

Compellence and Deterrence in International Politics

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S1545817

Word count: 8170

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# **On the use of Limited Aims Strategy following Compellence**

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## Contents

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### *Theoretical Introduction:*

Introduction	1
Research question	1
Concepts and definitions	2
Method	4

### *Case studies:*

The Kashmir-Jammu War, 1947	5
The Pakistani offensive in Kashmir, 1965	7
The Six-Day War in the Sinai, 1967	9
The Falklands War, 1982	11
The Thailand-Laotian border war, 1987	13
The Hanish Island conflict, 1995	15

### *Conclusion*

Conclusion and discussion	17
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Appendix A	20
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Appendix B	21
------------	----

Bibliography	25
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## **Introduction**

As conventional wars become relatively smaller in scale, a type of conflict strategy in wars between states has become predominant in international politics. This type of strategy has been dubbed the ‘limited aims strategy’. The strategy entails an initiator starting a conflict in order to compel a change to the status quo, but keeping that conflict limited in scope and intent. An initial definition that was generally accepted came from John Maersheimer, who defined the strategy as one in which the goal is to capture a specific segment of enemy territory, while minimizing conflict with the enemy’s forces (Maerscheimer, 1983). Further aspects of the strategy that still remain relevant such as tactical surprise and the use of offensive-defensive strategy are named by Maersheimer (Maerscheimer, 1983). However, the limited aims strategy and its uses have been expanded on by researchers such as Paul, for example with the emphasis on the negotiation advantage this strategy can achieve. As such, the limited aims strategy has not yet had all of its aspects examined, which is what this paper aims to contribute to.

## **Research question**

The research question of this paper is as follows: How do factors influence the outcome of a limited aims strategy following compellence? The sub-questions guiding this paper are centred around how a limited aims strategy has been applied in different cases. Specifically, how have states utilized a limited aims strategy in order to compel geopolitical gains? What aspects of this strategy caused it to succeed or fail? This paper focusses on aspects that explain how and why a limited aims strategy was put to use by an initiator, in order to make geopolitical gains on a defender. The pre-requisite conditions for all cases examined in this paper is that these are cases in which the initiator utilizes compellence in order to change a status quo, and when this fails, engages in conflict using a limited aims strategy.

In order to examine these questions, four variables are examined throughout six cases. The variables are selected on the basis of playing a significant role in the research of earlier researchers. These variables are as follows:

- *Alliance, coalition*
- *Military balance and capabilities*
- *Domestic and external pressures*
- *High/low risk strategy*

The cases are selected on a number of criteria. They have to be initial cases of compellence, which entails that an active strategy is used by the initiator with the purpose of changing the status quo (Sechser, 2011). In these cases, a limited aims strategy is used to induce a change in the status quo from the defending party. As such, the conflicts have to be limited in scope and aim, and contest a piece of territory in order to fulfil the criteria of being a limited aims conflict. In the case selection, a noticeable feature is that some conflict cases are part of a larger, overarching conflict. While the research of this paper intends to remain confined to the use of limited aims strategy, the presence of common factors such as an overarching conflict in multiple cases is taken into account.

The value of the contribution this paper makes lies in the examination of a conflict type that is becoming more prevalent, has not been fully examined, and of which the emphasis has possibly shifted. The prevalent norms in the international system have made a taboo of large-scale wars to resolve conflicts. As such, established states (often regional powers) wage conflict on a smaller scale, and are content with making limited gains. These gains may be limited, but may still have great symbolic or strategic value. The conflicts still set the tone for who is the stronger power, and limited territorial gains can still translate into larger geopolitical gains. Maerscheimer emphasises the key aspect of actively conquering and holding a piece of territory (Maerscheimer, 1982). Paul, on the other hand, emphasises the use of military means in order to achieve limited goals, most importantly in changing the status quo (Paul, 1994). The research on translation of limited conflicts in larger geopolitical gains could have as its basis a study on contemporary limited aims conflicts.

### **Concepts and definitions**

In order to ground the research, the following section contains a number of concepts, definitions and clarifications. It is necessary to properly explain these, as the research hinges on the conceptual clarification of its central terms.

For the definition of a limited aims strategy, this paper uses the definition Paul and Maerscheimer give; a limited aims/*fait accompli* strategy refers to the employment of military forces in battle in order to achieve limited goals that are not equivalent to the decisive defeat and surrender of the enemy (Paul, 1994). Maerscheimer defines it in similarly, stating the limited aims strategy emphasises minimizing contact with the defending forces, while capturing and holding some portion of enemy territory

(Maerscheimer, 1983). The limited goals mentioned by Paul entail taking or contesting portions of a territory, compelling states to negotiate, or keeping a conflict ‘relevant’ within international politics (Paul, 1994). Within this study, the emphasis will be on the capturing of enemy territory.

For the purposes of comparison and reference, the two main strategies other than limited aims will be explained. Maerscheimer argues that the difference between the limited aims strategy and the other two strategies, is that the attrition and blitzkrieg strategy are utilized to achieve a decisive defeat of the enemy (Maerscheimer, 1983). The attrition strategy entails that the initiator engages the enemy in battles of annihilation, or set-piece battles (Maerscheimer, 1983). The ultimate goal of this strategy is to wear the enemy down until it can no longer fight. The blitzkrieg strategy relies on the inherent mobility and speed of armoured forces to defeat an opponent decisively without a series of hard-fought battles (Maerscheimer, 1983).

Compellence is central to each case examined in this paper, and for that the definition of Sechser will be used. Sechser defined compellence as an active strategy of a state to persuade another state into action under military threat, objective of which is to change the status quo (Sechser, 2011). Sechser builds upon Schelling, who defines compellence as an active rather than passive strategy, stating that the threat that compels rather than deters often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts (Schelling, 1966).

