

**Whose Nation is it? A Discourse Analysis on Korean
Ethnic Nationalism Used in Ministry of Unification
White Papers**

Jake Wright

s2068419 – j.n.wright@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Supervisor: Professor Frank Pieke

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Abstract

Korean unification is a concept that seems impractical and unwanted by the Republic of Korea. Yet the government continues to purport its desire for it, primarily romanticising a reunited Korean bloodline. This project analyses the reasons and causes for this continued use of ethnic nationalism and explore how it shapes the very meaning of unification. Primarily, it is a speech act incorporated into the larger foreign policy of the Republic of Korea, mobilised for self-promotion and achieving its own interests.

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Acronyms

DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
GIC	Gaesong Industrial Complex
GTR	Geumgang Tourist Region
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation
LWR	Light Water Reactor
MOU	Ministry of Unification
NGO	Non-governmental Organisations
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
ROK	Republic of Korea
WPK	Workers Party of Korea

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1. Introduction

Korea remains one of the last divided nations on earth, a remnant of the Cold War. There have been several proposals for reconciliation, integration, and eventual unification. These attempts have ended in failure, yet attempts continue. Despite the clear ideological opposition and frozen military standoff, a constant reaffirmation of commonality binds them together. In being divided, politicians in the DPRK and the ROK view the other as the same people, using themes of ethnic unity and cultural homogeneity in both domestic and international stages, despite being separated for 72 years. This is a presumption integral to mainstream political culture on the Korean peninsula. In policy documents and public speeches, political actors in the ROK consistently muse over the damage and pain of a divided Korea. What purpose does this discourse serve for international audiences? At first glance, appeals to shared history of mythology, unity, and bloodline have no bearing on the US Department of State, for example, yet there must be a reason for conveying pain. Looking at the ROK, in appealing to a primal, romantic sense of ethnic nationalism and entitlement to unification, policy makers may be expressing frustration at the present circumstances or indicating their will to lead in diplomatic efforts as opposed to follow the status quo with the US. This discourse does not appear in isolation, the context and subjects in which it is used is also relevant to analyse its ultimate purpose. This project will not assess the efficacy of unification policies, as academics have undertaken before, but will track the changes in the ontology of unification and ethnic nationalism's role in this.

This project will focus on late 20th/early 21st century (1996-2016) ROK governmental policies on unification before, during, and after the most consistent rapprochement policy with the DPRK, President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine policy"¹. Observing this policy is relevant today as the incumbent President, Moon Jae-in follows in similar footsteps to Kim Dae-jung². Already President Moon engaged in rapprochement through sports, reconnecting direct phone lines, sending ministers to Pyongyang, and hosting Chairman Kim Jong-un in Panmunjom. Still much needs to be done, but by analysing the speech acts in promoting policies and approaches taken to unification during Sunshine, one can learn and understand how and why Seoul expresses a will to unify, even if it is a façade.

¹ The three principles of the Sunshine Policy are:

- 1) No tolerance of military provocation by North Korea.
- 2) No absorption of the North by the South.
- 3) Active promotion of reconciliation and cooperation.

(MOU, 2002: 15)

² The most in-depth speech given by President Moon is retrieved from: Bae H-J (2018)

Additionally, by looking at the surrounding circumstances and seeing the effect these had on the creation of unification documents, one can begin to understand when certain discourse is applied and the intention behind it. The period of investigation has several events relevant to the trajectory of the inter-Korean and US relationship that the author will consider as relevant to the causes and intentions³.

a. **The Current State of the Peninsula and Overarching Question**

In April 2018, President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un shook hands over the demarcation line separating the two Koreas and walked to the South side of Panmunjom, taking a picture in front of a Mt. Geumgang painting (see Figure 1). These images have resonated across the world and talk of rapprochement and unification returns to mainstream political discourse. How did this happen? It was merely months ago that the DPRK tested its largest missile ever, the Hwasong-15, and commentators argued it was “too late” to prevent a war (Nolet, 2018).



Figure 1: President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un shake hands in front of a picture of Mt. Geumgang in Panmunjom (26th May 2018) source: Xinhua Net (2018)

Although to many the Panmunjom meeting came as a surprise, the inroads developed for reconciliation and collaboration are over a decade in the making. Regardless of conservative administrations, nuclear tests, or the turns in the US-ROK military alliance, the facilities and language

³ See Appendix A (timeline) for a list of events from 1990-2018.

the two Koreas use to approach each other remains enshrined in international relations. Like a spectre, romantic discourse of tragic Korean separation, cultural and ethnic homogeneity lingers in publications and speeches.

There is an effect on the US stature as well. The US President moved from threatening “fire and fury”⁴ upon Pyongyang and forcible regime change, to holding the first ever high-level meeting between the two leaders. The speed at which diplomacy moves between the Koreas is unique, and the ROK has an uncanny influence on US security posture. Noting the changes in the security environment on the Korean peninsula: why is the speed of diplomacy so swift?

⁴ “Remarks by President Trump Before a Briefing on the Opioid Crisis”. *The White House*. Retrieved from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-briefing-opioid-crisis/>. Accessed 1st July, 2018

2. Literature Review

a. Previous work on Sunshine and ethnic nationalism

To understand ethnic nationalism interwoven in ROK policy, it is useful to explore theories on its nature and operation. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Smith, 1987) provides an extensive and historical account on the origins of the nation, ethnicity, and the connection to myths, events, symbols, and stories. The accounts described in this book helped the author understand both the gravity and the staying power of these myths. In turn, this helped provide an explanation as to why the two Koreas rhetorically have pushed, and continue to push, for national cohesion for so many decades. Gellner bases his conception of nationalism on consistency across the political state, replacing “complex structure of local groups” (1983: 57). Anderson largely concurs but adds that identity formation is initiated by incorporating and absorbing distinct cultures, later appropriating their culture as an integral part of the new identity (2006: 201). With Korea, the states in question are ostensibly of the same people, with similar cultures but heterogeneous elements would need to be accommodated into a larger identity. In a similar vein, constructing a coherent identity of “Korean” with over 70 million adherents would have a significant voice on the global stage.

Connor rebukes Anderson’s and Gellner’s hypothesis of incorporation as it assumes that ethnic strife cannot exist within a nation (Connor, 1994: 70); making “nation-building” a misnomer (71). Supplanting this, Connor proposes that ethno/ethnic nationalism is a political tool used to obscure intergroup differences and grievances (141) appreciating “the psychological/emotional depth of ethnonational identity”. In addition, Wallace (1991) posits the use of shared myths and constructions to bridge gaps between slightly distinct groups creating a feeling of mutuality in conceiving a nation. Kim Kwang-ok also weighs-in on the role of ethnic nationalism and cultural homogeneity discourse as a method of reaching a hybrid between the two disparate cultures of the Koreas. Asserting commonality, it allows the two Koreas to dispose of the incompatible features of their two systems and keep the best elements (1992:) As the Koreas have a shared history with founding mythology and, although ideologically and culturally they have moved very far apart, have advanced this mythology when discussing unification. Ethnic nationalist rhetoric can be used to ignore the incompatibilities between the economic, political, and societal models of the totalitarian North and the capitalistic South, prioritising ethnic over patriotic forces. This project will not divulge into the exact shared mythology of the Koreas but observe the usage of this assumed commonality.

However, this conception of national identity construction implies that formation is largely voluntary and internally mandated, but Geschiere proposes an alternate, reactive view. *The Perils of Belonging* observes a global phenomenon of autochthony in which, paradoxically, as global forces penetrate a state and increase interdependence, at the local level, there is a strong and urgent need for localisation and belonging. Although neoliberal norms advocate for a pairing-back of the nation-state and democratisation, right-wing populist forces repurpose the nation-state as a reinforcer of indigenous identities, excluding “strangers” as he labels them. The author demonstrates this in Francophone Africa noting a colonial-born dynamic distinguishing between “people of the land” (Geschiere, 2009: 15) and “allogenes”, or strangers typically of the same state (3). This differs from the Korean peninsula as it has no “stranger” group to exclude. However, both Koreas have been heavily coerced by their more capable allies to behave in certain ways. With a strong and globalised economy, perhaps one can interpret unification as a search for “belonging” or promotion of an exclusively Korean identity against coercive global forces. However, as unification intersects both conservative and liberal administrations, it is questionable if it can be called a right-wing populist force. On balance, the interactions between the two Koreas can be most accurately described as a combination of Geschiere’s and Connor’s accounts: constructing belonging and exclusivity in an internationalised world while using ethnic nationalism to perpetuate a ‘one-ness’ to the Korean people while ‘excluding’ their bilateral security relationship with the USA, prioritising blood over strategy.

The survey work of Shin Gi-Wook following the inter-Korean summit of 2000 inspired this project. From surveying members of the Korean public, he concluded that people of the ROK who believed in a strong sense of blood and ethnic homogeneity with people of the DPRK had a much stronger will to unify (2006: 195). Those same people also overwhelmingly believed that Kim Il-sung was the primary reason that the Korean peninsula was divided and that DPRK civilians are victims of a communist, totalitarian ideology (197). He concluded in this research that discourse designed to promote a belief in ethnic homogeneity and positive attitudes towards unification in general might raise the level of tolerance and understanding in the public for when inherent difficulties in unification plans arise (198). He interpreted ethnic nationalism as an “invaluable, though insufficient” tool in its own merit (187). This considered, this project will see how this tool is used with other ‘tools’ to promote a certain type of unification plan that can be perceived as welcomed and viable for both domestic and international actors.

