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Global Order in Historical Perspective



The difference in US presidential rhetoric regarding two different foreign political agendas: a case study of the War on Terror.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Historical context

On the 11th September, 2001, 19 Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four planes flying from the eastern US coast to the western coast. Three planes were directed at two targets in New York City and one in Washington D.C: American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 were crashed respectively into the North and South tower of the World Trade Centre in downtown New York City, while American Airlines Flight 77 was crashed into the Pentagon. At the moment the Pentagon was attacked, then President George W. Bush was absent from Washington D.C., visiting an elementary school in Florida. The final hijacking, United Airlines Flight 93, was thwarted by passengers on-board, resulting in the plane crashing in a field near Shanksville in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. With a total of 2,977 casualties, “9/11,” as it is now known, is the deadliest terrorist attack in US history. Within days, President Bush declared a global ““War on Terror”” against Al Qaeda and terrorism in general.

One day after 9/11, Bush delivered a speech directed toward the American nation in which he stated that...

“...the United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. This battle will take time and resolve, but make no mistake about it, we will win.” ¹

Building on the content and rhetoric of his first speech, Bush followed up in his address to Congress. Throughout Bush elaborated on the proposed “War on Terror” the US would wage:

“Our ” War on Terror” begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” ²

¹ Bush, G. W. (2017, 11). George W. Bush 9/11 Address to the Nation. Retrieved from: <https://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911addresstothetation.htm>

² Bush, G. W. (2001, 09). President Bush Addresses the Nation. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html??noredirect=on

In the period which followed Bush's first publicly response to the attack, the strategic and narrative structure of the "War on Terror" began to be designed by then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who coined the project "Operation Enduring Freedom."³ In addition to creating a structure around the "War on Terror," the Bush administration also institutionalized the war. This started on the 18th September, 2001, when Bush signed a joint resolution legally permitting the use of force against terrorism. This would later be used as a legal basis for invading Afghanistan, making use of extraordinary renditions and for setting up terrorist detention camps such as Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.

The term 'extraordinary renditions', which had been put into practice under President George W. Bush's authorization of drastic measures against terrorists signed in on the 17th September, 2001, is derived from 'renditions', which basically consists of bringing suspects of criminal acts to justice whenever these people are abroad (Boys, 2011). Extraordinary renditions does not take the legal aspect into account as suspects are only transferred from a certain country to another and do not face any trial. They are held captive without any legal stipulation (Satterthwaite, 2007). However, until 9/11, only a relatively small number of these renditions had taken place; however, after the attacks, the numbers vary according to the nature of the specific sources reporting them. For example, according to the former CIA Director George Tenet, there have been up to 80 cases of extraordinary renditions (Singh, 2013), however, investigative journalists Dana Priest from *The Washington Post* and Jana Mayer from *The New York Times*, estimate the true number to be between 100 and 150.⁴ Some even argue that the true number could even be in the thousands. In essence, it is very difficult to determine how many people have been exposed to extraordinary renditions, both due to the vagueness of the term's definition and to the US governments' strategy within the "War on Terror" (Satterthwaite, 2007). In any case, it is known that extraordinary renditions have taken place, drawing criticism both domestically and abroad due to the controversial methods of interrogation being used (Harlow, 2011). As the former CIA director of Counterterrorism Centre Cofer Black stated during a

³ Rumsfeld, D. (2001, 09). Rumsfeld: 'This is about self-defense'. Retrieved from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/25/ret.rumsfeld/>

⁴ Mayer, J. (2005). Outsourcing Torture: The secret history of America's 'extraordinary rendition' program. Retrieved from: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/02/14/outsourcing-torture>

Congressional testimony: “after 9/11, the gloves came off” (Singh, 2013). Additionally, on the 26th December, 2002, an article appeared in *The Washington Post* containing one of the most famous quotes relating to the ““War on Terror”,” attributed to an unknown US government official:

“We don’t kick the [information] out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the [information] out of them.”⁵

Here the unnamed US government official was describing the interrogation process of an extraordinary rendition. According to Satterthwaite (2007), this quote is ‘an elegant and simple formulation, the elements of a procedure that analysts have frustrated themselves trying to define: the practice of ‘extraordinary renditions.’’ (Satterthwaite, 2007, p. 1335).

Together with the practice of extraordinary renditions and often paired with it, the US started to detain terrorists and suspects of terrorism in so called detention camps, of which the camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is the most famous one. According to Hafetz (2012), 9/11 changed the way the US dealt with the incapacitation of terrorism suspects. In fact, prior to 9/11 the US relied solely on federal criminal prosecutions to detain suspects of terrorism. However, after 9/11, the US has developed an alternative system for military detention, which is mostly associated with the detention center of Guantanamo Bay. Already in 2002, about 158 detainees have been transferred from Afghanistan into Guantanamo Bay (Anderson, 2002). Moreover, the US had plans to increase this number over the years and for an undetermined period of detention. On the same level as the practice of extraordinary renditions, the detention center of Guantanamo Bay has sparked controversy. Various governments (mostly European) and Human Rights organizations such as Amnesty International have denounced inhumane treatments of detainees (Anderson, 2002). However, the Bush administration did implement these controversial actions for the sake of US security. Later on the Obama administration continued these practices even though it was on a different basis compared to the Bush administration.

⁵ Gellman, B & Priest, D. (2002). U.S. Decries abuse but defends interrogations. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/12/26/us-decries-abuse-but-defends-interrogations/737a4096-2cf0-40b9-8a9f-7b22099d733d/?utm_term=.b9bb6f1d6dd2

1.2. Research proposal

This study aims to contribute to the discussion of a presumed framing effect of Presidential rhetoric, in this case regarding the War on Terror. It is expected that, due to different political agendas concerning the War on Terror, both President Bush and President Obama did use a different rhetoric from each other in order to frame the War on Terror in a way that would suit their respective political agenda. In doing so, controversial policies, such as extraordinary renditions and the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay are taken as examples to illustrate why such framing takes place. On the one hand, these policies serve as examples to illustrate how President Bush's rhetoric framed the War on Terror so that such policies could be justified in the first place. On the other hand, they serve as an example to illustrate how President Obama changed his rhetoric in order to distance himself from his predecessor, as the policies and Bush's overall foreign policy regarding the War on Terror sparked criticism. This comparison in use of Presidential rhetoric and the purposes of it have not been investigated within the vast literature about both rhetoric and the War on Terror. Furthermore, this research is trying to contribute to the discussion of a relation between Presidential rhetoric, different political agendas and the justification of controversial policies as this thesis engages with the wider discussion on the risks of using certain styles of rhetoric in terms of their potential effects on the audience and therefore on the perception of certain policies. Especially, when it leads to human rights being violated over a substantial period, as was the case with extraordinary renditions and the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay.

To guide the research, the following research question is proposed:

How did both President George W. Bush and Barack Obama make use of a different rhetoric in order to support each of their specific foreign policy agendas regarding the Global War on Terror?

In developing upon the above research question, this thesis includes the following hypothesis in its research. Besides looking at the ways in which both Presidents have used rhetoric, I argue that both president's rhetoric has framed the War on Terror in a way that controversial practices such as Extraordinary Renditions and the practice of detaining

prisoners at Guantanamo Bay could be justified. In this study, both the detention center at Guantanamo Bay and the practice of extraordinary renditions are used as two examples of controversial US policies being implemented in the War on Terror. Thus, both the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay and the process of extraordinary renditions serve to illustrate how the framing of the War on Terror through presidential speeches might justify such controversial practices. Besides, the difference in the administrative approaches from Bush and Obama is especially interesting, as the election of President Barack Obama in 2009 was seen as a departure from the previous Bush administration in several categories, two of which being the use of extraordinary renditions and their secret bases. In fact, it was believed that all policies permitting renditions and extraordinary renditions would be abolished on the 20th January, 2009 (Boys, 2011). Together with a political campaign which highlighted core values such as liberty, freedom and justice, Obama enjoyed mass support both domestically and worldwide. Therefore, the specific rhetoric used by either President Bush or President Obama is interesting to research as both Presidents did have a different political agenda regarding the War on Terror.

In the following section, the main literature around the “War on Terror”, extraordinary renditions and the prison of Guantanamo Bay is reviewed, as well as a general account of the foreign policies implemented under both president Bush and Obama. This, in order to clarify both Presidents’ political agendas regarding the War on Terror. Furthermore, presidential rhetoric and its potential framing effect is discussed. Concerning the analytical part of the thesis, a content analysis of 6 speeches in total, both from President Bush and President Obama has been conducted on the basis of Critical Discourse Analysis, which is outlined later on in the methodology section. Finally, conclusions and some recommendations for further research are provided.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Al Qaeda and the “War on Terror”: Bush and Obama’s foreign policy

Years before the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda was already considered a terrorist organization, when the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1267, establishing the “Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.” From Resolution 1267 onwards, Al Qaeda, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, rose to notoriety from its base in Afghanistan.

