COUNTER-RADICALIZATION POLICIES – A THREAT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION?

A German Case-Study

Abstract

The phenomenon of European youth joining ISIS has been widely discussed and left politicians facing the question of how to prevent the radicalization of youth. In this qualitative case-study, the counter-radicalization strategies in Germany are analysed with regard to their effect on the principles of democratic education. The UK´s PREVENT policy is used as a benchmark. The argument is that if policies allow the security field to dominate the educational one, it will lose its autonomy and negatively impact the principles of democratic education. Bourdieu´s field theory will first be applied to the cases and analysed as to how the policies allow the security field to occupy the educational field. In a second step, the effects of the policies on four identified principles of education, namely (i) education as a transformative process, (ii) schools as safe and free learning environments, (iii) education based on diversity and (iv) teachers as role models, will be analysed. Interviews with German teachers will be used in the study to get a clearer view of the effects of the application of policy in day-to-day school environments. The findings will show that the PREVENT program focuses on policing instead of education, which also manifests itself in questions of school funding. Lack of funding can prevent schools from improving their skill sets and gaining more confidence in upholding the four principles above. These are exposed with a higher risk of being violated when a statutory duty is placed on teachers to report students they detect as "at risk". The German policy ensures a separation of the two fields, which gives teachers the necessary freedoms to enable them to uphold the principles of democratic education. One of the main objectives of the policy is also to improve teacher training in order to ensure that they have the necessary competencies to do so.

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Research Question

What are the effects of counter-radicalization policies on the principles of democratic education?

Introduction

Over the last few years, the issue of "home-grown terrorism" has been widely discussed in the political landscape. This trend has been reinforced in light of the rise of foreign fighters joining ISIS. It is striking that it is mostly youth who radicalize and decide to support and join such terrorist organizations. This has politicians puzzled as to what drives youth from western societies down such a path and why youth seem to be especially susceptible to becoming radicalized [Focus 2016]. Education is identified by many policy-makers as key in preventing youth from radicalization and being vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist organizations. As a result, counter-radicalization policies have already been implemented in the education sector [Durodie 2015, 22]. The most controversial policy in Europe is PREVENT, adopted by the UK government, in which schools are asked to play a role in preventing youth from radicalizing [Long 2017, 3]. According to the new regulations of the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015* schools are obligated to report students to the police and intelligence agencies that they have identified as being "at risk" of radicalization. Schools are also supposed to promote "fundamental British values" [Long 2017, 7].

The UK, Germany and the other members of the Council of Europe (CoE) are committed to the *Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education* (2010), which sees the purpose of education as the promotion of the "core values" of democracy and human rights, as well as a "defence against the rising of violence, racism, extremism, xenophobia, discrimination and intolerance" [CoE 2010, 3]. In its *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* (2008), the CoE also states that the purpose of education is not just to provide knowledge and to prepare students for the labour market, but also to prepare students to become active citizens [CoE 2008, 30]. By recommending the teaching of intercultural competencies, the CoE hopes to "encourage students to exercise independent critical faculties" in order to promote a "democratic culture" [CoE 2008, 43].

When comparing the approaches of the CoE and the UK towards prevention policies in the education sector, one can detect a discrepancy: while the Council relies on the promotion

of democratic values and human rights to fight extremism and radicalization, the UK seemingly goes the opposite way by trying to control what is taught in schools and "securitizing" education by using teachers as informants. This raises the question of what effects counter-radicalization policies have on the principles of democratic education and how other member states, in particular Germany, deal with this issue. This thesis argues that if counter-radicalization policies allow security agencies to dominate the educational field, the principles of education are violated. It will be structured as follows: First, the existing literature on this subject will be reviewed before presenting the theoretical framework, which consists of a combination of securitization theory in the context of Bourdieu´s field theory and critical education theory. The operationalization and the methods, as well as the scope follow. The analysis of the German case, using UK's PREVENT as a benchmark, will follow before concluding.

Literature Review

The issue of counter-radicalization strategies in education is currently a widely discussed topic. Scholars can be categorized into two main camps on this issue. One group of scholars thinks that controlling what is said and discussed in the classroom will protect children and youth from being exposed to or developing their own radical ideas. Another group of scholars advocates the critical education theory, which sees the purpose of education as teaching students the skills necessary to critically evaluate the positions and views of others, as well as develop their own.

The first group, which believes in controlling what is said and taught in classrooms, bases its views on the assumption that youth are especially vulnerable in their teenage years to being exposed to radical and extremist ideas. This is a major factor, because they are at an age where they are trying to find their identity [Precht 2007, 67]. A strong charismatic person who preaches radical and extremist ideas in mosques and prisons, as well as schools and universities can influence them more easily [Precht 2007, 53]. In combination with a lack of knowledge of Islam [Choudhury 2007, 32] and other factors such as social networks and the "desire to affect political change", this can lead to the radicalization of youth and a greater propensity for them joining terrorist organizations and becoming foreign fighters [Bizina/Gray 2014, 75]. This leads Bizina/Gray to recommend that police and social workers should be trained in detecting early signs of radicalization in immigrant communities – the focus of the paper. Youth should be socially integrated through exposing them to a "counter ideology by education" [Bizina/Gray 2014, 77].

The UK´s counter-radicalization policies are based on a similar notion that education needs to be controlled [Durodie 2015]. If certain "ideas, dispositions, relationships, ideologies and cultures" that are seen as being conducive to triggering terrorism and radicalization are to be stopped [Sukarieh/Tannock 2016, 28], education must play a vital role. According to Sukarieh/Tannock, this trend places the factor of culture at the centre of causes for triggering terrorism. Its underlying assumption is that certain cultures, religions or ideologies are inherently not compatible with democratic societies and turn into breeding grounds for scapegoating and stereotyping entire communities [Sukarieh/Tannock 2016, 28-29]. Unlike the factors that assume a heightened vulnerability of youth who are exposed to radical and extremist ideas, Durodie believes that people decide what content they accept or reject based on developed ideas, models and world views that have already been internalized [Durodie 2015, 28]. People should not be seen as "mindless sponges" [Durodie 2015, 27-28].