Although this project focuses on ROK governmental policy, similar ethnic nationalist forces must be evident in the DPRK as well. In *The Cleanest Race* (Myers, 2010), the author reported his findings of reading DPRK literature at the Information Center on North Korea and concluded the societal structure is based around a pure and innocent image of the Korean people. Nasr, having given a comprehensive historical account on ethnic nationalism as resembled in DPRK pieces of literature and works released by its leaders shows a progression into identification through bloodlines and hostility of foreign influences (2014: 49) prefaced on independent unification with Southern brethren (220). This was supported by primary records of Kim Il-sung speeches on unification, noting the ethnic nationalist discourse in the examples recorded in *For the Independent & Peaceful Reunification of Korea* (1976). Shin again contributes, collecting commentary on the state of North Korean society and its ethnic nationalist nature (2006: 86-95). These pieces show there is indeed a common ground of discourse, which both Koreas employ.

Literature on the Sunshine Policy and rapprochement towards the DPRK has predominantly focused on the projects' effect on inter-Korean relations. Son describes the policy as a three-level engagement: a domestic shift in identity, an inter-state change in the status quo, and global integration (2006: 45-60). It is helpful to this project due to its comprehensive and far-reaching account of the period. It also makes some effort in discussing norms of identity and shifts during this period. However, its account of identity is limited to a domestic audience and does not account for additional international elements of engagement. Kim Yong-ho delves further in to the nature of the Sunshine Policy and its rhetoric. He forwards state survival as the sole reason for the advancement of the Policy, and the subsequent acceptance by the DPRK. He recognises the Kim Dae-jung administration wished to push a positive identification with the North through this era but is quick to dismiss it. He argues the period of the Sunshine Policy was too short for any norms of identity to be internalised by the ROK population (2011: 174). However, this account is a victim of its age. Writing in 2011, this is in clear reaction to the Lee Myung-bak administration declaring Sunshine a failure (MOU, 2010: 17). Considering the most recent rapprochement efforts in 2018, although it was suppressed, themes of the Sunshine Policy live on today. This project will not focus on domestic reinterpretation of the DPRK, but internationally-focused speech acts avoiding Kim's critique.

b. Theoretical Literature

This project will presume that nationhood is a social construct and will explain the applicability of social constructivism. Wendt showed identities are not carried by actors independent of the wider social context, rather “[actors] define their interests in the process of defining their situations” (1992: 398). Statements made by these political institutions would constitute, as Foucault accounts, *serious speech acts*, designed to be internalised, repeated, and disseminated amongst the audience (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 48-49). In discussing and contextualising unification, the ROK government defines how the peninsula, their foreign policy interests *vis-à-vis* the DPRK moving forward, and their relationship with the DPRK regime. Son offers insight into the constructivist account of transnational integration and identities. He posits that the North must be reinvented as an ally as engagement is impossible with an enemy state (2006: 51). Moreover, interactions with the outside world, and especially with the ROK, would mean a shift towards interdependence and an adoption of a pan-Korean identity (2004: 95). According to Wendt (1999: 344), interdependence is a fundamental variable to adopting a collective identity. Thus, the ROK disseminates serious speech acts on its interpretation of the DPRK in relation to itself through unification discussion.

Ancillary to social constructivism, the application of ethnic nationalism requires an understanding of “securitisation” theory. Securitisation sees security as predominantly state-produced speech-acts (Wæver, 1995: 55). In security, there are certain issues which the state reserves an absolute right to take “extraordinary measures” on which it can give “supreme priority” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 26) to, beyond the standard rule sets expected of a state. To securitise an issue, the issue must be an existential threat, require emergency action, and have an “effect on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules” (ibid). Wæver suggests the first requirement does not need to be related to harm or damage necessarily, but anything that may undercut sovereignty and prevent politics from operating as autonomously as it should (1995: 51-2). Balzacq (2005) expands this theory by adding in further variables for effective securitisation: the surrounding context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience (172), and the degree of power held by the agent making the securitisation speech act (179). Moreover, the agent will use “various artifacts (metaphors, emotions, stereotypes, gestures, silence, and even lies)” to advance its agenda to the audience (172). It becomes clear the ROK could promote the standoff between the two Koreas to an existential threat through speech acts and unification publications to an audience with a very stringent agenda to maintain status quo (the US military forces).

3. Methodology

a. The Constructs for Observation

The observed constructs are the English-translated White Papers published by the MOU, available online. Three reasons explain the decision to limit the research to the English-published White Papers. Firstly, these White Papers represent a collection of speeches, policy decisions, research brought together from the contemporary administration condensed into a report format. It is logical to conclude the White Papers accurately represent the viewpoints of that administration comprehensively and fully. Secondly, the author is not sufficiently confident in their understanding of Korean for all annually published White Papers. Most importantly, the MOU translating these White Papers to English suggests a desire to make them accessible to an international audience, meaning there are stronger implications for international relations. Chilton observes political discourse carries with it a “charge” of legitimisation and cooperation (2004: 201-205). By publishing these White Papers in English at these certain points in time, the MOU is reaffirming its stance as legitimate actor and representative for the ROK government on all matters pertaining to unification. Due to this, the White Papers act as a signal to the international community for how the ROK government wishes to promote itself in the region, views the current geopolitical environment, sets goals, and what means it will use to achieve them.

b. Methodology in Approaching the Constructs

This project will assess the qualitative nature of statements in the White Papers considering the potential implications. The author will make observations on the content, format, and themes present in each document. Most pertinent to the project will be what discourse on ethnic nationalism combines with what other themes to elucidate how the ROK administrations viewed their brethren in the North, their own international position, and the future of the Korean nation. Through observing and analysing themes that appear in the White Paper, this project hopes to shed further light on the states of Korean unification discourse, and the intentions behind it. Substantive literature on the causes and historical context for these changes in discourse will be discussed later in the paper, now the primary focus is on illustrating the powerful influence of identities and application of ethnic nationalism.

In addition to this, a quantitative analysis on selected keywords will be used to account for transitions and prominence of themes before, during and after the Sunshine period. As noted by Chilton (2004: 9), the use of certain terminology and phrases indicate micro-intentions of a larger system and preference over other potential outcomes. Still, the number of key word appearances will be cited to punctuate and compliment qualitative findings.

For this project, the open source software *Yoshibikoder* was used. It allows for a full-text search of selected key words from a .txt file and lists them in a concordance with five words surrounding it to understand context. The text was copied to Notepad and then read through to ensure formatting remained consistent with the original. The author used the latent coding method detailed in Neuman (2013: 375-379) and was the only coder, eliminating the need to consider between-coder disagreements. Once the word count was established, the author made a concordance of all key words that appeared in the document, including five words before and after the key word to understand the context the word was used in. The author would then subtract uses of the words that were irrelevant to the themes being investigated, personally judging its relevancy. For an example of irrelevant key word usage, in using the word “united”, the phrase “united Korea” is substantially different than “United Nations”; the former suggests a single Korean nation state. Headers, footers, and proper nouns were subtracted from the final word count as the author found they did not contribute to the elaboration of the themes in question. Another example would be the difference between “national community”, implying a consistent linkage between all Koreans across the DMZ, and the “international community” which is indicative of a multilateral, global structure. By finding the most mentioned key words, the theme and intentions the MOU wished to convey can become apparent.

For this project, the coding decisions will help produce a vivid picture of how concepts are utilised and accentuate the analysis of trends across the various White Papers. However, to maintain impartiality, the manifest coding results (raw, as-is) will be included in Appendix C.

In addition to these word groups, the author also found the most commonly used independent words, as this helped find themes or catchphrases these publications promoted. These key words were acquired through a preliminary reading of the documents. The list was regularly updated to accommodate new words, phrases and themes that were unseen from other documents.

c. Coding Table

Word group	Key words
Activism	dictator*, dignity, free*, human rights, libert*, rights, violat*
Nationalism	Korean people, brethren, common*, communit*, consensus, divi*, homogen*, identity, nation*
Security against the North	aggressi*, conflict, confront*, nuclear, secur*, provoc*
Prosperity	co-prosper*, develop*, econom*, growth, prosper*

Note: the asterisk () represents any possible value to account for plurals and alternative forms of the base word.*

d. Limitations

There were limitations to this approach, however. The key words chosen for a single category sometimes appeared together in the same sentence and checking for these repetitions proved to be difficult as the concordances were ordered by key word rather than by chronological order of appearance, thus the author chose to include them into the final count. Also, the conversion of the 2001 White Paper was problematic due to it being a scanned document which made text copying difficult. Several words were converted into random characters that could not be detected by the software, so the final numerical results may not be entirely accurate. As the author decided key words' relevance, this may not reflect additional opinions and the robustness of the quantitative conclusions may be limited, but these conclusions are complemented by the additional textual analysis. Moreover, the data was collected over a period of one month and although the author tried to maintain standard rules for selection, there may be some human error in the results. Regardless, the author feels the results of the quantitative analyses are consistent with the qualitative findings.

