed a period of increased discussion and debate at the UN on the future of Rhodesia. During this period, the shared objectives of the Afro-Asian bloc and the ANC increased the front of opposition to the settlement proposals.

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[101] White, “Normal Political Activities,” 329-330.

[102] White, “Normal Political Activities,” 327.

[103] Shamuyarira, “Rhodesia,” 469.

[104] Security Council Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971, S/10405.

[105] TNA: FCO 36/1066, United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations (UKMIS) to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Text of Bishop Muzorewa’s Statement to the Security Council, February 15, 1972.

Thus, as time went on, the British government became acutely aware that the validity of the vote on the settlement proposals may be challenged. The growing opposition from the Afro-Asian bloc and Zimbabwean political groups led the government to consider policies which would encourage support for the proposals and legitimise the sending of the Pearce Commission in 1972. Internal correspondence from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office during this period newly reveals that, despite outward opposition, the government did consider the possibility of further UN involvement in this process. In correspondence between Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials Anthony Parsons and Martin Le Quesne, it was acknowledged that it was 'more than likely' that African member states would push for a resolution 'calling for a Security Council mission to test opinion in Rhodesia.'[106] Doing so, the Office recognised, would be grounded in recent precedent as the Security Council had approved similar investigatory missions to Guinea, Senegal and Jerusalem in the past twelve months. Due to this precedent, Under-Secretary Parsons made the suggestion that the government should invite the Security Council to attach a 'three-man mission as observers to the Commission which will carry out the test of acceptability.' This correspondence reveals the British government's recognition of the pressures exerted by the Afro-Asian bloc on this issue, as well as of how UN involvement may appease those opposed the Pearce Commission. More broadly, this correspondence represents the government's consideration of UN involvement, a policy position not often acknowledged in the scholarship of the early 1970s.

The possibility of UN involvement in the Pearce Commission was not discussed in isolation, as this option was considered by the British government throughout the period leading up to the Commission's visit to Rhodesia in January 1972. In December, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN Colin Crowe reiterated the suggestion for UN observation of the Test of Acceptability in correspondence with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.[107] In his recommendation, Crowe stated that as well as Afro-Asian opposition, concerns were also present within the American, French, Italian, Argentine and Japanese missions that the results of the test not 'rest upon the word of the British Commission alone.' These concerns evidence the lack of support

[106] TNA: FCO 36/854, A.D. Parsons, FCO, to C.M. Le Quesne, FCO, October 14, 1971.

[107] TNA: FCO 36/776, C.T. Crowe, UKMIS, to FCO, December 7, 1971.

for the Commission from Britain's own allies at the UN. Further along in the correspondence, Crowe stated that these concerns 'could probably be met by the appointment of a single observer,' most likely a personal representative of the Secretary-General. The government's internal correspondence has not been considered in much of the existing analysis of the Pearce Commission, yet through examining these records, it becomes clear that the government faced considerable pressure to allow UN observation of the Test of Acceptability. It was the pressure from the Afro-Asian bloc, as well as from Britain's European allies, that led to this consideration of UN involvement.

However, this opposition was not enough to fully erode the British government's position on external intervention. In December, the Rhodesia Political Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office came to the decision that representatives must firmly resist the calls for UN observation, stating that although 'careful consideration' had been given to the idea of 'some form of UN involvement,' the organisation's presence would ultimately 'jeopardise' the work of the Pearce Commission.[108] In this way, the British opposition to UN intervention built in the aftermath of the Congo crisis continued to inform government policy in the early 1970s. However, how exactly to resist these calls for UN observation remained a significant problem for the government. In the post-UDI period, the government could no longer tout the line of UN incompetence or lack of authority in order to oppose UN involvement in the Pearce Commission. Having over-extended its veto-wielding power in the Security Council during the early 1970s, the government also recognised that vetoing a resolution on UN observation would create 'the worst possible impression' in the eyes of the international community.[109] In order to avoid inflaming the opposition, the government chose an alternative route to oppose UN involvement in Rhodesia.

Instead, the government attempted to limit the criticism of the Pearce Commission in the hopes that the support for UN observation would dissipate. As stated, in the early 1970s the UN had been revived as a platform for African representatives and Zimbabwean political groups to voice their opposition to the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals. This criticism was seen as damaging to

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[108] TNA: FCO 36/776, FCO to UKMIS, December 8, 1971.

[109] The British delegation vetoed a total of six resolutions on the Question Concerning Southern Rhodesia between March 1970 and May 1973, Windrich, *Britain,* 38; FCO 36/854, Parsons to Le Quesne, October 14, 1971.

British interests in Rhodesia, particularly on the impact it may have on the support of its European allies. Thus, in December 1971, the British government in its capacity as the 'administering authority' in Rhodesia declined to forward invitations to leaders from ZAPU and ZANU to speak at the Security Council.[110] In the internal correspondence of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, it was made clear that the invitations to Joshua Nkomo and Reverend Sithole had a negative bearing on the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals and that they were seen as having the possibility to create 'something of a precedent' for the support of a 'UN Observation Mission' in Rhodesia.[111] In rejecting UN involvement, the government had to oppose not only the demands for UN observation, but also the use of the UN as a platform for the opposition to the settlement proposals. Much like in the months leading up to the UDI, this was a period in which tensions were escalated between British responsibility and UN special interest in Rhodesia.

When published, the results of the Test of Acceptability led to a rupture in the Anglo-Rhodesian relationship. The final Pearce Commission Report, made public in May 1972, detailed the Commission's visit to Rhodesia between January and March and concluded that the proposals had been overwhelmingly rejected by the African population of Rhodesia.[112] The British government's acceptance of the findings of the Pearce Commission Report angered Ian Smith, who stated that the vote had failed due to 'African intransigence and British incompetence.'[113] On the international stage, however, the Pearce Commission Report made evident the vast opposition of the African population to any settlement in Rhodesia which fell short of majority rule independence. In the aftermath of the report, the repeated failure of the British government to secure a resolution led to further questioning of the Anglo-Rhodesian route toward achieving a settlement.[114] The results of the Test of Acceptability represent a clear turning point in the cycle of Anglo-Rhodesian diplomacy, one which influenced the future of the negations on Rhodesia in the mid-to-late 1970s.

