


**Orchestration in International Governance: the case of the
India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum.**



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List of abbreviations.

BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CRA	Contingent Reserve Arrangement
G20	Group of 20
G20+	Group of 20 (developing nations)
G77	Group of 77
G8	Group of eight
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
IBSAMAR	India, Brazil South Africa Maritime
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organisation
MoU	Memoranda of Understanding
MTA	Multilateral Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDB	New Development Bank
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
P5	Permanent five
SACU	South Africa Customs Union
TRIPS	Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOSSC	United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation.
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Abstract.

In 2003 India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) formalised a dialogue forum regarding shared international political concerns, including democracy, personal freedom and human rights. By doing so they created a new global justice discourse shedding light on the North South divide. Since its creation IBSA has gained greater influence in the global political order by increasing their presence in global institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations. Acknowledging the difficulty of being accepted in large institutional councils (e.g. the UNSC) they have opted for a subtler approach and created diplomacy networks and steering committees. IBSA uses a soft power governance method known as orchestration to follow up on their founding document, the Brasilia Declaration. The IBSA initiative has sparked a new voice from the South which is challenging the current western dominance in international politics. The IBSA initiative aims to change the current course of international politics through international institutions. This article will delve into the method of orchestration and how IBSA uses it. This thesis will look at how IBSA uses orchestration theory to reach their goals.

Introduction.

The birth of the India, Brazil, South-Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum created new opportunities for middle powers in the Global South to voice their concerns about the global political system. The IBSA forum is based on the shared values of the three countries stemming from similar development situations. ‘Its creation recognised the necessity of a process of dialogue among developing nations and countries of the South to counter their marginalisation’ (IBSA). All three countries have traditionally been on the margins of North-defined international institutions and have been closely involved with third world nationalism (Vieira et. al., 509-510; 2011). However, they do respect the existing international order, as the Brasilia declaration states: “Respecting the rule of international law, strengthening the United Nations and the Security Council and prioritizing the exercise of diplomacy as means to maintain international peace and security” (Flemes, 402; 2009). An important part of the IBSA strategy is gaining influence on an international level through diplomacy and participation in international institutions. Through joining steering committees rather than aiming for top-decision making committees, IBSA aims to incorporate its values in the international system

in a multilateral way. “The principles, norms and values underpinning the IBSA Dialogue Forum are participatory democracy, respect for human rights, the Rule of Law and the strengthening of multilateralism” (IBSA). These values are largely based on the concerns of the global South relating to the North-South divide and the unfair balance of power in the international system. The middle power status which the three member countries enjoy, allows them to present themselves as representatives for other developing countries in the global south.

These ambitions in the global political system do not come easily. The IBSA forum has been struggling with obtaining international legitimacy, competition from other international coalitions (namely BRICS) and differences within the forum. The end goal is to change the current hegemony in the international system portrayed by the EU and the US. The forum aims to do this through soft- and institutional balancing strategies. In this, orchestration is used as the main form of global governance. Due to the financial crisis, which has affected the US and EU in much more intense ways than the IBSA member states, the global south has been able to develop from a third world status towards a global South. In this regard, its economic weight can prove to be of great importance in changing the global status quo. This thesis aims to investigate how IBSA uses orchestration theory to reach the goals it set out for itself in 2003. These goals include reform of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, and economic, social and environmental development. Ultimately these goals are drawn up in service of creating a greater voice for the Global South and moving influence away from the Northern hegemons (i.e. the US and EU) and towards the developing countries in the South. IBSA uses soft power and diplomatic bargaining as their main instruments to achieve their goals. Orchestration is an important mechanism in their strategies but is no panacea. This thesis will answer the following question: can IBSA create sustainable change in International Politics by using orchestration as main governance form, in order to increase the influence enjoyed by the Global South? This thesis will argue that IBSA has successfully implemented orchestration theory in a number of the issue areas stated in the Brasilia Declaration, mainly social equity, social inclusion and economic development. However, orchestration is less effective in shifting attention from the Global North towards the Global South, since UN reform is traditionally done by states and groups of states. Orchestration can be useful in creating leverage in intergovernmental negotiations in the United Nations. The thesis will be structured as follows: in chapter one a clear overview of the recent academic debate surrounding IBSA will be provided. Several scholars provide a different view as to whether IBSA is (still)

relevant. Chapter two will provide theoretical background and methodology. IBSA is rooted in institutionalism and multilateralism and relies on soft power. Orchestration theory will be broadly discussed in chapter two as it is the main form of governance used by IBSA. In chapter three the IBSA forum will be explained and contextualised. Its main 'competitor' BRICS will be explained and a case study between two financial development programs initiated by both dialogue forums will reveal the different relevance of both BRICS and IBSA. Chapter four will delve into the use of orchestration by IBSA, how the three countries are using it now and where it can be of importance in the future, mainly regarding the reform of the UNSC. Finally, some concluding remarks will be provided.

Chapter 1 - Literature Review.

The IBSA dialogue forum celebrated its 10-year anniversary in 2013. During its existence it has been a widely discussed subject in International Relations. This discussion ranges from the economic relevance of IBSA (Masters et. al.: 2015, Argawal: 2010, Taylor: 2009) to the regional impact IBSA has (Vieira et al., 2011, Rodrigues, 2016). Many aspects discussed by International Relations scholars are relevant to the goals IBSA ultimately wants to reach. Economic relevance relates to the soft power strategy the IBSA countries undertake, the BRICS take into question the legitimacy and relevance of the IBSA forum whilst simultaneously creating room for the expansion of the IBSA forum. In the following section a brief overview of the discussion on the IBSA forum in International Relations today is provided.

In 2008 the world had to deal with a financial crisis. In this, the Global North suffered far more gravely than the Global South¹. It was in this period that developing countries had the upper hand in the global financial market and developed their domestic economies to include a bigger middle class. Developing countries in the South and East were able to fill up the gaps in the world economy that were previously filled by the West before the crisis. Today, then, the middle class in developing countries is developing so quickly that it is far more interesting to focus on them, than for example the United States. Cross-regional cooperation, such as the IBSA forum, play an important role in this changing economic world order. Developing countries, and economic relations between them are increasingly shaping the global financial market and shifting away hegemony from traditional Western hegemons (Pieterse et al., 25-26; 2011). The rise of emerging societies marks a turn in globalisation and can ultimately lead to an emancipatory multipolarity. The question remains, however, whether these countries are merely joining the club, or are actually changing the world order.

Some authors argue that developing countries are indeed pushing for global reform in which the voice of the South is represented more equally (Pieterse et al. 2011; Flandes, 2009; Gray et al., 2016). The newly obtained position in the world order is used to reform institutions of global governance and increase development aid. The IBSA member states have pushed for the advancement of the Doha development round in order to prevent the reinforcement of Northern capacity to extract concessions from the weaker states in the South (Gray et al., 560;

¹ The term "South" or "Global South" refers to developing countries, which are located primarily in the Southern Hemisphere (UNDP definition). Consequently, the Global North are developed countries situated in the Northern Hemisphere.

2016). Furthermore, Southern countries are increasingly offering aid to developing countries which is changing the traditional North-South aid architecture. This also increased the influence the global South enjoys (Gray et al., 563; 2016).

Others argue that, even though developing countries are gaining increasing weight in the global order, it is far too early to argue that a New International Economic Order (NIEO)² is being developed. The IBSA forum is continuing a trend which can be seen from 1945 onward: a gradual self-assertion to the world stage by the south. However, this does not necessarily mean the Global South is changing the world order and pushing for a NIEO. Taylor rightly points out the existing problems in the IBSA initiative and argues that, although change can be witnessed, it is premature to point towards a NIEO. Taylor notes that unresolved political uncertainties within the forum will prevent it from leaving an impact. These ambiguities surround views on nuclear weapons, non-alignment, regional development programs such as South-Africa's role in NEPAD³ and the issue of the UN security council seats. These uncertainties need to be addressed before IBSA can move forward (Taylor, 52; 2009). Furthermore, creating a Southern trade geography will be less easy than one might presume due to the regional multilateral trade agreements (MTA) IBSA has to take into account. Examples are Mercosur in Latin America and SACU in Africa. These MTA's do not permit members to set up free trade agreements without the benefits being extended towards the members of the MTA. Consequently, extending a Southern trade geography will stimulate regional disapproval (Taylor, 53; 2009). A third problem Taylor highlights is the focus IBSA lies on state centric globalisation. Globalisation is, as Taylor argues, "characterised by the increasing importance of non-state actors and the transnationalisation of capital, where markets are increasingly global and integrated, allowing an internationalised ownership of capital and the transit of capital in and out of any number of corporations and territories" (34; 2009). The IBSA members do not seem to recognize this shift and still perpetuate the illusion that state leaders are the most central actors, disregarding the reality that foreign and strategic policies need to be understood in the context of transformations in the political economy (Taylor, 54; 2009).