This project is limited to the content of the White Papers and is not a comprehensive analysis of the causes behind numerous unification strategies. Therefore, ethnic nationalism cannot fully explain the founding the GIC and GTR, for example. However, the discourse in the White Papers plays a vital role in representation and the ROK's approach to the outside world. The author was led by the content of the White Papers and finding explanations rather than the inverse.

e. **Preliminary Hypothesis**

This section will propose hypotheses for the questions related to this project. For the question of consistently pushing for unification, the author believes unification diplomacy is beyond that of mere coexistence with an authoritarian “other” or a reduction of hostilities to secure the peninsula, it is a projection of self-interest and norms the ROK administration want to disseminate. This larger agenda may include greater autonomy in foreign policy and diplomacy, more influence in the security alliance with the United States, what economic route should be taken to develop the DPRK.

Regarding the question of ethnic nationalism, the author hypothesises it is an integral part of the ROK’s securitisation strategy. A unique feature of the Korean nation is its clear division in an ongoing, yet largely frozen, conflict. In this sense, division is difficult to grasp, unclear, yet malleable. This author hypothesises that proponents of the Sunshine Policy used the metaphors described by Balzacq (2005: 172) such as vague concepts of national pain and division to its advantage, as part of a larger toolset to achieve the state’s aims. This is not to say it causes a change in circumstances but is mobilised at times which the state aims to change the status quo. The author hypothesises progressive administrations chose to make the standoff an immediate existential threat to the entire Korean nation, securitising it. By tying objectives with ethnic nationalist discourse, the White Paper securitises the objective with an exclusivity that is beyond public debate (Huysmans, 1998).

The scope of this project spans five separate administrations, wrestling dominance between the Democratic Party (the Liberals) and the Grand National Party (Conservatives). Seeing as the Liberals pioneered the Sunshine Policy, it would serve their interests to incorporate greater emphasis on ethnic nationalism. This author hypothesises the nationalism key word group will be the most prevalent in 2001 and 2005 White Papers.

Conversely, with an anti-communist bend, and a reputation of maintaining strong relations with the United States, it would make sense for the Conservative administrations to minimise suggestions of brotherhood, or one nation state with the North, or even entertain unification diplomacy. The author hypothesises the three administrations will reinforce the importance of the strategic partnership with the United States. Therefore, these Papers should feature methods to redefine the meaning or goals behind unification, incorporating rhetoric that will portray unification as an extremely long-term project.

4. Analysis

a. White Paper 1996

i. Historical context

In 1992, it became clear the DPRK was developing a nuclear weapons programme using the Yongbyon reactor, a domestic source of natural uranium, and technology developed by ethnic Korean scientists in Japan (Oberdorfer, 2014: 195-198). Although it joined the NPT, it was unclear how much weight it gave to the obligations (198). Soon after, both Koreas had signed the first non-aggression and recognition pact in December 1991 (204). Following, US officials met with their DPRK counterparts and agreed to an IAEA inspection regime (208), but this agreement quickly fell through once the ROK pushed for a continuation of joint military exercises (217). The DPRK then declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT (218).

In 1993, both the US and ROK administrations changed to Democrat Incumbent President Clinton and the New Korea Party Incumbent President Kim Young-sam. The crisis continued through to 1994 (219-256), an uncertain period between diplomatic engagements, and proposed sanctions against Pyongyang, during its fourth year of decline (232-3). This cycle changed with Kim Il-sung's death in 1994 and the quick succession of his son, Kim Jong-il. There followed rapid progress in a deal for proliferation-proof LWRs and 500,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil in exchange for the DPRK to suspend its nuclear activities and return to the NPT (279-80): the Agreed Framework. However, tensions soon returned when KEDO designed to fund the LWRs stalled over the details of the reactors themselves (286). The 1996 White Paper was drafted with these events in recent memory.

The MOU published the 1996 White Paper in December, three years into President Kim Young-sam's term. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unification, Kwon O-kie, wrote the preface and used the unification of both Germany and Yemen as examples to show the Cold War has ended, and the world has moved on. He contrasts this with the Korean peninsula, demonstrating the need for it to "be carried out in the present reality" (MOU, 1996: v). Most importantly, though, is the emphasis on the *independent*, and bilateral nature this unification must take (vi). This analysis serves as a preliminary view into the conditions of ROK unification policy just before the beginning of the Sunshine Policy. The depiction of the peninsula and the Korean race will be analysed and discussed.

ii. Koreans as one people

Much of the content and rhetoric concentrated on reinforcing the idea that Koreans on either side of the DMZ are one people. Consistently, the document returns to discourse on restoring “cultural homogeneity” and creating a “national community”. Terms of this nature occurred 167 times in the document, far above any other group. The fact it uses these words with such fervour and prominence shows efforts to promote ethnic relations between Koreans remains high on the priority list for the administration. Moreover, the adverse factor negatively affecting unification progress is purportedly intensified heterogeneity (172-173). Citing Germany and its own problems with internal integration after the collapse of the Berlin Wall shows that even success stories struggle decades later. Although it hopes to learn from these difficulties, it puts the creation of a national community ahead of overcoming heterogeneity and prioritises ethnic solidarity over patriotism to the ROK.

iii. Sacrifices for brethren

The document acknowledges and indeed reminds the reader of the sacrifices needed and economic burden placed on “all Koreans” for unification to take place. Despite this frank estimation of “pain and sacrifice of the present generation” (179), the Paper pushes the narrative that the sacrifices are outweighed by the benefits. Moreover, the Paper employs an anti-communist narrative to explain the shortage of food in the North, claiming Soviet-style collectivisation of farmland led to inefficiencies in production (63). The Paper perceives of food donations as a method for dispelling mistrust and building confidence between the two (164).

iv. Korea as an international power

The document proposes a grand scheme of Korea as an international economic power. Complementing President Kim’s drive for globalisation, this document conceives of a united Korean peninsula as a capable competitor in Northeast Asia. The prospect of a rapidly developing Korean peninsula takes up much of the seventh chapter on the future. It uses the success of the ROK democratisation and economic liberalisation to argue a similar model can help improve the “welfare of all Korean people” (138-141). Faced with this success, DPRK economy liberalisation is allegedly inevitable (172) and that norms of respect for liberty and human rights will be institutionalised upon unifying; although it does not explicitly say that the ROK will *lead* this effort. Combined with the broken Cold War regional balance, the White Paper presses urgency in the economic development and industrialisation of the Korean peninsula to remain relevant amongst superpowers (175). This is

consistent with President Kim's 1994 Liberation Day speech expressing hope for gradual unification but that it may be possible to "occur unexpectedly at any time" (National Unification Board ROK, 1994: 10). As a region in transition, the Paper pushes a narrative of fear towards the neighbouring powers, suggesting their influence over the peninsula will stymie unification (MOU, 1996: 175), both Koreas must "establish the role and status of the Korean peninsula" (ibid). These plans have considerable urgency, not what the author expected of a conservative government. Thus, the White Paper wants to guarantee the promotion of a free market to improve the international prowess of Korea.

On the other hand, the document does not mention economics as often as security; the prosperity key word group only appeared 80 times compared to 99 times for the security group. Although, it is not a considerable difference between the two. This suggests while it is not the first priority, it is still an integral part of the administration's unification policy, and spillover from its worldview. This project will consider this worldview later.

v. **Korea as a single, independent and developed state**

Combined with the efforts for increased global presence is the emphasis on a developed "national community". The term "intra-Korean" is weaved through all topics, implying there is a single nation-state of Korea, rather than two independent states as "inter-Korean" would suggest. This is important for the internal economic environment, as the Paper wishes to incorporate stronger focus of travel and business enterprises over the DMZ to advance the welfare of "the entire Korean people" (141). To promote this, the Paper proposed that intra-Korean transactions carry no taxes or tariffs considering them domestic transaction (142). This has huge implications for how the administration views the DPRK, and suggests it is already well under way in considering it part of a single state.

Disregarding the word "unification", "intra-Korean" was the most prominent phrase in the document, with 153 mentions. This shows the norm of interpreting unification as a single state is the most important take-away from this Paper. The Paper defines the unification heavily on its independence, implying autonomy from other coercing powers which is like the platform taken by Kim Il-sung (1974: 37-38). In this regard, the two Koreas have peddled very similar discourse.

vi. **Unification as a synthesis of two**

The act of unification is left as an exercise to be determined between the two Koreas, rather than imposing the approach of one onto the other nor consulting other powers over the preferred approach. Near the beginning, the White Paper rejects an ROK-led, or military-backed push for unification. Additionally, the Paper rejects an interim agreement of a Korean Commonwealth, under a 'one country, two systems' approach à la Hong Kong and China, calling it "impossible" (MOU, 1996: 78). Rather, it wishes to take 'best' parts of both approaches and incorporate them together. Most notably, though, is that the Paper does not seek the help of the United States in this matter exclusively, rather it seeks help from the entire international community. Because a synthesis of a 'communist' system with a neoliberal democracy would be highly undesirable to the security interests of the US, the significance of this will be brought up again later.

vii. **Unification as the will of the people**

To support the heady claims and plans made in this document, the Paper tactically linked this desire for unification as an expression of will from the people of the ROK. It uses census data gathered by the Research Institute for National Unification to show that 84.4% of the public are in favour of unification with the DPRK (178). This use of survey figures is used to forward an impression of democratic mandate in the policies this Paper advocates for. In the 1994 Liberation Day speech President Kim describes the Korean War as a loss of Korea's independence and division between East and West (National Unification Board ROK, 1994: 13) and that unification should be decided exclusively by the Korean people and national consensus (15). Again, the status quo is viewed as unsatisfactory due to the lack of independence, and this survey data gives this view legitimacy.

viii. **Security concerns**

The Paper makes it clear that rapprochement should be based on clear potential for securing and de-escalating the peninsula. Quoting the President, only if there is a possibility that the DPRK would stop developing nuclear weapons would he endeavour to meet Kim Il-sung. In hindsight, a summit with the DPRK would be pivotal for any attempts at unification and rapprochement, as can be seen with the 2000 and 2005 Inter-Korean summits yet prefaces this on nuclear talks first. Additionally, the Paper mentions that the nuclear solution is the priority when interacting (MOU, 1996: 109). Yet very little is dedicated to discussing how denuclearisation can be achieved, aside from

offers for LWRs. Then, it wished to focus on the international dimension of it, utilising KEDO (124-125).