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[110] TNA: FCO 36/776, P.R.A Mansfield, FCO, to S.J.G Fingland, FCO, December 10, 1971.

[111] TNA: FCO 36/776, P.R.A Mansfield to S.J.G Fingland, December 7, 1971.

[112] *Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable Lord Pearce* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972).

[113] White, "Normal Political Activities," 337.

[114] Shamuyarira, "Rhodesia," 482.

The rejection of the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals had a profound impact on British government policy, as well as on the future of UN involvement in Rhodesia. One of the most significant impacts of failed proposals was the renewal of the discussion of primary responsibility within the British government. As it became clear that the settlement proposals were to be rejected, the government once again engaged in a discussion concerning UN involvement in Rhodesian affairs. In correspondence between the United Kingdom Mission to the UN and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in March 1972, Representative Crowe recommended that the government manoeuvre toward a position that allowed the UN to 'undertake certain actions' which would have the effect of 'arrogating responsibility to themselves and thus in practice eroding our own.'[115] Although the Foreign and Commonwealth Office did not accept this recommendation, in its response to Crowe it was made clear that the government had continued to look into a 'specific transfer of responsibility for Rhodesia to the U.N. or some other body' during this period.[116] This correspondence evidences the fact that the transfer of responsibility for Rhodesia to the UN remained a policy consideration in mid-1972. The question of responsibility that had been reignited by the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals led the government to further consider its own position in Rhodesian affairs, alongside a consideration of further UN involvement.

The British government's reconsideration of responsibility in Rhodesia was influenced by two additional factors, firstly through developments within the Afro-Asian bloc and secondly through the rising demands of Zimbabwean political leaders for independence. During the early 1970s, developments within the Afro-Asian bloc had a significant impact on the British discussion on responsibility. Following the rejection of the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals, the government was no longer able to ignore the fact that 'African resentment' at the UN built up in the early 1960s during the Congo crisis was now directed at the issue of British responsibility in Rhodesia.[117] Nor were the government able to ignore the calls of African representatives for change in the cycle of Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations, particularly from those who expressed their support for further UN involvement in Rhodesia. The government's response had traditionally been to deny African support for UN involvement, reflected in a statement from the Foreign and Commonwealth

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[115] TNA: FCO 36/1067, C.T. Crowe to C.M. Le Quesne, March 14, 1972.

[116] TNA: FCO 36/1067, C.M. Le Quesne to C.T. Crowe, March 27, 1972.

[117] FCO 36/1067, Crowe to Le Quesne, March 14, 1972.

Office in March that it was doubtful whether 'any Africans' were thinking along these lines.[118] However, this sentiment is directly countered by evidence within the government's correspondence which documented Afro-Asian support for UN involvement in Rhodesian affairs.

In April 1972, the British government's UN Department compiled a full report on Afro-Asian attitudes to British responsibility in Rhodesia.[119] The report evidences the growing Afro-Asian support for UN involvement, as it includes numerous references of support for the transferral of responsibility from the government to the UN. In particular, the report noted a meeting of the Security Council in December 1971, at which Nigerian Ambassador Ogbu stated that if the British government 'cannot discharge its responsibility' then it should enable the UN to 'take direct responsibility' for Rhodesia, followed by Indian Ambassador Sen's comment that the government should 'relinquish the legal fiction' of its responsibility for Rhodesia. Government correspondence also made note of a Special Committee meeting in March 1972, at which representatives of the Ivory Coast and Mali stated that the British government should admit that the Rhodesian problem was 'something outside its ability' and simply 'resolve and pass the whole matter' to the UN.[120] In June 1972, representatives at the UN Department even recognised the Tanzanian Foreign Minister's support for a return to UN Trusteeship.[121] Far from anomalies, these statements represent the growing Afro-Asian support for UN involvement in Rhodesia through 1971 and into 1972, particularly in the aftermath of the failed Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals. The report of the UN Department and other government correspondence reveals the British government's recognition of this support, which impacted the wider debate on British responsibility in Rhodesia.

Secondly, the British government's reconsideration of responsibility was influenced by the rising demands of Zimbabwean political leaders for independence. The rejection of the settlement proposals in 1972 emboldened the ANC under Bishop Muzorewa, who now represented the

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[118] FCO 36/1067, Le Quesne to Crowe, March 27, 1972.

[119] TNA: FCO 36/1083, UN Department Report, ""Little Bang" - some Afro-Asian attitudes," April 24, 1972.

[120] TNA: FCO 36/1083, P.R.M. Hinchcliffe, UKMIS, to M.A. Goodfellow, FCO, Report on the Committee of 24 Meeting on Rhodesia, March 29, 1972.

[121] TNA: FCO 36/1216, T.W. Keeble, FCO, to Mr. Dutton, FCO, June 9, 1972.

Zimbabwean independence movement in the eyes of the international community. In February 1972, Muzorewa made a statement to the Security Council stating that he hoped the UN now recognised that 'Britain has defaulted on its responsibility to promote majority rule in Rhodesia.'[122] Muzorewa also called for an extension of sanctions against Rhodesia to include a full blockade of the ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques in Mozambique, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Similarly to the Afro-Asian bloc, Muzorewa used the Security Council as a platform through which to place pressure on the issue of British responsibility, as well as to encourage further action against the illegitimate Smith regime.[123] The increased international attention on Rhodesia, paired with the emboldened position of the ANC, were two of the most significant factors which influenced the British government's reconsideration of its responsibility in Rhodesia. The possibility of extending UN sanctions, which would only further weaken the Anglo-Rhodesian relationship, also increased British concerns around achieving a resolution on the Rhodesian Question.

