Diversity in counter-radicalisation policy

A comparison between the counter radicalisation policies of the municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague

Leiden University, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences

Name: Pepijn Knops

Student number: S1142143

Supervisor: Dr. F. Ragazzi

Second reader: Prof. dr. P. Kopecky

Date: July 6th 2017

Word count: 8.536

Research question: What factors explain the differences in how municipalities develop their counter-radicalisation policies?

Abstract

This thesis analyses what factors explain the differences in how municipalities develop their counter-radicalisation policies. It has practical relevance since it can possibly improve the knowledge of policymakers on the development of these policies and help them improve these. Furthermore, this research hopes to contribute to filling a gap in the literature. The first assumption is that the model of integration of minorities affects the development of these policies. The second assumption is that political orientation affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies. Finally, the third assumption is that the local structure of civil society affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies. In order to examine this, the focus is on the municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague. This research confirms the last proposition and rejects the first and second propositions. Only the final factor, civil society, partly explains the different policies of the different municipalities. However, more research is needed on this subject to get a better image of all the factors that might affect the development of counter-radicalisation policies.

List of abbreviations

NCTV	National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
AIVD	General Intelligence and Security Services
VNG	Association of Dutch Municipalities
OM	Public Prosecution Service
KIS	Knowledge Platform Integration and Society
EUKN	European Urban Knowledge Network
PPN	Policy Planners Network on Countering Radicalisation and Polarisation
ICSR	International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

Introduction

"Our way of life is under fire (Rutte, 2016)." This sentence was used by the Dutch prime minister after the attacks on Brussels in March 2016. Every time an attack takes place somewhere in Europe, it seems to shake up the Dutch society. Even though the Netherlands has never experienced an attack comparable to those in Madrid, London or Paris, terrorism and radicalisation are much debated subjects. The current threat level is substantial, level 4 out of 5 (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2016). The sense of security has not improved over the last few months. "In December 2016, 78% of the Dutch population did not worry, or worried only a little, about their security as a result of an attack" (Ibid.). In June 2016 this was still 82% (Ibid.). Ever since the threat level went up in March 2013, the Dutch government has been working even more intensively on the approach of radicalisation and terrorism (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014). When it comes to policy development surrounding counter-radicalisation, a lot of research still has to be done (Elshimi, 2015).

In 2012, Delft was shocked by the fact that young people from a criminal network, living in their city, left for Syria. The municipality of Delft stated that radical ideas, street culture and youth criminality had gotten intertwined (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). In 2014, the government intensified its policies on radicalisation and as a result Delft received more money to improve their counter-radicalisation policies. The main goals they want to reach with these policies are prevention and increasing resilience, increasing awareness/knowledge on radicalisation processes, countering negative polarization, timely addressing social unrest and tensions and executing a personally oriented or group oriented approach at radicalisation and extremism (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). The municipality has established a strategic network, which includes for example social workers, volunteer organizations and police agents (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 6). They work together to achieve these goals (Ibid.). The focus of the municipality of Delft is on the community and the involvement of its citizens. They argue that the different communities and individuals make sure that the dialogue continues to exist; that Delft is a society where people meet each other and understand and respect each other (Municipality of Delft, 2015, p. 5).

The Hague is a Dutch city that was confronted with radicalisation as well. The municipality of The Hague recognizes that radicalisation is a serious problem that needs to be addressed. Just as in Delft, radicalisation and criminality seem to have intertwined. Member of the municipal

executive (wethouder) Ingrid van Engelshoven argued that "youngsters are mad at society because it does not offer them any future perspectives. So, they start looking for alternatives to be part of something: first criminality, now radicalisation" (Van Engelshoven, 2015). Over the last couple of years, more than 3500 professionals have participated in an orientation program in which they were informed about the backgrounds of Jihadism, the signs of radicalisation and what they can do when they recognize certain signals (Van Aartsen, 2016a, p. 3). In 2016, the city received nearly one million euro from the government to address radicalisation and jihadism. For a big part, this money was used/is being used to analyze the problems surrounding radicalisation (Fluit, 2016). More than half of the money (€550.000,-) was spent on extra capacity, extra hiring of knowledge and the strengthening of local partners (Van Aartsen, 2016b, p. 2). An amount of €350.000,- was spent on local networks and social resilience, which entailed extra coaching trajectories for vulnerable youngsters and trainings on radicalisation and identity (Ibid.). Former mayor of The Hague, Jozias van Aartsen, stated that "if we allow our society to be guided by distrust, fear and hate, we have lost that which we want to protect: a society with freedom of speech, freedom of religion and mutual respect" (Bertram and Van Aartsen, 2014, p. 2).

It is interesting to examine the counter-radicalisation policies at the level of the municipality, since municipalities play an important role in preventing social tensions and radicalisation (NCTV, 2014, p. 7). Most of the literature has focused on the differences of the counter-radicalisation policies between the different countries (Lindekilde 2012a, Lister and Otero-Iglesias, 2012, Silke, 2005). Furthermore, there are intergovernmental networks, such as the European Policy Planners Networks Countering Radicalisation and Polarisation (PPN), that bring together policy planners from integration and security ministries to look at the good and bad practices in this policy area (PPN, 2010, p. 1). However, very little has been written on the development of counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level. Therefore, it is interesting to examine these policies. Every country has its own unique cultural, political and legal elements, which contribute to how policies are shaped. However, even when cities are located in the same country, their policies differ sometimes. Some municipalities decide to take a tough approach, while others decide to take a softer approach. This thesis will focus on the factors that explain these differences. Thus, the research question is: *What factors explain the differences in how municipalities develop their counter-radicalisation policies?*

Literature review

In many debates, radicalisation is defined as "a process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs, and hence to some extent it is used to denote a major precursor to terrorism" (Dzhekova, Stoynova, Kojouharov, Mancheva, Anagnostou and Tsenkov, 2016, p. 8). However, this definition has been criticized since it is "neither based on empirical findings, nor does it help to better understand the mechanisms that lead to political violence and escalation" (Ibid.). According to Schmid (2013, p. 1), the concepts radicalisation and counter-radicalisation are problematic since they "are poorly defined and mean different things to different people." The municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague both use the same definition of radicalisation: "Radicalisation is the willingness to strive for, support or encourage far-reaching changes (possibly undemocratic changes) in society. Far-reaching changes are developments that can threaten the democratic order (goal) often with undemocratic means (means), that damage the functioning of the democratic order (effect)" (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 5 & Municipality of The Hague, 2014, p. 7). This definition will be used in this thesis, since the focus is on these two municipalities.