Although “nuclear”, both energy and weapons, only appears 53 times in total, the text gave significant gravity to nuclear proliferation and the security keyword group was the second most prominent group after nationalism. This shows its pivotal nature to inter-Korean dialogue.

b. White Paper 2001

i. Historical context

The rapprochement efforts advertised by President Kim Dae-jung began in earnest with “cattle diplomacy”, whereby Chung Ju-yung, founder of Hyundai and born in Northern Korea, brought 500 cattle to the North followed by another 501. (Oberdorfer, 2014: 325) This granted Hyundai the right to develop Mt. Geumgang for an inter-Korean tourist project. However, this private initiative soon changed to a public partnership, having the ROK government bailing them out.

This period was not without confrontations. In summer 1999, a series of conflicts broke out in the Yellow Sea due to Northern fishers in Southern waters (Michishita, 2010: 145-148). The most important event of this period and most relevant to the White Paper would be the inter-Korean summit of 2000. Following this was Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok’s visit to Washington, DC, complemented by the US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, visit to Pyongyang (Oberdorfer, 2014: 341-344). With travel between the respective governments at an all-time high, it appeared there was a cemented atmosphere for rapprochement and reconciliation. Unfortunately, it did not last as President George Bush succeeded President Clinton in early 2001. The MOU published the White Paper during the nascent stage of President Bush’s term and with no indications that the US would reverse all progress made from these numerous summits and negotiations.

Moreover, President Kim Dae-jung had returned from the 2000 Inter-Korean summit in June. Like 1996, it still places a strong emphasis on ethnic nationalism and seeks improved welfare of all 70 million people to “restore national hegemony” (MOU, 2001: 26) to “soar up to be the world’s greatest nation” (35). However, this romantic discourse is loaded at the front of the document, in the Promotion of the Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy chapter, rather than interwoven throughout. There is an exception to this, however, which will be discussed further down. From even the preface onwards, it becomes apparent that it emphasises the need for reconciliation and cooperation first. Rather than framing the creation of a national community or a single Korean state as an *immediate*

concern, it prioritises transitional justice and inter-Korean collaboration before such an objective can be achieved. Thus, the tone has much less urgency compared to 1996, a more gradual unification.

ii. **Economic nationalism and welfare**

Most striking is the combination of economics with nationalist discourse. It consistently mentions a need for “balanced development” across the Korean peninsula, rather than concentrated in the South and improving welfare for all Koreans. The language used around economics is very similar to 1996, an unexpected feature considering the political rivalry between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. The phrases “welfare of all Korean people” and “national economic community” appear regularly, which could be interpreted as advocating economic nationalism which will be discussed later.

Following a policy of “easy matters first” (62), the White Paper makes it clear that the ROK will court the DPRK in becoming economically interlinked with the globalised world (93) and developing the entire peninsula to serve as a land bridge between it, China and Russia. Normally this would be part of an ambitious construction project, but the White Paper tries to tie its completion to unification. It claims the reconnection of the North-South Gyeongui line will represent an overcoming of national division and “reconnect the main artery of the Korean people” (90). This is not followed by a concrete account on how this will increase inter-Korean travel or how the ROK will push for less restrictions on freedom of movement in the DPRK but its mere existence is supposedly monumental. This is consistent with the June 15th Joint Declaration that, while agreeing on independent unification, welcomed international cooperation and integration (MOU, 2000: 12). Overall, the White Paper is placing the exchange of economic supplies and regional integration as a fundamental landmark in unification.

Most noticeably, the prosperity key word group has become twice more prevalent since 1996, from 80 to 153. The author identified 25 sentences that linked prosperity as fundamental to national unification and recovery of national capacity. This suggests the focus of this document is based on economic cooperation with the DPRK for the mutual benefit of both parties. Moreover, this sends an important message to the reader that the ROK will use economic growth and cooperation as a means for unification.

iii. **Forgiveness and trust-building as a primary goal**

The nationalist discourse often combines with forgiveness and reconciliation. Quoting the President, unification must end “mistrust and enmity” to reunify “the motherland” (MOU, 2001: 34). Another example would be the constant reference to “mutual trust and national homogeneity” (37 & 41). This shows the authors interpret the issue of unification differently from their predecessors: there are hurdles that the *two* Koreas must resolve first in mutual coordination.

Security talks were a “dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula” (58) to create a “durable and stable peace” (77). At one point the document quotes President Kim Dae-jung in an interview in which he conceives of the Korean War as a humanitarian crisis, and one that is the most urgent to solve (165). The White Paper interprets this conflict and mentality to intersect all elements of inter-Korean relations, including worker relations, claiming a lack of coordination was due to differences in ideology and values (173).

iv. **Korea as two states for now**

The interpretation of Korea has radically changed in this document. All mentions of “intra-Korean” were removed from this document. While this may seem innocuous at first, it completely changes the policy the administration would take under President Kim Dae-jung. Rather than seeing unification as the priority and ‘muddling through’ the difficulties inherent in that approach, this Paper makes it clear in acknowledging two legitimate Koreas for the foreseeable future and building trust between each other first. The document also becomes more specific in what projects the two Koreas should undertake before talking of themselves as “one”. Kim Dae-jung’s approach to economic integration is more measured and detailed. The document proposes the GIC and GTR, along with humanitarian aid to bring Koreans in the North up to a similar standard of the ROK. “Cooperation” was used 391 times in the document and “inter-Korean” 388 times, the two most prevalent words behind North and South. Because of this prevalence, the reader receives the distinct impression that the DPRK is a business partner and stakeholder in the unification process, which was less obvious before.

v. **Humanitarian crises expanded**

This document emphasises the famine and the war threat as humanitarian crises but also raises defectors and the human rights situation in the DPRK, however it dismisses them as irrelevant to the

immediate future of inter-Korean relations, even damaging to conducive dialogue (165). For defectors, the document details the resettlement programme but acknowledges most defections as due to the food and economic situation (155), rather than escaping political repression. It dedicates most of the content to the challenges faced by the defectors on the way to the South Korean embassy in Beijing, choosing not to disclose an opinion on the conditions in the DPRK (157).

For human rights, the Paper summarises the findings of NGOs and intergovernmental organisations while once again remaining silent on governmental policy around human rights moving forward, acting as a mere messenger. The only response to these allegations is that the government is cataloguing the violations and recommendations from the international community for later consideration (166) but are very frank in that they will not take any action. Although the prevalence of the activist key word group only slightly reduced, they were used in a dismissive tone. Still, it is important to note the White Paper acknowledges the humanitarian issue as needing attention in discussion about unification.

c. White Paper 2005

i. Historical context

The 2005 White Paper released a few years after a tumultuous time in international relations, especially as an ally to the United States: the collapse of the Agreed Framework years into the Bush administration (Oberdorfer, 2014: 354 & 363), 9/11, the war in Afghanistan, the axis of evil speech following the 2003 Iraq invasion. All these events had an impact on the framing and the focus of the 2005 White Paper as a document. Possibly the most pivotal event, however, would be in 2003 where the DPRK refuelled the smaller Yongbyon reactor, effectively restarting its nuclear weapons programme (383).

Unlike previous editions, this has no preface and instead opts for a chapter on progress made so far under previous administrations and tellingly has a section dedicated to the Sunshine Policy. This recap has made similar observations to this project, stating the Kim Dae-jung administration saw the DPRK “as a partner for seeking coexistence and co-prosperity...instead of hastily seeking a *de jure* unification” (MOU, 2005: 14).

ii. Instability as a threat to the Korean nation

From the beginning, it becomes clear the Paper prioritises reducing military tensions and denuclearisation, referred to as a “peace regime” (15). Clearly the most pressing concern is the nuclear threat, as they put that as the starting point for security discussions (17). It recognises that any destabilisation or “any form of war that could destroy the Korean nation must be avoided” (ibid). However, they reported the Koreas made progress reducing tensions along the West Sea and have placed it on the agenda for the 13th and 14th inter-Korean dialogues (29-36). In other sections, the principle of peace seeps into progress reports. For example, on humanitarian aid contributions, the Paper states that shipments of rice and food help ease military tensions without disclosing exactly how or why that would be the case (72). Further, the GIC was reported to help bring “stability and peace... as well as resolving the North Korean nuclear issue” (75). It wishes to promote military security and resolving the unstable situation on the peninsula as the primary goal for their unification policy, yet the total number of mentions regarding security stayed around the same (at 47). The reader deduces that the MOU are reluctant to delve too deeply into why the security environment is unstable and how it can be resolved.