In summation, the UDI and the Pearce Commission represent two of the most significant turning points for UN involvement in Rhodesia. The UDI represents the extension of UN authority in Rhodesian affairs, bolstered through the introduction of mandatory sanctions and the development of the Security Council as an instrument of decolonisation. The Anglo-Rhodesian proposals and the Pearce Commission reflect the demand for UN involvement in Rhodesian affairs and the impact that the Afro-Asian bloc and Zimbabwean political parties had on the British government's reconsideration of responsibility in Rhodesia. A number of key archival documents from within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have newly revealed the extent of the Afro-Asian support for UN involvement in Rhodesia, as well as how this impacted the question of Britain's continued responsibility in the region. Together, these two events represent the effects of the UN's shift toward diplomatic and economic intervention during the 1960s and early 1970s, particularly on the issues of British responsibility and the survival of the illegitimate Smith regime.

Moreover, the two significant turning points of the UDI and the Pearce Commission also evidence the shifting interventionism of the UN during the 1960s. With the Congo model of peacekeeping

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[122] FCO 36/1066, Text of Bishop Muzorewa's Statement, 3-5.

[123] Shamuyarira, "Rhodesia," 469-470.

ruled out, the UN was forced to shift from military to diplomatic and economic intervention. However, many of the same precedents which arose during the UN mission to the Congo continued to influence the organisation's action in Rhodesia. The debates surrounding sovereignty and intervention sparked during the UN mission to the Congo played a significant role in the UDI and the Pearce Commission, particularly on the extent to which the British had a responsibility to intervene to end the rebellion in Rhodesia in 1965. The opposition to British colonial rule built during the early 1960s was also renewed and amplified during the UDI, seen in the growing support of the Afro-Asian bloc and the international community for majority rule independence.

However, the extremity of the situation in Rhodesia forced the British government to partially concede on its Congo-era narrative of UN incompetence. This is evidenced in the British government's turn towards the UN following the announcement of the UDI and the introduction of UN sanctions. The unique relationship between British responsibility, Rhodesia's claimed authority and the independence demands of Zimbabwean political groups also necessitated development beyond the Afro-Asian bloc's Congo-era criticism of British colonial rule, toward a demand for the government to take responsibility or else allow the UN further diplomatic authority over the region's affairs. In this way, although the UN's approach to intervention in the Congo and Rhodesia differ, similarities can be identified in the organisation's wider approach to the process of African decolonisation during this period. Now, having traced UN involvement through the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, the third and final chapter will examine the final stages of the negotiations from 1977 through to the declaration of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

Chapter Three

The UN and Zimbabwe: Intervention Re-examined

The UN was a significant actor in the process of decolonisation culminating in Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980. However protracted or complex this process may have been, UN representatives applied continual pressure to the British government and the illegitimate Smith regime on the issue of majority rule independence. However, the process of Zimbabwean independence in the late 1970s has been dominated by analyses of the Lancaster House Conference, Anglo-Rhodesian negotiation and Commonwealth intervention.[124] The UN has remained largely absent from these analyses, particularly on the role that the organisation played in the fulfilment of the conditions of independence. In contrast, this chapter outlines the UN's role in the independence process through a re-examination of the Anglo-American proposals of 1977 and the extension of UN action in Rhodesia between 1979 and 1980. UN involvement in the final stages of the independence process is examined through three significant factors; the UN Observer Group, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriation programme and the organisation's financial assistance. In this way, the UN's shifting interventionism is traced through to the culmination of Zimbabwean independence in April 1980.

The Second Chimurenga, also known as the Rhodesian Bush War or the Zimbabwe Liberation War, increased the pressure to achieve a political resolution in the late 1970s. During this period, conflict escalated between the Rhodesian Front and the Zimbabwean liberation movements of ZANU and ZAPU, led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo respectively, later known as the Patriotic Front.[125] Alongside opposition from liberation forces, the Smith regime also faced economic recession under

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[124] Andrew Novak, "Face-Saving Maneuvers and Strong Third-Party Mediation: The Lancaster House Conference on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia," *International Negotiation* 14, no. 1 (2009): 149-174; Timothy Scarnecchia, "The Anglo-American and Commonwealth Negotiations for a Zimbabwean Settlement between Geneva and Lancaster, 1977–1979," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no. 5 (2017): 823-843.

[125] The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) was the military wing of ZANU and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was the military wing of ZAPU, Alois S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 161.

the increased effectiveness of international sanctions.[126] With the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in the mid-1970s followed by the independence of Angola and Mozambique, and the South African policy of détente weakening its position, the Smith regime found itself largely isolated in Southern Africa.[127] Together, these factors contributed to the weakening of the white minority regime in Rhodesia. The response of the international community to the liberation war, and in particular the refugee crisis it created, also increased the pressure on the British government toward finding a political resolution.[128] Thus, as the 1970s progressed, significant movement was made toward all-party negotiations on the Rhodesian Question.

The Anglo-American Proposals

The parameters of UN involvement were once again extended due to the establishment of Anglo-American negotiations on Rhodesia in 1977. A number of global developments in the mid-1970s led the British government to re-engage in the negotiation process, particularly with the escalation of the conflict in Rhodesia and the collapse of Portuguese rule in Southern Africa. These international developments also attracted the interest of the United States, as under the newly-elected Carter administration a new 'ideological fervour' was introduced into American foreign policy on Southern Africa.[129] Thus, in March 1977, the British and United States governments formally agreed to work together to achieve a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. The proposals which emerged from these negotiations marked a significant turning point for UN involvement in the negotiation process. For the first time, the UN was granted a role within the negotiations and in the transition period proposed for an independent Zimbabwe.[130] The proposals also marked a turning point for the British government's approach to UN involvement, which had shifted considerably in

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[126] Mlambo, *History of Zimbabwe*, 160.

[127] Mlambo, *History of Zimbabwe*, 158.

[128] Nathaniel Kinsey Powell, "The UNHCR and Zimbabwean Refugees in Mozambique, 1975-1980," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2013), 65.

[129] Sue Onslow, "South Africa and the Owen/Vance Plan of 1977," *South African Historical Journal* 51, no. 1 (2004): 132.