² The New International Economic Order of the 1970's was a push by Southern elite fractions to establish the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The UNCTAD has at times positioned an alternative global vision vis-à-vis dominant global powers of that time (Taylor, 46; 2009).

³ New Partnership for Africa's Development. Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) and Omega Plan for Africa combined to give birth to a third initiative the New African Initiative (NAI) which then led to the establishment of NEPAD in 2001 (<http://www.nepad.org/content/about-nepad#aboutourwork>).

Vanaik goes even further in arguing that there is a shift in global power towards a quintet led by the US, directly diverting attention away from Southern development powers such as IBSA. The quintet is made up by the US, the EU, Russia, China and India. Its workings will be informal and revolve around the USA as the chief coordinator and bilateral transmitter. The states system must provide necessary stabilising mechanisms in order to prevent competition among capitals to become system threatening. Southern rising powers cannot contribute to stabilising the international system because they lack sufficient measure in either demographic, economic and/or military weight. The positive impact of India's economic growth is lower than one might expect. For example, growth rates in India are a result of a 'boom' in the service sector. About 60% of India's population still depends on agriculture and related activities for its livelihood.

Other authors take a middle road and argue that developing countries are indeed 'joining the club' of international institutions, but are also aiming to change the nature of these institutions towards a more South-oriented world image. Stephen, for example, argues that the IBSA states have spoiling, integrating and balancing effects. In the area of trade IBSA aims to redistribute towards developing countries. It is unlikely, however, that "the redistributive aspirations of the rising regional powers are [...] subsumed by hegemonic imposition" (Stephen, 300). This means that, although not overthrowing current hegemony, it does constitute balancing practices against the current, Northern, vision on international trade. Furthermore, Stephen argues that in the monetary area the IBSA states are not necessarily balancing but rather opt for intergovernmental cooperation and regulation in order to limit development-unfriendly instability in global finance. In that sense they are 'joining the club' to try to change its view from within. Lastly, Stephen points towards the area of security, arguing the IBSA states want to be integrated and co-opted within security institutions (i.e. the United Nations). The different standpoints IBSA takes in different areas of global governance show that there is a combination in active balancing and active co-optation in the global political order.

From the discussion surrounding the IBSA forum it is clear that developing powers from the global South are working together to create change in the current global order. The IBSA forum is the subject of this thesis, but other forums have been vital in Southern development too. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa (BRICS) have held several summits concerning developing countries' issues and the Group of Twenty (G20) has brought developing countries to the table that was once reserved for the Group of Eight (G8). In light

of these newly formed partnerships a discussion has formed regarding the relevance of the IBSA forum. On the one hand it is argued that the IBSA forum is no longer relevant because it has too many overlapping points with the BRICS summit (Doyaili, 2013, Kornegay 2012; Sidiropoulos, 2013). No doubt, IBSA has lost its spot in the spotlight since the emergence of BRIC, later BRICS, in 2009. This takes into question the relevance of the IBSA forum since all the IBSA member countries are also a member of the BRICS partnership. The addition of Russia and China has given BRICS more weight than IBSA will ever carry due to 'super power' statuses that are enjoyed by the two countries. This has even led to one Indian envoy taking into question the relevance of IBSA (Kornegay, 1; 2012). The new emphasis on BRICS has shifted focus away from the IBSA forum. Statements of intent by IBSA have remained unfulfilled and working groups in the forum have not been able to show progress, even leading to their reduction (Doyaili et al., 301; 2013). Some authors even note that China has brought South-Africa in the BRICS forum in order to demote IBSA as a multilateral organisation (Panda, 299; 2013). Sidiropoulos points out that IBSA is slowly losing legitimacy since "the efficacy of informal clubs is measured as much by their perceived legitimacy as by their contribution to the advancement of public goods and their impact on addressing global politico-security, economic and development challenges. If IBSA becomes a sub-category of BRICS in these domains, it will be lost in the cacophony of club acronyms" (288; 2013). This does not necessarily mean that IBSA should dissolve; it can find several niches in which it can stand out as a cooperative forum. Sidiropoulos goes on to argue that IBSA can differentiate itself through developing a stronger caucus within BRICS, treat each body as distinct and lastly to extend its membership in order to escape the characterisation of being assimilated into BRICS.

Daniel Flesmes argues that, for IBSA to remain relevant, the forum should institutionalise. In international relations, international institutions and international organisations are a widely discussed subject. The Handbook of International Relations by Carlsnaes et al. provides an apt definition of institutions as 'sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other' (Carlsnaes et al., 328; 2013). International organisations are defined as 'associations of actors, typically states' (Ibid, 329). These associations have membership criteria, and membership may entail privileges as well as costs. International organisations can thus embody institutions, such as the United Nations. Flesmes argues that the IBSA member states can use their economic weight in their advantage by institutionalising trade relations. South-South trade constitutes a large part of the overall world trade and is an ever expanding branch of the world economy. Institutionalising economic

relations will provide a market of 1.2 billion people which can lead to 400 million dollars in foreign trade (Flemes, 19; 2007). Furthermore, the sharing of expertise and best practices between the three countries can help ameliorate the issue areas the troika has settled upon. Managing this, however, will be more difficult than one might think. Differing degrees of economic internationalisation and geographical factors need to be overcome to establish sustainable institutions between the three member states.

On the other hand, scholars have argued that IBSA is still relevant as a standalone forum because certain focus points IBSA upholds vary greatly from those of the BRICS summit. It is these points the IBSA forum has to focus on (Arkhangelskaya, 2011; Stuenkel, 2014). Arkhangelskaya has written an article comparing BRICS and IBSA and assessing whether they are rivals or allies. She argues that an effective dialogue between the two groupings could be more effective than their integration. The BRICS countries have an economic priority rather than the developmental, political co-operation and integration priorities IBSA has. In this regard the BRICS grouping and IBSA do not compete with each other, but also cannot substitute each other. An important difference between the IBSA forum and BRICS is their mode of government. All three IBSA members are multiparty democracies allowing them to discuss certain topics (e.g. human rights, civil society, reform implementation) which the BRICS summits avoids (Struenkel, 2012). Kornegay furthermore highlights IBSAMAR (IBSA Maritime) as IBSA's ticket out of 'oblivion in the sweepstakes of geostrategic relevance' (2; 2012). IBSAMAR is the body of the IBSA troika which brings together the maritime fleets of the member countries to execute exercises. In this regard IBSA has the upper hand in the sense that BRICS can never replicate a similar security body. "The Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic represent IBSA's comparative strategic advantage as a complementary geopolitical factor in the BRICS equation which neither China nor Russia can claim" (Kornegay, 1; 2012). The majority of the works published on the relevance of the IBSA forum focusses on the reinvention of IBSA. Its relevance is barely doubted, but its need to focus on reinventing its agenda points and values are a common feat in many articles.

Developing the Global South towards a more active global player remains a necessary project. Both IBSA and BRICS are working on making an influential Global South a fact. IBSA uses different strategies to reach their goal than BRICS and can employ its influence in certain niches to remain relevant. It can actively contribute to the reform of global politics and relies on increasing soft power to do so. The increase in soft power stems from the use of

Orchestration theory by IBSA. The next section will set out on the theoretical background of IBSA and what orchestration theory entails.

Chapter 2 - Theory and methodology.

