# BUSINESS IN FAVOUR OF LABOUR MARKET REGULATION?

Employers and the creation of centralised bargaining in The Netherlands

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## 1. Introduction

By 'bringing capital back in', the political scientist Peter A. Swenson returned business to the forefront of academic analysis on the development of labour market institutions. After his critique, research into the factor of employers in the establishment of such arrangements flourished. Despite several decades of increased attention, the role that employers have played in the formation of collective bargaining arrangements remains widely disputed. The main point of this ongoing discussion is whether employers have displayed a genuine interest in the creation of such systems, and if so, why. Testing the different theories in this debate with new empirical cases contributes to the discussion by shedding new light on the relative explanatory power of the perspectives on employers' role in the establishment of collective bargaining systems.

To conduct such a test, new and theoretically relevant empirical material is required. In this regard, the establishment of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands has not yet been researched from the theoretical perspective of the genuine interest of Dutch employers. The inattention for this instance of collective bargaining creation in this academic debate is remarkable due to the relatively high level of centralisation, institutionalisation and durability of the resulting arrangement.<sup>3</sup> Next to its theoretical relevance, the accessibility and completeness of the archival sources of the Dutch employers' associations make the formation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands a great empirical case to test the different perspectives in the theoretical framework. Another reason to study the Dutch case is the understanding that this may provide to the labour market trajectory of that country. While the operation of the socio-economic arrangement once established has recently received more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Peter A. Swenson, 'Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden', *World Politics* 43:4 (1991) 513–544, there 513.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See for example: Thomas Paster, *The role of business in the development of the welfare state and labor markets in Germany. Containing social reforms* (London 2014); Cathie J. Martin and Duane Swank, *The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality.* Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge 2012); Peter A. Swenson, *Capitalists against markets: the making of labor markets and welfare states in the United States and Sweden* (Oxford 2010); Pepper D. Culpepper, 'The Politics of Common Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining', *International Organization* 62:1 (2008) 1–33; Margarita Estévez-Abe, David W. Soskice and Torben Iversen, 'Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State', in: Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice ed., *Varieties of Capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative advantage* (Oxford 2001) 145-183.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Sociaal-Economische Raad, *Advies algemeen-verbindendverklaring* (Den Haag 1992) 25-27; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 16-17; John P. Windmuller 'The bargaining structure', in: John P. Windmuller ed., *Collective bargaining in industrialised market economies: a reappraisal* (Geneva 1987) 81–119, there 107.

attention,<sup>4</sup> there are still gaps in the historical study of its creation process. The establishment of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands in the first half of the twentieth century, from a system of firm-level negotiation to economy-wide collective bargaining, took place in two relatively distinct steps with separate policy dilemmas and contexts. The first step was the shift from firm-level negotiation to sectoral collective bargaining between 1918 and 1937 via the adoption of the legal mechanism of statutory extension.<sup>5</sup> The second and subsequent change was the centralisation and institutionalisation of this collective bargaining system between 1944 and 1954.<sup>6</sup> The factor of business in the first step has received some attention in academic scholarship, especially in the case of Liberal employers, but the field misses a comprehensive study into the attitudes of employers towards the creation of centralised bargaining that systematically accounts for internal differences, both between and within employers' associations. Meanwhile, the role of employers in the second stage of centralisation has been generally understudied. Although the step is a vital part of the development of Dutch industrial relations, the theme is relatively unexplored and requires more research.

With these considerations in mind, this thesis aims to study to what extent the Dutch employer community has shown a genuine interest in the shift from firm-level negotiation to sectoral collective bargaining and the subsequent step of national centralised bargaining during the first half of the twentieth century.

To answer this question, the thesis follows a dualistic within-case research design of causal-process tracing and congruence analysis. The process-tracing approach follows an inductive logic and identifies the causal mechanisms behind employers' positions towards the creation of centralised bargaining from the empirical material of the study. After that, the current academic debate on the role of employers in the creation of centralised bargaining is contested using a deductive test of the causal mechanisms of the preference formation of the employers in the theoretical framework with the empirical findings. The study uses a diverse

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See for example: Jeroen Touwen, *Coordination in Transition: The Netherlands and the World Economy, 1950-2010* (Leiden 2014); Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck, *A Dutch miracle: job growth, welfare reform and corporatism in the Netherlands* (Amsterdam 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 179, 187; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 74, 76; Adriaan Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek van christelijk sociaal denken* (Nijkerk 1989) 139; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 26, 129, 134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 16-17; Windmuller 'The bargaining structure', 107; Maarten van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*": in de wandelgangen van de Stichting van den Arbeid, 1945-1995 (Amsterdam 1995) 90; Willem Albeda, Willem J. Dercksen and Frank H. Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland* (sixth edition; Alphen aan den Rijn 1998) 74-75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Joachim Blatter and Markus Haverland, *Designing case studies: explanatory approaches in small-n research*. Research methods series (London 2012) 27-29; Patrick Emmenegger, *The Power to Dismiss: Trade Unions and the Regulation of Job Security in Western Europe* (Oxford 2014) 19.

corpus of sources consisting of literature, academic articles and archival files of the main peak employers' associations as well as the relevant consultative institutions of which they are part.<sup>8</sup>

The introduction of the study proceeds with the conceptualisation of collective bargaining and a critical discussion of the historiography on the role of employers in the creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands separating for both steps in the establishment process. A review of the academic debate regarding the role of employers in the creation and sustainment of collective bargaining systems ensues these sections. This theoretical discussion occurs in such a way that it leads to a clear overview of the potential costs and benefits of the two stages towards centralised bargaining from an employer point of view which allows for a systematic test of these mechanisms in the empirical chapters. After this, the introduction is finalised with the operationalisation section that explores the most appropriate research design given the challenges of the study and an examines the sources of the thesis. Following these introductory sections, two empirical chapters form the analysis which separately addresses both steps in the creation of centralised bargaining. These sections are themselves divided in a part focused on causal-process tracing and a subsection where the congruence analysis is conducted. After that, the research findings are brought together in the conclusion.

# 1.1 Conceptualisation

The analysis of collective bargaining regimes unavoidably involves the use of several concepts that have been interpreted in different ways in the academic literature. Before the analysis can be conducted, it is, therefore, necessary to provide some conceptual clarification first. This study uses John P. Windmuller's definition of collective bargaining as 'a process of decision-making between parties representing employers and employee interests. Its overriding purpose is the negotiation and continuous application of an agreed set of rules to govern the substantive and procedural terms of the employment relationship, as well as to define the relationship between the parties to the process'. 9

This definition shows that collective bargaining is a relatively broad phenomenon which allows for many variations between countries. In practice, it is never the sole way of negotiation between employees and employers. The collective bargaining regimes in countries vary in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 112; Jan Bruggeman and Aart J. W. Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden: 100 jaar centrale ondernemingsorganisaties in Nederland (Wormer 1999) 293.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> John P. Windmuller, 'Origins and nature of collective bargaining', in: John P. Windmuller ed., *Collective bargaining in industrialised market economies: a reappraisal* (Geneva 1987) 3-16, there 3.

terms of the legal structure of the bargaining process, the scope of the conditions under the agreements, the extent of employees covered by its arrangements, the level of bargaining (sectoral or economy-wide as opposed to negotiation with a single employer), the institutionalisation of the system and the role of the government. For the period and country of this study, by far the most important point of debate in industrial relations was the bargaining level, notwithstanding that the other characteristics of bargaining systems played an important role as well.

After the establishment of the legal embeddedness of collective labour agreements in 1907,<sup>11</sup> the debate about the creation of a collective bargaining regime in the Netherlands really took off when the Dutch government announced in 1918 in its yearly *Troonrede* that it considered introducing statutory extension.<sup>12</sup> Although ever ongoing, the discussion about the industrial system eventually led to a provisional ending in 1954 when employers accepted that wages would be allowed to rise with productivity increases and thereby, de facto, complied with a durable system of national centralised bargaining.<sup>13</sup> This year, therefore, serves as the ending point of the analysis. In this period, the scope and coverage of the centralised bargaining system gradually increased to comparatively high levels during the midst of the twentieth century, leaving the disruption of the Second World War aside.<sup>14</sup> In addition, the role of the government in industrial relations greatly varied over this timeframe.<sup>15</sup> One of the major reasons for this was that the Dutch administration was coordinating wages to a relatively extraordinary degree in the first decades after the Second World War.

Analysing the discussion between employers about the bargaining level over the timeframe makes it necessary to make a distinction between two relatively distinct debates which have separate contexts and policy dilemmas. After the announcement of the government in 1918, the first discussion was about the adoption of statutory extension which would later

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> OECD, Employment outlook 1994, 170-172, 174.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Fernhout, 'Incorporatie van belangengroeperingen', 125; Taco van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht* (Nijmegen 1985) 111.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 179; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 74; Adriaan Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek van christelijk sociaal denken* (Nijkerk 1989) 139; Bouwe Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen tusschen werkgevers en arbeiders* (Haarlem 1929) 133-4; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 129.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Van Baalen e.a., *Het kabinet-Drees III*, 467-8; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 280, 286; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 181-2; Harmsen and Reinalda, *Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid*, 334; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 222; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 126; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 22, 24; Van Zanden,, *Een klein land*, 112; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 256.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Sociaal-Economische Raad, Advies algemeen-verbindendverklaring, 25-27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 74-75; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 16.

form the legal foundation for the Dutch collective bargaining system after its introduction in 1937.<sup>16</sup> This mechanism extends the applicability of collective labour agreements to a wider scope of (similar) institutions and their workers than fall under the signatory parties.<sup>17</sup> Essentially, the debate about the introduction of statutory extension was about a bargaining level shift from firm-level or single-employer negotiation to multi-employer or collective bargaining on the sectoral level. In the remainder of this thesis, multi-employer or collective bargaining on the sectoral level is meant when discussing sectoral bargaining.

After this discussion, the second bargaining level debate among employers was about the centralisation of this sectoral collective bargaining model after the Second World War. Due to the Nazi rule and its direct aftermath, the bargaining system had become heavily centralised and institutionalised with very limited sectoral flexibility. The main point of this discussion from the liberation of the South of the Netherlands in 1944, therefore, was to what extent this created economy-wide or national centralised type of multi-employer bargaining had to be sustained. In 1954, this debate ended with the decisions of employers to agree with centrally constrained wage compensation for productivity increases (real wage increases), thereby de facto accepting an economy-wide multi-employer bargaining model with restricted possibilities for sectoral differentiation. For simplicity's sake, the concept of economy-wide multi-employer or national centralised bargaining is referred to as centralised bargaining in the rest of this thesis.

# 1.2 Research question

In essence, the research question of this thesis, to what extent the Dutch employer community has shown a genuine interest in the shift from firm-level negotiation to sectoral collective bargaining and the subsequent step of national centralised bargaining during the first half of the twentieth century, is about explaining the attitudes of employers in these two relatively distinct

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> John P. Windmuller, 'The role of government', in: John P. Windmuller ed., *Collective bargaining in industrialised market economies: a reappraisal* (Geneva 1987) 121–148, there 134; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 14-15; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 179, 187; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 74, 76; Adriaan Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek van christelijk sociaal denken* (Nijkerk 1989) 139; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 26, 129, 134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Franz Traxler and Birgit Woitech, 'Transnational Investment and National Labour Market Regimes: A Case of 'Regime Shopping'?', *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 6:2 (2000) 141–159, there 146; John P. Windmuller, 'The role of government', 134; Windmuller, 'Origins and nature of collective bargaining', 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Van Baalen e.a., *Het kabinet-Drees III*, 467-8; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 280, 286; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 181-2; Harmsen and Reinalda, *Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid*, 334; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 222; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 126; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 22, 24; Van Zanden,, *Een klein land*, 112; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 256.

bargaining level discussions. The formulation of the question should be interpreted as such that it addresses both to what degree employers have shown a genuine interest in the establishment of the centralised bargaining system and why they have adopted this position. An important theoretical underpinning of the formulation of the research question is that the establishment of institutions and their operation once established should be distinguished to prevent a confusion of causes and consequences. As the operation once established has been analysed more extensively in academic research, the focus of this study is strictly on the creation process. Importantly, the thesis does not only address whether the employer community had a genuine interest in bargaining with workers but especially on whether they showed a genuine interest in the institutionalisation of this process.

Although analysing the precise impact of business on the creation of centralised bargaining is methodologically problematic and not feasible considering the resources of the research project, research on the (genuine) attitudes of employers towards collective bargaining, necessarily has to pay some attention to their influence over events. The reason for this is that instances of employer support for collective bargaining (or state measures to develop collective bargaining) do not have to be genuine but could also have been a strategic response to environmental circumstances, e.g. as a result of labour's increased bargaining power. Taking strategic behaviour into account when uncovering genuine interests does not necessitate an exact measurement of the impact of business' positions, however, which makes the research goal achievable while keeping the significant contributions to the theoretical and historiographical debates intact.

# 1.3 Historiography

To clarify these historiographical contributions, it is needed to provide a more elaborate discussion of current historical scholarship on the role of employers in the creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands. As this formation process consists of two relatively distinct steps, the role of employers in these different cases has also been studied separately, leading to distinct historiographies. In contrast with the theoretical framework, both of these are strictly organised along national lines and generally filled with publications that are written in the Dutch language.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Johannes Lindner and Berthold Rittberger, 'The Creation, Interpretation and Contestation of Institutions — Revisiting Historical Institutionalism', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41:3 (2003) 445–473, there 446; Pierson, 'The Limits of Design', 475, 478.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See for example: Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*; Visser and Hemerijck, *A Dutch miracle*.

## 1.3.1 The creation of sectoral bargaining

There are several studies which have previously analysed business positions in the discussion on statutory extension. As part of his doctoral research, Bouwe Bölger has extensively studied the stances of different employers' associations towards statutory extension but only from the First World War until the law on collective labour agreements of 1927, and not up to the establishment of statutory extension.<sup>21</sup> More briefly, Harry Hoefnagels and Van Peijpe have also shed some light on business positions regarding collective bargaining in the same period.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, Jan Bruggeman and Aart J.W. Camijn have analysed the stances of the peak employers' associations up to the establishment of the law in 1937, particularly for the main Liberal employers' association (VNW).<sup>23</sup> These analyses are largely based on external publications rather than internal minutes, however, and merely provide limited insight in internal discussions and opposition against the viewpoints of the business institutions required to test the different arguments in the theoretical framework.

### 1.3.2 The shift to centralised bargaining

The shift to centralised bargaining has received way less attention in the Dutch historiography than the statutory extension debate. Maarten van Bottenburg and, to a lesser extent, Van Peijpe have provided insight in the viewpoints of different employers on the role of the government and social partners in the newly created bargaining system through an analysis of the creation of the Labour Foundation,<sup>24</sup> but these investigations examine who is in charge of the bargaining system rather than the bargaining level. Additionally, Van Peijpe has shed some light on the positions of political parties and societal organisations on the wage formation process in the post-war period.<sup>25</sup> His analysis gives little insight into the debate between and within the business organisations on this topic before 1954, though, as it has a wider scope and is largely based on external publications. The current debate, therefore, lacks a study which systematically accounts for the different business positions of peak employers' associations on the shift to the centralised bargaining level between 1944 and 1954.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Bouwe Bölger, Organisatorische verhoudingen tusschen werkgevers en arbeiders (Haarlem 1929).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Harry Hoefnagels, Een eeuw sociale problematiek: van sociaal conflict naar strategische samenwerking. Bouwstenen voor de Kennis der Maatschappij 23 (Assen 1957); Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Jan Bruggeman and Aart J. W. Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden: 100 jaar centrale ondernemingsorganisaties in Nederland* (Wormer 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!"; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*.

#### 1.3.3 Contribution of this study

The fact that the creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands is made up of two relatively separate steps is also reflected in the historiographies on the role of employers in these cases. The historiography shows that the role of employers in the establishment of sectoral bargaining has already received quite some attention in academic scholarship but is lacking a comprehensive study which accounts for the attitudes of the different peak employers' associations over the whole study period and addresses the variation within these organisations. Meanwhile, the shift to centralised bargaining from the system of sectoral bargaining has received less attention and is relatively unexplored. By conducting a comprehensive study into the attitudes of employers in both cases, this thesis contributes to the historical understanding of the role of employers in both historiographies and the process at large.

#### 1.4 Theoretical framework

## 1.4.1 Why support collective bargaining?

As this thesis studies to what extent employers have shown a genuine interest in supporting the establishment of a centralised type of collective bargaining, the vital theoretical question is why (parts of) business would back or oppose the replacement of a single-employer arrangement with an economy-wide multi-employer bargaining structure. With this research problem, it is essential to make a distinction between the move from single-employer negotiation to sectoral bargaining and the shift from the sectoral to the centralised collective bargaining model, since they involve different theoretical dilemmas and considerations for employers. Table 1 shows the theoretical explanations for employers' attitudes concerning both steps in the academic literature, which are roughly based on three overarching theoretical approaches to preference formation.

#### 1.4.1.1 Power

The first perspective, consisting of followers of the power-resources approach (PRA), postulates that business' main motivation is power. These authors argue that the extent of collective bargaining and social policies in a country is dependent upon the power of the labour class, for example in the form of labour unions or socio-democratic political parties, and its capability to make coalitions with other parties of interest, such as agrarian and Christian democratic parties.<sup>26</sup> The underlying assumption of this argument is that employers and trade

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Michael Shalev, 'The Social Democratic Model and Beyond: Two "Generations" of Comparative Research on the Welfare State', *Comparative Social Research* 6 (1983) 315–351, there 317, 320; Gøsta Esping-Andersen,

unions want exactly the opposite.<sup>27</sup> While trade unions strive for the decommodification of workers, which means pursuing policies that reduce the dependency of workers on markets and employers, e.g. by government involvement, employers oppose such agreements out of fear of losing control on workers.<sup>28</sup>

Table 1 Motivations behind employers' stances towards sectoral and centralised bargaining

	Sectoral bargaining	Centralised bargaining
Power	Support: Strategic accommodation - Industrial peace  Opposition: Control over labour - Formal recognition of trade unions - Industrial citizenship for workers	Support: Strategic accommodation - Industrial peace Opposition: Control over labour
Business interests	Support: Specific-skills investments Administrative efficiency Wage moderation  Opposition: Wage increases Wage differentiation Flexibility	Support: Wage moderation Administrative efficiency  Opposition: Wage differentiation Flexibility
Ideational commitment	Support: Solidarity and subsidiarity	

The three worlds of welfare capitalism (Cambridge 2013), 17-8, 147; Paster, The role of business, 7, Walter Korpi, 'Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists', World Politics 58:2 (2006) 167–206, there 168, 172, 202; Philip Manow, 'Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain Esping-Andersewith Stein Rokkan', Socio-economic Review 7:1 (2009) 101–121, there 103, 108-109; Walter Korpi, The democratic class struggle (London 1983) 18-19; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Politics against markets: the social democratic road to power (Princeton legacy library edition; Princeton 2017) 36-37; John D. Stephens, The transition from capitalism to socialism. New studies in sociology (London 1979) 99-100.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Shalev, 'The Social Democratic Model', 320; Isabela Mares, *The Politics of Social Risk: business and welfare state development* (Cambridge 2003) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Paster, *The role of business*, 15; Swenson, *Capitalists against markets*, 6; Korpi, *The democratic class struggle*, 18-19; Esping-Andersen, *The three worlds*, 22; Mares, *The Politics of Social Risk*, 5, 25.

#### 1.4.1.1.1 Control over labour

From this perspective, the move from firm-level negotiation to sectoral bargaining is portrayed as an extension of workers' rights delivering them 'industrial citizenship' which recognises their role in the shaping of industrial relations and socio-economic policies.<sup>29</sup> This process often coincides with the formal acknowledgement of trade unions.<sup>30</sup> Both of these factors would reduce employers' bargaining advantage and, therefore, their control over labour which explains why labour is presumed to propagate sectoral bargaining, while employers are assumed to play a solely negative role and oppose the change in this direction. Consequently, collective bargaining generally has a wider scope, coverage, deeper government involvement and is more centralised when labour unions and left parties have more power and employers' associations have less. It follows that employers would also oppose the shift from sectoral negotiation to centralised collective bargaining as it would further harm their power position.

## 1.4.1.1.2 Strategic accommodation

In more recent years, the assumption that employers play a solely negative role in both steps of centralised bargaining creation has been revised by several PRA scholars. These authors argue that business is also capable of promoting the two steps of centralised bargaining creation due to accommodation strategies. The main argument of these authors is that, despite genuinely opposing the policy change, business can make the strategic decision to support (an extension of) collective bargaining to constrain more radical policy changes which is relevant for both sectoral and centralised bargaining establishment.<sup>31</sup> Employers, for example, may propose a system of collective bargaining which is more moderate in terms of scope, centralisation or coverage to prevent the realisation of a further reaching bargaining system. The differentiation between strategic and genuine preferences is an essential part of this argument and has important methodological implications which are discussed in the methodology section of this introduction.<sup>32</sup>

In industrial relations theory, one of the most influential applications of strategic accommodation has been the argument of industrial peace. According to this argument, (the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Korpi, The democratic class struggle, 8, 20; OECD, Employment outlook 1994 (Paris 1993) 169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Paster, The role of business, 78-79

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State', Politics & Society 30:2 (2002) 277–325, there 299-300; Patrick Emmenegger and Paul Marx, 'Employer Preferences and Social Policy: Business and the Development of Job Security Regulations in Germany since World War I', *IZA Discussion Thesis* 5043 (2010) 3; Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, *Development and crisis of the welfare state: parties and policies in global markets* (Chicago 2001) 33; Paster, *The role of business*, 2, 13, 78-79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Paster, *The role of business*, 17; Huber and Stephens, *Development and crisis*, 33.

threat of) labour unrest motivates employers to break radical opposition by incorporating workers in the decision-making process via a collective bargaining model in exchange for labour rest.<sup>33</sup> In the case of sectoral bargaining, employers can grant trade unions formal recognition and employees industrial citizenship, while labour gives up (part of) its right to strike, for example on already established collective labour agreements, by adopting no-strike clauses. As the centralisation of bargaining and the likelihood of strikes are inversely related, industrial peace may also play a role in the shift from sectoral to centralised collective bargaining. In the light of strong labour opposition, being further removed from the negotiation process may be attractive to employers as it can decrease the perceived accountability of individual employers and limits unrest within the firm.<sup>34</sup>

#### 1.4.1.2 Business interests

The labour-centred PRA approach triggered a response by authors who argued that it undervalued the pro-active importance of business in the creation of socio-economic regulation when it is in its economic interest, the business interest thesis (BI).<sup>35</sup> Proponents of this perspective have postulated a wide variety of economic interests that can motivate employers to pro-actively support the shift from firm-level negotiation to sectoral bargaining and the move from sectoral bargaining to centralised collective bargaining.

#### 1.4.1.2.1 Wage effects

The most apparent economic motivation behind employers' attitudes towards collective bargaining in the literature has to do with the perceived wage effects that such a policy would entail. In this regard, Swenson's study of the role of Swedish employers in the creation of solidaristic wage bargaining has been an important contribution. He found that a part of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> OECD, *Employment outlook 1994*, 169; Franz Traxler, 'Collective Bargaining in the OECD: Developments, Preconditions and Effects', *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 4:2 (1998) 207–226, there 208.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke and Christer Thornqvist, 'Strikes and Collective Bargaining in the Nordic Countries', *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 7:3 (2001) 245–267, there 245, 252; Anke Hassel and Britta Rehder, 'Institutional change in the German wage bargaining system: the role of big companies', *MPIfG Working Paper* 9 (2001) 4-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Korpi, 'Power Resources', 168-169, Swenson, Capitalists against markets, 21-22, 120; Paster, The role of business, 7, 9; Isabela Mares, 'The Sources of Business Interest in Social Insurance: Sectoral versus National Differences', World Politics 55:2 (2003) 229–258, there 249; Susan Pedersen, Family, dependence, and the origins of the welfare state Britain and France, 1914-1945 (Cambridge 1993) 226; Mares, The Politics of Social Risk, 23, 250; Theda Skocpol and Gilford J. Ikenberry, 'The Road to Social Security', in: Theda Skocpol ed., Social policy in the United States: future possibilities in historical perspective. Princeton studies in American politics (Princeton 1995) 157-158; Monika Breger, 'Der Anteil der deutschen Großindustriellen an der Konzeptualisierung der Bismarckschen Sozialgesetzgebung', in: Lothar Machtan ed., Bismarcks Sozialstaat: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Sozialpolitik und zur sozialpolitischen Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt am Main 1994) 25–60, there 25; Colin Gordon, 'New Deal, Old Deck: Business and the Origins of Social Security, 1920-1935', Politics & Society 19:2 (1991) 165–207, there 168.

Swedish employers played a pro-active role in the establishment of solidaristic wage bargaining as it aligned with their economic interests. The companies in the export sector of the countries formed a cross-class alliance with labour to introduce a centralised wage bargaining system and prevent employers in other sectors from attracting workers with higher wages.<sup>36</sup>

This case is also used as evidence of the argument that employers are no monolithic group. In this view, business is made up of groups with diverging incentives and policy positions. In the example of the creation of solidaristic wage bargaining in Sweden, the export-sector had an interest in low wages to remain internationally competitive and the removal of the possibility of wage differentiation that would allow other firms to attract high-skilled workers with higher wages.<sup>37</sup> The sector that produced for the domestic market, however, was less concerned about wage levels and had no interest in restricting the flexibility of wage differentiation. The consequence of the finding is that the creation of collective bargaining can no longer be viewed as a simple struggle between labour and capital. Rather these authors portray it as a complex process in which employers in a certain sector build a 'cross-class alliance' with employees to establish a certain type of labour market regulation.<sup>38</sup> This argument has the methodological implication that the analysis should address the possibility of internal variation of employers' preferences and its correspondence with diverging economic interests.

Swenson's finding that links centralised bargaining with wage moderation is in line with economic theory, although the causal mechanism behind the relationship is disputed. The cartelisation argument focuses on the role of employers in industrial relations by stating that the centralisation of bargaining, either from firm-level to sectoral negotiations or from sectoral to centralised collective bargaining, leads to lower wages as it reduces the competition among employers in attracting their workforce. Furthermore, collective bargaining may be a way to keep newcomers out of the market while not necessarily being beneficial to the employer community as a whole. Following this line of reasoning, both steps are in the economic interest of employers. More influential in current days, though, is the theory that postulates that the relationship between bargaining level and wages is hump-shaped as illustrated in figure 1 which is extracted from the book *The economics of imperfect labor markets* of the economists Tito Boeri and Jan C. van Ours.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Peter A. Swenson, 'Bringing Capital Back In', 517, 543-544.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Swenson, Capitalists against markets, 77, 131-133.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Swenson, *Capitalists against markets*, 22; Paster, *The role of business*, 9-10; Peter A. Swenson, 'Bringing Capital Back In', 514, 517.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Traxler, 'Collective Bargaining in the OECD', 208; Sociaal-Economische Raad, Welvaartsgroei door en voor iedereen: Themadocument Arbeidsverhoudingen (Den Haag 2006) 7.

According to this perspective, two effects play a role at the same time which explains the complex relationship. In the figure, line I represents the effect that is established by the internalisation of negative bargaining externalities. The economic logic behind this influence is that unions turn out to be more aware of the macroeconomic impact of their bargaining terms as the bargaining level becomes more centralised, especially in terms of the impact on inflation and unemployment. Line II combines the influence of the internationalisation of negative externalities with the second effect of the additional bargaining power that trade unions retrieve from centralisation. In the move from firm-level negotiation to sectoral bargaining, the bargaining power effect outweighs the impact of the internalisation of externalities leading to higher wages and unemployment. As this system becomes more centralised, however, the relative importance of both effects turns around creating wage moderation and lower unemployment. The result is the hump-shaped curve. Furthermore, line III of the figure shows that the effect of the centralisation of bargaining on wage outcomes is more moderate in both phases when the process is taking place in markets under the pressure of product market competition.




Figure 1 Relationship between bargaining level and wage outcomes<sup>43</sup>

On the one hand, this economic approach supports Swenson's theory that the shift from sectoral negotiation to centralised bargaining is beneficial to employers as it leads to wage moderation. On the other hand, it implicates that the move from firm-level bargaining to sectoral bargaining

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance', *Economic Policy* 3:6 (1988) 14–61, there 15, 35; Tito Boeri and Jan C. van Ours, *The economics of imperfect labor markets* (second edition; Princeton 2013) 84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Boeri and Van Ours, *The economics of imperfect labor markets*, 84; Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Bargaining Structure', 35-36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Boeri and Van Ours, *The economics of imperfect labor markets*, 84.

is not in the interest of employers as it causes higher wages and may be well a reason for opposition. As the economic theory is ambiguous about the wage effects of the shift from firm-level negotiation to sectoral bargaining, both the option of wage rises and decreases should be taken into account as a motivational factor for employers to support or oppose this policy step.

## 1.4.1.2.2 Specific-skills investments

Proponents of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach argue that changing an industrial relations system of firm-level negotiation into one of sectoral bargaining can also be in the employers' economic interest as a stimulator of specific-skills investments.<sup>44</sup>

To explain the argument, it is necessary to take a small step back to the fundamentals of the approach. The main proposition of the VoC perspective is that there are two types of national political economies: Liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. While Liberal market economies are characterised by coordination via the market and the need for general skills, specific skills and coordination via non-market relationships and networks are typical of coordinated market economies. Within this view, labour market policy is closely linked to specific-skills investments and therefore more apparent in coordinated market economies as spending time and money on increasing skills that are specific to a certain job and not easily transferrable, raises the risk of losing employment and income for workers. Within the approach, collective bargaining is portrayed as a system of labour coordination that compensates workers for their risks and stimulates them to conduct the asset-specific investments that the economic model requires.

Initially, the VoC literature aimed to explain current support of employers for collective bargaining systems without the ambition to make significant, functionalist claims about their creation process, but as the perspective became widely used, explanations of the school for states of socio-economic stability were also presented as its historical cause.<sup>48</sup> In 2007, for

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Estévez-Abe, Soskice and Iversen, 'Social Protection', 145; Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, 'Introduction', in: Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice ed., *Varieties of Capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative advantage* (Oxford 2001) 1–68, there 8; Korpi, 'Power Resources', 169-170; Torben Iversen, *Capitalism, democracy, and welfare*. Cambridge studies in comparative politics (Cambridge 2006) 10-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Hall and Soskice, 'Introduction', 8, 50-51; Peter A. Hall, and Kathleen Thelen, 'Institutional change in varieties of capitalism', *Socio-economic Review* 7:1 (2009) 7–34, there 1; Kathleen Thelen, 'Beyond Comparative Statics: Historical Institutional Approaches to Stability and Change In the Political Economy of Labor', in: Glenn Morgan e.a. ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis* (Oxford 2010) 42-62, there 46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Estévez-Abe, Soskice and Iversen, 'Social Protection', 150-151; Paster, *The role of business*, 12; Hall and Soskice, 'Introduction', 50-51; Iversen, *Capitalism, democracy, and welfare*, 10-11; Korpi, 'Power Resources', 169-170; Thelen, 'Beyond Comparative Statics', 47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Estévez-Abe, Soskice and Iversen, 'Social Protection', 153-154; Iversen, *Capitalism, democracy, and welfare*, 19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Paster, *The role of business*, 11-12; Hall and Thelen, 'Institutional change', 2.

instance, Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen and David Soskice argued that the varieties of capitalism and logic of skills investments heavily influenced the establishment of electoral systems within countries.<sup>49</sup> Currently, the usage of the VoC approach to explaining the creation process of institutions is still highly controversial, which means that its application to the establishment of collective bargaining systems should be addressed with great carefulness in the analysis.

#### 1.4.1.2.3 Other economic interests

Additionally, there are some other suggestions in the literature on how the introduction of collective bargaining is related to the economic interest of employers.

The first element that is mentioned concerns wage differentiation which also constituted an important part of Swenson's theory on the creation of centralised bargaining in Sweden. In the Swedish example, export-oriented employers supported centralised bargaining to moderate wages while preventing domestic-oriented businesses from attracting high-skilled workers with higher wages by restricting wage differentiation.<sup>50</sup> The introduction of the bargaining structure harmed the position of domestic employers who depended on wage differentiation to attract certain workers. Wage differentiation was, therefore, a motivation for this group to oppose collective bargaining. Just as this dynamic can play a role between sectors in the shift from sectoral negotiation to centralised collective bargaining as is shown by Swenson's example, it is also relevant for the competition between firms for workers during the move from firm-level negotiation to sectoral bargaining.

The second motivational factor consists of concerns about the flexibility of the labour market after the introduction of sectoral bargaining and centralised bargaining.<sup>51</sup> The severity of this issue depends on the scope of labour conditions under collective bargaining system, but it is clear that collective bargaining generally makes it more difficult for firms to adapt to changing circumstances in the market, e.g. limiting labour costs in difficult economic times.<sup>52</sup> Another concern for some employers is market inflexibility in the sense of barriers to entry. <sup>53</sup> Adherents to this position, argue that collective bargaining can make it difficult for new players to enter the market. Dispensation rules can be used to accommodate these concerns.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen and David Soskice, 'Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems', American Political Science Review 101:3 (2007) 373–391, there 374.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Swenson, Capitalists against markets, 77, 131-133.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Hassel and Rehder, 'Institutional change in the German wage bargaining system', 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> OECD, Employment outlook 1994, 169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Sociaal-Economische Raad, Welvaartsgroei door en voor iedereen: Themadocument Arbeidsverhoudingen (Den Haag 2006) 77.

Finally, the third argument in the academic debate is that centralisation of the bargaining level reduces the transaction costs of employers that are related to the regulation of the employment conditions of their labour force.<sup>54</sup> These administrative efficiency benefits are most clearly in the shift from firm-level to sectoral bargaining but may play a role in the centralisation step as well.

#### 1.4.1.3 Ideational commitment

A commonality of the PRA and BI approach is that they both assume that business consists of rational decision-makers in the narrow sense.<sup>55</sup> Employers are portrayed as self-interested actors that pursue the strategic optimisation of their own rational goals to increase their economic and political position. Such arguments are remarkable in comparison to the wider field of rational choice theory which generally assumes that individuals are instrumentally rational.<sup>56</sup> Followers of this interpretation of rationality state that actors use their means in the most effective possible way to optimise the fulfilment of their preferences. These goals themselves are not necessarily rational, though.

The consequence of the narrow focus of the current debate on the support of employers for collective bargaining is that it misses preferences that are non-rational. Employers may also adhere to ideas that are not (directly) aimed at increasing or consolidating their economic and political position. In other words, they may have an ideational commitment, meaning that they 'promote norms or ideas because they believe in the ideals and values that embodied in the norms, even though the pursuit of the norms may have no effect on their well-being'. <sup>57</sup> By pursuing these ideational preferences, employers may still behave rationally in the instrumental sense, optimising the fulfilment of their non-rational goals.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Traxler, 'Collective Bargaining in the OECD', 208.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and institutions*. The new institutionalism in American politics series (second edition; New York, NY 2010) 14, 17; Andrew Hindmoor, *Rational choice*. Political analysis (second edition; London 2015) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Hindmoor, *Rational choice*, 2; Shepsle, *Analyzing politics*, 15, 17; 'Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions. The Riker Objection Revisited', *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* (2008) 1031–1049, there 1034; Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *Political Studies* 44:5 (1996) 936–957, there 944-945; Vivien A. Schmidt, 'Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth "new institutionalism", *European Political Science Review* 2:1 (2010) 1–25, there 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization* 52:4 (1998) 887–917, there 887-888, 898.

#### 1.4.1.3.1 Solidarity and subsidiarity

In the literature on welfare state development and industrial relations, the Christian democracy with its cross-class structure constitutes an eminent example of the importance of such dedication. The ideology of the parties and organisations that are part of Christian democracy is primarily based on a set of religiously inspired principles that are largely founded on social Catholicism.<sup>58</sup> Concerning socio-economic policies, the tension between solidarity and subsidiarity constitutes the core of the doctrine. Solidarity in Christian democratic thought is defined as a concern about other social groups.<sup>59</sup> Where the Catholic social part of Christian democracy is more influential, these other groups are defined as those sets of people that are less well off. Policies that are motivated by concerns solidarity tend to lead to a more collective approach with more state intervention. The Christian democratic principle of subsidiarity, however, points to quite the opposite, namely that government intervention should only take place when 'lower social organs' are unable to conduct the activities. <sup>60</sup> Such an approach tends to lead to policy options that place responsibility closer to the individual. These contradictory principles and the cross-class nature of Christian democracy meant that organisations that adhered to this ideology always had to take positions that were the result of compromise, which the political scientist Kees van Kersbergen has called 'the politics of mediation'. <sup>61</sup>

Considering the political nature of these institutions, supporting sectoral bargaining is attractive as it is the industrial relations system that constitutes the middle ground in the tension between solidarity and subsidiarity. Under firm-level bargaining, there is a relative lack of solidarity between workers, while a system of centralised collective bargaining, as opposed to sectoral negotiations, conflicts with the principle of subsidiarity. These conflicting ideological elements put Christian democracy in the centre of the left-right spectrum on socio-economic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Kees van Kersbergen, 'Contemporary Christian Democracy and the Demise of the Politics of Mediation', in: Herbert P. Kitschelt e.a. ed., *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism* (Cambridge 1999) 346–370, there 352; Philip Manow and Kees van Kersbergen, 'Religion and the Western Welfare State – The Theoretical Context', in: Philip Manow and Kees van Kersbergen ed., *Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States* (Cambridge 2009) 1–38, there 13-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Van Kersbergen, 'Contemporary Christian Democracy', 352-353; G. J. M. van Wissen, *De christen-democratische visie op de rol van de staat in het sociaal-economische leven* (Amsterdam 1982) 11; Manow and Van Kersbergen, 'Religion and the Western Welfare State', 14; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 67-8; Wilhelmus J.P.M Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid in Nederland: terugblik en perspectief* (Alphen aan den Rijn 1980) 121.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Van Kersbergen, 'Contemporary Christian Democracy', 353, 356; Van Wissen, *De christen-democratische visie*, 39; Lawrence R. Cima and Thomas L. Schubeck, 'Self-Interest, Love, and Economic Justice: A Dialogue Between Classical Economic Liberalism and Catholic Social Teaching', *Journal of Business Ethics* 30:3 (2001) 213–231, there 224; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 121; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Manow and Van Kersbergen, 'Religion and the Western Welfare State', 13; Van Kersbergen, 'Contemporary Christian Democracy', 356.

policies which explains its importance for the establishment of political majorities in countries where these organisations had a significant size.<sup>62</sup>

#### 1.4.1.3.2 State involvement

Interestingly, the role of Protestant parties and organisations concerning Christian democracy has been somewhat ambiguous. Often their policy positions coincided with the Catholics to form a Christian democratic block, but sometimes they also emphasised the importance of self-regulation over solidarity and subsidiarity which placed them in between Catholic and economic Liberal positions. This notion of self-regulation in Protestant thinking points to another important ideational element behind the positions of employers towards collective bargaining: the attitudes of employers towards state involvement. In the PRA-approach, state involvement is presented as a power consideration as decommodification of workers leads to a worse power position for employers. Next to the opposition towards state involvement motivated by power, though, there is also an ideational aversion of state intervention and limitation of private initiative which is significant in Protestant thinking and even more eminent in economic Liberalism.

Although there is a clear ideational aversion of state involvement in industrial relations in Protestant and economic Liberal ideologies, the link between preferences towards state involvement and positions concerning collective bargaining is not straightforward. As discussed in the conceptualisation section of this introduction, the bargaining level and role of the government are separate characteristics of industrial relations systems. Whether collective bargaining, either sectoral or centralised, is perceived as a limitation or extension of government involvement depends on the nature and context of the concrete proposal, which is also the reason that it is not included in the motivations in Table 1. By and large, the bargaining level and government involvement are positively related suggesting that Protestant and Liberal employers are generally expected to oppose the centralisation of bargaining. In the academic debate, the introduction of collective bargaining has also been shown to be used to avoid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Manow and Van Kersbergen, 'Religion and the Western Welfare State', 22-23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Kees van Kersbergen, 'Religion and the Welfare State in the Netherlands', in: Philip Manow and Kees van Kersbergen ed., *Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States* (Cambridge 2009) 119–145, there 131-132; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Van Kersbergen, 'Religion and the Welfare State in the Netherlands', 132, 138; Cima and Schubeck, 'Self-Interest, Love, and Economic Justice', 224; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 65-6.

(further reaching) government intervention, though.<sup>65</sup> Although the relationship is complex, it is important to take the factor of government involvement into account.

# 1.4.2 The context of preference formation

Even a rational choice model that allows for the possibility of pursuing non-rational goals has some problematic aspects that have been pointed out in the academic debate on the preference formation of actors, however. The main issue is that such theories focus on the agency of actors by looking at individual decision-making but ignore how the context shapes this process as is indicated by systems-based theories. To avoid such mistakes, the preference formation of employers towards collective bargaining should be analysed in its context by taking a more holistic approach. Roughly categorised, the most relevant contextual factors for the positions of business towards collective bargaining are knowledge, the political environment and historical regularities.

# 1.4.2.1 Knowledge

Knowledge plays a major role in two ways.