Following are short definitions of the variables used in this paper. Alliance, or being part of a coalition, entails that either party to the conflict has support of allies. This support is not necessarily of combatant nature. It can come in the form of military aid with the delivery of weapons, the sending of troops to fulfil a combatant or supportive role, or international support vis-à-vis other states such as condoning the conflict or politically supporting a *fait accompli*. Military balance and capabilities refer to the respective strengths of the opposing forces at a specific time. This respective strength of either force comes in terms of military and technological power, as well as the military ordnance (materials, tanks, planes, artillery and so on). Domestic and external pressures refer to the pressures a government faces in the choice whether to start/continue a conflict. As the use of limited aims strategy has inherent consequences for those party to the conflict, the manner that these consequences generate a domestic and international response is a factor in deciding on whether to use/keep using this

specific strategy. The final variable is the high/low risk strategy. This does not refer to a specific strategy like the limited aims strategy, but rather indicates a general level of strategy. The high/low risk strategy variable is an indication of the general goals and manner in which those goals were pursued. For this study, a low risk strategy is one that emphasises the limited aims strategy's strengths, such as tactical surprise and an offensive-defensive strategy (Maerscheimer, 1983; Paul, 1996).

## **Method**

The research in this paper is done through a method of structured focussed comparison, utilized by authors such as George, Smoke and Paul. The method is 'structured' in that the paper is based around general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study. This is done to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making statistical comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible (Bennet & George, 2005). In this paper, the variable aspects of each case are examined through literature, then standardized to allow for testing. The method is 'focussed' in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. In this case, these are the four variables and their hypothesized relation to the outcome of conflicts. As required by Bennet and George, these requirements of structure and focus are applied equally to individual cases (Bennet & George, 2005). The aim of the method being applied is to eventually draw generalizations from the analysis in order to incorporate this into a theory, and reapply this to different cases. Ideally, the structured focussed comparison would yield a general analogy that could be reapplied to situations of compellence among policy-makers.

Due to the sample being very small, with six cases and four variables, an independent sample t-test is used to compare the means. The question that it answers is whether group 1 (success) is significantly different from group 0 (no success) on the variables military balance, pressures, alliance and strategy. Put otherwise, are variables more present in either success or no success. The variables are standardized by assigning them values of 1 or 0, 1 denoting the presence of a variable for the initiator.

First, a specification of the classes or subclasses of events, of which a single case or group of cases are instances. As such the cases of each study must be instances of one phenomenon; they are the cases of the subject studied for the research objective. In the case of this paper, the 'class of events' of which the cases are instances of are uses of limited aims strategy following compellence. Second, a well-defined research

objective and an appropriate research strategy to achieve that objective should guide the selection and analysis of cases with the class or subclass of the phenomenon under investigation (Bennet & George, 2005). The research objective here is to examine how factors determine the outcome of conflicts following compellence in which a limited aims strategy is utilized. Third, case studies should employ variables of theoretical interest for purposes of explanation. According to George, in order for the case study to remain politically relevant and applicable, it should include variables that provide some leverage to policy-makers to enable them to influence outcomes (Bennet & George, 2005).

An aforementioned issue with earlier examples of comparative case studies is that these lacked a clearly defined and common focus. This disables later researchers from comparing their own work to those examples, thus being unable to 'situate' their own research properly in the body of earlier research, which is key in identifying the contributions their research has made (Bennet & George, 2005). This paper attempts to tackle this issue by sticking closely to earlier works on the subject, as well as standardizing in a structured manner as to make comparison easier.

### **The Kashmir-Jammu conflict, 1947**

Following the accession of the provinces of Jammu and Kashmir to India, Pakistan reacted by engaging India in conflict over the territories (Bose, 2007). India issued Pakistan a compellent threat to make clear their intentions, and dissuade Pakistan from reacting in force to the ethnic violence taking place in the contested provinces (Nawaz, 2008; Bose, 2007). When conflict eventually erupted it was limited to the provinces of Kashmir and Jammu, with the intent and aims of the conflict being limited to the occupation of these territories (Nawaz, 2008). Indian leadership, as the initiator of compellence, reasoned it could not attack Pakistan territory and engage in an all-out war (Nawaz, 2008). For this reason, a conflict based on a limited aims strategy followed.

Military capabilities on both sides were initially limited by the presence of British army officers in both armies (Nawaz, 2008). Pakistan's capabilities were further limited by its relative recent formation, and a multitude of ethnic and tribal groups clamouring for war but inept at working together and fighting anything else than guerrilla warfare (Schofield, 2000). Conflicting reports on Pakistani capabilities vary from an army equipped with modern weaponry including heavy machine guns and mortars, to a rag-tag militia armed mostly with home-made weaponry and outdated

rifles (Nawaz, 2008). India's forces were several times larger, and they were equipped with modern weaponry and supported by air and armour capabilities, outclassing the Pakistani army in weapons, equipment, organization and resources (Nawaz, 2008).

Alliance configurations were hardly a feature of this conflict, with neither India nor Pakistan having allies that took part in the conflict in significant fashion. An exception to this was the relationship both countries had with Great Britain. British officers served in both armies, and India still hosted the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, in the build-up to the conflict (Schofield, 2000). Apart from this, the only allies present to the conflict were Afghan tribesmen, who come to the aid of Pakistan (Bose, 2007). However, as their influence on the conflict was minimal and they did not represent the Afghan state, they are to be mentioned but disregarded for any analysis.

With the contested provinces being Muslim-majority and the ethnic suppression taking place preceding the accession to India, Pakistan leadership felt the provinces belonged to them (Bose, 2007). This belief was reiterated by the leadership when the legality of the accession was called into question (Nawaz, 2008). Schofield reasons that due to a high degree of military involvement in politics at the time, Pakistani leaders were pressured into engaging in conflict (Schofield, 2000). India's leadership was not under similar military influence, but domestic calls for assertion of its rights and power vis-à-vis Pakistan had significant influence, likely relating to India recently gaining independence in 1947 (Schofield, 2000).

The strategy of both armies was significantly influenced by the terrain and weather conditions, with Kashmir and Jammu being mountainous areas subject to debilitating weather conditions for the larger part of the year (Schofield, 2000; Nawaz, 2008). As such, much of the conflict featured extensive manoeuvring of troops to hold critical mountain passes or similar points of passage, as to outmanoeuvre and cut off the enemy (Nawaz, 2008). The conflict featured many iterations of a low-risk offensive-defensive strategy that was mostly employed by Pakistan (Nawaz, 2008). Important iterations are the holding of Banihal Pass by Pakistan, which cut Indian troops off from the capital of Kashmir, which was the only place with a functioning airfield (Nawaz, 2008).