There has been an upsurge of academics interested in radicalisation from 2004 onwards, which can be seen in appendix 1 (Baker-Beall, Heath Kelly and Jarvis, 2015, p. 17). According to Baker-Beall et al. (2015, p. 16) "radicalisation analysts supply what policy-makers demand." After the murder of Theo van Gogh and the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and the attacks in London in 2005, policy makers had to devise counter-radicalisation policies to pre-empt such violence (Ibid.). Since then "several European countries have developed comprehensive counter-radicalisation strategies seeking to de-radicalize or disengage committed militants and, with even greater intensity, prevent the radicalisation of new ones" (Vidino and Brandon, 2012, p. 1). "Initially, there was confusion over the methodologies and terminologies used in counter-radicalisation programmes as these were developed separately in different countries and were subject to constant revision" (Rasheed, 2016, p. 40). Rasheed (2016, p. 41) states that "counter-radicalisation studies and programmes have extended the scope and impact of counterterrorism operations beyond conventional security and military paradigms by delving into ideological, religious, socio-political, economic and, at times, historical vectors." "The central premise of most counter-radicalisation programmes is that terrorism spreads in societies because of the extremely divisive and violent propaganda and indoctrination carried out by various extremist institutions and terrorist organisations" (Ibid.).

Over the years, the policy field on the prevention of radicalisation has taken shape. According to Lindekilde (2012a, p. 335), this policy field "identifies radicalisation as a growing social and security problem to which governments must attend in a timely manner in order to prevent radicalisation processes from taking hold." At the beginning, many looked at radicalisation as a linear process of increasing extremism, but more recent approaches of counter-radicalisation policies combine aspects of more classic security policies with elements of social cohesion programs, integration policies and community building (Ibid.). Some authors, such as Silke (2005) and Mueller (2005, p. 502), claim that counter-radicalisation can be counterproductive and costly. On the contrary, Laiq and Hearne (2010, p. 11) argue that "deradicalisation programs have the potential to be of enormous benefit to governments worldwide."

Several authors have given attention to counter-radicalisation policies in practice (Lindekilde, 2012a, Silke, 2005, Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009). While looking at different states, both differences and common traits can be found. Lindekilde (2012a, p. 337), for example, focused on Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands in his research. He noticed big differences in the initial policies of these states in terms of target groups, scope (local versus national) and the definition of 'a radical'. However, he also noticed that they had similar thoughts on how radicalisation develops and what the vulnerable group is (Ibid.). Lister and Otero-Iglesias (2012) made a different comparison by looking at the United Kingdom and Spain. They sum up their findings as follows: In Spain, "terrorism is dealt with within the existing legal framework and combined with a lingering skepticism of security services and the legal system suggests that increasing anti-terrorism powers are less politically viable (or legally necessary). In contrast, the United Kingdom, owing to its penchant for temporary law to deal with terrorism, has produced a situation where Parliament has become habituated to legislating on terrorism matters. These policy paradigms, along with differing attachments to civil liberties, help to understand the different responses by these countries to a seemingly common pressure" (Lister and Otero-Iglesias, 2012, p. 564). These authors show that despite a seemingly common threat, states respond in different ways because of (among other factors) their different historical legacies, institutional considerations and legal frameworks.

There are a lot of differences within countries that have left it to the local municipalities to choose their policies. So, there is also within country variation as opposed to only between country variation. However, in the current literature, not many authors focus on understanding

why it is that in the same country different cities would develop different policies. This makes it interesting to look at the development of counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level and to examine what factors explain the differences in these policies. According to the European Urban Knowledge Network (EUKN, 2016, p. 5), "some municipalities are already well on their way in developing and implementing policies, while other municipalities have to make a start or are uncertain about the right direction." Furthermore, they state that "mutual learning and exchange of experiences will help policy-makers and practitioners at various levels to get a better understanding of preventive approaches and measures" (Ibid.).

Theoretical framework

In social sciences, neoliberalism has become an important concept, which is "describing the structural changes in the global economy since the 1970s. At the most fundamental level, neoliberalism builds on the classical liberal notion implying the triumph of market forces and individual autonomy over state power" (Young, 2011, p. 1676). It can be understood as a theory that "proposes human well-being as best advanced through an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, free markets and free trade" (Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall and Jarvis, 2015, p. 2). However, neoliberalism has also changed the structure of the social relationships people have, such as relationships in the workplace, family, neighborhood and civil society (Kymlicka, 2012, 99).

"Various critical literatures in International Relations have identified neoliberal economic trends as integral to counterterrorism frameworks and techniques" (Heath-Kelly et al., 2015, p. 1). According to Heath-Kelly et al. (2011, p. 2), "the deployment of risk through security, for example, identify the application of actuarial tools drawn from the market to issues of political violence, tracing their subsequent development into speculative tools of contingency management. Here, insecurity is tamed through its rendering as manageable, predictable risk precisely by the application of economic technologies to various fields of security." According to Lindekilde (2012b, p. 110), "it is characteristic of the radicalisation discourse, and of the new policy regimes, that they mix a security agenda with an integration agenda, where security concerns and risk assessment become closely intertwined with questions of integration, anti-discrimination, and social cohesion." Furthermore, the link between neoliberalism and counter-terrorism has also focused on the growing role of private organizations in the security sphere (Heath-Kelly et al., 2011, p. 2). Some countries have employed "neo-liberal governmentality approaches of governance through individual support

and response, information and knowledge, empowerment, surveillance and intervention, and anti-discrimination" (Lindekilde, 2012b, p. 110). The aim of these policies is to prevent radicalisation by shaping, disciplining and transforming illiberal and violent radicals into liberal, active citizens (Ibid.). Thus, neoliberalism could serve worthwhile in analysing the different policies of the municipalities.

