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**UN Peacekeeping Operations in West Africa:
Why do they fail and why do they succeed?
Analyzing the Cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone**

1. Introduction

With his report *An Agenda for Peace* United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) signaled the UN's readiness to take responsibility for conflict reconciliation in the light of a growing number of civil wars, which occurred in the early 1990s. Therefore, the report marked the kickoff of the UN's gradual institutionalization of peacekeeping. Since then the United Nations' peacekeeping operations (UN PKO) have experienced continual change: the operations are continually growing in size and scope; the mandates are becoming more extensive; and the UN's expenditures on peacekeeping are increasing tremendously (UN 2015a). Behind this background it is crucial to create PKOs that produce the best possible outcome. But what causes a PKO's successful outcome? Why do some missions succeed in implementing peace after civil wars while others fail to do so? These are the questions this paper seeks to answer, and it will do so by analyzing the PKOs in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Neighboring countries in West Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone share similar geographical, demographical, and socio-economic characteristics. Additionally, they can look back on resembling and intermeshed historical developments. In the early 1990s, the autocratic governments of both countries were afflicted by coup d'états, which degenerated into civil wars. In response to that, both countries became hosts of long-term PKOs. Most interestingly, the course of the PKOs follows a similar pattern: In both cases the initial peacekeeping attempts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) failed. The subsequent early PKOs of the UN – the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the

UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) – were not able to implement peace either. First, after the US and the UK conducted unilateral short-term interventions, the situation turned around and paved the way for large-scale UN peace enforcement missions, which eventually succeeded in implementing peace. These similarities make the PKOs in Sierra Leone and Liberia compelling cases for a comparison.

In order to find out why the PKOs succeeded over time, this paper will discuss two possible explanations. The first one is the international commitment, which includes the robustness of the mandates of the PKOs and the troop strengths. The focus will lie on the UN as the most experienced actor in peacekeeping, however the PKOs of regional organization (ECOWAS) and the unilateral interventions cannot be ignored as they affect peacekeeping success. The second explanation to be analyzed is the impact of situational factors, namely the environment in which the PKOs are carried out. Conducting two in-case longitude studies enables one to control the situational factors over time; this leads to the assumption that the peacekeeping environment cannot sufficiently explain peacekeeping success. Instead, it will be argued that UN peacekeeping success requires a large scale of peacekeepers that are backed by an extensive mandate that allows the peacekeepers to defend themselves and thus gives them a certain security and authority. The case of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), in particular, will additionally show that an adequate understanding of mandated liberties and duties is essential for a PKO's success. Moreover, it will be proven that the unilateral intervention of well-equipped grand states such as the US or the UK can abate the violence in the short term, even if they are small in numbers; they cannot, however, provide long-lasting, sustainable peace. In sum, this paper aims to argue that the international commitment is critical to peacekeeping success. It further argues that success cases such as UNAMSIL and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) bear valuable lessons for future PKOs especially those conducted in war-prone West Africa.

To explore these arguments the paper will proceed as follows: The paper will first give an overview of the relevant approaches in the literature that indicate situational factors and international commitment as causal mechanisms for peacekeeping success and failure. Based on that, the theoretical framework of this paper will be developed and the hypothesis derived (Chapter 2). The paper will then briefly introduce the methods to be applied (Chapter 3). Before going into the in-depth analysis of the two cases the paper will give factual accounts of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Chapter 4 and 5). The discussion part (Chapter 6) will first show that situational factors can be excluded as a comprehensive explanation for peacekeeping success (Chapter 6.1) and secondly show that international commitment

explains why peacekeeping failed and succeeded in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Chapter 6.2). Finally, the paper will conclude that the mandate's robustness and its correct interpretation by the peacekeepers is the decisive indicator for sustainable peacekeeping success and that regional organizations and unilateral interventions can have a supporting effect on peacekeeping success (Chapter 7).

2. Theoretical explanations for the success and failure of PKOs

Peacekeeping literature comes in three chronological waves (Howard and Fortna 2008). The first wave deals with peacekeeping in interstate conflicts during the cold war. In the early 1990s, the literature shifted to intrastate peacekeeping as the number of civil wars rose with the end of the cold war. In line with *An Agenda for Peace* the literature initially promoted a rather optimistic perspective on peacekeeping. After the first failures of Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia the initial optimism was replaced by pessimism and brief analysis of failures and dysfunction of the peacekeeping concept. The third wave supersedes the pessimism: In mostly quantitative studies scholars analyze the benefits of peacekeeping. They start focusing more on the success stories and bringing forth the causalities of peacekeeping success and failure. This study is part of the third wave in that it tests suggested causalities.

As early contributors to the third wave of peacekeeping literature, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis suggest that a PKO's success must consider both the international and local levels. two levels (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 69). Doyle and Sambanis provide the underlying causality of this paper. On the local level *situational factors* will be considered, and on the international level *international commitment* will be considered. In the following sections, both concepts and their origins will be explained in more detail.

2.1. Situational Factors

Situational factors are important to consider because PKOs are not conducted in a vacuum but in a specific environment, which can complicate or contribute to the implementation and maintenance of peace (Fortna 2008). Situational factors therefore create prospects for peace to last, irrespective of whether a third party will intervene or not (Fortna 2004, 281). The literature puts forward numerous situational variables, which have proven effects on peacekeeping success in that they (a) abate violence and therefore increase the likelihood of peace settlement, (b) reduce the risk of war recurrence and therefore make peace more stable or (c) affect a conflict from spilling across borders. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2004 see

also Fearon and Laitin 2003, Sambanis 2008) have shown that low-level per capita economic growth makes the outbreak and recurrence of civil war more likely. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) further refer to the “resource curse” when demonstrating that natural resources, especially lootable resources, make peace harder to keep (see also Roos 2004) as they trigger greedy desires of rebel groups. Another aspect to consider is the number of conflicting parties. Whereas some scholars argue the number of factions plays an important role in the war’s intensity (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Collier and Hoeffler 2001, and Fearon and Laitin 2003) others do not find a significant relation (Fortna 2004). The fractionalization argument is closely related to Stephen Stedman’s (1997) assumptions on spoiler groups, which are actors that intentionally hinder a peace settlement because for them peace is economically less beneficial than war. Several scholars have proven (Fortna 2004, Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Hartzell et al. 2001) that identity-based wars, meaning those which are based on religious, ethnic, or linguistic affiliation, tend to last longer than economic-political based wars. Furthermore, the war intensity, which includes both casualties and displacements, needs to be taken into account. Whereas Walter argues a higher death toll makes peace more likely, Hartzell’s et al. findings prove the opposite (see also Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004). Scholars fairly agree that long war durations create longer lasting peace (Collier et al. 2003, Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Hartzell et al. 2004, Fortna 2004). The final situational variable to be considered is the war’s outcome. Richard Wagner (1993) and Roy Licklider (1995) argue that the military victory makes lasting peace more likely. Monica Toft (2010) shows that a rebel group’s victory favors stability and endurance of peace.

In sum, the existing literature does not provide a clear consensus on which factors do impact peacekeeping success in what way. They do point out that the situational factors *have* an effect on peacekeeping success and therefore offer a good starting point for examining peacekeeping successes and failures (Kreps 2010, 2).

2.2. International Commitment

Scholars mostly agree on the positive effects of peacekeeping operations on a conflict’s closure. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) found that especially multidimensional PKOs are beneficial for the peace building process. In line with that, Doyle and Sambanis claim that the extensiveness of the UN mandate is decisive for the peace success. They assume that strong troops cannot make a big difference if they are operating under a weak mandate. In particular, they claim that observer missions and peace enforcement missions are too weak to have a

significantly positive effect. Doyle and Sambanis therefore promote the primacy of the mandate above the troop strength. Walter (1997) supports this assumption. From her perspective “observers or unarmed peacekeepers with no military backup will have little positive effect on either negotiations or treaty implementations” (Walter 1997, 361). Hartzell et al. (2001) observed third party interventions (which include UN PKOs) and they prove that peace that was made with the assistance of third parties lasts longer. Similarly, Fortna (2004) argues that the presence of international personnel tends to make peace more likely and longer lasting.

The UN is often blamed for conducting PKOs only in fairly easy conflict situations, which favor a quick peacekeeping success (Carter 2007). Michael Gillian and Ernest Sergenti (2008) and Fortna (2004) however prove the opposite; they state that the UN is also operating in situations in which the conflict is still active, where a peace agreement is yet to be brokered.

In a large n-study Håvard Hegre et al. (2010) further evaluated the conflict-reducing effect of UN PKOs and they once more showed the stronger the mandate, the and the PKO’s strengths with regards of troop size and financial help, the greater the conflict-reducing effect. With regards to long-term effects of PKOs, Sambanis (2008) shows that the UN improved its peacekeeping skills over time. The author claims the UN can make a huge difference in the first years, after a while, however, only economic increases and institution building have a positive effect on the maintenance of peace. Whereas scholars mostly agree on the positive effect of a mandate’s robustness, they are less consist when it comes to troop strength. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) argue that the troop’s size does not make a huge difference if the mandate is weak. Fortna (2004) on the other hand finds significant evidence for a positive effect of the troop’s size on the maintenance of peace; Sarah Kreps’ findings (2010) prove the same. In sum, based on both quantitative and qualitative studies, scholars come to the conclusion that third party intervention in general, and UN intervention in particular, have a positive effect on (a) the implementation of peace, (b) the duration of the established peace, and (c) the prevention of a spillover of conflicts to neighboring countries.

In the last years the peacekeeping efforts of actors other than the UN, for instance NATO, the EU, or single states, gained increasing attention. Advocates of non-UN PKOs argue that regional actors (organizations or states) provide more adequate peacekeeping force as the UN’s PKOs suffer from high levels of bureaucracy (Fleitz 1990). Durch and Berkman (2006) argue that regional actors have the advantage of being more committed to establishing peace as conflicts are a threat to their own security. Moreover, the proximity affects the actors’ willingness to mobilize defense capabilities. Secretary General (Keohane 1989). acknowledged that non-UN PKOs undermine the UN’s legitimacy and its international character. Contrary to

that Durch and Berkman (2006) find that some PKOs tend to be less controversial regarding their legitimacy and the use of force than the UN's PKOs. Bellamy and Williams (2006) point to the risk of a possible self-interest, which may affect the regional actor's peacekeeping efficiency and the actor's international credibility. That is especially a concern in the case of single state PKOs such as the US intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan. On the other hand, unilateralism bears the benefits of rapidity, well-coordinated teams, and less complex command structures (Keohane 1989). In sum, regional organizations and single state interventions can support or impair peacekeeping success.

