Burundi: On The Brink of a UN Peacekeeping Operation?

Constructing an image of the context in which the UN Security Council started MINUSCA, ended ONUB and has up until May 2019 not made a move towards re-instating a PKO in Burundi



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List of Abbreviations

BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (French: *Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi)*
CAR	Central African Republic
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EUFOR-RCA	European Union Military Operation in the Central African (European Union Force *République Centraficaine*)
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (French: *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Centrafrique)*
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (French: *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali*)
MISCA	African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (French: *Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine)*
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi (French: *Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi)*
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Introduction

'The world looks away as blood flows in Burundi' (Graham-Harrison, 10th of April 2016, *The Guardian*). Since 2015 the safety situation in Burundi is deteriorating, yet the international community doesn't act upon it, even though scholars and political observers warn that it is important to sustain international attention to Burundi (Lotze and Martins, 2015, p. 268). Moreover, Burundi is ranked in the top 3 of under-reported crises of 2017 (Ratcliffe, 2018). whereas, at the same time the country is also reported to have one of the highest rates of children with stunted growth caused by hunger or undernourishment, namely 55,9 percent (Global Hunger Index 2018, p. 16-17). Thus, while the international press hardly mentioned the country, on the 14th of June 2019, there was a briefing of the Security Council on Burundi in which the Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Fernandez-Taranco, voices his concern over human rights and the humanitarian situation in the country. With the upcoming elections in 2020 Mr. Fernandez Taranco is worried about the 'many reported violations of fundamental civic and political freedoms' and the increasing food insecurity (Taranco, Briefing Security Council on Burundi, 14th of June 2019).

Aren't these enough reasons to wonder why there's no UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) deployed in Burundi? Intervention, in the form of a peacekeeping operation can, in some cases, meet a lot of criticism; intervening in another country is a difficult task. Yet, sometimes intervention by a UN peacekeeping mission is the only option to bring enduring peace. But how does the UN Security Council (UN SC) decide in which country they will deploy a PKO?

This thesis will focus on two aspects: first, the role of the member states of the Security Council, in which national interest often plays a role in their contribution during the UN SC meetings (Jakobsen, 1996). Second, this thesis will focus on another actor that might influence the decision-making process of the Security Council: the media.

It is often argued that intervention during the humanitarian crises in northern Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1992) 'were mainly driven by news media coverage of suffering people' (Robinson, 2002, p. 1). According to Robinson, media play an important role in influencing intervention. He describes the impact of media influence on intervention and explains how media can affect government policy-making (idem). Robinson argues that his study is valuable to those 'who seek to harness the potential of news media to facilitate humanitarian action or to control the unwanted intrusion of the news media' (idem.) This is particularly relevant to this

thesis because I will focus on the effect of media on humanitarian intervention. I will argue that media have considerable influence on the national policy, the 'policy-media interaction model' (Robinson, 2002), which indirectly influences the council members during the decision-making process in the UN Security Council. I will examine this by using a poststructuralist discourse analysis, and compare two cases: Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR). I will focus on three discourses that construct an image of the context in which the UN Security Council started MINUSCA, ended ONUB and has up until May 2019 not made a move towards re-instating a PKO in Burundi.

In 2014 MINUSCA was established, a UN peacekeeping mission to CAR. The UN peacekeeping mission ONUB to Burundi was completed in 2006, despite efforts of president Pierre Nkurunziza to have it continued. Already in 2006, Nkurunziza argued that Burundi is still 'on the brink and requires substantial peacebuilding initiatives' (Murithi, 2008, p. 74). Currently, the situation in Burundi is deteriorating, so now the country is perhaps even more on the brink.

Both Burundi and CAR have comparable conflict situations. Why is there still a UN peacekeeping mission in CAR and not in Burundi? My hypothesis is that contributing factors to this discrepancy are the discourse used by the members in the UN Security council and the discourse used by international media. In relation to CAR, the UN SC members and the media use a different language than in relation to Burundi. Moreover, both in the UN Security Council and in the media, there is much less attention given to Burundi than CAR.

This thesis aims to focus on an understanding of the decision-making process of the UN Security Council that goes beyond regular realist interpretation in which the member states are central; this thesis will focus on the construction of the discourse. Therefore this research question is proposed:

> *How does the discourse used in the UN Security Council meeting records and international media contribute to the context in which the UN Security Council decided to start MINUSCA and end ONUB? Can these discourses explain why there's no Peacekeeping Operation deployed in Burundi recently?*

This will be investigated by analyzing UN Security Council meeting records and media coverage of these two situations. I will use a post-structuralist approach because its focus on language and discourse can reveal constructed ideas of how respectively the members of the

UN Security Council approached the MINUSCA and ONUB debate, and how the media portrayed the situation in CAR and Burundi.

Assuming that the discourse used by the members of the Security Council and in the media contributes to the decisions made about PKO's, results of this research will be interesting for states who believe deploying a PKO in their, or a neighbouring country, is necessary. In that case, it might be beneficial to seek attention from international media, preferably media in countries that are UN SC member.

Furthermore, I hope this research will contribute to abolish inequality in cases like Burundi; even if there's little attention in the UN SC and little media coverage, deploying a PKO could still be justifiable.

After elaborating on my methodology, I will discuss the ethnic conflicts in both Burundi and CAR and end with the similarities and differences between those cases. Secondly, I will elaborate on the first and second generation of PKO's. Thirdly, I will elaborate on media influence on foreign policy, and in particular on PKO's and the Security Council. Subsequently, this thesis will analyze the UN SC meeting records and media coverage and end with the conclusion in which I present recommendations for future decision-makers on PKO's and further research.

Chapter I Methodology

1.1 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is aimed at revealing the hidden meaning in language by looking at the social and historical context. This method is like an analytical lens by which can be examined systematically through which key discourses a particular context was constructed (Bryman, 2012).

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the context in which the decision was made to start MINUSCA and end ONUB and maybe consider a new PKO in Burundi. In order to do that, mainstream international relations theories like realism could offer an obvious approach. A realist argument is based on three pillars. First, in their opinion states are the central actors in international relations, secondly the international system is anarchic; there's no supreme authority; thirdly, states strive for power and security maximization and they act rationally within the anarchic system in order to survive (Donneley, 2004). Typical for realism is that the state is seen as a black box, which means that the interior workings of the state are being ignored. In other words, the internal decisions-making process does not influence the inter-state relations.

Yet, for this research it is not relevant to look at a state as a black box, therefore I use a constructivist approach. Constructivists do acknowledge the importance of opening the black box of states and reveal internal dynamics. For constructivists, language forms the most important unit of analysis (Bryman, 2012).

According to Foucault (1971) discourse is the coherent whole of statements by a certain group, in which the discourse creates norms, values and reality. Hereby, Foucault implies that language is not only a medium, but also a concept as such. It is a way of ordering and interpreting the world. Statements within a discourse do not have to be exactly the same, but the relationships and differences between these statements must be systematic. Foucault calls the pattern that results from this order 'discourse'. The news media therefore give the world meaning and exert power by the discourse they produce. This concept is based on the concepts of knowledge and power and their mutual relationship. A discourse produces knowledge; knowledge generates power. In other words, those who influence the discourse (e.g. journalists) exert power over those within the discourse (e.g. the people of Burundi and CAR.)

A discourse analysis looks at statements that are found at a specific location and are used by certain authorities. What seem to be self-evident practices, are often practices that show a certain discourse. These self-evident practices must be critically analyze to understand a discourse (Foucault, 1971). Phillips and Hardy (2002), define a discourse as an 'interrelated set of texts and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception that brings an object into being.' (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 3). Thus, 'social reality is produced and made real through discourses and social interactions cannot be fully understood without reference to the discourses that give them meaning.' (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 3). Typical for discourse analysis is, that discourses should be looked at in the context of social structures, including the power relationships that are responsible for occasioning them (Bryman, 2012).

Discourse analysis mainly relies on an inductive approach towards the relationship between theory and research. Inductive reasoning starts with analysing empirical data first and then gather generalizable insights (Bryman, 2012). In this case, firstly UN SC meetings records are analysed in order to find the context in which the countries of The Council voted pro intervention in CAR (MINUSCA) and ended the mission in Burundi (ONUB). For the second part, when I look at the role of the media coverage of these situations, I use deductive reasoning. This starts with a hypothesis deduced from a selected theory, in this case the so called 'CNN effect' (see Chapter II, p. 21), which is then tested by empirical data. In this case, my hypothesis is that the media covered the situation in CAR more and in a different way than the situation in Burundi, which correlates with the start of MINUSCA and the ending of ONUB. However, keep in mind that the difference between an inductive and deductive approach is not as clear as it may seem; often researchers move back and forth between theory and imperial data (Bryman, 2012, p. 25).