Shortly after the attacks in London in 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair put the focus on integration. In Britain, the assumption was made that inadequate integration resulted in terrorist attacks (Rahimi and Graumans, 2016, p. 33). As a result, the Preventing Extremism Together Project (PET) was established, which focused on several integration agenda items (Ibid.). After this, "many other Western nations followed suit and began to develop security strategies and counter-terrorism measures that similarly adopted a strong focus on integration, reflecting the underlying assumption of failed integration as the cause of violent radicalisation" (Rahima and Graumans, 2016, p. 33). Even though many Western states seem to agree that integration is an important aspect in countering radicalisation, their models of integration of minorities differ (Ibid.).

Sedgwick examined three Scandinavian countries: Norway, Denmark and Sweden. According to him (2011), although these countries "have much in common socially, culturally and linguistically, they have diverged politically in recent years over issues connected with immigration and integration, and the divergence is reflected both in policies and in research on radicalisation." He concludes that political differences matched differences in the development of counter-radicalisation policies (Ibid.). However, according to De Haas en Natter, political orientation does not necessarily have to guarantee an outcome in a certain direction (2015, p. 2). Factors such as political negotiation or the influence of lobbies can alter the preferences of a party (De Haas and Natter, 2015, p. 2). Still, it seems most likely that the political orientation of a government affects its policies.

According to Van Ginkel (2012, p. 7), "it is clear that civil society organisations working in areas of development, women's rights, conflict transformation, governance building, freedom of the internet, interfaith dialogue, human rights and providing other forms of dialogue platforms, all contribute in some way in addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism." These organisations act locally, "while still being connected with grassroots movements that give voice to the grievances in society" (Ibid.). Van Ginkel (2012, p. 1) states

that civil society can play a crucial role in countering and preventing radicalisation. "Policy at both national and EU levels has acknowledged the role of civil society in counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation" (Institute of Strategic Dialogue 2010, p. 4). This implies that the local structure of civil society, has an impact on what counter-radicalisation policies look like. The Institute of Strategic Dialogue (2010, p. 25) argues that "civil society is now an integral player in counter- and de-radicalisation, encompassing community organisations, frontline workers and the general public."

Propositions

1) The model of integration of minorities affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies.

2) Political orientation affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies.

3) The local structure of civil society affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies.

These propositions are based on the theories presented in the theoretical framework. In order to test these propositions, this thesis will look at the municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague. Both municipalities use networks to reach people and consider cooperation to be an important aspect. The Hague states that countering radicalisation and jihadism is an intensive job that requires a broad municipal approach. They have chosen to intensify the cooperation between the different municipal services (Municipality of The Hague, 2014, p. 5). The municipality of Delft acknowledges that in order to be successful, they are strongly dependent of the efforts of parties such as the police, the Public Prosecution Service (OM) and societal organizations (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 9). Despite the common traits, the counter-radicalisation approaches of these municipalities differ. In order to confirm or reject the propositions that might explain these differences, this thesis will first explain what is different and will then test the propositions.

Object of study

This thesis aimed to assess what factors explain the differences in how municipalities develop their counter-radicalisation policies. The focus is on two Dutch municipalities: Delft and The Hague. Delft is a municipality which has over 100.000 inhabitants and is one of the Dutch cities with the highest number of individuals travelling to Syria (Kouwenhoven, 2014). The

municipality of The Hague has more than 500.000 inhabitants and is the Dutch city with the highest number of individuals travelling to Syria (Kouwenhoven and Smithuijsen, 2016). Different policy documents, documents from the city council, articles and newspaper articles have been analysed. By doing so, this research provides an in-depth examination of the way counter-radicalisation policies are developed at the municipal level.

Data generation and analysis

In order to conduct a discourse analysis, different written works were gathered. These are documents from the city councils of Delft and The Hague, policy documents, newspaper articles and so forth. In order to analyse the generated data, a sociological discourse analysis was used (Ruiz, 2009). Ruiz (2009, p. 2) defines discourse as "any practice by which individuals imbue reality with meaning." With the use of this discourse, three different levels of analysis will be discussed: a textual level, a contextual level and an interpretive level (Ruiz, 2009, p. 4). In the textual analysis the structure and composition of the discourse was characterized or determined (Ruiz, 2009, p. 7). In order to proceed to the contextual level, and more specifically the situational discourse analysis, a comprehensive description was required of the context in which the discourse was produced. A situational analysis "goes beyond a mere description of discourse to provide an initial explanation at a micro-sociological level" (Ruiz, 2009, p. 11). In the final level, the interpretive level, the discourse needed to be interpreted. During this interpretation connections were made between "the discourses analysed and the social space in which they have emerged" (Ruiz, 2009, p. 15)

The different approaches

Over the years, the municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague have developed counter-radicalisation policies. These two cities face problems with radicalizing citizens but they both deal with this in different ways. The municipality of Delft uses a soft approach, while the municipality of The Hague uses a harder approach. According to Hoeft (2015, p. 1), "the distinguishing feature of soft approaches is that they are designed to win the hearts and minds of radicalizing individuals by employing non-coercive methods." These approaches are aimed at preventing people from (fully) radicalizing and using violence. Pliner (2014, p. 9) argues that there is "a broad range of non-coercive instruments, such as messaging, capacity-building, outreach to civil society, and educational campaigns." He argues that they "are necessary to make environments non-permissive for terrorists seeking to exploit them."

The distinction in this thesis between hard and soft approaches is made based on two factors. The first factor is the density of municipality relations with civil society. If such meetings take place regularly, it contributes to a soft approach. This is the case because the municipality is reaching out to civil society. If not, it contributes to a hard approach. The second factor is the willingness of the municipality to acknowledge and to foster citizen initiatives that address polarization and radicalisation. When this is a priority, this factor contributes to a soft approach. However, when this is not a priority, this factor contributes to a hard approach.

The Hague states that countering radicalisation and jihadism is an intensive job that requires a broad municipal approach. They have chosen to intensify the cooperation between the different municipal services (Municipality of The Hague, 2014, p. 5). They are not in dialogue with other societal organizations on a regular basis (Ibid.), whereas Delft has a standard meeting on radicalisation/polarization with community organisations and citizens every month (Bruggen Bouwen Delft, 2017). The municipality of Delft argues that in order to be successful, they are strongly dependent of the efforts of parties such as the police, the OM and societal organizations (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 9). They actively try to engage with their community (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). So, while the municipality of The Hague is mostly focused on intensifying and solidifying the municipal services itself, the municipality of Delft has closer relations with their non-municipal services and is more actively trying to get its community to participate.