In order to answer the research question posed in the section above it is first necessary to set out a methodology and theoretical foundation. This thesis is based on relevant academic literature in the field of International Relations and International Politics. Drawing on the work of renowned scholars such as Jönsson (2001), Keohane (1990) and Ruggie (1992) institutionalism and multilateralism will be discussed, in order to better understand the nature of the IBSA dialogue forum. To understand the strategy that IBSA takes in International Politics it is important to understand different notions of Power in International Relations. Especially Soft power, as developed by Joseph Nye (2004), is an important factor in IBSA strategy. Soft power is also the basis of the governance method which suits IBSA's strategy best, namely: orchestration. Developed mainly as a strategy for International Organisations by Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, orchestration uses a soft and indirect approach to governance. It is especially relevant to IBSA's strategy, due to its soft nature and large potential in gaining international political influence. The next sections will look at the relevant theories surrounding IBSA to create a strong theoretical foundation. In order to substantiate the importance of orchestration, discourse analysis will be used. Furthermore, a case study will be provided which covers IBSA and BRICS (arguably IBSA's biggest rival) and a comparison between the IBSA Facility for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger (IBSA fund) and the New Development Bank (NDB, created by the BRICS countries). The focus of this thesis is on IBSA, because it uses a different strategy to shift the current global order towards the Global South. No other international institution or organisation uses soft power and diplomacy to the same extent as IBSA does. It is therefore an interesting case worthy of researching in the light of global political change. The following section will expand on the theories relevant to IBSA. Chapter three will expand on IBSA itself and contrast it with the BRICS initiative. Chapter four will investigate to what extent IBSA is using orchestration and where it can use orchestration to reach the goals IBSA has set out for itself.

In an academy which has, for a long time, been defined by realism it is rather difficult to create notions of institutionalism. After all, it would seem strange for a state to give up its sovereign power in order to co-operate with other states. In an anarchic world order, such as the realist tradition claims, it is not wise to agree to a set of rules, as this will negatively affect the power a state holds. Up until the 1970s, therefore, institutionalism remained atheoretical in nature. With influences from economics and political sciences, however, a broader theoretical

understanding of institutions came to be (Jönsson et al., 2001; 3). The notion of institution also changed, differentiating institutions from organisations; the former being an entity and the latter a set of rules (Martin et al. in Carlsnaes et al., 326; 2013). New interest in the theoretical side of institutions produced different approaches to the study of those institutions. As developed by Keohane, neoliberal institutionalism claims that ‘international relations would be unintelligible without some degree of institutionalization, because they would lack shared expectations and understandings, and that variation in the commonality, specificity, and autonomy of institutions will affect the constraints and incentives facing states and will therefore exert impacts on state behaviour in world politics’ (734; 1990). It therefore differs from neorealism, on which it is based, in that it denies that states constantly search for relative gains. On the other hand, rational choice institutionalism argues that utility-maximizing actors, in this case states, act out of self-interest and form central actors in the political process. Institutions are a product of their interdependence, strategic interaction and collective action. Institutions emerge and survive because they fulfil important functions for the actors involved (Jönsson et al., 5; 2001).

A more cultural approach to institutionalism can be found in historical institutionalism. It is not per se a calculated move to engage with an institution, but rather a result of shared world views. Institutions therefore provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action. Historical institutionalism allows for historic contingencies and focusses on path dependency which ultimately leads to the persistence of institutions. Closely related to historical institutionalism is normative institutionalism. The latter theory places attention on norms and values rather than historical background or self-interested strategic calculations. Institutions thus constrain individual choice and apply a logic of appropriateness in world politics. The latter is often conflicting with the logic of consequences, ultimately taking appropriate actions is less attractive to states than taking the actions that have the most positive outcome (Jönsson et al., 5-6; 2001).

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a period of accelerated globalisation. With unprecedented gains in economic growth and interconnectivity also came a negative side. Irregular migration, the rise of international terrorism and organized crime, food and energy insecurity and climate change. These challenges can no longer be faced by each country individually and states became interdependent (Rüland, 84; 2011). This is one of the underlying reasons why the IBSA initiative was brought to life. A cooperation between three states which aim to alter the world’s political order. This cooperation can be classified as multilateralism

and is thus an important aspect in understanding the structure the IBSA initiative has taken. Multilateralism can be defined in several different ways and over the years the definition has changed. Robert Keohane defined it in 1990 as ‘the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions’ (731). This leaves the meaning of multilateralism to a broad spectrum of possibilities. Nowadays, under Keohane’s definition, almost all international relations are multilateral. Ruggie expands the definition after concluding that Keohane’s definition remains too nominal and lacks a qualitative dimension. He defines multilateralism as ‘an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of "generalized" principles of conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence’ (571; 1992). Ruggie’s definition is much more specific in that it adds conditions in which multilateralism must take place. It is no longer merely the co-ordination of national policies of three or more states because those states will have to agree on certain principles of conduct. These principles of conduct create a framework in which the three states can co-ordinate their relations and can act on certain situations knowing it is done in the best interest of all three countries, rather than just one. Dent expands on the definition by Ruggie and introduces the concept of a Multilateral Utility. ‘A multilateral utility makes proactive contributions to global multilateral forums “to foster stability, peace, prosperity, and equality in the global system”, “empowers relevant institutions at the international system” and thwarts actors undermining the multilateral order’ (Rüland quoting Dent, 85; 2011).

For multilateralism to exist there must first be a certain degree of institutionalisation. Both Keohane and Ruggie emphasize the importance of institutions in multilateralism, for it is through institutions that the co-ordination is achieved and principles of conduct can be agreed upon. IBSA can be regarded as an international institution, regardless of the degree of formal institutionalisation. As pointed out above, a broad institutionalist view can allow for an international network to be classified as international institution, through a shared world view or shared norms and values. As Husar points out, IBSA can furthermore be classified as a multilateral utility, since it is contributing proactively to multilateral forums through ‘its capacity to increase the level of information, reduce transaction costs and strengthen the cohesion among the three members’ (Husar, 21; 2016). Within the scope of multilateralism, several authors have referred to the IBSA partnership as trilateralist. In the latter, the three member states put their own advancement before South-South solidarity. The two,

multilateralism and trilateralism, do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive, as Graham points out. 'IBSA is a trilateral forum within a multilateral system and also fits well with the concept of shallow multilateralism' (Graham, 412; 2011). In this, shallow multilateralism must be understood as commitment up to providing aid, information and consultation, but no 'deeper' commitment than that. Trilateralism, in the case of IBSA, can be combined with multilateralism because many of the issues that concern IBSA are shared by all three countries. This means that by acting in common, the three member states also act out of self-interest. By creating a multilateral alliance with countries that have similar international interest, developing countries are able to increase their visibility, voice and decision making-power through institutions.

Having established what IBSA is engaged in, it is now wise to look into different theories of how such partnerships can project power and reach the goals that have been set out. A major topic in International Relations is the concept of Power. It is at the heart of IR because it determines whether a state, or group of states, will have their desires fulfilled. An international institution, a multilateral cooperation or a trilateral partnership are all forms of constraining power or collectivising power in order to balance against a state with more power. In the case of IBSA, the concept of soft power is most important.

Joseph Nye, developed the notion of 'soft power'. 'This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them' (Nye, 5; 2004). This means that countries can gain power over other countries not only by military or economic might, but also by active involvement in institutions, a projection of norms and values and development aid and peacekeeping. However, soft power is different than influence. Influence can also have its roots in hard power mechanisms such as threats or payments. Soft power, on the other hand, is attractive power and its resources are those that produce attraction. Soft power is thus an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values (Nye, 7; 2004). It seems abundant to state that the three member states of the IBSA forum share the same values and recognize the duty to contribute to those values. The question is not whether the three states share those values, but how they attract the rest of the world to share those values and, consequently, increase their soft power. With soft power as a strategy, the IBSA forum engages with world politics in order to increase the voice of the global south. The main form of governance for IBSA is soft power, which can best be explained by the theory of orchestration. In international governance there are several theories on how international institutions and international organisations (IOs) can operate. Abbott et

al. aptly define four types of governance modes which help to understand the importance of orchestration, first as a mode of governance in general and, later, as form of governance for IOs. The latter is important to understand the use of orchestration for an international institution such as IBSA.