1.2 Poststructuralist theory in discourse analysis

In this thesis I will use the framework of Laclau and Mouffe who use a poststructuralist theory in their discourse analysis. The poststructuralist theory understands the social field as 'a web of processes in which meaning is created' (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 24). In other words, meaning is not something fixed and definite; it is rather fluid (ibid. p. 3). According to poststructuralists, signs are different from each other, and it's about how we position the signs; if they are positioned in different relations they may get new meanings. Poststructuralists see language as a social phenomenon: 'it is through conventions, negotiations and conflicts in social contexts that structures of meaning are fixed and challenged' (idem.). A discourse is formed

around certain ‘nodal points’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 161). A nodal point is the centre of a web encircled by other signs, a cluster of signs; ‘the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 4). The signs that encircle the nodal points together form a ‘chain of equivalence’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 130). Laclau (1997) argues that the more words a chain contains, the more meaning the words in the chain obtain, because their meaning depends on the other words in the chain. A particular combination of words will produce one set of connections while at the same time oppressing another. Due to the mobility of meanings of words, you need the help of other words that can pin it down to specific objects (Cornwall, 2007, p. 482). In this thesis, I focus on this framework: looking for repeated cluster of signs, the chain of equivalence, that form a particular discourse.

1.3 Framing

For the second part of the research, when I will elaborate on the media coverage of the two situations, I will focus on agenda setting and framing. According to Soderlund et al. (2014), prior to framing, comes agenda setting. Agenda-setting basically is ‘defining problems worthy of public and government action’ (Soderlund. p. 46). In other words, in cases like Sudan, where the UN intervened in 2005 with a mission called UNMIS, the public opinion would never push for international action, without ‘significant agenda-setting effort by mass media’ (idem.). As for agenda setting, if there is no Western military personnel involved in operations, these conflicts rarely have a prominent position in Western media. Especially in Africa this is the case. In other words, as for the situation in countries like Sudan the absence or presence of media attention is crucial in (Western) people’s awareness of what is happening (Soderlund et al, 2014, p. 45). Therefore, the media have a crucial role in agenda setting.

In every news story, two aspects can be distinguished. On the one hand, there are the facts (what, who, when, and where) and on the other hand, there is the ‘framing’ of the news (the fifth W: why). Framing ‘addresses the impact of media content on the direction of public opinion’ (Soderlund et al, 2014). In other words, journalists can significantly affect the way readers understand events. Framing is a technique that makes it possible to understand discourses. A frame is a central organizing idea or a storyline that gives meaning to a certain event or issue that exposes the core of discourse (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). ‘Frames function as internal structures of the mind and devices embedded in political discourse, and framing, therefore, may be studied as a strategy of constructing and processing news discourse or as a characteristic of the discourse itself.’ (Kinder and Sanders, 1990, p. 74)

Moreover, frames 'have the power to promote a particular course of action' (idem). Using the term 'genocide' instead of 'unrest' for instance, can make a big difference in this respect. The first requires immediate action from the international community, whereas the second implies that no immediate action is necessary, because the situation isn't very serious or 'nothing can be done about the situation anyway' (idem.). Framing can be seen as a 'tool of power'; 'political elites and the media can alter how an issue is understood and thus shift public opinion' (idem.). When images are shown of a humanitarian crisis, policymakers will be triggered to intervene in such a situation 'even though it might not be of national interest' (Gilboa, 2005, p. 29). Moreover, compelling images are part of the framing of such a situation. The framing of a humanitarian crisis may influence both policymakers as well as the public opinion (Gilboa, 2005).

1.4 Research Strategy

My research strategy will be qualitative, using text-as-data (Maussen and Moret, 2014, p. 157). This thesis narrowed its scope down to available and relevant UN meeting records which are important documents preceding the start of MINUSCA and regarding the ending of ONUB. In these meetings all the members of the Security Council participated. The timeframe for the meeting records concerning MINUSCA is 2012-2014 and for analysing the meeting records about the ending of ONUB it is 2006. For analysing the current situation in Burundi, in order to make the comparison between why the situation in Burundi might be similar to the situation in CAR when MINUSCA started, I focus on Burundi related media coverage from 2015 until 2019. In 2015 the chaos arose around the third term of president Nkurunziza and the uprisings in the country continue until today. I've used purposive sampling (Bryman, 2012, p. 418) because I've deliberately searched for a specific period. The data will be analysed by means of framing analysis.

All meeting records have been obtained from the UN Digital Library and the international media sources are from *The Guardian, The New York Times and Le Monde Diplomatique.* The author is aware of the fact that these are all Western media sources. The decision for these international media sources was made in consultation with Fieke Huisman, the First Secretary of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Khartoum. Further research would benefit from investigating local newspapers in Burundi, CAR and neighbouring countries.

To find out how the central concepts are reflected in news reports, three frames are specifically looked at: 'Genocide', 'Hegemonic players in the region' and 'Sensationalism'.

With these frames I can analyze how the discourse around CAR and Burundi is formed in UN Security Council and in international media coverage.

In other words, I will first do a discourse analysis based on the UN SC meeting records and secondly, I will analyze international media sources related to CAR and Burundi, in order to reveal the context in which the decisions were made about the withdrawal from Burundi and the intervention in CAR.

Chapter II Literature Review

In order to answer the question why the UN SC decided to start MINUSCA and is not deploying a PKO in Burundi right now, in the literature review I will focus on the start of MINUSCA, in April 2014, and the situation in Burundi since the ending of ONUB, December 2006. Besides the UN SC meetings records, there's a significant discrepancy between how the international media covered the start of MINUSCA and how it covered the situation in Burundi, therefore I will take the media coverage into account as well. I will first sketch the context of the ethnic conflicts in both CAR and Burundi. Second, what are the similarities between CAR and Burundi? Thirdly, I will focus on the history and proactive of UN peacekeeping operations (PKO's). Finally, I will focus on the role of the media.

2.1 Ethnic conflict in CAR

2.1.1 Short outline of the conflict in CAR

The Central African Republic (CAR) is located at the geographical centre of the African continent. The CAR is 620,000 square kilometres and had a population of around 4.6 million in 2016. Its capital is Bangui. During the colonial era, CAR was known as the 'Cinderella of the French empire'; big game hunters loved the sparsely populated spaces with lots of animals. A more negative indication of the country was: 'trash can'; of little strategic importance. Mainly colonial training school graduates with the lowest grades were sent there. In other words, it was a 'backwater' (Lombard, 2016).

After independence in 1960, twenty years of militarized politics started, including armed groups, coups d'états and international intervention. CAR is not considered a failed state but merely 'fragile' (Lombard 2016).

2.1.2 How rebellion became war

After President Bozize took power in 2003, a number of rebellions broke out in the rural areas, based on ethnic and religious tensions (Marchal, 2015). After a while, Bozize's government benefited only a small group around him, predominantly Christians (Lombard 2016). During Bozize's clientelistic presidency, there were a lot of internationally-led peacebuilding and state-building initiatives to counter the rural rebellions (idem). The

negativity still increased towards Bozize and in 2012 rebel groups met in Niger to prepare a takeover. A few months later the Seleka (which means coalition) of different rebel groups from Chad, Sudan and CAR marched towards Bangui. When regional heads noticed this, the Chadian president intervened by deploying extra soldiers for MICOPAX, the subregional peacekeeping mission in CAR. This mission prevented Seleka to enter the capital (idem). In 2013, both the Seleka group and president Bozize, entered peace negotiations in Gabon; a contract was signed but both Seleka and Bozize never implemented the terms (Lombard, 2016, p. 5).

The second time Seleka marched to the capital, no one could stop them. Seleka's leader Michel Djotodia took power violently, without elections. After this, insecurity increased. Now that Bozize was gone, killings and other forms of violence were every day's business. Although they came more and more into power, the Seleka group was not very united (Lombard, 2016, p. 15).

At the end of 2012 both the foreign embassies in Bangui and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office (BINUCA) had pulled out their staff. There were diplomats and Central African politicians who argued that 'peacekeeping presence would be needed to restore even the rather dire status quo' (Lombard, 2016, p. 18). Yet, the international and regional response was very slow. According to Lombard, the international community expressed their sorrows from afar, 'but were reluctant to claim leadership over resolving problems in what they considered a hopeless mess' (idem.).

In September 2013 president Djotodia was no longer able to keep his men under control and he separated from Seleka. At the same time other Central Africans had begun mobilizing against Seleka. They called themselves the Anti-Balaka group and – similar to the Seleka group – the Anti-Balaka members had all different interests and no unified organisation (Lombard, 2016, p. 18). Generally speaking, the Anti-Balaka group were mostly christians and the Seleka group were mainly muslims (Lombard, 2016).