The conflict eventually ended after the agreement of a cease-fire, with Kashmir divided by a line-of-control (Boze, 2007; Nawaz, 2008). What is interesting is that throughout various stages in the conflict, as well as in other iterations of India-Pakistan conflicts over Kashmir, there has been an emphasis on the use of a limited conflict to



achieve gains to be used in future negotiations. During the 1947 conflict, the Pakistani prime minister expressly stated the importance of the limited conflict for future achievement of political objectives through other means (Nawaz, 2008). This aspect of a controlled limited conflict to achieve political gains or diplomatic advantages in future negotiations has been emphasised by Paul and Maerscheimer (Maerscheimer, 1982; Paul, 1994).

### **The Pakistani offensive in Kashmir, 1965**

The relationship between Pakistan and India is another example of a hostile relationship since separation. When Pakistan gained independence from India, the main drivers for political independence was a great religious and ethnic divide between populations (Nasr, 2005). This divide has not, however, been rigorously applied when dividing the territory, leading to a number of border areas to exhibit similar tensions that drove both countries apart (Ghose & James, 1995). Kashmir is one of these, as it is a mostly Muslim population that is under India's control. Kashmir is not the main point of contention between India and Pakistan, but does provide a pretext for hostilities. Pakistan is of the opinion that Kashmir should belong to its territories as it is predominantly Muslim. Pakistan launched its Kashmir offensive in 1965, with the explicit goal of only occupying Kashmir. Pakistan considered the region to be part of its territory, but a status quo was rapidly forming in which India had firm control over the province. Pakistan would limit its war to India with Kashmir, but would also use small-scale means to do so, relying on commandos and urban insurrection (Paul, 1994). Furthermore, Pakistan included in the plans the possibility of defeat, after which the conflict would serve use by keeping the conflict 'relevant' and the status quo from forming.

Due to India being involved in another conflict, this one with China, Pakistan could ally itself to China and count on its political support (Ganguly, 1995). China possessed advantageous qualities similar to India's, notably a high population and military potential. Furthermore, China had been in conflict with India in 1962, in which India had been beaten (Ganguly, 1995). For these reasons China could be considered a powerful ally to Pakistan, which entailed that India would be less likely to escalate the conflict. Throughout the course of the conflict the Soviet Union would change its position on Kashmir, first ruling in unqualified support of India, then becoming neutral in 1965 after security council meetings in 1964 (Ghose & James, 1995). Pakistan thus

had reason to believe that the Soviet Union would not get involved in a conflict over Kashmir. For India, the loss of Soviet support meant the loss of a great power ally. The Soviet-India relationship had deteriorated since India had accepted military and economic aid from the U.S. and U.K. in 1962 (Paul, 1994). But the Soviets changing their stance on the Kashmir issue qualified as the adverse consequence of India losing the support of its major-power ally. Both India and Pakistan had received military and economic aid from the U.S. during the 1960s. Yet due to U.S. being preoccupied with its conflict in Vietnam and its earlier neutral stance on the Kashmir issue, the Pakistani leaders expected the U.S. not to involve itself with a limited aims conflict in Kashmir (Paul, 1994). An important takeaway from this, is that Pakistani leaders were operation on the expectation that as long as the conflict remained limited to Kashmir its great power allies would not intervene or oppose.

As previously mentioned, both India and Pakistan were receiving military and economic support from the U.S., with India receiving aid from the U.K. as well. Pakistan had received ordnance from the U.S. and had its offensive capabilities raised throughout the early 1960s by obtained superior armour and aircraft, but its officers were insufficiently trained to use these to their full extent (Paul, 1994). India had support in military and economic aid from the U.S., USSR and U.K., but had an inherent military potential that exceeded Pakistan's. India had embarked a five-year military modernization program after its defeat to China, which would greatly realize its military potential (Paul, 1994). The military modernization program of India would draw on what Paul described as India's strengths, which were its large population and economy, and would shift the balance of power in favour of India. A war of attrition would at this point be inconceivable for Pakistan, more so if it was not confined to Kashmir.

In the build-up to the conflict, Pakistan faced little external pressure to call of its plans for enacting a limited aims strategy to occupy Kashmir. The main superpowers, the Soviet Union and the U.S., would likely remain ambivalent to a conflict that remained limited to Kashmir. Furthermore, Pakistan had the open support of the regional superpower China, and counted on its defensive support if the conflict should escalate (Paul, 1994). Pressure did come from a domestic source for the initiator Pakistan, where the regime was pushed to prove its legitimacy. Pakistan's president, Ayub Khan, was popular due to his economic success, but wished to prove his credibility to the population and believed a conflict over Kashmir would do so (Paul,

1994). The conflict had to be limited as to not to be to taxing on the Pakistani population.

The strategy used by Pakistan was one that limited the risk of escalation of the war in scope and aim. Pakistan knew of its slim chance of success if a war of attrition was started, an awareness that was reflected in the decision to attack before India had completed its 5-year military modernisation program. As mentioned before, Pakistan hoped to succeed relying on commando units and civilian insurrection (Paul, 1994). The reason for this was three-fold. First of all, Pakistan knew that while it possessed superior armour and planes, its soldiers were not well-versed in how they were to be used and applied to the battlefield with coherent success. Second, using greater means to fight India would prompt India to respond with similar means, thus escalating the scope of the war. Third, Pakistan estimated that if the conflict was enlarged in scope and aim, India was liable to attack other border provinces as India had threatened to do (Paul, 1994).

Pakistan engaged in limited aims conflict in order to change an undesirable status quo. One of the main reasons for taking the initiative in the Kashmir issue was to gain international attention and challenge the status quo of Indian control. However, the major powers U.S. and USSR were expected to remain neutral, as long as the conflict remained limited to Kashmir. A limited aims strategy was suited to this purpose, as of all the three strategies it had the least chance of escalation. The decision to strategize in order to attain the lowest chance of escalation was further reflected in the strategy that Pakistan took. By limiting the means used such as armour and planes, Pakistan was able to prevent India from responding with similar means.