Simultaneously, the Taliban, which emerged in the aftermath of Afghanistan's post-Soviet civil war, supported Al Qaeda and provided resources for the organization to operate in Afghanistan. Actions such as the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, which was ordered and executed by Al Qaeda, assured Osama bin Laden the protection and support of the Taliban. Shah Massoud was the leader of an anti-Taliban group called the Northern Alliance, and his assassination resulted in less resistance and more freedom for the Taliban to operate in Afghanistan. This event marked a key development in the relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and at the same time gave Osama bin Laden the green light to conduct the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as Al Qaeda was now fully backed by the Taliban.

The events of 9/11 had an enormous impact on US foreign policy and immediate action was required. Therefore, in response to Afghanistan's unwillingness to deliver Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders to the US, President Bush ordered the invasion of Afghanistan on the 7th October, 2001. These attacks mostly consisted of air strikes and ground troops deployments, mostly led and facilitated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Army Special Forces units. The CIA's involvement in fighting the "War on Terror" in Afghanistan can be explained by the fact that the Agency already had some experience within Afghanistan. This stems from the Cold War period, in which the US was involved in a number of proxy wars against the USSR spread over a number of non-Soviet nations. Afghanistan and the USSR had been in contact with each other as far back as the 1950's, when the USSR provided military and economic aid to Afghanistan in order to garner the nation as a potential ally and trade partner. As a result, Communism began to grow in popularity within Afghanistan, and in 1978, the Afghan dictatorship was overthrown by Afghan Communists in the so-called April Revolution, where different Muslim fundamentalists and other tribal groups began to clash along ideological lines. In response, the CIA began training, organizing and leading guerrilla groups to support the anti-Communist, anti-USSR resistance in Afghanistan. These groups would consist of third-party allies, selected by the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). However, the CIA did not oversee the ISI's work in the selection of guerrilla groups, resulting in the ISI recruiting fundamentalist Muslim groups. Moreover, the ISI's autonomy was strengthened due to the effectiveness of the selected groups in resisting the rise of Communism in Afghanistan. This success resulted in the CIA supporting the Taliban in 1990, who were later on held partially responsible for the 9/11 attacks (Prados, 2002).

The impact of the 9/11 attacks on US foreign policy became clear in 2002, when the then president Bush himself released the National Security Strategy (NSS) in which the general US policy aspects are featured. In general, the US foreign policy seems to be centered on a perpetual combat against terrorists and parties supporting terrorism (McCartney, 2004). In this battle, neutrality was not possible, according to Bush⁶. When looking more specifically to the points mentioned in the NSS, one can distinguish the following foreign policy developments: First of all, the general war on terrorism has been led by the US and defended the central values of 'freedom' and 'justice', not only in the interest of the US but rather in that of the world as a whole. In doing so, the US increased of its own military forces, created bureaucratic instances such as the Department of Homeland Security and a developed its intelligence gathering systems alongside a revision of the law enforcement regarding these new methods. Throughout the NSS, Bush justified these measures by stating that this threat (i.e. terrorism) is different from the wars waged before as it concerns a much more elusive enemy, thus requiring new methods of combat. Finally, not only terrorism in the form of Al Qaeda has been fought but also nations who seek Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD's) became enemies. The realm of terrorism was thus enlarged and therefore, the Bush administration decided to move on to a policy of preemption, which has been materialized by the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

During Barack Obama's presidential campaign, he mostly centered his ideas on 'change' regarding his predecessor. When taking office in 2009, Obama rather quickly marked his campaigning words by signing a resolution which would close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay and which would officially forbid the use of torture by law⁷. Furthermore, in line with this resolution, Obama generally wanted to modify his administration's foreign policy in a more morally acceptable and nuanced way compared to Bush's. In this sense, the rephrasing of the 'War on Terror' into 'countering violent extremism' is an example of this general policy. However, Obama did not intend to stop the so called War on Terror, rather he wished to concentrate the efforts on Afghanistan and

⁶ G. W. Bush, (2002). National Security Strategy. Retrieved from: <https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA406411>

⁷ Barack Obama, 'Obama signs executive order on Gitmo', *New York Times*, 22 Jan. 2009, Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html>

Pakistan instead of Iraq. Therefore, the gradual removal of troops from Iraq can be seen as a major foreign policy shift compared to Bush's administration (see Table 1). Besides implementing change in the administration's foreign policy as to demark itself from the previous administration, Obama had also some convictions on how to operate in this new form of the War on Terror (Stern, 2015). In fact, Obama implemented the so called 'killing no-capture' policy by which unoccupied drones would perform airstrikes in hostile territory. This had the advantage of causing less US military casualties and also no prisoners could be taken for which there was no more detention capacities. Besides the use of drones, Obama began to rely extensively on electronic surveillance to gather information. This was performed by the National Security Agency (NSA). In the end, Obama also implemented a rather preventive strategy, however rather focused on the long term as the President wanted to promote civic engagement in regions where extremism might arise. Together with inclusive and effective governance, Obama wanted to contain and discourage extremism rather than using a preemptive strategy based on coercion as Bush did (Stern, 2015).

2.2 Guantanamo Bay and Extraordinary Renditions:

On September 6, 2006, the then President Bush publicly declared that his government was secretly detaining both terrorists and individuals suspected of being affiliated with terrorist organizations in various centers located throughout the world, in name of the "War on Terror" (Sadat, 2007). These revelations were already made by Dana Priest, a journalist from the *Washington Post*, who declared in November 2005 that the US, through the CIA, was detaining and interrogating suspects of terrorism inside secret prisons located throughout the world⁸. Besides the various facilities located in Eastern Europe, which are not directly operated by the US, some fall under direct US control. The most notorious ones are Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Fitzpatrick, 2003). Within the same statement, Bush also stated that no torture of prisoners was involved in the interrogation processes, however, according to scholars (Chwastiak, 2015; Murray, 2011; Poynting, 2015; Sadat, 2007), the US government, through its Central Intelligence Agency, did make use of interrogation methods involving "attention grasp, walling, facial

⁸ Dana Priest, CIA holds terror suspects in secret prisons, 2015. *The Washington Post*

hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, insects placed in a confinement box, and waterboarding” (Chwastiak, 2015, p. 494).

According to Fitzpatrick (2003), approximately 3,000 people have been captured and detained since the beginning of the War on Terror. All have been detained in secret basis located in different states than the US and which did not fall under the scrutiny of either national courts, human rights agencies or humanitarian law (Fitzpatrick, 2003; Moore, 2006).

Besides the detention and interrogation of terrorists and suspects of terrorism in secret bases, the US also implemented a network of so called extraordinary renditions, aimed at secretly transporting terrorists and suspects of terrorism towards the aforementioned secret facilities. This process of secretly detaining and interrogating prisoners began six days after the 9/11 attacks, when Bush first launched the “War on Terror” and signed a Memorandum of Notification, which gave the CIA the authority to arrest and detain terrorists and suspects of terrorism (Chwastiak, 2015). As Cordell (2017) contends, this process was in fact a secret rendition network facilitated through (extraordinary) renditions. These renditions conducted by the CIA consisted of secretly transferring suspects of terrorism via private civilian aircrafts. According to *The Washington Post*, most of the rendition flights took place between 2001 and 2005, and were facilitated by various other states throughout the world, including Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Syria, Egypt, and Afghanistan. These states were involved in the provision of secret CIA bases for detaining suspected terrorists by lending their airports for renditions flights to land and refuel, sharing intelligence gathered through interrogations, and arresting, capturing and interrogating suspects of terrorism, by order of the CIA (Cordell, 2017).

The practice of renditions in the US did not first emerge in the aftermath of 9/11, as in fact, evidence of its practice dates back to 1986, when the then President Ronald Reagan authorized the practice of rendering to justice, and to the US, suspects of criminal acts who were captured outside of the US. This was implemented in order to permit the trial of criminals residing within nation-states that did not facilitate extradition procedures to the US (Singh, 2013). In the following decades, renditions evolved gradually through legislation and documents signed by the President of that time. For example, President George H.W. Bush authorized certain aspects of renditions through “National Security Directive 77,” however, the accounts of these practices, including Directive 77, remain confidential.

Building upon the former President's authorization of renditions, President Bill Clinton continued the practice of rendering suspects to the US. In addition, Clinton also signed several directives (such as PDD-39 and PDD-62) which resulted in the evolution of traditional renditions to renditions encompassing prisoners being sent to foreign governments to face trial, conducted in total secrecy (Singh, 2013).

According to Singh (2013), there is no official US government definition of the term "extraordinary renditions." In order to define the term, "renditions" first must be defined. Renditions consist of bringing suspects of criminal acts who have been captured abroad to their home country in order to face trial (Boys, 2011). Murray (2011) argues that renditions are different from extraditions as the latter are considered to be the official vehicle between governments to legally and publicly transfer prisoners across state borders. In terms of "extraordinary renditions," Satterthwaite (2007) provides the following clear and concise definition:

"The transfer of an individual, without the benefit of a legal proceeding in which the individual can challenge the transfer, to a country where he or she is at risk of torture" (Satterthwaite, 2007. p. 1336).