Since the Anti-Balaka group gave a sectarian and ethnic dimension to CAR's upheavels, international diplomats began to advocate for a response, in the form of peacekeepers and humanitarian aid. They even played the 'genocide card' to describe the Anti-Balaka's targeting of Muslims (Lombard, 2016). France and the African Union both deployed peacekeepers in december 2013. Sangaris was the name of the French mission and the AU mission, deployed in 2013, was called MISCA, in English: African-led International Support Mission to CAR (Lombard, 2016, p. 19). At the peak of fighting in 2014, a quarter of the population, around 1,15 million, was displaced, mainly within CAR. The French and

MISCA actions were mainly directed against Muslims (idem).

Although the peacekeepers were there, the violence continued. President Deby of Chad convinced president Djotodia to step down, and recommended Catharine Samba-Panza as the new transitional president. At the same time, according to the Central Africans, the peacekeepers were too much focused on 'protecting government installations rather than preventing violence against people in the neighbourhoods' (Lombard, 2016, p. 19). The French and AU peacekeepers were mostly visible on the main roads in the capital, whereas the violence mainly happened at side streets (idem.).

Moreover, many of the AU peacekeepers came from the neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Chad and the two Congos). These troops operated on the borders, and were looking for opportunities for 'commerce and other cross-border activities' (Lombard, 2016, p. 20). This obviously increased suspicion amongst the Central Africans about the true motives of these peacekeepers.

After a violent incident in which Chadian MISCA troops killed 30 people at a market in Bangui, president Deby of Chad called them back. Most of the Chadian soldiers, although operating under the AU umbrella, were not neutral in the conflict (Lombard, 2016).

During this period French diplomats advocated for replacing MISCA with a UN hybrid military-civilian mission (ibid. p. 20). The Central Africans preferred a UN mission and for the French that would be beneficial as well, because then they could scale down their own involvement, also in financial terms.

2.1.3 MINUSCA

In April 2014, the UN mission MINUSCA was authorized by resolution 2149 (Resolution, 2149, un.org). MINUSCA had a Chapter 7 mandate, which means that it would not only focus on 'peacekeeping', but also on 'peace enforcement' which would allow for greater force. In a year they developed several proposals with the government, mainly focused on political dialogue; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) (Lombard, 2016, p. 21).

Remarkable is that over the past two decades UN PKOs have had smaller forces and limited mandates in comparison to MINUSCA, which combines military and civilian elements. Still, the peacekeepers actions weren't very effective, there were still a lot of uprisings in Bangui (ibid. p. 21).

In 2016, MINUSCA had about twelve thousand peacekeepers and civilian staff. Moreover, since 2014 a European Union force, EUFOR-RCA, has been present in Bangui, first in support of MISCA, deployed in 2013, and now in support MINUSCA (idem).

Great efforts, for example by the Bangui Forum which was a political dialogue between armed groups, the government and civil society were made to talk about disarmament and the future of the country. Nevertheless, disarmament has not happened. Various armed groups are still there and may even be increasing; they're spreading across the country. And it is unsure yet what form the DDR will take; will there be more focus on the communities or on the armed group members (ibid. p. 22)?

In other words, it's unsure yet whether MINUSCA will be a success (Olin, 2015, p. 216); essentially the conflict in CAR has a sectarian and ethnic dimension, and there has hardly been any conciliation between the two sides.

2.2 Ethnic conflict in Burundi

2.2.1 Short outline of the conflict in Burundi

Burundi is a rather small country of 27,834 square kilometres big and a population of 11 million, yet it faces a lot of difficulties. Once Burundi was part of the German colony of East Africa, later it became a League of Nations mandate and a 'United Nations trusteeship territory under Belgian administration' (Lemarchand, 1994, p. 1). Burundi became independent in the 1962. Although its neighbour Rwanda is similar in terms of cultural characteristics, the ethnic relations in Burundi before the twentieth century were more fluid than in Rwanda and not as simple as the split between Hutus and Tutsis (idem.). Furthermore, Burundi was a monarchy 'under a mixed government consisting of Hutu, Tutsi and 'princely' elements' (idem.). Due to the fact that it was a monarchy, the boundaries have remained almost unchanged throughout the historical development, up until now in the Republic Burundi. Moreover, its political institutions were not imported from abroad. The monarchy was never questioned. Yet, Burundi proved to be very susceptible for civil war (Rutake and Gahama, 1998).

2.2.2 How rebellion became war

In the 1500s the Burundian Kingdom emerged. Later it was colonised by Germany and then Belgium. Burundi has a history of ethnic conflict, which makes the situation similar to other strife-torn areas of the African continent. According to Lemarchand (1994), tribalism is the 'age old monster that suddenly rears its head from the mists of time to spread violence and bloodshed.' (Lemarchand, 1994, p. 4).

Since independence in Burundi, there has mostly been a Tutsi president in power, whereas the majority of Burundi is Hutu. Ultimately, this caused several uprisings from the Hutu', which in return were knocked down hard by the government, that felt threatened. And the local media often framed the Hutu's as 'having committed monstrous acts of genocide directed against the Tutsi group' (Lemarchand, 2011 , p. 39). Moreover, the media portrayed it as if the government was knocking down a rebel uprising, whereas the response was far to extreme for that. The inability or unwillingness of the international community to see through the humbug of official media is little short of astonishing' Lemarchand, 2011, p. 43). In short, Burundi is divided into castes of different rank and privileges, in which the Tutsi minority is associated with the ruling class and the Hutu majority is associated with the agricultural group.

2.2.3 ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi

From 1993 to 2005, Burundi experienced a civil war as a result of ethnic divisions between the Hutu and the Tutsi groups in Burundi. In order to establish a ceasefire, the Arusha peace deal[1] was agreed in 2000, which lays the basis for a power-sharing rule in Burundi. Nevertheless, the war raged on for several years. In April 2003, the African Union deployed AMIB (African Union Mission in Burundi) in order to monitor a ceasefire (idem.). A year later, in May 2004, the AU mission transformed into the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). At that time, the non permanent members of the UN Security Council were Algeria, Benin, Angola, Philippines, Pakistan, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Spain and Romania. ONUB deployed 5650 troops and had as its main task to monitor the ceasefire and the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). According to the International Crisis Group, 'by maintaining dialogue the mission prevented radicalisation and was able to maintain its credibility.' (Lotze and Martins, 2015, p. 262). Still, the fighting continued and ONUB had little influence on the clashes (Lotze and Martins, 2015).

In 2005 Pierre Nkurunziza (a Hutu) was elected president, and Burundi established ethnic quotas in the army, police and parliament to prevent oppressive majority rule (Howden, 2014). The mandate of ONUB ended in December 2006, whereas during the administration of Nkurunziza, the ethnic tensions rose (Lotze and Martins, 2015). Since Nkurunziza won a

[1] The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, widely known as the Arusha Accords (French: Accords d'Arusha), was a transitional peace treaty which brought the Burundian Civil War to an end. The agreement, negotiated in Arusha, Tanzania under the mediation of former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, was signed on 28 August 2000.

nationwide poll in 2010 after opposition parties boycotted it, Nkurunziza argued that his unusual route to office allows him to defy the constitution and stand for one more term. He arrested opposition leaders and suspended their parties. The result was the 'worst crisis in Burundi since the civil war' (Howden, 2014). According to Rwasa, the last rebel leader, Burundi is sleepwalking back to war, 'there are more similarities than differences between what Burundi is today and what Rwanda was in 1994.' (Howden, 2014).

After a failed coup attempt, Nkurunziza won a third term with 70 percent of the vote in 2015. (Graham-Harrison, 2016). Yet, this campaign of violence, murder and intimidation creates a regional refugee crisis, is a disaster for the economy and isolates Burundi (Graham-Harrison, 2016).

In 2016 UN general secretary Ban Ki-moon visited Burundi, the EU halted aid payments, and the UK, European and US governments imposed sanctions on several senior figures, in order to halt the crisis, but this has little effect (Graham-Harrison, 2016). Currently tensions are rising due to the abusive regime of president Nkurunziza. Apart from the human rights violations, 'there are signs of a deepening and perhaps increasingly ethnic crisis' (Steers, 2019). Even though the crisis initially had a more political nature, this unrest could become ethnic violence due to politicians who deliberately emphasize the historic tensions (Steers, 2019). This concern is shared by former president Pierre Buyoya, who's now a diplomat serving as the African Union special envoy to Mali, who believes that the Burundian regime 'ethnicizes' the tensions for electoral support in the light of the 2020 elections (Steers, 2019). The African Union considers sending in peacekeeping troops; but until now that has not happened.

2.3 Relevant Similarities and Differences

Although Burundi and CAR both experienced colonial rule, their states are organised in a different way. Burundi is originally a monarchy whereas CAR transformed form a tribal state to a republic. A feature they do share is that CAR and Burundi both experienced an ethnic conflict. As mentioned before, tribalism is one of the main reasons for conflict in Africa (Lemarchand, 1994). Burundi is mainly known because of the 'ethnic' conflict that has taken hold of the country since 1972 (Rutake and Gahama, 1998, p. 79), and the was Burundi was also affected by the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Furthermore, the ethnic tensions have been increasing since president Nkurunziza stays in office for a third term in 2016. Therefore, I want to argue that, compared to CAR, the situation in Burundi is similar to the situation in CAR

when the UN SC started MINUSCA.