The municipality of Delft highlights the importance of initiatives from societal organizations or citizens. They support and facilitate such initiatives and have made resources available to do so (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). For example, in 2016, they started a program to support initiatives of individuals to get out of crime and back on track. More than 24 cases were finished successfully and the goal is to support more than 50 initiatives every year (Municipality of Delft, 2017, p. 3). They clearly state that they also want the community to organize events aimed at the prevention of polarization and radicalisation (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). The municipality of The Hague does not consider this to be a priority in their counter-radicalisation policies. They mention that they sometimes support initiatives from citizens or societal organizations, but they do not get further into this in their counter-radicalisation policy (Municipality of The Hague, 2014). Overall, events aimed at the prevention of radicalisation and polarization in The Hague are initiatives from the municipality itself.

So, the relations between the municipality of The Hague and the societal organisations are not that strong and the municipality does not consider acknowledging and fostering initiatives to be a priority. Therefore, this thesis argues that the municipality of The Hague uses a hard approach when it comes to their counter-radicalisation policies. However, the municipality of Delft does have strong relations with their societal organisations and does consider acknowledging and fostering initiatives to be a priority. Thus, this thesis argues that the municipality of Delft uses a soft approach when it comes to their counter-radicalisation policies.

Model of integration of minorities

Integration is "the opposite of segregation, the bringing into equal membership of a common society those groups or persons previously discriminated against on racial or cultural grounds" (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 486). Rahimi and Graumans (2016, p. 33) state that when it comes to integration, "the lack of consensus regarding operational definition and measurement renders its usage and application, especially in national policies and strategies, problematic." According to Kymlicka, the rise of multiculturalism and integration was experienced by citizens as a part of a neoliberal whole (2015, 7): "they were told to extend equality to minorities, but the meaning of equality was being reduced and reinterpreted in a neoliberal form, as essentially equal access to (or perhaps better, equal exposure to) the competitive global marketplace" (Kymlicka, 2015, p. 8) The discourse on radicalisation also concerns how liberal Western democracies integrate, and relate to minorities (Lindekilde, 2012b, 110).

The Netherlands has created a model of integration of minorities in order to establish an inclusive society. The government promotes social cohesion and social stability through participation and integration of everyone with a migrant background (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2017). Their aim is to create a social, stable society, which means that people can participate without barriers, people can live together in variety and that everyone feels at home despite of his or her origin, religion or beliefs (Ibid.). In order to accomplish this, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment stimulates (using among other things financial instruments) the self-reliance and participation in society of migrants (Ibid.). In the period 2000-2015, integration was a much debated subject in society and politics and as a result the course of the national integration policy has shifted a number of

times (Klaver, Odé, Smit and Witkamp, 2016, p. II). This was accompanied by fluctuations in the available amount of money: approximately €123 million in 2000, €582 million in 2010 and €123 million in 2015 (Ibid.). The municipalities must give effect to the actual integration of migrants and accompany them through this process (VNG, 2016, p. 1).

The four biggest non-Western migrant groups in the Netherlands are first and second generation migrants of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin (Dagevos and Huijnk, 2016, p. 7). In a report on integration by the Social and Cultural Plan bureau, it is stated that their discomfort about their life and their possibilities in the Netherlands is increasing (Dagevos and Huijnk, 2016, p. 24). The bureau states that on the one side the level of education of migrants is increasing and their education results and control of the Dutch language are improving but on the other side they still have a disadvantage on the labor market and an overrepresentation in criminality (Ibid.) On both the national and the local level, policies have been developed to address these problems.

The models of integration of minorities of the municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague have small differences, but overall they are quite similar. Both want to include and connect their citizens and organizations, decrease discrimination and stimulate initiatives from citizens (Baldewsingh, 2015, p. 2 and Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 2). Another similarity is that both cities emphasize the importance of dialogue (Baldewsingh, 2015, p. 9 and Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 2), since they both have to deal with social unrest and/or tensions at times. Furthermore, in both cases, there are problems with the employment of migrants, who find it more difficult to find a job than non-migrants (Baldewsingh, 2015, p. 3 and Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 3), which needs to be addressed. Their main goals are the same.

The municipality of Delft wants to establish conditions in such a way that every citizen can chose his own course for his life (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 2), which is in line with neoliberal thinking. Furthermore, they want to make migrants feel welcome (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 4). The increasing number of migrants (see appendix 2) is accompanied by certain challenges. According to the municipality, results show that youth criminality in several migrant groups is out of proportion (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 3). The causes can mainly be found in the traditional authoritarian culture at home, which conflicts with the Netherlands, where (in the eyes of migrants) everything seems possible (Ibid.). The

municipality states that street culture, youth criminality and radical ideas have gotten intertwined in their city (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). This shows a link of the integration policies to the counter-radicalisation policies. One of the aspects of their integration policy is the addressing of youth criminality. Because of the decentralization of youth care, municipalities have quite some autonomy in deciding how they want to address certain issues (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 3). They have increased their control over the local youth and wellbeing facilities, which creates opportunities to better incorporate migrant organizations in their local policy. The municipality argues that by working together with these organizations, migrants get to know the youth facilities better and learn to trust them (Ibid.). By better involving migrants, the municipality hopes to make them more resilient, which is an important element of their counter-radicalisation policies. Delft recognizes that radicalisation and people travelling to Syria are serious problems and that their community needs to be resilient to resist this (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 2).

The municipality of The Hague more clearly states a link between their integration policies and their counter-radicalisation policies. According to them, the long-term solutions to prevent radicalisation and jihadism need to come from education, participation, emancipation and combatting unemployment (Bertram and Van Aartsen, 2014, p. 2), which are important aspects of their integration policy (Municipality of The Hague, 2017). Another aspect of their integration policy, that they expand on in their counter-radicalisation policy, is the involvement of different communities. A small number of initiatives from religious communities about distancing yourself from radicalisation are supported by the municipality (Bertram and Van Aartsen, 2014, p. 4). They consider their integration policy to be very important and therefore member of the municipal executive (wethouder) Rabin Baldewsingh (2015, p. 2) argues that “integration should be part of all the policy areas.”

These cases show that the model of integration of minorities does not explain the differences in the development of counter-radicalisation policies. Both municipalities have similar models of integration of minorities, but this has not resulted in similar counter-radicalisation policies.