Durodie puts securitization theory into the context of the field of education by speaking of a "securitization of education" through PREVENT. Waever (1995) describes securitization theory as putting areas outside of state security into the context of security [Waever 1995, 47]. This means that the state is able to justify exceptional measures in areas outside of the traditional area of state security by framing an issue as being under an existential threat [Waever 1995, 75], even if the measures were considered unacceptable before [Waever 1995, 51]. Durodie defines the "securitization of education" as "the possibility that the state (and other) actors might transform specific problems into security-related concerns in the pursuit of their agendas" [Durodie 2015, 23]. This would result in a mere transfer of controlled knowledge because security is prioritized and the "dominant cultural outlook" is adopted [Durodie 2015, 23]. As such, teachers are used as "tools of surveillance" [Sukarieh/Tannock 2016, 29] in order to ensure that "radical" ideas do not get spread and thus suppressed. Scholars and university unions have expressed their concern about the danger they see of breaking the relationship of trust between students and teachers. The aftermath is potentially alienation and fear among students to speak their mind freely, hindering the development of their thoughts and ideas, because they fear to be identified as an "at risk" person [O´Donnell 2015, 54]. O´Donnell then expresses her concern for the implications of such policies on the freedom of expression and the transformative effect that education is supposed to have [O´Donnell 2015, 71]. According to O´Donnell, the Universities and Colleges Union is also worried about the effect counter-radicalization policies might have on academic freedom [O´Donnell 2015, 62].

The effects of counter-radicalization policies on democratic education have been widely debated. While policy-makers hope to foster a safer learning environment and shield youth from

radical and extremist ideas, the securitization of education seems to have an opposite and alienating effect. Furthermore, PREVENT is considered to be the most elaborate counter-radicalization policy in Europe. Policies in other European countries could have varying effects on the principles of democratic education. Owing to the fact that the focus within the current literature has been on arguably the most extreme example of European counter-radicalization policy in the form of PREVENT, an analysis of the possible effects of alternative counter-radicalization policies on the principles of democratic education has yet to be adequately addressed.

Theoretical Framework

In order to analyse the possible consequences counter-radicalization policies may have on the principles of democratic education, securitization theory is used in the context of explaining a securitizing *effect* of counter-radicalization policies as a possible outcome, rather than analysing the actual process of securitization in the educational field. This means that education itself is not perceived as a threat, but seen as a tool to fight against the threat of home-grown terrorism. Pierre Bourdieu (2005) provides a useful framework to explain why this securitizing effect occurs: He analyses the relationship between the fields of politics, social science and journalism. All these fields take different positions, forcing the fields to compete and "battle with one another" in their interactions [Bourdieu 2005, 30-31]. Thus, the different fields try to keep their autonomy from one another, while expanding their influence on other fields. If a field loses its autonomy because it is influenced or even occupied by another field, Bourdieu talks about "heteronomy". They try to occupy other fields by giving themselves the authority, and through that, legitimize themselves to design categories of perception through which they can exercise "symbolic violence". Bourdieu gives the development of labels from "Islamic" to "Islamicist" to "terrorist" as an example [Bourdieu 2005, 37].

This mechanism of gaining influence can be explained through the Paris School of Security Studies. The first step is the "de-differentiation of professional activity", resulting in the construction of a security field, followed by the redefinition and classification of security threats. This is accomplished through a "redefinition of systems of knowledge and know-how", where actors in the security field base their definitions on their access to data, statistics and technologies. They communicate with the public through their view of the issues, leaving the public in a constant state of unease. This process then results in security being reduced to surveillance and information-gathering [Bigo 2006, 7-8].

Applying these concepts here, this would mean that the security field is trying to dominate the educational one through counter-radicalization policies. Through their self-proclaimed monopoly of legitimate knowledge, the security field is successful in framing the issue of radicalization as a threat, legitimizing the security field to put extraordinary measures of surveillance in place within the educational field. This then causes the securitizing effect on democratic education. The essence of education is compromised because it loses its autonomy. The principles of democratic education are violated, insofar as policies infringe on fundamental freedoms and human rights in the name of preventing radical or extremist views from spreading, despite the fact that they are vital in ensuring these principles are upheld. Ragazzi (2017) identifies such freedoms and rights to be "the specific legal protections accorded to children, the freedom of expression, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to one´s cultural identity, the right to education, the right to respect for private and family life and the freedom against discrimination" [Ragazzi 2017, 49]. The idea of such counter-radicalization policies is that the control – and inevitably the restrictions – over what is being said and taught will lead to a reduction of radicalizing youth [Durodie 2015, 28].

Critical Education Theory

Durodie´s assessment that people are not "mindless sponges" makes the method of controlling education and what ideas can be expressed in the classroom redundant, since the mere exposure to an idea or ideology does not make someone adopt it immediately [Durodie 2015, 27-28]. Building on this, critical education theory seeks to create "[H]abits of thought, reading, writing and speaking […] to understand the deep meaning, root causes, social context, ideology and personal consequences of any action, event, object, process, organization, experience, text, subject matter, policy, mass media or discourse" [Shor 2012, 129]. Youth should be taught skills to critically analyse, evaluate and question information themselves, while developing the capacity to argue their point of view based on evidence and to reflect on their own positions [O´Donnell 2015, 54], instead of only being exposed to previously approved ideas as would be the case in a securitized educational setting. The Charter on Democratic Education and other documents on the topic of education published by the CoE are inspired by critical education theorists [Huber/Mompoint-Gaillard 2011, 13].