### **The Six-Day War in the Sinai, 1967**

When Israel attacked Egypt in its Sinai region, it constituted a case of initial deterrence in which Egypt aimed to deter Israel from attacking Syria. Reacting to this deterrence by invading a small yet significantly important territory, Israel compelled Arab states into a favourable status quo. In its history, Israel has almost been in conflict incessantly with surrounding Arab states such as Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. It is the case of a larger overarching conflict, with particularly intense conflict iterations ranging from wars to terrorist threats (Maoz, 2005). Maoz comments on Israel's conflict history that, being beset from all sides and being subject to continuous hostilities brought to effect by the overarching conflict, Israel's best option is limited operations. However, Arab states

were faced with difficulties in completely occupying or destroying Israel, as it was the strongest military power in the middle-east and enjoyed good relations with the United States as well as the potential to develop nuclear weapons (Gat, 2005).

Examining the alliance configurations at the start of the conflict, these are notably in Egypt's favour. The Soviet Union had on multiple occasions provided political support as well as sharing information with Egypt. In the build-up to the conflict, the Soviet Union reaffirmed that it unequivocally supported Egypt, even in a possible conflict (Gat, 2005). Israel had no support from European powers such as France or Britain, and would likely only receive political support and aid from the United States (Gat, 2005).

The military capabilities of Egypt had been bolstered by Soviet support and arms purchases. Since 1963 Egypt had been amassing military equipment, most notably modern Soviet aircrafts. This build-up culminated in Egypt equipping itself with approximately 50 MIG-21 aircrafts, considered to be the cutting edge of Soviet aerospace technology (Gat, 2005). Egypt further possessed early anti-air warning systems and defences, as well as acquiring Soviet armour and anti-armour weapons (Gat, 2005). Israel possessed its own fighter and bomber planes, most notably the hybrid Mirage planes, which could contend with its Egyptian counterparts (Pollack, 2005). Israel also had an advanced conventional force, which, although smaller, was more sophisticated and better trained than the Egyptian adversaries (Pollack, 2005).

Egypt's leadership, most notably the president Nassar, had exemplified itself as the leading force within the group of Arab states aiming for the annihilation of Israel. However, Egypt was losing this reputation following political confrontations between Israel and Arab countries such as Syria over water infrastructure projects which threatened to deprive large Arab populations of consistent water supply (Gat, 2005). This placed considerable pressure on Egypt to reassert its commitments to seriously opposing Israel. Israel, having few concrete allies, was not in a position to be effectively pressured. Pressure did come from the U.S., whose stance on any conflict relevant to Israel was important to Israel's considerations. The U.S. had made a point to Israel in the past, emphasizing restraint and warning against escalations (Gat, 2005).

Israel's strategy involved a key element of the limited aims strategy, which is surprise. By conducting a destructive air raid on Egyptian airfields and military command centres, the Israeli Air Force managed to destroy most of the Egyptian ordnance and infrastructure that Egypt needed to (counter)attack with its planes

(Pollack, 2005). After obliterating the Egyptian air force, the Israeli army pushed into the Sinai territory and confronted the Egyptian force. Here the greater sophistication of the Israeli army shows itself, as it was able to effectively manoeuvre with a greater diversity of unit types against static Egyptian defensive positions (Pollack, 2005). After the Egyptian force had been driven out and/or drawn back out of the Sinai, the Israeli's utilized a defensive strategy, setting up fortifications called the Bar-Lev line (Sterling, 2009). This offensive-defensive strategy has offered Israel the opportunity to create a *fait accompli*.

By making good use of its own offensive capabilities, Israel is able to use the limited aims strategy to great effect. With the element of surprise and the use of an offensive defensive strategy, Israel created a *fait accompli*. Maerscheimer argues that these elements are critical to limited aims strategy success (Maerscheimer, 1983). Sterling notes that Israel plans to use the territory gained by its *fait accompli* in future negotiations (Sterling, 2009), compounding the aspect of negotiation of a limited aims strategy mentioned by Paul. Through the use of limited aims strategies, Israel is able to effectively engage in conflict with all of its adversaries, without forcing a truly decisive military decision (Moaz, 2007). The Six-Day War illustrates an iteration of the overarching conflict, in which Israel used the limited aims strategy to force a non-decisive defeat of Egypt.

### **The Falklands War, 1982**

The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands constitutes a case of compellence in which the primary goal of the conflict was not a decisive defeat of Britain, but rather a retaking of territories Argentina considered theirs. If that failed, the conflict would provide for impetus to resume negotiations over the ceding of the islands to Argentina, which so far had been protracted at best. After numerous smaller conflicts surrounding control over the Falklands, a status quo had formed in favour of Great Britain which solidified its control of the Falkland Islands. Argentina viewed British responses to these smaller conflicts as a sign of military commitment, which would solidify the status quo entirely (Paul, 1994). However, Argentina would have to contend with Great Britain as its adversary in any conflict, the balance of power being heavily skewed in favour of the latter (Lebow, 1983). The Argentina leadership knew it could not withstand the full force a major conflict with Britain would entail, and estimated that a limited aims strategy would invoke a limited response which it had a chance of resisting

(Lebow, 1983). Should the use limited aims strategy lead to a conflict loss either way, a significant challenge of the status quo would have taken place.

During the time leading up to the conflict, Argentina had cultivated a good relationship with the U.S. through the support of anti-communist operations in Latin America (Paul, 1994). Argentina had provided indirect support to U.S. covert operations in Latin America, as well as direct support through the use of covert death squads throughout the continent. As a quid-pro-quo for the Argentine support in the counter-revolutionary alliance in Latin America, the U.S. was expected to pursue a 'hands off' policy concerning a conflict over the Falklands. In other words, the U.S. was expected at best to give political support to Argentina and otherwise remain neutral in the conflict (Paul, 1994). Should the conflict be concluded in Britain's favour, the Argentine leadership expected the U.S. to act as a go-between in the negotiations concerning ceding of the Falkland Islands to Argentine (Paul, 1994). Britain was allied to the U.S. but expected no support in a possible conflict over the Falklands. This was based on the precluding Suez-crisis, in which Britain and France faced Egypt over the ownership of the Suez Canal and both nations eventually ceded control to Egypt, albeit under U.S. pressure (Paul, 1994).