After independence, both countries fit the instrumentalist interpretation. This interpretation emphasizes the central role of politics shaping collective identities (Lemarchand, 1994, p. 5). In other words, ethnicity is used as a political resource 'manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs' (Lemarchand, 1994, p. 5) who want to make their entrance in the political arena. Thus, ethnic entrepreneurs use it for their own gain. These ethnic groups have, both in CAR and in Burundi, used their ethnicity in order to come into power.

Furthermore, the patron-client ties are strong, both in Burundi (ibid. p. 5) and in CAR (Smith, 2015). This implies that 'dependence is being forced on the weak by the strong' (Lemarchand, 1994, p. 13). Obviously, this has a negative connotation, yet, the people of CAR and Burundi experience this as the weak actively seeking the protection of the strong (idem.).

The two main groups in Burundi, the Hutu and the Tutsi, make up respectively 85 percent and 14 percent of the population. Remarkable is that the Tutsi nevertheless were – until 1993 – the ruling party (Lemarchand, 1994, p. 6). In CAR there was, most of the time, a Christian president; whereas a significant part of the population is Muslim. In March 2014, the Muslim Seleka group toppled the regime of the Christian president Bozize. In other words, both countries have to deal with a regime that doesn't represent the majority of the population.

Generally speaking, both in CAR and Burundi, kinship and clan ties played a big role in shaping the hierarchical order. Moreover, there are little opportunities to improve the chances in life, since they are mostly based on ethnic identity (Lemarchand, 1994 et Smith, 2015). Furthermore, inequality has been pervasive both in Burundi as in the CAR society, with social inequality correlating to ethnic identity (Bierschenk and de Sardan, 1997, p. 441 et Lemarchand, 1994).

In short, I'll try to narrow down both conflicts to three basic differences. First, ethnicity as the main source of tension (Lemarchand, 1994, p. 18). Second, the differentiation between Hutu and Tutsi (idem) in Burundi and the differentiation between the Seleka group and the Anti-Balaka group in CAR. Thirdly, how history has shaped ethnic antagonisms (ibid. p. 18). For example, the French colonization in CAR made sure that the first president was a Catholic priest (Smith, 2015) which automatically created a misbalance with the Muslim minority.

One of the explanatory factors for the different decisions on PKO's in CAR and Burundi would probably be the (non)permanent members of the UN SC during those years. Remarkable

is that the non permanent members of the UN SC in 2014, when MINUSCA started, were: Jordan, South Korea, Chile, Argentina, Australia, Luxembourg, Azerbaijan, but most importantly: Chad, Nigeria and Rwanda. These three countries were all stakeholders in the conflict of CAR. In that year the PKO in CAR was deployed.

In contrast to 2006, when ONUB ended, at that time the non permanent members of the UN Security Council were Ghana, Congo, Tanzania, Qatar, Japan, Peru, Argentina, Denmark, Greece and Slovakia were in the council. Which are, in terms of stakeholders in Burundi, irrelevant countries. I'll elaborate on this later.

How is the situation in 2014 in CAR similar to the situation now in Burundi? In CAR there was the Islamist Seleka group and the Christian Anti-Balaka group. The Anti-Balaka group emerged as a response to the Seleka-led massacres. These rebel groups disrupted the country, causing enormous damage to both the state and the citizens. CAR collapsed into an uncontrollable power vacuum.

When president Nkurunziza from Burundi wanted to stand for a third term in 2015, which is not in line with the constitution, a lot of protests emerged. As a response, Nkurunziza cracked down all forms of opposition, in almost the same brutal manner as the violence in 1993 (Kingsley, 2016). By the end of 2016, over 360,000 Burundian refugees, around 3,4 percent of the population, were hosted in neighbouring countries, Tanzania and Rwanda receive the most Burundians, respectively 189,199 and 71,490, according to the UNHCR (data2.unhcr.org, 2019).

In CAR, prior to the peacekeeping operation in April 2014, the sectarian fightings between on the one hand the Anti-Balaka and on the other hand the Seleka group, lead to a call from French diplomats for a UN PKO. In March 2014, there were 162,399 refugees, around 3,5 percent of the population, from Central African Republic according to the UNHCR. SO, relatively speaking, both countries have almost the same percentage of their population on the run from ethnic violence, yet, there's no PKO in Burundi and there's one in CAR.

2.4 Peacekeeping operations

2.4.1 PKO first and second generation

It's important to make a distinction between first and second generation peacekeeping. The first generation peacekeeping consisted mainly of multilateral military forces who were present in a country until a more permanent peace agreement was established (Soderlund et al. 2014, p. 14).

During the Suez crisis in 1956, just military observers were no longer enough (Melber, 2008, p. 5). At that moment the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces came about in large numbers (idem.). 'By resolutions 1000 and 1001 the UN General Assembly established the practice of this kind of intervention' (idem.), which was basically the first PKO. Subsequently, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was created in 1956 to 'secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities under a commander appointed by the Assembly' (idem.). The second Secretary General of the UN Dag Hammarskjold mentioned three principles related to PKO's; the principle of consent, of impartiality (Schachter, 1962, p. 6) and of use of force only in self-defense (Bring, 2015, p. 4). Hammarskjold argued that 'only by embracing a variety of different interests and actors that a framework for lasting conflict resolution and peacebuilding could be achieved' (Melber, 2015, p. 11). He believed in an all-embracing approach and recognition of sovereign rights 'as well as obligations' (idem.). Furthermore, he changed the emphasis from a focus on the established international order, to a focus on the new member states who joined the UN after decolonisation (idem.).

Furthermore, first generation peacekeeping was a state-centric concept, aimed at 'keeping' the peace and not necessarily restoring it. The second generation of peacekeeping is more focused on restoring the peace, for example UNMIS, established 2005 in Sudan, and MINUSMA, established in 2013 in Mali. In April 2013 the Council authorised MINUSMA in Mali to support the transitional authorities of Mali and counter threats and actively prevent the return of armed forces in the country (Karlsrud, 2015, p. 40). UNMIS was established by UN the Security Council in March 2005. Apart from the peacekeeping mandate, UNMIS will give humanitarian assistance, civilian protection, promote human rights awareness, and focus on general reconstruction and development (Lie and Carvalho, 2010, p. 64). In other words, these mandates went beyond the traditional mandates of solely peacekeeping.

2.4.2 The new generation of PKO's

The new generation of PKO's are defined in the Capstone doctrine, issued in 2008, which is perceived as the highest level document of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations. Although there are no clear guidelines in the UN Charter for Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Council takes the following factors into account when they consider establishing new peacekeeping operations (UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p. 47):

- Whether a situation exists the continuation of which is likely to endanger or constitute a threat to international peace and security;
- Whether regional or sub-regional organizations and arrangements exist and are ready and able to assist in resolving the situation;
- Whether a cease-fire exists and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement;
- Whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate;
- Whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be formulated;
- Whether the safety and security of United Nations personnel can be reasonably ensured, including in particular whether reasonable guarantees can be obtained from the principal parties or factions regarding the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

  (UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p. 47-48).

Remarkable is that in this list of factors there is no mention of considerations concerning the civilian population involved in the country, like the amount of refugees or the amount of casualties. Under Chapter VI of the Charter, mainly Article 36(1)[2] and Article 37(2)[3], it is mentioned that if a situation poses a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council can take appropriate measures to counter the threat. This goes beyond the traditional peacekeeping paradigm, in which the UN's job was mainly to assist in maintaining a ceasefire, instead of enforcing peace or political solutions (Gerchicoff, 2013, p. 730). According to the Capstone doctrine, multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations (PKO) are meant to support the states' ability to maintain security, promoting dialogue and stimulate effective institutions (idem.). Thus, the foundations of modern peacekeeping operations go further than just maintaining ceasefires; peacekeeping operations nowadays support the establishment of an effective state and effective institutions of governance.

After the Cold War, a lot of conflicts occurred in for example Yugoslavia, Sudan and Somalia. There was often a discussion about the principle of state sovereignty. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter mentions that it's prohibited to interfere within the domestic jurisdiction

[2] 'The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.' (UN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 36(1))

[3] 'If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.' (UN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 37(2)).

without the state's consent, unless there are gross human rights violations, in which case the Council can start enforcement action (UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 45). The dilemma was between, on the one hand, doing nothing and just observe mass atrocities. And on the other hand, intervene and undermine the state's legitimacy (Soderlund et al. 2014, p. 23). A middle way is that there should be respect for the state's sovereignty, but when 'humanitarian assistance is necessary […] it must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality' (ibid. p. 24). Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is mentioned in Article 42 that 'if the measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate […]' the UN SC may take action that includes operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the UN (UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42). In other words, this suggests peace *enforcement,* which can be seen as a step further than peace keeping.