Arguments

In light of the considerations concerning the possible effects of counter-radicalization policies on the educational field, the following arguments are made:

(a) The educational field can lose its autonomy if counter-radicalization policies allow the security field to occupy the educational field and use it to serve its own needs. This has an impact on the principles of democratic education.

(b) The principles of democratic education are compromised and violated if the security field has succeeded in occupying the educational field through counter-radicalization policies that infringe upon fundamental freedoms and rights of both, students and teachers.

The Principles of Democratic Education

The CoE wants to foster active citizens who are critical thinkers and promote a democratic culture through education. The Paris Declaration of EU Education Ministers talked of building up "social, civic and intercultural competencies", training youth in media literacy and "promoting intercultural learning" [Paris Declaration 2015, 4]. The CoE's *Charter on Democratic Education* defines democratic education as "education, training, awareness-raising, information, practices and activities which aim, by equipping learners with knowledge, skills and understanding and developing their attitudes and behaviour, to empower them to exercise and defend their democratic rights and responsibilities in society, to value diversity and to play an active part in democratic life, with a view to the promotion and protection of democracy and the rule of law" [CoE 2010, 5-6]. These documents reveal a strong socialization focus. As advocates of critical education theory, Sukarieh/Tannock (2016) see a discrepancy between this goal and what is currently being implemented. Instead of focusing on "socially engineer[ing] a more inclusive, just and egalitarian society" through education, governments merely focus on educating students to be able to later compete in the global economy [Sukarieh/Tannock 2016, 31]. They identify three areas in education that they see being lost in a shift towards a mere transfer of knowledge: (i) the "radical tradition in education and youth work" [Sukarieh/Tannock 2016, 26], (ii) fostering a wish to create social change and (iii) the "transformative" power of education [Sukarieh/Tannock 2016]. They explain that the word "radical" now has a negative connotation because it is so closely connected with terrorism,

while radical thinking is traditionally a way of thinking outside of what is considered the norm in society. Without thinking radically and critically in this context, there would be no development and no social change [Sukarieh/Tannock 2016, 34-35]. In the beginning of the 20th century, the idea of women having equal rights to men, like the right to vote for example, was considered radical. If there had not been radical thinkers, such as the Suffragettes or other women active in the women´s rights movement, women would not have the right to vote today – a principle that is a self-evident part of equality in democracies today [Gleadle 2016, 3-4].

Drawing on this idea and the documents of the CoE, Ragazzi (2017) identifies four key principles of education: "[e]ducation as a transformative process", "[s]chools as safe and free learning environments", "[e]ducation based on diversity" and "[t]eachers as role models" [Ragazzi 2017, 5]. According to his interim report, some counter-radicalization policies can contradict these principles [Ragazzi 2017, 4].

Operationalization

This section will define the loss of autonomy the securitizing effect has on the principles of education and determine how it will be measured. The educational field loses its autonomy – or in Bourdieu´s words the educational field is "heteronomous" – if the security field has managed to dominate it and uses it as a means to satisfy its own needs. This is the case, for instance, if teachers are used as surveillance tools. This has a securitizing effect on democratic education, which occurs if exceptional measures are taken which infringe on fundamental freedoms and rights in the name of protecting youth from radicalization. These fundamental freedoms and rights are vital in the fulfilment of the four principles, which were identified by Ragazzi (2017).

The first principle of education as a transformative process has many dimensions: teaching critical thinking [Ragazzi 2017, 64] – which manifests itself through open discussions, the encouragement to question opinions and thoughts of others and of themselves, questioning authority and the empowerment to exercise and defend democratic rights [CoE 2010, 5-6]. The latter manifests itself through teaching about democratic rights and being critical of authority.

The second principle, schools as safe and free learning environments, can be measured through the freedom of expression [Ragazzi 2017, 66], of thought, conscience and religion [Ragazzi 2017, 53], as well as the freedom from discrimination [Ragazzi 2017, 58]. In

measuring the freedom of expression, one should look to indicators that enable schools to encourage their students to voice their thoughts without fear of repercussions [Ragazzi 2017, 67]. The indicators for freedom of thought, conscience and religion would be situations where students are able to practice their religion and voice their beliefs appropriately without fear of being accused of radicalizing [Ragazzi 2017, 53]. Freedom from discrimination manifests itself in policies that do not target minority groups.

The freedom from discrimination aspect mentioned above is a first step toward the third principle, education based on diversity fostered by intercultural competencies and teaching students to value diversity [Ragazzi 2017, 70]. This can be achieved by teaching about different cultures and promoting "intercultural dialogue against racism and discrimination" [Ragazzi 2017, 68-69]. Other indicators can be seen in the encouragement of diversity in thought and opinion through open discussions, as well as links to the indicator of critical thinking and teaching different (non-euro-centric) perspectives in school curricula in order to get a more holistic view.

The fourth principle, which focuses on teachers as role models, can be measured by analysing whether policies allow teachers to represent democratic values in the classroom and build trust relationships with their students. This would include not forcing teachers to report their students or target minorities [Ragazzi 2017, 71].

Object of Study

The research question will be analysed through a case study of the German S*trategy for the Prevention of Extremism*. In past years, Germany has seen an increase in terrorist activity, and, most recently, actual terrorist attacks. The topic of counter-radicalization has thus become more of a focus area for the German government. In order to get an idea of how different policies may affect the principles of democratic education, the UK´s PREVENT will be used as a benchmark. Germany and the UK have similar characteristics – both are western democracies and members of the CoE – but their counter-radicalization policies do differ, the most striking difference being that PREVENT gives teachers the statutory duty to report students when they suspect them of radicalizing, while the German policy does not. A difference in the level of autonomy of the educational field in both countries is recognizable through the different approaches of the policies: PREVENT seems to focus more on controlling the learning environment, while the Strategy against Extremism seems to rely more widely on

pedagogical methods as suggested by critical education theory. This makes the UK a good benchmark when analysing how different policies may have different effects on the principles of democratic education.