The document paints the KEDO Light Water Reactor initiative in an extremely favourable and optimistic light. In Chapter 5, it recaps how far the project has come and how much money each country has contributed in making it a reality. This Paper comes three years since the DPRK disclosed their HEU uranium programme and two years since the KEDO project was suspended in December 1st, 2003 (118) but calls this suspension “temporary”. By describing this project as only *temporarily* suspended, it shows the government wishes to press for the resumption.

iii. Regionalist economics

The Paper is consistent with 2001 with its depiction of the Korean peninsula as a “hub” for trade and manufacturing, putting the GIC as the centre. Their approach to this is by introducing the DPRK into regional initiatives and economic blocs such as ASEAN+3 and the Regional Forum (16-9 & 49). Much of the third chapter is devoted to data on inter-Korean trade but is then followed by pushing the need for reconnecting roads and railways between the two (39). It views this as an important step to creating a larger economic bloc. On page 67, it shows an image of a connected Trans-Siberian Railway and the Trans-Chinese Railroad terminating at Gaesong, referring to it as the “Iron Silk Road” (68).

Interestingly, the discourse on developing and improving the welfare of Korean people through economics has completely disappeared in this Paper. Now, economics is used as a method for regional integration and repositioning Korea as a land bridge “between the continental and oceanic economies” (17). The nationalism key word group only appears 33 times, a precipitous drop from the previous two Papers. It is important to ask why this nationalist discourse is not being used any more – has the objective been achieved? It would certainly appear not.

iv. **The DPRK as a reliable, almost blameless partner**

The Paper is reticent towards addressing genuine issues of the DPRK. When reviewing the progress made on separated families and reunions, the evaluation of how the DPRK dealt with this issue is light. Discussing the DPRK refusing to facilitate further family reunions, the Paper refers to it as due to a “cooling down of inter-Korean relations” (98) implying they both were at fault in its failure. The worst assessment they voice is the DPRK was “passive” (21). Combining with this is the reaffirmation that the DPRK is grateful for humanitarian contributions (106). All this together gives the impression that the ROK is aiming to portray the DPRK as a reliable partner in unification, and that the issues encountered in the relationship have, in some way, a linkage back to the ROK as well. For the audience, this depiction makes it appear the DPRK is ready for introduction back into the international system and trustworthy.

Regarding North Korean “refugees” and the human rights situation, these issues are not treated in a comprehensive manner. On refugees, rather than report on reasons for why they defected to the ROK in the first place, they refuse to apply a critical judgment and more as a simple fact, describing it as “the touchstone in establishing an inter-Korean community” (107). This changes their image from victims of an oppressive regime, to a prime example of how free movement between the two Koreas should operate which is both bizarre and interesting. For the human rights issue, it limits the discussion to just two pages passing little judgment on the current situation but reaffirms the ROK’s commitment to human rights. Commenting on the human rights situation, the Paper removes the ROK’s assessment entirely by stating “the international community considers North Korea’s human rights record to be poor” (111). On the UN Human Rights Council Resolution in 2004 condemning the DPRK human rights situation, the authors justified the ROK’s abstention by suggesting it would be better to “approach the issue in a prudent manner” and that the DPRK is not entirely to blame due to its “unique situation” (111). Finally, addressing the US Congress Bill on human rights, it effectively calls the Bill an unrealistic approach to helping the situation (112). Activism is down from 2001, showing up only twice. Reading this document shows the MOU are reluctant and trying desperately to keep the DPRK in as positive of a light as possible for the readers.

d. **Transitions into Sunshine**

Now the author will recount the changes seen between the White Papers and discuss reasons for these transitions. The aim of this exercise is to see how the use of nationalist discourse changed over time, what purpose this discourse served, and additional comments on changing approaches to unification over time.

i. **Korea – From one state soon, to two for now**

Initially the Korean peninsula was portrayed as tragically and artificially divided between a single people. The 1996 White Paper alluded to urgent unification for all Koreans to gain advantage of the globalisation drives of the Kim Young-sam administration. It recognised the obstacles inherent in this sudden push for unification but conceived of them as less important than the gains made from becoming a single nation state again. It heavily focused on the ideas of cultural, linguistic, and ethnic homogeneity to affirm this need for an urgent unification.

Then, the discourse of 2001 put urgent unification off the agenda, and instead focused on overcoming mistrust and past misgivings between the two Koreas first. It proposed inter-Korean collaborations on several fronts to achieve this goal. Despite this, the nationalist discourse employed previously remains strong in this document as well but entertains concrete ideas on how this can be best achieved. The Paper repurposed ethnic nationalist discourse for cooperation, rather than unification purely in itself.

By 2005, the norm of two Koreas as functional partners had become internalised to the point where the idea of a single state Korea was not discussed. The nationalistic and romantic discourse of 2001 and 1996 largely subsided, but several mentions were made to the idea of free movement and creating an inter-Korean national community through travel between the two Koreas.

Initially, it is perplexing to see the Kim Young-sam administration express an urgent need to create a single state, and frame discussion in the White Paper around this state. President Kim failed to enact any policies that would create such a single nation state and restore homogeneity. Although he was a democracy activist during the military dictatorship, he had no legacy of pro-North tendencies and reportedly shared anti-communist thoughts with former US President Jimmy Carter, disclosing the North's human rights abuses (Creekmore, 2006: 117). Yet this discussion of human rights abuses is only subtly hinted at in the document.

This author submits pushes for swift unification were due to a brief deterioration of relations with the United States. The inclusion of ethnic nationalism in this Paper could be due to the Kim Young-sam administration expressing a desire to independently engage with Pyongyang, showing frustration at American-led initiatives.

Observing the context of the ROK-US alliance may help explain the discourse in the 1996 White Paper. Kim Young-sam was a political rival to Kim Dae-jung. He would reportedly quote public opinion figures showing the desire for urgent reconciliation and creating allyship with “national kin” (Oberdorfer, 2014: 225). Kim Sung-han suggests the ROK and USA were in a “race” to reach a summit with the DPRK. The ROK wished to avoid a triangular relationship with the US and have inter-Korean relations dictated on their terms (2005: 182-183). President Kim saw bilateral deals between Washington and Pyongyang as a way to prop up the regime doomed to collapse (Yang, 2016: 17). Cha conceives of this competition and minor rivalry between the ROK and US to attribution error whereby the smaller ally either feels abandoned from its concerns or is placated simply to achieve the goals of the bigger ally (2005: 124-125). This recorded frustration continued when former President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang to talk informally with Kim Il-sung. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* interviewed chief negotiator of Seoul, Lee Dong-bok for a comment, saying “[Carter] may be an **honest** broker, but he is certainly **not a knowledgeable broker**” (Shim J. H. 1994), implying this informal visit was inappropriate to move dialogue along and that the ROK should be formally negotiating instead. Although President Kim welcomed US initiatives with the DPRK, “he held the ultimate position of command” (Creekmore, 2006: 116). When the US proposed suspending military exercises to the DPRK, President Kim met with President Clinton in November 15th, making it clear that it would be Seoul, not Washington, to decide if military exercises would continue. With evidence of strain between the two parties, the use of ethnic nationalism becomes a push for further autonomy in foreign affairs. Taken together, the White Paper was an outlet for this expression, an indicator of how urgent it sees its involvement as the primary actor in these discussions. The prominent use of ethnic nationalism suggests that “we know best” as national kin and perhaps even as a warning, accelerating the synthesis of the two Koreas should the US continue to deal with the DPRK without including Seoul.

Applying Connor (1994), the White Paper blurred ideological and cultural distinctions between the Koreas, showing commonality outweighed difference, thus making the ROK much more suited for discussions with the DPRK. Moreover, it represents unification as an urgent and spontaneous

desire. While it is not possible to say whether this discourse influenced changing US strategy towards DPRK engagement, ethnic nationalism was a consequence of being left out of this initiative.

ii. **Korea – From international competitor, to regional hub**

For economics and global position, the 1996 White Paper made it clear the Korean peninsula should develop a strong domestic economy and production base to compete with the rising influence of China, and the dominance of Japan. Conjuring dramatic and strong expressions of improving the welfare of all Korean people, its depiction of a united Korea was highly based in economic power. White Paper 2001 redefined this focus to operate inside, and with, Northeast Asia. It promoted Korea as a manufacturing hub for the rest of the region, all while using its own technologies and human capital rather relying on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) from other countries. Instead of competing against neighbouring powers, it sought to become self-reliant and an effective partner. This was reaffirmed in 2005.

This is a reaction to the Asian Financial Crisis. Much work has been written on *seggyehwa* (globalisation) and the “paradoxical” marriage of nationalism with globalisation (John, 2015: 41). Kim J. (2012) notes that globalisation and development (*seonjingu*) was a bipartisan policy advocated by even progressive leaders (86). Under Kim Young-sam, the ROK underwent economic reform to reduce reliance on Japanese and American technologies (Lee Y-I. & Lee K. T. 2015: 131), while still prioritising foreign-oriented growth through exports. The ROK was unique in its relationship between private enterprises and the government. The government effectively managed conglomerates known as *chaebols*. Through preferential loans, the state would guide where and how *chaebols* invested in commercial projects (D’Costa, 2012). These projects were financed through foreign credit loans rather than inward FDI for the state to have full autonomy over business decisions (126). Therefore, Kim J. was correct in noting the ROK’s willingness to accede to the neoliberal global order (2012: 83) but did so in a corporatist and top-down fashion to keep the nature of development securitised by the state. You-il Lee and Kyung Tae Lee (2015: 125-151) recount these years prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis were strongly economically nationalist.