2.4.3 Challenges faced by PKO's

One of the challenges that peacekeeping operations face is the 'Western bias'. After World War II, Canada took the lead in establishing 'a special status for Canada and other *middle power* states in the United Nations.' (Neack, 1995, p. 183). The purpose of the so called 'middle powers' (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Poland, Belgium and Sweden) was to give the UN more legitimacy, because the 'Big Five' (US, UK, France, Russia, China) were too controversial and their role was too big during World War II and partially during the Cold War. Moreover, middle powers are less threatening for the international peace. At the same time, these middle powers have sufficient resources to stand up against dominant states (Neack, 1995, p. 183).

Despite the Canadian effort, these middle powers didn't receive a special status in the UN, but they did become an important element in the discussion of the Suez Crisis in 1956. This resulted in the first formal UN peace-keeping operation, as mentioned before. Ultimately, UN peace-keeping became the privilege of middle power (Neack, 1995). Remarkable is that these middle powers are all non-African powers, who thrive by preserving the status quo, which I will explain below.

As I partly mentioned before, there's a thin line between states acting out of self interest and states acting to preserve international norms and values. From an idealist perspective, states will always pursue the international norms and values, even if that goes against their national interests (Neack, 1995). On the other hand, from a realist perspective, states will always do everything to protect their national interests. In other words, if the interests of states are in line with the international status quo, they will go for that. The middle powers have achieved relative

influence in the international status quo. Therefore, it is in the interest of the middle powers to maintain the international status quo (idem.). In other words, the status quo has a Western origin which makes it difficult for non-Western states to serve their own interests by supporting the international status quo, this is according to Neack (1995), the Western bias.

2.5 Role of the Media

2.5.1 Role of international media in foreign policy

In the post Cold War era lots of scholars noticed that politics were increasingly influenced by the media. There are a lot of fashionable terms to describe 'the new media dominated political system' (Gilboa, 2005, p. 37), for example the terms 'mediapolitik[4]' or 'teledemocracy'[5], but mainly the concept 'CNN effect' is heard often. The CNN effect is a phenomenon described in political science and media studies, which states that the images that CNN shows of humanitarian crises, pressures policy makers to intervene in humanitarian situations that are not necessarily in their interest (Gilboa, 2005). It started as a concept that only concerned US policy makers, but it has developed a broader scope. According to Hawkins, the CNN effect is 'concentrated and emotion-based media coverage of a select conflict, packaged in an oversimplified morality play format of good versus evil, evokes an emotional response among the citizens of a distant country, forcing that country's government to take interest, and perhaps intervene, in some form, in the conflict.' (Hawkins, 2002, p. 225). In other words, it's about media coverage that can – by influencing the public opinion - incite intervention.

This is a widely spread concept; gradually multiple interpretations of the concept 'CNN effect' have evolved. The concept has been criticized and praised; some scholars argue that the media cannot only restrict but also enable policymakers to apply a desired policy that reflects the public opinion (Wheeler, 2000). Some scholars even go a step further; they believe that the CNN effect does not only enable policymakers but has transformed foreign policy making (Gilboa, 2005, p. 37). On the other hand, there are arguments that only if a lack of leadership occurs; the CNN effect – media coverage – can have a decisive influence (idem.).

One of the risks that the concept 'CNN effect' faces, is that the cause and effect relation

[4] '*Mediapolitik* is an examination of the proper balance of media and politics, of a golden mean between these two institutions within the philosophical context of Western democratic values. When the government or the media attain too much power by disregarding or abusing democratic principles, an imbalance occurs, and freedom is threatened.' (Edwards, 2001, p. 175).

[5] Basically, a *teledemocracy* means that 'almost all the parliaments of the industrialized democracies have been opened to television, subjecting the legislative process to public examination as never before.' (Edwards, 2001, p. 304).

between media coverage and policy are easily mixed up (ibid. p. 38). It's important to make a distinction between a case in which a government has or has not decided to intervene. In the first case, the government will probably even welcome media coverage of atrocities. On the other hand, when a government or the UN Security Council is hesitant to intervene, they will resist media pressure (ibid. p. 38). Furthermore, by using the term 'forcing' in relation to the effect that media coverage has on policymakers, this implies that the media is taking over the policymaking process. Whereas the media can also be considered as one of several factors influencing decisions, so 'pressuring' policymakers might be a more convenient term to describe the mechanism (Gilboa, 2005, p. 38; Wheeler, 2000).

Furthermore, Wheeler (2000) argues that crisis coverage has either 'determining' or 'enabling' effects on decision-making. If media coverage would force certain policy on decision makers, then this would be a determining effect. If, on the other hand, crisis coverage would stimulate domestic support for humanitarian intervention, on which I will elaborate later, this would be an 'enabling effect'. According to Robinson, he would call it a strong effect when media coverage would be policy forcing, and weak when media coverage is only inclining policy makers to act (Gilboa, 2005).

In the words of Colin Powell, the chairman of the USA Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Bush sr. and Clinton Administrations, and Secretary of State under Bush jr., 'live television coverage doesn't change the policy, but it does create the environment in which the policy is made' (Gilboa, 2005, p. 28). According to Powell, the media by itself cannot persuade government officials to change their policies. Yet, if the right conditions are there, the media can have an impact on the decision making process. In addition, Anthony Lake, Bill Clinton's first national security adviser, mentioned that 'public pressure, driven by televised images, increasingly played a role in decision making on humanitarian crises' (Gilboa, 2005, p. 28). In other words, public opinion does play a role in the decision-making process on humanitarian crises (Robinson, 2002; Regan 2000). According to Strobel (Gilboa, 2005, p. 29) policymakers set the conditions, and depending on those conditions, the media can have an influence. In short, media or television coverage might not be determining in decision making, but most scholars and politicians agree that it certainly does play a role.

On the other side of the spectrum there are scholars who argue that media coverage only reflects the opinion of the government and its interests (Gilboa, 2005, p. 31; Jakobsen, 1996). Some of these scholars believe in the 'manufacturing consent theory', which is about the powerful who control both the 'media and the government through economic power' (Gilboa,

2002, p. 32). In other words, this means that the media is used as a tool for the state 'to use it to express their policies' (idem). Whereas during the Cold War the media was often used as a tool by government officials, in the post Cold War era this mechanism became less relevant to the conflicts (idem.). Thus, I'm more convinced by the CNN effect. When the media is flooded with crisis coverage, policymakers will act accordingly and focus on the crisis.

My argument will be based, not on the forcing, but on the 'pressuring impact' of media coverage. In other words, I'm aware of the fact that media is only one of several factors that influence decisions. Although there is no agreement over the extent of the effect of media coverage on government policy, it is 'generally recognised that the media, under certain conditions, can play a role in agenda setting, and the forming or changing of such policy.' (Hawkins, 2002, p. 225).

2.5.2 The decision making process of the UN Security Council

The UN Security Council consists of five permanent members (P5) and ten non-permanent members (P10). The members of the UN Security Council commit themselves to the principles of the UN Charter and to act on behalf of collective security (Mahbubani, 2004, p. 255). The permanent members have a veto power which 'gives them a privilege of significant control over a powerful global institution' (idem.). The UN Security Council is described by some as 'one of the most conservative institutions in the world today' (Hulton, 2004, p. 237), since the permanent members are a reflection of the most powerful states in the international order and these permanent members benefit from maintaining the status quo (Neack, 1995).

Yet, the Council has been improving itself a lot over the past few years (Malone, 2004). After the Cold War, the cooperation within the council improved; the fifteen members acted as a collective body. According to Hulton, 'this has led to increased consensus in its decision-making and a greater emphasis on becoming more operational.' (Hulton, 2004, p. 237). Moreover, the UN Security Council is becoming more involved in foreign affairs and therefore it receives more scrutiny. As a response, the Council is trying to become more transparent and efficient. Accordingly, since the 1990s, almost all resolutions are adopted by a unanimous vote, instead of conflicting votes; this emphasizes its sense of unity.

Still, there's a lot of controversy within the Council, for example related to the cases of Israel (McDowell, 2014, p. 1367), Syria (Gifkens, 2012) and Taiwan (Howe and Kondoch, 2014); on these countries the Council is bitterly divided.

All permanent members can cast a veto; the US, China and Russia often use this right and as a result they block the effectiveness of the Council. Yet, according to Hulton (2004), it's often more the threat of a veto than the actual casting of the veto.

Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind, is that the member states of the Security Council have to deal with national instructions. Thus, if the member states want to increase unity, their national instructions have to support that (Hulton, 2004, p. 239). The ten elected members have a disadvantage in terms of experience compared to the P5. The P10 are only part of the Council for two years, whereas the P5 have an institutional memory of decades, thus they understand the Council better (Malone, 2004).