Firstly, Abbott et al. describe a hard and direct form: hierarchy. In hierarchy the state promulgates mandatory, enforceable rules which apply directly to the target actors. These rules are backed by the state's monopoly of legitimate physical violence. These rules directly apply to the targeted agents, which makes hierarchy both a hard and direct form of governance (8, 2015). Secondly, Abbott et al. describe delegation, a form of governance which is hard, but indirect. Target agents are addressed indirectly, because the governor uses a third party to enforce rules or manage policy. It remains a hard form of governance, however, because the governor has formal legal control over the third party to which it delegated its tasks (9; 2015). The third mode of governance described is collaboration. This concerns a governance mode which is soft and at the same time direct. It uses ideational and material inducements instead of obligation and coercion to reach target agents. States and other governors collaborate with target agents to promote self-regulation rather than top-down state regulations. This, then, requires target actors to voluntarily abide by regulation, making it a soft form of governance. It is a direct form of governance, because no third party is used by the governor to address its targets (Ibid.). Lastly, states engage in a form of governance which is both soft and indirect: orchestration. Abbott et al. define it as follows: 'Orchestration is a mode of governance in which one actor (the orchestrator) enlists one or more intermediary actors (the intermediaries) to govern a third actor or set of actors (the targets) in line with the orchestrator's goals' (224, 2015). Orchestration is an indirect governance strategy because it uses intermediaries to govern targets. The governor does not firmly control its intermediaries and must therefore enlist their voluntary cooperation, making it a soft form of governance (10, 2015).

It must be noted that, in practice, these forms of governance are not as clear cut as they appear here. There are forms of '(in)directness' and 'hardness'. This is to say that the hard-soft and direct-indirect categories should be 'regarded as the extreme points of continua' (Ibid.). Collaboration, for instance, might slowly evolve into orchestration when governments promote the creation of professional associations which can act as middlemen between government and target. Furthermore, orchestration may lead to delegation, when orchestrators gain stronger control over intermediaries. Forms of ideational support can ultimately be the only reason for an intermediary to exist, granting the government more control than the private states of an

intermediary would originally have suggested. Having set out the general scope of forms of governance, it is wise to put them in an international scope.

Internationally, many trans-border problems must be solved through collective action. Multiple actors can benefit from collective action, unfortunately it often proves difficult to come to an arrangement or, once made, to stick to the arrangement. Two forms of governance can, then, offer a solution. The first is hierarchical in nature (resembled above by the two hard forms of governance: hierarchy and delegation), where one state has enough power to impose a solution. In a hierarchical situation, as it remains international politics, participation in an initiative remains voluntary. However, transnational governance can sometimes be established in a hierarchical manner. Examples are delegation from states to IOs or to private 'global governors' (Hale, 63; 2015). The second is a horizontal solution (represented above by the two soft forms of governance: collaboration and orchestration). In a horizontal solution 'actors must [...] strive to find a cooperative solution, bargaining with each other and establishing governance mechanisms that can resolve the issue' (Hale, 62; 2013). This also includes entrepreneurial governance (i.e. collaboration of firms and NGOs to set and enforce standards) and sub-state bottom-up transnational governance (i.e. elements of national bureaucracies and local/regional governments cooperating with peers across borders).

Orchestration is, then, a form of horizontal governance often used by IOs and states. Orchestration is of particular value to IOs, because pursuing hard and direct modes of governance is relatively more difficult for IOs than, for instance, states. IOs do not have the same capacity to enforce the rules they set. IOs do not have authority to govern states hierarchically through binding international law and are constrained by states jealous of IO intervention in domestic governance. Orchestration can help IOs in two ways: it can 'manage states' and it can 'bypass states'. The first can be achieved by 'enlisting intermediaries to shape state preferences, beliefs and behaviour in ways that enhance state consent to and compliance with [IO] goals, policies and rules' (Abbott et al., 11; 2015). This way, IOs can move away from their status as agents controlled by state principals, towards guiding the behaviour of states through intermediaries. Bypassing states can be attained by 'enlisting intermediaries to influence the conduct of private actors, or to supply public goods to private targets, without state intermediation' (Ibid.). This way, IOs reduce their impingement on domestic authority and create a domestic base of support through their intermediaries, reducing the likelihood of states blocking them (Abbott et al., 12; 2015). Orchestration, however, is not reserved for IOs alone. States also make use of the governance strategy in international politics. When a

collective action problem regarding the initiation or operation of a governance program is difficult for transnational actors to solve alone, a public actor can assist in the process by using its sphere of influence in the private sector (Hale, 64; 2015). These public actors can be (sub)state and non-state actors such as ministries, public authorities, civil society, cities, private actors, et cetera (Klingebl, 3; 2015).

IOs and states can draw upon a wide range of intermediaries. The most likely intermediaries are NGOs and other civil society organisations, because they can be located according to shared goals and similar substantive agendas. Furthermore, they often control key governance resources and are often viewed by governments as less threatening and intrusive than IOs. Trans-governmental networks are also a viable intermediary. Such networks have the ability to manage or bypass the upper political echelons of national governments. A third intermediary option is business organisations. Although often the target of orchestration, they can be used as intermediaries for their great resources, independence from national regulators and, their lack of fear of political repercussions due to their market actor status. Transnational partnerships also act as intermediaries, both public-private and private-private. The formation of partnerships is often encouraged by IOs to advance more effective, results-oriented implementations of their agendas. Lastly, international organisations themselves can be intermediaries. For example the World Health Organisation (WHO) which uses UNICEF as an intermediary (Abbott et al., 12-14; 2015).

In orchestration material and ideational support are most important in reaching desired goals. It is a soft approach and intermediaries must participate on a voluntary basis. In order to guarantee the support and participation of intermediaries an orchestrator can implement several techniques. IOs often have a large network within government domains which they can use to empower actors and organisation. This convening power sometimes results in the creation of new intermediaries. In addition, agenda setting can mobilise potential intermediaries. IO agenda setting can provide cognitive and normative guidance which can influence intermediaries' priorities and strategy. It can also steer donors into prioritising spending on intermediaries. A more straightforward technique is assistance in the form of material support such as finance or administrative resources. The same goes for endorsement, a relatively simple, yet effective, technique. By endorsing intermediaries, IOs and states can legitimize them and can formally recognize their activities. Lastly, coordination is an important technique, as it can increase the impact of intermediaries. Synchronizing activities can enhance the effectiveness of intermediaries (Abbott et al., 14-16; 2015).

IBSA is a multilateral institution consisting of three different states. This is a structure that is rarely discussed in orchestration theory. It does lend itself to orchestration as it shares many of its traits. IBSA must use soft power to increase its influence in global politics and in order to increase their share of soft power, orchestration is a viable strategy. Since orchestration itself uses a soft governance approach and uses intermediaries to reach targets, IBSA can vastly expand its network of influence in international politics by expanding cooperation with intermediaries. It has readily available the techniques which promote support and participation of these intermediaries. In the case of IBSA, the target would be the UN general assembly member states and, more specifically, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). They, ultimately, control the level of influence the Global South has and control the reform of the UNSC. How IBSA operates, what they have achieved, where their main competition comes from, how IBSA uses orchestration at the moment and how it can ameliorate in the future will be set out in the next two sections.

Chapter 3 - Putting IBSA in perspective.

South-South cooperation.

On 6 June 2003 the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Celso Amorim and Yashwant Sinhatree, respectively the three Foreign Ministers from South-Africa, Brazil and India, came together after trilateral talks during the 29th G8 summit in Evian, France. The purpose for the meeting was to formalize a new trilateral developmental initiative between the three states. During the meeting the Brasilia declaration was created, which marked the official start of what is known as the IBSA dialogue forum. It is the product of the shared views of all three states on influencing change in the global political economy and the promotion of South-South cooperation (Graham, 414; 2011). The creation of IBSA and BRICS lies in a broader South-South cooperation history. The United Nations office for South-South cooperation (UNOSSC) defines it as:

‘a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains. Involving two or more developing countries, it can take place on a bilateral, regional, sub regional or interregional basis. Developing countries share knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts’ (UNDP).

South-South cooperation began with the Bandung conference in 1955 which founded the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (da Silva et al., 172; 2016). In 1964 the group of 77 (G77) became the largest coalition of developing countries within the United Nations. This led to the creation of the UNOSSC in 1974 (UNDP). More recently, however, South-South cooperation became more important in the light of economic development. Emerging economies formed small developing country groups, such as the G8, that ‘identified themselves as defenders of the objectives and interests of the South’ (da Silva et al., 175; 2016). However, the post-Cold War uncertainty that marked the 1990s caused a significant loss of momentum in South-South cooperation. Not until 2003, with the creation of the G20+ and IBSA, was the southern cause reinvigorated.