Firstly, the available information for employers at the time influences their preferences as it shapes the range of policy alternatives and their effects. This factor is particularly important when considering functionalist arguments, e.g. those that are part of the VoC literature, that presume full availability of information. In his article on the 'limits of design', the political scientist Paul Pierson criticised such functionalist arguments for explaining things by their (intended) consequences rather than by their causes. <sup>66</sup> According to Pierson, such an approach is problematic since policymakers do not always act based on long term effects as they do not have the required information. Functionalist thinkers assume a full or sufficient availability of information concerning policy effects, but, in practice, information is often scarce which leads to unanticipated results of policy decisions. <sup>67</sup> This limitation makes it problematic to think that actors act according to their interests of years or decades ahead and that the function once established, therefore, is also the reason why a certain institution such as collective bargaining

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Calmfors and Driffill, 'Bargaining Structure', 25; Sociaal-Economische Raad, *Themadocument Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 74.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Paul Pierson, 'The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* 13:4 (2000) 475–499, there 475, 478.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Pierson, 'The Limits of Design', 483; Theda Skocpol and Paul Pierson, 'Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science', in: Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner ed., *Political Science: State of the Discipline* (New York 2002) 693–721, there 709.

# emerged.<sup>68</sup>

Also, the policy alternatives that are part of employers' preferences are not a given and have to be generated which is not an evident process. Individuals have to come up with ideas and have to present them in such a way that they are attractive to the business' representatives, e.g. by linking them to some principles of employers' associations.<sup>69</sup> As indicated by the previous section, they can do so either by showing how collective bargaining is beneficial to the economic and political position of employers, e.g. causing wage moderation, or by showing that the system is an expression of certain ideals and values that correspond with the employers' principles, such as solidarity and subsidiarity.

The second way in which knowledge plays a role is via the shared beliefs of the actors that are part of the policy process. The political scientist Pepper D. Culpepper has illustrated the importance of this point with the creation of wage bargaining systems in Ireland and Italy. He tries to explain how these labour market institutions were established, even though employers had the upper hand in industrial relations and structurally opposed it.<sup>70</sup> According to Culpepper, this can be explained by a change in 'common knowledge' which is triggered by political events.<sup>71</sup> The underlying argument is that a move of representatives of employers or employees towards a new shared understanding of the macroeconomic situation in a country and the consequential policy boundaries for industrial relations can shift the preferences of trade unions and employers' associations, e.g. in terms of collective bargaining.

In Italy, for example, Culpepper finds that trade unions moved from an understanding of the economy that promoted wage bargaining based on automatic inflation adjustment to a model that implicated negotiations about (partial) compensation for the forecast inflation. As both parties now agreed that the old bargaining system based on automatic adjustment was not able to control inflation levels, the forecast inflation appeared to be the only realistic alternative norm to enable firm-level wage bargaining and was, therefore, eventually accepted by the trade unions as a second-best option. Under these circumstances, it was no longer viable for employers to oppose firm-level wage coordination as it became possible to establish a certain amount of wage restraint with negotiations about (partial) compensation for the forecast inflation instead of the old automatic adjustment system while maintaining industrial peace.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Hall and Thelen, 'Institutional change', 14; Skocpol and Pierson, 'Historical Institutionalism', 708; Hall and Taylor, 'Political Science', 937, 942.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Schmidt, 'Taking ideas and discourse seriously', 14-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Pepper D. Culpepper, 'The Politics of Common Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining', *International Organization* 62:1 (2008) 1–33, there 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Culpepper, 'The Politics of Common Knowledge', 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Idem, 25-26.

Therefore, the common knowledge shift by trade unions, accepting that automatic adjustment was unsustainable, also moved employers away from their first preference of no firm-level bargaining and led them to accept the system based on the inflation forecast.

#### 1.4.2.2 Political environment

The political environment is another vital element of the context of employers' preference formation. The balance of power determines which policy options are politically viable for employers at a given moment in time and therefore how their strategic preferences are structured as these positions change under different political challenges. When employers have relatively less power and face difficulty building coalitions, their strategic preferences tend to diverge from their genuine ones. As described in the section on power, the power-resource approach emphasises the importance of this contextual element. Thomas Paster, for example, political scientist and proponent of the PRA perspective, has demonstrated how German employers changed their strategic preferences concerning collective bargaining due to the political challenges in the country after the First World War. The context of the political challenges in the country after the First World War.

Furthermore, the balance of power is partly determined by how business' influence on the political process takes place. Here, academic scholarship makes a distinction between instrumental and structural power. Instrumental power is exercised by installing people who back the interests of employers in important governmental positions and by influencing politicians with donations and lobbying. Initially, research on business' influence on politics emphasised the importance of the instrumental power of employers, but the dominance of this school of thought was eroded by several authors who argued that business mainly influences political decisions via structural power. Charles E. Lindblom, political scientist and the most influential proponent of the structural power thesis, argued that the central role of business in a market system gives it a 'privileged' position in impacting political decision-making. Much like governmental administrators, employers play a public role in society by controlling a large share of the allocation of the factors of production. Business' decisions concerning investments heavily impact economic growth, the living standard and wages which determine the resources of most citizens. As public policies may impact the choices of employers, politicians take this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 299-300; Paster, *The role of business*, 14, 78-79; Emmenegger and Marx, 'Employer Preferences and Social Policy', 3; Huber and Stephens, *Development and* crisis, 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Paster, *The role of business*, 78-79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 280.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and markets: the world's political-economic systems* (New York 1977) 171-172; Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 280-281.

'prospective punishment' into account in their decision-making.<sup>77</sup> Both the instrumental and structural power approach have proven to be relevant in explaining business' influence on policy-making, although the relative explanatory power differs between countries and over time.<sup>78</sup>

## 1.4.2.3 Historical regularities

Historical regularities also play an important role in the preference formation of employers towards collective bargaining. In the academic debate, path dependence is used as a core concept to illustrate the importance of this factor. In vague terms, the notion means that institutional development is affected by the fact that 'the past affects the future' by structuring the policy process over a long period via complex macro-historical regularities which can be created by people themselves.<sup>79</sup> The precise conceptualisation of path dependence is widely debated, however. It is not necessary for this study to contribute to this debate as the previous research on collective bargaining has already shown that path dependence is the most relevant for this subject in two concrete ways.

Firstly, policy feedback loops are the most relevant expressions of path dependence for this study. These mechanisms shape the preferences of employers by shaping the alternative policy options that are available to them as well as their relative costs and benefits. <sup>80</sup> In practice, employers calculate the benefit of certain policies in comparison with the current status quo rather than purely following their genuine preferences. In the case of collective bargaining, for example, it is easier to switch to a centralised bargaining system based on statutory extension from a sectoral one with the same foundation than to shift to a completely different system, such as solidaristic wage bargaining. Meanwhile, assuming the dynamics of the PRA approach, a move to sectoral bargaining also makes a shift to centralised bargaining more likely as it gives trade unions a better position of power which in turn increases their demands. <sup>81</sup>

Secondly, several authors have also argued in favour of the importance of macro-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Charles E. Lindblom, 'The Market as Prison', *The Journal of Politics* 44:2 (1982) 324–336, there 326; Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 281.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 283.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Pierson, 'The Limits of Design', 483; James Mahoney and Daniel Schensul, 'Historical Context and Path Dependence', in: Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (Oxford 2006) 454–471, there 458; Skocpol and Pierson, 'Historical Institutionalism', 695-696, 711; Schmidt, 'Taking ideas and discourse seriously', 10; Elizabeth Sanders, 'Historical Institutionalism', in: Sarah A. Binder, Rod A.W. Rhodes and Bert A. Rockman ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* (Oxford 2008) 39-55, there 39, 42; Hall and Taylor, 'Political Science', 937.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Paster, *The role of business*, 14; Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 312.

<sup>81</sup> Korpi, The democratic class struggle, 8, 20; Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 312.

historical political and socio-economic structures, such as electoral systems or societal traditions, for employers' preference formation. 82 To illustrate, the political scientists Cathie J. Martin and Duane Swank have shown the importance of such historical regularities for business' positions concerning the creation of collective bargaining systems. 83 They argue that the political structure of a country has a large influence on the organisation of employers' associations as the decision for a certain system of industrial relations is political. In a multiparty system, politicians would have more incentives to build coalitions and transfer power to a centralised collective bargaining process of labour unions and employers. At the same time, it is more attractive for employers to affect policies via centralised bargaining instead of party representation, as single political parties generally face difficulty to get majorities in multiparty systems. When the political system is centralised, the same tends to be the case for employers' associations in their ability to influence politics.<sup>84</sup> After that, Martin and Swank state that the organisation of employers itself has effects on their preferences and actions concerning collective bargaining. 85 Centralised employers' associations tend to be more cognitive of the benefits of a degree of policy coordination than their decentralised counterparts.86

#### 1.4.3 Contribution of this study

The theoretical framework of this thesis shows that the support of employers for collective bargaining is still widely debated. Although there have been numerous studies propagating new causal mechanisms, the debate lacks a study that analyses the wide spectrum of proposed theories and tests for which causal mechanisms hold up under the scrutiny of a thorough empirical test. With this, the analysis also takes the importance of the ideational commitment of employers into account which has been negated in the current theoretical approaches on employers and their support for collective bargaining. The study fills this gap with a thorough within-case analysis. This method enables the study to follow a holistic approach in testing these theories that also looks at the most important contextual factors concerning the preference

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 278-279; Martin and Swank, *The Political Construction*, 7-8, 249.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Cathie J. Martin and Duane Swank, 'Gonna Party Like It's 1899: Party Systems and the Origins of Varieties of Coordination', *World Politics* 63:1 (2011) 78–114, there 85; Martin and Swank, *The Political Construction*, 249. <sup>84</sup> Martin and Swank, 'Gonna Party', 86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Duane Swank and Cathie J. Martin, 'Employers and the Welfare State: The Political Economic Organization of Firms and Social Policy in Contemporary Capitalist Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies* 34:8 (2001) 889–923, there 902; Martin and Swank, *The Political Construction*, 8, 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Martin and Swank, The Political Construction, 249.

formation of employers towards collective bargaining instead of solely focusing on the actors themselves.

# 1.5 Operationalisation

# 1.5.1 Research method

By analysing how employers' positions concerning collective bargaining came about, the study aims to contribute to the understanding of causal mechanisms behind the preferences of business towards the creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands. To get a deep retrospective understanding of the complex preference formation of employers and test the underlying causal mechanisms that are postulated by the approaches in the theoretical framework, a within-case analysis is the most appropriate research design.<sup>87</sup> More than other research designs, a case study gives the possibility of testing a complex and diverse theoretical framework, such as the theoretical debate on the support of employers in the creation of collective bargaining systems, in a single analysis. 88 By analysing the support of employers for centralised bargaining in its context, the case study enables a comparison of both agency-based and systems-based theories, of regularities, norms and preferences, and, therefore an empirical test of the causal mechanisms behind the different theories of the related theoretical debates. At the same time, the relatively holistic approach reduces the risk of missing major explanatory factors while still allowing for comparison to a certain degree as this thesis analyses the relatively distinct cases of the creation of sectoral and modification towards centralised bargaining involving different contexts and policy dilemmas.

There are different methodological ways of conducting a case study on these instances, however. In their methodological work on case studies, the political scientists Joachim Blatter and Markus Haverland distinguish three explanatory case study designs: co-variational analysis, causal-process tracing and congruence analysis. The general overview of these approaches is presented in Table 2 which is a combination of the table in the methodological book of Blatter and Haverland and the modified version of Emmenegger in his academic work on job security regulation. <sup>89</sup>

Firstly, the co-variational analysis looks across cases to study the causal effect of a single independent variable. 90 Secondly, the causal-process tracing design is much more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Dimiter Toshkov, *Research design in political science*. Politcal analysis (London 2016) 156, 291.

<sup>88</sup> Blatter and Haverland, Designing case studies, 7-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Blatter and Haverland, *Designing case studies*, 27-29; Patrick Emmenegger, *The Power to Dismiss*, 19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Blatter and Haverland, *Designing case studies*, 24-25.

concerned with the dependent variable. The analysis focuses on a single case and studies what causal mechanisms can account for the outcome.<sup>91</sup> Thirdly, the congruence analysis critically assesses theoretical debates to evaluate the relative explanatory power of the different perspectives. This method can be conducted with both within-case and cross-case analysis.

Table 2 Three types of within-case designs<sup>92</sup>

	Co-variational design	Causal-process tracing design	Congruence analysis design
Research goal	Does variable X make a difference?	What makes the outcome (Y) possible?	Which explanatory approach provides more insights?
Focus	Independent variables	Causal mechanisms	Comprehensive theories
Variation	Cross-case variation	Within-case variation	Both cross-case and within- case variations
Case selection	Variation on the independent variable and scope conditions (controlled comparison)	Theoretical relevance of cases with regard to outcome	Likeliness of cases in respect to the selected theories (most likely cases)
Observations	Information corresponding to the indicators specified for the variables	<ul> <li>Information on the temporal unfolding of the causal process;</li> <li>information on spatial—temporal distance and proximity between causes and consequences;</li> <li>information on perceptions and motivations of important actors</li> </ul>	Information corresponding to the expectations (propositions, hypotheses, predictions) deduced from theories
Generalisation	Drawing conclusions about the causal effect of X on Y from sample to population	Drawing conclusions about the set of proven causal mechanisms	Drawing conclusions about the relevance of theories in the scientific discourse
Conclusions	X has a causal effect on Y	Identification of causal mechanisms that are necessary and together sufficient for the outcome	<ul> <li>Relative importance of selected theories</li> <li>Comprehensive explanation through a combination of theories</li> </ul>

The research design decision of this thesis is based on current academic progress and feasibility concerns. The theoretical framework and historiography of this study showed the existence of two gaps in the current academic field.

In the first place, the literature review showed that the academic debate misses a study

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Process tracing', in: Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel ed., *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Strategies for Social Inquiry (Cambridge 2014) 3–38, there 6; Blatter and Haverland, *Designing case studies*, 25; Toshkov, *Research design*, 298.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Blatter and Haverland, *Designing case studies*, 27-29; Patrick Emmenegger, *The Power to Dismiss*, 19.

that the relative importance of the current theories by studying if their causal mechanisms hold up under the scrutiny of a thorough within-case analysis. A thorough, congruence analysis is the most effective way to fill this gap. Secondly, the historiography of the creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands lacks an analysis that provides a systematic, thorough analysis of the positions of employers in the process. A congruence analysis alone is not enough to significantly contribute to this debate. This study, therefore, also conducts a causal-process tracing design that analyses the factor of employers in the causal mechanisms that underlie their preferences concerning the creation of centralised bargaining. The combination of these approaches is both effective and efficient, maximising internal validity and contributions to the academic field, given the available resources of the research project. Firstly, the causal mechanisms behind the preference formation of employers concerning centralised bargaining are reconstructed using an inductive process-tracing approach which is relatively context-sensitive. Secondly, these causal mechanisms are compared to the theoretical framework using a deductive approach to analyse to what extent these correspond with the mechanisms of the different theories, measuring their relative explanatory power.

The co-variation design is less suitable than the other approaches in the light of the gaps that were indicated by the historiography and complex theoretical framework as it focuses on the autonomous effect of a single independent variable. Since it is not feasible to add the approach on top of the other designs given the resources of this thesis, this study makes no use of this research design. Although the thorough within-case nature of the analysis is the most valid way to uncover the underlying mechanisms of the preference formation of employers concerning the establishment of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands and contribute to the theoretical debate about business support for collective bargaining systems, the methodological decisions to focus on a single country unavoidably limit the external validity of the study's results. By analysing the causal mechanisms behind the theoretical framework, the thesis contributes to a debate that consists of more general claims, however.

Furthermore, the choice for process-tracing and congruence analysis also implicates a certain way of data analysis, as is shown in Table 2. Case studies are characterised by a focus of effort on the generation of data due to the complexity of the empirical phase. <sup>96</sup> In the case of congruence analysis, the focus is on information that is related to the expectations that are

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Blatter and Haverland, *Designing case studies*, 79, 218-219; Emmenegger, *The Power to Dismiss*, 20; Toshkov, *Research design*, 298; Bennett and Checkel, 'Process tracing', 18, 21.

<sup>94</sup> Blatter and Haverland, Designing case studies, 24.

<sup>95</sup> Toshkov, Research design, 304-305; Bennett and Checkel, 'Process tracing', 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Blatter and Haverland, *Designing case studies*, 26.

implicated by the different theories in the overarching framework. After that, the observations can be compared to the implications of the theories to analyse their relative explanatory power. The observations that process-tracing requires are quite different. The analysis focuses on information about the development of the relevant causal mechanisms behind the preference formation of employers in relation to the case of the creation of the centralised bargaining system in The Netherlands.<sup>97</sup>

#### 1.5.2 Problem of revealed preferences

This operation is one of the major methodological challenges of the study because of the 'revealed preferences problem'. 98 Since this thesis analyses the positions of employers towards centralised bargaining, it has to identify their genuine preferences. Directly observing these is problematic as employers may choose to formulate their policy preferences strategically in anticipation of certain reactions, for example, by propagating moderate reforms to prevent more radical ones.<sup>99</sup> The study, therefore, must distinguish between genuine and strategic preferences.

Here, the method of causal-process tracing comes in. This analysis traces back the positions of business in the whole period of the creation process of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands. Analysing agenda-setting, initial viewpoints and the diachronic variation of preferences in the light of changing strategic environments, both sudden and structural, gives the ability to reconstruct the genuine and strategic preferences as near as possible. 100 Consistent changes in positions show a genuine shift, while sudden swifts during the policy-making process point to strategic preferences. Analysing such diachronic variation requires a relatively long timeframe, though, which should be considered in the case selection. <sup>101</sup>

After that, the next step is to establish the causal mechanisms between these preferences and outcomes. 102 This study analyses (the causal mechanisms behind) the genuine and strategic preferences towards the creation of centralised bargaining by studying the debates and voting behaviour of employers in the overarching consultative institutions (1), the discussions between the employers' associations themselves (2) and the minutes and publications of the employers'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Blatter and Haverland, Designing case studies, 30-31; Toshkov, Research design, 299-300; Bennett and Checkel, 'Process tracing', 6.

<sup>98</sup> Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 283; Bennett and Checkel, 'Process tracing', 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Bennett and Checkel, 'Process tracing', 32; Paster, *The role of business*, 17; Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 283; Huber and Stephens, Development and crisis, 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Paster, *The role of business*, 24; Bennett and Checkel, 'Process tracing', 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Paster, The role of business, 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Hacker and Pierson, 'Business Power and Social Policy', 285.

associations, both internal and external (3). Although it is never possible to reconstruct preferences with absolute certainty, the holistic process-tracing strategy consisting of minutes of meetings, publications and the hard data of voting behaviour is the best available method to approach this level of certainty and make reasonable claims.<sup>103</sup>

#### 1.5.4 Sources

As Table 2 shows, causal-process tracing requires a case that is accessible over a long period and theoretically relevant to the dependent variable. 104 Furthermore, the congruence analysis design needs a case which is likely to be relevant to the theoretical debate. The theoretical relevance of the creation of centralised bargaining regime in the Netherlands was already discussed in the introduction. From the perspective of sources, the case of the Netherlands is also an ideal case to test the theoretical debate, however, as the archives of the relevant employers' associations and consultative institutions are available over a long period of time, relatively complete and easily accessible. This empirical material includes minutes, publications, correspondence and information about voting behaviour. These sources enable the structural comparison of internal and external discussions within and between employers' associations with the relatively hard data of voting behaviour to reconstruct genuine and strategic preferences. The result is a methodological contribution to the academic field as the study investigates new primary sources with its thorough approach and analyses earlier studied sources from a new theoretical and methodological perspective. In this way, this thesis adds new empirical data and analysis to the historiographical and theoretical debates.

For this study, the employer community is operationalised as the main peak employers' associations as they are the main representatives of business in socio-economic discussions, decision-making and the execution of the collective bargaining process within the Dutch case. The main peak employers' associations in the Netherlands in the timeframe of this study are presented in Figure 2 which is based upon the scheme of Bruggeman and Camijn and extracted from Touwen's book *Coordination in transition*. The years in the figure show when the associations were founded, whereas the arrows give a picture of organisational development of the institutions. The limitation of the business community to these most important employers' associations is necessary to keep the research project feasible but necessarily impedes on the external validity of the research findings to the broader group. The extensive analysis of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> Toshkov, Research design, 121-122, 300; Bennett and Checkel, 'Process tracing', 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Blatter and Haverland, *Designing case studies*, 24; Paster, *The role of business*, 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 338-339; Paster, *The role of business*, 3.

positions of the (members of) main peak employers' associations concerning the two collective bargaining steps through a study of literature, academic articles and the archival files of all of these peak employers' associations as well as the consultative institutions of which they were part during the temporal framework of the thesis reduces the influence of limitation as far as possible, however, as it allows the comparison of these business organisations with the wider community of employers.

The relevant consultative institutions in the study period are the Supreme Council of Labour (*Hoge Raad van Arbeid*), the Board of Directors for Labour Affairs (*Raad van Bestuur in overleg arbeidszaken*), the Labour Foundation (*Stichting van de Arbeid*), the Contact Commission (*Contactcommissie*) and the Social and Economic Council (*Sociaal-Economische Raad*). The most important sources are the archival files of the associations themselves, though.




Figure 2 Main peak employers' associations in the first half of the twentieth century 106

Despite the completeness, organisation and accessibility of the sources, some limitations in the empirical material have come to the fore during the research process. Of these shortcomings, there are four instances of major importance. Firstly, there are no minutes for several meetings of the Supreme Council of Labour for the first case on statutory extension. Particularly relevant for this study, the minutes of an important meeting of the council on 17 March 1923 are missing.

 $<sup>^{106}\</sup> Bruggeman\ and\ Camijn,\ Ondernemers\ verbonden,\ 293;\ Touwen,\ Coordination\ in\ Transition,\ 112.$ 

This event is, therefore, reconstructed with the use of secondary sources. Secondly, some of the relevant peak employers' associations had only recently been founded when the discussion on statutory extension started. The documentation for the initial positions regarding statutory extension of some of these associations, particularly of the Protestant employers, is, therefore, less extensive and sometimes based on correspondence with or discussion by one or more of the other business institutions. Due to the comprehensive nature of this research project, the impact of these limitations is relatively small, though, as there was enough material left to retrieve the positions of the different peak employers' associations as well as the most relevant lower-level business organisations structured along sectoral, socio-cultural and geographical lines.

Thirdly, there is comparatively little empirical material in the archive of the Roman Catholic Confederation of Employers' Associations for both cases. As the archive of the General Catholic Employers Association which had a very influential role in the Confederation is relatively extensive, including a well-preserved common external publication of these two organisations, it is still possible to reconstruct the stances of the Confederation, however, albeit with a bit less insights in the underlying, internal dynamics that led to these viewpoints. Fourthly, there is relatively little empirical material available on the viewpoints of the wider employer community concerning the initial, relatively sudden creation of the centralised bargaining system at the start of the second case through the introduciton of the BBA. By combining a direct analysis of the limited sources on these stances during the establishment of the model with a indirect investigation of the much more well-documented attitudes regarding the system in the period after its creation, this thesis still aims to reconstruct the business positions on the initial creation of the Dutch centralised bargaining system with as much detail as possible.

#### 1.5.5 Contribution of this study

This study uses a comprehensive research method that combines a causal-process tracing and congruence analysis design to analyse new empirical data and already used sources from a new methodological and theoretical approach. In contrast with the dominant methods in the current academic field, the study focuses on an in-depth study of a single country to enable a more thorough reconstruction of the causal mechanisms behind the preference formation of employers concerning the creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands and to test the related theories on the support of business for the creation of collective bargaining systems.

The thesis now proceeds with the separate, subsequent analysis of both steps in the creation of centralised bargaining.

# **2. Statutory extension (1918-1937)**

The first empirical chapter analyses the debate among business' representatives on the establishment of sectoral bargaining through statutory extension. Although the creation of such a mechanism became relevant through the issues caused by the Law on the labour agreement in 1907 which legally embedded collective labour agreements without a clear, comprehensive framework, 107 the societal discussion really took off after the First World War. 108 During the conflict, Catholic employers had pro-actively promoted the statutory extension mechanism. In 1916, L.G. Kortenhorst, Secretary of the newly created Roman Catholic peak employers' association (ARKWV), openly argued in favour of statutory extension which led to an official advice from the ARKWV to the main Roman Catholic political party with the same message one year later. <sup>109</sup> The issue only became of major importance in the wider employer community, however, when the government announced in the yearly Troonrede that it wanted to regulate collective labour agreements more thoroughly and considered to create a mechanism of statutory extension as part of this effort. 110 This chapter provides an elaborate analysis of the business side of this discussion but first proceeds with a brief evaluation of the relevant institutional, political and socio-economic developments in the period up to this government statement.

# 2.1 The new landscape of industrial relations

One of the major drivers of the statutory extension debate was the increasing role of collective interest groups in industrial relations and expansion of labour regulation before the First World War. In these years, the increasingly organised nature of labour, extension of social policy and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 16; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 174-5; Fernhout, 'Incorporatie van belangengroeperingen', 125; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen, 71; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 105-6; Brug and Peer, Collectief geregeld, 14; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 111, 123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 135-6; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 123-4, 177.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1936:50 (Den Haag 1936) 599; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 136, 380; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 179; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 74; Adriaan Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek van christelijk sociaal denken* (Nijkerk 1989) 139; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 178; Bouwe Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen tusschen werkgevers en arbeiders* (Haarlem 1929) 133-4; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 129.

attempts to structure industrial relations triggered a response of business mobilisation.<sup>111</sup>

The creation of the Chambers of Labour (*Kamers van Arbeid*) 1897 to solve local labour disputes with collective representatives which consisted of and were elected by employers and employees was one important early initiative .<sup>112</sup> Although these institutions were not at all as influential in industrial relations as the name might suggest, they were a relevant experiment of functional representation where workers were incorporated. In consecutive years, the organisation of capital and labour expanded. Initiated by businesses in Twente, the first peak employer association was created in 1899 which had a Liberal orientation: the Association of Dutch Employers (*Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Werkgevers*; VNW).<sup>113</sup> Initially, the Dutch employers' associations were primarily active in the opposition against the continuously rising labour organisation. In 1906, the Socialist trade unions merged to create a large Socialist trade union (NVV) and the Roman Catholic trade unions followed with a merger to a peak organisation in 1909 as well.<sup>114</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the Law on the labour agreement (*Wet op de arbeidsovereenkomst*) in 1907 created an important but rough legal foundation for collective labour agreements and limited the discretionary space for employers to shape labour conditions. <sup>115</sup> Under this law, there was no clear framework for the rights and duties of the

Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 339; F. van Waarden,, '11. Regulering en Belangenorganisaties van Ondernemers', in: F.L. van Holthoorn ed., *De Nederlandse samenleving sinds 1815: wording en samenhang* (Assen 1985) 227-60, there 240; Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek*, 116; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 13-4; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 110; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 21; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V. Verslag tweede halfjaar 1954* (Den Haag 1955) 6.

<sup>112</sup> Adriejan van Veen, 'De Kamers van Arbeid. Experimenten met politieke vertegenwoordiging in Nederland rond 1900', *BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review* 128:2 (2013) 31–61, there 33-4; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 108; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 82-3; Fernhout, 'Incorporatie van belangengroeperingen', 122; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 79-80; Gerard Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad en de ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid* (Meppel 1968) 58; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 233; Anton Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', in: Stefan Berger and Hugh Compston ed., *Policy Concertation and Social Partnership in Western Europe*. Lessons for the Twenty-first Century (New York 2002) 221–234, there 225; Coen Helderman, 'De Hoge Raad van Arbeid, 1919-1940(-1950)', *Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History* 1:2 (2004) 45-70, there 49; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 134; Luuk Brug and Harry Peer, ed., *Collectief geregeld: uit de geschiedenis van de CAO* (Amsterdam 1993) 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 21, 78-9; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 109; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 52; Van Waarden, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 236; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 9-10; Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek*, 120; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 14; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 6; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 95.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> Harmsen and Reinalda, *Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid*, 90-1, 101; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 39, 43; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 12; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 18; Van Zanden, *Een klein land*, 104.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar* loonbeleid, 16; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 174-5; Fernhout, 'Incorporatie van belangengroeperingen', 125; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 71; Harmsen

parties under the collective labour agreement and the creation, enforcement and external validity of these contracts. Still, the reform was typical of a wider policy agenda to increase workers' rights after the change of the millennium, e.g. with the introduction of insurance against accidents in the workplace. Interest groups of workers and employers were part of the execution of health care provisions, but their role remained relatively limited whereas many business' representatives were unwilling to recognise trade unions formally. An important cause of the limited role of collective representatives of workers and employers was the fact that employers were relatively unorganised before the First World War.

This changed during the course of the war, however, as new peak employers' associations were established. 120 The pillarised landscape of social, economic and political life along ideological lines between 1917 and 1968 also applied to interest groups which explains the existence of a separate Protestant Association of Christian Employers and Wholesalers (*Vereeniging van Christelijke Werkgevers en Groothandelaren*; VCWG) created in 1918 and General Roman Catholic Employers Association (*Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging*; ARKWV) established in 1915, quickly complemented by the federative Roman Catholic Confederation of Employer Associations (*Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen*; RKVW) in 1919 in addition to the associations of Liberal employers. 121 The ARKWV was a major part of this federation which often represented the Roman Catholics pillar concerning the negotiations surrounding collective labour agreements. 122

In the same period, the Liberal representation of employers expanded with two additional peak employers' organisations although part of the members overlapped with the VNW. The Confederation of Dutch Manufacturers (*Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten* 

and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 105-6; Brug and Peer, Collectief geregeld, 14; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 122-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> Prak and Van Zanden, Nederland en het poldermodel, 243.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Fernhout, 'Incorporatie van belangengroeperingen', 125.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen, 71; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, Loonvorming en loonpolitiek, 14.


Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 111; Fernhout, 'Incorporatie van belangengroeperingen', 126; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de Nederlandse politiek* (eighth edition; Haarlem 1990) 47, 51; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 95, 134; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 112; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 21-2, 293; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 54; Van Waarden, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 236-7; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 18-9; Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek*, 118, 120-1; Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 291; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 14; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 224-5.

<sup>122</sup> Kouwenhoven, De dynamiek, 121.

Vereenigingen; VNF) was founded in 1917 and the Central Industrial Confederation (Centraal Industrieel Verbond; CIO) in 1920. 123 More importantly, these three Liberal peak employer organisations established a common Liberal consultative institution in 1920 which was called the Central Consultative Platform in Labor Affairs for Employer Organisations (Centraal Overleg in Arbeidszaken voor Werkgeversbonden; COAW) and merged into one overarching institution in 1926, the Confederation of Dutch Employers (Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, which used the same abbreviation (VNW) as the first employer association. 124 Figure 3 gives an overview of these organisational changes.

Figure 3 Main peak employers' associations between 1907 and 1937<sup>125</sup>



The establishment of the COAW was an expression of the distinction between 'social' and 'economic' affairs that became increasingly popular with Liberal employers. As a response to the rise of the organisation of labour, these business' representatives argued that labour's involvement in the determination of wages and labour conditions, which they labelled as social, was legitimate while they should not be involved in economic affairs such as taxes and trade

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> Van Waarden,, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 236; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 15-6; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 6; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 40: 'Statuten der vereeniging Centraal Overleg in Arbeidszaken voor Werkgeversbonden' (1920) 1; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 6; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 114-5; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 53; Van Waarden,, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 236; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 14-5, 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 293; Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 112.

policy.<sup>126</sup> Following this separation of issues, the COAW was created for discussions about social topics while the VNW would focus on economic affairs.<sup>127</sup> The leadership of the VNW played a major role in the COAW as well, though.

In the newly created landscape of employers' associations, the organisation of business was now clearly divided along different ideological lines. In terms of size, Liberal employers were by far the largest force, followed by the now relatively well-organised and cohesive Catholic business' representatives, and the still relatively small and unorganised Protestant structure of employers' associations. Despite the ideational differences, there was generally more of a consensus between employers' associations than between the similarly separated labour unions. 129 The smaller confessional employers' associations tended to follow their major Liberal counterparts, especially when opposition to labour was concerned. The fact that the chairs and secretaries of the employers' associations started to engage in regular meetings from 1921 onwards in an institute called the Council of peak employers' associations (*Kring van Werkgeverscentralen*) underlines this cohesion. 130

As part of a wide institutionalisation process, these employers also began to meet labour formally and state representatives as the tripartite Supreme Council of Labour was founded in 1919.<sup>131</sup> The council of about 40 to 50 members consisted of the minister of social affairs, representatives of the labour movement and employers' associations as well as civil servants and independent experts. Importantly, the share of members installed by the government was relatively high, while small- and medium-sized business' representatives took a comparatively

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 23; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 40: 'Statuten der vereeniging Centraal Overleg in Arbeidszaken voor Werkgeversbonden' (1920) 1; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 6; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 53; Van Waarden,, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 236; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 23-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 135-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>129</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 18; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 54-5; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 135.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 6: 'Een Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken' (1941) 2; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 20; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 55; Van Waarden, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 237; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 201.

<sup>131</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 3: 'Besluit van den 4den October 1919, tot vaststelling van een algemene maatregel van bestuur houdende instelling van een Hoogen Raad van Arbeid.' (1919) 1-2; Arent W. Quint, *Twintig jaar Hooge Raad van Arbeid* (Haarlem 1940) 5; Helderman, 'De Hoge Raad van Arbeid', 45; Fernhout, 'Incorporatie van belangengroeperingen', 126; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 135; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 66-7; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 81-2; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 90; Gerard Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*,52-3; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 233; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 67; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 226; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 161; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 20; Van Zanden, *Een klein land*, 107; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 156-7.

large share of employers' seats.<sup>132</sup> In practice, the influence of large enterprises was, therefore, relatively limited when compared to later consultative institutions in the Netherlands. While the Supreme Council of Labour is generally presented as the predecessor of the influential Labour Foundation and the Social and Economic Council, a preliminary investigation of consensus-building between representatives of workers and business and thereby an important motivator of mutual trust between representatives of capital and labour,<sup>133</sup> the policy effectiveness of the Supreme Council of Labour in its own time is disputed. Although former members of the council such as A.W. Quint have argued in favour of its effectiveness on the basis that roughly eighty per cent of its official advice (partly) turned into actual policy results between 1919 and 1939,<sup>134</sup> a critical evaluation of the archival material of the council by Coen Helderman suggests that the institution itself was not at all that influential.<sup>135</sup> Helderman argues that the social partners often circumvented the Supreme Council and consensus within the institution generally did not lead to an immediate follow-up in the political process.

As trade unions and employers' associations grew, collective bargaining also became increasingly normalised. Before the 1910s, the importance of collective labour agreements had been minimal, covering less than thirty-thousand workers. Business' organisations and individual employers often refused to engage in collective negotiations as it would establish the recognition of the trade unions involved. In the 1910s, this changed, however. A strike in the cigar industry in 1913 that ended in a collective labour agreement was an important event in this regard. Due to such results, Dutch employers became convinced that opposition to the demand by trade unions for a collective labour agreement was only effective when a firm's position was strong and could sustain the threat of strikes since trade unions now were increasingly organised and used striking funds to increase their bargaining position.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> Helderman, 'De Hoge Raad van Arbeid', 54-5; Quint, *Twintig jaar Hooge* Raad, 7-9; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 90-1; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 156-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 161; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 67-8; Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 20; Scholten, De Sociaal-Economische Raad, 56; Helderman, 'De Hoge Raad van Arbeid', 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Quint, *Twintig jaar Hooge Raad*, 18; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 54; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 66; Helderman, 'De Hoge Raad van Arbeid', 46, 60.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> Helderman, 'De Hoge Raad van Arbeid', 46, 60-1; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 56; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 161.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 246; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 51-2; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 178.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 178-9; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 18; Brug and Peer, *Collectief geregeld*, 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 18; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 51; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 17.

Otherwise, it was the better choice to engage in collective bargaining and promote industrial peace.

Table 3 Number and percentage of workers under collective labour agreements in the Netherlands 139

Date	Number of workers	% of employed labour force
1 January 1911	23,000	1.0
1 January 1917	83,000	3.3
1 January 1920	274,000	10.4
1 June 1924	286,000	10.4
1 June 1930	386,000	12.8
1 June 1934	259,000	9.1
1 June 1939	323,000	10.1

*Notes*: the number of workers is rounded up to thousands of people; the employed labour force consists of those people between 15 and 65 years of age that work at least 15 hours per week.

In a sense, the establishment of collective labour agreements itself also had a self-reinforcing influence as the bargaining process of these contracts required the technical expertise of employers' associations and trade unions which in turn increased the role of these interest groups and led to more collective negotiations. <sup>140</sup> The consequence was a sharp increase of collective labour agreements until 1920 which ensured that trade unions were generally recognised by employers when the statutory extension debate took off. <sup>141</sup> The expansion of the number of workers under collective labour agreements came to a halt in the fifteen years before the Second World War due to the large disruption caused by the Great Depression as is demonstrated in Table 3. The table shows that a large portion of Dutch workers did not fall under a collective labour agreement as well. The collective contracts largely applied to small firms, whereas white-collar workers and employees of large corporations were no part of such labour agreements before the Second World War. <sup>142</sup> Firms produced for the external market were generally more worried about increases in labour costs that would be caused by such agreements.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> For the number of workers under collective labour agreements, see Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1920* (Den Haag 1921) 98; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor Nederland 1930* (Den Haag 1931) 95; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor Nederland 1935* (Den Haag 1936) 109; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor Nederland 1940* (Den Haag 1942) 295; for the labour force statistics, see Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 'Beroepsbevolking; vanaf 1800 (12-uursgrens), 1800-2013' (version 4 April 2014)

https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/71882NED/table?fromstatweb (28 July 2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 339.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 13; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 51; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 246; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 179; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 19; Brug and Peer, *Collectief geregeld*, 15; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 138.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> Brug and Peer, *Collectief geregeld*, 15; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 51.

Next to the upsurge in the prominence of employers' associations, trade unions and the usage of collective labour agreements, the economic and political conditions in 1918 also moved the government to improve the regulation surrounding these contracts. Although the physical damage of the conflict to the Netherlands was limited due to the country's neutrality status, the First World War still had some significant effects on the Dutch economy as world market prices rose, real wages decreased and unemployment slightly expanded. 143 Given these economic circumstances, the government and employers cooperated to keep as much of trade intact as possible. 144 Meanwhile, the emancipation of the working class increased social tensions based on the economic inequalities in society combined with the reduced purchasing power of workers which led to strikes and isolated demands for the nationalisation of industries. 145 Inspired by the revolutionary mobilisation in Russia and Germany, the Dutch parliamentarian Pieter Jelles Troelstra decided to call for a Socialist revolution in November 1918, but his attempt failed. 146 This famous episode of Dutch political history is now known as 'Troelstra's mistake'. Whereas revolutionary groups had widely received support in neighbouring countries, revolutionary sentiment in the Netherlands turned out to be relatively limited and the countercampaign by the government which partly relied on loyalty to the Dutch royal house relatively successful. 147 The state cooperated with the trade unions to prevent social unrest with minimal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> Friso Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland. Van de opstand tot heden* (second edition; Amsterdam 2013) 293; Maarten Prak and Jan L. van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel: sociaal-economische geschiedenis van Nederland, 1000-2000.* De geschiedenis van Nederland 10 (Amsterdam 2013) 236; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland,* 48-9; Van Zanden, Jan. L., *Een klein land in de 20e eeuw: economische geschiedenis van Nederland 1914-1995* (Utrecht 1997) 131-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> W.S.P. Fortuyn, '13. Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek in de Twintigste Eeuw', in: F.L. van Holthoorn ed., *De Nederlandse samenleving sinds 1815: wording en samenhang* (Assen 1985) 283-304, there 286-7; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, I. 1950-1964* (Deventer 1982) 84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> Ernest Hueting, Frits de Jong and Rob Neij, Naar groter eenheid: de geschiedenis van het Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 1906-1981 (Amsterdam 1983) 66; Harry Hoefnagels, Een eeuw sociale problematiek: van sociaal conflict naar strategische samenwerking. Bouwstenen voor de Kennis der Maatschappij 23 (Assen 1957) 156; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 56, 70; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 129-30; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 84; Wielenga, Geschiedenis van Nederland, 292; Prak and Van Zanden, Nederland en het poldermodel, 236; Ger Harmsen and Bob Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid: beknopte geschiedenis van de Nederlandse vakbeweging (Nijmegen 1975) 128.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> Piet de Rooy, 'Een zoekende tijd. De ongemakkelijke democratie, 1913-1949', in: Remieg Aerts e.a. ed., *Land van kleine gebaren: een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-2012* (eighth revised edition; Amsterdam 2013) 197-282, there 212-3; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 131; Johan S. Wijne, *De "vergissing" van Troelstra* (Hilversum 1999) 7; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 56-7; Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 291-2; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 243; Harmsen and Reinalda, *Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid*, 130; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 67; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 156-7; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 292; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 77; Wijne, *De "vergissing" van Troelstra*, 8; De Rooy, 'Een zoekende tijd', 213.

intervention by employers.<sup>148</sup> A clear example of this collaboration is the government subsidy for the unemployment funds of the trade unions that existed until the Second World War.

Although government intervention decreased relatively quickly after the war, the economic tide and social unrest were an important reason for the government to announce its willingness for labour market regulation. Kortenhorst and the recently created ARKWV as a whole, in particular, pushed statutory extension as a way to promote industrial peace and consolidate the weight of collective labour agreements between the social partners. The Roman Catholic workers' representatives, as well as the MPs Kuiper and van Rijzewijk from the same pillar, supported their efforts. Still, the Roman Catholic RKSP party initially took a stance in favour of a new law on collective labour agreements without a clear reference to statutory extension, though, as did the left-leaning Liberal party (VDB) and the main Protestant trade union (CNV).