Overall, the activity of the Council has expanded a lot since the end of the Cold War; the amount of meetings and resolutions increased. In terms of peacekeeping, the Council started a lot of new operations mostly with states involved in civil wars, instead of between states, as it used to be. As a result, the traditional peacekeeping changed a lot; just monitoring a ceasefire is not enough anymore (Malone, 2004).

2.5.3 The role of the media in the decision-making process of the Security Council

According to Gilboa, The CNN effect would have 'decisive influence on the UN Security Council' (Gilboa, 2005, p. 37). Moreover, Melvern argues that one of the reasons for the sometimes inadequate response of the Security Council, is the 'failure of the western press to adequately report the scale and brutality of ongoing human rights abuses and their underlying causes' (Melvern, 2006, p. 95), which in turn causes a lack of public awareness of the situation. Moreover, the media didn't provide information about how 'UN policy is arrived at within the Security Council' (idem.). In other words, a lack of adequate media coverage can cause a lack of decision-making in the Council.

In March 2004, a UN representative Kapila in Sudan mentioned in the media that 'the worlds greatest human rights catastrophe' was taking place. In the week of Kapila's interview, the first Council discussion on the situation was held. And finally, in July 2004 Resolution 1556 was adopted (Melvern, 2006, p. 101). In other words, in this case, the media does to a certain extend influence the Security Council.

Important to mention, is that it is difficult for the media to report on how 'UN policy is arrived at within the Security Council' (ibid. p. 96). All the major decisions taken by the Council are reached behind closed doors; there's no public or press allowed. On the other hand, when the Security Council holds press briefings, these are often under-subscribed by the media. Yet, for a lot of UN SC crucial decisions there are no official records of how they were established.

Even the monitoring of sanctions is very difficult for the media since the committees responsible for the monitoring are doing so in secret (Melvern, 2006.). Thus, it's difficult to find out how the decision-making process is influenced by the media. Therefore, I will first focus on the meeting records of the UN SC that are available to the public in order to analyse the discourse used in the UN Security Council.

Chapter III Analysis

As described in the methodology, I use in my analysis Laclau and Mouffe's framework to examine the nodal points and chains of equivalence to discover the discourses that are used to start an intervention or to withdraw from a mission.

First, I will discuss the discourse and the construction of the contributions of several countries to the debate. Second, I will discuss the contradictions that this brings about. Thirdly, I will discuss the media angle to this debate.

This analysis finds three different discourses in the meeting records of the UN Security Council and in news items concerning the intervention in CAR and withdrawal from Burundi. These discourses are: 'Playing the genocide card', 'Sensationalism', 'Hegemonic players in the region'. All three discourses are constructed by certain nodal points and chains of equivalence which gain their meaning through their relationship to each other. Together, these three discourses construct an image of the context in which the UN Security Council started MINUSCA, ended ONUB and has up until May 2019 not made a move towards re-instating a PKO in Burundi.

3.1 Timeframe

Late 2012, CAR seemed on the edge of another cycle of violence. At this time, 'the UN and regional partners prepared for yet another intervention' (Carayannis and Lombard, 2015).
They prepared for this intervention during several meetings in the Security Council, I have investigated the meeting records of The Security Council from late 2012 till April 2014, when MINUSCA was established. I will focus on the context in which Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda and France made their contributions to this debate, since they were the members of the African Group in the Security Council in 2014 and stakeholders in the situation in CAR (Olin, 2015). Furthermore, I will focus on France, since they played a big role in the implementation of AU/UN forces in CAR, in the form of sending troops.

When investigating UN SC decisions concerning Burundi, for the ending of ONUB, I will take the Tanzanian contribution to the debate into account, as that country was the most relevant actor, and member of the UN Security Council in 2006. I will take the Tanzanian contribution to the debate into account. Subsequently, when investigating the media coverage,

I will focus on the news from 2015, when President Nkurunziza was nominated by his party to stand a third term, up to May 2019, keeping the upcoming elections of 2020 in mind.

3.2 Playing the genocide card

The first discourse, playing the genocide card, is structured by several related signs where 'genocide' acts as the nodal point. Genocide is the central sign around which other signs are positioned. The context of these signs shows the meaning of the chain of equivalence and how the discourse 'Playing the genocide card' is constructed. This chain of equivalence includes: cleansing, massacre, atrocities, humanitarian crisis and 'civilians killed'. The constructed discourse of 'Playing the genocide card' frames the intervention in CAR as a mission that is inevitable and therefore necessary. According to Lombard (2016) a genocide card is the 'main source of leverage in mobilizing interventions for ongoing conflicts' (Lombard, 2016, p. 19). Before I'll go to the media sources, I will first discuss the two countries that mention the term genocide quite often in UN meetings: France and Rwanda.

3.2.1 UN Security Council Meeting Records

Rwanda

Mr. Manzi (Rwanda) states that the Séléka Coalition traumatizes the population of CAR (7019th meeting of the UN Security Council, 19th August 2013, p. 20, hereafter referred to as: S_PV.7019, 2013). Manzi is very critical on the acts of military groups like the Séléka:

Mr. Manzi (Rwanda) is very critical on the acts of the Seleka group:

> 'Those forces use civilians as human shields, abduct and maim, forcefully recruit children and continue to carry out sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls. Such *genocidal ideologies* and inhuman acts should not be accommodated anywhere in the world.' (S_PV.7019, 2013, p. 20)

Remarkable is the outspoken commitment of Rwanda for the UN to 'finding lasting solutions to conflicts and their root causes' (ibid. p. 20). The genocide of 1994 in Rwanda has left its marks; the country is very concerned with conflicts in the region and emphasizes the importance of the role of the UN, including peacekeepers, 'to prioritize the protection of civilians' (idem.). Ms. Mushikiwabo (Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs) argues that, 'as a result of the experience of Rwanda, we feel a moral obligation to participate as vigorously as possible in

activities, such as UN peacekeeping operations, that increase protection for civilians in armed conflict' (6917th meeting of the UN Security Council, 12th of February 2013, p. 9, hereafter referred to as: S_PV.6917, 2013).

France

In September 2013 France's Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius, called for the UN Security Council to 'adopt a resolution next month to boost UN operations in the CAR, which he said risked becoming a new Somalia if it did not get immediate support' (Irish, 2014). Fabius reportedly said that CAR 'has become a lawless state and in a lawless state, the exactions increase and without any action it can become the refuge of all terrorists' (idem). Earlier, he told reporters that 'radical Islamist groups were already operating in the country.' (Irish, 2013). Remarkable is the reference to 'terrorists' which is a main concern for the international community (Weigend, 2006).

Initially France had been reluctant to get involved in the crisis, and suggested that the African nations and the African Union should resolve the crisis among themselves. Yet, while the African Union had plans to deploy a peacekeeping mission (MISCA) of 3,600 troops in CAR, this would be 'unlikely to be operational before 2014' (Irish, 2013).

Later, in November, Laurent Fabius warned that the CAR was 'on the verge of genocide' (De Waal, 2013). After this statement the UN, France and the African Union deployed 4,000 troops. Yet, according to Africa-specialist Alex De Waal, CAR didn't face genocide, but 'is experiencing state collapse and limited intercommunal killings after a military takeover by a coalition of undisciplined militiamen known as Seleka' (De Waal, 2013). Thus, why would France make the hasty reasoning to call it a genocide? According to De Waal, this is 'playing the genocide card' with the aim to trigger the international community to pay attention.

By December 2013, 500 people had been killed, and tens of thousands displaced. Yet, De Waal argued, this was not a genocide (idem): 'There haven't been large-scale and systematic massacres, and the killings are driven by the contingencies of fear, not a deeply nurtured intent to destroy another ethnic group.' (De Waal, 2013).

Why then would France use this discourse? According to De Waal, France was worried that CAR would implode and that would 'bring chaos to the neighbours Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Those two countries are rich in natural resources and important members of the global Francophone bloc.' The French were concerned that they could not, as

De Waal put it, ‘generate domestic support for a faraway military adventure unless they dramatized the crisis, and so they used the word genocide.’ (De Waal, 2013). The effect was that even in the UN Security Council resolution that followed, it says that the French troops can use ‘all necessary measures’ (UN Resolution 2149, 2014).