In the light of the theoretical assumptions, the following hypothesis can be derived:

Hypothesis 1.1: The more robust the mandates of (a) the UN, (b) ECOWAS, and (c) the UK and US, the more likely peacekeeping success.

Hypothesis 1.2: The larger the troop size of the (a) UN, (b) ECOWAS, (c) the UK and US, the more likely the peacekeeping success.

3. Methodology

This paper aims to explain why some UN PKOs succeed in implementing peace while others do not. Peacekeeping success can thus be identified as the dependent variable. Three factors need to be present for peacekeeping to be considered a success. First, the underlying conflict needs to be closed, for instance through a comprehensive peace agreement (conflict settlement). Second, negative peace must be achieved (absence of armed violence) for at least two years after the war's end. Third, the conflict must be contained for at least two years after the conflict ends. That means the conflict may not spread, either within the national borders or across (conflict containment). The date of the last cease-fire agreement marks the starting point of the two-year period.

There are two explanatory concepts to be tested in this paper: First, the situational factors and second, the international commitment. They can therefore be identified as independent variables. The previous section has shown why these variables are relevant for peacekeeping success. In order to make the concepts testable it is crucial to operationalize them. With regards to the situational factors, each factor serves as an indicator, which needs to be tested for every PKO at the time of deployment. The economic growth will be operationalized by the GDP per capita. With regards to natural resources it will be observed if the country is abundant of natural resources or not. Regarding the kind of war it is to be

observed if the war is identity-based or political-economic based. Identity-based wars are occurring if the clashing groups represent religious, racial, linguistic or ethnic interests. Political-economic wars are those that involve ideological or socio-economic interest (Hartzell et al. 2001, 198). Furthermore, the number of factions, meaning the number of combatting parties, must be counted. The war duration will be measured in years. Finally, the war intensity will be operationalized by the percentage of displaced or killed people of the total population.

The second independent variable is *international commitment*. International commitment will be operationalized by the total number of deployed peacekeepers, including military observers, staff officers, and police officers. A second indicator is the robustness of the mandate under which the PKO is authorized. Three kinds of can be differentiated. First, monitory and observer mandates which aim to support a state's peace process by monitoring an ongoing peace process and the adherence of a present truce. Peacekeepers of monitory and observer operations are lightly armed and not allowed to make use of force for other means than self-defense. Second, peacekeeping missions aim to facilitate and implement a negotiated settlement, and observe the situation. Peacekeepers operating under these missions lightly armed and not allowed to make use of force for other means than self-defense. The UN usually authorizes those kind of PKOs under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Non-Un actors conducting those missions do not require the explicit authorization of the UNSC. That is the crucial difference to the third kind of mandate: Peace enforcement mandates are designed to recreate public order, by the use of force if necessary. Peace enforcement mandates necessarily require the authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC) no matter if they are carried out by the UN or by non-UN actors.

Methods of Analysis

In order to find out whether situational factors and/or international commitment can explain peacekeeping success of PKOs in Sierra Leone and Liberia, this paper conducts a comparison of two longitude with-in case studies. The analysis can best be framed in a before-and-after research design of the PKOs changes over time; In Liberia, the before period includes the time of deployment of UNOMIL (1993-97), and the after period covers UNMIL's activities from its start in 2003 to 2005. The observation ends in 2005 with the conclusion of Liberia's successful elections. In the case of Sierra Leone, the before period includes UNOMSIL (1998-99), and the first months of its successor mission UNAMSIL from 1999 to 10.2000 (hereafter referred to as UNAMSIL I), the after period includes the UNAMSIL's operating period from 10.2000 to 2002 when the hereafter referred to as UNAMSIL II.

Both, Liberia and Sierra Leone experienced long-term PKOs, which created different peacekeeping outcomes over time. That enables one to apply Mill's method of difference in both cases. Indicators that were present at the successful PKOs – UNAMSIL II and UNMIL – but not at the PKOs that failed – UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL I, and UNOMIL in Liberia – are likely to explain the peacekeeping success of the first ones. An analysis of the situational factors will show that they remained fairly constant over time; this indicates that they cannot sufficiently explain the divergent peacekeeping outcomes. Therefore, everything points to the international commit as explanatory variable for peacekeeping success. The paper will draw upon the method of process tracing in order to test the established hypothesis that strong international commitment leads to peacekeeping success. Process further enables one to uncover which causal mechanisms are present. A cross-case comparison will then show that the findings are robust over time and in both cases. It will therefore uncover a certain pattern of peacekeeping success.

4. Civil war in Liberia

In 1822, the American Colonization Society sent a number of former African slaves back to Africa with the intention of finding a new home. They arrived in West Africa and founded Liberia. As the first state in West Africa, Liberia claimed independence in 1847. According to its initial founders the Liberian state was built based on the model of the US; that applied to the constitution, the culture, and the society. As financial backer and political supporter, the US continuously maintained its influence in Liberia. Henceforth, throughout the years, Liberia turned into a “client state of the US” (Feeney 2003) and became known as the US’ “fifty-first state” (Farrell 2013, 127). In the course of Liberia's independence the Americo-Liberians – the former slaves and their descendants – established a ruling oligarchy over the other 15 ethnic groups in Liberia (Bøås 2010, 75). The political order was stable and the Liberians lived peacefully for more than a century. The situation changed in 1980 when former Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, member of the Krahn ethnic community, and his armed militia group, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), invaded Liberia from the neighboring Ivory Coast to topple the Americo-Liberian regime. After killing President William Tolbert, Doe himself took over and granted himself unshared political power. Doe's rule triggered disputes between the ethnic groups as he offered privileges such as political positions especially to his own group and their sympathizers, and neglected the Americo-Liberians. Under pressure from the US, Doe eventually agreed on holding new multiparty elections on 15 October 1985. Doe won with by a

large margin. Despite election irregularities, the US continued to support the Doe regime (Howe 1996, 148; Kramer 1995). Dominated by corruption, theft of state's resources, violence, and massive human rights abuses (Bøås 2010, 80), Doe's rule eventually led Liberia to an economic collapse which further fueled hostility among the ethnic groups and laid the foundations for Liberia's civil war.

Liberia's First Civil War

In late 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a 100 man strong, lightly armed, Libya-trained rebel group under the command of Charles Taylor launched an incursion and a coup d'état. The NPFL fostered the Liberians' aversion against Doe and quickly gained new members throughout the whole country. Additionally, the NPFL recruited 5,000 child soldiers, many of them under the age of 18 (Bøås 2010, 80). NPFL and its subsidiary the Independent NPFL (INPFL) quickly became known for their brutal practices, including cannibalism, rape, amputations, and torture, against Doe's supporting militia, the AFL, but also against civilians. By August, the situation had significantly worsened. President Doe had obviously lost control of the state to the rebels, but he refused to resign. At that time the conflict had turned into a humanitarian catastrophe, with about 20,000 casualties (Nolte 1993, 608). Many Western and African States expressed their concerns about the hostile situation; the US provided financial and political support, but no state was willing to intervene militarily (Howe 1996, 150). In a letter to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) President Doe requested an ECOWAS Peacekeeping Force to prevent the violence from spreading. ECOWAS set up an emergency meeting with the Authority of the Heads of States. Five out of 15 ECOWAS states joined the meeting (Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia, and Sierra Leone), in which they decided to start its first peacekeeping mission, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), also known as the "Intervention Force of ECOWAS".

Officially, ECOWAS' intervention was legitimized by the ECOWAS Protocol of Non-Aggression (1978). The Protocol is a supplement to ECOWAS' founding treaty (*Treaty of Lagos*, 1975), which grants the option to intervene in an *intra*-state conflict with the objective to find a peaceful settlement. Additionally, ECOMOG's authorization referred to the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (1981), another supplementing document to the treaty. Its Article 4(b) states "In case of *internal* armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from the outside likely to endanger the peace and security of the entire Community" the ECOWAS member states "shall take appropriate measures", which includes the option of a military intervention (Article 6(3)). The legal basis of ECOMOG's

raised questions, as Liberia had signed the Mutual Assistance and Defense protocol, which was not binding for it (Howe 1996, Hutchful 1999). Nevertheless, the mission was established without any further discussions.

Based on the assumption the intervention would not take long (Adibe 1997, 472) ECOWAS created a peace plan for Liberia, which authorized the establishment of ECOMOG entrusted to supervise the peace and restore law and order; its tasks were the observation of an immediate ceasefire, the set-up of an interim government, the set-up of elections which excluded all rebel leaders within and the creation of a Special Emergency Fund (S/22025, §10, 20.12.1990). ECOWAS' rationale for an intervention was three-fold: First, Liberia's conflict caused instability in the region, an indicator for that was the conflict's spread to Sierra Leone. Second, ECOWAS was concerned about the humanitarian crisis, especially the huge number of deaths and refugees. Third, ECOWAS wanted to comply Doe's request (Ero 1995, Bellamy et al. 2004, 218). Nigeria, as leading force, contributed the most personnel (70 percent) and financial resources and took over command; the Anglophone states Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra Leone contributed troops. The francophone ECOWAS states opposed the mission (Adibe 1997, 483). ECOWAS did not ask for the authorization of the UNSC, nor did the UNSC explicitly authorize the mission of its own accord. Therefore, it was assumed that ECOMOG would be a non-enforcement mission, which does not require the UNSC's authorization as Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (1945) regulates. Without the unambiguous statutory authorization of the UN Security Council 4,000 peacekeepers were deployed to Liberia with the mission to defang Taylor's NPFL. Later ECOMOG's strategy changed to actively fighting the NPFL and creating a buffer zone around Monrovia. The latter task was achieved by November 1990. Fighting the NPFL turned out to be more challenging and the NPFL continued to gain ground and power. Nigeria was often questioned as a competent leader of ECOMOG due to its lack of impartiality and avowed support of Doe (Howe 1996, 155). In the following months, Doe was tortured and killed by the INPFL.