Methods of Data Generation and Methods of Analysis

Since the objective of this thesis is to understand the effects of counter-radicalization policies rather than the sociological conditions that lead to these policies, a contextual discourse analysis will be conducted [Ruiz 2009, 7-9]. This will enable an in depth understanding of the implications of the policies on the fundamental freedoms and rights in the educational field. The theoretical framework suggests that the degree of autonomy of the educational field that the policies allow is decisive in what effects they have on the principles of democratic education. Therefore, the discourses will be analysed through the use of language in the counter-radicalization policies themselves. Through that, the degree of influence, given by the policies and the methods they propose, can be analysed first, in order to establish the degree of autonomy of the educational field. This should show how policy-makers framed the issue of radicalization in order to justify the possible exceptional measures implemented or why exceptional measures were not considered in the first place. Recommendations and strategies from national agencies or ministries will be analysed to shed light on how they may have influenced policy. Then, policies specific to the educational field, such as curricula, will be analysed to show how the counter-radicalization measures affected them and the extent to which they infringed upon fundamental freedoms and rights. In order to garner insights into what practical and direct effects policies have in the classroom, interviews with four teachers in Germany were conducted, one of which teaches didactics of political science for ongoing teachers now. Interviews were conducted with a student wanting to become a politics teacher, a schoolbook researcher for the Gerhard-Eckert-Institute and a criminologist, who collaborated with the German Federal Police (BKA) and worked for the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigation. Consequently, primary sources were used wherever possible for the analysis of the German case, as there has been little research done on this topic to date. As there has been a lot of research conducted on PREVENT and its implications for the educational field, secondary sources will primarily be used to benchmark them to the findings of the German case. An interview was conducted with a Professor of Youth and Policy at the University of Huddersfield, who has recently conducted a study about the effects of PREVENT on British schools, to get an overview of the policy-reality in British schools.

Scope and Limitations

This case study will give a better understanding of the effects of counter-radicalization policies with regard to the principles of democratic education. Although the findings of the study will not be generally applicable to other cases and countries, due to the unique circumstances of each, it will give a general idea of what effects different types of counter-radicalization policies have on the principles of democratic education. If the findings show that Germany´s counter-radicalization policies have not lead to a securitizing effect on democratic education, then it could be an alternative solution to PREVENT, and also be more compatible to the commitments made by the member states of the CoE.

Analysis

Autonomy of the Educational Field

The theoretical framework suggests that an occupation of the educational field by the security field would have a securitizing effect on the principles of education. Consequently, the first step of analysis is to identify how autonomous the German educational field is compared to the British one. If the security field dominates counter-radicalization policies, it will lead to a loss of autonomy in the educational field and result in it serving the needs of the security field. As Bigo suggests, the framing of an issue and consequently the use of security language is vital in the process of domination. Therefore the degree of autonomy is measured through the use of security language and the proposed measures that may be justified through it. It should be noted here that security policy in Germany is mainly under the jurisdiction of the states (*Bundesländer*). Federal security policy and organized crime lye within the jurisdiction of the federal police (*Bundeskriminalamt*). Compared to PREVENT, the German Strategy against Extremism uses less security language, leaving less space for justifying exceptional security measures in the educational field.

The German counter-radicalization policy focuses on pedagogical means of prevention, allowing the educational field to maintain its autonomy. Much like PREVENT, the German government´s Strategy against Extremism also speaks of "at risk" people and groups [Bundesregierung 2016, 11], suggesting a need for protection and security. However, PREVENT uses more security language and forms a stronger narrative of children and youth being particularly "vulnerable" [UKHO 2015, 10] and there being a particular need to "protect" [Long 2017, 3; UKHO 2015, 10] and "safeguard" [Long 2017, 3; UKHO 2015, 4, 6, 10, 14] from extremist thoughts and views. This is based on the notion that students carrying radicalized ideas are a threat to other students by merely interacting with them [UKHO 2015, 14]. O´Donnell points out the wording as framing the "vulnerable" as being at risk and getting "infected" by radical ideas, and thus becoming radical extremists or terrorists [O´Donnell 2015, 53-54]. Although the German Strategy against Extremism also talks about a need to "protect children and youth from harmful content" in connection to media consumption, the German government only speaks of teaching children and youth media literacy as a method to protect them [Bundesregierung 2016, 24-25], instead of involving security agencies in the control of education. The light use of security language in the policy and the pedagogical methods that are proposed by it, suggest that the two fields are kept apart and the security field has not succeeded in occupying the educational field. This is amplified by the fact that security agencies are seen as a "last resort of a state under the rule of law" [Bundesregierung 2016, 13].

Teachers in the UK also see pedagogical tools as a first step [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017]. However, Thomas (2016) notes that PREVENT puts the emphasis on policing [Thomas 2016, 177]. An example that supports this observation is using teachers as "surveillance tools" [Sukarieh/Tannock 2016, 29]. PREVENT requires a close "partnership" between the police and educational institutions [UKHO 2015, 23], asking the police to assist with training and sensitizing teachers so they can better identify "at risk" students [UKHO 2015, 4, 15; Long 2017, 4]. In return, the teachers are asked to report these to the police [UKHO 2015, 15]. If schools do not comply, consequences follow, such as the loss of funding [UKHO 2015, 12]. This statutory duty created by PREVENT in the UK is the main, critical difference to Germany when it comes to the degree of autonomy of the educational field, at least at policy level.