Since the military assumed power in Argentina in 1976, the country had been building its offensive capabilities at a rapid pace. Between 1980 to 1981, the military regime spent \$13 billion on arms acquisitions in addition to ramping up domestic production of tanks and aircrafts as well as light and heavy firearms (Paul, 1994). Apart from this Argentina purchased more sophisticated ordnance such as the French Super Etendard aircraft and the Exocet missile, for which it was refitting its navy (Paul, 1994). However, both of these sophisticated pieces of ordnance were inapplicable in the Falkland war, as the military had not properly integrated them into the existing structure. Argentina had no electronic countermeasures or other sophisticated defensive capabilities. Furthermore, Argentina was inferior to Britain in its intelligence and tactical warning capabilities, leaving themselves unable to conduct effective offensive and defensive operations (Paul, 1994). Lastly, Argentina's sole aircraft carrier was stationed in home waters, impeding the bombing ability and the ability to counter naval forces effectively.

Argentina's relatively new military regime, or Junta, was under severe domestic pressure to prove its legitimacy and capability to last. This was both caused and exacerbated by the ongoing stalemate in negotiations to return the Falkland Islands to

Argentina, as well as a host of economic woes Argentina faced (Mesquita & Silverson, 2013). Britain faced its own set of domestic pressures, mainly from its own politicians in parliament and the Island residents (Norpoth, 1987). Negotiations to cede the Falklands to Argentina had made progress, with air and sea links being established between the islands and the Argentina mainland. However, the proposed leaseback by the junior minister of foreign affairs in 1977 was adversely received by the Islanders.

By quickly taking the territory, Argentina hoped to create a *fait accompli* situation, in which the new status quo would see Argentina being the sovereign ruler of the Falklands. Before Argentina's assessment of increased British military commitment became a reality, Argentina hoped to have completed its invasion of the islands. As soon as the invasion was completed, Argentina would have its troops take up strictly defensive positions in order to deter the British from an attempt at retake, as well as conveying the message that the Junta wanted to limit the conflict to this. By doing so the Argentina leadership assessed the risks to be the lowest and hoped to keep a British response to small-scale conflict. The strategy Argentina utilized was a typical limited aims strategy, in which it made use of the element of surprise to invade the Falkland Islands, but beyond that did not aim to attack Great Britain. The Argentina leadership made the assessment that increased military commitment to the Atlantic theatre, and with that the Falklands, would be unfavourable to its opportunities to gain the Falklands. The military capabilities were heavily skewed in Britain's favour, which could explain why Argentina disregarded this balance to the extent it did. What was a more significant factor was the domestic pressure the Junta faced, brought on by economic woes and an ongoing stalemate.

### **The Thailand-Laotian border war, 1987**

According to Kocs, one of the main reasons for border disputes after 1945 occurs due to (newly) independent states discovering that one of their shared borders is not clearly defined by any treaty or another document (Kocs, 1995). The initial compellent threat was issued by Laos in 1984, and with the border remaining undefined, a conflict erupted in 1987 (Sechser, 2011). Skirmishes had already taken place in the build-up to 1987, Wain argues that these skirmishes were extended into an eventual conflict in 1987 (Wain, 2012). The conflict was limited in scope and intent, with both militaries mainly contesting for the village of Ban RomKlao (Innes-Brown & Valencia, 1993). The

conflict itself remained limited for another reason, as officials from both sides expressed the desire to keep the conflict limited, or at least not be the cause for escalation, as this could provide an advantage in future negotiations (Kocs, 1995).

The military balance between both countries did not differ greatly, with the conventional armies of both sides being roughly equally equipped in material capabilities, with a slight advantage held by Thailand (Pinitbhand, 2013). Although the conflict was to remain limited, with the focal point being small border villages such as Ban Romklao, both sides utilized conventional troops as well as artillery (Wain, 2012). Thailand's leadership decided that although the conflict had to remain limited, they would commit more military ordnance in the form of bomber aircrafts (Banerjee, 1988). Thailand perceived itself as militarily superior, which was correct in terms of military capabilities as the country could and did commit more troops and military ordnance during the 1987 border conflict (Wain, 2012).

In terms of alliance configurations, Thailand relied on support of the regional organisation ASEAN for diplomatic support. The use of this was two-fold, as Thailand could gain some political support for its cause now, as well as being able to delegate to the organisation a future role as mediator in negotiations over the conflict (Innes-Brown & Valencia, 1993; Wain, 2012). The diplomatic support Thailand received during the conflict would not materialize into a notable advantage in deciding the conflict (Wain, 2012). Laos received military support from Vietnam, who supplied troops and logistics that supported Laotian troops in forward positions (Banerjee, 1988; Wain, 2012). As such, Laos received more tangible support than Thailand during the conflict.

The conflict's origin lies in the 1984 issuing of compellence by the Laotian leadership. Between 1984 and 1987 Laos embarked on a series of economic initiatives, based on socialist principles and grassroots production (Joiner, 1988). This placed considerable strain on the country's economy, as well as pressure on its leadership. This pressure was not directly linked to the conflict, but it did have as consequence that when border skirmishes escalated into hostilities in 1987, the Laotian leadership could not afford making another unpopular decision as so had to engage in conflict (Joiner, 1988; Wain, 2012). Pressures on Thailand at the time were negligible, with neither limiting nor encouraging pressures being significantly present that they contribute to the decisions concerning the conflict.

In strategy, the Laotian forces were able to overcome the gap in capabilities that the Thai forces had created with the introduction of bomber aircrafts to the conflict.