UN Early Involvement: UNOMIL

It was not until January 1991, that the UN first addressed the events in Liberia in public (UN 2001). In a statement, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali commended" ECOWAS efforts and requested the rebels respect the ceasefire agreement (S/22133, 22.1.1991). New split-off militia groups emerged on both sides and made the conflict even more confusing. In November 1992, the UN first became actively involved in the conflict in the form of an arms and military equipment embargo (S/RES/788, 19.11.1992, §8). In his related report, Boutros-Ghali held out

the prospect of a broader UN involvement by providing political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, and electoral assistance (S/25402, 12.3.1993). In its desperate search for support ECOMOG started to cooperate with anti-Taylor group ULIMO. Together they managed to weaken the NPFL sufficiently to force them to join peace negotiations. On 25 July 1993, Taylor, the interim government, and ULIMO signed the Cotonou Peace Agreement, which included a cease-fire, disarmament and demobilization (DD) efforts, and the holding of presidential elections under ECOMOG's supervision (UNMIL Background 2015). The agreement additionally requested a more extensive UN involvement in the form of a PKO. Accordingly, the UNSC authorized the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) by resolution 688 in September 1993. For the UN, UNOMIL was the first cooperation with a regional organization's PKO already in place. The Cotonou Agreement provided ECOMOG with more comprehensive tasks and asked UNOMIL to independently support and monitor these tasks (Cotonou Agreement, Art. III, § 2). Boutros-Ghali expressed his concerns about the co-deployment because UNOMIL's success in fulfilling its tasks necessarily depended on ECOMOG's performance and the adherence of the Cotonou Agreement. Therefore, Boutros-Ghali reserved the option of UNOMIL's immediate withdrawal in case of ECOMOG's misconduct. UNOMIL's final mandate comprised the cease-fire and peace agreement monitoring, election observation, coordination of humanitarian assistance and human rights, the training of ECOMOG troops in terms of mine clearance and bomb disposal. It was established for an initial period of seven months and authorized maximum of 368 lightly armed military and civilian observers (S/Res/ 866, §3, 22.9.1993). In January 1994, UNOMIL attained its total authorized strength of 368 and started to deploy throughout the country to begin with the disarmament of the combatants. By March, UNOMIL and ECOMOG had collected some 3,200 guns. New circle of violence between and within the rebel groups, however, held the peacekeepers back from further disarming. The situation continued to worsen by mid-1994, and the peacekeepers were transferred from the fighting regions back to the seemingly safe capital Monrovia. In September, all parties went back to the negotiation table and brokered the Akosombo Agreement. However, the related ceasefire was never met. The continued fighting prevented both ECOMOG and UNOMIL from carrying out their mandates. Additionally, ECOMOG was still not fully deployed and endured financial shortcomings, which affected its capacity in fulfilling its responsibilities. Consequently ECOMOG was unable to provide even basic security either to its own troops or to UNOMIL personnel. The unprotected peacekeepers became easy targets and the rebels kidnapped 43 blue helmets and six NGO workers. In response, the UN withdrew a large number of its

peacekeepers; only 90 observers remained in seemingly stable Monrovia (UN 2001). In his report, (S/1994/1167, 14.10.1994) Boutros-Ghali suggested rethinking ECOMOG's and UNOMIL's cooperation and blamed the member states for being disinterested in the humanitarian catastrophe and the threat Liberia potentially posed to the whole West African region. Despite these concerns, he extended UNOMIL's mandate for another two months.

First Accra Agreement

In October 1994, Boutros-Ghali stated conditions for UNOMIL's continuation. His report received lots of attention of international presidents that in turn addressed the conflict in public and created pressure on the rebel groups. In reaction to that, the conflicting parties once more returned to the negotiation table. The result was a new peace agreement brokered in Accra, Ghana, in December 1994. The Accra Agreement consisted of the previously signed Cotonou Agreement and the Akosombo Agreement. Additionally, it rescheduled elections for November 1995 and granted political positions to all participating rebel groups. Despite the agreement the military situation remained unstable and the ceasefire broke down immediately. UNOMIL's efficiency remained minimal, and peacekeepers were stuck in Monrovia, unable to restore the ceasefire. In April 1995, the fighting reached a peak when members of all militias clashed together in Monrovia. Any kind of law and order in the capital broke down and thousands of civilians were displaced, injured, or killed in massacres. 88 of the remaining 93 UN military observers were evacuated from Liberia. In the meantime ECOMOG had extended its personnel strength to some 9,000 soldiers to get the situation under control. On 10 June 1994, Boutros-Ghali repeatedly approached the rebel groups to stop the fighting and set an end to the conflict. More importantly, he threatened to fully withdraw UNOMIL if the security situation remained unchanged.

End of Civil War I

The threat of withdrawing UN peacekeepers seemed to have an effect on the rebel groups, who now seemed to be willing to accelerate the peace process. After two months of negotiations the Abuja Agreement was signed on 19 August 1995. The agreement introduced the beginning of end of Liberia's first civil war. Once the ceasefire was in place ECOMOG and UNOMIL started the disarmament process of the estimated 55,000 combatants (UN 2001). With new hope for lasting peace, Boutros-Ghali noted in mid-September: "the prospects for peace in Liberia are perhaps better now than they have ever been". UNOMIL was provided with an adjusted mandate (S/Res/1020, 10.11.1995) that reflected the lessons learned since UNOMIL's

start in 1993 (UN 2001): The mandate underlined the necessity to closely work with and coordinate with ECOMOG with respect to the latter's mandate and capacities, cease fire monitoring, to assist ECOMOG in terms of DDR, to report human rights and embargo violations, and to observe the elections foreseen for 20 August 1996. ECOMOG's reaction to the new situation was a troop extension of 12,000 peacekeepers.

Sporadic fighting continued, but the ceasefire was successfully restored. The humanitarian situation had significantly improved and the combatting factions cooperated in terms of disarmament and demobilization (DD) (UN 2001). The disarmament was carried out by ECOMOG and UNMIL (Jayne 2009). However deployment delays on the side of ECOMOG led to a delay in the DDR schedule. By late 1995, the still armed rebels triggered new circles of violence. The situation deteriorated again and forced peacekeepers to return to Monrovia. However, this time even Monrovia was seized and overrun by the rebels. In response, the majority of all deployed blue helmets were evacuated; only 10 military observers remained in Monrovia. On 26 May 1996, ECOMOG succeeded in restoring the ceasefire and regained control over Monrovia. The disarmament process resumed with the support of 78 redeployed blue helmets. By January 1997 the disarmament process was officially concluded. Shortly after that, in March 1997, more ECOMOG peacekeepers were deployed (10,000), UNOMIL then counted 97 blue helmets (UNOMIL Background 2001). Periodic fighting remained throughout the country, even though the situation was stable enough to hold elections in July 1997. 78 blue helmets were mandated to facilitate and monitor the elections alongside the ECOMOG troops. The final elections were categorized as "fair and free" and Taylor was elected president. The successful elections marked the closure of Liberia's civil war. For UNOMIL the elections meant the fulfillment of its final task. The mission was terminated on September 1997, and all remaining troops were withdrawn by then.

UNOL

On recommendation of the Secretary-General (S/1997/643, 13.8.1997; S/1997/712, 12.9.1997) the UNSC established the UN Observer Office Liberia (UNOL) in order to assist Liberia's government in keeping the peace, good governance and to mobilize international resources (UNOMIL Background 2001) and to create a suitable peace-building strategy that respects the government's demands, point out any needs in capacity for the scheduled elections, to address human rights considerations and to point out the needs for the scheduled elections and human rights. The government obstructed UNOL's work because it was unable to come to a consensus in terms of essential governmental questions. Even though the military situation remained

peaceful overall from 1997, with former rebel leader Taylor in power, the tensions remained unresolved. Under Taylor's rule, there was no clear development in direction of democracy, the economy remained weak, and the security situation fragile. Especially in the rural areas, people still fell victim to rape and violence by the militia groups (S/2003/875, 11.9.2003, §5). Frustrated about the political rule and with no improvement in sight, the combatants returned to fighting.

Liberia's Second Civil War

In April 1999, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) emerged under leader Sekou Conneh. The group consisted mostly of former ULIMO members; additionally LURD had recruited children and adolescents from refugee camps and captured territories. Backed by ECOMOG and the government of Guinea the LURD's goal was to end Taylor's rule.

In late 1999, the conflict spread over Liberia's borders. With combined power the Sierra Leone's rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the NPFL started to gain ground in Guinea. The LURD pushed the rebels back to Liberia and Sierra Leone and Taylor went under massive international pressure for looting conflicts in neighboring countries. The fighting between the rebel groups continued for three years. Over time, the UN's sanctions and its strict surveillance had significantly weakened Taylor (Bøås 2010, 84). LURD on the other hand benefitted from Guinea's generous supply of military equipment and gained enough power to get into Taylor-held Monrovia. At the same time in Ivory Coast, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), a LURD splitter group, opened a new war front at the Liberian-Ivorian border, which placed additional demands on Taylor and his military capacity. In September 2002 the international community established the International Contact Group for Liberia (ICGL). Its members, representatives of the African Union, ECOWAS, Ghana, Germany, Nigeria, Spain, Sweden, UK, UN, and the World Bank, were supposed to discuss possible means to resolve the conflict.

US intervention and End Of War

By 2003, the anti-Taylor rebels had gained control over two thirds of the country; the imbalance of power to Taylor's detriment became obvious and Liberia seemed to relapse into another civil war (Lamp and Trif 2009, 22). In response ECOWAS had established the ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operation Liberia (ECOMIL) under Nigerian lead. ECOMIL's task was it to stabilize Monrovia and the surrounding area and restore security. However, the 700

peacekeepers achieved were fairly powerless against the rebel groups. Under immense regional and international pressure the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) all parties returned to the negotiation table. The United States, a delegation of the UNSC and an ECOWAS mediator joined the peace talks. Beforehand the ICGL and the mentioned parties had agreed on an “immediate and unconditional cessation of the hostilities” as the most pressing requirement for a successful conflict reconciliation (S/2003/875, 11.9.2003, §8). Taylor entered the negotiations, announcing his intention to resign from power “in the interest of peace” (S/2003/875, 11.9.2003, §9). On 17 June 2003, all parties signed the cease-fire agreement, which was broken shortly after because Taylor did not hold his promise: He refused to resign before the UN had not implemented a PKO in Liberia. The UN refused to implement a PKO as long as Taylor remained in Liberia. Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended the immediate establishment of a multinational military force (S/2003/875 11.9.2003, §10). He suggested a deployment in three phases. Phase one would be the extension of ECOMIL with a troop size of up to 1,500, which offered to be vanguard of the force group; phase two contained the deployment of international troops after Taylor’s departure, which were authorized under Chapter VII; phase three was the establishment of a UN PKO, also under Chapter VII. Resolution 1497/2003 formally authorized the plan and therefore the multinational force and a UN PKO under the condition of Taylor’s departure. Annan had asked the US to take the lead of the multinational force, but US President George W. Bush denied; instead he announced a US military intervention which would be “limited in time and scope” (Schmitt 2003). In June and July 2003, the US deployed 200 US marines and a 100 member strong Humanitarian Assistance Support Team (HAST) at Liberia’s coast. The HAST was mandated to (1) assess ECOMIL’s military capacities; (2) provide training for ECOMIL if necessary, (3) assist ECOMIL in stabilizing Monrovia, and (4) provide secure access to the capital to enable humanitarian aid to flow (US Department of Defense 2003). Shortly after HAST’s arrival, US a 4,350 strong Joint Task Force, was positioned in Liberian water territory. The soldiers served as “Quick Action Response”-force, also known as “Over the Horizon”-forces, they were mandated to provide a reaction capability in case ECOMIL’s lost control over the situation (US Department of Defense, 2003). Bush repeatedly emphasized that the US soldiers would not be “blue-helmeted” and that “we would be there to facilitate an international force’s entry and then to leave” (Rhem 2003, US Department of Defense 2003,).