Political orientation

There is no universal definition of the term political orientation. The dictionary Merriam-Webster (2017) defines orientation as “a usually general or lasting direction of thought, inclination or interest.” In this line, political orientation can be seen as an orientation that

characterizes the thinking of a certain nation, party or government. This is the definition of political orientation that will be used in this thesis. Sometimes assumptions are made because of the left- or right-orientation of a government. For example, it is often assumed that a right-wing government is less pro-immigration than a left-wing government (De Haas and Natter, 2015, p. 2). However, according to De Haas and Natter (2015, p. 2), "political negotiating, the influence of (particularly business and trade union) lobbies, as well as the international diffusion of policy trends may water down parties' preferences and lead to much more fuzzy policy outcomes at the government level."

Since 2010, the Netherlands has had a Prime Minister (Mark Rutte) from the VVD, which stands for People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, 2017). This party "believes that the government's role is important, although not central, and it is not a goal in itself. In other words, the VVD wants everyone to have equal opportunities for development but, at the same time, it believes that those who earn more through hard work and those who develop their talents or take more responsibility upon themselves, should be better rewarded" (Ibid.). Under the leadership of the Prime Minister, the government has established three main goals when it comes to counter-radicalisation: protecting the democracy and the rule of law, fight and weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands and removing the grounds for radicalisation (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014, p. 2).

From 2004 until 2016, Delft had a mayor from the VVD. The VVD Delft believes that the local authorities should be less involved (VVD Delft, 2014, p. 1) and that security is a joint responsibility of citizens, companies and the municipality (VVD Delft, 2014, p. 28). A link can be made between the ideas of the VVD Delft and the counter-radicalisation policies of the city. The idea that security is a joint responsibility can also be found in the counter-radicalisation policies of the municipality of Delft. The municipality is in control but also depends for an important part on other organizations such as the police, societal organizations and first line workers (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 9).

Since 2008, The Hague has a mayor from the VVD as well. The VVD The Hague wants The Hague to take the lead when it comes to the broad application of administrative measures in order to prevent radicalisation (VVD Den Haag, 2014, p. 2). They argue that municipalities should not hesitate to bring the rules into practice: revoke passports, refuse the new issuing of passports, stop social benefits (Ibid.). They state the following: "We must fight this hard. The

Hague is the international city of justice and peace. That should be carried out on the streets as well" (VVD Den Haag, 2014, p. 3). The municipality of The Hague has a similar view on how they will address the problems surrounding radicalisation. They state that "The Hague will act with force against those who are radicalizing or who set up groups against each other" (Municipality of The Hague, 2015b, p. 3). They have made multiple arrests and a number of people have been convicted. By using this tough approach, The Hague wants to set an example and discourage people from radicalizing (Kouwenhoven and Smithuijsen, 2016).

These cases show that political orientation is not a factor that explains the differences in the development of counter-radicalisation policies. Both Delft and The Hague have the same political orientation (a mayor from the VVD), but the counter-radicalisation policies still differ.

Civil society

Civil society is defined as "the totality of voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the structures of the state or the market" (Institute of Strategic Dialogue, 2010, p. 4). "Several states and multilateral organisations have recognized the important role that civil society actors can play in dealing with conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and thus in preventing and countering violent extremism" (Van Ginkel, 2012, p. 2). According to Van Ginkel (2012, p. 5), it makes a difference in counter-radicalisation policies what the local structure of civil society looks like (free, regulated, restricted). She claims it can be beneficial for states to cooperate with civil society and not restrict their activities (Ibid.). Furthermore, she (Van Ginkel, 2012, p. 10) states that, "policymakers within governments and international organisations would be well-advised to actively engage with civil society organisations by inviting them to participate in the debate on the regional challenges and possible solutions in all aspects of preventing and countering violent extremism." As discussed earlier, this seems to be happening more often in Delft than it does in The Hague. This could possibly be explained by the local structure of civil society.

Delft has a very active and closely connected civil society. In 2010, the municipality had a meeting with several community organisations and they argued that they wanted to be more involved in the policies of the municipality (Hooijdonk, 2010, p. 3). As a result, the municipality stated that (in dialogue with these organisations) they wanted to work towards a

more dynamic system, with open minds for new and changing arrangements for cooperation (Hooijdonk, 2010, p. 4) Sometimes they want to do this with a central and leading role for the municipality and in other cases the municipality stays more on the background in a network of private and public organisations (Ibid.). This cooperation component is also present in their counter-radicalisation policies in which they explicitly state that they need to work together with their civil society (Municipality of Delft, 2014b, p. 2). The creation of these policies has resulted in regular meetings. In cooperation with Bruggen Bouwen Delft, they organize one meeting every month to talk about a topic which is related to radicalisation (Bruggen Bouwen Delft, 2017). Multiple citizens, community organisations and religious organisations attend these meetings (Ibid.). Furthermore, the municipality has intensified its meetings with the local police with who they meet twice a week (Municipality of Delft, 2017, p. 2). It is possible to organize their policies in such a way, because of the small size of the city and number of community organisations.

The Hague has an active civil society as well, but their civil society seems to entail more organisations and is more fragmented. Whereas in Delft the different organisations seem to be closely connected to each other, this seems to be more difficult in The Hague. According to the municipality, the different (international) organisations, companies, expats and citizens need to get intertwined and the municipality wants to have a leading role in establishing this (City Council Municipality of The Hague, 2009, p. 2). The municipality is working towards a participation society and is trying to counter fragmentation (Klein, 2014, p. 1). However, they do not have meetings with community organisations on fixed moments like they do in Delft. They use close connections between individuals who occupy crucial positions when dialogue is needed (Municipality of The Hague, 2015, p. 8). Besides this, they do not organize meetings for citizens and community organisations on a regular base (Ibid.). Instead of working with organisations to counter radicalisation, the municipality of The Hague seems to be using community organisations to reach their goals. This way, the organisations receive an assignment of the municipality. This shows that the civil society in The Hague is regulated.

These cases show that the local structure of civil society affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies. The local structures of the civil societies of the municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague differ and these municipalities adjust their policies accordingly. So, the denser the relations between civil society and the municipality, the more the counter-radicalisation policy is likely to be preventative rather than purely coercive.