The interviews conducted with German teachers show that they are left with room for manoeuvre, leaving it up to themselves if, when or how they want to interact with security agencies. Mrs. Jensen, a teacher for refugee classes in Hamburg, points out that teachers "have the job to teach, not to collect evidence of extremist ideas. We work on behavior and thinking."

[Jensen, personal communication, April 26, 2017]. In an interview for the *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung* (BpB) – a government agency which deals with the political education of the German public – Kurt Edler, a member of the State Institute for Teacher Training and School Development in Hamburg, said that if teachers suspect a student to be radicalized and pedagogical tools have failed to work, they are obliged to report it to school authorities. These evaluate the case together with teachers and parents and consult about what steps to take next [BpB 2015]. Ms. Ghazanfari, a teacher at a German school, also gave a pointed example when she commented that if a student voices radical anti-Semitic opinions, the consequences would be a parent-teacher meeting with the principle in which further steps of action are discussed together [Ghazanfari, personal communication, April 26, 2017]. These examples show that schools will look to pedagogical methods and solutions or get pedagogical help from outside before engaging security agencies, demonstrating a relatively high degree of autonomy. Similarly, teachers in the UK first search for dialogue with the students and their families if necessary, before contacting the local PREVENT coordinator to discuss how worrying the individual´s case is, before referring the student to security agencies. However, control mechanisms exist for schools, where teachers run the risk of getting punished if controlling agencies do not agree with their choices [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017], highlighting a lower degree of autonomy compared to Germany.

The German Federal Police (Bundeskriminalamt) sees their work as separate from the educational field, as the report from their autumn convention 2015 suggests. The Bundeskriminalamt considers education vital in counter-radicalization efforts. They should be shaped by *pedagogical* tools first and foremost. The security agencies should only become active if these tools have failed [Steffen 2015, 24]. This insight was gained from past experience with general crime prevention measures, where police would sometimes interfere in schools directly, which proved to be counter-productive [Steffen 2015, 22-23]. In various drug-prevention programs the police developed school programs to educate students about drugs and their dangers, only to find it to be counterproductive, as Dr. Wiebke Steffen, a criminologist who worked for the Bavarian State Police for several years, noted [Steffen, personal communication, April 25, 2017]. However, other state-level documents suggest a tendency towards a different approach. The key message of the *Action Plan for the Prevention of Islamic Extremism and Terrorism* of the Home Office of Lower Saxony is that an intensification of the collaboration between security agencies, schools and youth workers is planned [NMIS 2012, 2]. The document omits any details as to what this might mean in practice. However, it does lead one to expect that Lower Saxony aims to intertwine the two fields, potentially making it

possible for the security field to influence the educational field more directly in the future. This shows how federal and state-level agencies can differ in their approaches. Similar experiences have been gained in the UK over time with PREVENT. In the beginning, police would go to schools and talk to students, often finding it counter-productive, resulting in the police interfering less in schools over time [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017]. The German government remains more focused on funding peer-to-peer projects, such as the non-profit organization UFUQ, which several interviewees mentioned, instead of focusing on policing.

The idea of such projects stems from the fact that when teachers feel inadequate or overwhelmed by radicalism in the classroom, they should turn to experts in these projects and not to security agencies, as Dennis Sadiq Kirschbaum explains, who studies Politics and Ethics to become a teacher and is involved in UFUQ [Kirschbaum, personal communication, April 24, 2017]. Experienced and trained young people between the ages of 20 and 30 come to classes and talk about topics that reach or motivate youth, such as religion and identity. The young "peers" can thus start a dialogue with the students and show alternatives to radical views [UFUQ 2015]. The peers are not connected to the police [Kirschbaum, personal communication, April 24, 2017], which underscores their role as pedagogical supporters for schools. Because the British government is focused on policing instead of funding pedagogical measures, such programs are lacking although the teachers do ask for more support and training on these matters [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017], suggesting that the security field succeeded in establishing their monopoly of knowledge and a greater need for resources from the government.

The first part of the analysis shows a relatively high degree of autonomy for the educational field in Germany, due mainly to the fact that, unlike their colleagues in the UK, German teachers are free from any statutory duties to security agencies. The light use of security language in policies and the focus on pedagogical measures suggest that the security field has not gained as much influence over the educational field. This is apparent from the BKA´s statement that pedagogical tools should be the first step in countering extremism, suggesting that the security field has not claimed to have a monopoly of knowledge. Education is seen as the first step to fulfilling the goal of security, and not been reduced to surveillance. At the policy-level, this cannot be said for the UK. There, a heavy use of security language and the narrative of vulnerable youth, enables the security field to justify its exceptional measures of surveillance and dominance over the educational field. Reality in the UK, however, shows that the situation is not as grave as some scholars suggest, as the police in the UK see their direct involvement in

schools critically and teachers do not immediately contact the security agencies for every student they suspect of radicalizing. However, the focus on funding the security field more than the educational one and the existence of a statutory duty, suggests a higher degree of influence of the security field and therefore a lower degree of autonomy of the educational field in the UK than in Germany. On the state-level, this could be changing in Germany, as the example of Lower Saxony shows. Since the jurisdiction for both education and police lay with the Bundesländer, this will be an important dynamic to follow closely in the future.

The Effect on the Principles of Education

This section will show that if the educational field shows a higher degree of autonomy, upholding the principles of democratic education will be easier, than if the security field is the centre of policy. This is largely linked to the issue of funding and the higher risk of (mis)interpretation of policies.