This definition is the most relevant to this research, as it solely focuses on the practice of extraordinary renditions in the context of the "War on Terror." The essential difference between ordinary renditions and extraordinary renditions is that the latter is far more relevant to the practice of gaining information from the suspect in lieu of following the proper legislative procedure of a fair trial, as is the case with standard renditions. Extraordinary renditions also overtake normal renditions in the sense that the former implicitly connotes the risk of being exposed to torture, whereas the latter only deals with the transfer of an individual from one place to another (Boys, 2011). The shift from the use of standard renditions to extraordinary renditions has sparked criticism from human rights groups, the United Nations and various other governments (Satterthwaite, 2007). Hence, a large body of literature (Anderson, 2002; Falk, 2007; Fitzpatrick, 2003; Moore, 2006) does debate the legality of such actions, however the purpose of this thesis is not to contribute to the legal discussion, but rather to argue that both Bush and Obama's presidential rhetoric framed the War on Terror in a way that such controversial practices could be done and somehow could be justified. Having said so, its legal complexity needs to be reviewed for

the sake of the point this research is aiming to make, as this legal structure was impacted by a certain rhetoric used, as can be seen in the following review.

In reaction to the many critics, the US government has justified the process of extraordinary renditions by enshrining their practice into actual law. More precisely, a carefully constructed and intensely complex legal framework has effectively created a grey area in terms of the legal status of extraordinary renditions, where there is no actual support but also no prohibition of its practice as it takes place outside the US' borders where nonofficial arrangements are made with other countries. Set against the backdrop of the "War on Terror," this legal grey area continued to exist, permitting the use of extraordinary renditions and detainment (Fitzpatrick, 2003; Satterthwaite, 2007).

Fisher (2008) investigates the legal status of in particular extraordinary renditions, looking at rendition flights, the main manner by which extraordinary renditions are conducted. The study finds that renditions which occurred before 9/11 were very much bound to law, as several administrative and legal procedures needed to be fulfilled in order for them to be conducted (Fisher 2008). By referring to the procedure as an "extraordinary rendition," the Bush administration changed the initially regulated procedure to an arbitrary and independent executive law. From the 19th September 2001, terrorists and suspects of terrorism could be transferred without any legal or administrative interference, despite the fact that most of these renditions took place on foreign soil and were therefore not bound by US law.

In fact, as Satterthwaite (2007) contends, one of the main arguments advanced by the US government in justifying the legality of extraordinary renditions emphasized that human rights laws do not apply outside of the US. This argument is founded upon the perceived gaps in International Human Rights (IHR) law, seeking to find areas where such laws do not apply in order to implement extraordinary renditions. For example, one facet argued by the US government is that the human rights treaties signed by the US are solely applicable to US territories. Moreover, the US government has argued that meetings are conducted with officials from countries receiving individuals as a result of extraordinary renditions, where these officials assert that no torture will occur. From the perspective of legal terminology, the US government relies on so-called "diplomatic assurances" in these situations, and therefore does not take any responsibility for any potential wrong doings

stemming from the countries hosting the extraordinary rendered individuals (Satterthwaite, 2007).

Finally, when touching upon the subject of rhetoric, the US government justifies the use of extraordinary renditions by reiterating their use as a tool of defense in an ongoing war, as the former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice demonstrated in a statement given on the 5th December, 2005, during a state visit to Europe. In her statement, Rice suggested that the nature, scale and structure of the “War on Terror” meant that the US had to look beyond conventional military operations, such as those that were employed during the Gulf War.⁹ She also argued that captured terrorists did not fit within traditional systems of criminal or military justice, and therefore, that the US had to adapt. According to Satterthwaite (2007), the US adapted itself to the problem depicted by Rice by using extraordinary renditions to send suspects of terrorism to certain countries in order to be detained and interrogated.

Even though the US took the initiative and gave the order (via the CIA) to conduct a number of extraordinary renditions, it could not and did not operate on its own. In fact, many other countries around the world were involved in this process, however, the exact scale and scope of this international operation remains vague due to the efforts of the governments of the US and its allies to conceal it. Only a few countries have since publicly apologized to victims of extraordinary renditions, while most (including the US) do not acknowledge any involvement. The same goes for the detention camps. According to Dana Priest *from The Washington Post*, some Eastern European countries have set up such facilities in order to assist the US in its interrogation processes¹⁰. In fact, in his book *Globalizing Torture*, Singh (2013) has investigated the international aspect of both the practices of extraordinary renditions and the international reach of CIA detention camps. The author claims that a minimum of 54 foreign governments have somehow assisted the US in such practices. Amongst them can be found Western European nations as well as African and Middle-Eastern nations. Carey (2003) has revealed information pointing at the participation of the governments of Lithuania, Poland and Romania in both the process of extraordinary renditions and detention camps. The author has investigated how domestic

⁹ Rice, C. (12, 2005). Remarks upon her departure for Europe. Retrieved from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57602.htm>

¹⁰ Dana Priest, CIA holds terror suspects in secret prisons. *The Washington Post*, nov. 2005.

public opinion towards these governments has been affected by their participation in these controversial practices. Regarding Western Europe, as the nations presumed to be involved denied any participation in the aforementioned processes, the European Parliament created the Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners (TDIP) on the 18th January, 2006 (Satterthwaite, 2007). This committee was tasked with investigating, amongst others, whether the CIA conducted extraordinary renditions in the European Union and whether European member states were complicit. The committee gathered information regarding flights related to the CIA within Europe, concluding that since the 1st September, 2001, more than 1,000 stopovers in Europe have been made by aircrafts linked to the CIA. In February 2007, the final report of the TDIP Committee was delivered to the European Parliament, where it was clearly stated that Member States were aware of extraordinary renditions taking place within their borders. According to Satterthwaite (2007), Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in particular were heavily criticized within the final report, as their officials were actively involved in or actively ignored the process of extraordinary renditions.

Regarding research on extraordinary renditions and detention camps, overall vagueness persists due to the lack of available data. Therefore, most researchers do not research on these practices. However, Cordell (2017) is one of the scholars who proposes a specific and nuanced methodology for studies researching the data related to rendition flights specifically in order to gather the necessary data. The author has already used this methodology to uncover several of the nations involved. Other studies have also looked into whether relations between nations have been affected by their involvement in rendition scandals and the effects of secrecy on international relations. Balzacq and Puybureau (2018) have looked at US – E.U. relations in relation to, amongst others, extraordinary renditions, arguing that there is a so-called “economy of secrecy,” where different levels of secrecy, knowledge and ignorance affect relations between different nations. Nations are kept in the dark as to limit the impact of such controversial practices on the population and overall politics. He concludes that this economy of secrecy keeps power balanced by weighing the amounts of knowledge that is shared at certain times. This is also the case with extraordinary renditions and makes research on the subject rather difficult.

The fact that these renditions even took place is worth investigation, not only because it sheds light on the clandestine employment of controversial policies by state governments, but also because these policies could still be in use today.

2.3 Presidential Rhetoric and its framing effect

When looking at the potential effect of presidential rhetoric in the framing of the War on Terror, it is important to first look at presidential rhetoric as a concept. In the first place, the concept is derived from a broader one being political rhetoric. Van Dijk (1997) describes the term by giving the practice of rhetoric (or discourse) a central position and by seeing the political aspect as an approach to that discourse. In other words, rather than defining a discourse as political, Van Dijk (1997) argues that, when doing research on political discourse, one should take a political approach when analyzing a certain discourse.

Furthermore, political discourse is based upon the units of analysis the discipline is investigating in. In this case, politicians and their discourse would be the units of analysis. However, Van Dijk (1997) adds that merely analyzing politicians is not enough as political discourse is linked to the many receivers of this discourse. Thus, there is a need to add the recipients of political discourse to the analysis. Besides, not only professional or official politicians are involved in political discourse as voters, demonstrators and people from pressure groups can be involved in the process (Verba, et al., 1993). All together, these groups take part in the general political process. Next to the definition of the actors of political discourse, another factor to take into account consists of the actions of these political actors (Van Dijk, 1997). In fact, a politician is not always a politician and his/her discourse can only be political when this person is acting as a political actor. For example, when being at a family diner and having a conversation, a prime minister's discourse would not be considered to be political. So, in doing research on political discourse, it is important to select text and talk of the units of analysis when they are acting as political actors. Finally, the role of context plays an important role in defining political discourse and its analysis. In fact, according to Van Dijk (1997), the whole context defines a discourse as being political or not due to all the aforementioned factors but also due to the certain event or situation in which the discourse is performed.

Now that the broader concept of political discourse has been explained, presidential discourse can be considered to be a form or genre of political discourse with the unit of analysis being solely a president. As a unit of analysis, presidential rhetoric is very interesting to research as presidents potentially have an important power in shaping national definitions (Zarefsky, 2004) and in shaping an image of a nation through their administration (Murphy, 2003). Moreover, a president's rhetoric has an impact upon policy (Stuckey, 2008).

When defining presidential rhetoric, one can say that it basically consists of a process of choices made in order to convey a message to a certain audience (Zarefsky, 2004). In this process, the sender of the messages (stimuli), in this case the President, through his/her rhetoric, suggests possibilities and invites the audience to think in a certain way (*ibid*). In other words, rhetoric does not directly influence the audience following a single speech, but rather gradually implements a way of thinking or a way of seeing things on a long-term basis. From this perspective, several stimuli (for instance through speeches) conveying semantically similar messages must be delivered to a single audience in order to elicit such an influence.