Conclusion

Because of the murder of Theo van Gogh and multiple terrorist attacks in other European countries, the Netherlands felt the need to develop a counter-radicalisation policy. Currently the threat level is substantial and the sense of security among citizens could be better. The municipalities were given an important role in this matter and had the space to develop their own counter-radicalisation policies in line with the national policy. Both The Hague and Delft had/have problems with radicalizing youngsters and were shocked by citizens travelling to Syria. In order to deal with this, they both established their own counter-radicalisation policies. Whereas Delft developed a soft approach, The Hague developed a tougher approach. This thesis examined what factors explain the differences in these policies.

Delft and The Hague both have their own models of integration of minorities. They want to include their citizens and connect them with multiple organizations and stimulate dialogue and initiatives among citizens. In both cases, elements of their model of integration can be found in their counter-radicalisation policies. Delft tries to include migrants, hoping that this will make them more resilient and thus keep them from radicalizing. The Hague puts the focus on participation, education and emancipation in their integration policy. According to them these are long-term solutions to prevent radicalisation. According to these municipalities, integration is an important aspect when it comes to preventing radicalisation. This aligns with the statement made by Rahimi and Graumans (2016, p. 33), that many see failed integration as the cause of violent radicalisation. However, even though these municipalities have similar models of integration of minorities, they do not have the same counter-radicalisation policies. As a result, this research rejects the first proposition, which states that the model of integration of minorities affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies.

The city of Delft and the city of The Hague both had a mayor from the VVD the last couple of years. The VVD Delft considers security to be a joint responsibility of citizens, companies and the municipality. This is also part of the counter-radicalisation policies of the municipality, which states that the municipality is in control but (societal) organizations, first line workers, etc. also play an important part. The VVD The Hague wants to fight radicalisation with force and in the counter-radicalisation policies of the municipality it is also stated that The Hague will act with force and they do not hesitate to make arrests. This is in line with the thinking of Sedgwick, who claims that political differences match differences in

the development of counter-radicalisation policies. This means that the same political orientation should lead to similar policies. However, even though these municipalities both have the same political orientation, their counter-radicalisation policies differ. As a result, this research rejects the second proposition, which states that political orientation affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies.

Delft and The Hague both have their own local structure of civil society. Delft is a small city with a number of community organisations that can be dealt with in a free manner. Therefore, Delft works closely together with these organisations when it comes to their counter-radicalisation policies. The municipality of Delft does not always have to take the lead in these cases. The Hague is a city that entails more community organisations. This municipality always wants to be in control and overall they seem to be using the community organisations more than they are working with them to carry out their counter-radicalisation policies. This aligns with the statement made by Van Ginkel that policymakers acknowledge the role civil society plays in counter-radicalisation policies. As a result, this research does confirm the last proposition, which states that the local structure of civil society affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies. The denser the relations between civil society and the municipality, the more the counter-radicalisation policies are likely to be preventative rather than purely coercive.

Thus, this research partly answers the question: “What factors explain the differences in how municipalities develop their counter-radicalisation policies?” The local structure of civil society is a factor that affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies and partly explains the differences between these policies. However, the model of integration of minorities and political orientation do not seem to play a role in the development of counter-radicalisation policies. Therefore, in order to get a better view on the differences between these policies, more research needs to be done. In future research, it would be useful if more factors and more municipalities were included. (Counter-) radicalisation is a difficult field to study but also a very interesting one which still entails many opportunities.

Bibliography

Association of Dutch Municipalities. (2016). Factsheet. Integratie en participatie voor gemeenten. Viewed via: https://vng.nl/files/vng/20161213-factsheet-integratie-participatie-gemeenten.pdf.

Baker-Beall, C., C. Heath-Kelly and L. Jarvis. (2015). *Counter-Radicalisation. Critical perspectives.* New York: Routledge.

Baldewsingh, R. S. (2015). Hoofdlijnenbrief Integratie. Viewed via: https://denhaag.raadsinformatie.nl/document/3342306/1/RIS280888%20Hoofdlijnenbrief%20integratie.

Bertram, A. W. H. and J. J. Van Aartsen. (2014). Hoofdlijnenbrief preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019. Viewed via: https://denhaag.raadsinformatie.nl/document/3316188/1/214RIS278115%20Hoofdlijnenbrief%20preventie%20polarisatie%2C%20radicalisering%20en%20jihadisme%202015-2019.

Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research. *Journal of Strategic Security,* 4, 4, 37-62.

Bruggen Bouwen Delft. (2017). Nieuws. Viewed via: https://sites.google.com/site/bruggenbouwendelft/.

City Council Municipality of The Hague. (2009). Voorstel van het college inzake "nota verleiden en verbinden", toekomst van de internationale stad Den Haag. Viewed via: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:-S0HJ_SumfYJ:denhaag.nl/web/wcbservlet/com.gxwebmanager.gxpublic.risbis.fileservlet%3Ffileid%3D5673729a-0785-49c6-a085-5c6a6e359711+&cd=3&hl=nl&ct=clnk&gl=nl&client=safari

Coppock, V. and M. McGovern. (2014). Dangerous Minds? Deconstructing Counter-Terrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the Psychological Vulnerability of Muslim Children and Young People in Britain. *Children and Society,* 28, 3, 242-256.

De Haas, H. and K. Natter. (2015). *The determinants of migration policies. Does the political orientation of governments matter?* Oxford: The International Migration Institute.

De Jonge, L. (2016). Gemeente Delft zwijgt over jihadisten. Viewed via: http://www.ad.nl/binnenland/gemeente-delft-zwijgt-over-jihadisten~a254ca16/.

Delft voor elkaar. (2016). Over ons. Viewed via: http://www.delftvoorelkaar.nl/over- ons/.

Dzhekova, R., N. Stoynova, A. Kojouharov, M. Mancheva, D. Anagnostou and E. Tsenkov. (2016). *Understanding Radicalisation. Review of the literature.* Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

Elshimi, M. (2015). De-radicalisation interventions as technologies of the self: a Foucauldian analysis. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 8, 1, 110-129.

European Urban Knowledge Network. (2016). Local approaches to prevent and counter radicalisation in cities in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Viewed via: http://www.eukn.eu/fileadmin/Files/EUKN_Documents/2016/EUKN_BackgroundPaper_Local_approached_against_radicalisation.pdf.