1. Education as a Transformative Process

The autonomy of the German educational field enables teachers to teach critical thinking and empowers their students to exercise and defend their democratic rights. In Germany, empowerment to exercise and defend democratic rights is a clear goal of the curriculum for politics nationwide and across school types [HBSB 2014, 12; HK 2010, 3; HK 2002, 3; MKJSBW 2012, 36]. According to Dr. Riem Spielhaus, the head of the Department of Schoolbooks and Society at the Georg-Eckert-Institute for International Textbook Research, curricula are competence-oriented [Spielhaus, personal communication, April 24, 2017], meaning that they are designed to teach students to become politically mature, learn participatory skills and be motivated to apply these to society [Kirschbaum, personal communication, April 24, 2017]. Making politically mature choices requires students to learn to think critically. Schoolbook-assignments give insight into how this is done in classrooms. Spielhaus finds that the assignments encourage students to first form an opinion, then have a class discussion about it and finally learn how to form some sort of consensus. This is also done

with “hot topics” such as the headscarf debate [Spielhaus, personal communication, April 24, 2017]. History lessons are supposed to teach students to be critical of authority in the context of propaganda, right-wing radicalization and Nazi-Germany [HK 2002, 23]. These goals are not different from the UK, as the secondary national curriculum for citizenship education shows. Here the purpose is defined as “provid[ing] pupils with knowledge, skills and understanding to prepare them to play a full and active part in society” by teaching them to think critically [DFE 2014, 82].

Many scholars warn of possible negative consequences of PREVENT on the transformative process the curriculum wants to achieve. PREVENT defines extremism as “opposing fundamental British values” [O´Donnell 2015, 61], which may lead critical thinkers to be easily labelled as extremist. O´Donnell warns that this may make it difficult for schools to encourage students to think critically, let alone voice critical opinions about government or state authorities [O´Donnell 2015, 68]. Paul Thomas´ current study, however, indicates that PREVENT has actually led most schools to do *more* to teach critical thinking and have political debates in classes [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017].

These examples show that, where education is not controlled and kept autonomous, open classroom-discussions, encouraging critical thinking as an integral part of teaching, are easier to achieve. While PREVENT runs the risk of having a negative impact on the transformative process envisioned for education, it has inadvertently also challenged schools to work harder to improve this principle of democratic education. A pre-requisite to have truly open discussions in classrooms, is for teachers to also be able to create safe and free learning environments.

2. Schools as Safe and Free Learning Environments

Schools need to create a safe and free learning environment for students to have the confidence to express themselves and test their thoughts and ideas. If this is to happen, an environment of trust needs to be established. It requires a space that is “completely confidential”, in which “conversations cannot be linked back to criminal justice agencies or other governmental agencies”, which is the only space where vulnerable people feel safe enough to freely express themselves [Fitzgerald 2016, 143-144]. It is vital to analyse effect of counter-radicalization policies on this aspect of democratic education. The fact that German

schools are not required to work with the police when it comes to radicalization should enable teachers to build an environment of trust and a safe place for students to freely express their thoughts and beliefs. This may be more difficult in the UK, due to the statutory duty placed on teachers to identify and report "at risk" students, through which, according to O´Donnell, an "atmosphere of mistrust" [O´Donnell 2015, 62] is created.

In the German case, building such an environment is dependent, however, on the teachers and their training, as they have many freedoms in how they conduct their lessons. There is no guidance or "checklist" handed out by the police for signs of radicalization that teachers are supposed to look out for. There are no simple, detectable signs, like "growing a beard" that would indicate radicalization [Steffen, personal communication, April 25, 2017]. Because teachers are not asked to detect radicalization based on external or physical features, which may be connected to religious traditions, clothing, or practices, students do not need to fear repercussions for simply practicing their religion - at least on paper. Some teachers are insecure about this issue. Kirschbaum recalls instances where teachers thought that girls in their classes were radicalizing into extremists, because they started wearing headscarfs and voiced pro-Palestine opinions [Kirschbaum, personal communication, April 24, 2017], suggesting a lack of sensitized training and a latent danger of discriminatory behavior towards Muslim students.

The same tendency toward discriminatory behavior can be observed in the UK. The PREVENT-policy itself targets Muslims disproportionally as Fitzgerald (2016) points out [Fitzgerald 2016, 140], exposing a discernible discriminatory side-effect of this policy. Muslim youth are perceived to be especially vulnerable towards radical Islamist ideology by policy-makers. The voicing of (critical) political ideas, therefore, can be more quickly considered "evidence of exploited vulnerability" [Thomas 2016, 179]. Similar to Germany, the discriminatory behaviour of teachers is closely related to them being overwhelmed, particularly where they feel that PREVENT places all the responsibility on the individual teachers and they are left alone with this task [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017].

This may have implications on the student´s freedom of expression. There is a danger that youth may censor themselves out of fear to be labelled an extremist and are afraid of the consequences. Thomas points out that further studies need to be made on this specific issue, as this is not easily observable [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017]. The focus on Muslims may also have consequences on their freedom of religion because they are observed more intensely and outward expressions of their faith can be interpreted as a sign of radicalization [O´Donnell 2015, 55]. Thomas´s study shows that 10-20% of the students that

are reported to security agencies are neo-Nazis [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017], showing that teachers do not only look for Islamic radicalization.