[130] Mordechai Tamarkin, *The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonization in Regional and International Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 191.

the decade since the announcement of the UDI. In this way, the Anglo-American proposals of 1977 offer an opportunity to examine the shifts in UN involvement and British government policy in the lead up to Zimbabwean independence.

The shift in the British government's approach to UN intervention was influenced by a number of factors. Firstly, the framework of the Anglo-American negotiations shifted the British position toward allowing external involvement in the discussion of the settlement proposals. This shift was, in part, due to the leading of the negotiations by Andrew Young, US Ambassador to the UN, and David Owen, British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.[131] For the new Labour government under Prime Minister James Callaghan, the lesson to be derived from the failed proposals of 1972 was that the support of the international community was necessary for the success of any future settlement. Thus, when the Owen-Young delegation came together in early 1977, external consultation was seen as a necessary step in order to gain international support for the proposals. The negotiation framework was altered to include consultation with representatives of South Africa and the Smith regime, as well as those of Zimbabwe and the Frontline States.[132] This plan came to fruition in August when the Owen-Young delegation met with a number of African leaders on the question of establishing majority rule in Zimbabwe.[133] In this way, the previous framework of negotiations was altered by the Owen-Young delegation to include external involvement and consultation on the future of negotiated settlement in Rhodesia.

Due to this shift in framework, the British government slowly moved toward the possibility of UN involvement in the proposed independence process. In a speech at the Security Council in September, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary David Owen stated that although it was 'impossible to reach total agreement' among all parties on the Rhodesian Question, through

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[131] David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), 267-268.

[132] In 1977 the Frontline States (FLS) included Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique.

[133] The Owen-Young delegation met with leaders in Nigeria, Zambia, South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya and Zimbabwe, "Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement," *Department of State Bulletin* 77 (1977): 417.

these meetings it was clear that certain conditions would engender collective African support.[134] One such condition was the involvement of the UN, as Owen stated that the organisation's inclusion would offer an 'assurance to nationalist leadership' on issues of impartiality and majority rule independence. In recognising the support for UN involvement, the British government finally acknowledged the demands that members of the Afro-Asian bloc had been making for the last decade.[135] Therefore, it was the discussions with African leaders, the involvement of the United States and the international developments of the mid-1970s that shifted the government's position on UN involvement in Rhodesian affairs. In this way, the changed framework of the Anglo-American negotiations represented a significant development from the British government's earlier position on the lack of support for UN intervention.

Secondly, the growing Afro-Asian support for further UN involvement also impacted the British government's position during this period. Throughout the negotiation period, the Owen-Young delegation received support from individual African representatives, however, it was not until the official Anglo-American proposals were presented that the delegation was fully able to gauge the Afro-Asian support. The proposals, presented in both Salisbury and London on September 1, provided for the 'surrender of power by the illegal regime,' the orderly transition to independence through the holding of free elections on the basis of majority rule, and the establishment of an Independence Constitution providing for a democratically elected government.[136] These conditions were to be facilitated under a transitional administration established by the British government and aided by a UN presence, 'including a United Nations force.' Although reservations existed concerning Britain's colonial role in the transitional period, Afro-Asian support was shown for the inclusion of the bloc's long-standing demand for majority rule, as well as the move toward UN involvement within this process.[137] The tentative support of the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN, coupled with that of the Presidents of the Frontline States, showed the British government that a basis of support did exist for these proposals and the inclusion of the UN within them.

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[134] Statement by David Owen (United Kingdom), Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Second Year, 2033rd Meeting, September 28, 1977.

[135] Nyangoni, *Africa in the United Nations*, 159.

[136] "Foreword," *Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1977).

[137] Nyangoni, *Africa in the United Nations*, 150.

The third and final factor that influenced the British government's position was the development of Zimbabwean politics in the late 1970s. Through the development of the ANC and the escalation of the liberation war, the Zimbabwean independence movement had gained considerable traction on the international stage. This international attention, coupled with the ideological direction of former civil rights leader Andrew Young and the Carter administration, forced the British government to consider external intervention in the proposed independence process.[138] Thus, in an attempt at balance, the Anglo-American proposals requested that the Security Council establish a 'United Nations Zimbabwe Force' to supervise the proposed ceasefire and to liaison with both the Rhodesian and Zimbabwean Liberation armies.[139] As an external actor, the UN force was seen to represent a way in which to mediate between these two warring factions during the transitional period. Through the proposals for a UN mediating force and the talks held with the Patriotic Front, the Anglo-American delegation recognised the influence of Zimbabwean political demands on the independence process. This represented a significant shift from the British government's earlier opposition to UN military intervention, as well as from its previous reticence to consult Zimbabwean actors within the negotiation process. In summary, it was through developments in the negotiation framework, Afro-Asian support and developments in Zimbabwean politics that the British government's position on UN intervention was shifted in the mid-to-late 1970s.

In late September, the first official step was taken toward further UN involvement in Rhodesia. This initial step came with the appointment of a UN representative to formally enter into the ongoing negotiation process. On September 29, the Security Council held a vote on the British government's request for the Secretary-General appoint a special representative to enter into discussions with the British Resident Commissioner designate Lord Michael Carver, and with all parties considered necessary 'to effect the transition to majority rule' in Rhodesia.[140] All member states, except China and the Soviet Union, approved this request.[141] Shortly after, the Secretary-General formally

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[138] Onslow, "Owen/Vance Plan," 132-133.

[139] "The Transition," *Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement*, 1977.

[140] "The Transition," *Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement*, 1977.

[141] S/RES/415, https://undocs.org/S/RES/415(1977).

appointed special representative General Prem Chand, who led the peacekeeping forces during the Congo crisis. General Chand was the first formal representative of the organisation to be involved in process of negotiation on the Rhodesian Question, a topic which had been at the top of the UN's decolonisation agenda for the last decade.[142] General Chand's appointment represented the long-held efforts of the organisation on the issue of decolonisation in Rhodesia, particularly the work of the Afro-Asian bloc. It also represented the strengthened role of the Security Council during this period, as the body was responsible for both the authorisation and the approval of General Chand's appointment as UN special representative. In this way, the Anglo-American proposals had a significant impact on the extension of UN involvement in the process of decolonisation.