Several authors have defined and shaped the term “economic nationalism”. Rawi Abdelal defines it as “a set of policies that result from a shared national identity or from the predominance of a specific nationalism in the politics of a state” (2001: 33). Dent emphasises its capacity to damage competing interests, in that economic nationalism “seek[s] to advance the nation’s international

position at the potential expense of foreign national or international interests” (2000: 282). This calls back to Geschiere’s (2009) observation of using populism to reinforce and amplify “belonging” against others, in this case potential competitors, expressed through economic nationalism. Regardless, economic nationalism requires a state actor to make economic development of the “nation” a matter of policy and oversees the direction in which it takes. Returning to the pre-1997 Financial Crisis, Hahmn (2003) notes these *chaebol* projects often yielded little profit and instilled a moral hazard that the *chaebols* were “too big to fail” (95). When the crisis struck, the IMF required the ROK to open up to neoliberal reforms and accept inward FDIs. Kim Dae-jung complied and introduced the “five plus three” principles to bring transparency to *chaebol* affairs and create a “new, democratic market economy” (Kim B-K. 2003: 53). He used inward FDI to reform Korea as a global manufacturing hub (Lee Y-I. & Lee K. T. 2015: 133) for the global economy, integrating rather than competing.

The state-*chaebol* relationship remained but was utilised for means that are more political. Hyundai’s split from the Asan Group to receive funding for the GIC and later the GTR. This formed part of the 2001 plan to push for more regionalist efforts (47) rather than promoting Korea as an economic leader. Applying this context to the White Paper, the consistent raising of economics with the equal development of the Korean peninsula fits well with the aims to transform Korea into a manufacturing hub. This discourse of balanced development and improving welfare of “all Korean people” is guise for guiding *chaebol* investment in inter-Korean projects and gaining access to cheap DPRK labour for manufacturing, recognised during the 2000 inter-Korean summit (MOU, 2000: 15). The White Paper acts as a signal of the administration’s intentions: a liberalised economy, but with heavy state-led investment in the North. It would appear the most determinative cause for this discourse would be the Kim Dae-jung administration’s economic anxiety over being heavily dependent on FDI, and declaring it requires direct control over its economic affairs with the North, as a securitised project, with *chaebol* enterprises and thereby securitising the economic development of the DPRK.

iii. **The DPRK – From adversary, to responsible partner**

These documents slowly absolve the DPRK, as a state and political system, of infractions against the ROK over time. The 1996 Paper depicted the regime clearly as a dictatorship that was a primary obstacle to peace and security on the peninsula. President Kim Young-sam appeared reluctant to meet with Chairman Kim Il-sung and wanted the talks to have a clear purpose: nuclear disarmament. In 2001, discussion of the DPRK radically changed. It was no longer in direct opposition

with the ROK, but rather a clear and stable partner that was absorbed in unnecessary Cold War ideology, which the Paper also blames the ROK of similar faults. Thus, it shifted the blame of continued instability to both sides, that both must overcome. Finally, once inter-Korean projects made progress, the 2005 White Paper was often quick to portray the DPRK as a responsible and appreciative partner. In addition, although it raised the issues of human rights and defectors, the narrative quickly deflected blame away from the DPRK.

Looking for causes to this paradigm shift, Son argues the interactive element of Sunshine was intended to rehabilitate the DPRK to global norms and expectations while becoming interdependent on external trade (2004: 95). While this constructivist account is limited to accounting inter-Korean relations, its conclusions can effectively be transposed on to an international audience. The 2005 Paper aims to deflect conduct that might deteriorate the DPRK as a responsible actor while promoting its gratitude for the ROK in increasing inter-Korean efforts. This shows to the world that the DPRK is ready to re-engage with the Northeast Asian region and can be identified as a rehabilitated power. Moreover, it rebuts conclusions of observers like Wallace (2016) that see the DPRK's bellicosity as a method to eke out financial concessions from the ROK. This was especially needed after President Kim Dae-jung came under heavy criticism for the "cash for summit" controversy that gave \$100 million to the regime through Hyundai Group remittances (Yonhap News Agency, 25 June 2003 quoted in Son K-Y, 2006: 65).




Figure 3

iv. Security – From pivotal, to underplayed, to nationalist

Expanding from the above observation, security concerns and instability greatly reduced in presence in the discourse. In 1996, the possibility of an inter-Korean summit was premised on an effective solution to the nuclear development crisis by President Kim Young-sam, only if it effectively contributed to avoiding the crisis would he endeavour to meet President Kim Il-sung. In 2001, the security situation on the peninsula was treated as part of a broader problem of bellicosity on both sides, caused by the continuation of a Cold War mentality. However, in the 2005 White Paper, the military instability and nuclear arms crisis re-emerged as a primary discussion point of policy. Yet, it describes the situation as a “nuclear stand-off”, which is an especially slanted interpretation of the situation. During this period, the ROK had no nuclear weapons nor hosted nuclear weapons on its territory. A stand-off implies the two sides concerned are on an equal footing and that is simply not the case. Instead of interpreting the actions of the DPRK as “unilaterally withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and developing a nuclear weapons programme in secrecy”, it chose to portray them as an act of self-defence in a larger security dilemma with the United States. Moreover, it interwove discourse of protecting “the Korean nation” from disaster. In wrapping ethnic nationalist rhetoric with security concerns, it securitises the threat and heightens the focus.

It is important to understand why the 2001 White Paper downplayed the security concerns on the peninsula. If the intended effect is to portray the DPRK as a pacifistic actor, or at least stuck in a cycle of instability, then it would make sense to describe the current security environment in 2001. Wallace (2016) advances an explanation by arguing for appeasement. He demonstrates in a case study during the ROK elections, the DPRK intensified their hostile foreign policy (HFP) to try and sway the outcome (92-93). Once Kim Dae-jung was in power, the frequency of HFP events remained consistent to the previous administration from 1993-1997 (96). Michishita (2010: 134-136) concurs the North used missile test and nuclear diplomacy to eke appeasement out of the ‘soft’ Kim administration that refused to disengage from Sunshine even if missiles were tested (135). The ‘soft’ military approach of the administration could explain the lack of security discourse. However, using the data Wallace gathered for this specific period, the conflict intensity score decreased dramatically immediately following the June 2000 Inter-Korean summit (Wallace, 2016: 192, Appendix B), making 2000 the most peaceful year of Kim Dae-jung’s Presidency on average. To the administration at the time, the agreement of no tolerated provocations would appear to have worked and the lack of discussion is an attempt to demote the issue away from unification discussions.

Kim and Lee approach the Sunshine policy through the theory of securitisation. They submit the lack of kind-for-kind reaction to inter-Korean confrontation was due to a governmental effort to bring the DPRK threat down from high politics (military) to low politics (interaction through social and economic means) (2011: 34). In this way, the two authors reverse the causation of the appeasement theorists: the discourse appears to be part of a broader strategy to transform the conflict to active engagement (40). This does a good job on explaining the lack of security discourse in this White Paper by depicting it as an effort to desecuritise military security with the DPRK. Son described the security policy of Kim Dae-jung as “parallelism” in which both sides were blamed for escalations and instability across the DMZ (Vol. II, 2004: 308). He supported this with an excerpt from an interview with Lim Dong-won, the architect of the Sunshine policy, which suggested the DPRK’s nuclear development was in reaction to the threat of US military force (317). Therefore, security was demoted during the Sunshine policy and was no longer pivotal to inter-Korean cooperation.




Figure 4

The data (Figure 4) shows that the focus on security did not radically change from 2001 to 2005 in total, but the 2005 White Paper only had 131 pages compared to 186 in 2001 meaning security appeared more regularly in 2005. Although this is a clear decrease from 1996, inter-Korean stability and pacifism remained throughout the Sunshine period. The security discourse is more focused on one specific issue; it could still be more prevalent than statements in 2001. Moreover, the nationalist discourse clustered around the nuclear issue.

Regarding the return of this discourse and combining with nationalism in 2005, the data set Wallace (2016) created is useful here. Although there was a flashpoint of pacifism that lasted over a year in Korea, on average the provocations and clashes across the DMZ did not change under Kim Dae-jung (192, Appendix B). Overall, the agreement was not honoured, the ROK security posture became significantly more passive in response to these escalations. Whereas the 2001 White Paper was written during a peaceful period after the Inter-Korean summit of 2000, the MOU would need to answer for the lack of progress on achieving stability on the peninsula. This lack of progress mandated a need to resecuritize the military and nuclear situation. Equally, the Roh Moo-hyun administration could not entirely abandon the premise of forgiveness, peace and reconciliation inherent to the Sunshine Policy. The MOU in 2005 employs the “parallelism” from the Kim Dae-jung administration and refuses to acknowledge the DPRK’s bellicosity. It portrays the issue that affects both sides of the DMZ, depicts the DPRK as a responsible partner, and uses nationalistic rhetoric to dramatise security, giving it greater salience and shows that the ROK should take the lead on security. This nationalism brings both immediacy and recognition to the issue.

v. **Economics – From nationalist, to “business as usual”**




Figure 5

Figure 5 shows a noticeable drop in the application of nationalist discourse across this period. The portrayal of economic integration was similarly nationalistic between the 1996 and 2001 White Papers. However, the discourse on improving Korean welfare disappeared in 2005. Instead, the bulk

of the content was devoted to data on inter-Korean trade. At first glance, this would seem to suggest that the 2005 White Paper is less interested in carrying out full unification. However, this helps confirm the hypothesis that ethnic nationalism is used to securitise a desired policy change.