To help prevent discriminatory behavior, the state-funded organization UFUQ advises teachers in Germany. They do not single out students but work with classes on themes such as "How do we want to live?" and do so in an inclusive manner, avoiding a "us vs. them" posture [UFUQ 2015, 33-34]. Current schoolbooks make this difficult to accomplish, as Spielhaus points out [Spielhaus, personal communication, April 24, 2017]. Policy-makers can use schoolbooks to ensure that their goal to prevent extremism through democratic education is implemented in the classroom. Spielhaus found that German schoolbooks portray Islam as something historic and foreign – as something that does not belong to Germany. An example of this is when Islamic holy-days are introduced. This is done in schoolbooks by "showing a girl named Aicha living in Turkey, wearing a headscarf, who describes how she and her family celebrate the Sugar-Feast." On top of that, students are asked in tasks and exercises to ask their Muslim classmates how *they* think about different topics that are discussed in class, such as sex-education in biology. Spielhaus sees difficulties with this development, because the students are identified as being Muslim, eventhough they might be members of a different religion or are not religious at all, and are forced into a constant mode of justification. Some students are even brought into a position of policing and taught to see the *other* students as different and even "problematic", potentially promoting discriminating behavior and having a negative impact on creating a dynamic of trust in the classroom. The major causes for schoolbooks with discriminatory content in Germany, according to Spielhaus, is that the authors of the schoolbooks were not aware of the intercultural nature of today´s classrooms when they were written, and the extremely long and rigorous review process required by the ministries of education [Spielhaus, personal communication, April 24, 2017]. Consequently, a change in schoolbooks and the content they convey is a difficult and slow process, which results in teachers having to work with old schoolbooks. Therefore, changes in the training of teachers are required in order to ensure a safer and more confident handling of the school-materials without discrimination, which according to Burkhart Rosskothen, a teacher at a school in Offenbach, is already noticeable. During his training to become a teacher, intercultural competencies were not a focus and his generation of teachers was not trained to be sensitized on the issue of discrimination [Rosskothen, personal communication, April 28, 2017]. Kirschbaum agrees with this observation and says that, at least at his university, there are many preparatory courses on the topic of racism-prevention [Kirschbaum, personal communication, April 24, 2017]. Fereidooni sees racism-prevention as an important and very new topic that is

only being taught at four Universities in the country so far [Fereidooni, personal communication, May 1, 2017], suggesting that the awareness of this issue is developing slowly.

Although German schools are not required to work with security agencies at all, the effect of counter-radicalization policies on freedoms and, therefore, the safety of the learning environments is very dependent on the teachers and, inevitably, on their training. If teachers depend on schoolbooks and are not sensitized to the issue of discrimination, they will not be able to provide a safe learning environment for students to freely express themselves. If teachers are sensitized and use materials other than schoolbooks, they may be able to create an environment in which every student feels safe to express their beliefs and opinions freely. This is similar to the UK, where teacher-training is essential in combating the potential discriminatory effects and unsafe learning environments PREVENT could cause. As stated, most of the funding for PREVENT is directed towards the security field, reinforcing the fact that PREVENT allows the security field to dominate the educational field. The possible problems with discrimination in both cases raise the question of how the principle of education based on diversity is met.

3. Education based on Diversity

Diversity based education is a main objective of the German strategy against extremism, which is also reflected in school curricula. Although it is applied in schools, there may be evidence to show that the intention of policy-makers could be causing an opposite effect in practice. One of the overarching objectives of Germany´s strategy against extremism is "safeguarding and respect for human dignity and the strengthening of social inclusion in a diverse society" [Bundesregierung 2016, 11]. This is especially important in democratic education, as it should enable students to be competent in their approach to diversity [Bundesregierung 2016, 17]. Diversity based education is also mentioned in British school curricula. Within the context of citizenship education, it is specified that the "diverse national, regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United Kingdom and the need for mutual respect and understanding" should be taught [DFE 2014, 84]. In practice, this seems to be more of a focal point in all regions of Germany.

One example where intercultural competences are taught in German schools is in religion-class. Rosskothen is a teacher for a new subject that was introduced to his school,

which follows a "dialogical" approach to religion. Instead of teaching Catholic, Protestant, Islamic religion (in some *Bundesländer*) and ethics separately, as is standard in German schools, his school decided to offer a joint religion class instead. This was implemented because of the diversity of the students – over 70% have a migrant background – and it was intended to help the students learn from and about each other. Discussions in class encourage students to form an opinion based on knowledge that they gain and to debate their different opinions in class. Teaching the students to listen, to take each other seriously, and the ability to tolerate different ideas and opinions, are important skills to teach, Rosskothen says. He makes it clear however, that it is also important to set boundaries as to what views can be tolerated. This brings into play the aspect of compatibility with human rights [Rosskothen, personal communication, April 28, 2017]. Many interviewees confirm that disrespectful and hateful statements violating human dignity are the line that students should not cross [Annex 2, 4, 5, 7]. A similar subject has been introduced to schools in Hamburg. The curriculum specifies that in a culturally and religiously diverse society, students are supposed to be encouraged to learn about different cultures, religions, and their views and to engage in active conversations [HBSB 2011, 12]. In the UK, this all depends on the diversity the school is exposed to and its surroundings. If a school has a diverse student body, it will be much more conscious of teaching the required skills for day-to-day school-life to work well [Thomas, personal communications, May 31, 2017].

However, Fereidooni warns of the consequences that teaching "intercultural competencies" may have, as it could be conducive to increasing the "us-vs.-them" mentality and lead to harbouring prejudices and discriminatory behaviour. It can lead to thinking patterns in which behaviour is explained through culture, such as "Ali behaves this way because of his culture". Racism-prevention is therefore a more appropriate way of reaching the goal of teaching students to value diversity [Fereidooni, personal communication, May 1, 2017]. As this is not case-specific, this is not connected to the question of how autonomous the educational field is, but of how sensitized policy-makers are on this topic themselves. This also applies to the UK. Teachers there are also conscious of the fact that more has to be done on this issue, otherwise they see the danger of PREVENT becoming racist [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017].