The appointment of General Chand increased the initial Afro-Asian support for the ongoing Anglo-American negotiations. During the vote on his appointment, representatives from Benin, Mauritius, India and the Patriotic Front expressed their support for a UN representative who would be able to further the current negotiations and facilitate 'complete decolonisation' leading to an independent Zimbabwe.[143] In light of this, the Carver-Chand delegation initiated the new round of negotiations with a visit to Dar es Salaam in October to meet Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, who now represented the Patriotic Front.[144] The delegation entered these discussions from a position of relative strength, having secured a basis of Afro-Asian support through its commitment to majority rule and the appointment of UN representative Chand. However, despite these developments, the complexities of the internal political situation in Rhodesia had not changed. During the meeting in Dar es Salaam, clear disagreements arose on the conditions of the ceasefire and the transition period from within the different factions of the Patriotic Front.[145] For some, opposition was levied at the military arrangements proposed for the transition period, whilst others reiterated Joshua Nkomo's earlier fears that through its involvement the UN may be 'seduced into playing a role inimical' to

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[142] Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 274.

[143] Mr. Boya (Benin), Mr. Ramphul (Mauritius), Mr. Jaipal (India), and Mr. Nkomo (Patriotic Front) all made statements in support of a representative who would fulfil these conditions, Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Second Year, 2033rd Meeting, September 28, 1977.

[144] Tamarkin, *Making of Zimbabwe,* 199-200.

[145] Tamarkin, *Making of Zimbabwe,* 200.

the interests of the Zimbabwean people.[146] Much like in the earlier discussion of the UDI and the Pearce Commission, reservations were expressed toward the continued role of British colonial forces in the region, as well as to the mandate of a UN military force.

However, it was the opposition of the Smith regime that ultimately dissolved the Anglo-American route to settlement. When the Carver-Chand delegation visited Salisbury in early November, Smith outright rejected the proposals due to the inclusion of provisions which replaced much of the Rhodesian armed forces with 'African nationalist guerrillas.'[147] These provisions were a severe miscalculation, as due to their inclusion the South African government no longer placed pressure on the Smith regime to accept the proposals, as the Anglo-American delegation had expected.[148] In overstepping the mark, the plans for joint British-UN intervention were cut unexpectedly short, and instead, the Smith regime initiated its own negotiations with the Zimbabwean parties. Nevertheless, the Anglo-American proposals remain a significant turning point in the British approach to settlement in Rhodesia. Although the plans for further UN involvement were cut short, the inclusion of the organisation within the proposals signalled a significant development in British government policy during this period. Through the appointment of General Chand and the negotiations which then took place, the UN proved that it could play a role in the ongoing negotiation process. The long-held diplomatic efforts of the organisation were acknowledged through these events, which subsequently influenced the UN's role in the final stages of the decolonisation process.

The rejection of the Anglo-American proposals initiated a period of accelerated negotiation on the future of Rhodesia. With the collapse of the proposals, the Smith regime had the opportunity to pursue its own negotiations with the more moderate United African National Council (UANC) and ZANU-Ndonga parties, which in March 1978 culminated with the Internal Settlement Agreement.[149] This agreement facilitated the holding of elections following which Bishop

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[146] Statement by Joshua Nkomo (Patriotic Front), Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Second Year, 2033rd Meeting, September 28, 1977.

[147] Nyangoni, *Africa in the United Nations*, 151.

[148] Tamarkin, *Making of Zimbabwe,* 200.

[149] The final Internal Settlement Agreement was signed by Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa (UANC), Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU-Ndonga), and Chief Jeremiah Chirau, Mlambo, *History of Zimbabwe,* 169.

Muzorewa became the official Prime Minister of the newly-renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in June 1979. The international response was swift, as the Security Council declared the results of the election 'null and void' and stated that no recognition would be accorded to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia either by the UN or any member state.[150] Both the OAU and the newly elected Conservative government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher followed suit and declared the Muzorewa government illegal, following which it received no other formal recognition.[151] In the following months, African representatives at the UN and the Commonwealth placed pressure on the renewal of all-party talks. Once again, the negotiation process was initiated, offering the UN one final opportunity for further involvement within the process of decolonisation.

The Independence Process

Scholarship on the final two years of the decolonisation process in Rhodesia has not traditionally included analysis of UN involvement. The focus on key events such as the Lancaster House Conference and the creation of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF), though significant, has often foreclosed possible analysis of the UN's role in securing Zimbabwe's independence.[152] However, through an examination of the wider independence process, the role of the UN in the region can be further illuminated. Much like in response to the UDI, the Pearce Commission and the Anglo-American proposals, the UN worked to place pressure on the British commitment toward majority rule independence, as well as on the diplomatic and economic survival of the illegitimate Smith regime. Although scholars such as Stuart Griffin have tended to conflate the lack of UN military intervention in Rhodesia with a refusal to allow the organisation a 'meaningful role' in the final stages of the independence process, it is evident that through physical, diplomatic and economic intervention the organisation did play a significant role in facilitating the conditions that ensured the fulfilment of Zimbabwean independence.[153] The final two years of the decolonisation

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[150] S/RES/448, https://undocs.org/S/RES/448(1979).

[151] Nyangoni, *Africa in the United Nations*, 157.

[152] See for example Stuart Griffin, "Peacekeeping, the United Nations, and the Future Role of the Commonwealth," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 39, no. 3 (2001): 159-160.

[153] Griffin, "Peacekeeping," 159.

process follow the pattern of increased UN involvement in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980.