IBSA

The IBSA initiative was a new approach, different from the traditionally large groups of countries. In the words of Foreign Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim:

“Having gone through, in my previous experience as a diplomat and foreign minister, so many failed attempts of establishing such groups, but still recognizing the validity of my colleague’s (and, later on, also my friend’s) concern, I suggested we should try something relatively simple: a small group – only three countries – one in each continent of the South, all of them vibrant multi-ethnic, multicultural democracies, with an ever-increasing role in the world: India, South Africa and Brazil. Thus the idea of creating what came to be known as IBSA was born.” (231; 2010)

The Brasilia declaration of 2003 stated the special consideration by all three states for International Law, the strengthening of the UN and exercising diplomacy as the main way to achieve international peace and security. The main concerns stated in the declaration are the need to reform the UN, especially the Security Council, the new threats to security – such as, but not limited to: terrorism, transnational organized crimes and threats to public health – and the need for promotion of social equity and inclusion. On an economic note, the declaration states the intend to promote social and economic development through greater cooperation among their countries and recognize the need to reform the Global Political Economy through, *inter alia*, completing the Doha round of negotiations. Furthermore, the Rio Conference and its Agenda 21, the Millennium Summit and the Monterrey and Johannesburg Summits, and the Program for the Implementation of Agenda 21 are mentioned in the declaration and are emphasized upon, in that they ‘contain fundamental guidelines to orient the action of their governments and cooperation initiatives’ (Brasilia Declaration, 2003). In 2006 the first IBSA summit was held during which the Brasilia Declaration was signed by the three countries’ prime ministers.

Since 2003 the IBSA dialogue forum has developed into concrete measures taken in international politics. Politically, IBSA has seen successful cooperation on TRIPS (Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) and access to medicine. Furthermore, IBSA has successfully coordinated ‘the founding, maintenance and even leadership of the G20+ in the run-up to the WTO negotiations in Cancún, in 2003’ (Husar, 10; 2016). Such successes nurture the image of IBSA as the leader of the South. One important point in the Brasilia Declaration was the reform of the UN Security Council. Pushing for reform trilaterally has been difficult however, because of internal competition amongst African Union member states and the reluctance of other developing countries to support IBSA in taking a leading role in the UNSC. Ultimately, reform was vetoed by the Security Council, but IBSA did manage to secure a temporary seat from 2011-2012. Lastly, the IBSA states have taken a joint stance in the issue surrounding the Middle-East, especially Palestine. The foreign ministers met with the prime minister of Palestine on the side-lines of the 2010 IBSA summit in Brasilia and issued a joint

declaration on the situation in the Middle-East, which was followed up by annual declarations of IBSA foreign ministers (Husar, 10-12; 2016). Another important achievement was established in March 2004. The IBSA Facility for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger (the IBSA Fund) became operational in 2006 and offers developmental aid to projects in the poorest of countries. Another important achievement for the IBSA dialogue forum is political in nature.

The forum has established working groups, signed co-operation agreements, fostered collaboration on research issues of common interest and helped to build business partnerships (Mokoena, 131; 2007). In total, 16 working groups⁴ have been established in order to explore the potential of coordination between ministries. The work groups have resulted in several memoranda of understandings (MoU) (Husar, 12; 2016). Besides the working groups there are seven people-to-people fora⁵ ‘which reflect the interest of the three Member States in improving interaction and relations between Government and grass-root levels so that IBSA is not only restricted to Government efforts’ (IBSA). Other, more tangible, outcomes of the IBSA initiative include the IBSA nanotechnology initiative, the IBSA Virtual Centre and joint naval exercises under IBSAMAR.

BRICS

In 2001, Jim O’Neill coined the acronym BRICs (note the small ‘s’) in a paper discussing the world economic situation regarding large developing countries Brazil, Russia, India and China (3). At that point, there was no intention of creating a multilateral alliance born out of the need for reform and management of international financial systems (Sakar, 128; 2014). However, the acronym got traction in economics and, later on, in International relations. In 2011, with the inclusion of South Africa, the small ‘s’ was replaced with a large S and the BRICs became BRICS. The casus O’Neill brought to the attention of economists everywhere was indeed a very interesting one. The four countries had experienced rapid economic growth during the 1990s which gathered momentum in the early 2000s. Many multinational companies would implement BRICs business strategies and business schools around the world would launch courses set up around the BRICs idea (Liu, 443; 2016).

In 2006 political dialogue within the BRICS format started to take shape. The foreign ministers met at the Sixty-First UN General Assembly and initiated a regular informal

⁴ Agriculture; Culture; Defence; Education; Energy; Environment; Health; Human Settlements; Public administration ;Revenue Administrations; Science and Technology; Information Society; Social Development; Trade and Investment; Tourism; Transport and Infrastructure.

⁵ Academic Forum; Business forum; Tri-Nation summit on small business; Editor’s forum; Local Governance forum; Parliamentary forum; Women’s forum.

diplomatic coordination, with annual meetings of Foreign Ministers at the margins of the General Debate of the UN General Assembly (Liu, 444; 2016). In June 2008 the four BRICs leaders had short meeting at the G-8 summit in Japan where they decided to organise the first full-scale summit the next year. In the meantime, BRICs was routinely described as an 'informal group' and the countries held a 15 percent share of the world economy (Stuenkel, 3; 2014). The first BRICs summit was held in Yekaterinburg on 16 June 2009. It was in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis which had all the major Western powers in deep economic recession. The global South was able to avoid the financial crisis, which had somewhat eroded the triumph of capitalism in the Western world. This in turn allowed for the developing countries to step up and shift the balance of power toward them (Nayyar, 582; 2016).

The third summit introduced South Africa to the alliance creating the BRICS acronym. The economic and physical size of Brazil, China and India explains their inclusion and Russia, a former superpower, was strategically situated in Europe. The inclusion of South Africa, rather than for example Indonesia, marked the inclusion of the African continent to the alliance (Ibid.). The diversity of the alliance also comes with a downside. The BRICS countries are marked by their diversity which creates difficulties in creating a common vision on global affairs. There is next to no geographical proximity, their economic size and position in the global production chain vary widely and their values regarding political structures and geopolitical interests are diametrically different (Liu, 446; 2016). Furthermore, there are serious geopolitical conflicts amongst the BRICS, seeing as India and China are considered strategic rivals. Not only economically, but also security wise. India has expanded military cooperation to countries in the West Pacific and Indian Ocean in order to balance against Beijing. In turn, China has balanced against New Delhi by allying with Islamabad. On other points, such as the UN reform, the BRICS share different viewpoints too. The IBSA members have taken up Japan to issue a security council reform which has been opposed by China because inclusion of Japan in the security council would seriously impede Chinese influence in East Asia.

Despite, and to some extent due, to these structural problems, after several years of talks at different levels, all four members realised that without deepening coordination collective positions vis-à-vis the developed countries concerning global financial issues could not be reached. This new focus led to the creation of new ministerial meetings within the BRICS association (Liu, 445; 2016). These meetings range from agriculture to science, technology and innovation. The BRICS summits have been focused around commitments.

After each of the summits the member states issue a joint communiqué, often with a list of commitments to which each country will comply.

	Sanya 2011	Delhi 2012	Durban 2013	Fortaleza 2014	Ufa 2015	Average	
Trade	0.4	0	1	-1.00		0.1	55%
Development	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.8	+0.40	0.56	78%
Macroeconomic policies			0.2		1	0.6	80%
Financial regulation	0.4			0.2	1	0.53	77%
Climate change	0.8	0.2				0.5	75%
International financial institution reform	0.2	0.2				0.2	60%
Energy		0.6				0.6	80%
Regional security			0.2	0.2	-0.40	0	50%
Terrorism			0.4	0.6	+0.80	0.6	80%
Environment				1		1	100%
Human rights				0.6	+0.20	0.4	70%
Crime and corruption				0.8		0.8	90%
Information and communications technology					0.8	0.8	90%
Food and agriculture					0.8	0.8	90%
	0.48	0.28	0.48	0.4	0.56		
Average	74%	64%	74%	70%	78%	0.44	72%

Table 1

Source: Table 4: BRICS Compliance Scores, 2011-2015

From 2011-2015 the BRICS research group⁶ has analysed the compliance performance by the BRICS countries⁷. The outcome of their analyses is listed in table 1. The analysis reveals that the BRICS countries complied well with the development, terrorism and macroeconomic policies commitments at the core of their agenda. Performance on regional security issues is uneven, with an overall average of 50%. It seems that despite the structural constraints on development, the BRICS countries are strongly dedicated to carrying out their tasks at hand. This dedication is also one of the underlying reasons for the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB). The NDB was established during the sixth BRICS summit in 2014 after the signing of an agreement by the BRICS leaders (NDB History). Both the BRICS and IBSA thus have a financial initiative focused on development. They are, however, not quite the same as the following case study will reveal.