Feddes, A. R., L. Nickolson and B. Doosje. (2015). Triggerfactoren in het Radicaliseringsproces. *Expertise Unit Sociale Stabiliteit*, 1-123.

Heath-Kelly, C., C. Baker-Beall and L. Jarvis. (2015). Editors' introduction: neoliberalism and/as terror. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 8, 1, p. 1-14.

Hooijdonk, G. (2010). Brief maatschappelijk middenveld. Viewed via: http://ris.delft.nl/document.php?m=1&fileid=41003&f=2ee3318ee93082cb2ac6a9615b292bf1&attachment=0&c=21221.

Huijnk, W. and I. Andriessen. (2016). *Integratie in zicht? De integratie van migranten in Nederland op acht terreinen nader bekeken.* The Hague: Social and Cultural Planbureau.

Jongejan, D. and R. Salome. (2016). Van Aartsen wil gedwongen deradicalisering jihadisten. Viewed via: http://www.ad.nl/den-haag/van-aartsen-wil-gedwongen-deradicalisering-jihadisten~a9b7595e/.

Klaver, J., A. Odé, W. Smit and B. Witkamp. (2016). *Synthesestudie Beleidsdoorlichting Integratiebeleid*. Amsterdam: Regioplan Beleidsonderzoek.

Klein, K. (2014). Voortgangsrapportage Uitvoeringsprogramma Welzijn 2011-2014. *The Municipality of The Hague,* 1-5.

Kouwenhoven, A. (2014). Delft deed niets met melding moskee over Syriëgangers. Viewed via https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/07/05/delft-deed-niets-met- melding-moskee-over-syriegangers-a1423895.

Kouwenhoven, A. and D. Smithuijsen. (2016). Na twee zomers vol gedoe is het weer rustig in Den Haag. Viewed via https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/04/20/na- twee-zomers-vol-gedoe-is-het-weer-rustig-in-den-1612363-a4161.

Kymlicka, W. (2012). Neoliberal Multiculturalism? In Hall, P. A. and M. Lamont, *Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kymlicka, W. (2015). Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism. *Comparative Migration Studies,* 3, 17, p. 1-19.

Laiq, N. and E. B. Hearne. (2010). A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism. *International Peace Institute*, 1-20.

Lindekilde, L. (2012b). Neo-liberal Governing of "Radicals": Danish Radicalization Prevention Policies and Potential latrogenic Effects. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence,* 6, 1, p. 109-125.

Lindekilde, L. (2012a). Introduction: assessing the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies in northwestern Europe. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5, 3, 335-344.

Lister, M. and M. Otero-Iglesias. (2012). New problems, old solutions? Explaining variations in British and Spanish anti-terrorism policy. *Comparative European Politics,* 10, 5, 564-584.

Lozano, M. (2014). Inventory of the best practices on de-radicalisation from the different member states of the EU. Viewed via: http://www.terra-net.eu/files/nice_to_know/20140722134422CVERLTdef.pdf.

MacKinnon, D. and K. D. Derickson. (2012). From resilience to resourcefulness: A critique of resilience policy and activism. *Progress in Human Geography,* 37, 2, p. 253-270.

Merriam-Webster. (2017). Definition of orientation. Viewed via: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/orientation.

Ministry of Security and Justice. (2014b). *Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme. Overzicht maatregelen en acties*. The Hague: Ministry of Security and Justice.

Ministry of Security and Justice. (2014). *Handreiking aanpak van radicalisering en terrorismebestrijding op lokaal niveau*. The Hague: Ministry of Security and Justice.

Ministry of Security and Justice. (2016). Risico- en Crisisbarometer: Begrip en draagvlak voor veiligheidsmaatregelen. Viewed via https://www.nctv.nl/actueel/nieuws/2016/Risico-en-crisisbarometer-begrip-en-draagvlak-voor-veiligheidsmaatregelen.aspx.

Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. (2017). Rijksbegrotingsfasen. 13. Integratie en maatschappelijke samenhang. Viewed via: http://www.rijksbegroting.nl/2017/voorbereiding/begroting,kst225925_25.html.

Mueller, J. 2005. Discussion: Six rather unusual propositions about terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 487-505.

Municipality of Amsterdam. (2015). Aanscherping Aanpak radicalisering. Viewed via: https://amsterdam.raadsinformatie.nl/document/2171936/1.

Municipality of Delft. (2014). Nota zelforganisaties in relatie tot de sociale visie. Viewed via: http://ris.delft.nl/document.php?m=1&fileid=169858&f=4c5ddb1c123fd71381aee7852783f194&attachment=0&c=43195.

Municipality of Delft (2014b). Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme. Viewed via: http://ris.delft.nl/document.php?m=1&fileid=170656&f=31962a3916c7c0254e5d14f842a6905e&attachment=0&c=46147.

Municipality of Delft. (2015a). Een veilige stad maken we samen! Beleidskader veiligheid en handhaving 2015-2018. Viewed via: https://hetccv.nl/fileadmin/Bestanden/Onderwerpen/Veiligheidsplannen/delft_ivb_2015-2018.pdf.

Municipality of Delft. (2015b). Visie Polarisatie & Radicalisering. Gemeente Delft. Deel 1. Viewed via: https://media.delft.nl/pdf/Polarisatie_en_radicalisering/College_van_B&W_visie_polarisatie_&_radicalisering_en_Uitvoeringsprogramma_gewelddadig_jihadisme.pdf.

Municipality of Delft. (2016). Tussentijdse Informatie Voortgang Uitvoeringsprogramma Gewelddadig Jihadisme 2015-2019. Viewed via: http://ris.delft.nl/document.php?m=1&fileid=284416&f=fb543db49ef9488556e4a45a9759ea1f&attachment=0&c=61066.

Municipality of Delft. (2017). Beleidskader Veiligheid en Handhaving 2015-2018. Viewed via:http://ris.delft.nl/document.php?m=3&fileid=341593&f=3850d130a27f9f981a50048d944fdff0&attachment=0&c=64768.

Municipality of The Hague. (2017). Integratiebeleid gemeente Den Haag. Viewed via: https://www.denhaag.nl/en/residents/to/Integratiebeleid-gemeente-Den-Haag.htm.

Municipality of The Hague (2015b). Beleid Radicalisering en Polarisatie. Viewed via: https://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/wonen-en-bouwen/veiligheid/to/Radicalisering-en-polarisatie.htm.