According to Spielhaus, German schoolbooks are often lacking different perspectives. Exposure to different perspectives of history, for instance, is dependent on the degree of the teacher´s dedication. Spielhaus points out that the more competent the teacher feels, the more additional materials the teacher will use in class [Spielhaus, personal communication, April 24, 2017]. The common didactic methods to teach critical thinking – letting students work out pro

and con arguments and making them support the argument in a discussion they normally would not – suggest that introducing different perspectives is vital to the discussion. This aspect is also lacking in British curricula, as policy-makers do not show interest in including teaching different perspectives. So as in Germany, teaching different perspectives on topics is left to the individual teachers [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017].

These examples show that the focus German schools place on exposing their students to a variety of perspectives on a subject and teaching intercultural competencies can have an opposite effect of what is trying to be achieved. This is dependent in large part on the teacher´s dedication and competence, as is the case in the UK. The upholding of the principles of democratic education relies heavily on teachers and their ability to act as role models.

4. Teachers as Role Models

The strategy against extremism in Germany enables teachers to build a trust-relationship with their students and remain credible in promoting democratic values. All active teachers that were interviewed placed extreme importance on the trust relationship that is built in the classroom (Annexes 4, 5, 6). Because the security field has not occupied the educational field nearly as much as in the UK, more is inherently possible in Germany. Rosskothen noted that part of building this relationship is to assure students that "what is said in the classroom, stays in the classroom" [Rosskothen, personal communication, April 28, 2017]. This is possible because teachers are not required to report students to law enforcement. Due to the statutory duty of teachers to report students, this cannot necessarily be said about the UK. Because of their statutory duties, teachers may be perceived as spying on students [Thomas 2016, 176], negatively impacting their trust-relationships with those students. The German teacher Edler proposes that, in order to maintain a trust relationship with students, teachers need to be honest in where the boundaries are set and clarify the "legal relationship" before a student confides in the teacher [Edler 2016], as teachers are still obliged to report a student if they know that they are involved in illegal activities. This is also a common practice in the UK [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017]. This allows teachers to maintain their trustworthiness and credibility in front of their students.

In order to credibly represent democratic values, however, teachers need to be properly trained themselves. If teachers are not conscious of racism-prevention then how are they

supposed to be able to teach their students to value diversity? The Strategy against Extremism seeks to improve the quality of teacher training [Bundesregierung 2016, 17], and sought to rectify known shortcomings in the future. The credible representation of democratic values may be more difficult on an institutional level under PREVENT. Here, PREVENT leaves a lot of room for interpretation [Revell/Brian 2016, 351-352]. If teachers chose to interpret the promotion of "fundamental British values" as promoting human and democratic values [Thomas, personal communication, May 31, 2017], they may credibly represent and practice these principles, depending on *their* interpretation of PREVENT. The autonomy of the educational field enables German teachers to build credible trust-relationships with students, provided that they are well-trained themselves, something the government seeks to improve with its Strategy against Extremism. How teachers can credibly act as role models under PREVENT depends on the teacher as well, but the government does not invest in more training of teachers, as most of the budget of PREVENT is spent on security.

Conclusion

The question of what effects counter-radicalization policies have on the four identified principles of democratic education was analysed through a German case-study, in which the UK´s PREVENT was benchmarked. The study used securitization theory in the context of Bourdieu´s field theory and critical education theory to explain possible differing effects of the two cases on the principles of democratic education, as the first part of the analysis found the educational field of Germany and the UK to have different levels of autonomy. The German Strategy against Extremism puts a focus on democratic education as the means to fight against extremism and radicalization, as the security field does not claim to have a monopoly of knowledge in this area. The focus of PREVENT is on policing. Its budget focuses on security, because the security field was successful in framing a narrative in which education is key but surveillance and control manifests itself in the form of a statutory duty imposed on schools and teachers to report students they see at risk of radicalizing, enhancing the monopoly of knowledge the security field is supposed to have. This is justified through the framing of radicalization as a security threat and as a form of an "infectious disease" that can only be contained through more control by the security field. Teachers however, see little difference to their duty of safeguarding students from before PREVENT. Some scholars still warn of potentially negative impacts on democratic education if PREVENT is interpreted differently.

In Germany, the fields are kept more separate, because there are no statutory requirements placed on schools. The investment in pedagogical help from outside for schools and teachers where appropriate, demonstrates the focus on pedagogical tools in the German strategy that is lacking in the UK. Trends at the state level in Germany need to be observed however, as the example of Lower Saxony showed.

The *current* autonomy of the educational field in Germany gives teachers freedoms that allow the principles of democratic education, which are currently incorporated into school-curricula, to be upheld. A special focus lies on the transformative process and critical thinking, especially in history and politics classes. Although the UK has the same goal, many scholars warn of a possible negative effect. The reality in many schools in the UK shows that PREVENT has brought more political debate and a bigger focus on teaching critical thinking into the classrooms. The freedoms in both cases are dependent on the training and the overall competence levels of teachers, especially when it comes to prejudice and discriminatory behaviour. Improvements in teacher training are part of the German Strategy against Extremism, owing to the focus of policy on pedagogical tools, not overt security priorities. Such funding is not intended by PREVENT, because a monopoly of knowledge points its focus on security measures like surveillance. The focus on intercultural competencies instead of racism-prevention can have a counterproductive effect vis-à-vis the declared goal the policy-makers are trying to achieve. This is especially the case in Germany, where intercultural competencies may even reinforce discriminatory thinking- and behavioural patterns. As the competence of teachers is so important, future research should be conducted on how teachers are trained, particularly on the topic of racism-prevention.

The analysis showed that teachers in both countries are committed to tackling the issue of radicalization through pedagogical means, i.e. by upholding the principles of democratic education. The policies however, allow this to different degrees, owing to the fact that the security fields have different degrees of influence on policies: PREVENT shows a lower degree of autonomy and therefore a focus on policing, resulting in funds being mainly directed to security and not education. In Germany, a large portion of the funds go to the improvement and better training in the educational field because this is the focus of their strategy.

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