Two South-South development initiatives.

The IBSA fund.

In 2004 the IBSA leaders established the India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund). In 2006 the fund became operational with the purpose

⁶ Of the University of Toronto and the International Organizations Research Institute of the National Research University Higher School of Economics (IORI HSE).

⁷ For the full analysis please see <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/compliance/index.html>

to ‘identify replicable and scalable projects that can be disseminated to interested developing countries as examples of best practices in the fight against poverty and hunger’ (UNDP IBSA report, 2015). The IBSA fund supports projects on a demand-driven basis through partnerships and interaction with local governments, national institutions and implementing partners. Projects can range from providing food security to combatting HIV/Aids and are all in the aim of contributing to the achievement of the millennium development goals (UNDP IBSA report, 2015). The IBSA fund is more than providing financial aid to the poorest countries, it is also about knowledge sharing among Southern experts and institutions, capacity-building between beneficiaries and built-in project sustainability.

The IBSA fund is administered by the UNOSSC and governed by a board of directors which comprises the Ambassadors of India, Brazil and South Africa to the United Nations in New York. In 2005, it was agreed upon that all three countries would make an annual contribution of US\$ 1 million to the IBSA fund. Thus far, eleven projects have been finished, ranging from solid waste collection in Haiti to refurbishment of healthcare infrastructure in Cape Verde (IBSA Fund Project Portfolio). Another seven projects are ongoing, including a job creation project in Sudan and five more projects have been approved (as of 2015). So far, US\$ 29 million has been contributed and over US\$ 16 million has been implemented in 14 different countries (UNDP IBSA report, 2015). The three IBSA leaders have committed a minimum of US\$ 1 million each year to the fund and with each, new contributions are made.

The IBSA fund is a South-South cooperation answer to the Western notion of development diplomacy. This Western notion of aid comprises a focuses on multilateral institutions which are provided by official agencies and promote the economic welfare of developing countries which have to be concessional in character (OECD). The Western form of development, however, is often conditional to neo-liberal and good governance precepts. This has resulted in developing governments being bound to Western developed external funders rather than able to rely on their own constituencies (Masters et al., 347; 2015). The economic crisis of 2008 allowed for emerging economies to step into the development cooperation game as traditional donors had developed budgetary constraints. This expansion has created an increased emphasis on the importance of development diplomacy. In this regard, the IBSA fund has made a valuable contribution, moving away from Western aims and practices toward a Southern defined way of providing development aid; this includes an emphasis on non-conditionality (Masters et al., 348; 2015). Engaging with local entities is another innovative measure taken by the IBSA fund in development aid. This creates an

environment in which it is possible to provide development aid without ‘conditionalities’ and takes away any perceptions of paternalism and imperialism.

The NDB.

The New Development Bank is ultimately the best evidence of the BRICS countries’ ability to realise substantive agreements. It also shows the commitment to emerge as a counterweight to the established western financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. First signs of the creation of the NDB showed at the BRICS New Delhi Summit in 2012. In 2014 the leaders of the BRICS countries signed an agreement to establish the NDB and in 2015, in the wake of the seventh summit, the bank saw its ultimate realisation. The establishment of the NDB was to ensure institutionalisation of the BRICS alliance, but also as a reaction to the Western failure to invest in infrastructure deficits in developing countries (Qobo, 279; 2015). The Fortaleza Declaration emphasizes on these points:

‘In the Fortaleza Declaration, the leaders stressed that the NDB will strengthen cooperation among BRICS and will supplement the efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global development, thus contributing to collective commitments for achieving the goal of strong, sustainable and balanced growth’ (NDB History).

With the creation of the NDB, the BRICS countries also had the task to create a financial safety net. Through the establishment of a contingent reserve arrangement (CRA) that, short-term liquidity pressures would be forestalled (Qobo, 280; 2015). The creation of these two institutions marks an increase in bargaining power for the BRICS countries in the international financial order. It is a way to increase their hard power through economic means. Through the NDB the BRICS can address concerns that directly affect them and their regions with respect to infrastructure gaps, reach out to other developing countries and emerging economies with a view to augment their bargaining capacity vis-à-vis Western powers and strengthen their agenda-setting capacity in multilateral processes, while also elaborating new rules and norms (Qobo, 281; 2015).

At its conception, the BRICS leaders subscribed to US\$ 50 billion in capital to the NDB and authorized another US\$ 100 billion to the CRA. As of now the NDB has seven projects running, all of which in one of the BRICS countries. Six out of the seven projects revolve around renewable energy and one, in Madhya Pradesh (India), is to upgrade major district roads. This is in accordance with the Fortaleza declaration and the overall NDB mission, which

focuses on sustainable development (NDB Mission). The NDB funds projects by issuing loans, the first loan was issued in 2016 for a US\$75 million project in China.

Despite many structural constraints which inhibit the BRICS from flourishing, the creation of the NDB has had a significant political impact and shifted global political influence more towards the Global South (Liu, 449; 2016). However, this does not mean that the BRICS do not have a lot of improvements to make. The economic prosperity which were the primary cause to bring together these countries have mostly disappeared, economically the BRICS countries are far worse off than 15 years ago. Besides growing gaps between the GDP's of each BRICS country, the growth rates have been shrinking. Especially the economic performance of Brazil and Russia has been poor the past decade (O'Neill, 2016). Furthermore, BRICS tend to announce many meetings mechanisms, but seldom announce tangible policy measures and specific projects. Working groups do not yield effective results and in the event of major events in the international arena are not followed up by joint action.

IBSA and BRICS are in many ways very similar. Both are South-South multilateral cooperating mechanism designed to represent developed countries in the Global South. For too long the Western political status quo has defined world politics, but globalisation has turned the tables. A newly formed middle class in the Global South is shifting the global political economy towards the south, but global politics are not (yet) following. These institutions have devoted their partnership to changing just that. The idea of creating a voice for the Global South is shared by both IBSA and the BRICS, the way to aim to achieve that, however, is different. IBSA is relying on the shared norms and values between the three member states. India, Brazil and South-Africa all face the same problems surrounding poverty, social inequality and the need for sustaining economic development. IBSA recognizes that they are not the only countries in the global south facing these problems and thus aims to help not only themselves, but also other developing countries, to get rid of these problems. This cannot be done by these three countries alone, since the problem at hand lies in the structure of the international system today. International hierarchy might not apply amongst global super powers, but in the global south many countries do find themselves in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the Global North (Escudé, 56; 2015). To change this, IBSA aims to use soft power strategies to attract power from the Global North through political coordination in International Institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO. The IBSA countries lend themselves better for soft power strategies since they have shared norms and values. Something which cannot, necessarily, be

said for the BRICS countries. The IBSA fund is a case in point, it is not set up to run a profit, but it is there to sincerely help developing countries. Its non-conditional nature is an example of that, but also the fact that projects are funded, rather than the money being lend to certain developers. This ‘constructive and hands-on approach to development is what makes [IBSA] different from previous examples of South–South dialogue. Such initiatives failed to deliver tangible results, due largely to an amorphous membership with diverse interests’ (le Pere et al., 2008).

It is no secret that the BRICS countries do not share the same ideological views on certain important international matters. Both in geographical and economical size the BRICS countries diverge, but also in geopolitics. This has restrained them from taking a common standpoint on important issues, such as UN reform. Overall, the BRICS countries have upheld their commitments. Although not many concrete policies or coordinating rules have come out of these commitments, the BRICS have made a successful institution that will challenge the current Northern led system. The NDB is the Global South’s power house when it comes to providing an alternative for the current system. The BRICS countries are aware of their economic power and have now translated that into a development bank directly opposing the World Bank and WTO. This is a decidedly hard power strategy, as opposed to the soft power strategy which IBSA has taken on. The structure of the NDB is therefore completely different from the IBSA Fund. The NDB has to make a profit in order to increase its capital and with it increase its lending capacity (Griffiths-Jones, 3; 2015). In the same light, the NDB has already issued US\$ 435.5 million in bonds on the Chinese market and plans to extend this to up to US\$ 500 million in bonds (Kumar et al., 2017).