On 11 August, Taylor finally kept his promise. In a historic ceremony he transferred the presidential power over to vice-president Moses Blah. The anti-Taylor rebels MODEL and LURD celebrated their victory. Under the lead of ECOWAS and UN SC delegates new peace

talks started; on 18 August, all parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, which granted the governing rule to the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) under Blah and requested a multidimensional UN PKO. The second Accra Peace Agreement officially symbolized the end of Liberia's second war. On the day Taylor resigned, Bush authorized the 4,350 combat-equipped US soldiers to get on Liberian ground, mandated to restore and provide humanitarian assistance. Bush had announced to withdraw his troops as soon as the UN PKO would deploy (Rhem 2003).

Establishing UNMIL

Following the call of the Accra Agreement the UNSC adopted the tasks of the UNPKO, based on the recommendations of a previously conducted assessment mission. By resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003 the UNSC entrusted the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to observe and monitor the cease-fire, to start dialogues with the militias leaders, to provide security to civilians, UN personnel and governmental facilities such as the airports and harbors, to develop and carry out a "Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration" (DDRR) strategy, to provide humanitarian assistance, and support the security reform the Accra Agreement called for. The resolution also implied UNMIL to take over ECOMIL's peacekeeping tasks. ECOMIL peacekeepers would be reassigned into blue helmets, operating under UN command. UNMIL compromised a maximum troop size of 15,000 military and civilian peacekeepers, which were mandated to make use of any force necessary. That made UNMIL one of the most extensive PKOs under Chapter VII of all times (S/2003/875, 11.9.2003). President Bush kept his promise and pulled US soldiers out of Liberia before the blue helmets arrived. A group of 55 US soldiers remained in Liberia in order to monitor the ongoing peace process. ECOWAS viewed the US' drawdown "with considerable anxiety" (S/PV.4815, 27.8.03, 4)

Post-war situation and UNMIL mission

By the time of UNMIL's onset, on 1 October 2003, a total of 250,000 Liberians had lost their lives in one of the two Liberian civil wars; half of them were civilians and about one million were displaced from their homes or the country (S/2003/875, 11.9.2003, §26). The 1,696 former ECOMIL peacekeepers already on the ground instantly began conducting their "new" tasks. It was not before March 2004 that UNMIL had reached its authorized troop strength

(S/2004/229, 22.3.2004, §2). By then, the security situation in Monrovia had significantly improved thanks to means such as curfews, armed patrols, vehicle and identity checks, and aerial and reconnaissance patrols conducted by the peacekeepers. Sporadic fighting still occurred but was quickly eliminated by the heavily armed forces. Furthermore, UNMIL began the planned disarmament in Monrovia, five month later Monrovia was declared weapon free. Despite the quick successes in the capital, Monrovia's outskirts as well as the rural regions remained highly violent and unstable. The three rebel groups, LURD, MODEL and supporters of the former government kept fighting each other and continued killing civilians to demonstrate their power. UNMIL gradually deployed throughout the whole country. Due to Liberia's destroyed infrastructure it took UNMIL until April 2004 to position troops in every region (S/2004/430, 26.5.2004, §2-4). The US took responsibility for creating a new security force including the civilian police (CIVPOL) and the Liberian army by providing training, administration, equipment, and financial and logistic support. The new US-trained Liberian army was successively integrated in UNMIL's security supporting the completion of tasks and gradually taking over. While the Liberian security forces played an essential role in assisting the peacekeepers, they were not able to conduct complex tasks on their own, as they constantly experienced assaults by the Liberians. It became quickly apparent that Liberia's security was directly connected with the stability in the region and that Liberia remained the " ". The ongoing civil war in Ivory Coast, for instance, triggered new fighting in Liberia. Guinea continued to smuggle weapons and natural resources across the borders, and Sierra Leoneans came to Liberia aiming to get the benefits of Liberia's reintegration program.

DDRR

On 7 December 2003 the peacekeepers started to gradually disarm the combatants. The set-up of disarmament facilities in the region went along with attacks of the still active rebel groups. By November 2004, the disarmament process was officially completed. A total of 103,109 ex-soldiers, of whom 24,810 were female, and 10,972 were former child soldiers, had handed over their weapons. Whereas the disarmament and demobilization went fairly smoothly, reintegration and rehabilitation with the objective to enable ex-soldiers to fully re-enter society was problematic. UNMIL did not have the financial resources to provide equal RR-means for all ex-combatants. Additionally, there was a delay between disarmament and reintegration, which caused tensions between the unarmed Liberians (S/2005/560, 1.9.2005, §27). The reintegration process was complicated, as it offered different reintegration means for men, women and children (Jaye 2009, 16). In the end, the DDRR process was evaluated as a success.

A survey among ex-soldiers implied that 94 percent of the participants reintegrated society without any trouble (Jaye 2009, 17). Despite the unstable security situation, post-conflict Liberia was facing additional problems: A weak economy, a destroyed infrastructure, traumatized and injured people and corruption – especially in the government – were only some of them. UNMIL’s mandate was successively extended in order to address these problems (Crisis Group 2005). In cooperation with other institutions, the UN worked on governance and management assistance programs in order to strengthen Liberia’s economy and fight corruption. Long-term issues to be addressed were transitional justice and constitutional and judicial reforms (Crisis Group 2005).

2005 Elections

UNMIL was further mandated to monitor and facilitate general elections in October and November 2005 (Res/1561/04, 11.2.2005). In cooperation with the US, the EU commission, the World Bank, ECOWAS and the AU the UN facilitated the pre-elections campaigning; it conducted voters’ education programs and realized the voters’ registration. The election process itself went by smoothly and peacefully (National Democratic Institute 2005). On 23 November Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was declared elected president of Liberia. In his report (S/2005/764, 7.12.2005) Annan called the elections “orderly and peaceful”. The 436 election observers from ten national and international institutions agreed on this evaluation, describing the elections as “peaceful, orderly, free, fair, transparent and well-administered” (S/2005/764, 7.12.2005, §5). As one of these institutions, the US’ based National Democratic Institute (2005, 29) commended: “The 2005 elections were the most competitive elections in Liberia’s history, with a multiplicity of viable candidates crying for office. Following a remarkably peaceful and highly competitive electoral campaign, voting across the country was violence-free, orderly, and well administered, despite the massive logistical difficulties associated with holding elections in Liberia’s post-conflict environment. However, elections must be viewed as only one step in ensuring democratic governance.” For the UN, the successful elections symbolized the end of Liberia’s peace transition.

UNMIL today

In the following years, UNMIL maintained its above mentioned tasks. The reintegration-rehabilitation tasks remained especially challenging; additionally, UNMIL was mandated to observe the regulation of natural resources. The mission was successively extended up to 2015. In 2015 the mission is still ongoing but in its second of three drawdown phases. Its current

mandate includes the following tasks: to protect civilians, provide humanitarian assistance, which is especially important due to the Ebola epidemic, to support the reformation of the Justice and Security Institutions, to provide Electoral Support, to protect and provide human rights, and to protect its own personnel. In January 2015, UNMIL counted 5,819 UN peacekeepers, one third of the peak number in 2004

5. Civil war in Sierra Leone

When Sierra Leone declared its independence in 1961, it experienced a mostly peaceful transition from British colonial rule to a democracy with the All People's Congress (APC) as governing party. Sierra Leone is home to 14 ethnic groups, which lived together without notable tensions (Berman and Labonte 2006,143). Civil war broke out as Sierra Leone fell victim to the broader regional conflict, which has its roots in Liberia (see Chapter 4). In March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) ruled by former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) Corporal Foday Sankoh and supported by Liberia's rebel leader Charles Taylor invaded Sierra Leone to launch a coup d'état. The RUF copied Taylor's brutal practices and gained strength by allying with other militias such as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and an armed group of around 600 young men called the West Side Boys. The rebels took Sierra Leone's main diamond and gold mining regions under their control, thereby gaining the means to supply high-quality military equipment at large scales. At that time, the RUF's only opponent was the President-loyal Sierra Leone Army (SLA). Inferior in equipment and size the SLA was an easy adversary. After one year of bloody fighting, the rebels succeeded in removing President Joseph Momoh from power; additionally, they had gained control over two-thirds of the country and caused thousands of deaths (S/1995/975, 21.11.95, § 2). In response to the humanitarian catastrophe, the political chaos, and the increasing regional instability, the Organization of Economic Countries of Western Africa (ECOWAS) decided to support the SLA and redeployed a number of ECOMOG troops from Liberia to Sierra Leone. Drawing assistance from ECOWAS, a junta called the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was established under the lead of 25-year old military officer Valentine Strasser. . It was meant to support ECOWAS and SLA in fighting the RUF. The military attempt pushed the RUF back; it did not, however, manage to drive them out. Additional attempts to negotiate a cease-fire failed. In a letter to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, Strasser requested diplomatic

help. The UN sent a Special Envoy, whose numerous attempts to get in contact with the RUF failed (S/1995/975, 21.11.95, §3-5). Throughout the following years, Strasser's junta became corrupt and abandoned its support for ECOWAS. Subsequently, Sierra Leone's communities united and built up their own anti-RUF force group, the Civil Defense Group (CDF). With combined powers ECOMOG and CDF were at least partly successful in fighting RUF and eventually the fighting reached a stalemate.

In the light of overall shifting tides of war, the RUF entered peace negotiations initiated by ECOWAS in late 1996. The result was the Abidjan Peace Accord, brokered on 20 November 1996. At that time Sierra Leone seemed sufficiently stable to hold "moderately fair and free elections" from which the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SPP) headed by former UN-diplomat Ahman Kabbah emerged as winner. The RUF had not participated in the elections and denied to recognize the SPP as ruling party. The group started new attacks and removed President Kabbah from power on 25 May 1997. ECOWAS' response was a comprehensive embargo covering weapons, petroleum, and the travel of members of the rebel groups and their families. Rebel leader Sankoh had fled to Nigeria where he was arrested and later sentenced to death. Despite Sankoh's absence the fighting continued and the rebels increasingly gained power.