In the first stage, the conditions for UN involvement were created through the framework of the Lancaster House Conference, held between September and December 1979. The negotiations between the British government, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government, the Patriotic Front and Ian Smith, culminated in the Lancaster House Agreement and the establishment of the Zimbabwe Independence Constitution.[154] One of the most significant conditions of the Agreement was the formation of a Ceasefire Commission assisted by the CMF, as well as the creation of a Commonwealth Observer Group to monitor the elections scheduled to be held in February 1980.[155] Through this framework, the UN was able to establish three significant forms of involvement in the independence process. The first was the UN's role in the election observation, both within the work of the Commonwealth Observer Group and through Secretary-General representatives sent to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in February 1980. The second was the role that the UNHCR played in the repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees, a necessary condition for the fulfilment of the Lancaster House Agreement. Third, and finally, was the continued diplomatic and economic assistance provided to Zimbabwe in the lead up to, and immediately following Zimbabwean independence.

Firstly, the UN played a significant role in the independence process through its involvement in the election observation of February 1980. Alongside the Commonwealth Observer Group, UN representatives aided in the holding 'free and fair' elections as outlined in the Lancaster House Agreement.[156] At the invitation of the British government, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim sent a small group of UN representatives to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in order to observe the election process in early 1980.[157] Although there has been some doubt within scholarship as to whether this constituted an official observer group, in the report of the British Election Commissioner Sir John

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154 *Report of the Constitutional Conference: Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980).

155 *Report of the Constitutional Conference,* 38, 40.

156 *Report of the Constitutional Conference,* 34.

157 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General's Memoir* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 360.

Boynton, the UN representatives are clearly listed under 'Observers nominated by governments.'[158] Pressure from the international community, as well as from the Patriotic Front's demands for UN inclusion, forced those in the negotiation process to allow a small form of UN involvement within the election process.[159] In this way, the formation of the Secretary-General appointed observer group reflected the long-held efforts of the organisation within the process of decolonisation.

However, due to its size and limited time in the region, the UN observer group has often been discounted as evidence of UN involvement in the Zimbabwean independence process.[160] In a report of the elections by Bonnie Campbell, the UN observer group are labelled as 'witnesses' rather than observers, and their role described as having been limited by British objectives in the region.[161] However, through analysis of the reports of the British Election Commissioner and the Commonwealth Observer Group, it is evident that the UN representatives did play an active role in the election observation process. Perhaps most importantly, the presence of the UN representatives aided the legitimisation of the election process. The delegation chosen by Secretary-General Waldheim was headed by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who later became Secretary-General in 1982, along with three other representatives from the organisation.[162] The presence of these representatives signalled the legitimacy of the election process to the international community, and particularly to those in the Afro-Asian bloc who held concerns over British control in the region. The UN presence was particularly meaningful as during the elections of 1979, the Security Council issued a resolution urging all member states to 'refrain from sending observers' to Rhodesia due to the illegitimacy of the elections.[163] Therefore, the organisation's presence during the elections of February 1980 was a significant step in signalling the legitimacy of the elections to the international community.

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[158] John K. Boynton, *Southern Rhodesia Independence Elections 1980: Report of the Election Commissioner* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980), 88.

[159] Novak, "Face-Saving Maneuvers," 166.

[160] Bonnie Campbell, "Report on the Zimbabwe Elections February 1980," *International Journal* 35, no. 4 (1980): 701-723; Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 325-328.

[161] Campbell, "Report," 707, 712.

[162] According to the Report of the Election Commissioner, the three other observers were Mr M. Pedamon, Mr G. Schlittler-Silva (Brazil) and Mr A.H. Kabia (Sierra Leone), Boynton, *Southern Rhodesia Independence Elections,* 88.

[163] S/RES/445, https://undocs.org/S/RES/445(1979).

Moreover, the inclusion of the UN observers also legitimised the election results in Zimbabwe. Alongside the Commonwealth Observer Group and a number of other international observers, the UN representatives submitted a positive report on the election process.[164] Although clear problems were identified with issues of logistics and intimidation, the collective reports of the election observers encouraged the international acceptance of the election results in February 1980. It must be recognised that the bulk of international attention was given to the report of the Commonwealth Observer Group as the official observers of the Lancaster House Agreement. However, the presence of the UN can be also seen within the Commonwealth group, as its Chairman was Rajeshwar Dayal, Permanent Representative of India to the UN and head of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo between 1960 and 1961.[165] Another member of the Commonwealth Group, the Canadian delegate Gordon Fairweather, also had a close relationship with the organisation through his work with the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).[166] Through its influence in the reports of the UN and the Commonwealth Group, the organisation played an active role in legitimising the results of the election. Pressure from the Secretary-General also ensured the allowance of a small OAU observer group, which encouraged further Afro-Asian support for the election results.[167] The organisation aided in facilitating the 'free and fair' elections central to the Lancaster House Agreement. Although small in scale, the UN group directly contributed to the legitimisation of the elections to the international community and thus aided in the process of Zimbabwean independence.

Secondly, the UN also played a significant role in the repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees during the independence process. The repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees was deemed an essential condition in the pre-independence arrangements of Lancaster House Agreement, as was the British government's commitment to assist with this process.[168] In December 1979, the British government

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[164] Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace,* 360.

[165] *Southern Rhodesia Elections February, 1980: The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on Elections Leading to Independent Zimbabwe* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1980), 79.

[166] Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, *Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 90.

[167] According to the Report of the Election Commissioner, the OAU delegation consisted of three observers, Mr F.X. Ngenga (Kenya), Mr Laban S. Oyaka (Uganda) and Mr I.O. Mensah-Bonsu (Ghana), Boynton, *Southern Rhodesia Independence Elections,* 88.

[168] *Report of the Constitutional Conference*, 19.

formally requested that the UNHCR take charge of the 'overall coordination of the international effort' for the repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees.[169] This mandate involved leading the repatriation efforts in Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique, as well as coordinating the work of regional groups such as Christian Care and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.[170] At an estimated 250,000, the number of Zimbabwean refugees in the neighbouring frontline states represented a significant challenge to the UNHCR's resources in Southern Africa. The organisation had a presence in neighbouring Mozambique since 1975, but due to the restrictions on repatriation in place before the 1979 agreement, the UNHCR had only been able to offer assistance to the government-run camps during this period.[171] In this way, the request for the UNHCR to take charge of the international effort for repatriation represented a significant extension of the UN's involvement in the region.