Both South-South alliances have taken the idea of financial assistance in development and produced an institution which provides just that. However, IBSA has chosen for a soft power approach and BRICS has chosen a hard power approach. Nevertheless, the goal for both IBSA and BRICS is to increase the voice of the global South. In that sense, both of these approaches are working. Where IBSA lacks in hard power, BRICS makes up for that and vice versa. These two development programs are thus not mutually exclusive; in fact they complement each other.

Chapter 4 - Orchestration in practice.

India, Brazil and South Africa rely on soft power to reach their desired goals. They do so, because they do not enjoy the hard power that traditionally has ruled the landscape of global politics. Although IBSA is cooperating in defence matters, it does not come close to great powers such as the United States, the EU or China. On an economic note, IBSA cannot afford to use hard power economic strategy, since all three countries rely too heavily on export; which has been reaffirmed by the recent financial crisis in Brazil (ECB bulletin; 2016). The lack of hard power resources is not a problem, however, since IBSA is, and always has been, successful in the soft power game. Within the soft power game there still are different directions to take. As chapter two explains soft power governance can be done through collaboration or orchestration. This thesis focuses on the latter and therefore it comes as no surprise that IBSA uses the orchestration in its soft power approach. This chapter will look more closely in which fields IBSA already uses orchestration and in which fields it might use orchestration in the future. First, the IBSA fund and the G20+⁸ will be looked at as examples of how IBSA uses orchestration theory. Second, one of the main goals of the IBSA dialogue forum, namely reform of the UN, will be set in an orchestration light. How might orchestration be useful in achieving UN reform? Finally, concluding remarks will be given on the use of orchestration by IBSA and how this ultimately supports the change in global influence towards the Global South.

The IBSA fund and Orchestration.

Orchestration requires three ingredients: 1) orchestrator, 2) intermediary, 3) target agent. Abbott et al. (2015) have put these in a clear overview:



Figure 2

Indirect governance through orchestration

⁸ The G20+ here refers to the Group of 20 developing nations formed at the WTO Cancún ministerial conference in 2003. The G20+ is also referred to as the G22, the G20 and the G20 developing nations.

The orchestrator thus enlists an intermediary in order to govern a certain target. This indirect way is used, because the orchestrator does not have the means to govern a target directly. For IOs this is often a problem, since governments are jealous of IOs interfering with their sovereignty. Orchestration, then, is a useful way to bypass a state. Orchestration, however is not limited to IOs alone. In our case orchestration is used by a multilateral institution.

The use of orchestration by IBSA becomes very clear when looking at the IBSA development fund. This fund has been called into life to fulfil one of the many goals IBSA set out in its Brasilia declaration:

‘The Ministers highlighted the priority placed by the three governments on the promotion of social equity and inclusion, by implementing effective policies to fight hunger and poverty, to support family run farms, and to promote food security, health, social assistance, employment, education, human rights and environmental protection’ (Brasilia Declaration; 2003).

Declaring is, however, easier than implementing. Carrying out projects to combat social inequality and exclusion across borders is extremely difficult, especially for a multilateral institution. In this, IBSA faces the same challenges as IOs, since implementing development projects cannot be done without interference in a state that is not your own. The IBSA fund has projects in 13 different states, all of which use orchestration as a form of governance.

Orchestration in the IBSA fund can be broken down as follows: 1) the orchestrator is IBSA, 2) the intermediaries are the UNOSSC, local ministries, villages and sub-governmental departments and 3) the targets are the recipients of the IBSA fund projects (ranging from farmers to urban youth). IBSA itself cannot intervene in the states where IBSA fund projects are carried out. It neither has the required networks nor logistical assets to organise such projects. What it does have is financial support for the projects that are granted financial support by the board of directors. With the financial support, the IBSA fund calls upon the UNOSSC to administer the fund, since the UNOSSC has vast experience in organizing development projects and has offices in most of the countries that qualify for IBSA fund initiatives. Furthermore, the UNOSSC contains a large network which it can use when setting up and arranging a local project.

In this, the UNOSSC works closely together with local ministries and sub-state departments such as departments of provinces and local businesses. In that sense, the

intermediary enlists other parties to carry out the projects. This constitutes a form of collaboration: the UNOSSC collaborates with local authorities because these local authorities are cooperating voluntarily. The latter is important, because if participation would not have been voluntary, the UNOSSC would be delegating its tasks to local authorities. This, however, is not the purpose of the IBSA fund, which focusses on ‘capacity-building among project beneficiaries, built-in project sustainability, and knowledge-sharing among Southern experts and institutions’ (IBSA Report 2015) within its projects. Ultimately, the projects reach the target agents, which are the ‘poor and hungry’ which the IBSA fund is dedicated to alleviate. The IBSA dialogue forum thus uses an NGO as an intermediary to reach their target agents and provides financial support as well as endorsement and administrative support to steer the intermediary in the right direction.

The G20+, IBSA and orchestration.

From 10 to 14 September 2003 the fifth biannual WTO ministerial conference was held in Cancún Mexico. Some weeks before the ministerial conference the EU-US issued a joint document on agriculture. The EU-US document, however, blindsided developing countries in international agricultural trade. According to Celso Amorim, then foreign minister of Brazil:

‘The real dilemma that many of us had to face was whether it was sensible to accept an agreement that would essentially consolidate the policies of the two subsidizing superpowers – with very modest gains and even some steps backward (the new broader definition of ‘blue box’ subsidies to accommodate the US for instance) – and then have to wait for another 15 or 18 years to launch a new round, after having spent precious bargaining chips’ (Narlikar et al., 951; 2004).

The document the EU-US proposed was unsatisfactory to say the least and the IBSA countries took it upon themselves to provide a political alternative to what was perceived as a new Blair House Agreement, excluding the interests of developing countries (Veiga, 2005). The G20+ ‘was not born in Cancún or in Geneva, during the weeks preceding the WTO Ministerial Conference. It emerged from the political trust built up between Brazil, India and South Africa some months earlier’ (Ibid.). Knowing that a document proposed by the three countries alone would not survive the ministerial conference, the IBSA countries used orchestration to reach their target. In this case, 1) the IBSA countries are the orchestrator, 2) the G20+ is the intermediary and 3) reform of international agriculture policy is the target.

The IBSA states used their convening power to create a new coalition at the Cancún ministerial. Brazil and India drafted the first text together and then sought alliances with other developing countries participating in the ministerial to form the G20+. At the Cancún ministerial there were more groups than just the G20+, which made it especially difficult to align the developing nations to form a coordinated effort at presenting a proactive agenda. Ultimately, the G20+ did incorporate members from different groups to put forth an alternative to the EU-US document on agriculture. This highlights the importance of agenda setting and coordination in orchestration. By setting an agenda to provide an alternative to the EU-US document, the IBSA states were able to gather support from other developing countries despite different views on agricultural policy. The IBSA agenda provided cognitive and normative guidance. Furthermore, coordinating efforts between the members of the G20+ resulted in a stronger pact against the EU-US. This was necessary, because the build-up of the G20+ was a very unlikely one, combining Cairns Group exporters and defensive food importers, some of the largest countries in the developing world and some of the smallest. Theoretically, the G20+ was doomed to fail (Narlikar, 953-954; 2004). It did not, however, and is still active in the Doha Round negotiations, pursuing ambitious reforms of agriculture in developed countries with some flexibility for developing countries (WTO).

Using orchestration to create a bigger voice for the Global South.

Ultimately, both the IBSA fund and the G20+ stand in service of the greater goal IBSA aims to achieve, a greater voice for the developing countries in the Global South. Applying orchestration theory to that goal is different from applying the same theory to any given international organisation. The target agents in the case of the IBSA fund are not the traditional targets seen in orchestration theory. This is a result of the nature of IBSA itself, it is not an International Organisation but rather an International Institution. As has been established in the previous chapters, IBSA must rely on soft power to achieve its goal and in that sense, orchestration theory is very suitable to just that. Applying orchestration theory to IBSA's goal of gaining more soft power, the following division of the model proposed by Abbott et al. is at hand: 1) the orchestrator is IBSA, 2) the intermediaries are the projects IBSA carries out besides UNSC reform and 3) the targets are the member states of the UN general assembly and in particular the UNSC.