Laotian conventional troops were more lightly equipped, and could traverse the jungle terrain with greater ease (Pinitbhand, 2013). The trade-off was that Thai conventional troops had access to stronger weaponry such as heavy mortars and machineguns in addition to air support and artillery (Wain, 2012). Both Laotian and Thai forces jostled for control of the most important landmark, a strategic hill that overlooked most of the conflict area (Banerjee, 1988). By taking this hill and one similar to it, Laos could consolidate its control and use its lighter troops to lure Thai forces into engaging these defensive positions (Wain, 2012; Banerjee, 1988).

When the conflict had continued for approximately a year with neither side making any significant gains, political observers feared it might become a drawn-out conflict that would involve other states in the region (Banerjee, 1988). While a ceasefire was signed in 1988, the conflict had been one of the heaviest border conflicts in the region, with 1000 deaths on either side (Wain, 2012). With neither side willing to escalate the war, the limited aims strategy seemed best to attempt the consolidation of the contested territories, with its limited nature enabling future negotiations.

### **The Hanish Island conflict, 1995**

In the Red Sea lies an island archipelago, conveniently located on one of the world's busiest trading routes and possibly with untapped natural resources within its economic zone. Inconveniently the archipelago stretches 30 km from the Yemen coastline to 45km from the Eritrean coastline (Dzurek, 1996). In 1995 Eritrea attempted to compel Yemen into ceding sovereignty of the island group, with as most important asset Hanish Island (Lefebvre, 1998). When compellence failed, the two nations entered a conflict of which the aim was not total destruction, occupation or capitulation of the other. Rather, it was a conflict limited in forces and means, restricted to the largest islands of the archipelago (Lefebvre, 1998; Stansfield, 1998). What further complicated the matter is that sovereignty over the islands had remained undetermined previous to the conflict (Stansfield, 1998).

Eritrea had been in a protracted struggle for independence from Ethiopia previous to the Hanish Island conflict, and Yemen was recovering from its civil war (Cornwell, 1998; Stansfield, 2001). Yemeni forces however, appeared to be larger and better-equipped than their Eritrean counterparts, with the Eritreans having little to no experience in maritime/amphibious warfare (Stansfield, 2001). In offensive capabilities, Yemen further outclassed Eritrea with military ordnance, having superior air

capabilities, armour and military technology such as missiles (Stansfield, 2001). It should be noted that although Eritrea's military capabilities could not be accurately determined as it had recently split from Ethiopia in 1993, the combined military ordnance of both states when they were combined reveals it was significantly weaker than Yemen's at the time of the conflict (Stansfield, 1998).

Alliance configurations in this conflict are varied and entangled, with each state receiving support from a multitude of actors, but often in unclear forms such as by proxy or covert (Stansfield, 1998; Dzurek, 1996; Lefebvre, 1998). To gain comprehensive clarity, only the countries giving definitive support that entails either military or diplomatic support will be examined for this research. Yemen received diplomatic support from the Arab League, while Eritrea received similar support from the Organisation of African Unity (Stansfield, 1998). Overtly, Saudi-Arabia supported Yemen. However, the state indirectly backed Eritrea by reportedly financing the purchase of military ordnance (30 tanks from Qatar) and providing logistic and financial support (Lefebvre, 1998). Israel's extent of support to Eritrea has been disputed, but Eritrean rebels received military aid from Israel and the US during their struggle for independence from Ethiopia (Stansfield, 1998). For this reason, Israeli support most likely continued as it was tied to Israel's Red Sea security (Stansfield, 1998).

Pressures on Eritrea and Yemen were primarily economic, due to the perceived zero-sum game with as its prize the acquisition of 6400 square kilometres of ocean resources and fishing rights that falls within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the island group (Dzurek, 1996; Lefebvre, 1998). Ocean resources were perceived as significant, with some estimates stating that the area potentially has untapped oil and gas nodes (Lefebvre, 1998; Stansfield, 1998). Apart from this, its position along the Red Sea Route means the archipelago is situated on one of the most important trading routes in the world (Stansfield, 1998). Finally, Lefebvre notes that Yemen faced increasing domestic pressure to respond with military means to Eritrean compellence and eventually aggression (Lefebvre, 1998).

While Yemen had an advantage in military capabilities, Eritrea was able to negate this through strategy. Specifically, the negation of a Yemeni fait accompli situation in which it became undesirable for Yemen to retake specific islands, and from there gaining a stronger position in later negotiations (Dzurek, 1996). Eritrean troops were familiar with the islands, having used them as bases during their war of independence, and thus were better able to fight on and from these islands (Dzurek,

1996). This important advantage is reiterated by Stansfield, who states the inherent knowledge of the islands gave Eritrea the opportunity to exercise control of the conflict (Stansfield, 1998). Yemen had a total garrison of 500 stationed on the larger islands of Hanish, but could not prevent Eritrean forces from landing and engaging them in conflict (Stansfield, 1998).

The Hanish Island conflict is centred around economic opportunities for whichever state could claim it. Yet both states were careful not to escalate it beyond the means that were used. This is most likely due to both countries being dirt-poor and having experienced some other conflict in recent years (Dzurek, 1996; Lefevre, 1998; Stansfield, 2001). Owing to neither state having the intent nor ability to engage in conflict that exceeds the Hanish archipelago, a strategy of limited aims was applied when initial compellence had failed.

### **Conclusion and Discussion**

In examining the distinct cases of compellence using a limited aims strategy, similarities in how the four variables affected the course of the conflict have become apparent. The four variables – alliance/part of a coalition, military balance and capabilities, domestic and external pressures, high/low risk strategy – show that variations in the amount of attention a state has for these in its policies dictate the course and outcome of a conflict. Furthermore, states assessing their policy in regard to any of these variables beforehand have shown variations in expectations and aims, affecting the course and outcome.

The research here was performed on a small sample, making this a small-n study on which an independent sample t-test was applied. By comparing the means of the groups ‘success’ and ‘no success’, the presence of each variable per group is distinguished. As the amount of data is small, the results of the test are not significant, meaning the results of the test could be due to coincidence. Furthermore, the results that follow from the test cannot be extrapolated to a larger group of similar cases. However, the test does give an indication of the variables’ mean value. To get conclusive results that can be extrapolated to the whole class of limited aims conflicts following compellence, a similar large-n study should be done.