## 2.2 The early statutory extension debate

From the moment the post-war government Ruijs de Beerenbrouck I (1918-1922) consisting of a coalition of the Roman Catholic (RKSP) and Protestant (ARP and CHU) political parties also adopted this viewpoint, however, by announcing that it wanted to address these gaps through introducing more detailed regulation and that it considered the statutory extension instrument as part of this agenda, the societal debate really took off and this mechanism also became one of the major topics debated among the employers' associations in the other pillars. As a next step, Minister Aalberse requested the newly established Commission XII of the Supreme Council of Labour in 1920 for recommendations on the regulation of the labour market with the use of questions which among other things addressed the desirability of a statutory extension mechanism. Concretely, question 1A of the Minister addressed the desirability of a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 19; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 50-1; Hoefnagels, Een eeuw sociale problematiek, 157-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 287; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 84; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 248.

Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1936:50 (Den Haag 1936) 599; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 136, 380; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 188.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> Idem, 188, 197.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>153</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 179; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 74; Kouwenhoven, *De* dynamiek, 139; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 133-4; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 129; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 142, 177-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 3: 'Het Eene Noodige. Rede uitgesproken door Simon A. Maas Voorzitter van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen in de Algemene Vergadering van dat Verbond op

mechanism to determine binding rules for all workers and employers in a certain sector, while question 2 focused on the form and conditions of this mechanism as well as the institution that should be in charge of this process. Noteworthy, the peak employers' associations were severely underrepresented in Commission XII with only two representatives, L.G. Kortenhorst (AKWV) and F.G. Waller (VNW; later replaced by Mr Verkade), on a total of twenty members.<sup>155</sup>

A group of progressive Catholics led by law professor J.A. Veraart who also took part in Commission XII created an important ideational foundation for the post-war promotion of sectoral bargaining. These scholars presented an alternative to the revolutionary, Socialist agenda by suggesting that the competitive capitalist system which was inherently based on conflict could be reformed to an order based on mutually beneficial collaboration between representatives of capital and labour. <sup>156</sup> Following the subsidiarity principle, industrial relations was the domain of employers and workers, not the government. <sup>157</sup> Primarily, the systemic change was a plea for the introduction of the Public Industrial Organisation (*Publiekrechtelijke bedrijfsorganisatie*; PBO), consisting of councils which represented the common interests of employers and employees and would be in charge of a sectoral bargaining process on collective labour agreements, inspired by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum. <sup>158</sup> Collective labour agreements would constitute the foundation of the regulatory framework of the PBO and statutory extension an important mechanism to spread these agreements. <sup>159</sup> Importantly, the councils would involve employees in the management of the companies and economic sectors

Donderdag 21 December 1922, den Haag.' (1922) 28-9; HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1920.' (1921) 27-28; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 129-30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>155</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1920.' (1921) 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 163; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 70; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 285; Van Waarden,, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 257; Kouwenhoven, De dynamiek, 139; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 86; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 55, 104, 314; Hoefnagels, Een eeuw sociale problematiek, 157-8; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 225; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 191; Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingent in Nederland*, 71; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 380; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 86; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 191; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 225.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> L.G. Kortenhorst and J.A. Veraart, Welke moeten zijn de hoofdlijnen van eene wettelijke regeling van de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst? ('s-Hertogenbosch 1919) 123-4; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 225; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 70-1; Kouwenhoven, De dynamiek, 341; Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 163; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 86-7; Mulder, Loonvorming in overleg, 127-8; P.F. Maas e.a., Het kabinet-Drees van Schaik (1948-1951). Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945 3 A (Nijmegen 1991) 361; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 191; Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> Kortenhorst and Veraart, Welke moeten zijn de hoofdlijnen, 123-4; Bölger, Organisatorische verhoudingen, 340; Kouwenhoven, De dynamiek, 139; Hoefnagels, Een eeuw sociale problematiek, 193; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 181.

as a whole, thereby not solely limiting the influence of workers on social affairs.

Despite the magnitude of Veraart's ideas in the Roman Catholic pillar, <sup>160</sup> Roman Catholic employers responded with doubt to the idea of the PBO. In this regard, the central player was Kortenhorst, Secretary of the ARKWV and the Roman Catholic employers' association of the metal sector as well as a member of the Commission XII. While he was a clear proponent of collective labour agreements and statutory extension, he was relatively critical of the PBO and, therefore, proposed an adjusted different collective bargaining system method in 1919 that gave the Minister of Labour the power of statutory extension after convening with the Supreme Council of Labour. <sup>161</sup> After advising the RKSP to promote statutory extension in 1917, the ARKWV consolidated its position in favour of the mechanism in 1921. <sup>162</sup> On 29 December 1921, the ARKWV was also successful in convincing a majority in the wider RKVW to take a similar stance on the issue, which re-confirmed its support for the introduction of the instrument in July 1922 and 1923. <sup>163</sup>

From an ideational perspective, one might expect that Protestants evaluated the PBO and statutory extension proposals more critically. Both Protestant employers and the broader pillar generally positioned themselves in between Liberals and Roman Catholics concerning the shaping of the socio-economic order, being more critical of government interference and more valuing of particular initiative than their Christian counterparts but more encouraging of worker representation than economic Liberals. Whereas Roman Catholic thought depicted the different socio-cultural pillars as part of the state, Protestant thinking pictured the state as something different, next to these elements, which should be kept from dominating the societal sphere. Conceptually, Abraham Kuyper had defined this as 'soevereiniteit in eigen kring' at the end of the nineteenth century, referring to the sovereignty of every socio-cultural pillar. This

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 214-5; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 71; Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek*, 136; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 86; Piet de Rooy, 'Een zoekende tijd', 221-2; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 163. <sup>161</sup> Kortenhorst and Veraart, *Welke moeten zijn de hoofdlijnen*, 81.

Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1936:50 (Den Haag 1936) 599; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 136, 380.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 14: 'Vergadering van het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen op Donderdag 8 Maart 1923' (1923) 2-4; VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 21: 'De Nederlandsche Nijverheid. 5° Jaargang no.4' (1923) 66; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 136, 380; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 188.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> VCWG, 332, inv.no. 1: 'Beginselverklaring en toelichting' (1921) 2-3, 10-1; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 89-90; Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 290-1; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 190-1; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 380-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 191; VCWG, 332, inv.no. 1: 'Beginselverklaring en toelichting' (1921) 4.

philosophy was more critical of governmental interference than the Roman Catholic subsidiarity principle as it scrutinised top-down public force onto the different socio-cultural groups and promoted self-regulation by every pillar.<sup>166</sup>

Interestingly, Protestants generally used the same dichotomy between economic and social affairs as Liberals to explain the role of workers and employers in the socio-economic order.<sup>167</sup> Protestant business' representatives mostly portrayed economic affairs as the sole domain of employers while workers had a necessary and legitimate role to play in decisions in the social realm, although the final decision remained the privilege of employers. <sup>168</sup> Following this thought, Protestant employers generally saw the PBO as too far-reaching in the economic affairs of business and too top-down in its structure to support it, while they agreed with Roman Catholics that collective labour agreements were generally a positive, bottom-up development which promoted industrial peace in the social domain. 169 Building upon the enthusiasm regarding collective labour agreements, the Protestant peak employers' associations were remarkably positive towards statutory extension. The Board and General Assembly of the Protestant peak employers' association (VCWG) already adopted a stance in favour of the mechanism in 1921 given that a great majority of workers and employers in the sector would already be part of the collective labour agreement, <sup>170</sup> although one of its members, Mr Woldring representing the beverage manufacturer Woldring & Idema, objected fiercely as he viewed the instrument as an intolerable impediment on his freedom. <sup>171</sup> The statutory extension case shows that Protestant employers did not simply oppose every form of government interference. With statutory extension, the VCWG supported government intervention through a mechanism of statutory extension as they framed it as facilitating rather than limiting consultation between workers and employers on labour conditions.<sup>172</sup>

For economic Liberals, the aversion towards government interference was even more fundamental, however, and this proved to be relevant for the statutory extension mechanism as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 290; De Rooy 'Een zoekende tijd', 221-2; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 225; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 121-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 89.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>168</sup> VCWG, 332, inv.no. 1: 'Beginselverklaring en toelichting' (1921) 3, 15-7; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 380-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> VCWG, 332, inv.no. 1: 'Beginselverklaring en toelichting' (1921) 3, 18; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 89; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 149-50.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> VCWG, 332, inv.no. 1: 'Gecombineerde vergadering van Bestuur der Christelijke Werkgevers.- en Christelijke Middenstandsvereniging. 6 October 1921, 's namiddags 3 uur in gebouw "De Standaard" Amsterdam' (1921) 1; VCWG, 332, inv.no. 1: 'Program van Actie vastgesteld door de Algemene Ledenvergadering van 23 November 1921.' (1921) 1; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 198.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> VCWG, 332, inv.no. 1: letter from Mr. Woldring to Secretary 'Groningen den 27. Dec 1921' (1921) 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> VCWG, 332, inv.no. 1: 'Beginselverklaring en toelichting' (1921) 22.

well. On 26 January 1922, representatives the Board of the COAW already formulated their negative stance towards statutory extension. <sup>173</sup> The debate showed that Mr P.W.J.H. Cort van der Linden, son of the famous, right-leaning liberal prime minister and a VNW-Secretary without a sectoral affiliation himself, was fundamentally opposed to statutory extension, while most of the COAW members refuted the mechanism on more practical concerns and repeatedly demonstrated some sympathy for the argument that the instrument would prevent the undercutting of contracts by unorganised employers.<sup>174</sup> In this meeting, Mr F.L. van der Bom, representative of an association for the book publishing sector, stood alone in explicitly favouring statutory extension. He argued that the instrument was desirable as it would promote industrial peace. There was a wider circle of representatives who had sympathy for the instrument, though. In the vote upon the motivation for the public statement of the association's negative stance, a small minority supported Van der Bom in his refusal of the proposal.<sup>175</sup> A clear majority of the meeting was still in favour of the announcement, however. Despite the significant minority with sympathy for the mechanism, the COAW, therefore, decided to oppose statutory extension as collective labour agreements were not yet sufficiently regulated and their effects still unclear, while the economic circumstances for industry were already difficult and could be made worse due to the yet unclear impact of the introduction of statutory extension. The statement left an opening for revaluation of the position when these conditions would change, though. 176

The archives of its association indicate that the Liberal and relatively export-oriented manufacturers of the VNF were even more strongly opposed to collective bargaining than Cort van der Linden of the VNW as they not only took a stance against statutory extension but were also (internally) questioning the desirability of collective labour agreements themselves. <sup>177</sup> On 10 January 1922, the Central Board of the VNF discussed sectoral bargaining. Here, Mr A.H. Baron van Hardenbroek van Ammerstol, representative of the limestone industry, demonstrated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 37: 'Jaarverslag Centraal Overleg 1921' (1922) 19; COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van de Algemene Bestuursvergadering van Centraal Overleg. Op 26 Januari 1922, in het Scheepvaartshuis te Amsterdam.' (1922) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>174</sup> COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van de Algemene Bestuursvergadering van Centraal Overleg. Op 26 Januari 1922', 3-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>175</sup> W.J. van der Meer, J. Stakenburg, D.P. van Wageningen and G.M. de Jonge constituted this minority.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup> COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 37: 'Jaarverslag Centraal Overleg 1921' (1922) 19; COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van de Algemene Bestuursvergadering van Centraal Overleg. Op 26 Januari 1922, in het Scheepvaartshuis te Amsterdam.' (1922) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>177</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 25 Januari 1923, des namiddags te 2,5 uur, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, den Haag.' (1923) 5.

that he was one of the heaviest critics of statutory extension and collective labour agreements in general. In the discussion, he first used the slippery slope argument that statutory extension would be the first step in a more general socialisation process and proceeded with a broader critique on the inflexibility of a system of collective labour agreements in adjusting to fast changes in the economic tide. <sup>178</sup> The second point of this speaker eventually resulted in a vote in which a majority of the meeting deemed collective labour agreements problematic due to their rigidity. 179 Still, the minutes of the meeting also give indications that a small minority in the meeting had a more positive stance towards collective bargaining. Mr J. Zwaardemaker of the Association of Dutch fruit processors, for example, showed his sympathy for the undercutting argument for statutory extension, but he was immediately countered by the Chair of the Central Board, Simon A. Maas, affiliated with the distillery sector who argued that this was a lesser evil compared with the inflexible and sometimes untenable labour conditions which would be forced upon unwilling individual firms. 180 Additionally, he alluded to the general wage-increasing tension of collective labour agreements. Although the Central Board chose not to oppose collective labour agreements in general, it was clearly strongly against a statutory extension mechanism.<sup>181</sup>

On 8 Juni 1922, there was another meeting by the Central Board of the VNF on the subject. The complete board except for Mr W.B. Dresselhuys, former Chair of the Verbond van Vereenigingen van Sigarenfabrikanten in Nederland, now agreed on public opposition against statutory extension, while collective labour agreements themselves were also widely criticised. Dresselhuys used the cigar industry as an example to argue that statutory extension may be useful in particular circumstances to prevent the undercutting of collective labour agreements by a small, unorganised minority of employers, which was countered by Van Hardenbroek van Ammerstol with the argument that would be an unallowable impediment on the free development of these businesses. 183

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 7: 'Vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur, gehouden op 10 Januari 1922, des namiddags te 2.' (1922) 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>179</sup> Idem, 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> Idem, 9-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> Idem, 13-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>182</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 7: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 8 Juni 1922, des voormiddags te 11 uur, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36. den Haag.' (1922) 26, 31-2. <sup>183</sup> Idem, 26-8.

# 2.3 Business' positions after Commissions XII's response

After the war, the economy had recovered relatively quickly because of an enormous increase in external demand and continued to grow despite the international economic downturn from 1920 to 1923. 184 Whereas the international recession heavily hit the financial sector of the Netherlands, the effects on the rest of the economy were relatively limited as the vital export to Germany remained largely intact. 185 Still, employers tried to lower wages and workers' rights under these economic circumstances which resulted in more limited collective agreements and more extensive labour conflict, while social democracy was under pressure in the political sphere. 186 Due to the backlash against the expanding social agenda, labour was once more on the defensive and the government played a smaller role. Under these conditions, the plans of Veraart for a PBO failed in 1922.<sup>187</sup> Regardless of the changing momentum for social change, political rule by Christian democratic parties was remarkably stable in this period. 188 In 1922, 1925, 1926 and 1929, the election results enabled the same political parties (RKSP, ARP and CHU) to remain in power through the cabinets Ruijs de Beerenbrouck II (1922-1925), Colijn I (1925-1926), De Geer I (1926-1929) and Ruijs de Beerenbrouck III (1929-1933). Interestingly, however, there was no consistent stance of these seemingly similar coalitions towards statutory extension. In 1922, the Troonrede of the government merely mentioned that they were considering a more detailed regulation of the collective labour agreements, but there was little discussion in parliament as politicians awaited the Commission XII's report. 189

During the financial crisis, the Commission XII had been working on its response to Minister Aalberse's questions. In 1922, the Commission XII published its reply by means of a provisional advice which included statutory extension as its most urgent proposal. The Commission proposed a system of statutory extension in which the Minister of Labour would get the privilege to declare collective labour agreements universally applicable after a request

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 293-4; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 236; Van Zanden, *Een klein land*, 133-4; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 127.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup> Prak and Van Zanden, Nederland en het poldermodel, 236; Van Zanden, Een klein land, 141-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>186</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 63; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 245; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 159, 164.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>187</sup> Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 286; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 87.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> Wielenga, Geschiedenis van Nederland, 281, 283; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 142.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>189</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 179.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>190</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 21: 'Praeadvies van Commissie XII over een voorontwerp regelende de verbindendverklaring van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten' (1926) 1; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 137, 357; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 181; Quint, *Twintig jaar Hooge* Raad, 50; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 130-1.

by an industrial party and the consultation of an independent commission. The main criterion would be that statutory extension would be in the common interest and constitute no unreasonable impediment on particular interests. A majority of the commission supported this provisional advice on statutory extension. Only the representative of the VNW in the commission strictly opposed the measure, while a few members wanted more fundamental changes and others wanted to leave the choice whether to adopt a firm-level or collective bargaining system including statutory extension to firms themselves.

Under the conditions of the Commission XII's statutory extension proposal, a major concern for business' representatives, above all for those from the VNF and VNW, was to what extent the Minister needed their consent to declare collective labour agreements universally applicable. On 8 November 1922, the Board of the VNW discussed the general provisional advice of the Commission XII and showed its approval of the diverging critical stance of the VNW representative in the commission. Afterwards, the VNW held a General Assembly of members in 1923 which also focused on the advice and the provisional position of the Board of the association. The consensus in the General Assembly was to support the proposal of the Board to publicly oppose statutory extension although there was some disagreement on the exact motivation of this viewpoint for strategic purposes. This strategic discussion focused on whether the economic circumstances should be used as an argument against the instrument since this would open up a possibility when the economic downturn would be over. Interestingly, the Board also explained in this meeting that the position of VNW explicitly called statutory extension a limitation of freedom to convince Christian employers who were sensitive to this argument.

The VNW's negative stance towards sectoral bargaining was in alignment with the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 21: 'Praeadvies van Commissie XII over een voorontwerp regelende de verbindendverklaring van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten' (1926) 1; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 137, 357; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 181; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 180; Quint, *Twintig jaar Hooge* Raad, 50; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 130-1; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 138-9, 363; Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek*, 138; Van Waarden,, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 239-40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>193</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.01, inv.no. 7: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur der Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Woensdag, 8 november 1922. Te 's-Gravenhage.' (1922) 20, 22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.01, inv.no. 16: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van de buitengewone algemene ledenvergadering der Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Donderdag, 18 januari 1923. Te Amsterdam.' (1923) 14; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 363.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>195</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.01, inv.no. 16: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van de buitengewone algemene ledenvergadering der Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Donderdag, 18 januari 1923. Te Amsterdam.' (1923) 5, 11-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>196</sup> Idem, 14.

small-sized CIV which had close ties with the larger liberal peak employers' association as is demonstrated by their common monthly external publication: De Werkgever. In the first volume of this journal, the critique of Van der Linden on the proposal for statutory extension was published in accordance with the outcome of the assembly. 197 He argued that the government should only be allowed to intervene in the formation of labour conditions under special circumstances and, therefore, should not get the permanent right to declare collective labour agreements universally applicable. These specific conditions for government intervention were that it merely was to correct misuses of collective labour agreements and followed a just purpose which had not to be confused with a goal favoured by the majority. Van der Linden explicitly refuted the idea that the government intervention through statutory extension would promote industrial peace, e.g. through the prevention of undercutting by the unorganised. Rather the government had to allocate itself a minimal role in promoting industrial peace as the focus of establishing such peace had to be pursued on the firm- rather than the sectoral level. After this, he finalised his argument with an economic argument, arguing that it would be 'criminal' to introduce statutory extension during the economic tide of the time because of its negative effect on the international competitiveness of industry implying that the mechanism would lead to increased costs for these companies and may lead to problems as they cannot compensate this with higher prices. 198

The Central Board of the VNW also strongly opposed the proposal as shown by its meeting on Thursday 7 December 1922. Here, VNF-Chair Simon A. Maas argued that the representation of employers in the Supreme Council was too weak. The other board members supported his position and stated that the report was excessively one-sided. Additionally, the Board confirmed a position paper in which it opposed a statutory extension mechanism concerning collective labour arguments or prices as well as the PBO. The criticism of Maas himself on the Council and Commission was more explicit in a statement in the General Assembly of the VNF later that month. Here, he strongly criticised the large and biased role of the Minister in the determination of the members of the Supreme Council of Labour and its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.01, inv.no. 24: 'De Werkgever 1923. 1e Jaargang no.1. 1 Juni 1923' (1923) 10.

<sup>198</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>199</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 7: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 7 December 1922, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, Haag.' (1922) 8, 10-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 7: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur, gehouden op Donderdag 7 December 1922', 13.

commissions and the relatively small influence of the business' representatives of industry.<sup>201</sup> Due to the limited representativeness of the council as well as its commissions, Maas questioned the meaningfulness of the proposals of its Commission XII. Interestingly, he put people such as ARKWV-Secretary Kortenhorst under the category of sociologists rather than business' representatives.<sup>202</sup>

In response to the advice of this commission, Maas underlined the importance of the criticism of the VNW representative in the commission that the mechanism may force firms to allocate more resources to attracting the necessary labour than they can bear. Maas stated that the harm inflicted upon the contract freedom of the minority of employers which would force all employers to abide by the collective labour agreements that would largely be determined by ever more powerful trade unions was more eminent than the benefits gained through preventing the undercutting of these contracts which was the Commission XII's main argument. Additionally, he pointed out that the mechanism would reduce the price competition between employers which was an important stimulator of the increased Dutch export position. Furthermore, the discussion about the PBO and statutory extension was deemed far too theoretical, missing the reality of the decrease in the number of collective labour agreements in the last years and the economic difficulties that firms face. Under these circumstances, free negotiations between workers and firms, whether individual or collective, would be needed without any government interference.

A speech by the VNF-Secretary A.N. Molenaar, who had no sectoral affiliation, in the General Assembly confirmed this view on statutory extension and its call to focus on practical arguments rather than vague theoretical sketches. Additionally, the speaker used the slippery slope argument that statutory extension would constitute the first step towards a Socialist state and would quickly be followed by the PBO. Although some businesses had good experiences with collective labour agreements, some had not or were not able to abide by such rules which

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>201</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 3: 'Het Eene Noodige. Rede uitgesproken door Simon A. Maas Voorzitter van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen in de Algemene Vergadering van dat Verbond op Donderdag 21 December 1922, den Haag.' (1922) 5, 7-8, 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>202</sup> Idem, 27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> Idem, 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> Idem, 33-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>205</sup> Idem, 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> Idem, 46, 49-50.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> Idem, 54-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 25 Januari 1923, des namiddags te 2,5 uur, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, den Haag.' (1923) 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup> Idem, 14, 18.

showed the problems of statutory extension as a limiting force of flexibility and free competition.<sup>210</sup> The crux of his argument regarded the fundamental contract freedom of individual employers, though. According to Molenaar, the undercutting argument missed the point as individual employers, whether part of a majority or not, always need to have the fundamental freedom to negotiate their own labour conditions.<sup>211</sup> An impediment of this freedom would hurt rather than promote industrial peace.

Interestingly, however, there was also some disagreement within the Central Board of the VNF on the statutory extension position. Board member W.B. Dresselhuys argued that the statutory extension had practically proved its necessity in the Cigar industry where collective labour agreements of businesses in large cities proved untenable as firms in other areas where workers were willing to work for significantly lower wages undercut these contracts. This positive stance was an isolated viewpoint, though. Additionally, two other board members, G.F. Evelein, Director of social affairs at lighting company Koninklijke Philips N.V., and M.J. van Löben Sels, with a background in the stone industry, pointed to the problematic nature of introducing the law across all sectors. Due to the important difference between firms that produced for the domestic and international market, the latter were far more constrained by international competition and, therefore, would be harmed by statutory extension.

Following the VNW, the COAW also took a stance against the proposal. On 15 February 1923, all the sectoral organisations under the COAW explicitly indicated their position on statutory extension through a formal vote. Eleven of the fourteen votes were against the mechanism, while the representatives of the bakeries (*Vereniging van Werkgevers in het Bakkersbedrijf*) and book publishers (*Nederlandsche Bond van Boekbinderspatroons*) were in favour, and the electro-technical business association was not able to choose between the two options.<sup>214</sup> Although the liberal peak employers' associations and a large majority of their members were, thus, in favour of the proposed mechanism, there was also a significant minority who backed the proposal of Commission XII, particularly when considering Roman Catholic and Protestant employers as Table 4 illustrates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 25 Januari 1923, des namiddags te 2,5 uur, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, den Haag.' (1923) 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> Idem, 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> Idem, 21-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Idem, 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>214</sup> COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van de Algemene Bestuursvergadering van Centraal Overleg op Donderdag 15 februari 1923 in het Scheepvaartshuis te Amsterdam.' (1923) 1-2.

**Table 4** Proponents of statutory extension as proposed by Commission XII in 1923<sup>215</sup>

Level	Employers' association	Sector	Pillar
Peak	Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversverenigingen	X	Catholic
	Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging	X	Catholic
	Vereeniging van Christelijke Werkgevers en Groothandelaren	X	Protestant
Sectoral	Nederlandsche Bond van Boekbinderspatroons	Publishing	Liberal
	Vereeniging van Chemigrafische Inrichtingen	Chemigraphy	Liberal
	Nederlandsche Bond van Steendrukkerijen	Lithography	Liberal
	Vereeniging van Cartonnagefabrikanten	Cardboard	Liberal
	R.K. Bond van Klei- en Aardewerkindustrie	Clay	Catholic
	R.K. Bond van Metaalfabrikanten	Metal	Catholic
	R.K. Bond van Waalsteenfabrikanten	Brick	Catholic
	R.K. Bond van Bouwpatroons		Catholic
	Patroonsbond voor de bouwbedrijven in Nederland	Construction	Liberal
	Bond van Smedenpatroons in Nederland	Blacksmith	Liberal
	R.K. Bond van Stucadoorspatroons	Plasterwork	Catholic
	Nederlandsche Stucadoorspatroonsbond	Plasterwork	Liberal
	Bond van Loodgieterspatroons in Nederland	Plumming	Liberal
	Bond van Nederlandsche Schilderspatroons	Painting	Liberal
	Christelijke Schilderspatroons		Protestant
	R.K. Bond van Schilderspatroons	Painting	Catholic
	R.K. Bond van Meubelmakerspatroons	Furniture	Catholic
	Nederlandsche Bond van Meubelfabrikanten	Furniture	Liberal
	R.K. Bond van Lederindustrie	Leather	Catholic
	Nederlandsche Bond van Werkgeversvereenigingen in het	Textile	Liberal
	Heerenkleedingbedrijf		
	R.K. Bond van Kleermakerspatroons	Textile	Catholic
	R.K. Bond van Textielfabrikanten	Textile	Catholic
	R.K. Bond van Confectie-industrie	Textile	Catholic
	Vereeniging van Werkgevers in het Bakkersbedrijf	Bakery	Liberal
	R.K. Bond van Brood-, Koek- en Banketbakkerspatroons	Bakery	Catholic
	Verbond van Vereenigingen van Sigarenfabrikanten in Nederland	Cigar	Liberal
	Bond van Kleinfabrikanten in het Sigarenbedrijf	Cigar	Liberal

The Commission Hellebrekers assigned by the Roman Catholic peak employers' associations requested the Supreme Council to accept the proposals of its Commission XII in 1923. After this, the different organisations that were part of the Roman Catholic Confederation of Employer Associations also adopted this stance including the ARKWV except for its department in Den Bosch which primarily opposed the instruments. Meanwhile, the peak

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 25 Januari 1923, des namiddags te 2,5 uur, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, den Haag.' (1923) 5-6; VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 21: 'De Nederlandsche Nijverheid. 5° Jaargang no.4. Woensdag 28 Februari 1923' (1923) 65-7; ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 14: 'Vergadering van het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen op Donderdag 8 Maart 1923' (1923) 2-4; HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1923.' (1924) 7-8; COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van de Algemene Bestuursvergadering van Centraal Overleg op Donderdag 15 februari 1923 in het Scheepvaartshuis te Amsterdam.' (1923) 1-2.

Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1923:5 (Amsterdam 1923) 75-6; ARKWV and RKVW, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1936:50, 599.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 14: 'Vergadering van het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen op Donderdag 8 Maart 1923' (1923) 2-4; ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 13 'Notulen der vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der

employers' association of the Protestant pillar also supported the proposal. These positions were confirmed by the meeting of the Supreme Council of Labour on 17 March 1923 that discussed the Commission XII's proposals. While most of the commission's proposals including the PBO were refused, a large majority (23-6) was for the recommendation of statutory extension. In the vote, four of fourteen business' representatives opposed the proposal representing an association for the export-oriented industry (*Maatschappij voor Nijverheid en Handel*; part of the COAW), the coalmine industry (*Vereeniging tot behartiging van de belangen der Limburgsche mijnindustrie*), shipping companies (*Scheepsvaart Vereeniging Noord en Zuid*) and the VNW.

Table 4 shows the proponents of the Commission XII's statutory extension proposal in 1923. This overview enables the investigation of the relative importance of economic and ideational factors for the positions of the different employers' associations. Unfortunately, the archives provide no possibility to reconstruct a similar list of opponents but it is clear that they were in the majority. The table of proponents suggests that there was no perfect division on the statutory extension proposal across either economic or ideational lines. Although most of the employers' associations in favour of statutory extension represented small- and medium-sized enterprises which produced for the domestic market, this is no exact distinction as the list also contains organisations which were dominated by export-oriented companies.<sup>219</sup> At the same time, the proponents tend to come from the Roman Catholic and Protestant pillar, but the significant representation of Liberal associations indicates that this is no absolute distinction as well. Although it is important to note that the Liberal pillar was often used as neutral and default option, especially in the '20s when the sectoral Roman Catholic and particularly Protestant business organisation was relatively underdeveloped and mostly contained opponents to statutory extension as illustrated by the previous sections, there are also examples of Liberal proponents were this process had already taken place, such as the construction, plasterwork, painting, furniture and bakery sectors. The commonality of these instances is that their activities

A.R.K.W.V. op Maandag 16 November 1925 n.m. 1.30 in "Huize Voorhout" Lange Voorhout 19 Den Haag (1925) 4; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 204.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1923.' (1924) 7-8; HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 21: 'Praeadvies van Commissie XII over een voorontwerp regelende de verbindendverklaring van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten' (1926) 1; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 92; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 185; Brug and Peer, *Collectief geregeld*, 17; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 131; Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1923:12 (Amsterdam 1923) 163; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 180, 206; Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1925:32 (Den Haag 1925) 363; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 139.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> VNW, inv.no. 235: 'De Werkgever 1930. Jaargang 1930 no.26' (1930) 408.

are mainly targeted on the domestic economy. To explain the variation in these business' positions, it is, therefore, needed to use a common explanation of both divergent economic interests and ideational differences.

## 2.4 An unsatisfying compromise

Additionally, the list of proponents demonstrates the continuation of business' positions with those of the early statutory extension debate, while the outline of the vote in the Supreme Council of Labour shows the importance of the diverging stances of employers as it broke the opposition against the mechanism and gave a mandate of broad societal support for the instrument in the following years. After the vote in favour of statutory extension with a clear majority, the VNW and VNF increased their efforts with heavy campaigning against the instrument. At the same time, the international financial crisis waned, leading to an upsurge in growth in the internationally oriented economy of the Netherlands in consecutive years. The number of members of the labour unions also started to rise while industrial relations and socio-economic policies were increasingly shaped by trade unions and employers' associations as the government generally aimed to get their approval. Pollowing this trend, the RKSP-Minister of Labour, Trade and Industry P.J. Aalberse pursued the outcome in the Council on the basis of the Commission XII's work by formulating a proposal for statutory extension which he sent back to the institution for evaluation in 1925.

Aalberse's initiative revitalised the debate on statutory extension within the employers' associations and the Supreme Council of Labour. The ARKWV and RKVW immediately expressed their satisfaction with the proposal of the Roman Catholic Minister in *De R.K. Werkgever*, only suggesting several small amendments.<sup>224</sup> To underline the importance of the instrument, both Roman Catholic peak associations wrote an extensive discussion of sectoral bargaining spread over several editions of *De R.K. Werkgever* in which they aimed to demonstrate the value of collective labour agreements in promoting industrial peace and the contribution of statutory extension to this institution through the undercutting argument.<sup>225</sup> In

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 184.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>221</sup> Van Zanden, *Een klein land*, 143-4; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 62; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 236-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 58, 66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> Bölger, Organisatorische verhoudingen, 140; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 131; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>224</sup> Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1925:25 (Den Haag 1925) 300.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>225</sup> Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1925:29 (Den Haag 1925) 339; ARKWV and RKVW, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1925:32, 363.

one of the articles, the redaction also aimed to counter the individual contract freedom argument of the Liberal employers. Although stating the individual contract freedom was of great value, they argued it could be no justification for a small minority to make decent relations and agreements between a majority of representatives of workers and employers impossible. <sup>226</sup> In other words, industrial peace and collaboration for the majority had to be valued over individual contract freedom, and the government was able to facilitate this with the statutory extension mechanism on request by the social partners. Next, they addressed the other major argument of Liberal employers concerning the competitiveness of the export industry by stating that this problem was not inherent to the law, but rather dependent on its application. <sup>227</sup>

Later that year, the Federative Board of the ARKWV made up by representatives of its five departments discussed its position on the statutory extension proposal. Interestingly, the minutes of this meeting signal significant internal opposition within the association against the instrument. H.M.J. Blomjous from the department in Den Bosch opposed the mechanism using the slippery slope to the PBO and socialism argument, while also pointing to the difficult circumstances of the time as a reason to oppose statutory extension. Additionally, L. Teulings representative of the same area criticised statutory extension on its inflexibility regarding differences between firms within an economic sector. AP.L. Steenberghe, from the same area and Roman Catholic representative of the textile sector in the RKVW, responded to this criticism by refuting the slippery slope argument, presenting the proposed statutory extension law as an alternative policy rather than a step towards the undesirable PBO. Regarding the inflexibility argument, he argued that it was a critique on collective labour agreements as such rather than the extension instrument since the required coverage of the contract under employers in the proposal before the mechanism could be applied.

Ch. Stulemeyer, from the Breda department and representative of the peak association in the Supreme Council, postulated that the issue of statutory extension demonstrated the fundamental difference between the Liberal and Christian worldview as the latter perspective included the principle of solidarity and, thereby, promoted industrial peace.<sup>231</sup> He added, however, that the mechanism was also favourable from an opportunistic viewpoint as it

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> ARKWV and RKVW, De R.K. Werkgever 1925:32, 363-4.

<sup>227</sup> Idem 364

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>228</sup> ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 13 'Notulen der vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der A.R.K.W.V. op Maandag 16 November 1925 n.m. 1.30 in "Huize Voorhout" Lange Voorhout 19 Den Haag (1925) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>229</sup> Idem, 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>230</sup> Idem, 8-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>231</sup> Idem. 10-1.

facilitated mutually beneficial negotiations between workers and employers by promoting an alternative to rather than a step towards a Socialist system, thereby contesting the slippery slope argument. After this, the rebuttals by Stulemeyer and Steenberghe were extensively backed by Kortenhorst with similar arguments.<sup>232</sup> The latter stressed that the crux of the debate was the ideational question on social affairs which centred on whether workers and employers had to determine labour conditions together or not. As statutory extension would facilitate collective bargaining, it would lead to lower government interference. The debate within the Federative Board ended with a vote indicating that a majority was for the proposal as thirteen counting votes were in favour of the law, as well as three advisory votes by the Secretaries Kortenhorst, B.J.M. van Spaendonck and A.A.W. Diepenbroeck, while two votes were blank and five were against the instrument.<sup>233</sup> The outcome of the vote shows significant internal opposition within the federative board of the ARKWV, although all negative votes came from the same department in Den Bosch. As they had also opposed the mechanism at an earlier stage, though, these votes reflected no remarkable change of preferences.

The viewpoints on sectoral bargaining remained similar in the VNF as well. Collective labour agreements themselves were still questioned by the association<sup>234</sup> that disagreed that undercutting would harm industrial peace and stated that statutory extension would rather constitute a threat, as it was an unallowable impediment on freedom forcing untenable labour conditions upon employers trying to sustain their companies.<sup>235</sup> Additionally, they argued that statutory extension would limit price competition<sup>236</sup> and pointed out that uniform wages across a sector would be problematic as purchasing power diverges between different geographical areas, leading to unnecessary high wages in the countryside.<sup>237</sup> The VNW also clung to its earlier stance. In 1925, before the concrete advice of the Commisson XII on the statutory extension law, *De Werkgever* was again the platform for a critique by Van der Linden, now redactor of the publication. Once more, he stressed the importance of the private contract freedom of individual workers and employers who should keep the right to stay out of collective

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>232</sup> ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 13 'Notulen der vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der A.R.K.W.V. op Maandag 16 November 1925 n.m. 1.30 in "Huize Voorhout" Lange Voorhout 19 Den Haag (1925) 12-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>233</sup> ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 13 'Notulen der vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der A.R.K.W.V. op Maandag 16 November 1925 n.m. 1.30 in "Huize Voorhout" Lange Voorhout 19 Den Haag (1925) 16; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 204.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 23: 'De Nederlandsche Nijverheid. 7<sup>e</sup> Jaargang no.16. Zaterdag 22 augustus 1925' (1925) 244.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>235</sup> Idem, 245-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>236</sup> Idem, 245.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>237</sup> Idem, 246.

labour agreements<sup>238</sup> and stated that statutory extension would be the first step in the process of socialisation as pursued by people such as Troelstra rather than an isolated initiative for labour market regulation.<sup>239</sup>

The debate also took part in the consultative institutions. On 18 September 1925, the Council of peak employers' associations met and agreed to distinguish between further regulation of the collective labour agreement and the statutory extension mechanism.<sup>240</sup> The representatives of the Roman Catholic employers association, respectively Kortenhorst (metal sector), Van Spaendonck (wool sector) and Van Steenberghe (textile sector), still turned out to be clear proponents of the mechanism who were in control of their backbenchers.<sup>241</sup> Given these conditions and the favourable stance of the government towards the mechanism, there was a widespread concern within the VNF that statutory extension would be established, moving the VNF to organise new protest actions with the CIV and VNW.<sup>242</sup> As a response, another protest action was organized with the CIV and VNW. After this, the Commission XII also gave its view on the proposal. A majority of the advisory body agreed with Aalberse's law as it placed the control over the mechanism in the hands of the Minister of Labour, Trade and Industry, while a minority wanted to leave this power to the social partners through the Supreme Council of Labour and one member wanted to give it to an independent legal institution.<sup>243</sup>

Like their Roman Catholic counterparts, the Protestant peak employers' remained in favour of the mechanism. On 14 January 1926, the Central Board of the Protestant association discussed its position on the concrete proposal. While most speakers argued in favour of the extension mechanism, Woldring still strongly opposed the instrument. J.F.H. Spier, a contractor and estate agent, defended the role of the government in the proposed statutory extension process by portraying it as the protector of freely conducted agreements between most representatives of workers and employers against undercutting. In the end, a majority of the meeting voted for a motion by Chair Van der Bom which stated that the association would remain in favour of statutory extension and vote accordingly for the law in the Supreme Council

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>238</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.01, inv.no. 24: 'De Werkgever 1925. 3º Jaargang no.10. 1 October 1925' (1925) 280-1; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 206; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 182-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>239</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.01, inv.no. 24: 'De Werkgever 1925. 3e Jaargang no.10. 1 October 1925' (1925) 280-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>240</sup> VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 8: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur, gehouden op Vrijdag 25 September 1925, des namiddags te 2 uur ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, den Haag' (1925) 3. <sup>241</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>242</sup> Idem, 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>243</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 21: 'Praeadvies van Commissie XII over een voorontwerp regelende de verbindendverklaring van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten' (1926) 7-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>244</sup> Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1926:5 (Den Haag 1926) 52-3.

given two conditions that addressed the main counterarguments by Liberal employers. Firstly, the number of employers in the sector under the collective labour agreement would need to exceed a share that would convincingly demonstrate the willingness of business in the sector to declare the contract universally applicable. Secondly, there had to be sufficient guarantee that the application of the mechanism would not lead to higher prices or problems for the competitiveness of export-oriented companies.<sup>245</sup>

In 1926, after the merger of the VNW, CIV and VNF into the VNW, the newly created Liberal peak employer' association reconfirmed its opposition against statutory extension.<sup>246</sup> The institution motivated its stance by calling sectoral bargaining an impediment on freedom and extending the argument that based itself on differences between the domestic- and exportoriented companies. The latter centred on the idea that statutory extension would establish more protection of workers in already sheltered economic sectors which would lead to higher prices and possibly even cartelisation. As export-oriented companies would not be able to pay higher wages and stay internationally competitive, statutory extension would establish differences between these firms and the sheltered companies focused on the domestic market that would be able to mutate their prices with limited consequences. Once again, the liberal employers pointed to the 'skewed' composition of Commission XII with a relatively low number of employer representatives who were more positive towards statutory extension than the general business population.<sup>247</sup> As part of their campaign to turn the societal discussion against sectoral bargaining, the Praesidium of the VNW specifically targeted proponents and doubters in the employer community before the 1926 vote.<sup>248</sup> According to their archives, the employers' associations of farmers and the small- and medium-sized enterprises were finding it particularly difficult to determine their positions.