ECOMOG and early UN sanctions

ECOWAS' failed diplomatic efforts and ECOWAS' request to the UN to adopt the embargo, eventually motivated the UN get actively involved into the six year-long conflict. On July 1997, the UN imposed an arms and petroleum embargo and prohibited the rebel group members and their families from leaving the country (S/Res/1123, 30.7.1997). Additionally, the UNSC authorized ECOWAS to enforce the embargo under Chapter VIII and urged member states to provide technical and logistical support for the ECOWAS mission. After all ECOMOG developed the Conakry Accord (1997), a peace plan containing the stabilization of the country through road-blocks and patrols, the disarmament of combatants, and the provision of security to international personnel and the civilians to be conducted by 15,000 peacekeepers (S/1997/824, 14.11.1997; S/1998/249, 17.3.1997, §21.). In October, ECOWAS established its third Monitoring Group (ECOMOG); up to 1,000 mostly Nigerian ECOMOG troops were deployed, in addition to that 900 Nigerian troops already on the ground were integrated in the ECOMOG mission. In presence of the African peacekeepers the situation seemed to stabilize and elected president Kabbah returned to Sierra Leone, announcing quick reconciliation efforts. Even though partly successful, ECOMOG was still suffering from logistical and financial shortcomings. Additionally, the mission experienced internal problems mainly caused by the

Nigerian leadership, which was blamed to be impartial and to pursue its own interest in Sierra Leone (S/1998/249, 17.3.1997). Additionally, ECOWAS was confronted with an additional opponent, the RUF-ally the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) emerged and gave the rebel movement new impetus. With regards to the highly fragile situation, President Kabbah stressed the immediate deployment of UN military troops.

April 1998, significantly pressured by the UK and France, the UN decided to get more involved into the ECOMOG mission and agreed on the 90-day-long deployment of ten military liaison officers to provide ECOMOG with assistance in planning for 90 days (S/Res/1162, 17.4.1998). The tasks of this mission included the monitoring of ECOMOG activities, the assessment of the military and security situation, the monitoring of demobilization and disarmament, the observation of the arms collection process, and as advising the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) (S/Res/1162, 17.4.1998).

Establishing UNOMSIL

As the UN-assisted ECOWAS mission did not make any progress, the observers found significant needs of more international support. On 13 July 1998, the UN co-deployed its own PKO with Resolution 1181 (S/Res/1181, 13.7.1998) authorized the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). This mission was composed of 70 military observers mandated to monitor the military and security situation, the disarmament and demonization process, and to offer advice on legal issues. UNOMSIL was explicitly meant to complement but not supplant the ECOMOG mission.

Shortly after the authorization the RUF committed one of its bloodiest attacks in the capital Freetown. When seizing the capital Freetown and other parts of the country the rebels killed some 5,000 civilians. Consequently, President Kabbah increasingly forfeited legitimacy, because his inability to provide security to the people. At the same time, a Sierra Leonean court sentenced RUF leader Sankoh, who was still under arrest in Nigeria, to death (S/1998/1176, 16.12.1998, §4). In December 1998, ECOWAS, representatives of the US and the UK came together and accused Liberian President Taylor to provide the RUF with weapons; Taylor denied any relations to the RUF, and ensured to respect the embargoes (S/1999/20, 7.1.1999, §13-15). The deteriorating security situation forced the UNSC to repeatedly withdraw blue helmets. By March 1999, a total small group of 10 observers was left in Sierra Leone (S/1999/20, 7.1.1999, §8).

Hostage Crisis and UNOMSIL

In May 1999, the ECOWAS, and the UN observers convinced the RUF to participate in new negotiations. The result was a ceasefire agreement signed on 18 May 1999. With the signing Annan announced a possible expansion of UNOMIL's mandate and size, depending on the further conflict developments and under the condition of signing a comprehensive peace treaty (S/1999/645, 4.6.1999, §50-52). An assessment team was sent to Sierra Leone in order to explore possible tasks and estimate the needed troop size. The negotiations for a comprehensive peace agreement continued and on 7 July 1999, the parties eventually signed the Lomé Peace Accords. The incentive for the RUF to sign it was the pardon and amnesty of Sankoh; additionally, Sankoh was designated to become vice-president of a newly elected government (S/1999/777, 7.7.1999, Art. IX, V). In turn the RUF and its allies had to lay down their weapons for good. The agreement also asked for a scheduled withdrawal of ECOMOG troops (S/1999/777, 7.7.1999, XIII) and the deployment of additional UN peacekeepers. France, the UK and UNSC members sharply criticized the Lomé Accords for its vast concessions. The UN followed the call by authorizing resolution 1260 (S/Res/1260, 17.12.1999) which authorized the expansion of UNOMSIL to 210 military observers and the provision of the required equipment. Nevertheless, the rapid withdrawal of the 14,000 ECOMOG troops created a gap that 210 blue helmets could not fill. In October Sankoh returned to Sierra Leone to take office as Vice-President. New fighting broke out and the limited number of peacekeepers on the ground had problem controlling the situation (S/1999/1223, 6.12.1999). The remaining violence restrained the combatants from participating in the disarmament process which had started in October 1999. In response to the events and UNAMSIL's obvious understaffing, the UN decided to strengthen the mandate and replaced the observer mission (UNOMSIL) for the UN Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which started in December 1999 (S/1999/1270, 22.10.1999). UNAMSIL's objectives were to implement the agreement and to assist the DDR process. The UNSC authorized the deployment of up to 6,000 blue helmets. Even though many UNSC members had recommended authorizing UNAMSIL under Chapter VII, the final mandate entrusted a Chapter VI-mission. When ECOMOG further reduced its troop size by early 2000. In response, the UNSC extended UNAMSIL for another 5,000 peacekeepers. Additionally, UNAMSIL received a Chapter VII mandate (S/Res/1289 7.2.2000). However, the authorized troops were not forthcoming because the rebels occupied Sierra Leone's international airports and the coastlines. In January the troops strength stood at 4,819 (S/2000/446, 17.5.2000) and 7,391 in March (S/2000/186, 7.3.2000). The UN was well aware of its problems; Annan noted: "One of the problems with peacekeeping has been the speed of deployment. With each delay the problems get worse"

(Kreps 2010, 17). Additionally, Annan appealed to countries that had the according capacity, such as France, the UK, or the US, to deploy troops quickly. The combination of ECOMOG's ultimate pullout and the blue helmet's delayed deployment eventually led to a security vacuum, which was exploited by the rebels. The military situation deteriorated in that the RUF committed more attacks, with UNAMSIL as particular target. The RUF's increasing violence was fueled by Sankoh, who humiliated and disregarded UNAMSIL in public statements (S/2000/186, 7.3.2000, §6).

British intervention

On 1 and 2 May 2000, the RUF and the West Side Boys managed to abduct some 400 blue helmets including 11 British peacekeepers and a helicopter. At the same time UNMASIL peacekeepers were seized and disarmed when they attempted to deploy to a RUF stronghold in a main diamond mining area. Those two events marked major setback for UNAMSIL and led the mission to a near-by collapse (Kreps 2010, 16). The remaining blue helmets were paralyzed and unsure about the mission's resumption.

Annan appealed to UNAMSIL troops to make use of their mandate and to defend themselves if necessary by the use of force. He further approached to states with rapid reaction capabilities, namely the US, France, and the UK, to intervene immediately. The US and France rejected, but UK as a former colonial power and resident state of abducted peacekeepers agreed on sending troops to Sierra Leone.

Mission Palliser

On 7 May 2000, 800 Royal Marines, a Joint Rapid Reaction Force, reached Sierra Leone. The so-called Mission Palliser was originally established to evacuate the British nationals from Sierra Leone and to provide sufficient security means for the pending UN peacekeepers to deploy. Formally, Mission Palliser did not have a combat mandate and did not require the UNSC's authorization. Within two weeks the well-equipped, professionally trained British Marines – a rapid reactionary force – managed to regain control over the main airport and maintained the evacuation of peacekeepers. Therefore, their initial mandate was fulfilled. Concerned about a renewed collapse in the case of a pullout, Prime Minister Blair extended the mission and authorized the deployment of another 500 UK marines (Evoe 2008). Officially the mandate was still limited to rescue and security tasks but Foreign Secretary Robin Cook made clear: “When I say they will not be combat troops, I don't want any misunderstandings by the rebels that these people cannot hit back and cannot hit back hard if they are attacked [...]”

(MacAskill and Norton-Taylor 2000). In line with that the British troops did not hesitate to use of their weapons, which had a deterrent effect on the RUF who started to pull back from Freetown and the airports. Unofficially, the British troops also began to support UNAMSIL in fulfilling its mandated tasks; they got involved in DDR activities but also in restoring security and more areas. Another major success was the UK's detention of Sankoh, which plunged the RUF into a leadership crisis.

The situation started to stabilize quickly and the weakened RUF were obviously daunted by the UK presence. The UN finally deployed the pending peacekeepers in mid-June 2000. By then Mission Palliser was terminated. The UK set up the follow-up mission, Mission Basilica, which contained the further security stabilization of Sierra Leone and the short-term and long-term training of the SLA and SLP by a total of 1,000 troops. Besides the training, the UK provided uniforms, equipment, officers' salaries as a means to prevent corruption (Evoe 2008, 81).

The UN's reaction on the May crisis was the restructuring of UNAMSIL with the objective to enhance the effectiveness of the operation (S/2000/832, 24.8.2000). New intelligence and communication means were established, the multinational peacekeepers were trained in coordination and cooperation, command and control structures were improved (S/2000/832, 24.8.2000, Art. V, VI) and all peacekeepers were additionally briefed in how to act according to their mandate; that included for instance the instruction to "decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly [and make] direct use of force" (S/Res/1313, 4.8.2000, §3). Furthermore, the troop size was extended to 17,500 (S/Res/1346, 30.3.01).

The remaining presence of UK troops and the overlapping mandates of UK and UN, let the two forces run into problems: The British troops were following a rigid military approach, whereas the blue helmets followed a rather political route (Bah 2012). Therefore they had problems agreeing on a strategy to fight the RUF.

The security situation started to make progress, and on 13 November 2000 a ceasefire agreement, the Abuja Agreement, was signed.