Following the results of the independent sample t-test, group differences were not significant for any of the variables: military balance ( $t(4) = -.516, p = .541, d = 0.408$ );

pressures ( $t(4) = .516, p = .541, d = 0.408$ ); alliance ( $t(4) = 2, p = .116$ ); strategy ( $t(4) = .516, p = 5.41, d = .408$ ).

Military balance has a higher presence in the group 'success' ( $M = .50, SD = .707$ ) compared to the group 'no success' ( $M = .50, SD = .500$ ). Conflict initiators subject to pressures as examined in the case studies have a higher presence in the 'no success' group ( $M = .75, SD = .500$ ) compared to the group 'success' ( $M = .50, SD = .707$ ). Conflict initiators in an alliance have a higher presence in the 'no success' group ( $M = 0.75, SD = .500$ ) compared to the group 'success' ( $M = .00, SD = .000$ ). Finally, strategy has a higher presence in the 'no success' group ( $M = .75, SD = .500$ ) as opposed to the 'success' group ( $M = .50, SD = .707$ ). Finally, it should be noted that these values only provide an indication, and have little substance due to being coded in binary manner.

Being part of an alliance or coalition has in the observed cases has had a negative effect on successful conflict outcome for the initiator. In the observed cases, being part of an alliance or coalition was not an inhibiting factor on the initiator to attack, or on the defender to respond in force. The former can be seen in China's alignment with Pakistan during the 1965 Kashmir offensive (Malik, 2002), the later in Soviet alignment with Egypt during the build-up to the Six-day war in 1987 (Gat, 2005). In cases of asymmetric conflict in which the weaker state initiates a great power ally evens the odds, or evens the odds for the defending state. This may provide an incentive from keeping the conflict from escalating. This can be seen in the Kashmir offensive in 1965, in which China's alignment with Pakistan disincentivises a disproportionate response to the initiation by the defender India (Ganguly, 1995, Malik, 2002). However, in the test no initiator with an alliance achieved conflict success. It is possible that being in an alliance prevents a conflict from being fully determined, leaving the conflict in a protracted situation in which neither party becomes the determined winner. A limited aims strategy aims to keep the conflict from escalating beyond the predetermined scope. Rather, the use of a limited aims strategy by the initiator entails not escalating the conflict while encouraging a proportionate response of similar means (Maerscheimer, 1983). For this reason, political support from allies in the form of affirmation of a *fait accompli* is a use of alliances when successfully utilizing a limited aims strategy. An example of a state who relied or would rely on this type of support include Argentina during the Falklands war (Paul, 1994).

Military capabilities have been used to great effect, which can also be noted from the comparison of means. This is true most of all when it plays to the strengths of the strategy. Israel had superior military capabilities at the start of the Six-Day War (even though not by much), but its resounding victory is due to Israel combining its military air capabilities with the element of surprise (Moaz, 2007, Pollack, 2005). Catching the Egyptian military by surprise, Israel built on its initial advantage by using its sophisticated military to outpace Egyptian forces, and created a *fait accompli* situation in the Sinai (Pollack, 2005). A further use of military capabilities is to disincentivise escalation of the conflict beyond its limited scope. Initiator states such as Pakistan in the Kashmir offensive in 1965 purposefully held back a deal of their military capabilities, as to encourage a response by proportionate means as well using the passive military capabilities as a veiled threat should the conflict escalate (Paul, 1994). The limited aims strategy emphasising the limited use of military capabilities by the initiator as well as a proportionate response by the defender.

The most significant pressures states have faced in the examined cases that led them to opt for a limited aims strategy are either economic or revolve around regime legitimacy. Both pressures are exemplified in Argentina's Junta during the Falkland War. The Junta was faced with an economic downturn that made its population loathe to spend on war. The regime was otherwise confronted by its waning legitimacy, which originated from the ongoing stalemate in negotiations with Britain (Lebow, 2008). In the case of the Chinese intervention in Korea, economic pressures made policy-makers adverse to war, especially a protracted conflict.

Concerning strategy in the examined limited aims conflicts, there have been a number of impressive iterations. This risk-averse strategy is featured in cases in which the initiator uses an offensive-defensive strategy, often to create a *fait accompli* situation. The construction of the Bar-Lev line immediately after the Six-Day War in the Sinai illustrates the creation of a *fait accompli* situation (Sterlin, 2009). The creation of a *fait accompli* situation can be used in future negotiations, and often serves as a strategic goal in the use of limited aims strategies, as was the intention in the case of the Hanish Island conflict (Dzurek, 1996). Even if a *fait accompli* fails, by using the limited aims strategy to keep a conflict relevant, the need for negotiations over ownership or accession of contested territories can be reemphasised. This happened on some level in all of the conflicts, in the case of the Hanish Islands and Kashmir offensive this led to U.N. intervention and mediation (Westerling, 2002; Khalid, 2012).

The implications for these findings are that the limited aims strategy has a surprising amount of variety in its use. The strategy can be used as a conventional tool to invade and hold territory effectively, by using the element of surprise to take the territory and using an offensive-defensive strategy to effectively hold the territory. In the likelihood that the conflict fails for the initiator, the limited aims strategy keeps an overarching conflict over a specific territory politically relevant, and provides a pretext for negotiations.