The twentieth meeting of the Supreme Council of Labour on 26 April 1926 confirmed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>245</sup> A.R.K.W.V. and R.K.V.W., De R.K. Werkgever 1926:5, 53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 72: 'Nota, behoorende bij punt 3 der agenda voor de bestuursvergadering van donderdag, 8 april a.s.' (1926) 6-7; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 72: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Donderdag, 11 Maart 1926, des voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te 's-Gravenhage' (1926) 10-1; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 205: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Vrijdag, 8 October 1926 des voormiddags te 10.15 uur in het gebouw van het verbond, Mauritskade 5, Den Haag' (1926) 1; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 232: 'De Werkgever 1926. Jaargang 1926' (1926) 207-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>247</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 72: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Donderdag, 11 Maart 1926, des voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te 's-Gravenhage' (1926) 10-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 205: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het presidium van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, op Woensdag, 7 April 1926 des namiddags te 3 uur, ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te 's-Gravenhage' (1926) 3.

this image. The complete gathering was devoted to a comprehensive discussion of the statutory extension law of Aalberse and the advice of the Commission, and a vote on the desirability of the mechanism.<sup>249</sup> The scientific member De Vooys started the debate by arguing that the knowledge on the impact of collective labour agreements was too limited to introduce statutory extension.<sup>250</sup> Still, he suggested that the available spare cases at the time indicated that the mechanism tended to increase the level of wages and thereby often limited general economic development, increased unemployment and spurred labour unrest due to differences between economic sectors. As Liberal representative of the agricultural sector (*Koninklijk Nederlandsch Landbouw Comité*), De Boer also opposed statutory extension. His main complaint was the negative effect statutory extension would have on the export of Dutch agricultural products, as the sector in The Netherlands was so internationally integrated and the production process relatively labour intensive.<sup>251</sup>

Additionally, Waller of the VNW declared that collective labour agreements themselves first had to be regulated in more detail before statutory extension should be introduced and pointed to the wage-increasing tension of statutory extension which would lead to higher costs for firms, harm export and thereby lead to higher unemployment. 252 Ch. Stulemeyer of the ARKWV, however, supported the proposal with a demonstration of the ideational differences of the Liberal and Christian democratic positions. He argued that whereas statutory extension constituted an impediment on individual freedom for Liberals, harming social peace because of the conflicting nature of individual and society, Christian democrats rather saw statutory extension as a mechanism that could align the individual freedom with societal well-being through solidarity, social peace and mutually beneficial cooperation between labour and business.<sup>253</sup> Additionally, Stulemeyer contested the perceived wage-increasing tension of collective labour agreements and statutory extension by arguing that they would only lead to more stability but not a different level of wages.<sup>254</sup> He also declared that collective labour agreements would never be declared universally applicable when it is unbearable for firms due to the requirement of a request by a large share of the social partners.<sup>255</sup> Van der Linden countered Stulemeyer's argument by stating that some Christian democrats also opposed the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>249</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 2: 'Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.' (1926).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>250</sup> Idem, 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> Idem, 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>252</sup> Idem, 7-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>253</sup> Idem, 8-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>254</sup> Idem, 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>255</sup> Idem, 9-10.

proposal as they pursued a decentralised negotiation process. <sup>256</sup>

A. Plate, Liberal representative of the shipping companies, agreed with the opposing stance of Van der Linden. Although he contended that statutory extension could be beneficial for specific cases where undercutting by a small minority was problematic, Plate argued that it would lead to economic harm in the long run due to the inflexibility of labour conditions it causes, while it is also problematic for companies around the border because of their competitiveness. J.F.H. Spier of the VCWG, though, argued that statutory extension would facilitate the organic development of negotiations between capital and labour, while the government would check that the consensus of these groups would not be too much of an impediment on the general interest. After that, A. Haex, who represented the mining industry in Limburg, motivated his opposition by arguing that there was no legal foundation to force labour conditions upon a firm which was unable to bear the consequences. He also stated that the current debate undervalued the interest of consumers who would face higher prices.

Table 5 demonstrates the results of the successive vote on the desirability of the statutory extension of collective labour agreements.<sup>260</sup> J. Muysken, of the VNW, L. Attema, representing Protestant small- and medium-sized businesses, (*Vereeniging van den Christelijke Handeldrijvenden en Industrieelen Middenstand in Nederland*), and L.N. Deckers who stood for Liberal farmers (*Nederlandsche Boerenbond*) were absent for the vote, while two present members did not vote as shown in Table 6.<sup>261</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>256</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 2: 'Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.' (1926) 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>257</sup> Idem, 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>258</sup> Idem, 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>259</sup> Idem, 15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>260</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 2: 'Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.' (1926) 15; HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1926.' (1927) 9; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 141; Quint, *Twintig jaar Hooge* Raad, 50-1; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 93; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 184; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 141; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 72: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Woensdag, 12 Mei 1926, des voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te 's-Gravenhage' (1926) 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>261</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 2: 'Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.' (1926) 1.

Table 5 Vote of Supreme Council of Labour on statutory extension in 1926<sup>262</sup>

Vote	Member name	Representation	Organisation
For	P.J.M. Aalberse	Scientific	X
(21)	J.D.J. Aengenent	Scientific	X
	P.A. Diepenhorst	Scientific	X
	W.H. Nolens	Scientific	X
	A. Folmer	Public servant	X
	J. Westhoff	Public servant	X
	Ch. Stulemeyer	Business	Algemene R.K. Werkgeversvereniging
	J.F.H. Spier	Business	Christelijke Werkgeversvereniging
	J.A.G.M. van	Business	Nederlandsche R.K. Middenstandsbond op
	Hellenberg Hubar		Federatieven Grondslag
	Joh. Brautigam	Workers	Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	P. Danz	Workers	Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	R. Stenhuis	Workers	Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	F. van der Wal	Workers	Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	F. van der Walle	Workers	Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	A.C. de Bruyn	Workers	R.K. Werkliedenverbond in Nederland
	J.A. Schutte	Workers	R.K. Werkliedenverbond in Nederland
	P.J.S. Serrarens	Workers	R.K. Werkliedenverbond in Nederland
	H. Amelink	Workers	Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond in Nederland
	K. Kruithof	Workers	Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond in Nederland
	M.M. Cohen	Workers	Algemeen Nederlandsch Vakverbond
	L. Veenstra	Workers	Verbond van Vakorganisaties van Hoofdarbeiders in
			Nederland
Agginst	I D do Vooys	Scientific	X
Against (15)	L.P. de Vooys A. Polak	Scientific	X
(13)	H.W. Methorst	Public servant	X
	A.L. Scholtens	Public servant	X
	C.J.Ph. Zaalberg	Public servant	X
	P.W.J.H. Cort van	Business	Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers
	der Linden	Dusiness	verbond van Nederlandsche vverkgevers
	F.G. Waller	Business	Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers
	G.A. Kessler	Business	Nederlandsche Maatschappij van Nijverheid en
	G.A. Kessiei	Dusiness	Handel
	A. Plate	Business	Scheepvaart Vereeniging Noord en Zuid
	A. Haex	Business	Vereeniging tot behartiging van de belangen der
			Limburgsche Mijnindustrie
	F.V. Valstar	Business	Nederlandsche Tuinbouwraad
	D. de Boer	Business	Koninklijk Nederlandsch Landbouw Comité
	J.C. Blankert	Business	Nederlandsche Middenstandsbond
	H. Maters	Workers	National Arbeids-Secretariaat
	B. Lansink Jr.	Workers	Nederlandsch Syndicalistisch Vakverbond
No vote	F.M. Wibaut	Scientific	X
(2)	Chr. Van den Heuvel	Business	Christelijke Boeren- en Tuindersbond in Nederland
(-)			

As suggested within the VNW, the Roman Catholic and Protestant representatives of farmers and small- and medium-sized enterprises seemed to have had difficulty with the proposal when compared with 1923 given their lack of support for the proposal in the vote except the Roman

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>262</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 2: 'Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.' (1926) 15; HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1926.' (1927) 3-5; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 141; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 72: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Woensdag, 12 Mei 1926, des voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te 's-Gravenhage' (1926) 6-7.

Catholic association of small- and medium-sized employers (*Nederlandsche R.K. Middenstandsbond op Federatieven Grondslag*). Due to the shifts of these organisation rather than the peak employers' associations, eight business institutions voted against in 1926 as opposed to four in 1923. As the majority in favour of statutory extension was much smaller and the opposition of business much larger in the 1926 vote, the outcome was received with enthusiasm by the Board of the VNW.<sup>263</sup>

More importantly, the political window of opportunity had shifted in 1925 and 1926 despite the consistent rule of the same Christian democratic parties. As the government had fallen in 1925, Aalberse was replaced by D.A.P.N. Koolen as Minister of Labour, Trade and Industry. After this, Koolen quickly stepped down in 1926 and the Protestant CHU-Minister Slotemaker de Bruine took his place. <sup>264</sup> When compared with Aalberse, his two successors were far more reluctant to introduce statutory extension. <sup>265</sup> Although the Koolen and Slotemaker-de Bruine initially declared to await the response by the Council, the latter ignored the small majority in the Supreme Council for the law proposal by choosing not to pursue statutory extension at that given moment. <sup>266</sup> His motivation showed the differences between Roman Catholics and Protestants as his arguments were quite similar to those of Liberal employers as he used the fundamental point of government interference and pointed to the uncertain link between the wage-increasing tension of statutory extension and prices on which he added the difficult circumstances of the time as an additional problematic factor. <sup>267</sup> Indeed, the CHU was the most critical of the religious political parties concerning statutory extension, even more so than its Protestant counterpart, the ARP. <sup>268</sup>

He now supported an alternative law for further regulation of collective labour agreements to Aalberse's proposal in which the statutory extension mechanism was no longer present. To be sure, the Minister even stated that it was no step towards statutory extension. <sup>269</sup> The law in 1927 would merely establish established equal treatment between organised and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>263</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 72: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Woensdag, 12 Mei 1926, des voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te 's-Gravenhage' (1926) 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>264</sup> Bölger, Organisatorische verhoudingen, 141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>265</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>266</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 232: 'De Werkgever 1926. Jaargang 1926' (1926) 205-6; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 142; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 184-5; Brug and Peer, *Collectief geregeld*, 18; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>267</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 232: 'De Werkgever 1926. Jaargang 1926' (1926) 205-6; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 142.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>268</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 198-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>269</sup> Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 146.

unorganised workers within a single firm but not the more significant element of equal obligations for employers under and out of the collective labour agreement in a certain economic sector which still left the opportunity for unorganised businesses to undercut these contracts.<sup>270</sup> Notwithstanding the heavy initial opposition to the exclusion of statutory extension in parliament, the backlash against the law proposal itself proved to be limited, and the law passed both chambers with only a few amendments.<sup>271</sup> Despite a preference for statutory extension by the Roman Catholics, Socialists (SDAP) and sympathy by the left-leaning Liberals (VDB), the RKSP accepted the Minister's proposal without any amendments, probably to sustain the Cabinet with the Protestant CHU and ARP which were much more divided on the issue and supported the Protestant Minister.<sup>272</sup> The division is shown by the fact that the CNV-leader Smeenk, who also functioned as an MP for the ARP, consistently advocated for statutory extension, before and after the vote.<sup>273</sup> During the vote on the 1927 law itself, however, Smeenk also did not speak up.

To be sure, the right-leaning, economically Liberal *Vrijheidsbond* structurally opposed statutory extension but its share of the seats was relatively small when compared with the parties from the Roman Catholic, Protestant and Socialist pillars.<sup>274</sup> As part of the discussion on the few amendments that actually were postulated, the Roman Catholic MPs Engels and Kuiper heavily criticised the Socialists for pushing compulsory trade union membership which is typical of the Scandinavian bargaining model.<sup>275</sup> The clearly negative stance in the relatively left Roman Catholic pillar towards this system explains why it was never really a realistic option in the Dutch political context. In the end, the law passed comfortably. Sectoral bargaining was not yet established, though. Interestingly, the law decreased the direct benefit of trade union membership, as members now had to be treated equally to non-members.<sup>276</sup> Even though this

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Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1926:40 (Den Haag 1926) 456; Marco H.D. van Leeuwen, 'Collective agreements, unions and welfare in the Netherlands, c. 1910-1960', in: Ad Knotter, Bert Altena and Dirk Damsma ed., *Labour, social policy and the welfare state* (Amsterdam 1997) 73–82, there 73-4; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 74-5; Kouwenhoven, *De dynamiek*, 139; Bölger, *Organisatorische verhoudingen*, 147; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 72; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 14; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 123; Harmsen and Reinalda, *Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid*, 106; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 229; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 186; Van Zanden,, *Een klein land*, 107; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>271</sup> Bölger, Organisatorische verhoudingen, 143, 145; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 181.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 189, 192-3, 197-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>273</sup> Idem, 197-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>274</sup> Idem, 201-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>275</sup> Idem, 191, 194.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>276</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 75.

regulation was no significant concession for Liberal employers compared with statutory extension, since it kept their freedom to choose for either firm-level or sectoral bargaining, their tone remained negative. The VNW argued that the sanctions in the law constituted unequal treatment between employers and workers in the enforcement of their contracts, but they were less assertive out of fear of further reaching reforms.<sup>277</sup> The regulation was also not received with much enthusiasm by the Daily Board of the ARKWV who argued that it left too much vagueness, e.g. for amendments of already existing collective labour agreements, while there was also some sympathy for the uneven sanctions argument.<sup>278</sup>

## 2.5 The establishment of sectoral bargaining

In November 1927, some prominent MPs from Roman Catholic (Kuiper, Kortenhorst and Smeenk) and Socialist parties (Van der Waerden) requested the Minister to introduce statutory extension quickly but the CHU-Minister continued to refute the mechanism. After reconfirming its stance on statutory extension on 28 May 1926, the Supreme Council of Labour would, therefore, have to await the government's policy translation for a long time, until 1936. In this period, the instumrent was, therefore, not much of an issue in the institution. There were some isolated upheavals in the societal debate, however. In this timeframe, changes in the government's stance on sectoral bargaining were generally followed by more attention of the peak employers' associations for the subject.

Between 1929 and 1936, there was enough economic turmoil to establish such political shifts. After a period of relative economic stability, the Great Depression, starting in 1929, had harsh effects on the international economy from which the Netherlands was not able to escape.<sup>281</sup> Initially, the influence of the crisis in the country seemed remarkably limited, but from 1931 onwards, when Germany heavily reduced its international trade as part of a wider protectionist agenda, the impact became more severe. As the Netherlands remained committed to the Golden Standard for a relatively long time and, therefore, became comparatively

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>277</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 232: 'De Werkgever 1926. Jaargang 1926' (1926) 479-80; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 233: 'De Werkgever 1927. Jaargang 1927 no.20' (1927) 255-6; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 233: 'De Werkgever 1927. Jaargang 1927 no.23' (1927) 295-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>278</sup> ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 37: 'Notulen der vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuur der A.R.K.W.V. gehouden op Dinsdag 28 December 1926 des voormiddags te half twaalf uur in "Huize Voorhout" te 's Gravenhage' (1926) 2-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>279</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 181.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>280</sup> HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1932.' (1933) 13; HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1937.' (1938) 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>281</sup> Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 288; Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 296; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 246; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 164; Van Zanden, *Een klein land*, 141; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 214.

expensive, it was not able to get out of the economic downturn for seven years, resulting in gradually increasing unemployment numbers with a peak of thirty-three per cent in 1936.<sup>282</sup> Labour conflict was widespread in the depression period, but the relationship between the representatives of trade unions and employers' associations became better over time as both parties saw the need for cooperation in the grim economic tide.<sup>283</sup> Politically, instability also increased although the changes were still limited considering the economic difficulties. While the Cabinet Ruijs de Beerenbrouck III (1929-1933) continued the long-term rule of the RKSP, CHU and ARP, they were no longer able to govern on their own during the course of the Great Depression due to rising popular discontent and, therefore, also incorporated the right-leaning Liberal LSP (previously the *Vrijheidsbond*) and left-leaning Liberal VDB in Cabinet Colijn II (1933-1935) and Colijn III (1935-1937).<sup>284</sup>

Just before the crisis, the government had drafted a new proposal for statutory extension which was received with much enthusiasm by the RKVW as it largely followed their suggestions. <sup>285</sup> Once again, Van der Linden and COAW-Chair J. Goedkoop had pointed to the danger of these statutory extension proposals in a meeting of the General Board of the VNW in as following the proposal would mean that labour conditions were (partly) established by institutions outside of the industrial process. <sup>286</sup> Under the new Cabinet Ruijs de Beerenbrouck III, Verschuur now became Minister of Labour, Trade and industry and declared in 1930 that he was willing to establish statutory extension of collective labour agreements in the short term. <sup>287</sup> Despite this shift, the VNW consolidated its opposing stance with similar arguments to the previous debates. In a General Assembly in 1930, H.P. Gelderman, the new Chair of the VNW and Managing director of the textile company *H.P. Gelderman & Zonen N.V.*, used the diversity within economic sectors to foster his argument since sectoral agreements would not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>282</sup> Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 237; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 68; Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 296-7; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 223, 230; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 164; Van Zanden, *Een klein land*, 151-2; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 216-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>283</sup> Hoefnagels, Een eeuw sociale problematiek, 223-5; Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>284</sup> Wielenga, Geschiedenis van Nederland, 283, 300-1; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 218-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>285</sup> ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 14: 'Notulen Vergadering secretarissen R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen op Dinsdag 9 October 1928, Den Haag' (1928) 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>286</sup> COAW, 2.19.103.04, inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van Centraal Overleg op 20 september 1929 des namiddags twee uur in de Industrieele Club te Amsterdam.' (1929).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>287</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 73: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Donderdag 19 December 1929, des voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, Mauritskade 5, 's-Gravenhage' (1929) 11; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 146: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de Buitengewone Algemene vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. 20 Maart 1930 te Amsterdam in de Industrieele Club.' (1930) 4, 6-7; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 244.

be able to address all these divergences and, therefore, issue harm.<sup>288</sup> The individual contract freedom and the competition argument were also still widely used, sometimes using a new example.<sup>289</sup> To illustrate, *De Werkgever* used the German potato market to demonstrate that statutory extension would limit competition and thereby increase the prices for consumers.

When the crisis deepened the attention of the societal debate mainly shifted to another statutory extension mechanism, though. In these turbulent times, the focus of social policy was strictly on the issue of unemployment, and there was only limited support for the statutory extension mechanism of collective labour agreements which was still widely regarded as a wage-increasing measure while employers called for lower wages which would enable them to increase employment.<sup>290</sup> With the new Cabinet Colijn II in 1933, Slotemaker de Bruine came in charge of the relevant Ministry again, and the window of opportunity for a general mechanism of statutory extension for collective labour agreements disappeared as he stated that it was untenable given the economic circumstances of the time.<sup>291</sup> Due to the economic tide of the time, the government rather started to actively pursue socio-economic policies in the course of the 1930s which limited competition and promoted agreements between firms to increase the employment and profits of the companies.<sup>292</sup> Cartel agreements were, thus, widely accepted and even regarded as a measure to soften the impact of the crisis. Illustratively, a new law in 1935 on cartels gave industry an improved position. The law formalised the role of cartels in the Dutch socio-economic system by constituting an extension mechanism of agreements between firms in a certain sector to the whole sector to prevent undercutting by other players in the market.<sup>293</sup>

This law provides a test case for the genuineness of the more ideational individual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>288</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 146: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de Buitengewone Algemene vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. 20 Maart 1930 te Amsterdam in de Industrieele Club.' (1930) 3, 5. <sup>289</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 235: 'De Werkgever 1930. Jaargang 1930 no.26' (1930) 407; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 235: 'De Werkgever 1930. Jaargang 1930 no.34' (1930) 537; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 235: 'De Werkgever 1931. Jaargang 1931 no.2' (1931) 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>290</sup> Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 234; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 69; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 223-4; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 232, 244.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>291</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 236: 'De Werkgever 1932. Jaargang 1932 no.49' (1932) 689; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 236: 'De Werkgever 1933. Jaargang 1933 no.50' (1933) 599-600.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> Bram Bouwens and Joost Dankers, 'The invisible handshake. Cartelisation in the Netherlands, 1930–1980', *Business History Review* 84:4 (2010) 751–771, there 754; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 166-7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> Bouwens and Dankers, 'The invisible handshake', 755; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 113; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 75; Van Waarden,, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 257; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 83; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 237; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 166-7; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 134.

contract freedom argument as it involved a similar statutory extension mechanism but one which would be beneficial to large, export-oriented companies. The archives of the peak employers' associations largely indicate the consistency of these business organisations' stances to both statutory extension mechanisms. On the one hand, the Board of the VNW and a majority of its General Assembly opposed the introduction of this law on cartel agreements as it would give the government the power to disentangle established agreements (1), give trade unions more influence in economic affairs (2) and an isolated argument that it would constitute an impediment on individualism (3).<sup>294</sup> For several members, however, practical concerns seem to have had more weight than the fundamental ones. Some business' representatives of the Textile industry in Twente were in favour of the statutory extension concerning cartel agreements to fight the economic tide.<sup>295</sup> The association, therefore, did not oppose all cooperation between firms in the extremely difficult economic times, while a significant share of the members even backed the law.<sup>296</sup>

On the other hand, there was consensus in a meeting of the Daily Board of the ARKWV and the representatives of the different associations under the Roman Catholic employer confederation in 1933 on the support of a statutory extension mechanism for economic agreements, e.g. on prices and production, to fight the economic crisis by limiting the competition between firms.<sup>297</sup> Some members also suggested to include the instrument concerning collective labour agreements in the proposals, but there was wide sympathy that it was a difficult economic moment to introduce such a mechanism although it was desirable when the crisis would have gone away. The Law on cartel agreements in 1935 established the statutory extension mechanism for economic contracts and was, therefore, warmly welcomed by the ARKWV and the Roman Catholic Confederation in their publication *De R.K.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>294</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 209: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium en de verbondsdelegatie uit den Nijverheidsraad op Maandag, 11 Juni 1934 des n.m. 9 uur ten kantore van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1934) 1-3; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 156: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de Buitengewone Algemene Ledenvergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Vrijdag, 22 Februari 1935 te Amsterdam, in het Koloniaal Instituut.' (1935) 4-5; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 209: 'Kort verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium op Vrijdag, 11 Januari 1935.' (1935) 2-3; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 167.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>295</sup> Van Waarden,, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 257; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 247.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>296</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 156: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de Buitengewone Algemene Ledenvergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Vrijdag, 22 Februari 1935 te Amsterdam, in het Koloniaal Instituut.' (1935) 7, 10, 22, 29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>297</sup> ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 14: 'Gecombineerde vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuur der A.R.K.W.V. met de besturen van het bij het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen aangesloten patroonsbonden, op Maandag 10 Juli te Tilburg' (1933) 5-7.

## Werkgever.<sup>298</sup>

According to authors such as Windmuller and Hoefnagels, the possibility for employers to establish collective cartel agreements made it difficult for employers to block statutory extension of collective labour agreements as their old economic point of price increases and ideational argument of individual contract freedom were no longer sustainable now that such government intervention via extension was normalised and prices could be controlled given the law of 1935.<sup>299</sup> Although this may have been a political reality, there is no such evidence in the position of peak employers' associations as their stances show great consistency with their viewpoints in the earlier period. Minister Slotemaker-de Bruine had made clear that he solely supported statutory extension of secondary labour conditions such as vacation days and wanted to exclude wages from the instrument. When Minister Slingenberg replaced him in the Cabinet Colijn III in 1935, however, the new official issued a new proposal for statutory extension, after initially refusing to do so because of the economic conditions.<sup>300</sup>

Given these circumstances, the VNW initially decided to consolidate its opposing stance towards sectoral bargaining, and thereby the proposed law, which is typical of the remarkable stability of the genuine preferences of the peak employers' associations on this issue. 301 As might be expected, the right-leaning Liberal LSP was also highly critical of the law. 302 Importantly, the ARP and CHU, in particular, had changed their stance, though, and backed the renewed statutory extension proposal next to the Roman Catholic RKSP and left-leaning Liberal VDB, making a clear majority favour the law. 303 The inclusion of the mechanism to disentangle the collective contracts was of particular importance for the CHU in this shift. Despite its enthusiasm for statutory extension, the Socialist SDAP was critical of the new law proposal because of the inclusion of the mechanism to declare collective labour agreements disapplicable. 304 As the support for the law proved to be too great, however, the VNW

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>298</sup> Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1935:9 (Den Haag 1935) 108.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>299</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 75; Hoefnagels, *Een eeuw sociale problematiek*, 238; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 186; Brug and Peer, *Collectief geregeld*, 18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>300</sup> ARKWV and RKVW, De R.K. Werkgever 1936:50, 600; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 245, 264.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>301</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 78: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op Donderdag 10 December 1936, des n.m. 1.30 uur, ten kantore van het verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1936) 8; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 263

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>302</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 264.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>303</sup> Idem, 251, 254, 260.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>304</sup> Idem, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 255-6.

strategically tried to limit the extensity of the statutory extension mechanism by changing its stance to just opposing statutory extension of wages and prices instead of the whole instrument, despite some internal opposition against this shift.<sup>305</sup> If Minister Slingenberg excluded wages from the statutory extension of collective labour agreements, the VNW would be available for negotiations on a mechanism for the other labour conditions.

In the end, the law of 1937 established statutory extension by the Minister of Social Affairs (and Employment) in a framework similar to the cartel law of 1935, although the Socialists decided to keep themselves from voting. 306 The government ignored the VNW's offer and only partly followed the Supreme Council of Labour's recommendation of 1926. The most important adjustment was the inclusion of a mechanism for the government to disentangle collective labour agreements, but this was merely controversial with Socialist political parties and trade unions instead of business' representatives who recognised like the Cabinet that it was necessary to compensate for the inflexibility of collective labour agreements under extreme circumstances such as the recently experienced Great Depression. 307 As the Cabinet threatened to retract the full proposal when such a mechanism would not be accepted, as it was already a compromise for the governing parties, the Socialists abstained from voting on the specific instrument, and the law was passed. Statutory extension was now established. Interestingly, the LSP tried to follow-up on the idea of the VNW by introducing an amendment to the law that would exclude wages from statutory extension, but this was refused by the Dutch parliament. 308 Importantly, the sectoral bargaining framework was shaped in such a way that the government

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>305</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 237: 'De Werkgever 1936. Jaargang 1936 no.38' (1936) 447; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 79: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Vrijdag, 5 November 1937, des n.m. 2.30 uur ten kantore van het verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, Den Haag' (1937) 7-8.

<sup>306</sup> Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 165-6; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 76; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 286; Van Waarden, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 257; Kouwenhoven, De dynamiek, 139-40; Van Leeuwen, 'Collective agreements', 74; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen, 72; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 93; P.S. Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements in the Netherlands', in: Adolf Sturmthal ed., Contemporary collective bargaining in seven countries. Cornell international industrial and labor relations reports 4 (Ithaca 1957) 98–126, there 101; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, Loonvorming en loonpolitiek, 13; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 106-7; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, Naar groter eenheid, 83; Hoefnagels, Een eeuw sociale problematiek, 238; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 229; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 187; Van Zanden, Een klein land, 107; Brug and Peer, Collectief geregeld, 18; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 26, 134; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 237: 'De Werkgever 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.12' (1937) 135; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 259, 268.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>307</sup> Quint, Twintig jaar Hooge</sup> Raad, 51; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 244-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>308</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 264.

now had the legal instrument to steer the bargaining process.<sup>309</sup>

The reception of the law by business' representatives shows the differences the peak employers' associations of the Liberal pillar on the one hand and the Roman Catholic as well as the Protestant organisations on the other hand. As the final law included the statutory extension of wages, the VNW reacted disappointed pointing to the wage- and price-increasing tension and the inflexibility of this measure. To the contrary, the formal establishment of statutory extension was received with great delight by the external publication 'De Werkgever' of the Protestant employers of the VCWG, using the same title as their Liberal counterparts, who praised it as an achievement of Christian social thought. The Roman Catholic employers of the ARKWV showed a similar stance by expressing their gratitude and relief to Minister Slingenberg for the establishment of the statutory extension mechanism for collective labour agreements similar to Aalberse's proposal in the mid-twenties despite consistent opposition of the VNW.

#### 2.6 Theoretical reflection

The business positions of the peak employers' associations show remarkable consistency from the early statutory extension debate after 1918 up to the reaction on the final law in 1937, as shown by internal discussions and external publications of these institutions as well as their voting behaviour. Despite political and economic disruptions as well as internal opposition, Roman Catholic and Protestant peak employers' associations structurally favoured statutory extension, while their Liberal counterparts strongly opposed it. The business organisations of farmers and the small- and medium-sized enterprises were an exception, however, as the viewpoints of the Roman Catholic and Protestant employers' associations for these groups became more negative to the mechanism when comparing the 1923 and 1926 vote in the Supreme Council of Labour.

Interestingly, a more thorough analysis of the stances of employers in 1923 demonstrated that the representatives of export-oriented sectors tended to an opposing stance,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>309</sup> Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 108; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 187; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 77; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 286; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 166.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>310</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 237: 'De Werkgever 1936. Jaargang 1936 no.50' (1936) 591-2; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 237: 'De Werkgever 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.11' (1937) 127-8, 130; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 237: 'De Werkgever 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.12' (1937) 135.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>311</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 252: 'Kroniek 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.4. 29 Januari' (1937) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>312</sup> ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 49: 'Notulen der vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuursvergadering der A.K.W.V. Federatie op Maandag 22 Maart 1937 om 10.30 uur v.m. Lange Voorhout 19, 's Gravenhage' (1937) 17; ARKWV and RKVW, *De R.K. Werkgever* 1936:50, 599-600.

whereas those organisations in a sector with a domestic focus were generally more favourable towards the instrument. This pattern is not able to explain the full variation in the business' positions in 1923, though. Even the VNW had to concede that the export-oriented industry was relatively well-represented in the AWRKV that supported the mechanism 'for historical and political reasons'. Indeed, the divide between proponents and opponents makes clear that the ideational commitment of employers' associations also played a major role in addition to sectoral divergences. By following their socio-cultural pillar, a large share of Roman Catholic and Protestant employers established a certain degree of cross-class solidarity and broke the business opposition against sectoral bargaining.

Power played a relatively important role in explaining these attitudes. According to the existing theoretical perspectives, control over labour would be the major reason for employers to oppose sectoral bargaining. Although the formal recognition of trade unions as such and their proper role in social affairs (industrial citizenship) was merely still an issue for a small share of employers in the study period, Liberal employers' representatives repetitively pointed to the (threat of the) increasing strength of labour as a motivation to oppose statutory extension. They often used a slippery slope argument that portrayed statutory extension as the first step towards a PBO and a Socialist state in which workers would also have major control over economic affairs.

In the business' representatives' arguments, industrial peace plays an interesting role as it is used as a motivation by both proponents and opponents of the statutory extension mechanism. Those who favoured sectoral bargaining pointed to the value of collective labour agreements to promote industrial peace and the threat of the undercutting of these contracts by unorganised workers and employers to the sustainability of this state as the major reason to support statutory extension. Those who were against the mechanism argued that it would constitute an impediment on the individual contract freedom of employers. By forcing (unbearable) labour conditions on these businesses, the government would risk industrial peace rather than facilitate it. Interestingly, the industrial peace argument was, therefore, not used as a way of strategic accommodation as suggested by the theoretical framework, but instead to support the genuine viewpoints of the peak employers' associations.

Concerning strategic accommodation, revolutionary tendencies may have played a role in the political agenda-setting of statutory extension, but they were not enough for the creation of sectoral bargaining as such and did not prevent Liberal employers from heavily opposing the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>313</sup> VNW, inv.no. 235: 'De Werkgever 1930. Jaargang 1930 no.26' (1930) 408.

mechanism from 1918 until 1936. If anything, economic and political circumstances were preventing rather than promoting the introduction of the system as contextual factors since there was still a lot of uncertainty on its effects, making the governments unwilling to implement the instrument in difficult economic times. The only clear case of strategic accommodation was the VNW's effort in 1936 to avert the proposed statutory extension of wages by showing its willingness to talk about a more limited instrument for secondary labour conditions when this part would be dropped.

Business interests were an important motivational factor for opponents of the instrument as well. Following theoretical expectations, business' representatives that were against the extension mechanism generally pointed to its (perceived) wage-increasing tension which would be particularly problematic for firms that competed on the international market, especially during difficult economic times. The limited flexibility of sectoral bargaining was also an important motivation to oppose this negotiation system and also the reason that the power for the Minister to declare collective labour agreements inapplicable was not so controversial among employers after it was clear that statutory extension would be established. Remarkably, business interest arguments were no major motivational factor for proponents of statutory extension as such.

Rather these employers emphasised the importance of ideational factors in combination with the earlier presented undercutting argument to make their case. A system of sectoral bargaining fitted particularly well in Roman Catholic thought as a middle ground between solidarity and subsidiarity. As statutory extension was framed as facilitating instead of limiting self-regulation through the negotiations between business' and workers' representatives, it was also widely supported by Protestant employers. Liberal employers still saw government involvement as a reason to oppose the mechanism, though, and not merely because of power concerns. The ideational element of its objection against such interference by the Board of the VNW was demonstrated by its negative stance on The law on cartel agreements in 1935 as it was an alternative statutory extension mechanism which could economically benefit its members in contrast with the instrument related to collective labour agreements.

The statutory extension case also demonstrates the significance of contextual factors. The relevance of ideational commitment implicates the importance of knowledge. Ideational created the link between statutory extension and the socio-cultural thought in the pillar to make it into a favourable arrangement. These actors were particularly active in the Roman Catholic pillar. While Veraart is widely mentioned as such a player in the historiography, the role of Kortenhorst in providing this linkage for Roman Catholic employers is significantly

undervalued. Knowledge and the political environment were also relevant in delaying the introducing statutory extension mechanism. Due to the uncertainty on the instruments' economic effects and the change of relevant ministers, it took much longer to establish sectoral bargaining than one expects when purely looking at the societal debate. This may also explain why proponents of statutory extension were relatively reluctant in using economic arguments. The widely perceived wage-increasing tension of statutory extension can also be viewed as an example of common knowledge as it led to broad sympathy for delaying the mechanism under difficult circumstances. Due to the enormous increase in unemployment during the Great Depression, employers could also use their structural power to postpone statutory extension by stating that higher wages would harm employment which they had to generate.

In addition, a significant role was played by historical regularities, however. The fact that the pillarised socio-cultural landscape played a vital role in establishing cross-class solidarity underlines the importance of historical regularities for the establishment of sectoral bargaining in the Netherlands. The historical experience with collective labour agreements as a way of shaping industrial relations provided an important motivation as well. For Roman Catholic and Protestant employers it was a motivation to support statutory extension as a means to consolidate collective bargaining, and for more radical Liberal employers such as the VNF who already disliked these contracts, it was a reason to oppose it heavily.

# 3. Centralised bargaining (1944-1954)

The second chapter of this thesis analyses the debate among the business community on the step from sectoral to centralised bargaining between 1944 and 1954. When moving to this case, it is important to notice that a world war preceded both collective bargaining steps. When evaluating their relevance for the establishment of centralised bargaining, an essential difference between these conflicts is their impact on the political and economic circumstances of The Netherlands, though. Whereas the economic damage of the First World War to the Dutch economy had been largely limited to the reduction of international trade, destruction after the Second World War was more widespread and had also severely harmed the country's physical infrastructure and production capacity. This impact translated into enormous unemployment

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>314</sup> F.J.F.M. Duynstee and J. Bosmans, *Het kabinet-Schermerhorn-Drees* (1945-1946). Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945 1 (Assen 1977) 15; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 163-4, 172 204-5; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 25; Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 330; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 248; Herman de Liagre Böhl 'Consensus en polarisatie. De kwaliteit van de democratie 1945-2000', in: Remieg Aerts e.a. ed., *Land van kleine gebaren: een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-2012* (eighth revised edition; Amsterdam 2013) 283–

and a structural shortage on its balance of payments in the aftermath of the war, while the Dutch economy also became more limited in terms of natural resources as the Netherlands quickly lost control over its colonies.

Under these difficult circumstances, the government started a period of strict, centralised wage control, guidance of prices and stimulation of industrial production to prevent inflation, attract investment, increase export, reduce the current account deficit and promote employment after the liberation of the south of the Netherlands in 1944.<sup>315</sup> The most remarkable element of this agenda was the centrally enforced Guided Wage Policy, which heavily impeded on the sectoral bargaining process of employers'and workers' representatives.<sup>316</sup> Given the status quo of a centralised bargaining system led by the government, employers debated two major questions between 1944 and 1954 concerning the Dutch industrial system: to what extent the formation of primary labour conditions had to remain centralised (1) and if so, to what extent the government had to stay in charge of this process (2)?<sup>317</sup> As this thesis analyses the stances of business' representatives concerning the bargaining level, the first question is the main focus of this empirical chapter. As both discussions overlap, the investigation also touches upon the second debate, but the discussion as a whole is not essential for solving the research problem and is, therefore, not the focus of this thesis.

# 3.1 The heritage of Nazi occupation

When moving to the business debate on the centralised bargaining status quo in the post-war period, it is necessary to start by placing the model in its historical context through a reflection on the adjustments to the system during and directly after the Second World War. The major challenge of this undertaking is that there is relatively little data on the positions of the employers' associations as the creation of the main structure of the post-war bargaining system

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<sup>349,</sup> there 285; Van Zanden, Een klein land, 170-1; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 281; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 271, 320.

Zanden, Nederland en het poldermodel, 248-9; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 26, 139, 168; Theodorus B. C. Mulder, Loonvorming in overleg: gedragingen van het georganiseerde bedrijfsleven in Nederland na de tweede wereldoorlog (Assen 1956) 19, 30; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 108-9; Wielenga, Geschiedenis van Nederland, 332; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, Loonvorming en loonpolitiek, 16; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 255-6; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, Naar groter eenheid, 148; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 229; Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 7; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 217-8; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, 10 jaar C. S. W. V., 17, 26; Van Zanden, Een klein land, 170; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 281; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: 'Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen' (1952) 2; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 366-7.

Kan, *De Nederlandse overlegeconomie: een kritische balans* (Den Haag 1993) 7; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 74; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 266; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 256. <sup>317</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 126.

through the introduction of the Extraordinary Decree on Labour relations (Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen; BBA) by the government in exile happened relatively sudden and occurred in a period from which comparatively little archive files are available as employers' representatives had to operate in secrecy. As a consequence, it is difficult to directly reconstruct the positions of the employer community regarding these vital systemic changes. This thesis applies a two-part strategy to reconstruct employers' preferences under these difficult conditions. Firstly, paragraph 3.1 addresses the development of the Dutch industrial landscape during the Second World War and contains a reconstruction of the stances of employers' representatives towards these changes to the extent that this is possible given the limitations of the sources. Secondly, the stances of the employer community on the introduction of the centralised bargaining system are also indirectly reconstructed through a comprehensive analysis of the viewpoints of the employer community in the well-documented post-war period. Although it is difficult to determine the genuine preferences of the business community because of the strategic incentives created by the new status quo, an elaborate analysis of the development of its attitudes between 1944 and 1954 under changing external conditions still gives important insights in the (initial) preferences of the employers' associations.

The first part of the investigation starts with the Nazi take-over in 1940. After a short period of limited interference in socio-economic life, the new regime severely changed the industrial landscape of the Netherlands. Firstly, it aimed to unite employers' representatives in a single institution by pushing the creation of the Board of Directors for labour affairs (*Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidzaken; RBA*) in 1941, in which the VNW, RKVW, VPCW and COAW took part.<sup>318</sup> On the labour side, the Nazis took control of trade unions or disbanded them.<sup>319</sup> Since there were no longer legitimate representatives of employees in the bargaining process, the employers' associations declared that they would not take part in collective negotiations any longer and were also disbanded as a response.<sup>320</sup> The reaction of the business associations

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RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 6: 'Betr: Oprichting Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken' (1941) 1-3; RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 6: 'Een Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken' (1941) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>319</sup> Duynstee and Bosmans, *Het kabinet-Schermerhorn-Drees*, 54; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 85; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 74; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 290-1; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 117; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 105; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 227; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 28-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>320</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05. inv.no. 32: 'Kort verslag van het verhandelde van de Algemene Ledenvergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op donderdag 26 Juli 1945 des namiddags 1 uur in de Stadsschouwburg te Utrecht' (1945) 1; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 16: 'Notulen van de Gecombineerde Vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der Algemene Kath. Werkgeversvereeniging en van de Besturen der bij het R.K. Verbond aangesloten vakvereenigingen, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 November 1945 te Tilburg' (1945) W.93; Mulder, Loonvorming in overleg, 11; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 93;

suggests that at least a majority within these institutions recognised the role of trade unions in the collective bargaining system and committed itself to the establishment of labour conditions through a process of negotiations with these representatives. Secondly, the Germans centralised the sectoral bargaining model and put the control over this process in the hands of the already existing government mediators (*rijksbemiddelaars*) who had been separately handling specific labour disputes under the authority of the Minister of Labour, Trade and Industry (and later Ministry of Social Affairs) since the enactment of the Law on labour disputes in 1923. As they now had a vital collective role in industrial relations, they came to be known as the Government Mediation Board (*College van Rijksbemiddelaars*). This governmental organ also got the power to issue binding wage declarations and force wage levels upon the social partners. In 1942, however, the new rulers decided to align the Dutch bargaining model with the German system by moving the wage formation authority from the Government Mediation Board to the *Gemachtigde voor den arbeid*, which was merely one individual instead of a collective. This situation continued until the liberation of the South of the Netherlands in 1944.