Stabilization, War ends, elections

In early 2001, the cooperation between UN and the British had improved thanks to daily briefing meetings of the commanders (S/2001/228, 14.3.2001, §19-21). In labor division they succeeded in restoring security and stability and the ceasefire continued to hold. Border patrols

were essential to security as Liberia was in the midst of its second civil war and because RUF started attacks on Guinean territory. Furthermore, the blue helmets, the British troops, and the UK-trained SLA and SLP started with the demobilization and disarmament of estimated 40,000 combatants rebels in May 2001.

The quick and successful disarmament efforts, which were completed on 17 January 2002, were followed by crucial shortcomings in terms of reintegration and rehabilitation. The UK had to provide short-term projects to keep the situation under control and prevent disarmed soldiers from going back to fighting (S/2001/1195, §23). The government managed to provide the funding for reinsertion payments for all 47,076 disarmed ex-soldiers (S/2002/1195, 24.10.2002, Art. VI). The Sierra Leoneans celebrated the weapon destruction and declared the war to be over (S/2002/267, 14.3.2002, §12). The further peace process was making enforcing progress. UNAMSIL II kept deploying troops all over the country to control the security situation. War crime courts wereset up to call prosecutors to account and thus contribute to reconciliation.

Elections

Presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled for 14 May 2002. Initially, UNAMSIL II was mandated to *assist* the National Electoral Commission in preparing the elections and to observe them (S/Res/1270, 22.10.1999). Due to the Commission's shortcomings, UNAMSIL's election related tasks were broadened to logistical and technical assistance and public information campaigns. The RUF had officially converted to a political party and participated in the elections. President Kabbah won with 70.06 percent of the votes; the RUF candidate received 1.7 percent (S/2002/679, 17.6.2002, Art. II). The elections were monitored by several international observers, which assessed them as fair, free, and fairly free of violence. For UNAMSIL II, the post-election period marked the transition to peace consolidation and national recovery. It further marked the end of the mission.

Withdrawal

In June 2002 the British troops left Sierra Leone; a small number of troops stayed to observe the further peace process. At that time, 17,800 UN peacekeepers remained in Sierra Leone mandated with peace building tasks and security provision. Another indicator of liberation and reason for relief was the (natural) death of rebel leader Sankoh, which implied the final downfall of the RUF as a militia. UNASMIL II's mandate was successively extended until 2005 to monitor the peace process and conduct peacebuilding tasks. In June 2005 the UN

started to gradually withdraw from Sierra Leone. According to plan, the last peacekeepers left the country in December 2005. To date, there are a small number of UN officials stationed in Sierra Leone. The UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOISL) are further addressing the root causes of the conflict, supervising the war trials, and observing the human rights situation.

6. Analyzing Peacekeeping Success and Failure in Liberia and Sierra Leone

The central question that rises when observing the two war histories is why did UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL I and UNOMIL fail in peacekeeping whereas UNAMSIL II and UNMIL succeeded? This paper tests two possible explanations: Situational factors and the international commitment. This chapter will discuss the explanatory power of these concepts, by testing the indicators presented in Chapter 3.

6.1. Situational Factors

When observing the situational factors it becomes obvious that they remain fairly stable over time and across the cases. Table 1 summarizes the findings (see next page).

	Sierra Leone 1991-2002			Liberia 1st Civil War 1990-1997	Liberia 2nd Civil War 1999-2003
Sit. Factor	UNOMSIL	UNAMSIL I	UNAMSIL II	UNOMIL	UNMIL
GDP per capita (current USD) ¹	170.06 USD			180.7 USD	134.7 USD
Natural Resources	Diamonds, iron ²			Iron, timber, rubber, diamonds ³	
Number of Fractions	5 ⁴			5 ⁵	4 ⁶
Kind of war	Political-Economic			Political-Economic	Political-Economic
War intensity (% of the pop) ⁷	Dead 1,24 % Displaced 49,62 %			Dead 8,47 % Displaced 52,9%	Dead 0,8% Displaced 52,9%
War Duration	11			7	4
				12	
Decisive Outcome	Yes			Yes	Yes
PK Outcome	Failure	Failure	Success	Failure	Success

Table one: Situational factors of Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL I and II) and Liberia (UNOMIL and UNMIL) over time.

¹ For all cases see: World Bank (2015)

² CIA World Factbook (2015)

³ CIA World Factbook (2015a)

⁴ The RUF, the West Side Boys, the AFRC, and Liberia's NPFL as supporter on the one side, and the SLA and the CDF on the pro-government side.

⁵ NPFL and INPFL, UNLIMO, Liberian Army (LAF), ECOMOG

⁶ LURD and MODEL, LAF and NPFL

⁷ For all cases see: Political Economy Research Institute

Economy: In both states, the economic situation prior and during the war was bad. Despite both states had promising economic potential due to their natural resources, they lacked the administrative know-how to manage and trade them. The black market boomed and revenues were reserved to the elite groups and warlords. For instance, it is estimated that Charles Taylor raised an annual amount of 400 million USD between 1992 and 1996 (Berdal and Malone 2000). Additionally, both Liberia and Sierra Leone made deceptive contracts with greedy international companies and obstructed their opportunities to compete in the international market (S/2003/937, 28.10.2003, 20).

Natural resources: Both states bear lootable natural resources. Sierra Leone possesses diamonds (CIA World Factbook); Liberia is rich in oil, gas, and timber (CIA World Factbook 2015b). From a warlord's perspective, diamonds are the more beneficial resources. Their small size make them an easy product to smuggle and their high value make them demanding products on the international black market. The shadow trade with oil, gas, and timber requires more planning in transportation and therefore more complex economic ties. Yet, they are useful resources to finance a war. In sum, both states fell victim to the *resource curse* (Collier and Hoeffler 1998).

Fractionalization: All conflicts started with a coup d'état launched by one rebel group. The number of factions changed over time as new splinter groups of the main combatting parties emerged and vanished. The rebel groups acted as peace spoilers in that they impeded the negotiations by means of violence or by not participating.

Kind of war: In both cases the root causes of war can be ruled back to greedy desires. The warlords Doe, Taylor, and Sankoh were mainly interested in their personal economic and political benefits, not so much in to eliminate possible grievances. The rebel leaders, however, used ethnic affiliation as a means of troop mobilization and therefore as an amplifier of the already present hostility. People of the same ethnic group are more committed to each other and tend to trust each other more than members of other ethnic group. In sum, greed can be identified as motive for the escalation and the persistence of a war, whereas grievances amplified the onset of a war.

War intensity: In both states the wars went along with humanitarian disasters. In Sierra Leone, almost half the population became refugees or internally displaced persons (UN 2001). Liberians were affected by displacements as well, yet even more people were killed in the two wars. It is estimated that half of the casualties are civilians (UNOMSIL Background 2001).

War duration: In both cases the conflict lasted longer than a decade. Sierra Leone's civil war lasted 11 years continuously; Liberia's war was split into two main episodes 1989/90 to 1997 and 1999 to 2003. However, as the historical background (Chapter 4) shows, the two years between those wars was not free from violence.

Decisive outcome: In all cases the war ended with the rebel's victory and the autocrats' removal from power.

The analysis shows that the situational factors remain constant within the cases over time and also across the cases; therefore, they are problematic as explanation for peacekeeping success and failure. That in turn leads to the second possible explanation, the international commitment, which will be discussed in the following section.

6.2. International Commitment

With regards to international commitment two testable indicators were presented: the mandate and the troop size. In the following it will be tested if and how those two indicators affected the divergent peacekeeping outcomes. The analysis will mainly consider the Liberian case and conduct Sierra Leone as control case. The analysis will further lay on the UN PKOs.

6.2.1. Peacekeeping Failure: The shortfalls of UNOMIL, UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL I

The UN's first crucial peacekeeping failure in Liberia is its non-intervention. In the early stages of Liberia's conflicts the UNSC denied to take any kind of responsibility. By not intervening the UNSC acted conformingly to the principle of respect of sovereignty and non-interference in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" Article 2(7). However, the UN missed addressing the conflict by any means. Attempts of the Liberian representative to the UN, William Bull, to put the topic on the UNSC's agenda were not approved (S/PV.2974, 22.1.1991, 3). That means the UN was informed about the existence of the conflict and its seriousness, but even though it did not respond it. That created the appearance of disinterest. In the first meeting on the crisis in Liberia in January 1991 William Bull firmly criticized that behavior saying "the imperative need to review, and perhaps reinterpret, the Chapter particularly its provision which calls for non-interference in the internal affairs" and further "it has hampered the effectiveness of the Council and its principal objective of maintaining international peace and security" (S/PV.2974, 22.1.1991, 3).

ECOWAS' prelude

When the civil war further exacerbated and a third party intervention became inevitable, the UN relied on the regional organization ECOWAS to take the burden of intervening militarily. Doing so the UN acted in accordance with *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), which promoted the sovereignty of regions and states (Article 16). It therefore advocated a stronger role of regional organization and states in terms of security and peacekeeping with the overarching goal of the “democratization [...] [of] the task of maintaining international peace and security” (Article 65). However, the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia turned out to be a painful test case of the more robust role of regional organizations in peacekeeping. ECOMOG was confronted with several challenges: ECOWAS’ lacked the necessary experience, the institutions⁸, the appropriate equipment, the logistics, the intelligence⁹, and the negotiation skills to implement peace in hostile theater like Liberia (Howe 1996, 173-176).

ECOWAS had authorized a large number of troops. A total of 12,500 peacekeepers appeared to be a solid number to fight the large number of rebels. However, the troops were not forthcoming. At times only 2,500 ECOMOG soldiers were on the ground. The number of soldiers was sufficient to keep Monrovia safe, but not for providing security to the whole country. Howe (1996) estimated that for maintaining ceasefire throughout the whole country some 20,000 soldiers would have been needed (168). On top of these shortcomings, ECOMOG was operating under a vague and inappropriate mandate (van Walraven 1999). The mandate comprised monitoring and observing tasks but ECOMOG was deployed when no peace agreement was at place and, henceforth there was no agreement to be observed or to be monitored. The deteriorating security situation forced ECOMOG to convert from a peacekeeping to a peace enforcement operation. Doing so the the peacekeepers did not disrespect its mandate, as ECOMOG’s mandate was “nearly [...] a *carte blanche* for military action” (van Walraven 1999, 37). As a combating party in the conflict and by later allying with the militia ULIMO, ECOMOG had inevitably ceased its impartiality. Which is critical considering the fact that impartiality is one of the main principles of peacekeeping (UN 2015a). In line with the vague mandate, also other instructions were not existing or unclear. For instance, it was not communicated if the soldiers had to bring their own equipment. Eventually, some peacekeepers arrived in Monrovia without uniforms, weapons, or equipment (van Walraven 1999). Additionally, the troops experienced internal tensions. With Nigeria as main troop and financial backer, the Nigerians perceived themselves to be superior to peacekeepers

⁸ It was said, that ECOMOG’s planning unit did not have an officer for logistics (Howe 1996, 165)

⁹ ECOMOG commanders confessed that they had underestimated Taylor’s intentions, it was thought he would agree on a power-sharing solution. Additionally, ECOMOG had no knowledge of Liberia at all: They did not even have appropriate maps of the country before the US had provided them (Howe 1995, 164).

from other countries. In consequence, the operations on the ground were unsmooth and partly inefficient. In sum, the authorized troop size demonstrates the commitment of ECOWAS to bring peace to Liberia and Sierra Leone. However the lack of capacities and experience prevented ECOWAS from reconciling the conflict. The lack of experience was also reflected in the mandate which was too vague and with its mainly monitoring and observing task inappropriate for the given conflict situations.