Municipality of The Hague. (2015). Speerpuntenprogramma. Viewed via: https://denhaag.raadsinformatie.nl/document/3331578/1/RIS281554_Bijlage%20Uitvoeringsprogramma%20preventie%20polarisatie%2C%20radicalisering%20en%20jihadisme%202015-2019.

Mythen, G., S. Walklate and F. Khan. (2009). “I’m a Muslim, but I’m not a Terrorist: Victimization, Risky Identities and the Performance of Safety.” *The British Journal of Criminology,* 49, 6, 736-754.

National Coordination for Terrorism and Counter-terrorism. (2014). Handreiking aanpak van radicalisering en terrorismebestrijding op lokaal niveau. Viewed via: https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/handreiking-terrorismebestrijding%20voor%20gemeenten_tcm31-31657.pdf.

Omroep West. (2016). Tot nu toe 35 Haagse jihadisten vertrokken naar het Midden-Oosten. Viewed via: http://www.omroepwest.nl/nieuws/3240779/Tot-nu-toe-35-Haagse-jihadisten-vertrokken-naar-het-Midden-Oosten.

Policy Planners Network on Countering Radicalisation and Polarisation. (2010). The Role of Civil Society in Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation. Viewed via: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_xDkgvpaJOAJ:https://www.counterextremism.org/download_file/10/134/6/+&cd=4&hl=nl&ct=clnk&gl=nl.

Rahimi, S. and R. Graumans. (2016). Reconsidering the Relationship Between Integration and Radicalization. *Journal for Deradicalization,* 5, 28-62.

Rasheed, A. (2016). Countering the Threat of Radicalisation: Theories, Programmes and Challenges. *Journal of Defence Studies*, 10, 2, 39-76.

Ruiz, J. R. (2009). Sociological Discourse Analysis: Methods and Logic. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 10, 2, 1-30.

Rutte, M. (2016). Korte toespraak van minister-president Rutte in de Tweede Kamer naar aanleiding van de aanslagen in België. Viewed via: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/toespraken/2016/03/22/korte-toespraak-van-minister-president-mark-rutte-in-de-tweede-kamer-naar-aanleiding-van-de-aanslagen-in-belgie.

Schmid, A. P. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation : A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. Viewed via : http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/31064974/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1495713704&Signature=WJGZXJiPe4PtQz0bfMkDs00DJgQ%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DAlex_P._Schmid._Radicalisation_De-Radica.pdf.

Sedgwick, M. (2010). The Concept or Radicilization as a Source of Confusion. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22, 4, 479-494.

Sedgwick, M. (2011). Policies and research on radicalization in Scandinavia. Viewed via: http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/sedgqick-2011-policies-2/.

Silke, A. (2005). Fire of Iolus: The role of state countermeasures in causing terrorism and what needs to be done. In Tore Bjorgo (Ed.) *Root Causes of Terrorism*, p. 241- 255. Oxford: Routledge.

Slootman, M. and J. Tillie. (2006). Processes of Radicalisation. Why some Amsterdam Muslims become radicals. *Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam,* 1-129.

Van Aartsen, J.J. (2016a). Tot nu toe 35 Haagse jihadisten vertrokken naar Syrie en Irak. Viewed via: http://denhaagfm.nl/2016/09/18/tot-nu-toe-35-haagse-jihadisten-vertrokken-naar-syrie-en-irak/.

Van Aartsen, J.J. (2016b). Voortgangsbericht uitvoeringsprogramma aanpak polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2018. Viewed via: https://denhaag.raadsinformatie.nl/document/3408282/2/RIS293911_Voortgangsbericht_uitvoeringsprogramma_aanpak_polarisatie%2C_radicalisering_en_jihadisme_2015-2018.

Van Bijsterveldt, M. (2016). Tussentijdse informatie voortgang uitvoeringsprogramma Gewelddadig Jihadisme 2015-2019. Viewed via: http://ris.delft.nl/document.php?m=1&fileid=284416&f=fb543db49ef9488556e4a45a9759ea1f&attachment=0&c=61066.

Van Engelshoven, I. (2015). De aantrekkingskracht die het radicalisme op jongeren heeft is te vergelijken met die van jeugdbendes. Viewed via: http://denhaagfm.nl/2015/12/08/de-aantrekkingskracht-die-criminele-jeugdbendes-op-jongeren-hebben-is-te-vergelijken-met-die-van-het-radicalisme/.

Van Ginkel, B. (2012). Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism. Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Viewed via: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf.

Verkerk, B. (2014). Beantwoording schriftelijke vragen Onafhankelijk Delft inzake 'inzet van radicaliseringsexperts forum en expert Halim El Madkouri'. Viewed via: http://ris.delft.nl/document.php?m=1&fileid=154702&f=54c00aa92613eda31257c91e3f757bf0&attachment=0&c=46138.

Vidino, L. and J. Brandon. (2012). Countering Radicalization in Europe. Viewed via: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf.

VVD Delft. (2014). Delft verdient meer! Meer stad, minder overheid. Viewed via: https://delft.vvd.nl/uploaded/delft.vvd.nl/files/581cbd0446465/vvd-delft-verkiezingsprogramma-2014-2018.pdf.

VVD Den Haag. (2014). Voor jihadisme is geen plek in Den Haag. Viewed via: http://www.vvddenhaag.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Voor-jihadisme-is-geen-plek-in-Den-Haag.pdf.

VVD Internationaal. (2017). Who we are. Viewed via: https://international.vvd.nl/info/1113/who-we-are.

Young, B. (2011). Neoliberalism. In Berg-Schlosser, D. and B. Bertrand, *International Encyclopedia of Political Science.* London: Sage.

Appendix 1 (Baker-Beall et al., 2015, p. 18)



Articles mentioning radicalisation in 30 peer-reviewed journals.

Appendix 2 (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 4)

Nederlandse en buitenlandse etniciteit in Delft							
Jaar	1998	2000	2004	2008	2012	2015	2020
% inwoners Ndl etniciteit	79	76,5	73,5	71,1	68,5	66,7	65,3
% inwoners buitenl etniciteit	21	23,5	26,5	28,9	31,5	33,3	34,7
bron : 1998-2012 : GBA / 2015-2020 : prognose CBS							