It was only after this regime change that the trade unions and employers' associations were able to pick up their official activities again. During the conflict, the most important representatives of the social partners still met regularly in the informal sphere, though, leading to the creation of the Labour Foundation (*Stichting van de Arbeid*; StAR) in 1945.<sup>324</sup> According

Dirk U. Stikker, Memoires: herinneringen uit de lange jaren waarin ik betrokken was bij de voortdurende wereldcrisis (Rotterdam 1966) 38-9; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 274.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>321</sup> Gerardus C. J. Kuijs, *De vrees voor wat niet kwam nieuwe arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland 1935-1945, aan het voorbeeld van de Twentse textielindustrie* (Amsterdam 2010) 381, 489; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 41; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 87, 131; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 290; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 14-5; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 303-4; Harmsen and Reinalda, *Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid*, 245; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 148; Duynstee and Bosmans, *Het kabinet-Schermerhorn-Drees*, 410; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 76.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>322</sup> Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 41-2; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 76; Kuijs, *De vrees voor wat niet kwam*, 381; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 87; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 290; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 15; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 305.

Mulder, Loonvorming in overleg, 17; Duynstee and Bosmans, Het kabinet-Schermerhorn-Drees, 411; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 87-8; Kuijs, De vrees voor wat niet kwam, 501; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 245-6; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, Naar groter eenheid, 148; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 43; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 280.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>324</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 97: 'Afschrift 250-A-18' (1945) 1-2; VNW, 2.19.103.05. inv.no. 32: 'Kort verslag van het verhandelde van de Algemene Ledenvergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op donderdag 26 Juli 1945 des namiddags 1 uur in de Stadsschouwburg te Utrecht' (1945) 1-2; Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 34, 36-7, 84; Duynstee and Bosmans, Het kabinet-Schermerhorn-Drees, 55; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 120; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 205; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 95, 133; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros,

to one of the major spokesmen of the Liberal employers at the time, Dirk U. Stikker, Director at the brewing company Heineken, there was a sense among representatives of employees and employers that industrial relations during reconstruction had to be characterised by mutually beneficial cooperation through an institutional framework, again signifying widespread acceptance within the employer community of the role of trade unions in the social sphere.<sup>325</sup> There was a dispute among these business' representatives on the structure of this arrangement, however. Whereas the Catholic business' representatives under the leadership of Kortenhorst aimed for a corporatist, public institution to shape such collaboration, prominent members of the Liberal employers' association wanted a solution in the private sphere, less affected by government influence and, therefore, also less dependent on the reconstruction of the Dutch public administration.<sup>326</sup> Rather than the top-down approach of the Supreme Council of Labour spurred by government representatives, Liberals wanted the Labour Foundation to function bottom-up with a private law basis.<sup>327</sup> The VNW-member Molenaar, therefore, proposed to start the Labour Foundation as an autonomous and private organisation of employers and employees to regulate social issues and proved successful in convincing the other representatives.<sup>328</sup>

Despite the debate on the fundamental structure of the institution, the founders of the Labour Foundation agreed that the goals and privileges of the organisation had to be ambitious. The willingness to give the Labour Foundation a central coordinative function regarding the collective bargaining process including the ability to issue binding decrees determining labour conditions, as indicated by the statutes of the organisation, is the clearest example of this state of mind. For this coordinative function, the statutes established a far-reaching, hierarchical control of the Board of the Labour Foundation over the employers' associations and trade unions on the lower level. From the business side, the Board of Directors for Labour Affairs

Arbeidsverhoudingen, 74-5; Scholten, De Sociaal-Economische Raad, 60; Mulder, Loonvorming in overleg, 11-2; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 104; Stikker, Memoires, 30; Wielenga, Geschiedenis van Nederland, 327; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 276, 284, 287; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 244; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, Naar groter eenheid, 143; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 227; Van Zanden, Een klein land, 112.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>325</sup> Stikker, *Memoires*, 30; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 98; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 37; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 286.

<sup>326</sup> Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 120-1; Stikker, Memoires, 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>327</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 20, 37.

Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 98; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 120; Stikker, *Memoires*, 43; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 97: 'Afschrift 250-A-18' (1945)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>329</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 97: 'Afschrift 250-A-18' (1945) 3; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 122; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 133; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 288; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 16.

became the overarching institution in this system where the peak employers' organisations met the representatives of the small- and medium-sized enterprises and agricultural employers. After the war, this institution continued to be the formal meeting platform of employers, where they agreed on their common business stance concerning wage policy and decided whom to delegate to the consultative structures with representatives of the trade unions such as the newly created Labour Foundation.<sup>330</sup> At the same time, the Contact Commission functioned as a more informal meeting platform of the peak employers' associations, similar to the Council of peak employers' associations before the Second World War.<sup>331</sup>

It is important to realise that the statutes of the Labour Foundation were enacted after the centralisation of the Dutch bargaining system through the BBA, which is addressed in more depth in the next section, and a relatively small share of business' and workers' representatives was responsible for the creation of the institution. It is, therefore, not possible to conclude from the statutes that the employer community showed a genuine interest in the centralisation of the Dutch bargaining system under the difficult post-war conditions. At the same time, however, the small share of the workers' and business' representatives who created the Labour Foundation was widely accepted as the leadership of these groups and the ambitious statutes of the Labour Foundation indicate that they challenged the leadership of the centralised bargaining model by the government under the difficult direct post-war conditions rather than fiercely opposing a system of central coordination itself.

Up to the creation of the Labour Foundation, there were some other changes in the landscape of employers' associations in between the first and second case that also have to be mentioned (see Figure 4). Before the war, the Protestant VCWG changed its name into the Association of Protestant-Christian Employers in the Netherlands (*Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland; VPCW*). Similar rebrandings occurred in the Catholic pillar in this period as the ARKWV turned into the General Catholic Employers Association (*Algemene Katholieke Werkgeversvereniging; AKWV*), while the RKVW became the Catholic Confederation of Employer Associations (*Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen; KVW*). In 1945, the COAW was also transformed into the Central Social Employers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>330</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 16: 'Notulen van de Gecombineerde Vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der Algemene Kath. Werkgeversvereeniging en van de Besturen der bij het R.K. Verbond aangesloten vakvereenigingen, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 November 1945 te Tilburg' (1945) W.93-4; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 25; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 13; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 254; Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 54.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>331</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 355.

<sup>332</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 293

Confederation (*Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-verbond; CSWV*), which preserved its predecessors' focus on social affairs, i.e. industrial relations, but controversially now also included representatives of the KVW and VPCW next to the VNW, and thereby came to be seen as the overarching institution of large businesses with a central role in the RBA.<sup>333</sup>




Figure 4 Main peak employers' associations in 1945<sup>334</sup>

#### 3.2 The consolidation of central socio-economic control

As mentioned in the previous section, the centralisation of the Dutch bargaining system preceded the establishment of the Labour Foundation. Just after the liberation of the south of the Netherlands in 1944, the government in London, made up by representatives of the Roman Catholic RKSP, Protestant ARP and CHU, Socialist SDAP, left-leaning Liberal VDB, right-leaning Liberal LSP and non-party members, had already issued the Extraordinary Decree on Labour relations (BBA) to structure the new industrial landscape.<sup>335</sup> Similar to the model of the

Gecombineerde Vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der Algemene Kath. Werkgeversvereeniging en van de Besturen der bij het R.K. Verbond aangesloten vakvereenigingen, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 November 1945 te Tilburg' (1945) W.93, 98-9; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 117; Van Waarden,, 'Regulering en Belangenorganisaties', 236; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 32: 'Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, op 17 april 1945 te Utrecht gehouden' (1945) 1; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 355.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>334</sup> Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 293; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 112.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>335</sup> Duynstee and Bosmans, *Het kabinet-Schermerhorn-Drees*, 410; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 87, 106; Rinnooy Kan, *De Nederlandse overlegeconomie*, 29; Mulder,

German rulers before 1942, this emergency measure enforced a centralised bargaining system where the Government Mediation Board controlled the formation of wages and labour conditions and was only accountable to the Minister of Social Affairs (from 1951 Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health). Prices were also heavily regulated to ensure a certain level of purchasing power. Through the statutes of the Labour Foundation, the leaders of the peak employers' associations primarily challenged the role of the government in the centralised bargaining system through the Mediation Board by presenting the Labour Foundation as the alternative central coordinator rather than opposing central coordination as such.

Due to the enormous, far-reaching ambitions of the Labour Foundation, the London government responded to the organisational initiative with little enthusiasm. The cabinet feared that the Labour Foundation would establish an enormous concentration of power concerning socio-economic affairs with very limited to no public control.<sup>337</sup> Business' representatives challenged the far-reaching government involvement and the exclusion of the social partners in the central coordination process, however. In a meeting of the VNW's General Assembly, VNW-Chair H.F. Gelderman, who had a background in the textile sector, expressed his disappointment with the status quo which he saw as a continuation of the heavy impediment on the individual, economic freedom of entrepreneurs imposed during the war.<sup>338</sup> Despite the necessity of a heavier role of the government in the immediate post-war era, he pointed to the danger of a permanent consolidation of the system through an agenda of state socialism.<sup>339</sup> According to Gelderman, the government merely needed to play a reserved controlling function where business was concerned, leaving employers able to manage their own companies, among other things through the Labour Foundation.<sup>340</sup>

After the liberation of the whole country, post-war elections were called, and the four-

Loonvorming in overleg, 15; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 245; Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 72.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>336</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 76-7; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 88, 106, 122, 124-5; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 169; Scholten, De Sociaal-Economische Raad, 270; Mulder, Loonvorming in overleg, 15-6; Duynstee and Bosmans, Het kabinet-Schermerhorn-Drees, 412; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 310; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 44-5; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, 10 jaar C. S. W. V., 6; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 16: 'Notulen van de Gecombineerde Vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der Algemene Kath. Werkgeversvereeniging en van de Besturen der bij het R.K. Verbond aangesloten vakvereenigingen, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 November 1945 te Tilburg' (1945) W.100-1; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 303-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>337</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 42, 56-7; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 99; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 288; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 44-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>338</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 32: 'Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, op 17 april 1945 te Utrecht gehouden' (1945) 2-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>339</sup> Idem, 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>340</sup> Idem, 5-6.

party Schermerhorn-Drees cabinet (1945-1946) was formed, consisting of the RKSP (from 1946 onwards KVP), ARP, SDAP and VFB (both become part of the PVDA in 1946).<sup>341</sup> Due to the increasing opposition against the BBA, this new government introduced the adjusted BBA which formally recognised the Labour Foundation and gave it a central advisory role while emphasising that the measure was only to be temporary until the end of the reconstruction period. Whereas the decision power remained in the hands of the Mediation Board as long as they followed the broad instructions of the Minister, it was now obliged to convene with the Labour Foundation before making its decisions on labour conditions. <sup>342</sup> Leniently, the government generally followed its advice, as it wanted to maintain industrial peace. Although employers' associations and trade unions always had to comply with the centrally determined declarations, they still engaged in sectoral negotiations about collective labour agreements but needed the approval of the Board in order to establish these contracts formally.<sup>343</sup>

The incorporation of the social partners in the centralised bargaining model through the adjusted BBA decreased the opposition of workers' and business' representatives against the system, but the advisory function of the Labour Foundation was still a clear disappointment to

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Duynstee and Bosmans, *Het kabinet-Schermerhorn-Drees*, 414; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 123, 127; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 292; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 75; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 313, 324; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 25; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 13; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 106; Stikker, *Memoires*, 67; De Liagre Böhl 'Consensus en polarisatie', 300; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 16-7; Harmsen and Reinalda, *Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid*, 245; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 150-1; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 227-8; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 47, 72-3, 77; SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 3; VNW, 2.19.103.05. inv.no. 32: 'Kort verslag van het verhandelde van de Algemene Ledenvergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op donderdag 26 Juli 1945 des namiddags 1 uur in de Stadsschouwburg te Utrecht' (1945) 2.

<sup>342</sup> Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 227, 229; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 59, 61; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 106, 128, 130, 133; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 751 Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 13; SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 3; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 106, 119; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 249; De Liagre Böhl 'Consensus en polarisatie', 300-1; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 17; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 143; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 151; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 8; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 392; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 218; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 47, 72, 75, 81-2; Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953* (Den Haag 1953) 153-4; Van Zanden,, *Een klein land*, 112; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 47-8, 50, 263-4, 282-3; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: 'Notitie t.a.v. enkele vragen in verband met de loonpolitiek' (1953) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>343</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 3; AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 153-4; Brug and Peer, *Collectief geregeld*, 19-20; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 127; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 15, 51; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 16; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 218-9; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 76-7; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 48, 263-4; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 315, 318.

the employers' associations. <sup>344</sup> They argued that the degree of government interference under this law was still way too extensive since representatives of employers and employees had to be in charge of what they called social affairs. When pressed on the desirability of these intruding institutions in a common meeting of the KVW and AKWV, Kortenhorst, for example, argued that as the political and economic circumstances required decisive and centralised action, it would be either the government or the social partners to take up this task. <sup>345</sup> When the government left too little room for workers and business' representatives, opposition by these societal players would be a logical consequence. Even though he expressed the willingness to temporarily leave the decision power to the Mediation Board, the Labour Foundation would have to replace this institution concerning social affairs in the long run which fitted well with the Catholic vision on the PBO. <sup>346</sup> This again shows that the initial critique of employers' representatives was focused on the primacy of the government in the centralised bargaining system instead of the necessity of bargaining on the central level.

Under the adjusted BBA, the Labour Foundation turned out to have a relatively broad impact, in practice, however, as it not only heavily influenced industrial policies but also had an important voice in more general socio-economic discussions. The large practical influence of the Labour Foundation even became a point of debate in the General and Daily Board of the CSWV as J.G.J.C. Nieuwenhuis, Director of the transport company *N.V. Rotterdamsche Electrische Tramweg Maatschappij*, F.C. Bouman, Director of the textile company *Palthe's Veredelingsbedrijf N.V.*, and H. Smidt van Gelder, Commissioner of *Van Gelder Zonen N.V.*'s paper factories, clung to the pre-war position that workers' representatives had no or a very limited role to play in economic affairs, which was violated by this practice. These discussions suggest that a clear majority in the CSWV was in favour of giving employees influence through the Labour Foundation, though.

Due to the extraordinary post-war circumstances and incorporation of the social partners

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>344</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 313-4; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 47-8, 72-4; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 234.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>345</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 16: 'Notulen van de Gecombineerde Vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der Algemene Kath. Werkgeversvereeniging en van de Besturen der bij het R.K. Verbond aangesloten vakvereenigingen, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 November 1945 te Tilburg' (1945) W.95.

<sup>346</sup> Idem, W.96.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>347</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 102, 134; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 74-5, 78; Rinnooy Kan, *De Nederlandse overlegeconomie*, 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>348</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Voorlopig Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 6 maart 1946 des n.m. te 2 uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1946) 2; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 30: 'Besluitenlijst van de vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuur Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 31 October 1946 des n.m. te 2 uur ten kantore van het Verbond' (1946) 1-2.

in the centralised bargaining system through the Labour Foundation, the majority of business' and workers' representatives abided by the far-reaching policy agenda of the government in the first years of the reconstruction period including the centralised bargaining system with far-reaching government involvement.<sup>349</sup> The Catholic peak employers' associations even openly supported the public policy of wage repression to promote industrial peace (as there was little room for negotiations), expand production capacity and increase international competitiveness despite its far-reaching government interference.<sup>350</sup> At the same time, the Protestant employers of the VPCW reaffirmed their highly critical stance on public influence on social affairs under normal conditions in their action programme but argued that this was no argument against government interference in the exceptional, transitory post-war phase.<sup>351</sup> Crucially, the social partners severely limited the extent of conflict over the harsh emergency measures until the end of the reconstruction period. In 1947, the RBA and the central institution of trade unions (*Raad van Vakcentralen*), for example, both wrote a manifest in which they called for industrial peace among workers and employers to support the government in its post-war reconstruction effort.<sup>352</sup>

As demonstrated earlier, the opposition of employers' representatives against the BBA was primarily targeted at the role of the government in the centralised bargaining system rather than the bargaining level. Employers' associations and trade unions generally agreed on the main targets of socio-economic policy and broadly cooperated, merely debating and negotiating the precise wage compensation required due to the fluctuations in the prices of crucial goods and services. From a strategic point of view, the lack of pushback by employers against centralised bargaining itself in the immediate post-war period is not that remarkable as the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>349</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 102-3, 126, 205; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 291; Rinnooy Kan, *De Nederlandse* overlegeconomie, 7; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 74, 237-8; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 11-2; Wielenga, *Geschiedenis van Nederland*, 326-7; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 248-9; Van Zanden, *Een klein land*, 115-6; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 291; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: 'Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen' (1952) 2-3; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 235-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>350</sup> Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever* 1946 (Den Haag 1946) no.1 p.4-5, no.10 p.2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>351</sup> AKWV and KVW, De Katholieke Werkgever 1946, no.14 p.11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>352</sup> Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever* 1947 (Den Haag 1947) 111-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>353</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium van het Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, uitgebreid met enkele in de nabijheid van Den Haag wonende bestuursleden, gehouden op 23 November 1949 Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1949) 1; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 179; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 467; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 34: 'Gezamenlijke werkgeversorganisaties inzake de loonsverhoging' (1951) 1.

guided wage policy largely aligned with the economic interests of the large, industrial employers due to its promotion of the limitation of wages and consumption to stimulate productivity, industrial output and prevent inflation.<sup>354</sup> The members of the Praesidium of the Protestant peak employers' association, for instance, were very positive towards the restriction of wage increases which they viewed as a last resort option when the government could not keep prices of basic goods in check using controls or subsidies and was unwilling to shrink income tax. The main reason for the VPCW's stance on wage moderation was the international competitiveness of the industry as its members wanted to keep wages low, particularly when compared with geographically close competitors such as England.<sup>355</sup> The high degree of consensus within the VPCW on this attitude suggests that tensions between sectors producing for the external and domestic market based on differences in economic interests played no large role in this association at the time.

At first sight, the approach of the trade unions was more surprising from a strategic perspective, as they adopted a critical stance towards strikes and did not challenge the primary focus of the government on the recovery of industrial production instead of the living standards of workers who were obliged to work 48-hour workweeks under the BBA and were only allowed to quit their jobs in special circumstances. This position was partly caused by the experience of the Great Depression combined with a growing working population, which spurred concerns about the detrimental effects of (future) unemployment. The focus of trade unions, therefore, was on increasing industrial output and employment using a centralised, institutionalised framework rather than on higher wages. As a result, wage growth was lower in the post-war period than in surrounding countries which facilitated a remarkable economic recovery even when comparing with other countries in Continental Europe. The focus of trade are contined to the post-war period than in surrounding countries which facilitated a remarkable economic recovery even when comparing with other countries in Continental Europe.

Another strategic consideration for the social partners might have been the consistent political leadership of Catholics and Social Democrats which backed these policies in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>354</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 1: 'Loon- en Prijs-politiek' (1950) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>355</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van het verhandelde op de vergadering van het Praesidium, gehouden op 11 November 1947 des namiddags om 2 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1947) 2-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>356</sup> Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 150-1; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 75; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 76, 92; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 102-3; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 293; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 23; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 255.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>357</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 68,124-5, 204-5; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 293; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 92; ; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 250; De Liagre Böhl 'Consensus en polarisatie', 301.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>358</sup> Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 35; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 76; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 168.

immediate post-war years. After the Cabinet Schermerhorn-Drees, the KVP and PvdA formed the Cabinet Beel I (1946-1948) on their own and the Cabinet Drees-Van Schaik in cooperation with the Protestant CHU and the newly created, right-leaning Liberal VVD (1948-1951). During these cabinets, the consensus among the Social Democrats, Protestant, Catholics and right-leaning Liberals on the strict guidance of wages and prices remained. As part of this agenda, the government aimed to create similar labour conditions within these sectors through the increased use of collective labour agreements and statutory extension which led to a quick increase of the coverage of the collective labour agreements during these cabinets, both in absolute and relative terms (see Table 6). Section 1948.

Table 6 Number and percentage of workers under collective labour agreements in the Netherlands<sup>362</sup>

Date	Number of workers	% of employed labour force
1 January 1911	23,000	1.0
1 January 1917	83,000	3.3
1 January 1920	274,000	10.4
1 June 1924	286,000	10.4
1 June 1930	386,000	12.8
1 June 1934	259,000	9.1
1 June 1939	323,000	10.1
1 June 1941	451,000	13.6
1 January 1951	950,000	24.8
1 December 1954	1,330,000	33.8

*Notes*: the number of workers is rounded up to thousands of people; the employed labour force consists of those people between 15 and 65 years of age that work at least 15 hours per week.

Importantly, however, these political parties disagreed on which long-term policies were desirable. The PvdA and NVV preferred a permanent guiding role for the government, while the KVP, CHU, ARP, the employers' associations and the other trade unions only supported the centralised bargaining system led by the government as a temporary measure given the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>359</sup> Bogaarts, M.D., *Het kabinet-Beel (1946-1948)*. Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945 2 A (Den Haag 1989) 1-2, 120; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 326; Maas e.a., *Het kabinet-Drees van Schaik*, 13, 603-4; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 138-9; De Liagre Böhl 'Consensus en polarisatie', 294-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>360</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 327.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>361</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 127-8, 206; Brug and Peer, *Collectief geregeld*, 20; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 288.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>362</sup> For the number of workers under collective labour agreements, see Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1920* (Den Haag 1921) 98; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor Nederland 1930* (Den Haag 1931) 95; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor Nederland 1935* (Den Haag 1936) 109; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor Nederland 1940* (Den Haag 1942) 295; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor Nederland 1953-1954* (Zeist 1956) 301; for the labour force statistics, see Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 'Beroepsbevolking; vanaf 1800 (12-uursgrens), 1800-2013' (version 4 April 2014)

https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/71882NED/table?fromstatweb (28 July 2019).

extraordinary post-war circumstances.<sup>363</sup> Due to the opposing stances, an increase of tensions between these groups was merely a matter of time.

# 3.3 Permit or mandatory decree?

The previous section has demonstrated that the peak employers' associations primarily contested the role of the government in the centralised bargaining system rather than the bargaining level in the immediate post-war years. Due to the extraordinary post-war circumstances and the incorporation of the social partners in the adjusted BBA, the fierceness of business opposition was limited and the social partners facilitated a period of relative industrial peace. This chapter shows that the the bargaining level of the centralised bargaining model became more controversial in the employer community when conditions improved and social tensions increased, however, leading to an expansion of business resistance against the system.

This upsurge in societal pressures on the the centralised bargaining system started in 1949 and became more severe during the early 50s.<sup>364</sup> Due to the successful reconstruction of industry, low level of unemployment, positive balance of payments, high economic growth, unbalanced performance of different sectors and partial liberalisation of prices, the call for higher and more flexible wages increased.<sup>365</sup> Within the employer community, wage differentiation was the most eminent concern. Under the Guided Wage Policy, the government tried to keep wages as low and uniform as possible, only compensating for unpreventable price increases in the necessities of living, in order to stimulate industry and employment.<sup>366</sup> This system merely allowed very limited wage differentiation based on variation in municipality, educational attainment, experience, performance and job type.<sup>367</sup> It may come as no surprise

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>363</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 409, 416.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>364</sup> Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 470; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 49; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 17; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 221; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 80, 100; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 285, 290-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>365</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 210, 212; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 170; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 147; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 221; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 101, 120; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 397.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>366</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 77, 79-80; Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 169; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 172, 174; Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 295; Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen, 74; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 169; Scholten, De Sociaal-Economische Raad, 19; Mulder, Loonvorming in overleg, 90; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 112; Van Zanden, Een klein land, 112; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 256, 260-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>367</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 5-8; AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 153-4; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 172-3, 175; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 169-70;

that the social partners constantly disputed the relatively arbitrary categories used to measure these differences. The central wage decrees which usually determined the mutations, excluding municipality differentiation, were generally drafted in such a way that there was little flexible room for the bargaining process surrounding primary labour conditions on the sectoral level, making this level of negotiation relatively unimportant. These directives could either have a mandatory nature simply prescribing a certain wage level or take the form of a permit which would allow for sectoral negotiations between employers' associations and trade unions on the height of the mutation within a centrally determined range. Although the Government Mediation Board generally used mandatory wage increases, business' representatives increasingly started to ask for more flexibility through the use of permits. This signifies that the peak employers' association were not yet willing to fundamentally challenge the centralised bargaining system in this period, but opted for adjustments within the model instead by contesting the form of the the system's output.

The trend of increasing opposition against the centralised bargaining level started during the wage negotiations of 1949. Here, trade unions called for a mandatory five per cent compensation for the price increases resulting from the devaluation of the Dutch guilder.<sup>369</sup> Whereas the peak employers' associations insisted on the damage a wage increase would bring to the international competitiveness of the Dutch economy, the trade unions claimed, and the government eventually decided, that abstaining from wage compensation was socially unacceptable.<sup>370</sup> According to the business organisations, such a wage expansion contradicted the initial goal of the devaluation to increase the competitiveness of Dutch companies on the international market in order to increase production, recover the balance of payments of the

Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 273; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 27-9, 94; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 112, 116-7; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 152; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 219; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 20-1; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 286.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>368</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 90; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 178-9; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: 'Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen' (1952) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>369</sup> Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1949* (Den Haag 1949) 372; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 239: 'De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1949. Jaargang 1949 no.24' (1949) 497; Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1950* (Den Haag 1950) 17, 335; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 239: 'De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1950. Jaargang 1950 no.18' (1950) 396; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 2: Letter from CSWV Secretary C.E.J. Maitland to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 10 December 1949, no. 8297/Mz/LB (1949) 1-2; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 393.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>370</sup> AKWV and KVW, *Katholieke Werkgever 1949*, 372; AKWV and KVW, *Katholieke Werkgever 1950*, 335; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 239: 'De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1949. Jaargang 1949 no.24' (1949) 497.

Netherlands and anticipate the end of the Marshall funds.<sup>371</sup> Following their argument, a small decrease in purchasing power was necessary for achieving these goals. As it became clear that a wage increase was unavoidable, employers' associations strategically changed their attitude by trying to achieve a permit of five per cent rather than a mandatory central decree with no possibility to account for different sectoral circumstances.<sup>372</sup> The Dutch government, however, issued a mandatory increase of five per cent, thereby siding with the trade unions.<sup>373</sup>

For the employers' associations, their difficult position in the negotiations was a wakeup call, making these organisations realise the necessity of thinking about an alternative bargaining model for the future. On 4 October 1950, the Katholieke Werkgever opened by using the experience of the wage round of 1949 to argue for more room for sectoral negotiations in the bargaining system.<sup>374</sup> According to the publication, the combination of strict wage regulation with relatively free price formation caused issues which had to be solved by the gradual liberalisation of wage bargaining allowing for an adjustment to the different circumstances of economic sectors and regions.<sup>375</sup> Within the Daily Board of the AKWV, B.J.M. van Spaendonck, who also represented the wool manufacturers from Tilburg in the RKVW, also called for constrained liberalisation. While mentioning that it was too early for a return to free sectoral negotiations, he argued that it was the right time for the government to modify its role from steering into one of more modest control.<sup>376</sup> F.H. Terwindt, who was in charge of the stone factory Rossum N.V., agreed with him on this specific point but emphasised the importance of increasing the role of sectoral negotiations over time, which was supported by R.A.H.M. Dobbelmann, Managing director of the soap manufacturer with the same name. P.J. Spoorenberg, who had a background in the sugar industry, though, problematised the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>371</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 239: 'De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1949. Jaargang 1949 no.24' (1949) 497; AKWV and KVW, *Katholieke Werkgever 1949*, 372; AKWV and KVW, *Katholieke Werkgever 1950*, 17-8, 335; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 239: 'De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1950. Jaargang 1950 no.18' (1950) 396.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>372</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 16: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 December 1954, ten kantore Javastraat 2b, 's-Gravenhage' (1949) 6, 8-9; AKWV and KVW, *Katholieke Werkgever 1949*, 372-3; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 239: 'De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1950. Jaargang 1950 no.18' (1950) 396; AKWV and KVW, *Katholieke Werkgever 1950*, 17-8; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 2: 'Mededeling van de opvatting der centrale werkgeversorganisaties' (31 Augustus 1950) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 2: Letter from CSWV Secretary C.E.J. Maitland to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 10 December 1949, no. 8297/Mz/LB (1949) 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>373</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 4: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 22 Maart 1951, no. 2431/Mz/HL (1951) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>374</sup> AKWV and KVW, *Katholieke Werkgever 1950*, 325; VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Maandag, 23 October 1950, in Restaurant Garoeda te 's-Gravenhage' (1950) 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>375</sup> AKWV and KVW, Katholieke Werkgever 1950, 325-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>376</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 59: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Woensdag 25 October 1950, om 14.00 uur te Tilburg, Willem II-straat 47/49.' (1950) 5.

stimulation of such bargaining as the sectoral establishment of wages ran the risk of harming labour-intensive sectors.

In 1951, Van Spaendonck and J.H. Derksen, Secretary of the AKWV and KVW, observed that the centralised bargaining model led to an increasing number of structural problems on the sectoral level leading to the conclusion that at least some of the negotiations had to move back to this level of negotiations.<sup>377</sup> The other Board members of the KVW had a similar view on sectoral differentiation in this period. Here, A.M.C.J. Steinkühler, Catholic business' representative of the cigar industry, stated that the rigid centralised bargaining system left no room for solving inequities between different economic sectors. He, therefore, proposed to centrally introduce wage increases with a significant margin for sectoral negotiations.<sup>378</sup> Van Spaendonck supported this statement, while H.J.M. van der Ven, who had a scientific background and was affiliated with the Catholic business organisation of the metal sector, pointed out that such a system would have to include a limited maximum because of the difficulty it could bring to labour-intensive firms.<sup>379</sup> These debates within the AKWV and RKVW suggest that the centralised bargaining model became more controversial within the Catholic employer community under the changing economic circumstances, although some members were concerned about radical short-term change because of the possible effects on labour-intensive firms. Based on the these discussions, it is not possible to conclude that differences in the affiliations of the employers' representatives between domestic and exportoriented sectors explain who in the AKWV and RKVW expressed their concern about shortterm change, however.

In the CSWV-Commission on wages and prices, the system was also debated and criticised in this period. Interestingly, these meetings plainly demonstrated the divergence of ideational and pragmatic business interests concerning the bargaining model. Whereas the business' representatives in the committee generally ideationally opposed the agenda of the NVV to minimise wage differences and viewed the increased influence of employees on economic affairs due to the centralisation of the bargaining process as a threat, they argued that the system was strategically attractive under the circumstances of 1950 because of the economic damage of the war, the tight labour market and the inferior organisational capacity of capital on

<sup>377</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 60: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Vrijdag 7 December 1951 om 2.00 uur n.m. te Tilburg ten kantore Willem IIstraat 47/49' (1951) 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>378</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 15: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, gehouden op 8 November 1950 te 14.15 uur te Tilburg, Willem II straat 47/49' (1950) 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>379</sup> Idem. 5.

the sectoral level when compared with labour.<sup>380</sup> Additionally, the balance of payments was seen as an important macro-economic motivation to delay reform.<sup>381</sup> Despite the majority in favour of limited short-term change, not all members wanted to postpone fundamental reform because of these strategic considerations. S.H. Visser, VNW-Secretary without a sectoral affiliation, for instance, used the threat of the increasing influence of labour to back an agenda that would directly introduce more flexibility in the bargaining system.<sup>382</sup>

The increasing occurrence of black wages also challenged the centralised bargaining model. For the trade unions, the wide usage of these wages was a real threat as they directly challenged their legitimacy by showing that some businesses were willing to pay their workers more than the centrally determined threshold.<sup>383</sup> Workers' representatives, therefore, became more assertive in their call for wage increases, while employees became increasingly annoyed as the social partners were unable to reach an agreement. The viewpoints of the members of the Praesidium of the VPCW show this rise of industrial tensions between 1949 and 1951. Despite concerns about the balance of payments, there was widespread sympathy amongst the Praesidium for the trade unions' demands for compensation in 1949 based on the fact that the wage level was far lower than in the other (neighbouring) economically developed countries.<sup>384</sup> This viewpoint was remarkable when compared with the dominating attitudes in the other peak employers' associations at the time. In 1950, the tables turned, however. A clear majority of the body was strongly opposed to wage compensation in 1950 for the inflation due to the Korea crisis, as they argued that the government had to deal with the decrease in purchasing power through a cut of income tax, a further limitation of prices or an increase of subsidies rather than wage expansion.<sup>385</sup> Only a minority was still willing to tolerate wage compensation in order to ensure industrial peace.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>380</sup> CSWV, inv.no. 204: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Centrale Werkgeversorganisaties voor Lonen en Prijzen, gehouden op 2 November 1950, des n.m. om 3 uur, Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage) Den Haag' (1950) 7-9; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 204: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Werkgeversorganisaties Lonen en Prijzen, gehouden op 13 November 1950' (1950) 2, 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>381</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 204: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Werkgeversorganisaties Lonen en Prijzen, gehouden op 13 November 1950' (1950) 2-5; CSWV, inv.no. 204: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Centrale Werkgeversorganisaties voor Lonen en Prijzen, gehouden op 2 November 1950, des n.m. om 3 uur, Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage) Den Haag' (1950) 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>382</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 204: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Werkgeversorganisaties Lonen en Prijzen, gehouden op 13 November 1950' (1950) 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>383</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 101, 120; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 283.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>384</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium van het Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, uitgebreid met enkele in de nabijheid van Den Haag wonende bestuursleden, gehouden op 23 November 1949 Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1949) 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>385</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 6: 'Kort verslag van de praesidiumvergadering van het Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden 30 Augustus 1950 ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1950) 1-4.

The Board of the VPCW was still more hesitant about a return to sectoral bargaining than the Catholic employer community, though. Although a lot of its representatives saw a liberalised labour market as the most attractive option in the long term, most were critical of short-term reforms given the tight labour market and war destruction. After the result of a mandatory wage expansion of five per cent in 1950, trade unions increased their demand for new wage increase after another upsurge in prices of ten per cent. Bemployers, however, were unwilling to compensate for the full ten per cent. The rigidness of the wage compensation mechanism and tough negotiations with the trade unions increased irritation among business' representatives. In the yearly assembly of the VPCW in 1951, Chair A. Borst, who was in charge of the *N.V. Brood-Unie* holding which contained bread and biscuit factories, now openly criticised the centralised bargaining system for its forced uniformity but also emphasised the importance of caution with the introduction of flexibility in the system. Whereas Protestant employers had opposed significant change in 1949, they now supported a shift at a limited pace.

This upsurge in dissatisfaction with the centralised bargaining system was typical of the wider employer community. Increasingly, business' representatives such as J.G.J.C. Nieuwenhuis, who represented the Liberal business association for the transport sector in the General Board of the CSWV, felt that continuous central negotiations on wage compensation for price increases were unsustainable and employers had to formulate an own alternative way of future wage politics.<sup>389</sup> In the negotiations of 1951, business' representatives collectively took the stance that they could merely allow wage increases that coincided with productivity improvement.<sup>390</sup> In his speech for the General Assembly of the VNW in October 1951, Chair T.J. Twijnstra, who was in charge of a linseed oil company (*U. Twijnstra's Oliefabriek N.V.*), even showed a glimpse of a more radical stance towards government involvement. After recognising the importance of the immense post-war public intervention, he praised the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>386</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Maandag, 23 October 1950, in Restaurant Garoeda te 's-Gravenhage' (1950) 7-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>387</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 111-2; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, 10 jaar C. S. W. V., 22; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 285-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>388</sup> Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1951* (Den Haag 1951) 881.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>389</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 4: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op dinsdag 13 november 1951, des voormiddags 11 uur, in het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Mauritskade 63 te Amsterdam' (1951) 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>390</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Gezamenlijke werkgeversorgansiaties inzake de loonsverhoging' (1951) 1.

initiatives for stimulating productivity increases and linking them to wage development.<sup>391</sup> According to Twijnstra, this policy had to be part of a larger effort to increase the discretionary space of employers and liberalise the formation process, though.<sup>392</sup> He even openly showed his willingness to return to a system of free collective negotiations. One month later, F.H.A. de Graaff, Chair of the CSWV and Director of the paper factories of *Van Gelder Zonen N.V.*, also argued in favour of introducing more freedom in the wage formation process during a meeting of the General Assembly of the organisation.<sup>393</sup> After acknowledging that centralised bargaining promoted industrial peace and enabled the possibility to control inflation, De Graaff argued that the costs of the system outweighed the benefits as the system did not allow for any form of wage differentiation, prevented the reach of a natural equilibrium of demand and supply, and imposed a stringent model of price controls based on continuous struggles over imprecise indices which were not able to account for more detailed developments.<sup>394</sup>

The concrete negotiations also resembled these calls for sectoral differentiation as employers continued their push for wage increases in the form of a permit which would account for sectoral differences rather than a binding decree as trade unions desired.<sup>395</sup> In the end, trade unions showed their leniency in these negotiations as they were only partially compensated with a mandatory wage increase of five per cent for the ten per cent price increases which de facto meant a controversial real wage decrease of five per cent.<sup>396</sup> A discussion on whether this partial compensation was justified or rectification was required to ensure full compensation following the principles of the bargaining system in the immediate post-war period would

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>391</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 172: 'Rede, uitgesproken door de Heer T.J. Twijnstra, Voorzitter van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, op de algemene ledenvergadering van dat Verbond op 18 October 1951 te Groningen' (1951) 11-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>392</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>393</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 102: 'Rede uitgesproken door de voorzitter, de heer Mr F.H.A. de Graaff in de Algemene Ledenvergadering op Dinsdag 13 November 1951 te Amsterdam' (1951) 4-5; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1951. Jaargang 1951 no.23' (1951) 512; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 425.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>394</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 102: 'Rede uitgesproken door de voorzitter, de heer Mr F.H.A. de Graaff in de Algemene Ledenvergadering op Dinsdag 13 November 1951 te Amsterdam' (1951) 4-5; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1951. Jaargang 1951 no.23' (1951) 512.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>395</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 34: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 24 Mei 1951, des namiddags 2 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1951) 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>396</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 179-80; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 38, 43, 47; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 112; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 22; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 347, 393; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 4: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 22 Maart 1951, no. 2431/Mz/HL (1951) 1.

continue for years.<sup>397</sup> There was no reason for employers to celebrate the outcome as well, however. Although the practical damage of these negotiations for the employers' associations was limited, they were still typical for the disappointing achievements of business' representatives in the 1949-1951 period due to the inability of the employers' associations to reach an agreement with the trade unions and their failure to change the standard form of wage declarations from mandatory decrees into permits.

Although the business' representatives were relatively unable to realise their goals, the stances of the peak employers' associations showed a significant development between 1949 and 1951. Next to the role of the government, the bargaining level of the centralised industrial system in the post-war period was increasingly criticised within the employer community, signifying that they had no genuine interest in maintaining the model in the long run. The model was still not fundamentally contested for pragmatic reasons, however, as business' representatives mainly aimed to achieve modest change by turning the mandatory decrees of the Mediation Board into permits. Similar to the immediate post-war period, employers' representatives were relatively united in their stance on the centralised bargaining system. Sectoral differences played a comparatively small role, but there were some divergences among the peak employers' associations across the different socio-cultural pillars. The Catholic employer community was relatively early and vocal with its stance against the centralised bargaining model, while the Liberal peak employers' associations followed and quickly became more critical of the system. When compared with its Liberal and Catholic counterparts, the Protestant VPCW was more hesitant in challenging the post-war model, but eventually started to push an agenda of moderate change in 1951.

### 3.4 The system's fundamentals questioned

The political status quo was one of the major reasons for the lack of success of the peak employers' associations. The stances of the new cabinets in the early '50s showed no significant movement regarding the consensus on the centralised bargaining system. After the change of government in 1951, the cabinet Drees II (1951-1952) constituted by the PvdA, KVP, CHU and VVD as well as the cabinet Drees III (1952-1956) formed by the PvdA, KVP, ARP and CHU

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>397</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Kort verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag, 29 November 1951 des namiddags te 1 uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8(1e étage) te 's-Gravenhage' (1951) 1-2; RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Woensdag 15 Juli 1953, des namiddags om 3 uur, tenkantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 1.

continued to push the centralised bargaining model which was initiated and led by the state.<sup>398</sup> This stability is explained by the heavy, consistent support from the PvdA for the guided wage policy. The Protestant CHU and ARP as well as the Liberal VVD, openly asked for a more liberal wage formation process through sectoral differentiation in Parliament in these years.<sup>399</sup> Notwithstanding a more moderate attitude, the Catholic KVP also clearly showed its sympathies towards such reforms (at a limited pace).<sup>400</sup> In 1952, the research institute of this political party published a report on future wage politics in which it criticised the lack of wage differentiation across economic sectors and argued that the economic tide allowed for a more liberal bargaining model combined with a consolidation of central control of the government, which was received with enthusiasm by the AKWV and KVW.<sup>401</sup>

The most significant developments in this period had been institutional, however. The founding of the Social and Economic Council (*Sociaal-Economische Raad*; SER) in 1950 had had a large impact on the consultative structures of the Netherlands. It was designed as a tripartite advisory institution under public law with fifteen representatives of employers, fifteen members assigned by the government called crown members (*kroonleden*) and fifteen representatives of trade unions.<sup>402</sup> Although the SER later came to be known for its socioeconomic advisory role, it was primarily established as the peak organisations of the PBO.<sup>403</sup> The creation of the SER immediately triggered a discussion about the future role of both the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>398</sup> J.J.M. Ramakers, *Het kabinet-Drees II (1951-1952)*. Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945 4 (Nijmegen 1997) 13, 160-1; C. van Baalen e.a., *Het kabinet-Drees III (1952-1956)*. *Barsten in de brede basis*. Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945 5 (Den Haag 2001) 24, 462-3; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 139; De Liagre Böhl 'Consensus en polarisatie', 294-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>399</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 418-9, 425.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>400</sup> Idem, 419.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>401</sup> Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1952* (Den Haag 1952) 439-40; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 420-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>402</sup> Fortuyn, 'Staat en Sociaal-economische Politiek', 293; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 87, 106, 134; Rinnooy Kan, De Nederlandse overlegeconomie, 29; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 130; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 122; Wielenga, Geschiedenis van Nederland, 327; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, Loonvorming en loonpolitiek, 17; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 228; Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 154.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>403</sup> Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 75; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 138-9; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 127-8; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 122; Prak and Van Zanden, *Nederland en het poldermodel*, 256; De Liagre Böhl 'Consensus en polarisatie', 299-300; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 17; Harmsen and Reinalda, *Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid*, 315; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 143; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 228; Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 113-4; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 110; Brug and Peer, *Collectief geregeld*, 18; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 141.