UNOMIL

The UN's response to the conflict was UNOMIL. The observer mission counted 368 lightly armed military and civilian observers and was authorized under Chapter VI. As the Cotonou Agreement desired, the mandate entrusted UNOMIL to observe and monitor ECOMOG's efforts in implementing peace. UNOMIL therefore had no actual mandate to contribute to peacekeeping implementation. The Cotonou Agreement in was a deeply flawed foundation for a PKO mainly because it was imprecise and inappropriate for Liberia's security environment: The Agreement clearly requested a UN PKO at the side of ECOMOG; it also specified that ECOMOG had to supervise and implement the Agreement's implementation and that UNOMIL had to verify and observe ECOMOG's work (S/26272, Article 8), but it did not explain what tasks exactly were to be done; additionally it lacked to clarify the two missions' security providing relationship and how it would function (Mackinlay and Alao 1994). Moreover, the agreement was associated with several foreseeable difficulties, which would make it challenging for UNOMIL to perform well on the ground. For instance, the agreement implied a "disarmament-resettlement-elections" strategy (Cotonou Agreement 1994, Art. 9 - 15). In practice that meant the combatants would be separated from each other once the ceasefire was in place, then they would be disarmed, and be taken back to their villages. In the end the holding of elections would close the conflict. The strategy missed the "reintegration"-component, meaning incentives for the combatants to actually lay down their weapons and look forward to a more promising life after the war. The only incentive offered was a food coupon and tools for work (Jayne 2009, 6) The potential flaws of the "disarmament-resettlement-elections"-strategy were familiar to the UN beforehand, as they were uncovered when the strategy was applied in the Cambodia (UNTAC 1992/93) and Angola (UNAVEM II 1991-95). Nevertheless the strategy was implemented in the Cotonou Agreement, which was brokered in presence of the UN representative James Jonah. In his corresponding report on the negotiations, the Secretary General mentioned that the disarmament and demobilization component was one of the most "difficult issues" to be negotiated, without going into detail. Before the actual

deployment of blue helmets members of the Security Council signaled their optimism and great expectations about the planned co-deployment. Djibouti's representative for instance called it a "shining example" of the regional and international division of labour" (S/PV.3263, 10.8.1993, 14); Morocco's representative praised it as "a major achievement" and a "good example of sound cooperation" (S/PV.3263, 9.8.1993, 17); the UK's representative called it "an excellent example of cooperation" (S/PV.3263, 27).

On paper the two missions were independent as they were operating under separate mandates and following separate command structures (S/26272, Article 1 (1, 3)). In practice, UNOMIL highly depended on ECOMOG because ECOMOG had to provide for UNOMIL's security (S/Res 813, article 12). Regarding the small troop size and the insufficient equipment (light weapons) UNOMIL was not even able to provide security for itself. That ECOMOG was not capable of providing appropriate security became obvious when 43 UN peacekeepers were kidnapped in September 1994. UNOMIL's only security procedure under its own control was a troop withdrawal from the operational region (S/46422 §14). UNOMIL had to make use of this option several times (S/Res/950 1994, 21.10.1994). As the security situation continued to deteriorate, the UN successively withdrew troops from *Liberia* (not just the region) to a minimum of 20 observers in April 1995 (from initially 368) which once more revealed that the security regulations in place were inappropriate for the given conflict situation. In general, a troop withdrawal prior the completion of the mandate should be the last resort. However, especially in 1994 behind the background of the PKO Rwanda, where 27 blue helmets lost their lives, the UN was highly sensitive in terms of its peacekeepers' security and regarded a withdrawal as the appropriate option. In sum, the formally intended independence of the two missions is highly questionable.

With establishing UNOMIL the UN was challenged to resolve the conflict, but not taking a dominant role over ECOWAS (Kihunah 2005, 122). As it was the first co-deployment for the UN, it had to create a new kind of peacekeeping mandate. Just as the Cotonou Agreement missed a specification of the labor division, the UNOMIL's mandate did not provide this either; the only specification was that UNOMIL was not authorized to participate in enforcement operations, and to "coordinate with ECOMOG in the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities both formally ... and informally" (S/Res/866, Art. 2).

UNOMIL did not have an adequate mandate to implement peacekeeping success; instead, it was mandated to supervise another mission to do so. Therefore, UNOMIL's potential impact on the peacekeeping success was limited. Nevertheless, UNOMIL also failed in even making its little contribution of monitoring and supervising ECOMOG's performance, because

ECOMOG failed to provide the required security situation and any success in implementing the agreement. The limited troop size in combination with the inadequate equipment hindered the blue helmets from protecting themselves. In the ideal case, UNOMIL with its know-how and experience in peacekeeping would have been the “thinking brain” of the combined mission, and ECOMOG with its personnel strength would have been the “muscle” carrying it out (backed with financial support of the UN). This ideal was impossible to achieve because the two missions lacked the communication mechanisms and a clear commando structure, what in turn made a military cooperation infeasible. In sum, UNOMIL suffered from an imprecise conceptual framework and a weak practical foundation, which hindered it from fulfilling its mandate *and* from making peacekeeping a success.

UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL I

An overall similar scenario can be observed in Sierra Leone. Despite the limited success of the ECOWAS/UN co-deployment, the UN decided to establish another observer mission in a setting, where ECOWAS already was in place. With UNOMSIL, the UN established a monitoring and observer mission, numbering 70 lightly armed military and civilian observers. By then ECOWAS had barely one year of peacekeeping experience, therefore, the mission’s flaws were the same as in Liberia: The mission was ill-equipped, it lacked the capacity, the communication and the logistics to establish peace in the complex conflict. With replacing UNOMSIL for UNAMSIL I the UNSC established another supervisory mission to ECOMOG under Chapter VI, which was supposed to take over ECOMOG over time and to undertake peacekeeping tasks. The biggest flaws of the ECOMOG-UNAMSIL I co-deployment was the lack of coordination and communication. ECOMOG did not clearly communicate its withdrawal plans to UNAMSIL I. ECOWAS withdrew from regions where the blue helmets had yet to be deployed. Those uncontrolled regions were immediately occupied by the rebels. Even if UNAMSIL I had been informed about the withdrawal plans, it cannot be denied that the initially authorized troop strength of 6,000 could have impossibly substituted for ECOWAS activities conducted by also twice as many peacekeepers. The UNSC’s subsequent troop expansion to 11,000 was adequate but it came too late. At the time of deployment strategically important spots such as the airport and the harbor were already under the rebels’ control and made a further deployment impossible. The main failure of transferring from ECOMOG to UNAMSIL I lies in the lack of political arrangements *prior* the actual execution of the transfer on the ground.

Furthermore UNAMSIL I's fell victim to the UN's poor planning and imprecision of the authorized tasks: Coordination among the multinational peacekeepers was poor in that The peacekeepers were confused about their mandated tasks, especially in terms of use of force. In confrontation with the RUF many peacekeepers surrendered unsure, if they were allowed to use weapons or not. Moreover, the peacekeepers were sent to highly volatile areas, being confronted with heavily armed rebels they were hopelessly inferior . Adequate planning and sufficient intelligence would have prevented events like that.

Backing UNAMSIL I with a robust Chapter VII mandate was the UNSC desperate attempt to get the deteriorating situation under control. However, the mandate-change and the troop expansion did not help to get the situation under control it rather led to confusion: The large number of newly arriving peacekeepers caused communication problems. Some peacekeepers for instance took commands from their home countries but not from their authorized commander (Evoe 2008, 87). The peacekeepers were confused about their mandated tasks, especially in terms of use of force. In confrontation with the RUF many peacekeepers surrendered unsure, if they were allowed to use weapons or not. Moreover, the peacekeepers were sent to highly volatile areas, being confronted with heavily armed rebels they were hopelessly inferior. Adequate planning and sufficient intelligence and communication would have prevented events like that.

All in all UNAMSIL I clearly demonstrates that the authorization of a strong mandate alone does not make peacekeeping a success. It is further necessary to provide the capacities which are required to fulfill the mandated tasks; that includes tools but also time for coordination. In short, a strong mandate is worth nothing if it cannot be implemented. Likewise, a large troop size is futile if it cannot be deployed. With UNAMSIL I the UN did demonstrate its political willingness and its commitment. However, it did not directly contribute to peacekeeping success.

In sum, the early missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were doomed to fail in peacekeeping because they were not adequate for the given security situation. The mandates were weak and limited to observing and monitoring. Therefore, the blue helmets were not able to contribute to violence abatement, conflict reconciliation. With UNOMIL, UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL I the UN did not only fail in peacekeeping, even more concerning it also put its own people at risk. These failures inevitably resulted in dramatic peacekeeping crises.

6.2.2. Game changer for peacekeeping: The unilateral interventions of the UK and US

In both cases the UN's lack of commitment resulted in a crisis. In Liberia the only partially fulfilled disarmament and demobilization (DD) mandate and the failure to close the conflict crucially resulted in the outbreak of another civil war. In Sierra Leone, the UN's late mandate strengthening and the inability to implement it caused the hostage crisis. In both cases the intervention of single states, namely the UK in Sierra Leone and the US in Liberia, turned the conflict situation around.

UK in Sierra Leone

The British intervention in Sierra Leone was necessary in order to fill the security vacuum that ECOWAS' premature pullout and UNOMSIL I's delayed deployment had created. Mission Palliser was small in number yet it was able to change the security situation. The mission benefitted from high quality equipment, logistics, intelligence, and, unity of the troops. The 800 soldiers were perfectly attuned to each other, which prevented the occurrence of several problems, such as misinterpretation of the mandate or communication problems. Additionally, they deployed with an Over-The-Horizon force, which enabled them to act quickly and with specially trained soldiers. Additionally, the British were tactically smart. For instance, they instantly recognized the benefits of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Police (SLP) and included them in their missions - a strategic approach the UN had missed. Furthermore, the UK troops received respect from the civilians who celebrated their arrival, and also from the rebels who started to fear the heavily armed UK forces. The UN had fortified its respect with its poor performance in early 2000. Not just the rebels disrespected the blue helmets but also the civilians who invented nicknames such as "UNAMSILLY" or "UNASTY" (Evoe 2008).