Figure 6

In prosperity (Figure 6), there was a decline in usage from 2001 to 2005. As explained above, the historical context can explain the sharp increase of usage in 2001. The Kim Young-sam administration devoted much energy to globalising the Korean economy. Shin records that globalisation in the ROK, rather than internationalise, intensified national identity out of self-preservation and a push to remain national competitive, appropriating global trade while staying firmly in control (2006: 211-214). While the 1996 and 2001 Papers were promoting the potential for inter-Korean economic integration, 2005 catalogued the progress made on the inter-Korean projects so far. Projects advocated for in 1996 in 2001 have been established and were functioning. In this way, it became “business as usual”, before it remained undecided but required promotion: the method for promotion is ethnic nationalism. The decrease in prosperity prevalence confirms this conception as inter-Korean economic cooperation became institutionalised. Thus, ethnic nationalism was used to express an internal desire of the ROK government to shift its economic model under the auspices of developing its northern brethren.

e. **Summary of the Period**

Words and phrases of an ethnic nationalist character serve several purposes in these policy documents. Firstly, they have been used to express a dissatisfaction with the current balance-of-power with an ally, using notions of creating a single state and cultural homogeneity to push diplomacy towards a more favourable direction and to gain further influence over the ROK's position in the relationship. Later, it was used to indicate and signal to the reader what policies it will emphasise when approaching the North: from promoting further economic integration and interdependence, to resuming talks on denuclearisation and security. Finally, once the promotion of a certain norm has been effectively internalised, it appears the discourse tapers-off, along with economics in 2005. Ethnic nationalism played a fundamental role in highlighting the importance of certain values and policies the ROK will take *vis-à-vis* the North, and perhaps have an influence on the US strategy towards the North as well.

f. **Moving out of Sunshine: White Papers 2010-2016**

Now it is important to analyse how the right wing Grand National/Saenuri/Liberty Korea Party treats established norms with the DPRK. In analysing the four White Papers in this period (2010, 2013, 2014, 2016), it became clear that much of the content was repetitive. As such, the themes of this period will be summarised under one section. Moreover, because this is outside of the investigative period, the author shall not consider explanations and will focus on the state of ethnic nationalist discourse and the interpretations of unification.

i. **The DPRK as an illegitimate power**

The Papers consistently affirm the DPRK is unreliable, aggressive, and illegitimate as a partner for unification. The Lee Myung-bak administration sought to continue the policies of previous administrations (MOU, 2010: 17) pushing for “a relationship that is mutually beneficial” (MOU, 2013: 16) based on returns in kind. In almost every section of economic activities, communications, humanitarian issues, the White Papers preface the discussion with instances of the DPRK unilaterally obstructing ‘progress’. For 2010, the event brought up was the sinking of the *Cheonan* in March. Even the progress on economic exchanges was mired by criticism over the DPRK's actions, such as nuclear tests, missile launches, and suspension of communications (MOU, 2010: 57). However, when the DPRK seeks returns, like stopping propaganda posters dropped over North Korea or suspensions of

the ROK-US Joint military exercises, the Paper dismisses the demands outright (MOU, 2016: 16) so there is a clear double standard. The Papers are very detailed about every minor action that the DPRK unilaterally took such as demanding a wage hike (2016: 86), changing the times for an inter-Korean meeting (181), and shutting down the GIC in 2008 (MOU, 2010: 103). Both 2014 and 2016 discuss the Trust-Building Process as a key concept, which resembles Sunshine-era trends, but there is no elaboration what exactly the ROK will do to develop trust.

Additionally, the White Papers are disinterested in improving dialogue. The most drastic expression of this disinterest is the 2013 Paper, which dedicates just 9 pages to inter-Korean dialogue (MOU, 2013: 156-164). Moreover, despite the talk of mutual benefit and conditionality, there is no expectation for the DPRK to do anything to bring about further interdependence, let alone unification. It appears the ROK government perceives unification with the DPRK regime as unachievable. By listing its failed attempts at dialogue, it conveys to the reader an impasse where relations and normalisation are unachievable. As a result, the entire Paper feels like it is talking over the North's head; it appeals to numerous regional and international powers (MOU, 2014: 284-286) and Koreans living in diaspora in Central Asia (286). The consequence of this is that efforts for phased unification are rendered irrelevant, it is no longer considered practical nor desirable, yet the publications continue.




Figure 7

ii. **The ROK as a responsible international actor**

Contrasting with the DPRK, the Paper depicts the ROK as a responsible, capable, and cooperative international power. For all initiatives, it focuses on what it has achieved and how it can achieve more in the future, by itself. In all Papers, there is always a chapter dedicated to education, called “capacity building and laying the groundwork” in 2010 (MOU, 2010: 212). However, there is no discussion on what kind of unification shall manifest. This author infers preparedness for a unilateral unification in a hypothetical scenario of DPRK regime collapse. If true, the discourse demonstrating the ROK to be a responsible actor could be its way of showing its capacity to the international community. This extends beyond unification, one of the only original propositions under the Park Geun-hye administration for inter-Korean cooperation was the World Eco Peace Park along the DMZ and joint environmental committee to preserve the habitat (MOU, 2016: 57-61). This project seems especially removed from the goal of inter-Korean coordination. Rather, it appears to be an appeal to creating an ecological record for the international image of the ROK.

While pivoting away from interacting and engaging with the DPRK, there is a risk of appearing to be abandoning humanitarian concerns, so the Papers make sure that contributions are remembered. Notably is the TamiFlu vaccinations, which was raised repetitiously and in different contexts (MOU, 2010: 112 & 126). This shows the ROK is not giving up on previous pledges for humanitarian aid thereby portraying itself as ethical. When this is the only mention of inter-Korean development, the image of North Koreans changes dramatically.

Interestingly, the GIC remains part of the White Papers with detailed reports on development and planned expansion. However, this discourse is focused on the safety of the South Korean workers and the safety of international and domestic investment. It does not mention how these developments will engender further cooperation between the two Koreas. Therefore, the GIC becomes detached from the larger goal in which it was established, inter-Korean cooperation, and is an investment opportunity for international business instead.




Figure 8

iii. The North Koreans as victims

As opposed to nationalistic rhetoric of Korean glory and commonality, the Papers depict North Koreans as passive objects to regime oppression.

Notably, the Papers greatly expand discussion of the human rights situation in the North. Compared to the previously dismissive tone in dealing with human rights, these Papers are more responsive to the UN condemnations and report by UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korean Human Rights. Each Paper consistently shows the ROK voted in favour of annual resolutions condemning the human rights situation in the DPRK (MOU, 2016: 147) and incorporating this in their domestic law (151-153). By doing this, the MOU has mainstreamed human rights and securitising it as an objective, or demand, when interacting with the DPRK.

All of these documents feature similar sections on support for North Korean ‘refugees’. These refugees are considered part of the separated families issue “who also suffer from national division” (MOU, 2010: 168), meaning they are pained from being separated from the South. They note that negative public opinion will interrupt the refugees’ chances at integrating into ROK society, thus discusses the effect of public exposure campaigns and TV programmes (MOU, 2013: 196). Yet the Papers don’t recognise a need for the South society to change to accommodate these differences in culture. Like previous observations, it would appear it is promoting Southern politics and culture as the most appropriate for the Korean race. Similarly, the children of North Korean refugees born in

third countries were considered “socially disadvantaged” when being chosen for universities (MOU, 2016: 215). Instead of disclosing a policy to ease this social disadvantage, combating discrimination, the Paper focuses on relieving the financial burden instead. Again, the social setting these refugees would arrive in seems set in stone and entirely non-negotiable. Despite being portrayed as damaged victims, the refugees will adapt and settle to the hyper-capitalistic South, there is no other way nor synthesis as in 1996.




Figure 9

Figure 9 demonstrates that nationalist discourse was on a downward trend overall but did increase from 2005 to 2010. The 2010-2016 period consistently uses nationalistic discourse less than the Sunshine period. Still the White Papers do recognise North Koreans as their own people but focus on the “national pain of division” through family reunions and caring for refugees. A different form of ethnic nationalism complements the discourse of North Korean refugees. Compared to the Sunshine period documents, the ethnic nationalist discourse is focused on improving the lives and conditions of DPRK defectors. Rather than pushing an optimistic narrative of a prosperous, equally-developed Korea that has two functional partners, these White Papers make it clear the ROK is dedicated to reaching out and supporting defectors for when the ROK might have to step in and absorb an additional 20 million citizens.

iv. **Findings on Exiting Sunshine**

The transition out of Sunshine is a sharp one. Conservative administrations from 2010 uprooted internalised and institutionalised behaviour on how unification should come about, the relationship between the DPRK and the ROK, and the nature of the Korean race. The desire of a functional, mutually beneficial relationship with the DPRK has been eroded under the pretence of failed conditionality and mistrust. Conversely, the ROK has promoted itself as a responsible state actor that abides by all international norms and strategies, to the point of including environmental conservation as part of its unification strategy. Issues over security have changed to absolve the ROK and USA of blame and depicted the DPRK as an aggressive power failing to abide by norms of responsible behaviour. At the same time, the Papers have taken ownership of Koreans both overseas in China, Central Asia, the US, and Russia, and shown dedication to rehabilitating North Korean ‘refugees’. Because of this, the idea of a mutually agreed settlement on unification becomes an increasingly distant possibility. On the other hand, it is clear that conservatives also refuse to see a bilateral relationship with the US as sufficient for the state’s self-interest. Therefore, these administrations also use speech acts of unification to forward their own agenda.