SER and the StAR because of its wide working area. There was societal consensus that the SER had to be in charge of economic advice but disagreement on whether this also had to be the the case for social affairs. Eventually, the compromise was that the Labour Foundation turned into a more technical organ in the social realm which had to tackle the issues that confronted the SER with the execution of wage decrees. Additionally, the Labour Foundation continued to be the meeting platform for negotiations between the social partners on the central level and kept an advisory role where policies concerning industrial relations were concerned. Crucially, though, it had lost its status as the primary socio-economic advisory institution for the government to the SER.

The new institutional structure was immediately used to tackle the issues with the industrial system that had appeared since 1949. Given the increasing social tensions, SER and StAR commissions were installed to think on adjustments to the centralised bargaining model. Of the eight members of the newly created SER-Commission on Wage politics in the long run led by the crown member J. Tinbergen, the VPCW, CSWV and KVW all had one representative as was the case for the three main trade unions, while two scientific members appointed by the government finalised the committee's composition. In its advice on the wage formation model in 1951, the SER advised continuing the central role of the government in wage politics in the short term despite the increasing business opposition against the model. As a compromise, the advice of the Council spoke of a constrained wage policy in the next years rather than a guided one. This outcome was the result of a debate between employers and the Protestant trade union CNV, who wanted more freedom for the social partners in the bargaining process, on the one side, and the NVV which aimed to consolidate the central guidance of the government on the other side. In practice, the general goal of the policy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>404</sup> Van Bottenburg, "Aan den arbeid!", 101, 103; VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Maandag, 23 October 1950, in Restaurant Garoeda te 's-Gravenhage' (1950) 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>405</sup> Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, *Arbeidsverhoudingen*, 75; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 127; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, *Loonvorming en loonpolitiek*, 17; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 228.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>406</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 135; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>407</sup> Touwen, *Coordination in Transition*, 153; Hemerijck, 'The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:', 229; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 135-6; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 127; Mulder, *Loonvorming in overleg*, 14; Pels, 'The Development of Collective Employment Agreements', 120.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>408</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Maandag, 23 October 1950, in Restaurant Garoeda te 's-Gravenhage' (1950) 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>409</sup> Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 470; Scholten, De Sociaal-Economische Raad, 274.

remained the same, though, aiming to attract investment, stimulate export and solve the balance of payments through the repression of wages. The fact that the peak employers' associations abided by this result confirms that they were unwilling in 1951 to fundamentally challenge the centralised bargaining system in the short run.

In the same year, the trade unions pushed the radical idea of a workers' share in the investments of companies. 411 Since the low wage costs enabled the profits of companies in the first place, they argued that this would give workers their rightful share and allow them to increase their living standards under the system of wage repression. As the major employers' associations commonly denied the claim by employees on a share of the increase in national assets given the limited income rises under the guided wage system, these initiatives were relatively unsuccessful. 412 Meanwhile, the peak employers' associations were also investigating fundamental adjustments to the centralised bargaining system, but for them the major motivations were the continuous struggle on the details of wage compensation and the lack of possibilities for wage differentiation. 413 After the creation of the SER commission on the subject, the peak employers' associations also created their own commission in May 1951 to advice on future wage policy and determine their position. <sup>414</sup> The Chair of the CSWV, F.H.A. de Graaff led this committee, while the members fully consisted of representatives of the different peak business organisations. 415 Additionally, the KVW formed its own committee in December 1951 to add more concrete proposals to the findings of this commission in which it was also represented.<sup>416</sup>

In the next years, the different organs of the Liberal employers' associations became ever more outspoken in favour of wage liberalisation. At the end of 1951, the VNW postulated in its publication that a healthy economy was merely reachable through the means of more economic freedom.<sup>417</sup> In 1952, De Graaff repeated his critique on the uniformity of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>410</sup> Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 470.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>411</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Donderdag 27 September 1951 te 10.30 uur in Hotel des Pays Bas, Utrecht' (1951) 4-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>412</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 35: 'Eigendomsvorming door werknemers in het bedrijfsleven' (1952) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>413</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1952. 2e Jaargang no.4' (1952) 85; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1952. 2e Jaargang no.12' (1952) 277.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>414</sup> CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 11: 'Enkele vraagstukken inzake de loonpolitiek op lange termijn' (1952) 1; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: 'Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen' (1952) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>415</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>416</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>417</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1951. Jaargang 1951 no.23' (1951) 512.

centralised bargaining system in his speech for the General Assembly. He also argued that the reforms had to be undertaken with great caution given the threat of possible wage increases, though. Under his leadership, the commission of the peak associations on future wage policy advocated more flexibility in the wage formation process without returning to completely free collective negotiations through a report in the same year. Even in the long term, some centralised bargaining between workers' and business' representatives on the major guidelines was necessary according to the committee, however. While the promotion of industrial peace and limitation of inflation were the major advantages of the centralised bargaining system, the removal of the responsibility of the social partners by the government, the homogenisation of wages ignoring the balance between supply and demand, the shift from trade unions' demands from higher wages to the expansion of other labour conditions such as a share of the investments, and the danger of the government enforcing a too high wage level were seen as more important motivations, explaining the negative stance towards the status quo. Algorithm and the status quo.

After this, the committee continued with several suggestions to liberalise this system: establish minimum wage increases on top of which differentiation could be possible within a certain limit which had to be determined by a classification system (1), create standard wages as a result of the bargaining process between the government and the social partners from which workers' and business' representatives could negotiate a deviation within a certain margin (2), use a wage system built upon different scales (3) and finally return to free sectoral bargaining as was the case in the pre-war period (4).<sup>421</sup> While it generally portrayed liberalisation as the solution, the committee also recognised that this reform would possibly lead to more labour conflict as there would be more room for negotiations.<sup>422</sup>

The Daily Board of the CSWV used this report on the long-term wage system to ask for the opinion of its underpinning organisations. While most of the underlying institutions stated that the post-war bargaining system had been beneficial, there was a clear consensus in favour of gradual liberalisation of the negotiation process.<sup>423</sup> Interestingly, none of the organisations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>418</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 102: 'Rede uitgesproken door de voorzitter, de heer Mr F.H.A. de Graaff in de Algemene Ledenvergadering op Vrijdag 3 October 1952 te Rotterdam' (1952) 13-4; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 426.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>419</sup> CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 11: 'Enkele vraagstukken inzake de loonpolitiek op lange termijn' (1952) 3, 5; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: 'Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen' (1952) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>420</sup> CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 11: 'Enkele vraagstukken inzake de loonpolitiek op lange termijn' (1952) 4-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>421</sup> Idem, 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>422</sup> Idem, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>423</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Samenvatting van de antwoorden van de bij het C.S.W.V. aangesloten werkgeversverenigingen op de discussie-nota van Januari 1952' (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter

backed a sudden return to the free sectoral bargaining process of the pre-war period. The employers' associations saw agreement on the wage compensation for housing rent increases, reform of the rigid dismissal procedure, favourable economic circumstances and an improved power position of organised employers as conditions that had to be met first before promoting more radical change, which suggests that they did not fundamentally challenge the centralised bargaining system as a way of strategic accommodation. 424 Concerning the other policy options, the business' representatives preferred the usage of minimum wage increases and collective labour agreements with statutory extension over a system with a negotiable margin. 425

They disagreed on whether to sustain maximum increases, however. Despite an ideational preference for free collective negotiations and a fear that government intervention would structurally increase when sustaining its post-war influence, the metal sector, in particular, was concerned that, without a maximum, wages would increase too heavily in the short term given the economic circumstances and insufficient power position of business. The Metal Association (*Metaalbond*) therefore, called for gradual reform with self-restraint, indicating an agenda of strategic accommodation. This signifies that sectoral differences in the employer community became more relevant to the business stances on the centralised bargaining system when the opposition of capital against the model increased. It is not possible to conclude, however, whether the distinction between export-oriented and domestic sectors is able to explain these divergences. Furthermore, it is important to mention that the sectoral differences in business stances on the centralised bargaining system were still relatively small.

Up to the elections of 1952, the Cabinet pressed the employers' associations to take a

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from the General Secretary of the *Algemene Werkgevers-Vereniging* M. Klaassen to the CSWV, 29 February 1952, no. S/87 (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from Metaalbond Director H.Ph. de Kanter to the CSWV, 14 March 1952, no. 3000dK/Ko (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from J.K. Hummel (Scheepvaart Vereniging Zuid) to the CSWV, 11 April 1952 (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from Chair W.H. Kruyff and Director Bastet (Scheepvaart Vereniging Noord) to the CSWV, 2 April 1952 (1952)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>424</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Samenvatting van de antwoorden van de bij het C.S.W.V. aangesloten werkgeversverenigingen op de discussie-nota van Januari 1952' (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from Metaalbond Director H.Ph. de Kanter to the CSWV, 14 March 1952, no. 3000dK/Ko (1952) 1-3; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from the General Secretary of the *Algemene Werkgevers-Vereniging* M. Klaassen to the CSWV, 29 February 1952, no. S/87 (1952) 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>425</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Samenvatting van de antwoorden van de bij het C.S.W.V. aangesloten werkgeversverenigingen op de discussie-nota van Januari 1952' (1952) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>426</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from Metaalbond Director H.Ph. de Kanter to the CSWV, 14 March 1952, no. 3000dK/Ko (1952) 1-3; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond gehouden 5 Juni 1952, des voormiddags om 10.30 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1952) 5.

concrete stance on the liberalisation of the wage formation process.<sup>427</sup> These business organisations declared that they were awaiting the advice of their committees to formulate their specific policy positions. Internally, the Board of the Catholic business confederation had already discussed the topic, though. In this meeting, there was a clear majority in favour of allowing for limited flexibility in the wage formation process.<sup>428</sup> The focus of the debate, therefore, moved to how this had to take place. While most of the members backed a vision which involved introducing more possibilities for sectoral differentiation with a negotiable margin between a maximum and minimum wage increase, some wanted additional bargaining freedom on the firm-level with the use of the job classification mechanism, while H.M.C. van der Waerden, who represented the Catholic cigar industry, was alone in his plea for immediate wage liberalisation.<sup>429</sup>

Later that year, the Commission on long-term wage politics of the same association published its final report. All In this advice, they presented an overview of the up- and downsides of introducing more flexibility in the centralised bargaining system. According to the committee, the biggest technical arguments against continuing the direct post-war centralised bargaining system was its limited capability to deal with particular circumstances and its stringent price system, including the labour market, which was no reflection of labour and supply, and thereby particularly harmed those people with more human capital. Furthermore, the report relatively radically mentioned that the centralised bargaining model gave trade unions the illusion that they had the right to a certain share of the national product, which could lead to higher wages and an expansion of the costs of secondary labour conditions. Moreover, the commission described the stimulation of economic recovery and the building of mutual understanding and trust between workers' and business' representatives and thereby the promotion of industrial peace as main benefits of the post-war system. After this, the commission suggested three concrete ways of (limitedly) liberalising the centralised bargaining

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>427</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 264: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 3 Juni 1952 te 10.00 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, Den Haag' (1952) 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>428</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 15: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, gehouden op Woensdag 12 Maart 1952 te 14.00 uur in Tilburg' (1952) 8-10. <sup>429</sup> Idem, 9-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>430</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: 'Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen' (1952) 3; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de loonpolitiek' (1953) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>431</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: 'Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen' (1952) 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>432</sup> Idem, 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>433</sup> Idem. 2.

system: using minimum rather than set wages, allowing for more variation between jobs, particularly based on educational attainment, and finally through experience tariffs and meritrating. 434

On 27 August, the Daily Board of the AKWV discussed the report. The meeting demonstrates the widespread consensus within the association for introducing more flexibility in the centralised bargaining system despite the satisfaction of its Board members with the results of the guided wage model in the direct post-war years as underlined by the reactions from Dobbelmann (soap manufacturer), N.P.J.M. Daalderop (background in the metal sector through the company Koninklijke Metaalwarenfabriek Daalderop), A.M.J.J. Smits van Waesberghe (working in the sugar industry at N.V. de Faam) and J.L.J.M. Raymakers (affiliated with the textile sector) to the advice. 435 Similarly, most of the Board of the VPCW wanted to gradually introduce a limited amount of flexibility in the system, while C.J. den Heeten, who represented the machine manufacturer G. den Heeten & Co., was a strong proponent of immediate liberalisation. 436 Meanwhile, Liberal business' representatives consolidated their criticism from the previous years. In 1952, for instance, the Nederlandse Industrie, the new external publication of the VNW, opened with a criticism of the centralised bargaining system. After recognising the benefits of the model in the direct post-war period, the publication argued that the system was too rigid as it did not account for differences between workers, firms and economic sectors, thereby limiting a healthy and balanced development of the Dutch economy. 437 For this reason, the discretionary space on the sectoral level had to increase with more influence for the social partners. In the same period, the external publications of the CSWV and the AKWV gave similar critiques focused on the lack of differentiation in the centralised bargaining system. 438 Indeed, the stances of the peak employers' associations showed much similarity in these years.

Collectively, the representatives of the peak employers' associations also argued that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>434</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: 'Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen' (1952) 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>435</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 61: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Algemene Katholieke Werkgeversvereniging, gehouden op Woensdag 27 Augustus 1952 te 14.00 uur, Willem-II straat 47/49, Tilburg' (1952) 2-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>436</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering op Vrijdag 14 November 1952 te 11 uur in Hotel "Wittebrug" te 's-Gravenhage' (1952) 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>437</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1952. Jaargang 1952 no.13' (1952) 297.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>438</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1952. Jaargang 1952 no.14' (1952) 329; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 4 September 1952 om 14.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1952) 4.

the issue of wage compensation for the rising costs of housing rents had to be settled before shifting to a new bargaining system for the benefit of the relationship with the trade unions and the government. These business' representatives were no supporters of general wage rounds anymore, though, now that the tensions surrounding the process had increased and the social partners were unable to reach agreements. In October 1952, the Commission on long-term wage politics of the peak business organisations, therefore, concluded that the stance of these employers would have to be that the wage compensation for increasing housing rents had to be the last general wage round, signifying the radicalisation of the attitudes of the peak employers' associations regarding the centralised bargaining system in 1952.

The discussion around the future wage system reached its peak in 1953, though. Early in that year, the Commission-de Graaff of the peak business organisations published a small report which backed the relatively moderate agenda of gradually introducing more flexibility in the rigid bargaining system through a margin. <sup>441</sup> In this way, the new system would allow for some sectoral differentiation based on economic performance but keep the Mediation Board and Labour Foundation in charge of the wage formation process which was agreed upon by the Daily Board of the AKWV. <sup>442</sup> The NVV and PvdA, however, still opposed the initiatives for more wage flexibility. In an extensive response to the report of the Commission-de Graaf within the CSWV, Nieuwenhuis, who represented the transport sector and was Director of a tram transportation company himself (N.V. Rotterdamsche Electrische Tramweg Maatschappij), also opposed the Commission's viewpoints on practical grounds. <sup>443</sup> According to him, the liberalisation of the wage formation process was only desirable under the right circumstances. Pointing to the difference between sheltered and unsheltered sectors, he argued that these conditions were not met. Whereas the right for workers to strike would drive up wages in sheltered sectors, similar increases would not be possible in unsheltered industries which were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>439</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 4 September 1952 om 14.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1952) 3; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1952. Jaargang 1952 no.13' (1952) 297; CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering d.d. 4 Juni 1952 van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden te Tilburg ten kantore van Mr. B.J.M. van Spaendonck' (1952) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>440</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 35: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 October 1952 te 10 uur v.m. in Hotel Figi te Zeist' (1952) 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>441</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Het vrijer maken van de loonvorming' (1953) 1-2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>442</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Het vrijer maken van de loonvorming' (1953) 1-2; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 2 Februari, om 14.00 uur in Den Haag, Raamweg 32' (1953) 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>443</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Enige opmerkingen over de nota van de commissie-de Graaff over Het vrijer maken van de loonvorming' (1953) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Enige opmerkingen over de nota van de commissie-de Graaff over Het vrijer maken van de loonvorming' (1953) 7.

constrained by international competition. As a result, wages for similar work would diverge between these sectors, which would harm industrial peace and social justice, while making it harder for the unsheltered firms to attract high-quality personnel. The pressure on the sheltered industries would also make it more difficult to compete in the international market leading to higher unemployment. According to Nieuwenhuis, liberalisation, therefore, had to take place after a reduction of striking rights. His stance is remarkable as it contradicted the Catholic ideal of sectoral bargaining. Nieuwenhuis believed that competition for labour between economic sectors would do more harm than the uniformity of a centralised bargaining model focused on limiting unemployment given the conditions of the time. He stated that the introduction of a negotiable margin would not be fundamentally different as it would lead to a similar wage-increasing trend with sectoral divergences and the approach, therefore, only could be undertaken with great caution for these differences. He

The early responses to the document by his fellow CSWV-Daily Board members were sympathetic but critical. According to Chair J. van den Berg who also functioned as Managing director of a ship repair company (*Niehuis & Van den Berg Scheepsreparatiebedrijf N.V.*) and represented the larger metal sector in the association, Nieuwenhuis' contribution was an expression of the difficult post-war dilemma for business. Whereas employers ideationally supported more liberal negotiations, practical concerns forced them to maintain the centralised bargaining system. Mauritz, who functioned as CSWV-Secretary without a sectoral affiliation, also concretely criticised the proposal for focusing too much on the job classification mechanism to establish wage differentiation. When Nieuwenhuis repeated his critique in a meeting of the General Board of the CSVW a few weeks later, De Graaff responded that the employers' associations had already openly backed the shift to a more liberal wage formation system without central decrees. Additionally, Mauritz mentioned that the sectoral associations had also expressed the desire to use the goal of employment in their negotiations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>444</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Enige opmerkingen over de nota van de commissie-de Graaff over Het vrijer maken van de loonvorming' (1953) 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>445</sup> Idem, 3, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>446</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 16 Maart 1953, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 5; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Enige opmerkingen over de nota van de commissie-de Graaff over Het vrijer maken van de loonvorming' (1953) 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>447</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond gehouden 5 Maart 1953 des voormiddags te 10.30 uur Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>448</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 16 Maart 1953, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 5-6.

H.Ph. de Kanter, Director of the Metal Association, noted that the continuation of a centralised bargaining model based on promoting full employment would consolidate centralised bargaining influence, while it would be impossible to break down already established striking rights.<sup>449</sup>

When the Daily Boards of the VNW and CSWV discussed the issue in a common meeting, there was again a clear consensus that something had to be changed after settling the housing rent issue. 450 The employers' representatives disagreed about how this shift had to occur, however. Whereas W.H. Kruyff (CSWV-representative of shipping companies who was in charge of a large shipping company (Koninklijke Nederlandse Stoomboot-Maatschappij) himself), S.H. Visser (VNW-Secretary), H.J.M. Simonis (Vice-Chair of the VNW and Commissioner of cutlery company *Gerofabriek N.V.*) argued in favour of a more radical stance backing free collective negotiations similar to the pre-war period, H.B.N. Ledeboer (CSWVrepresentative for the textile sector and Managing director of the textile company Van Heek & Co), A.J.R. Mauritz (CSWV) and Van den Berg (CSWV; ship repair company) backed a more cautious approach of gradual change. 451 This debate shows that the attitude for more radical change and, therefore, the internal disagreement with the main consensus was more eminent in the Liberal employer community. When looking at the sectoral affiliations of the business' representatives involved in this discussion, there is no convincing evidence that proponents of decentralisation of the bargaining system generally produced for the domestic market, while opponents were focused on export, which is the expectation based on the theoretical framework. The Koninklijke Nederlandse Stoomboot-Maatschappij which Kruyff represented, for instance, specialised itself in the transport of goods across international markets, but Kruyff still backed the decentralisation of the bargaining model.

Meanwhile, the position of the Protestant employer community also became more crystallised. The central actor in the VPCW on this issue was J.W. de Pous both theoretical economist at the *Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam* and Economic advisor as well as Secretary in the Board of the VPCW. In his academic work, De Pous argued that a centralised bargaining model controlled by employers' associations and trade unions could enable the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>449</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 16 Maart 1953, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>450</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 36: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 3 Februari 1953 te 12.30 uur in de Van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 7-9.

<sup>451</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>452</sup> AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 221; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.11' (1953) 296.

combination of full employment with a stable price level and free collective wage formation. His argument constituted a response to the suggestion that workers' demands were causing an inflationary tension of wages and prices under the condition of full employment. Particularly, social partners with the maturity of the Dutch model would be able to run this model and evade inflation through self-restraint. Despite his willingness to give the social partners more responsibility, he was unenthusiastic about the idea of introducing a margin as he aimed for more radical changes which would not involve binding decrees by the government at all. 454

In the meeting of the Board of the VPCW, De Pous stated that there were three reasonable adjustments that would introduce more flexibility in the system: allowing for more variation between sectors through the job classification system, introducing (more) general wage differentiation with the criterion of employment and opening the possibility of more divergences in secondary labour conditions. The Board members of the VPCW were generally relatively critical of immediately returning to the pre-war situation. They perceived a sudden liberalisation of the labour market as something dangerous under the conditions of international monetary uncertainty and the recent occurrence of the North Sea Flood, Rather they saw an expansion of the job classification mechanism as the best option policy option to introduce more flexibility based on performance as opposed to the alternative of significant sectoral differentiation which was regarded by T. Slavenburg, Founder and Director of the *Slavenburg's Bank N.V.*, and W.A. van der Velden, Director of the *Zuidhollandse Bank N.V.*, as a wage-increasing measure. The sector of the support of the

Although the VPCW wanted sectoral differentiation, their attitudes were, therefore, more moderate in terms of fundamental changes to the centralised bargaining system than their Liberal and Catholic counterparts. Notwithstanding the consensus in the employer community on sectoral differentiation, the business' representatives were divided on the way in which this had to be established, both across and within the different peak employers' associations. The Liberal employer community, in particular, was split on the desirability of radical short-term change. The distinction between affiliations with domestic and export-oriented sectors is not convincingly able to explain these divergent stances of business' representatives as was the case for the establishment of statutory extension, however.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>453</sup> AKWV and KWV, De Katholieke Werkgever 1953, 221-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>454</sup> Idem, 222.

<sup>455</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering op Donderdag 19 Februari 1953 te 11.00 uur in Hotel Wittebrug, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>456</sup> Idem, 2-3.

<sup>457</sup> Ibidem.

### 3.5 Sectoral differentiation debated in the SER

The common stance of the peak employers' associations in favour of more sectoral differentiation also had had its effect on the broader societal debate. Under the circumstance of the increasing calls for more wage differentiation, Minister Suurhoff had asked the SER for advice on the future system of wage guidance in 1952. This recommendation became the task of the specific subcommittee on Wage politics in the long run under the leadership of J. Tinbergen. Given the stances of the peak employers' associations, the CSWV-representative within this commission got the mandate to push an agenda of moderate liberalisation with the introduction of a margin as a concrete possibility.

One year later, the SER sent its advice on wage politics to the Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health Suurhoff after the Council had spent a whole meeting on an extensive discussion of the draft advice of its Commission on Wage politics in the long run. The report outlined four motives for changing the post-war bargaining system: ideology, labour mobility, sectoral differences in performance and the pressures arising from the Benelux partnership. Concerning the first motive, the report stated that a small majority of the Council ideationally opposed the status quo as it left too little room for individuals and larger groups of employers and employees to have a say in the determination of their labour conditions. This group of opponents was divided in a part that refuted all post-war general wage rounds and a cohort that had previously backed these interventions to guarantee minimum living standards for workers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>458</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 1-2; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de loonpolitiek' (1953) 1; VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering op Donderdag 19 Februari 1953 te 11.00 uur in Hotel Wittebrug, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 1; AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>459</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden 8 Januari des voormiddags te 10.30 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>460</sup> SER, 2.06.04, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 194; SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 1; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Besprekingen loonpolitiek; schets van de gang van zaken tot dusverre; de stand van het ogenblik en de te verwachten procedure' (1953) 1; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de loonpolitiek' (1953) 2; AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 141; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3° Jaargang no.8' (1953) 201; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 398; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 239; Van Baalen e.a., *Het kabinet-Drees III*, 462; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 471; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 275; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 121.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>461</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 10-1; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 398.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>462</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 11.

given the extraordinary post-war circumstances but now thought something had to change. 463 At the other end of the debate, one member of the committee argued that the current system already contained enough possibilities for differentiation, thereby suggesting that adjustments were unnecessary. 464

The second argument of labour mobility was based on the fact that the rigid post-war system restricted the price signals (labour conditions) to workers, pushing them where they would be the most useful. By allowing for more labour mobility incentives, the report stated that employment and national income could increase. The third motive, postulated by a significant share of the commission, was that allowing for sectoral differentiation reflecting divergences in performance would lead to more efficiency and allow workers to share in these successes. Finally, the fourth reason to introduce more wage flexibility was to satisfy the Benelux partners who were complaining that the Dutch government kept wages way too low, harming their international competitiveness.

Given the special economic circumstances of the post-war period in general and the aftermath of the North Sea Flood in particular, the Social and Economic Council advised leaving the system largely intact for another one to two years with some additional possibilities for sectoral differentiation dependent upon the macro-status of employment. 468

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>463</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>464</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 11; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 398.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>465</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>466</sup> Idem, 12-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>467</sup> Idem, 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>468</sup> SER, 2.06.04, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 198; SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 26; AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 141-2; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 398; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3<sup>e</sup> Jaargang no.8' (1953) 201-2; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Besprekingen loonpolitiek; schets van de gang van zaken tot dusverre; de stand van het ogenblik en de te verwachten procedure' (1953) 1.

**Table 7** Vote of the SER on the introduction of a margin in  $1953^{469}$ 

Vote	Member name	Representation	Organisation
For	J.A. Veraart	Crown member	X
(21)	G.M. Verrijn Stuart	Crown member	X
	T.J. Twijnstra	Business	Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers
	A.J.R. Mauritz	Business	Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond
	J.H. Derksen	Business	Katholiek Verbond van
			Werkgeversvakverenigingen
	J.W. de Pous	Business	Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers
	D. Swagerman	Business	Koninklijke Nederlandse Middenstandsbond
	Joh. De Jong	Business	Christelijke Middenstandsbond
	G.W. Kampschöer	Business	Katholieke Nederlandse Boeren- en
	•		Tuindersbond
	H.A. Quarles van Ufford	Business	Organisaties van ondernemers
	G. van der Wal	Business	Organisaties van ondernemers
	A.F. Vas Dias	Business	Hoofdgroep Verkeer
	H.T. Asser	Business	Hoofdgroep Verzekering
	A.A. van Sandick	Business	Hoofdgroep Banken
	J.A. Middelhuis	Workers	Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging
	W.D. Lelieveld	Workers	Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging
	J.W. van den Akker	Workers	Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging
A Fi	A.A. Boersma	Workers	Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging
	Fr. Dohmen	Workers	Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging
	K. de Boer	Workers	Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond
	C.J. van Mastrigt	Workers	Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond
Against	J.A. Berger	Crown member	X
(19)	F. de Roos	Crown member	X
(17)	J.J.A. Charbo	Crown member	X
	W.F. de Gaay Fortman	Crown member	X
	J.H. Kiewiet de Jonge	Crown member	X
	J. Tinbergen	Crown member	X
	F.J.H.M. Van der Ven	Crown member	X
	F. de Vries	Crown member	X
	C. Goedhart	Crown member	X
	J. Horring	Crown member	X
	J.M. den Uyl	Crown member	X
	C.Th.E. van Lynden van	Business	Koninklijk Nederlands Landbouw-Comité
	Sandenburg		
	J.J.A. Berger	Workers	Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	H. Oosterhuis	Workers	Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	D. Roemers	Workers	Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	H. Korte	Workers	Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	A. Vermeulen	Workers	Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	A.J. Wamsteeker	Workers	Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen
	C.W. van Wingerden	Workers	Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen
Blank	W.C.L. van der Grinten	Crown member	X
(2)	Chr. van den Heuvel	Business	Nederlandse Christelijke Boeren- en Tuindersbond
Absent	A. van Oven	Crown member	X
(3)	Th.S.J. Hooij	Business	Nederlandse Katholieke Middenstandsbond
(2)	M. Ruppert	Workers	Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>469</sup> SER, 2.06.04, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 193, 207.

After these years, no one in the committee was arguing in favour of a sudden return to pre-war conditions, but a minimal majority, made up by most employers' representatives, two crown members and the confessional trade unions, was in favour of stimulating more sectoral differentiation through the use of margins. Table 7 shows the exact results of the margin vote. In the debate surrounding the vote, Mauritz argued that a margin that accounted for macroeconomic conditions could be used to transition from the post-war system to the normal free sectoral negotiations of the pre-war system. This margin would allow for variation surrounding the centrally determined wage guidelines, either under, above or both. The vagueness of the discussion point in the SER, i.e. a margin without specification, masked significant disagreement among its proponents on the practical form of the margin, though. The CSWV-representative Mauritz, for instance, argued in favour of a margin under the centrally determined guidelines, while Lelieveld of the main Catholic trade union (KAB) backed a margin above this level.

Moreover, a large minority, made up by most crown members appointed by the government, all members of the Socialist trade union NVV and the representative of the Liberal business organisation of farmers, opposed any margin arguing that it would not have the desired effect of higher labour mobility. They wanted to keep the current system intact with some additional possibilities for differentiation on secondary labour conditions. Even though there was a majority in favour of the margin, the voting result, therefore, gave no clear advice on the issue to the government. Additionally, the SER-members disagreed on whether a margin would be effective and lead to other practical outcomes than a general wage round given the unusual

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>470</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 14, 16; SER, 2.06.04, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 207; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 398; Hueting, De Jong and Neij, *Naar groter eenheid*, 239; Van Baalen e.a., *Het kabinet-Drees III*, 462; Willem Dercksen e.a., *Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen*, 471; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 275; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 121.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>471</sup> SER, 2.06.04, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 198.

<sup>472</sup> Idem, 205.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>473</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 17; SER, 2.06.04, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 207; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 409-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>474</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 26-7; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.8' (1953) 201, 203; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Besprekingen loonpolitiek; schets van de gang van zaken tot dusverre; de stand van het ogenblik en de te verwachten procedure' (1953) 1; AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 143.

economic circumstances of high employment in combination with low wages.<sup>475</sup> While the proponents of a margin argued that wages would reflect sectoral performance to a greater extent and the mechanism would stimulate employment, opponents argued that it could establish a threat to unsheltered companies that operated in a very competitive environment, making them have to cut their workforce.<sup>476</sup> Furthermore, there was a clear sense that the negotiations that would be enabled by the introduction of margin were likely to harm industrial peace.<sup>477</sup>

In its external publication, the VNW responded with great disapproval to the report of the SER. According to the association, the advice merely consolidated the power of the Mediation Board in the short run, which did not reflect the opinion of employers, and did not involve a clear, comprehensive vision in the long run. <sup>478</sup> The other employers' associations were more positive about the voting result in the SER, however. In his speech for the General Assembly of the CSWV in April 1953, De Graaff stated that the employers had backed the margin as it was the most obvious way of introducing slightly more flexibility in the system despite fierce opposition by the NVV. 479 In a radio-speech, Mauritz reconfirmed the stance of the CSVW in favour of more flexibility in the bargaining system and expressed the hope for a follow-up on the outcome of the SER with a wider dispersion of wages considering macroconditions such as employment. 480 The KWV and AKWV also responded to the SER advice through a discussion in their common publication. The issue agreed with the (minimal majority of the) SER that allowing for more variation would allow for more mobility between shrinking and growing sectors, while they criticised the opponents of a margin for their narrow focus on its effects on the current situation without any outlook for its structural impact. 481 According to the publication, the maximum increases under the margin were the likely short-term result given the extraordinary circumstances, but there was no reason to suppose this was also the case in the long term.

Overall, these stances in the SER reconfirmed the positive stance of the employers'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>475</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 21; SER, 2.06.04, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 199-200, 212.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>476</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 22-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>477</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953) 24; SER, 2.06.04, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 212.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>478</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.9' (1953) 229-30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>479</sup> CSWV, 2.19.10.06, inv.no. 102: 'Rede Mr. F.H.A. de Graaff gehouden op de Algemene Ledenvergadering op Maandag 24 April 1953' (1953) 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>480</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Welvaart en loonvorming' (1953) 3-4; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.8' (1953) 219.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>481</sup> AKWV and KWV, De Katholieke Werkgever 1953, 142-3

associations towards more possibilities for sectoral differentiation. The previous section demonstrated that the peak employers' associations agreed on the necessity of adjustments to the centralised bargaining system, but were internally divided on the nature and rate of shortterm change. The relatively unified stance of the employer community in the SER in favour of the margin vote signified the consensus that the bargaining model had to be changed in the long run. The fact that D. Swagerman, Joh. De Jong and G.W. Kampschöer, who represented the Liberal, Protestant and Catholic associations of small- and medium-sized enterprises which are dominated by domestic-oriented companies, also supported the margin in the SER suggests that domestic- and export-oriented firms were not divided on this issue. Although a significant share of the business' representatives wanted a more fundamental shift of the system in a shorter period, the margin was the most viable option for change in the SER at the time given the fierce opposition of the NVV against reform of the centralised bargaining system. Through a crossclass coalition with the Catholic and Protestant trade unions on the margin, the business community was able to establish an SER advice for the government in which a majority propagated adjustments to the centralised bargaining system. The vagueness and moderate nature of the margin proposal masked the significant differences within this coalition, however.

### 3.6 Negotiations on the 'last' general wage round

A comprehensive analysis of the concrete bargaining positions during the wage negotiations of 1953 gives a detailed insight into these divergences, including the divisions within the employer community. The negotiations on wage compensation per January 1954 started in May 1953 when the trade unions declared that they wanted a wage increase because of higher housing rents and the limitation of consumption due to the real wage decrease in 1951.<sup>482</sup> With a report in June, the trade unions motivated their demand for an increase of five per cent which they quickly adjusted to seven per cent afterwards.<sup>483</sup> On the business side, there was an increasing feeling that this wage round was the right time to speak out in favour of liberalisation of the bargaining process, even though they knew that the NVV still heavily opposed such reform.<sup>484</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>482</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 23: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 26 Juni 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 5; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3º Jaargang no.19' (1953) 531; AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 351-2, 359.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>483</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3° Jaargang no.19' (1953) 531; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 23: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 26 Juni 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>484</sup> CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden op Vrijdag 5 Juni 1953 te 10.00 v.m. in de Van-Hogendorpzaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 4-5.

In terms of the bargaining level, the consensus in May was to leave the central coordination of negotiations intact for the time being, although employers' representatives generally wanted more influence at this stage.<sup>485</sup>

In this period, the Netherlands also received an increasing amount of external pressure to leave its rigid wage system, especially from Belgium within the Benelux framework which had been criticising the Dutch Guided Wage Policy for years. Whereas wages had been significantly lower in Belgium than in the Netherlands before the Second World War, they had become significantly higher during the post-war years and still followed a diverging trend which gave firms in the Netherlands an increasing international competitive advantage because of more limited productivity differences. Whereas wages had been significantly higher during the post-war years and still followed a diverging trend which gave firms in the Netherlands an increasing international competitive advantage because of more limited productivity differences. Whereas was an ename, argued in favour of leaving the Guided Wage Policy in May 1953. Within the baily Board of this association, Simonis, Van den Berg and Visser were also vocal proponents of this fundamental shift using ideational arguments. Whereas wages had been critically supported wage liberalisation, his viewpoint in the meeting was also more reserved because of the possible effects on the operation of the export, construction and metal sectors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>485</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Voorlopige conclusies bespreking op 16 Mei 1953' (1953) 1; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Besprekingen loonpolitiek; schets van de gang van zaken tot dusverre; de stand van het ogenblik en de te verwachten procedure' (1953) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>486</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Besprekingen loonpolitiek; schets van de gang van zaken tot dusverre; de stand van het ogenblik en de te verwachten procedure' (1953) 1; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 36: 'Benelux-bespreking met Prof. G. Brouwers' (1953) 1-2; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de loonpolitiek' (1953) 2; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 36: 'De stand van zaken met betrekking to Benelux' (1953) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1952. 2e Jaargang no.18' (1952) 436.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>487</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 35: 'Concurrentieverhoudingen in West-Europa' (1952) 2-3, 5; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1952. 2<sup>e</sup> Jaargang no.18' (1952) 436-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>488</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 19 Mei 1953 te 11 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 3-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>489</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 5 Mei 1953 te 10 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 6-7; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 19 Mei 1953 te 11 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 3-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>490</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 5 Mei 1953 te 10 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>491</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 19 Mei 1953 te 11 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 4; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 5 Mei 1953 te 10 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 6-7.

Using the same argumentation, E.L.C. Schiff, Director of the rubber factory *Vredestein*, and De Graaff, in charge of several paper factories, also opposed more moderate change at the given moment, though, which is remarkable given De Graaff's active promotion of reform in the earlier period. The position switch is typical of the difficulty the employer community had to take a stable and concrete common stance on short-term reform in this period. Whereas the Daily Board of the VNW commonly favoured wage liberalisation on ideational grounds in the long term, they were, therefore, still not able to agree on when and how radically this shift had to occur because of short-term strategic concerns. Meanwhile, the main socialist political party (PvdA) and trade union (NVV) kept on resisting any change, as they wanted to continue the centrally enforced Guided Wage Policy.<sup>492</sup>

In the next months, wage liberalisation remained the major issue in business circles. The different commissions on the topic continued their activities, while the leadership of the peak employers' associations repeatedly discussed the issue. 493 Interestingly, there was a lot of sympathy for more radical liberalisation of the labour market in the AKWV given the favourable macroeconomic conditions of the time and its part in the negotiations for the Benelux agreement. If free sectoral wage negotiations were introduced, the dominating view in the AKWV, formulated by the Daily Board members A.H.M. Albregts, Secretary without a sectoral affiliation, L.A.J.M. van Heijst, AKWV-Chair with a background in the metal sector, Terwindt, representing the Catholic brick manufacturers, and L.F.H. Regout, affiliated with the mine industry in Limburg, was that this process would have to be radical by leaving the system of central coordination altogether rather than changing the actor in charge of this process.<sup>494</sup> The call for more severe action also increased in the business organisations of the other pillars during these weeks. The meeting of the peak employers' associations on 11 June 1953 where they agreed not to engage in any general wage bargaining after this round demonstrates this shift. 495 From 1954 onwards, the importance of the sectoral negotiations had to increase, signifying the willingness to reduce the central control in the collective bargaining system. After

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>492</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de loonpolitiek' (1953) 2; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 347, 399.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>493</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de loonpolitiek' (1953) 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>494</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Woensdag 3 Juni 1953 des morgens te 10.00 uur v.m. te Den Haag, Raamweg 32' (1953) 6-8; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Besprekingen loonpolitiek; schets van de gang van zaken tot dusverre; de stand van het ogenblik en de te verwachten procedure' (1953) 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>495</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Kort Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Loonpolitiek van de Vier Centrale Werkgeversverbonden dd. 11 Juni 1953' (1953) 1.

a period of unclarity and repeated changes in concrete positions, the business organisations had finally come to a common viewpoint.

Building upon this agreement, the main point of debate became to what extent the peak employers' associations had to express this stance externally. In a meeting of the General Board of the VNW a few days later, Twijnstra suggested issuing a common statement of business' representatives in favour of a more liberal wage formation process.<sup>496</sup> Again, a large share of the active members of the VNW took a very reserved stance towards change, though. W.H. van Leeuwen, who was in charge of the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Gist- en Spiritusfabriek which produced yeast and spirit, De Graaff, W. Bruynzeel, Managing director of the Bruynzeel factories that mainly produced floors and kitchens, and M.H. Damme, the former CSWV-Chair who represented a machine manufacturer (Werkspoor N.V.), expressed their doubts on such a statement by arguing that the status quo functioned pretty well given the circumstances, making a shake-up undesirable at the given moment. 497 J.M. van den Bosch, Director of a synthetic fibre producer (Algemene Kunstzijde Unie N.V.), however, used the lack of wage differentiation under the centralised bargaining system to support Twijnstra's position, while C. van Loon, Director of a stearin candle factory (Gouda Apollo), pointed to the threat of black wages as a reason to be supportive and Visser argued that the centralised process increasingly gave (undesirable) influence to trade unions. <sup>498</sup> The minutes of the meeting give a remarkable insight in the discussion on wage liberalisation in the Liberal employer community as they contain a repetition of the major arguments of the pillar and demonstrate that opportunistic opposition based on momentous economic conditions was most eminent within the leadership of the VNW.