Moreover, the work of the UNHCR was particularly important in facilitating the repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees in time for their participation in the February elections. The Lancaster House Agreement specified that the 'return of citizens living outside Rhodesia' was necessary for the fulfilment of 'free and fair' elections, as did the Security Council resolution issued which called for the 'speedy and unimpeded' return of Zimbabwean exiles and refugees.[172] From this point onward, an essential task given to the UNHCR was to provide for the repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees in time for the February elections. The total repatriation figures vary between sources, however, the Commonwealth Observer Group reported that the UNHCR repatriated a total of 33,430 Zimbabwean refugees in time to take part in the February elections.[173] Limitations imposed by administrative delays and the Rhodesian Front authorities were cited as reasons for lower repatriation figures in Mozambique and Zambia, as was the return of refugees through 'non-official' channels.[174] Despite these limitations, the organisation's efforts were essential in the fulfilment of

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[169] Powell, "UNHCR and Zimbabwean Refugees," 59.

[170] Jeremy Jackson, "Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s," in *When Refugees Go Home: African Experiences*, ed. Tim Allen and Hubert Morsink (Geneva: UNRISD, 1994), 129.

[171] Powell, "UNHCR and Zimbabwean Refugees," 45-46.

[172] *Report of the Constitutional Conference*, 19; S/RES/463, https://undocs.org/S/RES/463(1980).

[173] *Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group,* 24.

[174] *Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group,* 23.

the conditions of the Lancaster House Agreement, and thus the conditions of Zimbabwe's independence. Although not often included in the analysis of the independence process, the UN did play a significant role through the UNHCR programme for refugee repatriation.

After the elections and the formal granting of independence to Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980, UNHCR staff continued their repatriation efforts in the region. The focus of the UNHCR turned to the remaining Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique and Zambia, particularly on allowing relief agencies such as the International Red Cross to gain further access to these regions.[175] Due to the continuing restrictions and the UNHCR's mandate which was oriented towards those outside their country of citizenship, less could be done for internally displaced persons. In mid-1981, the UNHCR wrapped up its operations in Zimbabwe, having assisted the new government in its repatriation efforts during the past two years. In total, a UNHCR report estimated that around 70,000 refugees were 'eventually repatriated' as part of the organisation's operations in Southern Africa.[176] Thus, although the UN did not play a central role in the military intervention, the organisation did work toward the fulfilment of the other conditions of the Lancaster House Agreement. The repatriation of refugees was a significant part of the independence process, both in terms of the political agreements and in relation to the future of the newly independent Zimbabwe.

Third and finally, the UN provided necessary financial assistance to facilitate Zimbabwean independence. Beyond the terms of the ceasefire and the military intervention, the question of future economic development was essential to the newly-independent nation. In February 1980, the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) agreed to an indicative planning figure of $5.6 million for Zimbabwe for the remainder of the 1977-1981 planning cycle.[177] No longer restricted by the principle of British responsibility, nor the limitations of the sanctions policy, Secretary-General Waldheim was then able to send a UN mission to visit Zimbabwe

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[175] Roger Southall, "Resettling the Refugees," *Africa Report* 25, no. 6 (1980): 49.

[176] "Voting With Their Feet: A Review of Refugee Participation and the Role of UNHCR in Country of Origin Elections and Other Political Processes," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Service, PDES/2010/12 (September 2010), 10, https://www.unhcr.org/4ca08d249.pdf.

[177] "Assistance to Zimbabwe," Chapter 9: Matters Relating to Africa, *Yearbook of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1980), 248.

between May and June 1980 in order to consult with the government on the implementation of its financial assistance.[178] Following this trip, the UN assisted the Zimbabwean government in setting up a number of development programmes, such as in the field of water sanitation and the scholarship fund set up through the UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa.[179] Although clear limitations existed in the UN's aid capacity, through the UNDP and other organisational bodies the UN was able to provide support to the development of the newly-independent Zimbabwe. The UN also acted as a platform to encourage international aid to the region, as was the case with Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's appeal to the international community at the General Assembly in August 1980.[180] In this way, financial assistance provided by the UN worked in conjunction with the Zimbabwean government to aid in the independence process, as well as in the discussion on the future of the newly-independent nation.

In summation, the UN played a significant role in the fulfilment of the Lancaster House Agreement and thus the granting of Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980. The decolonisation process would not have been complete without the programme on refugee repatriation and the legitimacy of the election process, both of which the organisation made a significant contribution to. Although the UN did not play a military or peacekeeping role in the independence process, this did not prevent the organisation from playing a 'meaningful' role, as certain scholarship might suggest. By more closely examining the reports of the Commonwealth, the UNHCR and other observers of the process, it becomes evident that the organisation did provide diplomatic and economic assistance to the region, as well as to the legitimacy of its newly-elected government.

Moreover, the final stages of the independence process also reflect the UN's long-held interests in Rhodesian affairs, particularly in how diplomatic and economic intervention could facilitate the decolonisation process. The Anglo-American proposals of 1977 reflect how much development was

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[178] "Assistance to Zimbabwe," *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 248-249.

[179] David Sanders and Rob Davies, "The Economy, the Health Sector and Child Health in Zimbabwe since Independence," *Social Science & Medicine* 27, no. 7 (1988): 727; "United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa," *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 249.

[180] A/RES/35/100, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/35/100.

made during this period toward the inclusion of the UN in Rhodesia, a possibility which was heavily opposed by the British government in the aftermath of the Congo crisis. The appointment of General Prem Chand and the discussion of the UN 'Zimbabwe Force' also demonstrate the developments in the debate on sovereignty and intervention, which was shaped through the mission in the Congo and the response to the UDI and the Pearce Commission, as well as through the global developments of this period. In this way, the final stages of the independence process form part of a long trajectory of developments within the UN's shifting interventionism of the 1960s and 1970s.