However, the definition as described above and its presumed effects have not and are not shared by every scholar interested in this field. For instance, Edwards III (2003) argues in his extensive work that the effect of presidential rhetoric on its audiences' opinion or beliefs is quite limited and should be nuanced. A parallel can be drawn looking at media studies focusing on the theory of 'limited effects', which suggests that messages sent towards an audience do not 'penetrate' the audience as the so called 'hypodermic needle' theory suggests it does. In fact, the audience also thinks for itself and thus, one should not assume that an audience would simply take the message for granted. This is also the case for presidential rhetoric (Edwards III, 2003; Schudson, 2003).

Considering these critiques, Zarefsky (2004) seeks to shed light on presidential rhetoric as a whole: how it works and its effects. In the first place, Zarefsky (2004) agrees with the aforementioned critiques as one should not merely look for a relationship between a message and an audience and the effects of this message on this audience as this relationship is too simplistic to give a valid reflection of the process of rhetoric and its

influence. In fact, Zarefsky (2004) argues that this assumption is only one way of looking at it and that the message-audience relationship is far more complex. Thus, on the contrary, it is more bound to the rhetor's choices about which cues to embed in his/her message in order to be able to achieve his/her goal in the best possible way, considering a specific audience and a specific context in which this audience is set. Considering this argument, Bitzer's (1968) work can be taken into account as he also claims that the situation, thus the context, in which the rhetor and the audience are set is crucial for the interpretation of the message. Besides, presidential rhetoric cannot on its own influence a certain outcome, due to the many uncontrollable other factors such as people's own agency (Zarefsky, 2004). Therefore, when talking about the direct effects of presidential rhetoric on an audience, one should nuance one's research by stating that presidential rhetoric *invites* to a certain interpretation or that it *might* influence an audience.

However, some scholars argue that presidential rhetoric does have a direct effect on audiences. This is the case for Cohen and Hamman (2003) who found that presidential foreign policy speeches can have an influence on the public's perception on the economy, especially when the president is popular at the time of his/her speech. Druckman and Holmes (2004) posits an argument following the same logic, but in a broader perspective: favorable public opinion of a national leader is shown to be a key factor in determining that leader's power and policy-making success. The study also finds that the type of rhetoric employed can have a significant impact on the speaker's approval rating in public opinion polls (*ibid*). Building upon these studies, Brower, Emrich, Feldman and Garland (2001) who argue that a leader's (president) vision is best transmitted to others by being able to formulate a verbal picture through rhetoric. The authors develop their argument by stating that the usage of words that evoke pictures, certain sounds or smell do trigger receiver's life experiences and thus have an impact upon them. Thus, one can assume that in the process of framing events through rhetoric, political leaders such as presidents would make use of words evoking certain pictures or visuals.

When looking at the potential framing power presidential rhetoric may have, Meyer (1995) investigated this issue in the context of the Cold War. The author, through a content analysis of amongst others, presidential State of the Union addresses, concludes that rhetoric has a framing effect when implemented in a favorable (delicate) context such as the Cold War was or such as the War on Terror. Furthermore, Hawdon (2001) has

researched the potential of presidential rhetoric to create and sustain moral panics. The author did so by analyzing the presidential addresses of both President Reagan and George H. W. Bush related to the war on drugs. Hawdon (2001) found out that their presidential rhetoric did influence the public in creating a moral panic, which supported his policy of a war on drugs in the US.

3. Methodology

3.1. Research design

Considering the above, this thesis takes into consideration the context in which the speeches (data) used for this actual research are gathered. Both Presidents' foreign policy agendas are considered to be the context in which they develop their rhetoric as to support these different agendas. In this sense, this research seeks to unveil a possible influence of presidential rhetoric on the effect of supporting one's political agenda. Two controversial policies implemented during the War on Terror are taken as examples to illustrate how presidential rhetoric may support certain policies. The two examples for this study are the policies of extraordinary renditions and detention camps such as Guantanamo Bay. To resume, no direct influence or causal relationship is claimed or even investigated in this research but, as presidents make serious efforts to refine their rhetoric (Edwards, 2002) and considering the above mentioned scholars' findings, this study aims to contribute to the discussion of the potential effect of presidential rhetoric on the framing of events in a certain context, being foreign policy agendas residing within a broader context of the War on Terror.

In order to answer this thesis' research question, 6 public speeches delivered by both Bush and Obama during their respective presidencies were analyzed. These speeches have been selected according to different moments within the history of the "War on Terror," to address how both presidents have used a different rhetoric to promote a different agenda regarding the War on Terror. A qualitative analysis of each speech has been conducted via Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), unpicking the specifics of the content of each speech. The analysis of the transcribed (textual) speeches through a critical discourse analysis has been done based on Van Dijk's (2004) framework, which is described in the following part.

3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) originates out of several disciplines, often used interchangeably with Critical Linguistics (CL). In modern usage, CDA is seen as an overarching discipline that embraces the practices of CL as well (Meyer & Wodak, 2008). CL is only one of the many roots of CDA, as it also stems from a vast range of disciplines such as rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, socio-psychology, cognitive science, literary studies and sociolinguistics (*ibid*). Opposing other disciplines related to discourse studies and CDA, Meyer and Wodak (2008) argue that the latter is focused on researching complex social phenomena that require a multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical approach rather than a focus on a single linguistic unit. In other words, CDA enables the study of social phenomena such as the multitudinous effects of speech and discourse on an audience, rather than individual elements that might influence a presumed outcome.

All of the aforementioned approaches focus on “discourse” as the central unit of analysis. This term is rather broad and can take various forms, from policy documents to speeches delivered by politicians or other public figures, to historical monuments and other facets of memorialization. Discourse is often understood as being politically charged, garnering labels such as “racist,” “feminist,” “political,” and “social,” among others (Meyer & Wodak, 2008). Therefore, a crucial step of CDA is identifying the category of discourse under analysis, from a broad level (i.e. “political”) to the specific (i.e. “perceptions of the invasion of Afghanistan post-9/11”). In the case of this study, the discourse about the War on Terror is analyzed.

According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), CDA concerns the analysis of language as a social practice, meaning the context in which that language is used is an essential consideration when conducting CDA. As a social practice, CDA relies on the assumption that there is a dialectic relationship between the context in which the language appears and the various situations, institutions and social structures that might influence this specific discursive event (*ibid*). Fairclough and Wodak (1997) asserts that discursive events and various situations, institutions and social structures mutually influence and shape each other, as discourse itself is a social construction. As a result of the direct social impact a discursive event can potentially exert, discourse is very much related to power (*ibid*). Weiss and Wodak (2003) argue therefore, that CDA critically digs into the structural relations of

power, control and domination, which are created, manifested and legitimized through discourse. In this sense, discourse is not seen as a tool to neutrally describe events but is rather seen as a conveyer of power relations through the use of certain words and sentences, which are purposely chosen in a particular context (Taylor, 2001). Discourse therefore, is a key factor in the balance of power relations, helping to produce or reproduce (un)equal power relations between certain groups, through the various forms in which it displays or represents certain people, events, ideas and historical facts (*ibid*). Following this line of reasoning, Fairclough (1992) adds that discourse, especially as described above, serves not just to represent the world through language but to construct the world according to a certain meaning given by the use of specific words. This is also what this research is aiming to unveil by analyzing the rhetoric used by President Bush and Obama. In this case, their framing of the War on Terror is investigated through both Presidents' respective rhetoric.

As mentioned above by Taylor (2001), CDA it takes into account the importance of context when analyzing discourse. Moreover, it values context as being part of the research process, as will be referred to throughout this research. In fact, the different use of rhetoric by Bush and Obama within the context of the War on Terror is investigated. It is argued that the context by which these two Presidents operated has had an impact on their rhetoric. Therefore, the two Presidents' foreign policy agendas are taken as general context for this study.

The importance of context in doing discourse analysis is highlighted by Murphy (1992) who argues that much of the research conducted on rhetoric and its effects has been done by solely analyzing textual features of the rhetoric, while context-setting is imperative when doing research involving rhetorical text analysis. This emphasis on the context of research is also advocated in Wodak (1996; 2001). Wodak (2000) explains that when doing a CDA on a political topic, it is crucial to integrate into the analysis the social and political background of the sources employed. This is reinforced in Van Dijk (2004), in which it is argued that knowledge of a certain phenomenon is given meaning by embedding a message into the shared beliefs of a certain community. This "context model," can be seen as a mental representation of the audience's perception of the social situation surrounding them, through which they draw meaning (*ibid*).

Fairclough (2013) presents a similar argument to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), in that CDA is contained within the critical tradition of social analysis within the study of languages. In particular, it contributes to critical social analysis in the context of discourse in relation to other social elements. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). Published later on, Fairclough (2013) finds that CDA (especially the *critical* side of it) offers both a normative and explanatory way of analyzing discursive events. Moreover, CDA offers a normative critique, as it does not merely describe realities but also evaluates and assesses the way these realities (realities that are being studied) may or may not reflect certain values by which a certain society is presumed to live by, for instance, certain political standards or levels of human well-being (*ibid*).