By comparison, the other peak employers' associations were more positive towards changing the centralised bargaining system and issuing a statement than the VNW. They, therefore, worked on a proclamation despite the reluctant attitude of the VNW. On 18 June 1953, the Board of the VPCW discussed the draft version of this statement. Here, De Pous expressed his agreement with the statement but pointed out that some centrally determined guidance of the centralised bargaining system had to stay for the time being, regardless of the initiative for more wage differentiation through sectoral bargaining.<sup>499</sup> While Slavenburg

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>496</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Juni 1953 om 2 uur n.m. in de Van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>497</sup> Idem, 8-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>498</sup> Idem, 9-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>499</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering gehouden op Donderdag 18 Juni 1953 te 11.00 uur in Hotel Wittebrug, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 2.

worried about the statement as he wanted to continue the Guided Wage Policy, most in the meeting agreed with De Pous' viewpoint and adopted the formulation of the proclamation with small amendments.<sup>500</sup> These viewpoints make clear that there was opposition to change motivated by pragmatic considerations in the peak Protestant business' organisation as well but in a much smaller proportion than in the VNW.

The willingness for short-term transformation was most eminent among Catholic employers' representatives. During the early discussions on the 1953 wage compensation in the Labour Foundation, the KVW representatives Terwindt and Derksen were most assertive in announcing that this wage round had to be the last of the era, preluding a time of a more liberal bargaining process.<sup>501</sup> In the consecutive weeks, discussions within the CSWV led to a wide consensus on the need of the common external statement, making the Daily and General Board of this institution, as well as the VPCW and the AKWV (with several remarks), adopt a stance in favour of a proclamation.<sup>502</sup> In the CSWV, more influence for sectoral negotiations in combination with central coordination through the SER became the consensus despite criticism from both sides of the argument. 503 Whereas Nieuwenhuis opposed a larger role for the sectoral social partners, J.M. van den Bosch criticised the position for its continuation of central coordination.<sup>504</sup> As the CSWV now backed the statement, the topic returned to the agenda of the General Board of the VNW which had adopted a stance against the document. Here, the CSWV-Chair De Graaff defended his change of mind in favour of the drafted statement and got support from the VNW-member H.G. Nolen, Director of which produced transformers a (Willem Smit & Co's Transformatorenfabriek). 505 Due to the decline of resistance against wage differentiation in the short term, Twijnstra was now able to conclude that the VNW agreed with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>500</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering gehouden op Donderdag 18 Juni 1953 te 11.00 uur in Hotel Wittebrug, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 2-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>501</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 23: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 26 Juni 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 7; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 23: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 17 Juli 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>502</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 Juli 1953 om 2 uur des namiddags in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 8-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>503</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 9 Juli 1953 ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 11-3.

<sup>504</sup> Idem, 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>505</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 Juli 1953 om 2 uur des namiddags in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 9.

the common statement. 506

Two days later, on 23 July 1953, the peak employers' associations took the big step of publishing their common statement on the future wage system which had been the result of an intense drafting process. In the document, the organisations first declared that the centralised wage system had been beneficial, given the special post-war circumstances. The collective bargaining model had been successful in combining considerations regarding a socially acceptable minimum with the stimulation of employment and the recovery of the balance of payments. Additionally, the system was beneficial in its coordination of the balance between the different economic sectors and its promotion of industrial peace. With the post-war upturn, the downsides of the model had become increasingly eminent, however.

For the employers' associations, the responsibility of the wage formation process in the hands of the central government was undesirable from an ideational and economic perspective. Ideationally, the Guided Wage Policy established a system of far-reaching government interference in the operations of the social partners, which were only permissible for employers under the special circumstances of the immediate post-war period. Economically, the business' representatives criticised the centralised bargaining system for the insufficient link between the performance of economic sectors and their wage levels. As these downsides now outweighed the benefits of the centralised wage system, the employers' associations were no longer willing to cooperate on general wage decrees after the compensation for rent increases of 1 January 1954 that was already part of industrial negotiations. The peak business

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>506</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 Juli 1953 om 2 uur des namiddags in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 11; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 86: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 Juli 1953 om 11.00 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>507</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Verklaring van het Centraal-Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen en het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke werkgevers in Nederland over de loonpolitiek in de nabije toekomst' (1953) 1; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 426.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>508</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Verklaring van het Centraal-Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen en het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke werkgevers in Nederland over de loonpolitiek in de nabije toekomst' (1953) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>509</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Verklaring van het Centraal-Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen en het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke werkgevers in Nederland over de loonpolitiek in de nabije toekomst' (1953) 1; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.16' (1953) 428-9.

AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Verklaring van het Centraal-Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen en het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke werkgevers in Nederland over de loonpolitiek in de nabije toekomst' (1953) 1-2; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 36: 'Uit het bedrijfsleven. "De werkgeversverklaring inzake de loonpolitiek" (1953) 3; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.16' (1953) 429; CSWV,

associations proposed a shift to a new collective bargaining model instead where the central institutions of the social partners would coordinate the wage formation process on the grounds of employment and the balance of payments, and leave more discretionary space for their sectoral counterparts resulting in wage differentiation across these economic sectors.<sup>511</sup>

In a later meeting of the RBA after the publication, the business' representatives of the farmers and the small- and medium-sized enterprises in the meeting, respectively W.P. Hollebrands and N.A. Vaandrager, declared that their associations agreed with the statement but were disappointed for being left out of the writing process, again signifying relative unity within the employer community between domestic- and export-oriented sectors.<sup>512</sup> Unsurprisingly, the trade unions reacted negatively towards the sudden move of business' representatives and asked them for clarification and adjustments. Despite the criticism of the trade unions in the Labour Foundation, the peak employers' associations kept their stance intact, however.<sup>513</sup> After the declaration, the political momentum for sectoral differentiation also increased. In the *Troonrede* of 1953, the government declared that it was considering changes to the post-war centralised bargaining system.<sup>514</sup> Moreover, there was a consensus within the Catholic pillar that a new bargaining model with more involvement for the social partners was desirable. 515 In this system, the SER would draft general guidelines which would leave more room for sectoral negotiations on wage increases. This consensus also became influential within parliament through increasing pressure from the governing KVP party to introduce more sectoral differentiation, while the PvdA was still backing the status quo with the NVV.516 Consistent with earlier viewpoints, the ARP, CHU and VVD supported these calls of the KVP

<sup>2.19.103.06,</sup> inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3º Jaargang no.15' (1953) 402-3; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 426.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>511</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 36: 'Uit het bedrijfsleven. "De werkgeversverklaring inzake de loonpolitiek" (1953) 2-4; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3º Jaargang no.15' (1953) 402; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Verklaring van het Centraal-Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen en het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke werkgevers in Nederland over de loonpolitiek in de nabije toekomst' (1953) 2; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.16' (1953) 428-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>512</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 20 Augustus 1953 ten kantore, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>513</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 21 Augustus 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 1-2, 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>514</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 398-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>515</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de loonpolitiek' (1953) 2; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Nota inzake toekomstige loonpolitiek' (1953) 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>516</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 399, 409, 419-20.

for reforms of the centralised bargaining system.<sup>517</sup>

Although the major actors in the employer community commonly agreed that something had to change and the political moment had increased, there was still significant dispute on the form of wage differentiation among and within the different business organisations. In the Daily Board of the AKWV, Dobbelmann emphasised the importance of reluctance with the introduction of a negotiable margin because of possible inflationary effects. After this, the idea of replacing the set wages with a minimally required wage level was discussed. Here, H. Hollenkamp, part of an eminent family in the textile sector, wanted to adjust collective labour agreements to include minimum wages only above which individual companies could decide to pay more, while Dobbelmann wanted to leave the question of the minimum to sectoral negotiations. The Suggestion that it could take the form of a permit allowing for sectoral negotiations on the exact height of the increase came back to the fore. Mauritz declared, however, that the wage increase of 1953 was likely to get the form of a mandatory decree. In this case, some additional wage differentiation could still be established using the mechanisms of the status quo based on municipality and job type as Nieuwenhuis advocated.

In the Daily Board of the VPCW, most members were still relatively reluctant regarding fundamental changes because of international tensions and economic circumstances.<sup>522</sup> The VPCW's involvement in the common statement was, therefore, mainly aimed at guiding the calls for wage differentiation of the wider employer community, by proposing moderate, gradual adjustments to the bargaining system. In the Daily Board, J.H. van Lonkhuyzen, who worked for *N.V. Sopla Fabrieken* which produced cigars, proposed to introduce more possibilities for wage differentiation on the grounds of performance, while De Pous expressed the willingness to continue the centralised bargaining system under the guidance of the SER with more room for differentiation.<sup>523</sup>

Leading up to September, the employers' associations that were part of the RBA and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>517</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 420.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>518</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Woensdag 24 Juni 1953 te 10.00 uur v.m. te Utrecht, in het Jaarbeursrestaurant' (1953) 5. <sup>519</sup> Idem. 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>520</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 9 Juli 1953 ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 8.

<sup>521</sup> Idem. 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>522</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur gehouden op Woensdag 19 Augustus te 13.30 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 3.

<sup>523</sup> Ibidem.

Labour Foundation developed a common position in favour of a 'last' general wage compensation for the recent rent increase and the real wage decrease of 1951. This wage compensation was complemented with an agenda to establish more differentiation by increasing the importance of the job type mechanism, decreasing the relevance of municipality and introducing more sectoral flexibility. Unsurprisingly, the height of the wage increase was again one of the major issues, but there was a lot of willingness to reach a compromise after years of unsuccessful negotiations. The final consensus of the Daily Board of the AKWV was to request an advice from the SER on this wage increase. Interestingly, Dobbelmann, Albregts and Spaendonck pleaded for a generous wage increase as a royal gesture given the favourable economic tide, while Terwint opposed such a measure.

The Daily Board of the VPCW was a bit more critical of generous wage expansion but one of its most influence actors, De Pous, argued that there was no point to more liberal wage negotiations when workers' and employers' representatives would not be able to reach a consensus and, therefore, supported a wage increase of six per cent. The meetings of the Board of the VPCW suggest that a significant share of the body, H. Smitskamp, Director of the bread factory *Nieuwe Haagse Broodfabriek*, in particular, argued for a constructive approach by business' representatives, not asking too much from trade unions and allowing for a compromise between the demands of capital and labour as they highly valued the industrial stability of the post-war period. There also were widespread concerns about the bearability of these increases for firms in competitive markets, though, most eminently expressed by Vice-Chair Slavenburg.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>524</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 20 Augustus 1953 ten kantore, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 4-5; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 17 July 1953, no. 6280/Mz/CB (1952) 1-2; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19' (1953) 531; RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Woensdag 15 Juli 1953, des namiddags om 3 uur, tenkantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 5; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 23: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 17 Juli 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>525</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 31 Augustus 1953 te 2.00 uur n.m. te Tilburg, Willem-II-straat 47-49' (1953) 10-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>526</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur, gehouden op Maandag, 14 September des avonds 7.15 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>527</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur, gehouden op Donderdag 22 October te 11 uur in Hotel "Wittebrug" te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 2; VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering, gehouden op 26 September 1953 te 10.30 uur in Hotel "Wittebrug", 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 1-3; VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur, gehouden op Donderdag 17 September om 11 uur v.m. in Hotel "Wittebrug" te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 3-4.

For Liberal employers' representatives, the focus of the debate was on the form of the wage increase. Once again, the CSWV-Chair De Graaff demanded a wage increase through a permit rather than a decree as it would leave room for sectoral negotiations, supported by De Kanter and M. Klaassen (Secretary of the *Algemene Werkgevers-Vereniging*, an employers' association which was dominated by industry) who opposed a uniform wage round as such a decree would not consider differences in sectoral circumstances. When the RBA also discussed the form of the likely wage increase on 11 September, it became clear that the employer community disagreed on the subject. As a response to the trade unions' demand of a mandatory decree of at least six per cent, the RBA was split between supporting a small wage increase (around three per cent) through a mandatory decree (1), S.J. Hooij's proposal supported by the CSWV of a somewhat larger pay rise (around four per cent) through a permit (2) or De Pous' suggestion of an even larger increase (around five per cent) by a mandatory decree which would be partly compensated through tax relief (around two per cent)(3).

Despite repeated discussions in the Labour Foundation in August and September, the social partners were again unable to reach an agreement on the required height of the wage compensation, <sup>530</sup> which eventually led to a mandatory decree of five per cent by the Mediation Board on 28 September. <sup>531</sup> Although the peak employers' associations had made significant

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>528</sup> CSWV, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 3 September 1953, des namiddags te 2.- uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 (1<sup>e</sup> étage), te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 3-4, 7-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>529</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Vrijdag 11 September 1953 ten kantore van het C.S.W.V., Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 2-4; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Woensdag 16 September 1953 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 2.

<sup>530</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 21 Augustus 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 10-12; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 4 September 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, te 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 7-8, 10; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 18 September 1953, des n.m. om 14.30 uur ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 3-5; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 26 September 1953 om 3,15 uur n.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 2, 5-6; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19' (1953) 532-3, 535; RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur uit de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op 26 September 1953, des namiddags 1.00 uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, 1e etage' (1953) 1; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 393.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>531</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19' (1953) 525-6; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 180; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 393-4; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 122-3; RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur uit de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op 26 September 1953, des namiddags 1.00 uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, 1e etage' (1953) 1.

concessions by offering a mandatory increase of five per cent, which representatives of small-and medium-sized enterprises opposed, the trade unions took a harsh line and refuted the offers for a compromise below their demand of six per cent.<sup>532</sup> After this response, the Mediation Board chose to enforce the conditions of the peak' employers' associations' last offer. As the decree only contained a limited extension of possibilities for differentiation using the job type method already established in the centralised bargaining system, while the negotiations were characterised by disagreement on the computation of the required compensation for inflation, the wage increase still fitted the post-war pattern.<sup>533</sup> Again, the social partners were not able to reach a deal, and the CSWV was not able to get a permit.

Interestingly, the relatively domestic-oriented associations of the small- and medium-sized enterprises turned out more radical than the relatively export-oriented peak employers' associations when it came to repressing wage increases during these negotiations which contradicts the expectations from the theoretical framework. In general, however, it is important to emphasize the relative unity of business stances towards changes to the centralised bargaining system in 1953 which is demonstrated by the July statement. In this proclamation, the peak employers' associations refuted future wage rounds and propagated a bargaining model with more sectoral influence under the leadership of the social partners. Similar to the period between 1949 and 1951, the Catholic business' representatives were most assertive in demanding reforms of the industrial model. By comparison, the Liberal peak employers' associations were generally more hesitant for opportunistic reasons, while the VPCW proved to be the most reluctant as it consistently tried to steer the agenda of the employer community to more moderate changes to the bargaining system.

## 3.7 To a centrally coordinated bargaining system?

A discussion of the outcome of the wage negotiations in the external publication of the CSWV expressed that the leadership of the association viewed this result as a reconfirmation of the idea that something had to change.<sup>534</sup> Whereas Minister Suurhoff and some workers' representatives saw the inability to reach an agreement as a reason to abstain from liberalisation, the CSWV argued that it showed the necessity of decentralisation. Similarly, the Board of the VPCW saw the outcome as a reason to rediscuss the future bargaining model. Most of its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>532</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 26 September 1953 om 3,15 uur n.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953) 2-3, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>533</sup> AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 351-2, 359; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19' (1953) 525-7, 535.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>534</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19' (1953) 528.

members wanted to establish a more liberal bargaining process in the short term through moderate reforms. G.C. van Dam, VPCW-Secretary without a sectoral affiliation, for instance, argued that a coordinative system that combined more flexibility with central control guaranteed the consolidation of the industrial peace of the post-war centralised bargaining system and was more in accordance with the principles of the Protestant business community.<sup>535</sup> Building upon this suggestion, J. de Jong, Director of the car insurance company De Auto Onderlinge, stated that such a coordinative institution had to consider employment and the balance of payments when formulating the guidelines.<sup>536</sup> There was also opposition to this line of reasoning in the Board, though. Dooyes asked why the other employers' representatives in the meeting were unhappy with the status quo given the great practical results of the system for employers in the form of industrial peace and wage levels.<sup>537</sup> According to him, the introduction of more flexibilty would only lead to higher wages. The VPCW-Chair Borst replied to this critique by arguing that a more liberal system would be better in alignment with the principles of the VPCW and could reduce the issue of black wages.<sup>538</sup> This interaction was in line with the broader pattern: those business' representatives who wanted to consolidate the centralised bargaining status quo tended to use strategic arguments, while those who argued for immediate wage liberalisation pointed to ideational concerns and those in between instrumentalised a combination of both.

An extensive opinionated document by the VNW-Secretary Visser in 1954 shows that he also fitted this pattern. After stating that a moderate approach would merely lead to a continuation of the centralised bargaining system, he used the ideational argument of entrepreneurial freedom as the main reason to propose a more radical liberalisation agenda than was backed by the majority of the peak employers' associations. In his model, the government played a more limited part, merely guarding special cases relevant to the general interest, while an organisation with a PBO structure that incorporated the social partners got the coordinative role. Moreover, minimum wages would be established centrally to ensure a certain level of social justice while the absence of a maximum created the possibility of significant,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>535</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering d.d. 21 Januari j.l. in Hotel "Wittebrug" te Scheveningen' (1954) 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>536</sup> Idem, 4.

<sup>537</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>538</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>539</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: 'Nota betreffende de loonpolitiek als een der hoekstenen van het beleid der ondernemersorganisaties' (1954) 1; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Maart 1954 om 11 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's- Gravenhage' (1954) 5-6.

free sectoral negotiations.<sup>540</sup>

As a response, Mauritz wrote that a voluntary limitation of freedom through an agenda of gradual change was required to enable the limitation of wages under the difficult circumstances of the time and to prevent the risk of inflationary tendencies.<sup>541</sup> When the Daily Board of the VNW discussed these pieces, De Graaff also criticised Visser for missing the relevance of the trade unions' sectoral power position which would cause an upsurge in wages under more liberal negotiations, which suggests that strategic accommodation was an important motivation for De Graaff's support for moderate reform.<sup>542</sup> The rest of the leadership of the VNW disagreed on the issue as Simonis supported Visser in his effort to return to free sectoral bargaining, while W.N.H. van der Vorm, C.M. Hage, Director of the *N.V. Lijm- en Gelatinefabriek Delft* which produced bone glue and gelatin, and Schiff agreed with De Graaff and Mauritz that the circumstances were not right for such radical change.<sup>543</sup> A few days later, the same discussion took place in a common meeting with the Daily Board of the CSWV, leading to a similar majority for the moderate consensus.<sup>544</sup> Despite the comprehensive efforts of the more radical wing of the Liberal employer community, the moderate reform agenda, therefore, remained the stance of the CSWV and VNW.<sup>545</sup>

Meanwhile, these employers' representatives had been convening with the trade unions in the Wage commission of the Labour Foundation on the design of a new bargaining system, building upon the SER advice of March 1953. On 18 March 1954, De Pous mentioned in the Board of the VPCW that there was consensus on a coordinated bargaining model in which there would be no return to the free collective negotiations of the pre-war period but still more opportunity for sectoral differentiation in combination with central coordination. The Wage commission of the Labour Foundation finished its concept-report in June 1954 which consolidated the consensus of moderate liberalisation with a more concrete proposal on the future coordinative wage system led by a newly created Wage Council that would be part of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>540</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: 'Nota betreffende de loonpolitiek als een der hoekstenen van het beleid der ondernemersorganisaties' (1954) 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>541</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: 'Naschrift bij de nota betreffende loonpolitiek van Ir. S.H. Visser' (1954) 4-5. <sup>542</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Maart 1954 om 11 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>543</sup> Idem, 6-7.

VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 25 Maart 1954 om 12.30 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 8-10.
 Idem. 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>546</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering gehouden op 18 Maart j.l. in Hotel Wittebrug te Scheveningen' (1954) 3.

the SER.<sup>547</sup> Similar to the report of the SER, this document included the possibility for sectoral differentiation to account for variation in employment, productivity and profitability.<sup>548</sup> The result was remarkable given the fierce opposition of the NVV against the liberalisation of the centralised bargaining system in the previous period.<sup>549</sup> Now that it could not avoid changes to the Guided Wage Policy any longer, the NVV adjusted its stance to suggesting that sectoral differentiation merely should take place when certain generally agreed guidelines such as a certain level of employment were met.<sup>550</sup> Interestingly, the Catholic and Protestant trade unions were particularly enthusiastic about the report as it combined a consolidation of central coordination, now in the hands of the social partners, with the possibilities of sectoral differentiation.<sup>551</sup> One remaining point of division, though, was the possibility of general wage rounds, with the representatives of the peak Liberal and Protestant employers' associations generally arguing in favour of abolition while the trade unions wanted to keep the option.<sup>552</sup> The Catholic AKWV was an exception as it was relatively sympathetic towards retaining the possibility for general wage rounds under special circumstances as a compromise between the viewpoints of both sides of the social partners.<sup>553</sup>

In the same period, the peak employers' associations also presented their own report based upon the common statement of July 1953 which showed a lot of similarity with the StAR proposal except for some details which are not so relevant for this study, such as the voting procedure of the overarching Wage Council.<sup>554</sup> Importantly, however, the advice suggested a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>547</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 410: 'Nota inzake de toekomstige loonpolitiek' (1954) 1-2; VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur d.d. Donderdag 17 Juni '54 te 11 uur in Hotel "Wittebrug" te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 3; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Notitie over "De nota inzake toekomstige loonpolitiek" van de Looncommissie van de Stichting van den Arbeid' (1954) 1; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 400-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>548</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 410: 'Nota inzake de toekomstige loonpolitiek' (1954) 10; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 400.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>549</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 5 Juli 1954 t.k.v. Mr. B.J.M. van Spaendonck, te Tilburg, Willem-II-straat 47-49 te 10.30 uur v.m.' (1954) 4; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 409.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>550</sup> Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 409.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>551</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid gehouden op Vrijdag 16 Juli 1954 om 10.15 uur v.m te Baarn' (1954) 9-10.

<sup>552</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Notitie over "De nota inzake toekomstige loonpolitiek" van de Looncommissie van de Stichting van den Arbeid' (1954) 3; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 410: 'Nota inzake de toekomstige loonpolitiek' (1954) 20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>553</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 5 Juli 1954 t.k.v. Mr. B.J.M. van Spaendonck, te Tilburg, Willem-II-straat 47-49 te 10.30 uur v.m.' (1954) 12-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>554</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Rapport inzake de toekomstige loonpolitiek' (1954) 1; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, welke werd gehouden op 20 Juli 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 8; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 427.

new coordinative model which would allow for more sectoral differentiation. When the General Board of the VNW discussed the report, the main discussion point was again the timing of the proposed reforms. W.H. van Leeuwen and A.J. Engel, representing a synthetic fibre producer (*Algemene Kunstzijde Unie N.V.*), questioned the introduction of more freedom during a period with a tight labour market, but Twijnstra expressed that it would not be right to wait until a time of more widespread unemployment to liberalise the system.<sup>555</sup> The discussion of the reports by the General Board of the CSWV also indicates that employers agreed on the liberalisation of the bargaining system but still disputed the timing and pace of this change. While De Kanter, who had a background in the metal sector, for instance, feared that the proposal defended by Mauritz and De Graaff would establish too little liberalisation, J.H.A.A. Kalff, Director of the insurance company *Onderlinge Levensverzekering-Maatschappij* and representative of the insurance sector, thought the reforms went too far, and Nieuwenhuis argued for either a continuation of the status quo or radical change rather than a moderate reform agenda.<sup>556</sup>

Despite the ongoing disagreement, there had been a clear development in business positions. At the beginning of 1954, the Liberal and Protestant peak employers' associations upheld the spirit of the July statement of 1953 by consistently opposing general wage rounds. The AKWV and KVW, however, took a more moderate stance that allowed for general wage rounds under exceptional circumstances, which is remarkable given their radical viewpoints in the previous years. This attitude was the result of balancing solidarity with the Catholic trade union (cross-class) and the employer community. Although changes to the centralised bargaining system remained a controversial issue, the short-term reform of the centralised bargaining model had become a realistic possibility due to the majorities in the peak employers' associations in favour of moderate change (1), their refusal of future wage rounds through the July statement (2), the compromise of the NVV in the Wage commission on adjustments to the bargaining model (3), the government which had left an opening for reform (4) and the support for modification by the Liberal, Protestant and Catholic political parties (5).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>555</sup> VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, welke werd gehouden op 20 Juli 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 9-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>556</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 1 Juli 1954, des namiddags te 2.15 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage (1e etage)' (1954) 8-9, 11.

## 3.8 Sectoral differentiation in exchange for real wage improvement

The momentum for systemic change also played an important role in the wage negotiations of 1954. On 27 August 1954, the SER unanimously approved its report on the desirable height of wages under the new circumstances of the time that had been prepared by its Commission on Wages and Prices after a request by the trade unions. The trade unions had triggered a new bargaining round on 6 July 1954 by arguing that price increases required another wage compensation and that the workers had to get their rightful share in the post-war prosperity expansion. As the government usually called for advice from the SER instead of the social partners, the one-sided appeal for an SER report by the trade unions was widely viewed as remarkable but nonetheless successful.

Importantly, the SER document postulated that there were favourable economic circumstances for real wage increases in the short run next to the compensation for housing rent increases because of the exceptional development of national income. This point is noteworthy as the post-war discussion had typically focused on compensation for price increases, but the commission, partly consisting of business' representatives, now also included the idea that workers' had a rightful share in the post-war expansion of national income. Additionally, the report mentioned that a wage increase designed to account for sectoral differences was preferable from a purely economic point of view but could cause harm from other perspectives such as industrial peace. The report, therefore, postulated no clear stance on whether the wage increase had to get the form of a mandatory decree or a permit.

SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de vierenzestigste vergadering (zevenentwintigste openbare vergadering) van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 27 Augustus 1954 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 108; SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 484: 'Concept-advies inzake de wenselijkheid van een loonsverhoging' (1954) 1; Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1954* (Den Haag 1954) 497, 499-500; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954) 1; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 241: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1954. Jaargang 1954 no.18' (1954) 518; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.17' (1954) 525; CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden op 1 September 1954 om 2.00 n.m. in Hotel des Pays-Bas te Utrecht' (1954) 2; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Donderdag 2 September 1954 om 2.15 uur ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 3; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 394.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>558</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.17' (1954) 525.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>559</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 484: 'Concept-advies inzake de wenselijkheid van een loonsverhoging' (1954) 18, 20-1; Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1954* (Den Haag 1954) 497, 499-500; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.17' (1954) 527, 532.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>560</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.17' (1954) 526; SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 484: 'Concept-advies inzake de wenselijkheid van een loonsverhoging' (1954) 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>561</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 484: 'Concept-advies inzake de wenselijkheid van een loonsverhoging' (1954) 16, 22; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.17' (1954) 532.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>562</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 484: 'Concept-advies inzake de wenselijkheid van een loonsverhoging' (1954) 22.

the Social and Economic Council discussed the draft of the Commission on wages and prices, employers' representatives were remarkably inactive except the VPCW-representative De Pous.<sup>563</sup> The limited resistance to the document might indicate that business' representatives thought that some sort of real wage increase was unavoidable given the favourable economic conditions.

In contrast to previous years, the employers' representatives were relatively divided in opinion up to the final part of the bargaining process.<sup>564</sup> When discussing the draft version of the SER report in the Daily Board of the VPCW, Slavenburg argued that the economic progress of the post-war period was mostly due to the Guided Wage Policy and real wage increases could harm this development. 565 Rather he suggested to aim for wage stabilisation in combination with an increase in the workers' share in the profits. De Pous, however, stated that a limited uniform wage increase was problematic due to sectoral differences in performance and a permit which could account for these divergences was desirable instead. 566 On 1 September, the Contact Commission of the peak employers' associations also discussed the document, where the business' representatives agreed upon the maximum height of the wage increase but disagreed on its form. 567 Twijnstra, Chair of the meeting, opened the debate with the viewpoint of the representatives of the VNW and CSWV who were willing to maintain the spirit of the common statement of July 1953, while accepting that a wage increase of some sorts was unavoidable given the very tight labour market, widespread occurrence of black wages and increasing threat of strikes.<sup>568</sup> To reconcile these two elements, these associations wanted to pro-actively open up sectoral negotiations on wage increases of zero to five per cent. After this statement, Terwindt and Borst who responded for the KVW and VPCW said that these organisations were also in favour of pro-actively supporting a wage increase of five per cent at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>563</sup> SER, 2.06.064, inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de vierenzestigste vergadering (zevenentwintigste openbare vergadering) van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 27 Augustus 1954 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>564</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Maandag 23 Augustus 1954 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>565</sup> VPCW, 332, inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur gehouden op Woensdag 18 Augustus 1954 te 1.30 uur n.m. ten kantore Parkstraat 28 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 3. <sup>566</sup> Idem, 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>567</sup> CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden op 1 September 1954 om 2.00 n.m. in Hotel des Pays-Bas te Utrecht' (1954) 2-3; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954) 1. <sup>568</sup> CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden op 1 September 1954 om 2.00 n.m. in Hotel des Pays-Bas te Utrecht' (1954) 2-3.

maximum.<sup>569</sup> Although slightly contrasting the fundamental thought behind the earlier business' declaration, G.C. van Dam of the VPCW stated that he preferred a wage increase through a centrally determined permit to the solution of the VNW and CSWV, as it was more likely to lead to a quick agreement with the trade unions in the Labour Foundation.<sup>570</sup> Still, the KVW and VPCW were relatively reluctant about their exact, definitive position on the form of the wage increase given the short time in between the SER report and this meeting.

The RBA discussed the same topic on the next day.<sup>571</sup> Here, the farmers' representatives P.C. Elfferich and C.S. Knottnerus rejected the consensus of the Contact Commission as they opposed any wage increase, while the Liberal association of the small- and medium-sized enterprises represented by D. Swagerman pressed the peak employers' associations to exercise extreme caution in the negotiations in the Labour Foundation.<sup>572</sup> These associations pointed to the economic circumstances to argue that any commitment to a possibility for wage increases would immediately lead to an expansion of workers' income. Interestingly, the VPCW-Chair Borst used this meeting to argue that introducing a margin was unattractive as the resulting tensions would be a threat for industrial peace which conflicted with the stance of the Liberal peak employers' associations.<sup>573</sup> These viewpoints illustrate the divergence among employers ranging from a complete rejection of wage increases to facilitating maximised sectoral negotiations without a central permit, to a limited central permit for sectoral bargaining, to a central mandatory wage increase, to a central decree which combined a mandatory element and a permit.<sup>574</sup>

Remarkably, the discussions show a clear difference in positions between the peak employers' associations in this period. Since the common statement, the CSWV and VNW had

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>569</sup> CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden op 1 September 1954 om 2.00 n.m. in Hotel des Pays-Bas te Utrecht' (1954) 3-4. <sup>570</sup> Idem, 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>571</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 2 September 1954 om 1.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>572</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 2 September 1954 om 1.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>573</sup> Idem, 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>574</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.10, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 2 September 1954 om 1.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1-3; CSWV, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Maandag 23 Augustus 1954 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 3; RBA, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 26 Augustus 1954 om 2.00 uur n.m. ten kantore van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, Raamweg 32 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 2-5.

adopted the stance of refusing further central wage negotiations,<sup>575</sup> which was politically supported by the VVD.<sup>576</sup> Under the pressure of the trade unions, the Daily Board of the CSWV was divided between a group that was unwilling to cooperate on any increase and a group that backed introducing a possibility for sectoral increases without a decree by the Mediation Board to keep the initiative in the bargaining process.<sup>577</sup> Given the tight labour market and the SER report, the latter business' representatives saw a refusal of any wage increase as unrealistic and eventually were in the majority. At the start of September, the position of the CSWV and VNW, therefore, was in favour of sustaining current central wage guidelines in combination with introducing the possibility of maximised sectoral negotiations.<sup>578</sup> For the CSWV, the essential difference between this stance and the central permit was that the first option would only constitute a small commitment and stimulate bottom-up regulation through sectoral negotiations, while a central permit would formally place the burden of proof in the hands of the employers, making them obliged to motivate to the Mediation Board which enforced the decree top-down why the maximum allowed by the permit could not be implemented with the risk of still having to do so.<sup>579</sup> `

By refuting the central permit of the Mediation Board next to its mandatory decrees, the CSWV and VNW fundamentally challenged the centralised bargaining system for the first time in the post-war period in line with the July statement and in contrast with the other peak employers' associations. The fact that the relatively domestic-oriented Liberal association of small- and medium-sized enterprises had pressed the peak employers' associations in the RBA to undertake extreme caution with the wage negotiations in the Labour Foundation suggests

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>575</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 2.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>576</sup> Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 430.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>577</sup> CSWV, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Maandag 23 Augustus 1954 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>578</sup> RBA, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 26 Augustus 1954 om 2.00 uur n.m. ten kantore van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, Raamweg 32 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1-2; CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden op 1 September 1954 om 2.00 n.m. in Hotel des Pays-Bas te Utrecht' (1954) 2-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>579</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 2.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 5; RBA, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 26 Augustus 1954 om 2.00 uur n.m. ten kantore van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, Raamweg 32 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 2; CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden op 1 September 1954 om 2.00 n.m. in Hotel des Pays-Bas te Utrecht' (1954) 5.

that the radical stance of the relatively export-oriented Liberal VNW and CSWV is not best explained by a distinction between affiliations with domestic- and export-oriented sectors. Rather it seems that the division within the employer community in these negotiations was structured along socio-cultural lines. As the Protestant and Catholic peak employers' associations had already refuted future general wage rounds in the July statement of 1953, the more moderate stance in the wage negotiations of 1954 might be best explained by a pragmatic choice for cross-class solidarity with the Protestant and Catholic trade unions which was more likely to lead to an agreement.

The negotiations in the Labour Foundation also show that the peak employers still tried to take a common external stance, however, emphasising their agreement on the refusal of a general wage round and the promotion of sectoral differentiation. Despite these efforts, the difference in viewpoint remained clear in the meetings of the Labour Foundation. Whereas the VPCW argued for a permit, the liberal business' representatives feared that such an increase forced economically weaker sectors to pay unaffordable wages and, therefore, merely backed the creation of the possibility of more voluntary sectoral negotiations, and the Catholic employers did not adopt a concrete attitude. From the labour side, there was a willingness to agree with a permit when it contained a higher maximum increase than the proposed general wage round. Meanwhile, the Daily Board of the AKWV still debated the Catholic business stance. C.J.J. de Wit, in particular, argued against the permit because of its risk to put the Mediation Board in a difficult position when there would be no sectoral agreement. He lost the debate, though, as the Catholic business' representatives of the KVW announced that they backed a permit of five per cent at maximum as well a few days later.

Now that the CSWV was alone in its viewpoint against a permit, its General and Daily Board rediscussed this position. Maitland's stance in the General Board was indicative of a majority within both the Daily and General Board of the CSWV. Although the decision to negotiate on the sectoral level through either a top-down enforced permit or more voluntary

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>580</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Donderdag 2 September 1954 om 2.15 uur ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 3-4, 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>581</sup> Idem, 4, 8-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>582</sup> Idem. 10, 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>583</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 6 September 1954 om 10.30 uur in het Victoria-hotel te Amsterdam' (1954) 5-7. <sup>584</sup> Idem, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>585</sup> CSWV, 2.191.03.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 2.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 2.

bottom-up initiative would probably not lead to many practical differences given the low wage level, tight labour market and strong sectoral power position of trade unions, he argued that there was a vital ideational distinction that favoured the latter option as it would steer towards sectoral self-determination. 586 The initial conclusion of the meetings of the General and Daily Board was, therefore, that the association kept its stance intact.<sup>587</sup> The representatives of the CSWV still changed their attitude on the next day, however.<sup>588</sup> On 10 September, the RBA convened and discussed the position of the government on the wage negotiations in anticipation of a meeting with the Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health.<sup>589</sup> As statements by the government made a centrally enforced wage compensation for a rent increase in the short term very likely, the CSWV strategically decided to change its mind on its first-order preference in order to form a common business block on the more achievable second-order preference in the form of a permit. Basing themselves on the SER report, the peak employers' associations now commonly argued in favour of a permit of five per cent which would enable the possibility of a real wage increase while also accounting for the future rent increase. <sup>590</sup> The medium-sized business organisations continued to express their dissatisfaction, however, again signifying that they were more critical of wage increases than the more export-oriented peak employers' associations in contrast to the theoretical expectations of this thesis.

On 11 September, the business organisations presented this viewpoint in the Labour Foundation.<sup>591</sup> The main argument for backing a permit rather than a mandatory decree of the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>586</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 3.30 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage), te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 3-4; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 2.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>587</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 2.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 7; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 3.30 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage), te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>588</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 16 September 1954, 3.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>589</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur uit de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Vrijdag 10 September 1954 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage (1954) 1. <sup>590</sup> RBA, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur uit de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Vrijdag 10 September 1954 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage (1954) 2-4; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 16 September 1954, 3.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954) 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>591</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 11 September 1954 om 2.00 uur n.m. ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 4, 7; Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van

business' representatives was that it could consider sectoral differences and thereby prevent harm for sectors in difficult (international) circumstances.<sup>592</sup> Consistent with their earlier statements, the trade unions responded that they were willing to accept the form of a permit but demanded a higher wage increase under these conditions<sup>593</sup>, which led to another standstill on the height of a wage increase.<sup>594</sup> On 14 September, the Labour Foundation met again after discussing with the Minister of Economic Affairs and Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health to break the deadlock.<sup>595</sup> Here, the employers' representatives moved by offering a permit of six per cent instead of five, which was agreed upon by the trade unions.<sup>596</sup> The difficult position of employers' representatives due to the economic conditions and their wish for sectoral negotiations explains the leniency of business in accommodating a (higher) real wage increase. Moreover, the representatives of both capital and labour wanted to avoid another top-down decree from the Mediation Board by reaching an agreement in contrast to the period up to that moment from 1949 onwards.<sup>597</sup> Subsequently, the business members in the Labour

Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1954* (Den Haag 1954) 531; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond,gehouden op Donderdag, 16 September 1954, des namiddags te 3.30 uur, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage), te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1-2; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, welke werd gehouden op 21 September 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 6; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954) 2; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.18' (1954) 565-6; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 16 September 1954, 3.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>592</sup> Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1954* (Den Haag 1954) 531.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>593</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 11 September 1954 om 2.00 uur n.m. ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 4-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>594</sup> Idem, 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>595</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Dinsdag 14 September 1954, om 2.30 uur n.m. ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954) 3; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 16 September 1954, 3.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 2-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>596</sup> StÅR, 01411, inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Dinsdag 14 September 1954, om 2.30 uur n.m. ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1-2; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954) 3; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, welke werd gehouden op 21 September 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 6; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 16 September 1954, des namiddags te 3.30 uur, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1° étage), te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>597</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond,gehouden op Donderdag, 16 September 1954, des namiddags te 3.30 uur, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1º étage), te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 3; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de

Foundation successfully defended this stance in the RBA in front of the wider group of employers' representatives who now had to convince their backbenchers.<sup>598</sup> As both employers' and workers' representatives were able to persuade their associations, they reached an official agreement on a permit of six per cent on 17 September, which was quickly approved by the Mediation Board.<sup>599</sup>

The wage increase established a systemic shift in two ways. Firstly, the outcome of a real wage increase meant that the result was not merely about (partial) compensation for price increases but also involved the possibility of improving the standards of living in contrast with the period between 1944 and 1954. 600 Secondly, the form of a permit implicated that the central government merely established a maximum wage increase based on productivity gains. Within the space between the previous central guidelines and this maximum, representatives of employees and employers negotiated on the sectoral level, even though the maximum wage increase was often the result of these negotiations in the first years because of the relatively low general wage level, tight labour market and the strong sectoral power position of the trade unions. 601 Whereas trade unions wanted the real wage increase, the employers' associations strived to achieve the permit. The agreement, therefore, was as an exchange where trade unions got real wage improvement for the allowance of limited sectoral differentiation which business desired. In the following years, the collective bargaining process consolidated this outcome of sectoral negotiations about a significant part of the centrally determined wage increases. 602

vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Dinsdag 14 September 1954, om 2.30 uur n.m. ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1, 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>598</sup> AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954) 3.

<sup>599</sup> StAR, 01411, inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op 17 September 1954, ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954) 1-2; Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging and Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1954* (Den Haag 1954) 541, 563; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4º Jaargang no.18' (1954) 566-8; AKWV, 917, inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954) 3; Van Peijpe, *De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht*, 394; Van Baalen e.a., *Het kabinet-Drees III*, 467-8; Scholten, *De Sociaal-Economische Raad*, 280, 286; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 181-2; Harmsen and Reinalda, *Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid*, 334; Bruggeman and Camijn, *Ondernemers verbonden*, 222; Van Bottenburg, "*Aan den arbeid!*", 126; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 22, 24; Van Zanden,, *Een klein land*, 112; Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 256.

<sup>600</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 181; Scholten, De Sociaal-Economische Raad, 297; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 334; Van Baalen e.a., Het kabinet-Drees III, 468; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 372; Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 169-70; Van Zanden, Een klein land, 112; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 260.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>601</sup> Fase, *Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid*, 256; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 24; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 182; AKWV and KWV, *De Katholieke Werkgever 1953*, 359, 392.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>602</sup> Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, *Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland*, 183; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, *10 jaar C. S. W. V.*, 24.