*Appendix A*

```
T-TEST GROUPS=success(0 1)
/MISSING=ANALYSIS
/VARIABLES=military_balance pressures alliance strategy
/CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

**Table 1. Group Statistics**

	success	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
military_balance	0	4	.25	.500	.250
	1	2	.50	.707	.500
pressures	0	4	.75	.500	.250
	1	2	.50	.707	.500
alliance	0	4	.75	.500	.250
	1	2	.00	.000	.000
strategy	0	4	.75	.500	.250
	1	2	.50	.707	.500

**Table 2. Independent Sample t-test**

		<b>F</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>
military_balance	Equal variances assumed	.444	.541	-.516	4	.633
	Equal variances not assumed			-.447	1.531	.710
pressures	Equal variances assumed	.444	.541	.516	4	.633
	Equal variances not assumed			.447	1.531	.710
alliance	Equal variances assumed	4.000	.116	2.000	4	.116
	Equal variances not assumed			3.000	3.000	.058
strategy	Equal variances assumed	.444	.541	.516	4	.633
	Equal variances not assumed			.447	1.531	.710

*Appendix B***Overview**

The following coding document describes the purpose, structure and variables of the Militarized Compellence Cases (MCC) dataset.

**Purpose**

The purpose of the MCC dataset is to provide structure to the small amount of data to be used in research on compellence and deterrence, the initiator using limited aims strategy. The dataset itself is greatly derived from the Militarized Compellent Threat dataset by Sechser (2013), but it differs on some important points. Most importantly, Sechser's data is limited to compellent threats that may be followed by compellence through conflict. This dataset includes cases of physical compellence, or compellence through physical military force even if they have not been preceded by a compellent threat. Sechser omits the Chinese intervention in Korea as a case of compellent threat because it did not include a material change to the status quo when the threat was issued

(Sechser, 2013, 380). However, as Schelling's (1966) definition of compellence is used, compellence in itself is defined as a strategy of coercion designed to induce a target state to change the status quo, and it may involve coercive diplomacy (words alone) or outright physical compulsion.

## **Definitions**

*Compellence.* Sechser defined compellence as an active strategy of a state to persuade another state into action under military threat, objective of which is to change the status quo (Sechser, 2011, pp380). Sechser builds upon Schelling, who defines compellence as an active rather than passive strategy, stating that the threat that compels rather than deters often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts (Schelling, 1966, pp 69-72).

*Limited Aims Strategy.* The definition of the limited aims strategy used here is the one used by Paul; a limited aims/*fait accompli* strategy refers to the employment of military forces in battle in order to achieve limited goals that are not equivalent to the decisive defeat and surrender of the enemy (Paul, 1994, pp21). It is important to note that earlier literature on the subject by Maerscheimer emphasised the taking of a small portion of territory as the goal of a limited aims strategy (Maerscheimer, 1983, pp30). What is most significant about the limited aims strategy, is that contact with the defender is minimized by the initiator, and the main goal is taking some portion of territory rather than the total defeat of the defender (Maerscheimer, 1983, pp30).

## **Variables**

*Casenumber.* An identifying tag for each of the six cases. Each case is presented and tagged in chronological order, earliest being first and last coming last.

*Year.* The year in which the initial compellent threat was made. In all but one case this is also the year in which the conflict erupted. The exception to this is the Thailand-Laotian border war, in which the initial compellent threat was issued in 1984, after which a number of skirmishes followed, but the conflict eventually erupted in 1987.

*Country\_a.* Correlates of War (CoW) country code for the state initiating the conflict. In all but one case this is also the country that issued the initial compellent threat. The exception is the Pakistan offensive in Kashmir in 1965. According to



Sechser, India issued the compellence. But this paper treats Pakistan as the initiator of the conflict, and as such the variables input follow Pakistan's perspective.

*Country\_b.* Correlates of War (CoW) country code for the state that is being engaged by the initiator. This state is the defender in the conflict.

*Alliance.* The variable of being in an alliance or part of a coalition is an indication that the initiating state has the support of other countries in its military venture. In the introduction this variable is referred to as 'alliance/part of a coalition.' It refers to the initiating state enjoying either strong political support, or military support of either combative or non-combative nature. Strong political support should be seen as a threat of a third party joining the conflict, should the initiating state otherwise be defeated. As such it is codified with 0 being 'initiator is part of an alliance or coalition' and 1 being 'initiator is not part of an alliance or coalition'.

*Military\_balance.* The variable pertaining to military power that states can put to use indicates who, in raw military terms, has the upper hand in a conflict. In the introduction of the paper this variable is referred to as 'offensive capabilities/military balance'. It should be noted that when, for lack of information, the actual military power of a state may be unknown. In these cases, the assessment of participating states of what the other would use in conflict is taken as the real value. Because the research is aimed to follow the perspective of the initiator of the conflict, this variable will be codified as 1 being 'initiator has military supremacy' and 0 being 'initiator has no military supremacy'.

*Pressures.* The initiating state party to the conflict could face an extent of domestic and external pressures. This variable indicates whether or not significant pressure(s) were present, in the introduction this variable is referred to as 'domestic and external pressures.' The external pressures are limited to pressures from other states to either dissuade from/end the conflict, including states' tacit agreement of the conflict through explicit lack of opposition to the conflict. The domestic pressures are limited to either economic pressures, or regime legitimacy pressures. The variable is codified as 1 being 'initiator is subject to significant pressure(s)' and 0 being 'initiator is not subject to significant pressure(s).'

*Strategy.* While this variable covers the broad strategy of either party in the case studies, for the purpose of furthering the research here it is limited to a high-low risk strategy by the initiator. In the introduction this variable is referred to as 'high/low risk strategy.' Whether a specific strategy falls in the category of high or low risk is

dependent on whether the initiator utilized the potential strengths available to him using the limited aims strategy. In accordance with Maerscheimer and Paul, the initiator using a low-risk strategy will utilize the element of surprise, use an offensive-defensive iterative of manoeuvres, and attempt to control the escalation of the conflict. The variable is codified as 1 being ‘initiator utilized a low-risk strategy’ and 0 being ‘initiator utilized a high-risk strategy’.

*Success.* This variable entails that the limited aims strategy succeeded in its principal goal, which is to conquer and hold territory effectively to create a (temporary) status quo. The variable is codified as 1 being ‘initiator successfully conquers territory’ and 0 being ‘initiator does not successfully conquer territory’. This variable in its most basic form is an indicator of whether or not the initiator won the conflict.

**Table 3. Binary Codification of Variable presence per conflict Initiator**

	<b>Military_balance</b>	<b>Pressures</b>	<b>Alliance</b>	<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Success</b>
Kashmir-Jammu, 1947	1	1	0	0	0
Kashmir Offensive, 1965	0	0	1	1	0
Six-Day War 1967	1	0	0	1	1
Falklands War, 1982	1	1	0	0	1
Thailand-Laotian Border War, 1987	0	1	1	1	0
Hanish Island Conflict, 1995	0	1	1	1	0

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