As mentioned above, Van Dijk (1993) posits that CDA can be used reveal social inequalities that result from the abuse of power by those in a position of power, from national leaders to the management of large firms. From this perspective, discourse exists in a top-down structure, where power is exerted by elite groups upon the general population via discourse (*ibid*). Therefore, this research focusses on the Presidential rhetoric of both Bush and Obama, as the President (in the US) has the greatest rhetorical power, especially in times of a crisis, which was the case after the events of 9/11 (Croft, 2006; Maggio, 2007). The top-down structure of social power structures is headed up by what Van Dijk (1993) refers to as “power elites.” Putting the concept of “voice” as central, Van Dijk (1993) contends that the source of power within power elites is their access to platforms upon which discourse can be voiced. On a more general level, Van Dijk (1993) makes a distinction between force being used to exert power and cognitive ways of using power in order to gain control over people. Regarding the latter, this strategy involves acts of persuasion, dissimulation and or manipulation to change the will of the listener toward the intention of the speaker (*ibid*). The aspect of affecting opinions through language is the point where discourse and CDA meet. The usage of cognitive power is also the most common one used by the aforementioned power elites as it is a more subtle form of the exertion of power. Therefore, and because of its effects according to Van Dijk, this study aims at uncovering a cognitive power exertion by the use of presidential rhetoric in order to minimize the controversy over extraordinary renditions.

Furthermore, Van Dijk (1993) also finds that power involves a battle for control between in-groups and out-groups. In this sense, control refers to the power exerted by a

certain group of people over the minds of another group. Van Dijk (1993) argues that power and the form of dominance it can have over a certain group often appears in an organized and institutionalized way, vectored by the channels by which discourse is disseminated among populations, translated within institutionalized forms such as legal units adopting a certain form of power, or enacted and reinforced by media outlets.

3.3 Analytical framework:

This research makes use of the analytical framework of Van Dijk (2004), who selected 27 keywords by which rhetoric and its implications can be analyzed. These keywords are centered predominantly on the dichotomy of positive self-representation and negative other representation. Van Dijk (2004) associates positive self-representation with in-group positivism, which is considered to be a tool employed in the process of 'impression management'. On the other side, negative other-representation is another strategy aimed at the out-group. By highlighting one's positive aspects and others' negative ones, a division is made between 'good' and 'bad' or US vs. THEM (Van Dijk, 2004). In order to clarify the above, the author created the following square (Van Dijk, 2004, p. 18).

Emphasize *Our* good things

Emphasize *Their* bad things

De-emphasize *Our* bad things

De-emphasize *Their* good things

Along with the keywords used to highlight the dichotomy of positive self-representation and negative other-representation, Van Dijk (2004) has introduced 25 other keywords to assess rhetoric. In this research, a selection has been made of 13 keywords amongst which 5 are meant to highlight the self/other-representation dichotomy explained above. This selection has been made by eliminating the keywords addressing other rhetorical cues than those evident in textual transcriptions of the speeches (e.g. visual cues or auditory cues). The 5 keywords referring to the dichotomy will be marked with 'dichotomy' in brackets behind it. The 13 keywords selected are the following:

Actor description (dichotomy): Ways of describing actors or people from a certain society. Either positively or negatively.

Authority: Referring to authorities to justify one's argument.

Categorization (dichotomy): Creating different groups amongst people.

Consensus: Creating an agreement and unification.

Disclaimer: Referring to a positive/negative idea, and rejecting it in the next sentence by using words as 'but'.

Evidentiality: Advancing hard facts.

Hyperbole: Sentence to exaggerate and reinforce one's argument.

National Self Glorification (dichotomy): Glorify one's nation in order to create a positive self-representation.

Number Game: Attempt to enhance one's credibility by referring to numbers and statistics.

Polarization (dichotomy): Categorizing people with positive characteristics to the US category and people with negative characteristics to the THEM category.

Presupposition: Drawing upon common knowledge, which is taken for granted.

Vagueness: Creating a sense of uncertainty.

Victimization (dichotomy): Enhancing negative stories about people who do not fall into the US category.

Besides a CDA focusing on the keywords proposed by Van Dijk (2004), this study takes into account the context in which the two Presidents operated, being their respective foreign policy agendas. In fact, it is argued that their rhetoric is adapted to their respective foreign policy agenda regarding the War on Terror. Therefore, both Presidents' (general) foreign policies regarding the War on Terror are recapitulated in the section below.

Foreign policy agenda Bush:

According to Dunn (2005), US foreign policy in response to 9/11 was essentially focused on facing a state-to-state threat, coming primarily from Afghanistan as Osama bin Laden operated from there. Dunn (2005) contends this foreign policy resembles traditional counter-terrorism, due to its focus on regime change within Afghanistan in order to re-establish stability and security for the US. As Dunn (2005) states, the enemy was seen as a

fixed entity and was seen as a fixed number of terrorists led by Osama bin Laden that needed to be tracked down and eradicated.

Over the years within the Bush administration, the “War on Terror” grew in scale, as did the funds to which it was allocated (see Table 1). The overall positive outcome of the war in Afghanistan was paired with relatively few American casualties, and resulted in an administration confident of its tactics within the war (Dunn, 2005). In fact, US foreign policy towards the Middle East became a policy of pre-emption, as Bush did not want to wait until a new attack would hit the US, taking the policy that the US had to actively seek potential threats in order to combat them, especially focused on regimes with Weapons of Mass Destruction. With the positive outcome in Afghanistan (i.e. the installation of a new regime), the US administration wanted to enact a similar policy in Iraq. As Dunn (2005) states, the US failed to comply with the international agreements regarding pre-emptive circumstances that would justify an attack, choosing to operate instead by his own set of rules. However, it became clear to Bush’s administration that pre-emption was not enough to eradicate terrorism, and thus enacting democratization in the Middle East became key (Dunn, 2005; Napoleoni, 2010).

Factually speaking, by 2006, during President Bush’s second term as US President, the “War on Terror” had been going on for five years and had cost approximately \$127bn.¹¹ In the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a total of 154,220 American soldiers were deployed¹².

Thus, in short, Bush’s foreign policy goals were:

- No neutrality is accepted in waging the War on Terror
- Secure the US by institutionalizing the War on Terror through the creation of Homeland Security.
- Expanding the War on Terror from Al Qaeda to regimes possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Therefore, implementing a strategy of pre-emption/prevention

¹¹ Amadeo, K. (04, 2019). War on terror facts, costs, and timeline. Retrieved from: <https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300>

¹² Amadeo, K. (04, 2019). War on terror facts, costs, and timeline. Retrieved from: <https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300>

- With the goal to bring about regime change and democratization throughout the world

Foreign policy agenda Obama:

First of all, Napoleoni (2010) argues that President Bush left President Obama with a huge national debt (\$10tn), which predominantly had been built up through war and domestic securitization against terrorism. President Obama took office in the midst of a severe economic crisis and therefore called for change.

In that sense, President Obama's foreign policy towards the Middle East marked a break from that of President Bush, both on an executive level and an ideological one. Early in his first term, Obama announced his willingness to close the detention center of Guantanamo Bay (McCrisken, 2011). Besides, Obama adopted a "smart power" strategy, comprised of a mixture of hard and soft power. This foreign policy strategy was also deployed from the background rather than being on the forefront, as was the case with both wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Obama, also commences a gradual reduction in the number of US troops stationed in the Middle East (Kandel, Maya and Maud Quessard-Salvaing, 2013).

According to Hlavsova (2017), President Bush's democratization policy in the Middle East was partly responsible for the so called Arab Spring in 2010, which saw many countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East revolt against their authoritarian regimes. As an example of President Obama's multilateral approach to foreign policy in the Middle East, the intervention in Libya consisted not only of US troops but of a coalition where both Middle Eastern and NATO European States were involved (Goldberg, 2016). In addition, Stern (2015) argues that Obama wanted to include other nations within the war against terrorism. Besides, Obama also wanted to diminish American casualties by relying more on drones to operate in hostile territories.

Thus, in short, Obama's foreign policy goals were:

- A break with Bush by focussing on Afghanistan and Pakistan rather than Iraq and by making the War on Terror more morally acceptable
- In doing so, Obama wants to close detention centre Guantanamo Bay
- Implementing a pre-emptive strategy as well but focused on civic engagement, inclusive and effective governance, rather than force

- Implementing drones in order to limit American victims
- Rely more on other governments to help in the combat against terrorism

In order to see whether both President's did act as their foreign policy agendas would suggest, below *Table 1* provides an overview of the situation in the US during the War on Terror¹³ around every analyzed speech. This information is taken into account later on when looking at the specific rhetoric of each President in order to unveil whether their actions are supported by a certain rhetoric.