There are, however, some significant downsides to calling the crisis in CAR a genocide. As a result of treating this crisis like a genocide, there’s a big chance that the wrong actions will be taken. ‘The playbook for an international response operation to mass atrocities calls for neutralizing perpetrators and protecting unarmed civilians; it is not designed to manage a conflict among many armed actors, each with a distinct civilian constituency.’ (De Waal, 2013). In other words, the procedure was not suited for the divided conflict in CAR. The mission of the soldiers was to ‘disarm the militias and hand over security to the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic, which the United Nations Security Council has charged with stabilizing the country over the next 12 months.’ (UN Resolution 2149, 2014). But which forces should the troops disarm? If it was a genocide, the answer would be simple: the perpetrator of violence. However, in CAR there were no ‘clear villains and victims: all parties are armed, and all can plausibly claim to be acting in self-defense.’ (De Waal, 2013). Moreover, if the label ‘genocide’ is applied to any conflict situation, ‘it will lose its analytic power and its special moral force’ (De Waal, 2013).

3.2.2 International media sources

Remarkable is that in the 63 news sources I investigated, the word ‘genocide’ is mentioned 28 times in relation to CAR in contrast to 6 times in the Burundi related articles. On the other hand the word ‘unrest’ is used 29 times in relations to Burundi, whereas it’s only mentioned twice in relation to CAR. This illustrates the difference between the discourse used in relation to CAR as compared to Burundi.

Interestingly enough, it is mainly UN officials who emphasize the (threat of) genocide, for example:

> ‘Violence between armed groups, often competing for natural resources in a context of complete lawlessness, has overlapped with long-standing ethnic rivalries and distrust between the Christian majority and the Muslim minority. The UN’s emergency relief coordinator, Stephen O’Brien, has spoken *of the early warnings of genocide’*. (Ratcliffe, 2017).

Next to the emergency relief coordinator, the UN had apparently also appointed a 'Genocide Official' for the situation in CAR:

> '*The United Nations' top genocide official* said on Friday he had reports that militia fighters in Central African Republic hunted down and massacred members of the Fulani ethnic group during violence that killed 85 civilians this week.' (Reuters, 2016)

This is remarkable since UN human rights investigations in CAR were still looking into reports of mass killings; a genocide had not yet been established (Reuters, 2016).

Also, referring to the violence in CAR, parallels were quickly found with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda:

> 'European foreign ministers meeting in Brussels endorsed the military deployment amid growing fears that the collapse of government authority and the spiralling violence could escalate into a *repeat of the genocide that convulsed Rwanda in 1994*.' (Nossiter, 2014).

For a country where it is not even sure if there's a genocide, this is a heavy discourse, again by officials, this time European foreign ministers, who make the comparison with Rwanda.

In contrast, discussing the Burundi situation the discourse genocide is used less frequently and more reservedly. The UN special adviser for the prevention of genocide, Adama Dieng, warned that the situation iwas 'spiralling out of control':

> 'I am not saying that tomorrow there will be a genocide in Burundi, but there is a *serious risk* that if we do not stop the violence, this may end with a civil war, and following such a civil war, *anything is possible*' he said. (Allison, 2015)

Remarkably, is that when ONUB ended, there were no members of the UN Security Council that specifically mentioned the worrisome situation in Burundi. Only Carolyn McAskie, the Special Representative for the Secretary General and head of ONUB, expressed some concerns for the ending of the ONUB mandate, but nothing alarmist like a warning of genocide (UN Department of Public Information, December 2006).

Concluding, use of the genocide discourse, although unfounded, happened relating to CAR, mainly by UN officials, and resulting, amongst other factors, in MINUSCA. In the case of Burundi, genocide was hardly mentioned by UN officials or on the media; possibly no party

saw the political use of ‘playing the genocide card’ to get a vote on re-instatement of a PKO in Burundi.

3.3 Hegemonic players in the region

The second discourse ‘Hegemonic players in the region’ is also built on a chain of equivalence which is based on a nodal point in the centre of relational signs. The nodal point in this discourse is ‘regional engagement’ and receives its meaning by the related signs responsibility, leadership and development. The constructed discourse of ‘Hegemonic key players in the region’ projects Rwanda as an ‘experienced actor’ in the field of post conflict countries (Musahara and Huggins, 2005). Second, Nigeria is called a ‘regional hegemon’ in the sense that Nigeria has relatively more legitimacy than other countries in the region, due to their military and economic power (Baregu and Landsberg, 2003). Lastly, Chad plays a dominant role in the situation in CAR (Marchal, 2015).

3.3.1 UN Security Council Meeting Records

Rwanda

Rwanda has experienced a genocide in 1994 (Musahara and Huggins, 2005) and sees itself as an ‘experienced actor’ in the region concerning handling conflicts. In the case of CAR they emphasize the importance of intervening, implying that it could easily escalate to a genocide similar to that of Rwanda.

Nigeria

Nigeria is a major troop-contributing country. Mr Sarki (Nigeria) argues that in order to enhance effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions, it is necessary to ‘facilitate the implementation of their protection mandates’ (S_PV.7019, 2013, p. 62). In other words, Nigeria wouldn’t mind extending the mandate in order to enhance an effective peacekeeping missions, for example in CAR.

Ever since Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president in 1999, Nigeria has been calling for greater ‘international burden-sharing in peacekeeping missions in Africa’ (Baregu and Landsberg, 2003). After the Cold War, due to ‘the reluctance of Western countries to intervene militarily in African countries’ observers wondered whether ‘potential African hegemons like South Africa and Nigeria could fill the security vacuum (Baregu and Landsberg, 2003, p. 171). Due to the relatively large military and economic power of Nigeria, and their influence in states

in the region, you could call Nigeria a regional hegemon (Baregu and Landsberg, 2003 and Adebajo, 2000). Which makes the international community assume that Nigeria can play a significant role in peacekeeping missions. Moreover, Nigeria has relatively more legitimacy than other states in the region. Yet, Nigeria lacks the capacity 'to dominate their sub regions' (Baregu and Landsberg, 2003, p. 172). In other words, even though Nigeria is a regional hegemon and has significant legitimacy in the region, still Nigeria needs support from the UN to convince other states to follow their lead (idem.).

Chad

Mr. Allam-mi, the UN representative for Chad, emphasizes in the UN Security Council meetings the worrisome humanitarian situation in the CAR and how it has deteriorated (6967th meeting of the UN Security Council, May, 2013, p. 8, hereafter referred to as: S_PV.6967). Furthermore, he states that 'the country's people await in distress, in vain, concrete action by the international community' (S_PV.6967. p. 8).

In other words, according to Mr. Allam-mi, the situation in CAR required assistance of the international community and in particular the Security Council. Apart from the worries about the situation in CAR, as a neighbouring country Chad has had to cope with a large amount of refugees from CAR.

Chad is 'a military heavyweight in the region' (Duckstein, 2014). President Idriss Deby Itno has been a key figure in the current crisis. After a summit of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), CAR's interim president Michel Djotodia resigned under pressure of President Deby. According to Helga Dickow, expert on Central Africa, Chad considers the CAR as its backyard. Furthermore, a 'large part of the 5,500-strong military mission of the African Union (MISCA, predecessor of MINUSCA) was provided by Chad'. The Chadian troops, however, are not seen as a good force by all in CAR; some of the Chad soldiers were accused of supporting and even training Seleka rebels (Duckstein, 2014). Moreover, according to Marchal, Chadian troops shot down civilians (Marchal, 2015, p. 187). This gives the impression that Chad is 'playing the deterioration more than stabilization card' (Marchal, 2015, p. 188).

In the case of Burundi there were no hegemonic regional players members of the UN Security Council in 2006. Furthermore, the hegemonic players in the region were not necessarily present in the international media regarding CAR and Burundi. It were mainly UN officials and the

citizens of CAR and Burundi. Therefore, there was almost no discourse of 'hegemonic players in the region', except for Chad's big presence within the AU and UN operations.

3.4 Sensationalism

The last discourse that is revealed in the UN Security Council meetings and international media sources is 'sensationalism'. This comes from the nodal point sensationalism and the signs in the chain of equivalence are rape, blood flows, horrors, wound, innocent people, children, and atrocities. These signs and the nodal points together form the third discourse that constructs the context in which the decision for MINUSCA was made and the PKO in Burundi has not been prolonged since the end of ONUB in December 2006.

3.4.1 UN Security Council Meeting Records

Chad

In the UN Security Council meeting of May 2013 (S_PV.6967)**,** Mr. Idriss Deby Itno, President of the Republic of Chad, took the floor:

'The Central African Republic is like *a wound in* the heart of Central Africa. Despite all remedies proffered to resolve the crisis in the country, the wound only appears to have been healed. We need to engage seriously to end the situation of recurring instability — this time decisively, I hope.' (S_PV.6967, p. 8).

Chad's permanent representative to the UN, mr. Allam-mi added: 'We must ensure that the wound does not turn into gangrene and infect the entire subregion'.