Paradoxically, the accord was both a consolidation and dissolution of the centralised bargaining system from the business perspective. Although employers de facto accepted the new reality of centralised wage negotiations through the agreement, the wage increase also constituted a small step in the direction of more wage differentiation, making the bargaining system less centralised and closer to the pre-war model. 603 The moderate outcome was the result of the disagreement among and within the employers' associations during the wage negotiations of 1954 in contrast with the relative alignment of business positions in the immediate post-war period. Despite a wide consensus in favour of wage differentiation since the early 1950s, the rate of reform was still widely disputed in the employer community which prevented a more radical outcome. Whereas the Catholic and Protestant peak employers' associations supported a central decree in the form of a permit which allowed for more wage differentiation within the centralised bargaining model, only the Liberal business' representatives fundamentally challenged this system in the short run with their initial disapproval of central decrees in any form. The more moderate stance of the Catholic and Protestant employer community might be explained by cross-class solidarity with the Catholic and Protestant trade unions along socio-cultural lines.

#### 3.9 Theoretical reflection

When compared with their earlier stances, the business positions during the wage negotiations in 1954 mark the significant changes in the viewpoints of the employers' associations in the second centralised bargaining case. Whereas the attitudes of the business' representatives were remarkably consistent throughout the first case on sectoral bargaining, there was comparatively much development in the stances concerning the bargaining level in the immediate post-war period.

The relatively limited amount of information on the stances of the employer community regarding the introduction of the BBA in 1944 which provided the legal foundation for the centralised bargaining system in the post-war period posed a major challenge to reconstructing the business attitudes in the immediate post-war period. By combining an analysis of the limited data on the business positions regarding the introduction of the BBA with a comprehensive investigation of the reactions of employers' representatives after the establishment of the centralised bargaining model, this study was able to establish that the business opposition against the centralised bargaining system was mainly targeted at the role of the government in this model instead of the bargaining level. Although this study did not find conclusive evidence for a genuine interest by the employer community in the creation of the centralised bargaining

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>603</sup> CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.18' (1954) 566.

model, it is clear that the leadership of the peak employers' associations were willing to abide by a system of central coordination under the difficult circumstances of the reconstruction period, as indicated by the statutes of the Labour Foundation. As part of their challenge of the government's role in the system, these business' representatives proposed to continue the centralised bargaining model under the control of the social partners, which de facto also meant the recognition of a role of trade unions in economic affairs. As the initial BBA gave little influence to the social partners, the resistance of the peak employers' associations against the model was relatively fierce. When the newly elected Schermerhorn-Drees cabinet introduced the adjusted BBA, which incorporated the social partners through the Labour Foundation and would be restricted to the reconstruction period, opposition became less severe, however, and the business' representatives tolerated the far-reaching government influence in the immediate post-war period.

Whereas all peak employers' associations ideationally favoured a more liberal system of wage formation in the long run, suggesting that they had no long-term genuine interest in the model, the extreme circumstances of the time made it strategically attractive for them to maintain the restrictive centralised bargaining system which established wage moderation. Due to this tension, the business opposition conformed to the centralised bargaining system up to 1949. From 1949 onwards, the peak employers' associations were still fearful of the effects of fundamental changes to the centralised bargaining system, but tried to tackle the inflexibility of the centralised bargaining system by changing the practice of mandatory central decrees by the Mediation Board into a standard usage of permits. The CSWV, in particular, was pro-actively pushing for permits in this period. As the economy recovered, the tensions among the social partners increased and the industrial negotiations were repeatedly unsuccessful, the peak employers' associations started to aim for more fundamental changes to the centralised bargaining model, again signifying the lack of a structural, genuine business interest in the system.

Despite a trend of agreement between the peak employers' associations on the centralised bargaining system up to 1954, which was illustrated by their common statement of July 1953 and the vote on the introduction of a margin in the SER, Liberal and Catholic business' representatives were consistently more radical in their approach than their Protestant counterparts. Interestingly, the Liberal and Catholic peak employers' associations took turns as the most radical employers' association between 1944 and 1954. In 1954, the divergences between the peak employers' organisations of the different socio-cultural pillars became larger, as Liberal business' representatives kept themselves to the statement and, therefore, were alone

fundamentally challenging the centralised bargaining status quo. When the Catholic and Protestant employer community proved to be more lenient by advocating a permit rather than no central decree at all and the circumstances showed that a central decree was very likely, the CSWV and VNW strategically caved in which led to the moderate compromise of a permit of six per cent in 1954. The end result was, therefore, a significant adjustment within the centralised bargaining system rather than an instance of fundamental change.

Despite these trends, there was internal opposition by minorities against these stances in all of the peak employers'associations, however, and the leadership of the Liberal employer community was opportunistic as well which is shown by their short-term opposition against reform and the common statement during the wage negotiations of 1953. In comparison with the first case, differences between domestic- and export-oriented sectors were less important in explaining the attitudes of business' representives, though. If anything, the business associations of the small- and medium-sized enterprises were generally more radical in opposing wage increases than the comparatively export-oriented peak employers' associations which contradicts the theoretical expectations of this thesis.

In these debates, proponents of the status quo pointed at the strong sectoral power position of labour as a reason to oppose the short-term liberalisation of the wage formation process. Moreover, the initial consolidation and later limited reform of the centralised bargaining system should be viewed as instances of strategic accommodation. Due to the better sectoral power position of trade unions, the tight labour market, relatively low wage level and workers' right to strike, a large share of the business' representatives chose to tolerate the centralised bargaining system and its central decrees as a way to maintain industrial peace and prevent more radical wage increases. On the other side of the argument, the opponents postulated that this support would lead to the normalisation of the centralised bargaining model, structurally sustaining its far-reaching government involvement and substantial influence of workers on economic affairs. Furthermore, they stated that maintaining the centralised model increasingly gave trade unions the wrong impression that they had the right on a share of the national economy.

When investigating the importance of business interests, these motivations played a much larger role in the second case than in the first one. The most important reasons for the employer community to oppose the centralised bargaining system were wage differentiation and flexibility. These critics argued that the centralised bargaining model caused inefficient allocation in the labour market, illustrated by the increasing eminence of black wages, as the wages did not reflect sectoral circumstances and human capital. For these business'

representatives, the lack of adaptability of the centralised bargaining system under swiftly changing circumstances due to its limited flexibility also was a widely mentioned concern. On the other side of the argument, the wage moderation and control on inflation established by the Guided Wage Policy was a vital reason for employers' representatives to support the status quo. Due to the tight labour market and comparatively low wage level, these proponents argued that liberalisation would immediately cause significantly higher wages. Moreover, some of them added upon this argument that sectoral bargaining under these conditions would lead to wage competition between unsheltered and sheltered sectors severely harming the competitive position of unsheltered industries. Additionally, administrative efficiency played no important role as an argument.

Given its extreme nature from a business perspective, there was no prevalent ideational motivation for employers' representatives to support the centralised bargaining system of the immediate post-war period. There were important ideational reasons for them to oppose it, however. This type of argument was particularly important among Catholic business' representatives who maintained their ideational commitment to sectoral bargaining as part of a wider cross-class coalition in the Catholic pillar. For the Liberal employer community, there was also a clear ideational component in its opposition to the centralised bargaining model because of its impediment on the right of employers to determine their labour conditions. Interestingly, the ideational factor played a smaller role in the Protestant peak employers' association where pragmatic arguments tended to dominate concerning the centralised bargaining system in this period. Still, the cross-class coalition of the organisations of capital and labour in the Catholic and Protestant pillar played an important role in both forcing the NVV to break its fierce opposition against any changes in the centralised bargaining system and convincing the CSWV and VNW to take a more moderate stance on central decrees, allowing the outcome of the wage negotiations of 1954 with an exchange of sectoral differentiation for real wage improvement.

In terms of the contextual factors, the political environment and historical regularities played a major role in the centralised bargaining debate. The political environment played an important role through the close ties between the PvdA and NVV who took a common stance against adjustments to the centralised bargaining model. The Protestant, Catholic and Liberal political parties all openly advocated systemic change in the early 1950s but were initially unsuccessful in their efforts due to the crucial role of the PvdA in the post-war governments of the Netherlands. Similar to the first case, the cross-class solidarity in the Catholic and Protestant pillar shows the relevance of historical regularities in the form of the creation and consolidation

of the highly pillarised socio-cultural landscape in the Netherlands up to this period. Furthermore, the paradoxical nature of the 1954 outcome demonstrates the importance of policy feedback loops concerning the centralised bargaining discussion. While the result was undesirable for the business' representatives from a purely ideational perspective, it was a step in the direction of their genuine preferences given the path dependency of the policy process which the Nazis had started during the Second World War.

## 4. Conclusion

The research question of this thesis is to what extent the Dutch employer community has shown a genuine interest in the shift from firm-level negotiation to sectoral collective bargaining and the subsequent step of national centralised bargaining during the first half of the twentieth century. To answer the question, this thesis applied a two-step method of causal-process tracing and congruence analysis. For the first case on sectoral bargaining, this investigation demonstrated significant internal differences within the employer community, with some business' representatives displaying a genuine interest for statutory extension and remarkable stability of these divergent positions over time. Arguments based on ideational commitment and business interests proved to be particularly important throughout the sectoral bargaining discussion.

For the second case on centralised bargaining, the employers' representatives were relatively united in their genuine long-term interest to dissolve the centralised bargaining system, but their short-term stances on the system were unstable and comparatively disparate, particularly due to the extreme nature of the post-war circumstances. Although the limited availability of information made it difficult to reconstruct the (genuine) business positions regarding the establishment of centralised bargaining in 1944, it is clear that employers' representatives chose to oppose the role of the government in this model rather than the bargaining level. As the statutes of the Labour Foundation indicate, the leadership of the employer community even supported a continuation of the centralised bargaining system under the control of the social partners for the length of the reconstruction period. From this cannot be concluded, however, that the wider employer community showed a genuine interest in the initial creation of the centralised bargaining system, as the employer community was led by a very small group in this period and the centralised bargaining system was established before the Labour Foundation which might have led to strategic behaviour in the writing of the Labour Foundation's statutes. In the second case, motivations based on power, business interests and ideational commitment all played an important role. Interestingly, though, proponents of the status quo tended to use motivations regarding power and business interests, while opponents mostly used arguments regarding business interests and ideational commitment.

When looking at the first case in more detail, the consensus of the peak employers' associations from the Catholic and Protestant pillar was consistently in favour of statutory extension and these organisations, therefore, showed a genuine interest in sectoral bargaining. In stark contrast with the expectations from the theoretical framework, the Catholic peak employers' association evenly pro-actively supported the introduction of the mechanism. The Protestant and Catholic business organisations of farmers and the small- and medium-sized enterprises did not fully fit this pattern, however, as they became more negative towards the instrument over time. Moreover, Liberal employers structurally opposed sectoral collective bargaining as expected. Only just before the establishment of statutory extension, they changed their stance to limit the labour conditions that would fall under the mechanism which, remarkably, was the only major instance of strategic accommodation.

The main difference between the attitudes of the peak employers' associations across the pillars is explained by the variation in their ideational commitment. Due to the pillarisation of Dutch socio-economic life, the dominant Christian democratic ideas within the Protestant and Catholic pillar heavily influenced the positions of their peak business organisations which provided the basis for cross-class solidarity. Here, the contextual factor of knowledge played an important role as ideational innovators Veraart and Kortenhorst played a vital part by linking the wider Christian democratic thought with the introduction of sectoral collective bargaining and thereby stimulated the ideational commitment to statutory extension by the Protestant and Catholic employers' representatives. Although a majority of the business' representatives opposed statutory extension, a significant minority, therefore, backed the mechanism. A closer look indicates that sectoral differences were of major importance as well, though. The analysis of the sectoral business institutions that were in favour and against sectoral collective bargaining shows that employers' associations representing an export-oriented sector were far more likely to oppose statutory extension than those of a domestic-oriented sector.

Next to Christian democratic ideational arguments, the most important motivation postulated in favour of sectoral collective bargaining was that the unorganised workers and emlpoyers were undercutting collective labour agreements, thereby making them unsustainable and threatening industrial peace. As these collective labour agreements were already highly valued by this part of the employer community, it made sense to establish collective bargaining through a system based on these contracts which demonstrates the importance of historical regularities in this case. The opposing side implemented a wider variety of arguments based on

power, business interests and ideational factors. First of all, these employers' representatives feared that statutory extension would increase the power position of labour, which would consequently expand its influence even further. Often, this concern culminated in slippery slope arguments pointing to the threat of the PBO or the establishment of a socialist state. Another influential argument was that sectoral bargaining constituted an impediment on the fundamental, individual contract freedom of employers. Economically, opponents argued that statutory extension would lead to higher wages, harming the international competitiveness of export-oriented companies and the agreement would cause inflexibility leading to severe problems when quick adjustments would be needed, e.g. during economic crises.

In the second case, the employer community struggled with a dilemma between shortand long-run preferences, which had been less apparent in the first case. Given the historical regularity of the extreme centralisation of the bargaining system in the immediate post-war period, there was a wide consensus within the employer community that the status quo was (ideationally) undesirable in the long term, signifying that they had no genuine interest in structurally maintaining the model. The major point of debate was when this system had to be dissolved, though, because of the difficult post-war conditions and favourable central government policies for the business community in this period which made the model strategically attractive in the short run. Due to these conditions, the short-term interest of business' representatives changed severely from 1944 to 1954. Initially, all peak employers' associations conformed with the status quo because of the difficult circumstances and wage moderation enforced by the government. From 1949 onwards, however, economic conditions improved and the call for wage differentiation in the centralised bargaining system increased in the form of a request for permits by the Mediation Board rather than mandatory decrees, slightly moving the stances of the employer community in the direction of its long-term preferences. A combination of further improving economic circumstances, increasing tensions between the social partners and their inability to reach agreements on wage mutations caused a radicalisation of business' stances between 1952 and 1954, making them demand more fundamental changes to the centralised bargaining model which were closer to their long-term views.

Notwithstanding internal opposition and instable viewpoints, the Catholic and Liberal business' representatives were generally more radical in their call for change than their Protestant counterparts, while sectoral differences played a less important role in explaining divergent stances. In 1954, the Liberal peak employers' associations were the only one to (initially) follow their genuine preferences by fundamentally challenging the centralised bargaining model and clinging to the July statement of all the peak employers' associations to

refute future central decrees, but they had to give in as the other peak business organisations had strategically moved to their second-order preference by trying to achieve a compromise through a permit instead. Here, the Catholic and Protestant peak employers' associations might have been motivated by cross-class solidarity with the trade unions in the same socio-cultural pillars. Despite the compromise, the outcome of a permit of six per cent established a first significant change to the centralised bargaining system in the post-war period through an exchange of wage differentiation for real wage improvement. The lateness of this reform was partly caused the political circumstances of the time as the PvdA and NVV strongly opposed any reform to the centralised bargaining system until they were forced to leave this position in the SER through a cross-class coalition of the Protestant and Catholic pillar which shows the importance of the pillarisation as a Dutch historical regularity.

In the discussion up to this result, the critics of the centralised bargaining system generally used economic and ideational arguments and tended to avoid power-based motivations. When they referred the power, the opponents of centralised bargaining stated that the sustaining of the centralised bargaining model normalised severe government intervention and a significant role of workers in economic affairs, while also giving trade unions a wrong idea that employees had a rightful share in the national economy. Regarding business interests, they pointed to the lack of wage differentiation under the model by arguing that it did not account for (sectoral) differences, thereby not directing labour to the sector where it would be the most productive through price signals. Similarly, people's earnings did not reflect their human capital, which led to the issue of black wages as firms were sometimes willing to pay more than the centrally determined wage level. Additionally, the rigidity of the centralised bargaining system limited its ability to react to swift changes such as economic downturns. Ideationally, the peak employers' associations argued for the desirability of a free bargaining process between the social partners on a lower level, consistent with the Christian democratic and economically Liberal thought of the respective business institutions.

Proponents within the business community of (temporarily) maintaining the bargaining model used pragmatic motivations rather than ideational arguments given the extraordinary conditions of the time and the extremeness of the bargaining system in the direct post-war period. Using power as an argument, representatives of the peak employers' associations repeatedly acknowledged that the organisational capacity of labour on the sectoral level was superior to that of capital and a return to negotiations on this level was, therefore, undesirable. Combined with the relatively low general wage level and tight labour market maintaining the centralised bargaining system was a way of strategic accommodation to limit wage increases

and maintain industrial peace. Proponents feared that liberalisation would lead to a quick expansion of wages and inflation, caused by the economic circumstances, competition between sheltered and unsheltered industries and the workers' right to strike, which would be particularly problematic for those companies operating on the international market.

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#### **5.2** Archival files

# 5.2.1 National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague)

- 5.2.1.1 Vereeniging van Nederlandse Werkgevers (VNW) no. 2.19.103.01
- Inv.no. 7: Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur der Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Woensdag, 8 november 1922. Te 's-Gravenhage.' (1922).
- Inv.no. 16: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van de buitengewone algemene ledenvergadering der Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Donderdag, 18 januari 1923. Te Amsterdam.' (1923).
- Inv.no. 24: De Werkgever 1923. 1e Jaargang no.1. 1 Juni 1923' (1923).
- Inv.no. 24: 'De Werkgever 1925. 3e Jaargang no.10. 1 October 1925' (1925).
- 5.2.1.2 Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen (VNF) no. 2.19.103.02
- Inv.no. 3: 'Het Eene Noodige. Rede uitgesproken door Simon A. Maas Voorzitter van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen in de Algemene Vergadering van dat Verbond op Donderdag 21 December 1922, den Haag.' (1922).
- Inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 25 Januari 1923, des namiddags te 2,5 uur, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, den Haag.' (1923).
- Inv.no. 7: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 7 December 1922, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, Haag.' (1922).
- Inv.no. 7: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 8 Juni 1922, des voormiddags te 11 uur, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36. den Haag.' (1922).
- Inv.no. 7: 'Vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur, gehouden op 10 Januari 1922, des namiddags te 2.' (1922).
- Inv.no. 8: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur, gehouden op Vrijdag 25 September 1925, des namiddags te 2 uur ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, den Haag' (1925).
- Inv.no. 21: 'De Nederlandsche Nijverheid. 5<sup>e</sup> Jaargang no.4. Woensdag 28 Februari 1923' (1923).
- Inv.no. 23: 'De Nederlandsche Nijverheid. 7° Jaargang no.16. Zaterdag 22 augustus 1925' (1925).
- 5.2.1.3 Centraal Overleg in Arbeidszaken voor Werkgeversbonden (COAW) no. 2.19.103.04
- Inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van de Algemene Bestuursvergadering van Centraal Overleg. Op 26 Januari 1922, in het Scheepvaartshuis te Amsterdam.' (1922).

- Inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van de Algemene Bestuursvergadering van Centraal Overleg op Donderdag 15 februari 1923 in het Scheepvaartshuis te Amsterdam.' (1923).
- Inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van Centraal Overleg op 20 september 1929 des namiddags twee uur in de Industrieele Club te Amsterdam.' (1929).
- Inv.no. 37: 'Jaarverslag Centraal Overleg 1921' (1922).
- Inv.no. 40: 'Statuten der vereeniging Centraal Overleg in Arbeidszaken voor Werkgeversbonden' (1920).
- 5.2.1.4 Verbond van Nederlandse Werkgevers (VNW) no. 2.19.103.05
- Inv.no. 1: 'Loon- en Prijs-politiek' (1950).
- Inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Juni 1953 om 2 uur n.m. in de Van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 20 April 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 Juli 1953 om 2 uur des namiddags in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, welke werd gehouden op 20 Juli 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 3: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, welke werd gehouden op 21 September 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 32: 'Kort verslag van het verhandelde van de Algemene Ledenvergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op donderdag 26 Juli 1945 des namiddags 1 uur in de Stadsschouwburg te Utrecht' (1945).
- Inv.no. 32: 'Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, op 17 april 1945 te Utrecht gehouden' (1945).
- Inv.no. 34: 'Gezamenlijke werkgeversorganisaties inzake de loonsverhoging' (1951).
- Inv.no. 35: 'Eigendomsvorming door werknemers in het bedrijfsleven' (1952).
- Inv.no. 35: 'Concurrentieverhoudingen in West-Europa' (1952).

- Inv.no. 35: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 4 September 1952 om 14.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1952).
- Inv.no. 35: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 October 1952 te 10 uur v.m. in Hotel Figi te Zeist' (1952).
- Inv.no. 36: 'Benelux-bespreking met Prof. G. Brouwers' (1953).
- Inv.no. 36: 'De stand van zaken met betrekking to Benelux' (1953).
- Inv.no. 36: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 3 Februari 1953 te 12.30 uur in de Van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 36: 'Uit het bedrijfsleven. "De werkgeversverklaring inzake de loonpolitiek" (1953).
- Inv.no. 37: 'Naschrift bij de nota betreffende loonpolitiek van Ir. S.H. Visser' (1954).
- Inv.no. 37: 'Nota betreffende de loonpolitiek als een der hoekstenen van het beleid der ondernemersorganisaties' (1954).
- Inv.no. 37: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 25 Maart 1954 om 12.30 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 37: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Maart 1954 om 11 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's- Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 72: 'Nota, behoorende bij punt 3 der agenda voor de bestuursvergadering van donderdag, 8 april a.s.' (1926).
- Inv.no. 72: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Donderdag, 11 Maart 1926, des voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te 's-Gravenhage' (1926).
- Inv.no. 72: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Woensdag, 12 Mei 1926, des voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te 's-Gravenhage' (1926).
- Inv.no. 73: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Donderdag 19 December 1929, des voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, Mauritskade 5, 's-Gravenhage' (1929).

- Inv.no. 78: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op Donderdag 10 December 1936, des n.m. 1.30 uur, ten kantore van het verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1936).
- Inv.no. 79: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Vrijdag, 5 November 1937, des n.m. 2.30 uur ten kantore van het verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, Den Haag' (1937).
- Inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Juni 1953 om 11.00 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 19 Mei 1953 te 11 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 Juli 1953 om 11.00 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 87: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 5 Mei 1953 te 10 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 146: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de Buitengewone Algemene vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. 20 Maart 1930 te Amsterdam in de Industrieele Club.' (1930).
- Inv.no. 156: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de Buitengewone Algemene Ledenvergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Vrijdag, 22 Februari 1935 te Amsterdam, in het Koloniaal Instituut.' (1935).
- Inv.no. 172: 'Rede, uitgesproken door de Heer T.J. Twijnstra, Voorzitter van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, op de algemene ledenvergadering van dat Verbond op 18 October 1951 te Groningen' (1951).
- Inv.no. 205: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Vrijdag, 8 October 1926 des voormiddags te 10.15 uur in het gebouw van het verbond, Mauritskade 5, Den Haag' (1926).
- Inv.no. 205: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het presidium van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, op Woensdag, 7 April 1926 des namiddags te 3 uur, ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te 's-Gravenhage' (1926).
- Inv.no. 209: 'Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium en de verbondsdelegatie uit den Nijverheidsraad op Maandag, 11 Juni 1934 des n.m. 9 uur ten kantore van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1934).

- Inv.no. 209: 'Kort verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium op Vrijdag, 11 Januari 1935.' (1935).
- Inv.no. 232: 'De Werkgever 1926. Jaargang 1926' (1926).
- Inv.no. 233: 'De Werkgever 1927. Jaargang 1927 no.20' (1927).
- Inv.no. 233: 'De Werkgever 1927. Jaargang 1927 no.23' (1927)
- Inv.no. 235: 'De Werkgever 1930. Jaargang 1930 no.26' (1930).
- Inv.no. 235: 'De Werkgever 1930. Jaargang 1930 no.34' (1930).
- Inv.no. 235: 'De Werkgever 1931. Jaargang 1931 no.2' (1931).
- Inv.no. 236: 'De Werkgever 1932. Jaargang 1932 no.49' (1932).
- Inv.no. 236: 'De Werkgever 1933. Jaargang 1933 no.50' (1933).
- Inv.no. 237: 'De Werkgever 1936. Jaargang 1936 no.38' (1936).
- Inv.no. 237: 'De Werkgever 1936. Jaargang 1936 no.50' (1936).
- Inv.no. 237: 'De Werkgever 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.11' (1937).
- Inv.no. 237: 'De Werkgever 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.12' (1937).
- Inv.no. 239: 'De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1949. Jaargang 1949 no.24' (1949).
- Inv.no. 239: 'De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1950. Jaargang 1950 no.18' (1950).
- Inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1951. Jaargang 1951 no.23' (1951).
- Inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1952. Jaargang 1952 no.13' (1952).
- Inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1952. Jaargang 1952 no.14' (1952).
- Inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.9' (1953).
- Inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.11' (1953).
- Inv.no. 240: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.16' (1953).
- Inv.no. 241: 'De Nederlandsche Industrie 1954. Jaargang 1954 no.18' (1954).
- Inv.no. 252: 'Kroniek 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.4. 29 Januari' (1937).
- Inv.no. 264: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 3 Juni 1952 te 10.00 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, Den Haag' (1952).

- 5.2.1.5 Hoge Raad van Arbeid (HRA) no. 2.15.29
- Inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1920.' (1921).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1923.' (1924).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1926.' (1927).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1932.' (1933).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Jaarverslag over 1937.' (1938).
- Inv.no. 2: 'Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.' (1926).
- Inv.no. 3: 'Besluit van den 4den October 1919, tot vaststelling van een algemene maatregel van bestuur houdende instelling van een Hoogen Raad van Arbeid.' (1919).
- Inv.no. 21: 'Praeadvies van Commissie XII over een voorontwerp regelende de verbindendverklaring van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten' (1926).
- 5.2.1.6 Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond (CSWV) no. 2.19.103.06
- Inv.no. 2: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 17 November 1950, no. 8534/Mz/HL (1950).
- Inv.no. 2: Letter from Secretary CSWV C.E.J. Maitland to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 10 December 1949, no. 8297/Mz/LB (1949).
- Inv.no. 2: 'Mededeling van de opvatting der centrale werkgeversorganisaties' (31 Augustus 1950).
- Inv.no. 2: 'Notulen van de gezamenlijke vergadering van de Besturen van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 16 Mei 1950, des namiddags 4 uur ten kantore van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers te Den Haag' (1950).
- Inv.no. 2: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Voorlopig Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 6 maart 1946 des n.m. te 2 uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1946).
- Inv.no. 4: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 22 Maart 1951, no. 2431/Mz/HL (1951).
- Inv.no. 4: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 31 January 1952, no. 736/Mz/HL (1952).
- Inv.no. 4: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op dinsdag 13 november 1951, des voormiddags 11 uur, in het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Mauritskade 63 te Amsterdam' (1951).

- Inv.no. 5: 'Enige opmerkingen over de nota van de commissie-de Graaff over Het vrijer maken van de loonvorming' (1953).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Het standpunt van de gezamenlijke centrale werkgeversorganisaties inzake loonmaatregelen per 1 januari 1954' (1953).
- Inv.no. 5: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the members of the association, 17 July 1953, no. 6280/Mz/CB (1952).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Rapport inzake de toekomstige loonpolitiek' (1954).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 16 Maart 1953, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 1 Juli 1954, des namiddags te 2.15 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage (1e etage)' (1954).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 3 September 1953, des namiddags te 2.- uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage), te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 9 Juli 1953 ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 3.30 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage), te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 16 September 1954, des namiddags te 3.30 uur, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage), te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Woensdag 16 September 1953 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 5: 'Welvaart en loonvorming' (1953).
- Inv.no. 30: 'Besluitenlijst van de vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuur Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 31 October 1946 des n.m. te 2 uur ten kantore van het Verbond' (1946).
- Inv.no. 34: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 24 Mei 1951, des namiddags 2 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1951).

- Inv.no. 35: 'Het vrijer maken van de loonvorming' (1953).
- Inv.no. 35: Letter from Chair W.H. Kruyff and Director Bastet (Scheepvaart Vereniging Noord) to the CSWV, 2 April 1952 (1952).
- Inv.no. 35: Letter from J.K. Hummel (Scheepvaart Vereniging Zuid) to the CSWV, 11 April 1952 (1952).
- Inv.no. 35: Letter from Metaalbond Director H.Ph. de Kanter to the CSWV, 14 March 1952, no. 3000dK/Ko (1952).
- Inv.no. 35: Letter from the General Secretary of the *Algemene Werkgevers-Vereniging* M. Klaassen to the CSWV, 29 February 1952, no. S/87 (1952).
- Inv.no. 35: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 4 September 1952 om 14.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1952).
- Inv.no. 35: 'Samenvatting van de antwoorden van de bij het C.S.W.V. aangesloten werkgeversverenigingen op de discussie-nota van Januari 1952' (1952).
- Inv.no. 35: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond gehouden 5 Juni 1952, des voormiddags om 10.30 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1952).
- Inv.no. 35: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond gehouden 5 Maart 1953 des voormiddags te 10.30 uur Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 35: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden 8 Januari des voormiddags te 10.30 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 36: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond op 5 November 1953 des voormiddags te 10.30 uur, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 16 September 1954, 3.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 2.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 37: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Maandag 23 Augustus 1954 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).

- Inv.no. 102: 'Rede Mr. F.H.A. de Graaff gehouden op de Algemene Ledenvergadering op Maandag 24 April 1953' (1953).
- Inv.no. 102: 'Rede uitgesproken door de voorzitter, de heer Mr F.H.A. de Graaff in de Algemene Ledenvergadering op Dinsdag 13 November 1951 te Amsterdam' (1951).
- Inv.no. 102: 'Rede uitgesproken door de voorzitter, de heer Mr F.H.A. de Graaff in de Algemene Ledenvergadering op Vrijdag 3 October 1952 te Rotterdam' (1952).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1952. 2e Jaargang no.4' (1952).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1952. 2e Jaargang no.12' (1952).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1952. 2<sup>e</sup> Jaargang no.18' (1952).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.8' (1953).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.11' (1953).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.15' (1953).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no. 19' (1953).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.17' (1954).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no. 18' (1954).
- Inv.no. 165: 'De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.20' (1954).
- Inv.no. 204: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Centrale Werkgeversorganisaties voor Lonen en Prijzen, gehouden op 2 November 1950, des n.m. om 3 uur, Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage) Den Haag' (1950).
- Inv.no. 204: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Werkgeversorganisaties Lonen en Prijzen, gehouden op 13 November 1950' (1950).
- 5.2.1.7 Contactcommissie Vier Verbonden (CVV) no. 2.19.103.08
- Inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering d.d. 4 Juni 1952 van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden te Tilburg ten kantore van Mr. B.J.M. van Spaendonck' (1952).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden op 1 September 1954 om 2.00 n.m. in Hotel des Pays-Bas te Utrecht' (1954).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, gehouden op Vrijdag 5 Juni 1953 te 10.00 v.m. in de Van-Hogendorpzaal, Kneuterdijk 8, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 11: 'Enkele vraagstukken inzake de loonpolitiek op lange termijn' (1952).

- 5.2.1.8 Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidzaken (RBA) no. 2.19.103.10
- Inv.no. 1: 'Gezamenlijke werkgeversorgansiaties inzake de loonsverhoging' (1951).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Kort verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag, 29 November 1951 des namiddags te 1 uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8(1e étage) te 's-Gravenhage' (1951).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 26 Augustus 1954 om 2.00 uur n.m. ten kantore van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, Raamweg 32 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur uit de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op 26 September 1953, des namiddags 1.00 uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, 1e etage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur uit de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Vrijdag 10 September 1954 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage (1954).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 2 September 1954 om 1.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 20 Augustus 1953 ten kantore, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Vrijdag 11 September 1953 ten kantore van het C.S.W.V., Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Woensdag 15 Juli 1953, des namiddags om 3 uur, ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 6: 'Betr: Oprichting Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken' (1941).

- Inv.no. 6: 'Een Raad van Bestuur in arbeidszaken' (1941).
- 5.2.1.9 Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER) no. 2.06.064
- Inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 128: 'Verslag van de vierenzestigste vergadering (zevenentwintigste openbare vergadering) van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 27 Augustus 1954 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 484: 'Concept-advies inzake de wenselijkheid van een loonsverhoging' (1954).
- Inv.no. 487: 'Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing' (1953).

## 5.2.2 Catholic Documentation Centre (Nijmegen)

- 5.2.2.1 Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging (ARKWV) no. 917 (including the archive of the Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen (RKVW))
- Inv.no. 13: 'Notulen der vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der A.R.K.W.V. op Maandag 16 November 1925 n.m. 1.30 in "Huize Voorhout" Lange Voorhout 19 Den Haag (1925).
- Inv.no. 14: 'Vergadering van het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen op Donderdag 8 Maart 1923' (1923).
- Inv.no. 14: 'Notulen Vergadering secretarissen R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen op Dinsdag 9 October 1928, Den Haag' (1928).
- Inv.no. 14: 'Gecombineerde vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuur der A.R.K.W.V. met de besturen van het bij het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen aangesloten patroonsbonden, op Maandag 10 Juli te Tilburg' (1933).
- Inv.no. 37: 'Notulen van de Dagelijksch Bestuur der A.R.K.W.V. gehouden op Dinsdag 28 December 1926 des voormiddags te half twaalf uur in "Huize Voorhout" te 's Gravenhage' (1926).
- Inv.no. 49: 'Notulen der vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuursvergadering der A.K.W.V. Federatie op Maandag 22 Maart 1937 om 10.30 uur v.m. Lange Voorhout 19, 's Gravenhage' (1937).
- 5.2.2.2 Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging (AKWV) no. 917 (including the archive of the Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen (KVW))
- Inv.no. 15: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, gehouden op 8 November 1950 te 14.15 uur te Tilburg, Willem II straat 47/49' (1950).

- Inv.no. 15: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, gehouden op Woensdag 12 Maart 1952 te 14.00 uur in Tilburg' (1952).
- Inv.no. 16: 'Notulen van de Gecombineerde Vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der Algemene Kath. Werkgeversvereeniging en van de Besturen der bij het R.K. Verbond aangesloten vakvereenigingen, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 November 1945 te Tilburg' (1945).
- Inv.no. 59: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Woensdag 25 October 1950, om 14.00 uur te Tilburg, Willem II-straat 47/49.' (1950).
- Inv.no. 59: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de A.K.W.V.-Federatie, gehouden te 's Gravenhage, Raamweg 32 op Woensdag 31 Mei 1950, 10 uur v.m.' (1950).
- Inv.no. 60: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Vrijdag 7 December 1951 om 2.00 uur n.m. te Tilburg ten kantore Willem IIstraat 47/49' (1951).
- Inv.no. 61: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Algemene Katholieke Werkgeversvereniging, gehouden op Woensdag 27 Augustus 1952 te 14.00 uur, Willem-II straat 47/49, Tilburg' (1952).
- Inv.no. 62: 'Besprekingen loonpolitiek; schets van de gang van zaken tot dusverre; de stand van het ogenblik en de te verwachten procedure' (1953).
- Inv.no. 62: 'Kort Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Loonpolitiek van de Vier Centrale Werkgeversverbonden dd. 11 Juni 1953' (1953).
- Inv.no. 62: Letter from AKWV to Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health, May 1953, 210/5/53-211/5/53 (1953).
- Inv.no. 62: 'Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de loonpolitiek' (1953).
- Inv.no. 62: 'Notitie inzake verordende bevoegdheden t.a.v. lonen en andere arbeidsvoorwaarden' (1953).
- Inv.no. 62: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 2 Februari, om 14.00 uur in Den Haag, Raamweg 32' (1953).
- Inv.no. 62: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 31 Augustus 1953 te 2.00 uur n.m. te Tilburg, Willem-II-straat 47-49' (1953).

- Inv.no. 62: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Woensdag 3 Juni 1953 des morgens te 10.00 uur v.m. te Den Haag, Raamweg 32' (1953).
- Inv.no. 62: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Woensdag 24 Juni 1953 te 10.00 uur v.m. te Utrecht, in het Jaarbeursrestaurant' (1953).
- Inv.no. 62: 'Verklaring van het Centraal-Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen en het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke werkgevers in Nederland over de loonpolitiek in de nabije toekomst' (1953).
- Inv.no. 62: 'Voorlopige conclusies bespreking op 16 Mei 1953' (1953).
- Inv.no. 63: 'Nota inzake enkele aspecten van een nieuw loonsysteem' (1954).
- Inv.no. 63: 'Nota inzake toekomstige loonpolitiek' (1953).
- Inv.no. 63: 'Notitie over "De nota inzake toekomstige loonpolitiek" van de Looncommissie van de Stichting van de Arbeid' (1954).
- Inv.no. 63: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 3 Mei 1954 t.k.v. Mr. B.J.M. van Spaendonck, Willem-II-straat 47-49 te Tilburg om 14.30 uur' (1954).
- Inv.no. 63: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 5 Juli 1954 t.k.v. Mr. B.J.M. van Spaendonck, te Tilburg, Willem-II-straat 47-49 te 10.30 uur v.m.' (1954).
- Inv.no. 63: 'Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden op Maandag 6 September 1954 om 10.30 uur in het Victoria-hotel te Amsterdam' (1954).
- Inv.no. 63: 'Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen September 1954' (1954).
- Inv.no. 374: 'Notulen van de Gecombineerde Vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V. en van Voorzitters en Secretarissen van de bij het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen aangesloten organisaties, gehouden op Woensdag 23 Augustus 1950, 16.30 uur te 's Gravenhage, Raamweg 32' (1950).
- Inv.no. 1419: 'Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen' (1952).

#### 5.2.3 Historical Documentation Centre for Dutch Protestantism (Amsterdam)

- 5.2.3.1 Vereeniging van Christelijke Werkgevers en Groothandelaren (VCWG) no. 332
- Inv.no. 1: 'Beginselverklaring en toelichting' (1921).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Gecombineerde vergadering van Bestuur der Christelijke Werkgevers.- en Christelijke Middenstandsvereniging. 6 October 1921, 's namiddags 3 uur in gebouw "De Standaard" Amsterdam' (1921).
- Inv.no. 1: letter from Mr. Woldring to Secretary 'Groningen den 27. Dec 1921' (1921).
- Inv.no. 1: 'Program van Actie vastgesteld door de Algemene Ledenvergadering van 23 November 1921.' (1921).
- 5.2.3.2 Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland (VPCW) no. 332
- Inv.no. 6: 'Kort verslag van de praesidiumvergadering van het Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden 30 Augustus 1950 ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1950).
- Inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur gehouden op Woensdag 18 Augustus 1954 te 1.30 uur n.m. ten kantore Parkstraat 28 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur gehouden op Woensdag 19 Augustus te 13.30 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur gehouden op Woensdag 20 Mei te 13.30 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28 Den Haag' (1953).
- Inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur, gehouden op Maandag, 14 September des avonds 7.15 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Praesidium van het Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Dinsdag 16 Januari 1951, Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1951).
- Inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Praesidium van het Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Donderdag 19 Juni 1947 in het Verbondsbureau, Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1947).
- Inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium van het Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, uitgebreid met enkele in de nabijheid van Den Haag wonende bestuursleden, gehouden op 23 November 1949 Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1949).
- Inv.no. 6: 'Verslag van het verhandelde op de vergadering van het Praesidium, gehouden op 11 November 1947 des namiddags om 2 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage' (1947).

- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering d.d. 21 Januari j.l. in Hotel "Wittebrug" te Scheveningen' (1954).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering d.d. 26 November j.l. in het Kurhaus te Scheveningen' (1953).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering gehouden op 18 Maart j.l. in Hotel Wittebrug te Scheveningen' (1954).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering gehouden op Donderdag 18 Juni 1953 te 11.00 uur in Hotel Wittebrug, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering op Donderdag 19 Februari 1953 te 11.00 uur in Hotel Wittebrug, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering op Vrijdag 14 November 1952 te 11 uur in Hotel "Wittebrug" te 's-Gravenhage' (1952).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering, gehouden op 26 September 1953 te 10.30 uur in Hotel "Wittebrug", 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur d.d. Donderdag 17 Juni '54 te 11 uur in Hotel "Wittebrug" te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur gehouden op 15 April 1954 te 10.00 uur in Hotel "Wittebrug" te Scheveningen' (1954).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Donderdag 27 September 1951 te 10.30 uur in Hotel des Pays Bas, Utrecht' (1951).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Maandag, 23 October 1950, in Restaurant Garoeda te 's-Gravenhage' (1950).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur, gehouden op Donderdag 22 October te 11 uur in Hotel "Wittebrug" te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 10: 'Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur, gehouden op Donderdag 17 September om 11 uur v.m. in Hotel "Wittebrug" te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).

## 5.2.4 International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam)

- 5.2.4.1 Stichting van de Arbeid (StAR) no. 01411
- Inv.no. 16: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 December 1954, ten kantore Javastraat 2b, 's-Gravenhage' (1949).

- Inv.no. 23: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 17 Juli 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 23: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 26 Juni 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 18 September 1953, des n.m. om 14.30 uur ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 21 Augustus 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 4 September 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, te 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 24: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 26 September 1953 om 3,15 uur n.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1953).
- Inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op 17 September 1954, ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Dinsdag 14 September 1954, om 2.30 uur n.m. ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Donderdag 2 September 1954 om 2.15 uur ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid gehouden op Vrijdag 16 Juli 1954 om 10.15 uur v.m te Baarn' (1954).
- Inv.no. 25: 'Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 11 September 1954 om 2.00 uur n.m. ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62 te 's-Gravenhage' (1954).
- Inv.no. 97: 'Afschrift 250-A-18' (1945).
- Inv.no. 410: 'Nota inzake de toekomstige loonpolitiek' (1954).