Conclusion

During the 1960s and 1970s, UN intervention shifted away from peacekeeping and toward alternative forms of diplomatic and economic intervention within the process of African decolonisation. Following the contentious UN mission in the Congo from 1960 to 1964, the organisation's peacekeeping mandate was questioned as norms of sovereignty and intervention were re-assessed on the international stage. Under the shadow of the Congo crisis, international attention turned to how the UN would respond to the constitutional crisis created by the announcement of the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence. For the next fifteen years, the organisation engaged in a two-pronged approach, placing pressure on the British government's responsibility to take action as the 'administering authority' in the region and on the economic and political survival of the illegitimate Smith regime. Thus, from the early 1960s up until the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the role of the UN shifted toward the development of alternative forms of intervention within the process of African decolonisation.

This shift in UN intervention was influenced by a number of factors. Firstly, the large-scale peacekeeping operation which took place during the Congo crisis led to a re-assessment of norms of sovereignty and intervention both at the UN and on the international stage. The crisis revealed the inherent tension between the principles of state sovereignty and human rights enshrined in the UN Charter, as well as the limitations of the principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force in large-scale inter-state conflict. Although the same pattern of military intervention was not repeated in Rhodesia, many of the norms which developed during the crisis continued to influence the organisation's policy of intervention during the late 1960s and 1970s. On the one hand, the debate sparked from the Congo crisis on human rights and self-determination empowered the Afro-Asian bloc to utilise the UN for the advancement of the decolonisation process. The crisis also demonstrated how the UN platform could be used to exert pressure on colonial powers, which had a direct impact on the UN's approach to British responsibility in Rhodesia in the mid-1960s.

On the other hand, the negative legacy of the UN mission in the Congo damaged the organisation's international standing and limited its mandate for future intervention in Africa. The escalation of force during the UN mission created a climate of opposition to UN peacekeeping, which later gave further justification to those who opposed UN intervention in Rhodesian affairs. As the events in Rhodesia unfolded, the absence of peacekeeping forced the organisation to develop alternative forms of intervention to aid in the decolonisation process. However, this shift in intervention did not entail a complete deviation from the norms created during the Congo crisis, but rather their application to the development of UN sanctions and Afro-Asian pressure on the process of decolonisation in Rhodesia from mid-1960 to 1980. In this way, the Congo crisis set a precedent for the future of UN intervention, particularly concerning the issues of state sovereignty, the use of force and the path to decolonisation.

Secondly, a number of intra-organisational developments shifted the UN's approach to intervention. In the early 1960s, the newly empowered General Assembly and the Special Committee on Decolonisation allowed the Afro-Asian bloc an avenue through which to explore the possibilities of diplomatic intervention. Thus, from as early as 1961, the Rhodesian Question was prioritised on the UN's growing decolonisation agenda. The UN offered a platform for African representatives and Zimbabwean political groups to address the world on the issue of majority rule independence, as well as to engender further support Afro-Asian support at the organisation. As the Rhodesian situation was declared a threat to international peace, the Security Council was then empowered to take action against those who impeded the decolonisation process. Through the establishment of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, the appointment of a UN special representative and the sending of the UN Observer Mission, the Security Council continually ensured the prioritisation of the Rhodesian Question on the UN agenda.

Moreover, in the absence of military intervention, the UN platform developed as one of the most significant sites of pressure on the decolonisation process in Rhodesia. Through a number of intra-organisational developments, the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council were all empowered to place pressure on colonial powers and other member states who sought to impede the decolonisation process. Following the UDI, the UN platform was used to place pressure on the diplomatic and economic survival of the illegitimate Smith regime, as well as

on the United Kingdom as the 'administering responsibility' in the region. Through the sending of the Pearce Commission in 1972 and the Anglo-American proposals of 1977, the UN remained the platform through which diplomatic pressure was placed on the principle of majority rule independence. The continual pressure from the UN, OAU and the Commonwealth nations also kept the debate on the transferral of responsibility alive, particularly as calls for UN intervention were extended in the early 1970s. In this way, intra-organisational developments shifted the UN's approach toward diplomatic and economic intervention, and in doing so, ensured the organisation's place as a central actor in the Rhodesian decolonisation process.

Third and finally, a number of global developments also influenced the shift in UN intervention in the 1960s and 1970s. The lack of UN peacekeeping in Africa during this period has often been explored through the framework of the Cold War, however, what remains less explored is the influence of global developments on the diplomatic and economic intervention undertaken by the UN. A number of developments such as the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa, the Nigerian Civil War and the collapse of Portuguese Africa brought international attention to the struggle for independence in Southern Africa. These events facilitated the UN's turn toward human rights in the 1960s, which shaped the organisation's approach to majority rule and later justified the involvement of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Rhodesian affairs. Developments in the governments of South Africa and the United States also had a direct impact on the UN intervention in Rhodesia, seen in the extension of sanctions and with the introduction of Anglo-American talks under the Carter administration in the late 1970s. Much like during the Congo crisis, global developments had a direct impact on the organisation's shifting interventionism in Rhodesia.

To answer the original research question, UN intervention developed away from peacekeeping and toward diplomatic and economic intervention within the process of African decolonisation during the 1960s and 1970s. How this shift in UN intervention occurred was the through the re-assessment of a number of factors, particularly on how both the organisation and the international community contended with the principles of sovereignty and intervention in the aftermath of the Congo crisis. Traditional scholarship has framed the UN as an organisation 'paralysed,' or even as David

Mackenzie argues, 'frozen into impotency' during the Cold War.[181] In contrast, this thesis has shown that the 1960s and 1970s was a period of institutional transition in which the UN developed alternative means of diplomatic and economic intervention in Africa. The case studies of the Congo and Rhodesia have highlighted the transition of the UN during the Cold War not to inactivity, but rather to a period of alternative intervention within the process of African decolonisation.

[181] David MacKenzie, *A World Beyond Borders: An Introduction to the History of International Organisations* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 57.

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