Table 1: Facts on US "War on Terror" (WOT) per speech for both President Bush (red) and President Obama (blue):

Speeches Bush/Obama	Costs US in WOT in billion \$	Increase (+) or decrease (-) in costs US in WOT related to the previous period in billions \$	US boots on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq	Increase (+), decrease (-) or equal (=) in US boots on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq
Bush				
2001	31		9,700	
2002	59.1	+ 28.1	9,700	=
2006	127	+ 67,9	154, 220	+ 144, 520
Obama				

¹³ Retrieved from www.thebalancecareers.com/the-cost-of-war-3356924 and www.thebalancecareers.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300 [Accessed 28/6/19]

2008 (still Bush administration)	235.6		181, 000	
2009 (2 speeches)	197.1	- 38.5	183, 300	+ 2, 300
2011	162.4	- 34.7	105, 555	-77, 745

4. Analysis and discussion:

In the following part, the analysis of the 6 speeches is conducted by paying attention to the keywords mentioned above. First, a short summary of the speech is provided. Then the CDA is performed and the parts with which the keywords match are made **bold**. A discussion of the implications of the keywords and the impact of their usage in the speeches is also provided. This all is woven into the CDA, as well as the comparison of Bush and Obama’s rhetoric, which is put in relation to the President’s respective foreign policy agendas regarding the War on Terror.

4.1.1. Speech 1 President Bush: 11/09/2001 Address to the Nation, Oval Office, Washington D.C.

Summary:

During President Bush’s first speech after the 9/11 attacks, he first addresses the American citizens and describes the intended purpose of the attacks as the undermining of cohesion between American citizens. He then assures that it failed in fulfilling its purpose, as America remains strong. Furthermore, he states that actions have already been undertaken in order to find and punish those responsible for the attacks. Finally, Bush reaches out to America’s international allies and calls upon faith by citing Psalm 23.

CDA:

In the first paragraph of his speech, Bush directly evokes a sense of **unification** by using a **polarization** as he refers to ‘our citizens’, by which Bush indicates that the citizens are his and thus fall under his responsibility. Then, Bush immediately refers to an ‘act of terrorism’, which leaves out every other option as to determine the nature of the ‘attack’. Bush also uses **hyperbolic** phrases as he describes the attack: ‘evil, despicable acts of terror’. Bush also

creates a **dichotomy** by using the tactic of **polarization**. In fact, he creates distance between himself and the Americans as a whole (using 'us') and the terrorists (using 'they'). Moreover, he reinforces the positive 'us' sentiment as he states that 'our country is strong', and thus **glorifies the US**. The next paragraph is predominantly in light of this **glorification of the US** and the **polarization** of 'our' good vs. 'their' bad. In fact, Bush refers to 'a great nation', talking about the US. Furthermore, Bush makes use of various **disclaimers** as he describes the destructive intentions of the terrorists and directly contrasts them with the positive aspects of the US. In doing so, Bush emphasized the **categorization** and good vs. bad **dichotomy**, by also making use of strong words in the form of **hyperbolic** sentences. In the next paragraph, Bush emphasizes the strength of the US by pointing at the many governmental organizations that did function well and which will keep on going. This creates a form of **consensus** and **reassurance** in the context of chaos after the attacks.

When talking about those responsible for the attacks, Bush uses a **hyperbole** as he states that the 'full resources' of the 'intelligence' and 'law enforcement communities' have been directed at finding them. This can also be seen in Table 1, as the Bush administration started to allocate financial means to the war. Furthermore, Bush includes everyone who wants 'peace' and 'security' in the world in joining him and America in 'winning this war against terrorism'. Here, Bush creates a **consensus** by including almost everyone as 'peace' and 'security' in the world are common wishes and standards to live by. Thus, Bush creates a **consensus** amongst the nation and in doing so, Bush binds people who pursue those values to him and America in a **hyperbolic** 'war against terrorism'. As those values are very generally pursued and seen as positive, at least in the US and Western world, Bush aims at rallying everyone to his cause. Finally, Bush evokes God and asks for prayers and therefore makes use of an **authority** 'greater than any of us' in comforting his stands.

4.1.2. Speech 2 President Bush: 29/01/2002 Presidential State of the Union Address

Summary:

On January 29, 2002, President Bush addresses the State of the Union officially for the first time since taking office. In this traditional speech given to a Joint Session of Congress, President Bush began by saluting the present entities and US citizens before presenting an overview of the nation's problems, amongst which being the "country's war. President Bush begins by mentioning the events of 9/11 and what it entailed for the US and the entire

world, followed by an overview of the successes over terrorism that had already been achieved in “four short months.” Bush then discusses the war in Afghanistan and how the US and Afghanistan work hand in hand in combatting terrorism and in “rebuilding” Afghanistan. As it is normal to highlight during a State of the Union speech, President Bush also expands upon budgets and while still remaining in the context of the “War on Terror,” emphasizing that a lot of resources are needed in order to win the war, and thus a large budget will be allocated to this purpose. Following the subject of budget, President Bush mentions other domestic points of issue for Americans, however, these issues are still centered around the “War on Terror.”

CDA:

Directly, Bush starts with a **disclaimer** as he notes that ‘our nation is at war’ and names other flaws the US is facing while adding in the next sentence that the ‘state of our Union has never been stronger’. By using the possessive pronoun ‘our’, Bush uses the tactic of **polarization** and creates a **consensus** and includes himself within the American citizens and thus reinforces the feeling of his good intentions as he is ‘one of us’. At the same time it is a **hyperbole** as we don’t know whether it has never been stronger than it is now: it seems exaggerated. Bush continues about the War on Terror and refers to **hyperbolic numbers** as he states that ‘thousands of terrorists’ were eliminated already. This highlights the positive effects of the actions already undertaken in the war on terrorism. Furthermore, he enumerates the positive actions undertaken by the US. In doing so, Bush **glorifies** the US and sends out the message that its actions are ‘good’ and ‘just’. Bush also tells small stories about people who lost loved ones in the 9/11 attacks in order to emphasize the impact of the attacks and to show his **empathy** with the victims and the Americans in general. Then, he continues by **polarizing** and stating that ‘our cause is just’, talking about the War on Terror and making this war not only his but that of the nation as a whole.

Then, he creates **vagueness** by using hyperbolic sentences such as: ‘Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears.’ He then describes these findings and reveals plans to attack ‘American nuclear power plants’ and creates a **consensus** on the dangers facing the US and the world in general, as well as, the measures that are needed to be taken. Again, Bush uses **hyperbolic numbers** as he refers to ‘thousands of dangerous killers’ when **describing** the terrorist threats who are ‘schooled in the methods of murder’ and are

like ‘ticking time bombs’. By doing so, Bush **presupposes** that these threats are not only still present but also ongoing and that immediate action is required.

Halfway the speech, Bush describes the two major points that need to be tackled: (1) the general war on terror and (2) a war on terrorists and regimes ‘who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons’. In describing these regimes as he did, Bush puts them in a **bad light** and thus triggers the justification for his actions against these regimes. Besides, Bush does not advance any sources to back up his claims and thus relies on himself and the intelligence services as **authorities**. Bush develops these two focus points and therefore begins to expand the initial War on Terror focused on the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The whole speech is centered on the War on Terror and the actions that are needed to be undertaken. When addressing the measures taken in the War on Terror, especially regarding ‘Homeland security’, Bush underscores these measures by stating that they also help America on the long run in other situations than the War on Terror. In fact, ‘knowledge gained in from bioterrorism research will improve public health.’ In doing so, he **positively** represents the actions he is willing to undertake in order to tackle the negatively represented regimes mentioned previously.

After having discussed the terrorist threat regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bush devotes some time to his will to improve the US’ economy. Then, Bush directly returns to the topic of terrorism and **glorifies** the US as he has seen ‘the true character of this country in a time of testing.’ He also **describes** the terrorists as being as ‘wrong as they are evil’ since Bush states as an **evidentiality** that the terrorists assumed that the US would ‘splinter in fear and selfishness’. The next few paragraphs are based on the **glorification** of the US and its people. Then, just before ending his speech, Bush one last time **depicts** the terrorists as ‘embracing tyranny and death’ and **contradicts** this with the American people as they ‘choose freedom and the dignity of every life’.

4.1.3. Speech 3 President Bush: 11/09/2006 Address to the Nation on the Five-Year Anniversary of 9/11

Summary:

Five years after the attacks of 9/11, President Bush delivered an address to US citizens, where the events of the “War on Terror” and what it entailed for America and the rest of the world are described. During this speech, Bush highlights that the “War on Terror” was

not over, and emphasized the need to continue fighting. Bush also used the speech to commemorate the victims of 9/11 and paid tribute to those who were directly involved in relief, and to the whole of America in general. At this point, President Bush focusses on the activity of the ongoing “War on Terror” in the Middle East. Bush goes on to summarise the achievements made in five years within the “War on Terror,” especially in Afghanistan, before going on to discuss the ongoing war in Iraq, reminding the audience why he and his administration consider it important.