3.4.2 International media sources

Although every conflict has its victims which make for horrific pictures, the international media presented the violence in CAR in especially great detail. By presenting the conflict in a barbaric way, it was simplified into an almost medieval scene that is far from reality. In relation to CAR, the rebels were depicted as warriors:

> 'Those [the rebels] responsible for leaving hundreds of thousands of *innocent people* with nowhere to hide from their *murderous violence* must be given nowhere to hide from justice.' (Hussain, 2016)

Furthermore, the way the media brutally portrays the people in CAR creates a certain distance:

> 'There have been *atrocities* by all sides. Women have been *raped, children* have been recruited into armed groups, *people have been blown up*, stabbed, beheaded, their homes destroyed and looted, and all with impunity.' (Chonghaile, 2016).

One of the key differences between the sensationalist discourse that the media use when covering CAR compared to Burundi media coverage, is that when, for example, media talked about mass atrocities in relation to Burundi, it is more in the sense that there is a fear that something can happen, if nothing is done to prevent them:

> 'Mass *Atrocities Looming in* Burundi?' (Kristof, 2016)

And:

> '[…] *this unrest* may be *only a foretaste of worse to come* as accelerating political instability stirs up unhealed ethnic enmities between Burundi's Hutu majority and Tutsi minority.' (Tisdall, 2015)

3.5 Burundi

Remarkable is that there is never reference to the situation of Burundi in terms of 'genocide', whereas the situation with fighting militias, who also turn against civilians, is comparable to that in CAR. Although I will focus on the fact that currently the situation in Burundi is worsening and in terms of atrocities it's comparable to the situation in CAR when MINUSCA was deployed, it's important to consider the circumstances in which the mandate of ONUB ended.

When the mandate of ONUB ended in December 2006 the Peace and Security Section of the UN launched a report stating that the situation in Burundi still required monitoring. **'**Experience has taught that the departure of a peacekeeping operation usually leaves residual elements of the peace settlement in need of sustained attention. In the case of Burundi, human rights continue to be threatened and the political environment remains volatile.'. Furthermore, Carolyn McAskie, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support and head of ONUB, argues that, 'Burundi's partners must now continue to deal boldly and expeditiously with the need to help Burundians to address the social and economic needs of the population to

bring the fruits of peace to Burundians and to ensure that never again will they be drawn into conflict.'

And:

'It is critical that the international community support the country now as it moves past this fragile post-conflict stage towards long-term and sustainable development.'

These observations by McAskie were emphasized in a letter by the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the UN, addressed to the President of the Security Council. After the decision to end the mandate of ONUB, the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) was set up at the beginning of 2007. This office was set up to 'broker a peace agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-Forces nationales de liberation (FNL)' (UN Letter from November 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana, Effah-Apenteng, p. 2, hereafter referred to as S_2006_901, 2006, p. 2). In August 2006 the Security Council President made a press statement to convey the concerns of the members of the Council about the reports of a possible coup attempt in Burundi and the subsequent arrest of political leaders.' (S_2006_901, 2006, p. 2). In other words, although there were actual and significant concerns about the situation in Burundi, the mandate of ONUB was replaced by a lighter mandate; BINUB.

How did BINUB develop? On the 25th of August, 'the Security Council held informal consultations on Burundi at which the acting Special Representative of the Secretary General, Nureldin Satti, briefed the members on the situation in that country and the setting up of a UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)' (S_2006_901, 2006, p. 2). Unfortunately, for informal meetings, there are no records published.

At the same time, in the addendum of the Seventh report of the Secretary-General on ONUB, a remarkable lot of challenges are mentioned. For example, that BINUB is focused on supporting the government of Burundi, despite the fact that the government has very limited resources. Furthermore, human rights violations are being committed by some state institutions of Burundi, thus it is a risk to adopt BINUB. Lastly, due to the difficult economic situation and widespread poverty, the numbers of refugees will intensify and the internally displaced persons will increase. In other words, despite all these challenges the peace operation ONUB was replaced by the UN integrated office BINUB. France and Tanzania are important actors in this situation.

Tanzania

Burundi's neighbour Tanzania was part of the UN Security Council in 2006 when ONUB ended. The country received over 6,000 Burundian refugees in 2006, who were seeking shelter (S_2006_163). Tanzania had put enormous efforts in facilitating negotiations between the FNL and the Burundian government, yet without making much progress.

Unlike Chad or Nigeria, however, Tanzania is not an hegemonic power in the region. In other words, at the time when the decision about ending ONUB was made, there was no country in the UN Security Council that had enough weight to stand up effectively for Burundi.

France

France had conditioned the provision of the funding of the National Defence Force (Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi, March 2006, hereeafter referred to as: S_2006_163). According to the records concerning the transition from ONUB to BINUB, it is often mentioned was a high risk in narrowing down the mandate, since the situation in Burundi was still fragile. Amongst others, this was emphasized by the Canadian Mrs. McAskie, head of ONUB. Remarkable is the fact that Canada was not a member of the Security Council in 2006. If it had been up to McAskie, and Canada had then been a member of the Security, perhaps the mandate would have been extended.

But, unlike the CAR, Burundi is not a member of the global Francophone block (De Waal, 2013), nor is Burundi rich in terms of resources, like the oil-rich CAR. In other words, the only country that directly experienced the results – in terms of refugees - of the situation in Burundi, is Tanzania, and Tanzania on its own was not strong enough to extend the mandate of the peacekeeping mission ONUB.

Conclusion

This thesis started with the question: '*How does the discourse used in the UN Security Council meeting records and international media contribute to the context in which the UN Security Council decided to start MINUSCA and end ONUB? Can this explain why there's no Peacekeeping Operation deployed in Burundi recently?'*
If it depends on the situations in the country, then the situation in Burundi is as fragile now as CAR was when the UN SC deployed MINUSCA.

However, this thesis revealed that the discourse that constructs the contexts in which these decisions are made, plays a significant role in the decision to start imposition or withdraw from a country. In other words, as long as the discourse around Burundi, both during the UN SC meetings as well as in the media, doesn't change, Burundi is not on the brink of a PKO. Yet, fortunately the UN SC recently gave a briefing on the deteriorating situation in Burundi (Taranco, Briefing Security Council on Burundi, 14th of June 2019), which might trigger the debate.

The analysis focused on three different discourses, 'Playing the genocide card', 'Hegemonic players in the region' and 'Sensationalism'. These three discourses together construct the context in which the members of the UN Security Council use heavy words like 'genocidal ideologies' or how the history of Rwanda 1994 would repeat in CAR, how hegemonic powers in the region have significant influence on the debate about CAR, as opposed to the meetings in the UN SC about Burundi, where the stakeholders were rather insignificant and no member of the UN SC 'played the genocide card' in relation to Burundi. Lastly, there is strong discourse of sensationalism, both visible in the UN SC meetings and in the media coverage. Besides the fact that Mr. Idriss Deby Itno, president of the Republic of Chad, calls CAR a 'wound in the heart of Central Africa' (S_PV.6967, p. 8), the media also plays a role in this debate by describing the situation in CAR quite bluntly, with 'atrocities' and worse, while referring to the situation in Burundi more in terms of 'unrest'.

Remarkable is that the discourse 'Playing the genocide card' revealed another card: 'playing the terrorism card'. France's Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius mentioned the threat of (Islamist) terrorism that was looming in CAR. This terrorism card probably cannot be played in the case of Burundi.

I want to conclude with the fact that although the situation in both countries is similar, the media mentioned words like ‘genocide’ way more often in relation to CAR to show the intensity of the conflict and perhaps trigger the international community to take action, or justify the peacekeeping mission of the UN. Yet, in Burundi the soft term ‘unrest’ is mentioned often. By using the term ‘unrest’, the international community will not necessarily be triggered to take action. Moreover, de Waal (2013) argued that the French authorities used the word genocide to create domestic support for a foreign mission in CAR, which suited French national interests. Yet, at that moment, it had nog even been established that there had actually been genocidal violence (De Waal, 2013).

The situation in Burundi is not only underexposed in UN SC meetings and in international media, but when exposed, it is exposed in rather ‘soft’ terms like ‘unrest’ instead of vigorous terms like ‘mass atrocities’. On the other hand, CAR is presented as a chaotic and barbaric state, that cannot solve the situation in the country on its own.

As aforementioned, clearly the discourse around CAR is very different from the discourse used in relation to Burundi. If the discourse concerning Burundi doesn’t change, there is little chance that the UN Security Council will deploy a PKO.

The current guidelines on how to decide on a PKO are those in the Capstone doctrine and they are rather vague. To ensure equal treatment and clarity, perhaps a set of fast and hard rules which are more about the situation in the country itself, would be an improvement. In terms of refugees, which is obviously an indication of unrest in a country, it’s not necessarily logical that the UN SC decided to deploy a PKO for CAR in 2014 and that until now, while the amount of refugees from Burundi is still increasing, there’s no PKO deployed in Burundi.

Further research would benefit from using a broader scope of sources in this discourse analysis. Moreover, in terms of the media coverage it would be beneficial to take local newspapers form CAR, Burundi and neighbouring countries into account as well.

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