5. Application

a. Regarding the Panmunjom Declaration in 2018

Be aware that the Declaration is substantively very different from detailed White Papers on unification policy. However, the MOU has not published an English language White Paper yet, so this is the most extensive document available.

Upon analysis, many of the themes seen in the Sunshine Period White Papers reappear, but in a more direct fashion. For one, the Declaration refers to reconnecting the “blood relations” of the people, implying it has been diluted or sullied since the years of division. It also pushes for determining “the destiny of the Korean nation on their own accord” and that improving inter-Korean relations is the “prevalent desire of the whole nation” (Available at BBC, 2018). This is very similar to the discourse observed in the 1996 White Paper, excluding other actors in deciding how inter-Korean relations should manifest. Also, like 1996, the Declaration reaffirms the urgency of inter-Korean rapprochement.

This intense language could be due to an inclusion of DPRK-born norms of nationalism inside the document. Academics on these norms have noted a consistent reference to purity of blood and racial superiority as guiding principles in many publications regarding reunification. One could easily point out the limitations of both studies: neither the authors live inside Korean society and whether the general population have similar values, and there is no way of knowing whether the enactors of this policy (the WPK and Chairman Kim Jong-un) share these sentiments. For the latter, it is very likely they would not be swayed by such romantic visions of a united Korea. On the other hand, this Declaration is not for them – it is intended for an international audience and for many observers, this adoption of the DPRK’s public rhetorical performance shows the ROK is willing to utilise some of its created norms of bloodline and racial purity for a certain effect.

The Declaration also continues the timeline of rapprochement from where it was left in October 4th, 2007 with the last high-level inter-Korean summit and reaffirms a commitment to balanced development and reintegration of transport links previously seen in the 2005 White Paper. Although the staffers between all Liberal administrations are distinct from each other, the policies advocated have a clear element of consistency and build upon each other. It is worthy to see how quickly the two Koreas can pick up exactly from where they left off over ten years ago. Further, this

declaration shows more willingness to compromise with the DPRK than the 2010-2016 White Papers, ending the leaflet distributions and loudspeaker campaigns along the DMZ which was outright rejected in 2016 (MOU, 2016: 156).

The intended effect, looking at circumstances leading up to this meeting, appears to be a signal to the US that the ROK is ready to lead on diplomatic projects with the DPRK. By tying this Declaration with exclusionary, exceptional language based around racial commonality and purity, it indicates that the issue should be primarily dealt with the two Koreas and that it will be internationalised at their own pace and accord. This continued rhetoric has had a powerful effect on the conduct of the US administration. After the summit, there was much tension between President Trump and DPRK media outlets, leading to an abrupt cancellation of the US-DPRK summit in Singapore on June 12th. In response, the ROK Cabinet made it clear that they would continue along the path of rapprochement with or without the US (Available at CNBC (Kemp: 2018)). Fortunately, the summit was uncanceled and led to a US-DPRK Joint Declaration. This shows that ethnic nationalism and exceptionalism increases in both intensity and degree in instances where external actors take away too much autonomy away from the ROK, irrespective of the administration's political leaning. Moreover, this author submits the vague nature of the US-DPRK Joint Declaration is at least in part due to the ROK taking a more dominant lead in diplomatic relations, relegating the US to a 'rubber stamp'.

Judging by the discourse, the Moon Jae-in administration is establishing inroads to *re*-securitise rapprochement with the DPRK, promoting its benefit in easing the pain of national division and maintaining bloodline, something outside observers cannot understand. On initial observation, the agreement is more in-line with the 1996 approach, pushing for independent and bilateral efforts. Unlike the events around 1996, President Moon has made the ROK indispensable as an intermediary between the US-DPRK nuclear negotiations. As a veteran of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, one can speculate that his policy towards would be like what came before. However, this stronger push to both incorporate, yet simultaneously guide the hawkish President Trump in interactions with Pyongyang shows a clear departure from the divided approach seen under Sunshine. Regardless, the ROK shall continue securitising and taking ownership of certain elements in interactions with the DPRK by channelling its incomprehensible experience of national division and stay present as an overseer on all US-DPRK summits moving forward.

Due to this, President Moon would likely be willing to continue efforts on a bilateral basis. Although the US has responded positively to rapprochement, the steps for denuclearisation are sufficiently vague that conflicts may arise over its interpretation⁵. Should the efforts be successful, though, President Moon would favour further economic integration with the Northeast Asian region and begin new inter-Korean economic projects like President Kim Dae-jung and securitise balanced economic development as part of greater Korean welfare. Likewise, if the current agreement falls apart and hostilities continue, the Moon administration looks poised to advocate for further nuclear diplomacy and denuclearisation incentives such as KEDO and securitise it through ethnic nationalist discourse.

⁵ Full text available at: “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit”. (2018) last accessed 1st July 2018

6. Conclusion

Speech acts on unification should be analysed more holistically moving forward. The application of ethnic nationalism has been shown to be a fundamental political tool in reporting how Liberal administrations will approach the North regarding unification. Ethnic nationalism frames the approach to unification and securitises certain self-interested foreign policy goals. As hypothesised, it combines in areas of specific importance to each respective administration and behaves as a device for securitisation of an issue. Through imparting notions of racial and cultural homogeneity, the ROK signals to the international community that they view the DPRK as part of their nation and claims both belonging and “ownership” over the issues that arise in their relationship. Simultaneously, it applies national strife and pain over division to grant itself further autonomy and independence. Thus, the triangular relationship between the USA and the two Koreas is avoided and instead puts the USA behind the ROK as a follower rather than a leader. Surprisingly, many of the themes in the Sunshine period began in nascent during President Kim Young-sam’s term in clear frustration regarding the ROK’s relative position in the world and the ideas clearly developed during this period.

Interestingly, contrary to the hypothesis, ethnic nationalism does not disappear entirely from 2010 to 2016 but are reinterpreted. Instead of portraying the North as a reliable partner, these administrations view the DPRK as unreliable and unworkable, viewing the people as victims. The documents promoted the ROK as an effective and autonomous middle power throughout this period; it does not consign itself to complying with the US’ wishes, and still declares independent diplomacy with Russia and China (arguably the DPRK’s closest allies). These respective White Papers are closest to a public image piece, showing the ROK as responsible and benevolent, contrasted with the DPRK’s irresponsibility and incompetence. In this manner, unification has been used as a way for the ROK to sell itself, portraying itself as successful versus the DPRK’s failure; an internationalised and reliable power with a modern and ‘advanced’ culture. This only intensified as time went on, expanding the topics of discussion to regional development, nuclear energy, environmental protection, and education of Korean culture. Thus, the discussion of unification will not disappear under further Conservative administrations, it still serves a practical purpose. However, the expansion of agenda items has obfuscated the ontology of unification that it has lost a clear meaning requiring a concerted effort to put cooperation with the DPRK at the forefront.

The Panmunjom Declaration shares themes to previous inter-Korean summits and policies advocated in the White Papers. Nevertheless, there are clear efforts to bring the DPRK back into unification policies with more ambitious goals and summits. The ROK was able to achieve a functional relationship with the DPRK so quickly because ethnic nationalism is both malleable and long-lasting, allowing for the two Koreas to resume the nature of their relationship from over a decade ago. Moreover, the ROK is again the lead diplomat in approaching the DPRK, setting the agenda for the United States. In all, it would be beneficial for future research to understand the concept of unification is much broader in scope than interactions between the two Koreas: it is a purposefully designed and utilised speech act with a variety of self-interested purposes for the ROK.

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
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
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
8. Appendices

a. Appendix A

Timeline of events







Appendix B

Keywords in 1996 - latent

Categories	Number
Activism	37
Nationalism	167
Security against North	99
Prosperity	80

Keywords in 2001 - latent

Categories	Number
Activism	36
Nationalism	110
Security against North	39
Prosperity	153

Keywords in 2005 - latent

Categories	Number
Activism	2
Nationalism	33
Security against North	47
Prosperity	68

Keywords in 2010 – latent

Categories	Number
Activism	54

Nationalism	78
Security against North	61
Prosperity	115

Keywords in 2013 – latent

Categories	Number
Activism	57
Nationalism	42
Security against North	90
Prosperity	63

Keywords in 2014 – latent

Categories	Number
Activism	65
Nationalism	47
Security against North	89
Prosperity	68

Keywords in 2016 – latent

Categories	Number
Activism	49
Nationalism	43
Security against North	55
Prosperity	56

Appendix C

Keywords in 1996 - manifest

Categories	Number
Activism	71
Nationalism	357
Security against North	132
Prosperity	116

Keywords in 2001 - manifest

Categories	Number
Activism	59
Nationalism	246
Security against North	50
Prosperity	215

Keywords in 2005 - manifest

Categories	Number
Activism	8
Nationalism	65
Security against North	50
Prosperity	129

Keywords in 2010 - manifest

Categories	Number
Activism	91

Nationalism	253
Security against North	86
Prosperity	208

Keywords in 2013 - manifest

Categories	Number
Activism	93
Nationalism	237
Security against North	114
Prosperity	131

Keywords in 2014 - manifest

Categories	Number
Activism	95
Nationalism	316
Security against North	102
Prosperity	182

Keywords in 2016 - manifest

Categories	Number
Activism	77
Nationalism	290
Security against North	81
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