CDA:

At the beginning of the first paragraph of his speech, Bush glances back to the 9/11 attacks and describes these attacks by using **numbers** and a **hyperbolic** structure as he refers to ‘nineteen men’ who attacked ‘us with a barbarity unequalled in our history.’ In recalling this traumatizing experience in such detail, Bush makes use of **evidentiality** as to prove that the measures undertaken have been needed and are still needed. In the second paragraph, Bush **categorizes** the terrorists by calling them **negatively** ‘the face of evil’ and the **positive** ‘ordinary citizens’ who responded with ‘extraordinary acts of courage.’ Moreover, this sentence is also a **glorification** of the US as Bush describes these actions as something ‘distinctly American’. By this passage, Bush clearly **categorizes** and emphasizes the gap between the evil terrorists and the good Americans.

The fourth paragraph of the speech is entirely dedicated at the **description** of the terrorists and is filled with **hyperbolic** sentences and **categorizations** as the terrorists launch attacks on ‘America and other civilized nations’, implying that terrorists are not civilized and that non-civilized nations have nothing to fear. In the next paragraph, Bush continues to **describe** the terrorists and the far reaching threat they pose. At the same time, he **victimizes** the US as he states that ‘America did not ask for this war’. Furthermore, Bush states that ‘America must confront threats before they reach our shore’ and thus again creates a **consensus** as he uses the pronoun ‘our’ to include himself. By doing so he directly promotes his foreign policy of preemption and creates trust amongst the population as he operates as one of the citizens.

Halfway through his speech, Bush addresses 9/11 and uses **numbers** again as the terrorists have ‘carried out attacks in more than two dozen nations’. Bush reminds the audience of the actuality of the threat and states that the US will continue the war. Bush re-

categorizes the war by stating that ‘this struggle’ is ‘between tyranny and freedom’, thus **describing** the terrorists as tyrants and pairing the US with freedom.

Next, Bush relies on a **presupposition** and a **number game** as he declares that millions of Iraqi have the ‘desire’ to be ‘free’. Thus, Bush depicts the actions of the US in Iraq as a liberation wanted, without any doubt, from the inhabitants. Then, Bush again **glorifies** America as being a forefront fighter for freedom throughout history. This goes on in the next paragraph, as Bush **glorifies** the US through a **hyperbolic** statement as he states that it is the ‘finest Army the world has ever known’, which seems rather exaggerated. In the same passage, Bush recalls a story in which a mother tells him how proud she is of her son being in the army, even though his dad died being in the army as well. By recalling this story, Bush shows **empathy** and shows that these stories touch him. Throughout this story, Bush tries to trigger a feeling of proudness and support for the US army. Bush ends his speech by recalling an **authority** and again creates a consensus by including himself to the American people as ‘God made us to be free’ and thus leaves no doubt regarding the justness of his, or rather *their* cause as being America, in fighting this War on Terror.

4.1.4. Speech 1 President Obama: 20/01/2009 First Presidential Inaugural Address

Summary:

During President Obama’s first address to the US citizens, right after he took his presidential oath, Obama talked at length about the American history and talks about the many crises the nation was facing. When addressing the subject of terror, Obama does not name the “War on Terror” explicitly instead discusses the fight against terrorists and assures victory for America. President Obama calls for peace in Afghanistan and a withdrawal of troops in Iraq. Throughout his address, Obama makes a lot of historical references to America.

CDA:

Throughout the first paragraphs of his speech, Obama lays out the many problems and tasks America faces, amongst which is the war against a ‘far-reaching network of violence and hatred’. However, Obama does not expand on this war and focuses on other subjects and concludes by a **disclaimer** as these ‘challenges are real’ and ‘they will not be met easily’ but ‘they will be met’. Obama creates **consensus** throughout the first paragraphs by using the possessive pronoun ‘our’ or referring to ‘us’ when addressing these issues. Therefore,

Obama includes himself and shows that the problems faced by the Americans are also his problems. Then, Obama calls for change and seems to **negatively represent** the Bush administration in a subtle and indirect way as he states that on this day, 'we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and false promises [...] that far too long have strangled our politics.' Thereby, Obama advances change within his politics and continues by **glorifying** the US by calling upon the 'greatness of our nation' as he states at the same time that work will be needed as this greatness is not a 'given'. A few paragraphs further, Obama again calls for a change as he states to be willing to 'law a new foundation for (economic) growth.'

Overall, Obama's speech is a **glorification** of the US, but mostly of the history of the US as he recalls all the many hurdles had to be tackled in the past. Sometimes, this **glorification** is more direct as Obama states in a **hyperbolic** way that the US 'remains the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth'. By recalling this history, Obama is willing to **unify** the nation in facing the problems of today (war, economical problems etc.). As stated above, Obama focusses on other subjects than the War on Terror and uses **hyperbolic** sentences to create a unity as can be seen when he states that 'we will harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars'. This sounds rather ambitious and is therefore a strong way of creating trust and motivation within the American population. In recalling the American history, Obama also makes use of an **authority** to back up his ambitions and words as he calls upon the virtues of the Founding Fathers and their 'charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man'. Besides, Obama again **glorifies** the US by stating that these virtues 'still light the world'. More importantly, the reference to the Founding Fathers is a sign of change in Obama's policy regarding defense, as he glances back at history and states that 'earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions'. He continues by **depicting** a defensive strategy based on a 'prudent' use of power and that 'humility and restraint' are valuable convictions, **presupposing** that his predecessor did not value them. Thus, this passage can be seen as a subtle, indirect way of announcing change in his foreign policy regarding the War on Terror. This becomes clear in the part that talks about the War on Terror. Without naming the war as Bush baptized it, Obama addresses the subjects of Iraq and Afghanistan and states that the US will 'responsively leave Iraq to its people', **presupposing** that the Bush took it from the Iraqi. Moreover, Obama states that he wants to 'forge a hard-earned peace in

Afghanistan', which supports his foreign policy goal to focus on Afghanistan rather than Iraq. This can be seen in Table 1 as a few years later, Obama had already decreased by \$38.5bn the costs of the war on terrorism.¹⁴ Despite this, 2,300 more soldiers had been deployed in either Afghanistan or Iraq (Table 1), again being quite in line with his speech.

Furthermore, Obama rather **unifies** than categorizes the question as he states that with 'old friends and former foes' they will work to less these threats. Furthermore, Obama depicts his hopes of a better world through a foreign policy of inclusiveness and civic engagement as he **describes** a wish by proclaiming a **consensus**, not only for America but to the world, as he states 'that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself.' This is again reinforced when Obama addresses directly the 'Muslim world' and as he 'seeks a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.'

In the end, Obama **describes** the Americans by using positives virtues and stating that 'honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism' are old American values that are needed in the future again. In doing so, Obama also relies on a **common sense** that these values are true. Finally, Obama **appeals** to God as being the one that 'calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny', as to refer to a greater good.

4.1.5. Speech 2 President Obama: 11/09/2009 9/11 Pentagon Memorial Speech

Summary:

Obama first delivered a speech in which the events of 9/11 are discussed eight years after the attacks. President Obama starts by commemorating the victims of 9/11 before commemorating the deaths of the American soldiers that had died fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. After having paid his respects to the dead, President Obama speaks about those who are responsible for the 9/11 attacks and renews his commitment to the protection of America.

CDA:

In his speech, Obama creates a **consensus** by incorporating himself and the First Lady within the citizens by using 'we' and 'us'. This goes on during the whole speech as to **unite** themselves and the US citizens.

¹⁴ Amadeo, K. (04, 2019). War on terror facts, costs, and timeline. Retrieved from: <https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300>

Looking at the speech in more detail, one can see that Obama uses **numbers** to emphasize his words in the second paragraph. In fact, by referring to ‘3,000 days have passed – almost one for each of those taken from us’, Obama emphasized on the one hand the losses of 9/11 and other hand the time that has passed since. However, as a comparison to President Bush’s speeches regarding 9/11, Obama uses a less depicting language and does not **describe** the tragic event in a vivid way, as Bush used to do. However, this aforementioned passage serves as a **disclaimer** as Obama immediately states that ‘no turning of the seasons can diminish the pain and the loss of that day’ and still wants to create a **consensus** on the fact that it must never be forgotten. In the 7th paragraph, Obama refers to God as an **authority** and again makes use of a disclaimer as he first enumerates negative outcomes and then turns the paragraph positively as God will ‘restore you and make you strong’. This emphasizes Obama’s awareness of the bad times the US is experiencing, while still creating a sense of a positive future.

In Obama’s appeal to ‘renew the true spirit’ of 9/11 he **describes** the terrorists without naming them as well as the American people. In doing so he **categorizes** the two as Obama enumerates the contradictions opposing both: ‘human capacity for evil’ versus the ‘human capacity for good’ and the ‘desire to destroy’ opposed to the ‘impulse to save’. Right after this **opposition**, Obama **glorifies** the US as he refers to the ‘ordinary goodness of America’.