For IBSA, the most likely way to achieve their goal of greater equality in global politics is through reform of the UN, especially reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Reform is therefore one major part of the Brasilia Declaration, which states:

‘They [the IBSA leaders] stressed the necessity of expanding the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent member categories, with the participation of developing countries in both categories. They agreed to combine efforts in order to enhance the effectiveness of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations’ (Brasilia Declaration, 2003).

Participation of developing countries in the UNSC is key to creating a shift in world politics. UN reform, however, is difficult to achieve and it will take a long time to reach consensus in the General Assembly. The need for reform, however, is natural to an institution such as the United Nations and has been a topic of discussion since its foundation in 1945. The fact remains, however, that despite a general agreement on the need to reform the council, there is also a general disagreement on how to reform the council. This makes the topic divisive and contentious and its continued failure highlights the growing division within the General Assembly. Logically, then, what is needed is greater agreement on the way the UNSC must be reformed. IBSA can play an important role in this process, since it positions itself as representative of the global south and has proven to be successful in bringing together diverse groups of countries.

In 2007 the IBSA member states made an attempt at reform with a draft resolution dubbed ‘L69’ which was signed by 25 member states. The draft was produced by India and co-sponsored by Brazil, South-Africa and Nigeria. ‘The move by the IBSA-countries was by any standard highly extraordinary as it suddenly presented the Working Group with the possibility of employing a vote, rather than their usual consensus method of working’ (Swart et al., 15; 2013). Ultimately, the draft resolution was not called to a vote, but rather an amended draft report by the chairman reached a general consensus. The proposal by the IBSA states did ‘stir the pot’ and was aimed at triggering other states to come forward with their own draft proposals, so that different views could be discussed. The amended report by the chairman included the words ‘intergovernmental negotiations’ which was perceived as move toward actual negotiations on a concrete text (Swart et al., 16; 2013). In the fall of 2007 the three states reaffirmed their dedication to UNSC reform in a statement: ‘They [India, Brazil, and South

Africa] expressed their full support for a genuine reform and expansion of the Security Council, in permanent and non-permanent categories of membership, with greater representation for developing countries in both. [...] They agreed to further strengthen cooperation amongst their countries and with other Member States interested in a genuine reform of the Security Council' (Centre for UN Reform).

In 2012 the sponsors of the original L69 presented a new draft resolution representing the continuing effort by IBSA to reform the UNSC. However, as much as orchestration has been helpful to IBSA in many of the issues pointed out in the Brasilia declaration of 2003, when it comes to UNSC reform, orchestration theory is not the way to go. It is ineffective and undiplomatic to issue an intermediary to negotiate in the UN on your behalf. This does not mean that orchestration cannot be helpful. In the United Nations consensus is the main tool for decision making. This means that the general assembly wholeheartedly agrees on a draft resolution and therefore does not need to vote in order to pass that draft resolution. This is especially important when a draft is not legally binding because then consensus will encourage member states to implement recommendations from a draft resolution voluntarily. Reaching consensus is equally important in reforming the UNSC. 'The veto power of the P5 is one of the biggest obstacles to the reform of the Security Council. Any fundamental reform, such as any changes to the number of the Security Council seats, has to be inscribed into the Charter. On the other hand, Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter give veto power to the P5 over any amendment to the Charter. Therefore, no reform can materialise without the consent of the permanent members' (Okhovat, 42-43; 2011).

In order to reform the UNSC, then, IBSA must set out on a diplomatic mission to reach a consensus on the draft resolution they proposed. Effectively, this means increasing soft power to gain a better bargaining position at intergovernmental negotiations. Building a large enough negotiating 'bloc' is necessary to reach the best possible position in intergovernmental negotiations and 'allow nations to build on a position of strength in numbers' (Sidhu, 30; 2007). Imperative to this strategy is to continue to carry out a leading role in all fields related to the UN. Therefore, the projects IBSA initiates besides UNSC reform can be seen as intermediaries. Projects like the G20+ and the IBSA fund are used as intermediaries to reach consensus with other UN member states. By funding development projects in Africa, those countries are prone to vote in line with IBSA when asked to do so. Member states in the G20+ have worked together on reform of agricultural policy and are more likely to agree on UNSC reform because

of their shared history. Orchestration is thus not used to reach the ultimate goal of UNSC reform, but rather to create the means to reach the desired end.

Ultimately IBSA can gain a lot from orchestration theory. If not directly, then indirectly. In the development field IBSA already uses orchestration effectively by using the UNOSSC and local governments as intermediaries. In reforming global financial institutions, IBSA uses the G20+ as an intermediary and still participates actively in the Doha round of negotiations. When it comes to reforming the United Nations Security Council, orchestration takes on a roll backstage. Since within the United Nations negotiating can, ultimately, inly be done by states themselves. However, in the United Nations it is of vital importance to hold enough cards to play in intergovernmental negotiations. In acquiring these cards, orchestration plays an important role. Orchestration is what makes projects such as the IBSA fund work and it is those projects which build towards a greater 'bloc' of power.

Conclusion.

Since 2003 IBSA has shown the world that the Global South is not sitting still and will fight for more equality in global politics. It has shown that there is more to the Global South than the Western hegemons might think. Three different countries from three different continents have taken the task to represent the developing countries of the Global South, which have grown more important in light of global developments. In 2008 the financial crisis drew attention away from the west, which was deeply affected by the crisis, towards the Global South which was able to largely avoid the crisis and develop a substantial middle class. With growing economic importance IBSA became more relevant than ever through active engagement in the Doha development round by preventing the reinforcement of Northern capacity to extract concessions from the weaker states in the Global South. With IBSA there are several other Southern initiatives by developing countries which creates doubt among some authors on whether IBSA remains relevant or not. Especially the BRICS forum is one of the main competitors to IBSA, not least because all three member states are also in the BRICS initiative. This thesis has shown, however, that there are important differences between the two dialogue forums. BRICS uses hard power as their main strategy in global governance, whereas IBSA uses soft power. Both are dedicated to closing the North-South divide and both groupings are complementing each other through taking different approaches.

The soft power approach IBSA uses is largely built on methods of orchestration. The main theory this thesis focused on was orchestration theory as developed by Abbott et al.. Governance through the use of intermediaries is indirect and soft in nature. Indirect, because a third party is used to reach the target agent. Soft, because the intermediary voluntarily works with the orchestrator to govern the target. For IBSA this is an especially important form of governance, since for an international institution it is often difficult to govern targets in the sovereignty of member states. Through the IBSA fund and the G20 IBSA has used orchestration to govern a specific target. In development projects supported by the IBSA fund, intermediaries such as the UNOSSC and local ministries and government bodies, IBSA is able to govern the recipients of IBSA fund projects (i.e. the targets). Furthermore, through the G20 IBSA used its convening power in order to bring together a group of countries that no scholar thought would stick together. In setting their own agenda IBSA were able to start a coalition which fought off the EU-US document on agriculture, which would have been devastating for developing countries in the Global South.

These orchestration techniques are used to implement statements made in the Brasilia Declaration of 2003. They have, however, another purpose, namely increasing the soft power status enjoyed by IBSA. Ultimately, IBSA aims to increase the influence of the Global South in international politics. This means increasing influence in global political institutions, such as the WTO and the UNSC. The latter is in need of reform before the IBSA countries can gain more influence in the institution. IBSA does not enjoy hard power, they do not have the defence capabilities nor the economic capabilities. Therefore, IBSA has to rely on soft power techniques to create consensus amongst the UN general assembly members and, most importantly, the P5. Through the use of orchestration in the fields of development aid and international economic reform the soft power of IBSA increases and with it their chances of successful UN reform. IBSA is thus using orchestration theory to divert attention away from the Global North. However, generating change in International Politics remains a long term project. IBSA is working hard to create that change and reform at the UN cannot be ignored by the P5 forever. When the time comes, IBSA will stand ready to propose their draft resolution and with soft power strategy they will be able to create a greater voice for the Global South.

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