4.1.6. Speech 3 President Obama: 01/05/2011 Obama announces the Death of Osama bin Laden

Summary:

During this speech, President Obama directly addresses American citizens and to the world in general. Immediately, Obama announces the death of Osama bin Laden and restates the fact that Bin Laden was the leader of Al Qaeda and the main individual responsible for the 9/11 attacks which had taken place 10 years ago. Obama then describes the events of 9/11 and depicts the losses of many families throughout the US. Following these statements, Obama discusses the initial commitment made by the US 10 years ago to bring to justice those responsible for 9/11, in particular Osama bin Laden. Obama states that it was his top priority to either capture or kill Osama bin Laden, emphasizing that it was he who gave the order to launch an operation to capture him on this day. Obama states that the nation was

not at war with Islam, mentioning the Pakistani allies who worked along with the US in localizing bin Laden. In the end, Obama restates the US' will in defending its values through war.

CDA:

Obama directly begins his speech with a **description** of Osama bin Laden as being a 'terrorist' and responsible for 'the murder of thousands of innocent men, women and children.' Within this phrase, Obama makes use of **numbers** to emphasize the scope of bin Laden's actions. By referring to 'men, women and children' instead of 'men', Obama also emphasizes the cruelty of bin Laden's actions. Compared to his previous analyzed speech, Obama now vividly **describes** the 9/11 attacks as to make sure that the audience remembers the pain it caused the US. Furthermore, Obama does not create a consensus as he refers often to himself with 'I' and thus **positively depicts** himself as being the one who managed to kill Osama bin Laden.

From the 4th paragraph onwards, Obama describes the American citizens by referring to their positive actions in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. This can be seen as a **categorization** in that it creates a distance and opposition between the US citizens and terrorists. Again, as to oppose the good American citizens, Obama **described** Al Qaeda, which has 'openly declared war on the United States and was committed to killing innocents'. Then, Obama **describes** the work that has been done in fighting al Qaeda, without referring to the War on Terror, and uses **hyperboles** to highlight these efforts. This can be seen as Obama **describes** the 'painstaking work by our intelligence community' and the 'tireless and heroic work of our military and counterterrorism professionals' in searching for Osama bin Laden.

Besides, Obama does also **positively describes** the Pakistani as being an ally of the US when stating that it was 'our counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan' that lead to Osama bin Laden. By sharing the credits somehow, Obama supports his foreign policy regarding an inclusive governance paired with a civic engagement relying on allies. Therefore, the War on Terror becomes less a war only fought by the US.

By the end of his speech, Obama states that the 'American people did not choose this fight', which is form of **victimization** to convey the message of acting in a reaction instead of attacking. Finally, Obama **glorifies** the US as he states that the killing of bin Laden

is 'a testament of the greatness of our country and the determination of the American people.' He reiterates in the last paragraph of his speech by enumerating the positive values of the American people who are 'one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.'

5. Conclusion:

Based on the Critical Discourse Analysis performed on the three speeches by President Bush and the three speeches of President Obama, one can see some differences and similarities between them. Within his speeches, Bush makes an extensive use of the dichotomy of positive self-representation and negative other-representation. By doing so, Bush utilizes the tactic of hyperbolic phrases by which he emphasizes his words. In every speech, President Bush appeals to the audience's feelings and makes use of contrasts (good/bad). He very clearly depicts the 'evil' terrorists in contrast to the 'good' Americans and thus, reinforces the hatred against these terrorists. This rhetorical style can be seen as a tool to justify or to create support for his foreign policy of direct and massive allocation of means to fight the War on Terror. This support derived from his rhetoric is also reinforced by his empathic phrases as he portrays himself as one of the American citizens and thus becomes more trustworthy as to evaluate the decisions he makes in the perceived best interest of the US. Overall, one can see in Table 1 that Bush's actions regarding the financial means and the troops allocated to the War on Terror are in line with his rhetoric and thus with his foreign policy. In fact, supported by his rhetoric, Bush decided to directly allocate important financial means to the "War on Terror," as well as the deployment of troops in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, which clearly underscores his preemptive foreign policy strategy, which has been supported extensively during his speeches. Clearly in every speech, Bush extensively emphasized the dichotomy of the 'bad' terrorists opposed to the 'good' Americans. On top of that and to enlarge the scope of the War on Terror, Bush emphasized a threat of regimes seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction. This supported his preemptive foreign policy goals and thus the invasion of Iraq.

Regarding President Obama's rhetoric within his three analyzed speeches, one can distinguish a clear difference from Bush's rhetoric as Obama's rhetoric features a strong sense of inclusivity, which is emphasized in all speeches. This is also paired with a strong

sense of humility as well. In fact, the inclusivity is not only directed at the American citizens but on a general level to the world in general as Obama gives credits to Pakistan when mentioning their cooperation in finding and killing Osama bin Laden. Moreover, humility is a key factor in Obama's rhetoric, which can very well be seen in his Inaugural Address as he refers to the US history and makes himself and the current US population rather small and puts all the problems back into perspective. Moreover, this rhetoric seems to suit his foreign policy goals as well as can be seen with the actions he undertook regarding the War on Terror. In fact, as featured in Table 1, when President Obama delivered his 3rd (analyzed) speech, the cost of the "War on Terror" had decreased by \$34.7bn, and 77,745 American soldiers had been sent back from the Middle East. Besides, Obama focused on Afghanistan rather than Iraq as can be seen through the allocation of troops. This was combined with a different foreign policy centered on "smart power," which combined multilateralism and decisiveness, while still remaining somehow unilateral at times. In general, it becomes clear that President Obama's rhetoric was much more centered on creating a distance with President Bush. Obama intended to break with both Bush's rhetoric and his overall foreign policy regarding the War on Terror, this all through a modified rhetoric.

In the end, when looking at Bush and Obama's speeches, the differences and similarities are patently clear, as has been shown in shown in the sections above. Looking closely at these differences and similarities, one could say that the aspect of overall context within the "War on Terror" appears to be an important aspect to take into consideration when explaining the specific differences. However, this research argues that the specific foreign policies of each President play a key role in explaining their different rhetoric. This has been supported by examining 6 speeches from both President Bush and President Obama by using a Critical Discourse Analysis through Van Dijk's (2004) framework. This examination revealed a clear difference in the two Presidents' rhetoric as Bush made more extensively use of the tactic to negatively represent the terrorists and positively represent the US as a whole. In this sense, Bush justified his foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, Obama's foreign policy was mostly based on a foreseen break with Bush's and this can also be seen through a different rhetoric used being more centered on inclusiveness of other nations as well as humility. Moreover, Obama also utilizes the strategy of negative other-representation but on a subtle way and targeted at putting President Bush's methods in a negative daylight.

In forming their rhetoric as the two Presidents did, both did seek legitimization for their foreign policies. This is seen as an important objective sought by politicians in order to justify their actions to the population and the world in general (Cap, 2008). By using Van Dijk's (2004) framework, many tactics have been revealed by which both Bush and Obama did try to control and influence the audience's mind in order to promote or justify their respective foreign policy agendas. Overall, these tactics have served to emphasize, mitigate, enhance or distract the attention on the specific issues and subjects mentioned by the two Presidents.

In fact, as this research demonstrates, one can conclude that both Presidents did mold their rhetoric according to their respective foreign policy agendas. However, it appears that President Bush managed to pair his words with actions more than President Obama did. In fact, President Bush's foreign policy goals are globally fulfilled whether President Obama's are less. Even though Obama managed to focus the War on Terror on Afghanistan and Pakistan instead of Iraq, he did not manage to fully remedy to the controversial policies being extraordinary renditions and the detention center of Guantanamo Bay. In fact, the latter is still open and due to the secrecy around extraordinary renditions, the status around this policy remains rather unclear. Building upon this research, an interesting suggestion to investigate would be to see how it comes Obama did not manage to close Guantanamo Bay for example.

Coming back to the research question, it is clear that, in the context of the War on Terror, presidential rhetoric has been molded in a way that it might create support for the foreign policy agenda belonging to the specific President. It is also likely that such rhetoric and its influence contributes to the likelihood of controversial actions or policies to be implemented and justified. In the case of this study, extraordinary renditions and the detention center of Guantanamo Bay were taken as a case study to illustrate how presidential rhetoric can support foreign policies and thus also the potential implementation of such controversial policies. The CDA reveals that President Bush made sure to build on a rhetoric aimed at creating an atmosphere in which several practices, such as extraordinary renditions, can be seen as necessary since the enemy's threat demands such practices. On the other hand, Obama's rhetoric changed as his foreign policy deemed these practices as unnecessary and inhuman. This could be seen with a rather inclusive and humble rhetoric and the willingness to, for instance, close the detention center at

Guantanamo Bay. In the end, it is difficult to assess whether these two rhetoric have had a direct effect on the implementation of the policies of extraordinary renditions and the detention centers, as it remains a taboo topic for both administrations. However, this study was able to reveal that both rhetoric might have an effect on the promotion of foreign policy agendas and might therefore also have an effect on the way public views controversial policies or actions.

Therefore, building upon the results of this research, further studies might investigate the difficulties encountered by President Obama in his attempt to close the detention center of Guantanamo Bay and how it comes such difficulties were encountered. Furthermore, as more information might become public concerning both extraordinary renditions and detention centers as Guantanamo Bay, it may be very interesting to investigate if and how US public opinion might be influenced by a molded presidential rhetoric, fit to support a (controversial) foreign policy agenda.

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