The British Mission Palliser did not have a combat mandate but the soldiers did not hesitate to make use of force if it was necessary. Doing so the British soldiers did not act perfectly according to their mandate but instead according to the requirements of the given situation. That was only possible because they were experienced enough to estimate the situations correctly and because they had the political backing. The UK's presence and its successes also had a significant psychological effect on the UN peacekeepers.

The British government demonstrated commitment in that the mission was established in the first place, when all other major powers refused to intervene. Another indicator for its commitment was the establishment of a follow-up mission to Mission Palliser. Mission Barras, also a non-combat mission, was necessary to prevent the situation from collapsing again. The extended stay was advantageous in terms of security but it did cause tensions between the two

forces on the ground: The difficulties the British troops and the blue helmets were facing during their co-deployment did not affect the overall objectives of peacekeeping success, they did however have a negative effect on the UN PKO as it made the UN shortcomings apparent. In a direct comparison on the ground, the British were operating more efficiently and overshadowed the UN peacekeepers. In sum, overtime with the co-deployment, the initially positive psychological effect the British had on the blue helmets turned into a negative psychological effect.

It can be argued that the UK became increasingly aware of its pivotal status in Sierra Leone and acted in a manner according to its own interests and estimations rather than the UN's. The strictly military approach for instance contradicts the UN's principles of minimal use of force. For the UK, Sierra Leone was a compelling opportunity to demonstrate its military power, which somewhat fell into oblivion since the UK had not conducted a large-scale military mission within two decades.

US in Liberia

The US intervention was a response to the rising international pressure. When Bush declined to operate under UN mandate, he got compelled to move considering the background of the US' historical responsibility toward Liberia. By first deploying the 300 men strong non-combatant evacuation JTF and holding more troops on standby, Bush found a middle way between a large-scale US military intervention and military idleness. Officially, the UN welcomed these efforts. When the Marines arrived in mid-August 2003, Annan's special representative Jacques Klein said: "These few Americans on the ground – it makes all the difference." (Weinert 2003).

The US Joint Task Force (JTF) played an important role in providing security to strategically important areas, such as the seaport and the airport. Once the ports were rebel free, the pending ECOMIL peacekeepers were able to deploy; by late August the number of ECOMIL troops had reached 1,696 (S/PV.4815, 4). The US training for ECOMIL peacekeepers and the provision of logistical devices were important as well. The US offered helicopter escorts to rebel-held Monrovia, where the US-trained ECOMIL troops successfully pulled the rebels out. ECOMIL further benefitted from the US' psychological backing. With the 4,350 man strong "over the horizon"-force remaining on stand-by in Liberian sea territory, ECOMIL knew they would receive support in case they lost control over the situation. The US presence further had a threatening effect on the rebels, who now needed to fear a heavily armed, well-trained US force in addition to the ECOMIL troops.

The US presence at the port area was also important for humanitarian aid. A cargo ship of the World Food Program carrying meds, food, and clothes was eventually able to reach Liberia after waiting on the water for days. Furthermore, after Taylor resigned and the “Over the horizon”-force was deployed to Liberia, they managed to establish a security passage to Monrovia and made humanitarian aid available for people there. Bush kept his promise and withdrew the majority of the US forces before the UN peacekeepers arrived. By doing so he prevented the two forces from running into problems as the British in Sierra Leone. In sum, the US intervention can be seen as a political and military vanguard as it provided the requirements the UN had posed for a PKO, namely Taylor’s detention and a peace treaty.

For the UN both third-party interventions were both blessing and curse. They were a blessing in that US and UK “saved” the UN’s PKOs, meaning its establishment in Liberia or its continuation in Sierra Leone. The UK and US did so by filling capacity gaps and providing psychological backing. The interventions were a curse for the UN because they publicly demonstrated the UN’s obvious inability in peacekeeping. The signal was sent that the UN could not solve critical situations by itself and even brought its own soldiers at risk due to preventable reasons, namely male-planning and understaffing. The impression of the UN’s shortcomings was underlined by the US’ and the UK’s refusal to operate under the UN’s mandate. It appeared that both states perceived the UN PKO framework to be insufficient to make the necessary change in the hostile theatres. With regards to this, it needs to be kept in mind that Western militaries *objectively* have some advantages over the UN’s multinational military coalition: They have the logistics, the intelligence, and most important a clearly defined command structure. The aggregation of these factors acts as a “force multiplier” (Evove 2008) which makes the US and the UK forces stronger and more efficient on the ground than the blue helmets, and can at least partially explain the UK’s and US’ refused cooperation.

The interventions were impetuses for the UN to overthink its strategies. The UNSC finally realized that an extension of the mandates, and an expansion of the troop size were inevitable to bring peace to Sierra Leone and Liberia. Representative Klein underlined this saying (on 16. Sept, three days before UNMIL authorization): “The international community must make a strong commitment now to Liberia.” And further: “The future of Liberia and its people is currently in the hands of the members of the Council. [...] If we want this mission to be successful, member States must demonstrate their will to give us the mandate and necessary resources to achieve our objectives.” (S/PV.4826, 6).

However, the rethinking was not just the UN's own interest in peacekeeping: Due to its initial poor performance, the UN was now *forced* to make the PKOs a success in order to reverse the public impression of its peacekeeping inabilities. Especially behind the background of the immense media attention on Liberia and Sierra Leone the UN could not afford another peacekeeping failure.

The intervention of the Western states also had a psychological effect on the civilians, the rebels, and the peacekeeping forces on the ground: It sent the signal that the situation was eventually taken serious enough for grand powers to eventually intervene with adequate forces and mandates. For the peacekeepers, the initially good feelings such as relief, support, and motivation were quickly replaced by negative feelings such as incapacity, deficiencies, and futility.

In sum, the US and the UK pushed the conflict consolidation forward in a way that the UN - with the given mandates and capacities - was not able to. The unilateral interventions thus contributed to peacebuilding success in that they enabled the UN PKOs to fulfill their peacekeeping tasks.

6.2.3. Peacekeeping Success: The success stories of UNMIL and UNAMSIL II

UNMIL

UNMIL was established in a post-conflict environment. A cease-fire and President Taylor's resigning were the stated conditions under which the UN was willing to deploy a second time. With these conditions the UNSC created a starting position that promised a minimum of security and one that enabled it to actually conduct *peacekeeping* tasks. Doing so the UN prevented UNMIL from running into the same problems as UNOMIL was facing. UNMIL was backed by the Joint Monitoring Committee, the Implementation Committee, and the International Contact Group. By establishing those committees the UN provided control and monitoring mechanisms that ensured UNMIL's adequate task execution and it can therefore be regarded as quality assurance for UNMIL's peacekeeping success. UNMIL's robust, enforcement mandate demonstrated that the UN had learned its lesson from the previous peacekeeping failures and that it was willing and committed to establishing and keeping the peace in Liberia. The main tasks were the provision of security to people, UN staff, and facilities; to develop and carry out the DDRR process; and to prepare the elections. A troop size

of 15,000 blue helmets was entrusted to fulfill these tasks. That record number was necessary especially in order to provide security all over the country.

UNMIL's quick success in providing security was a good start for the mission. It gave the peacekeepers confidence in their abilities and created credibility among the civilians. The successful disarmament process was an essential mean to abate the violence. The fact that so many ex-soldiers (100,000) were willing to hand over their weapons showed that they really believed the war is over, and that they would not need their weapons anymore to provide for their own security. In order to inform people about the possibility to disarm, UNMIL started public information campaigns. It used media campaigns (mostly radio) and public performances. Furthermore, the disarmament of some former rebel leaders was celebrated in public. Those promotion campaigns were essential to encourage more fighters to disarm, but also to educate the civilians about the necessity of forgiving those ex-fighters and reintegrate them. Those campaigns essentially promoted UNMIL and its activities, which in turn created more credibility among the civilians. With regards to the reintegration and rehabilitation success claims are harder to sustain. However reintegration and rehabilitation are essential for the conflict reconciliation and for the elimination of hostilities. By not providing sufficient reintegration means UNMIL had again fortified the credibility and trust of some ex-soldiers. With the intention to enable Liberia for its own security in the long run. The US undertook the recreation of the security force, namely the Army and the National Police. Whereas, the training went well and fairly smooth, the integration of the security forces in practice was more difficult. The security forces were repeatedly attacked by former rebels but also verbally discredited by civilians. Therefore it was evident that Liberia was still far from being able to provide for its own security and that the Liberian's were not ready yet to accept national security forces. The meetings with the head of other PKOs in the neighboring countries, especially with Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast were an effective mean of conflict containment. The meetings were an opportunity to discuss political means for getting the conflicts in the region under control. However, the practical execution of conflict containment turned out to be more difficult. The large-scale smuggle of small and light weapons for instance continued. One of UNMIL's greatest success in peacekeeping was the effective support and observation of 2005 elections. The fact that the elections went by peacefully and emerged a democratically elected President was a major success in peacekeeping. The elections symbolized the start of a new political era.

UNAMSIL II's success

After the hostage crisis UNAMSIL I eventually received the necessary dedication and attention of the UNSC. The mandate changes were made based on the recommendations of an assessment mission that had interviewed UNAMSIL I peacekeepers in order to find out which internal flaws actually led to the crisis. Doing so, the UN demonstrated its willingness to improve. In the end, the mandated tasks of UNAMSIL I and II remained mostly the same. The main difference was an expansion of the troop size to up to 17,500 peacekeepers. Additionally the UN implemented training sessions and regular meetings in order to make sure, that UNAMSIL II troops would have a shared and correct understanding of their tasks and liberties. UNAMSIL II's achieved quickly peacekeeping successes. Only one month after its establishment, it had brokered the Abuja Agreement, which marked the end of the final conflict settlement.

In terms of DDDR, UNAMSIL II was confronted with similar challenges and successes as UNMIL: The disarmament proceeded fairly peaceful and encouraged 75,000 ex-soldiers to lay down their weapons. Contrary to that, the reintegration processes were flawed. The main problem was the limited number of reintegration projects. The few existing projects were run by local organizations. Poor planning and communication led to confusion between these organizations and UNAMSIL II further complicated the reintegration means. (Berman and Labonte 2006, 203).

UNAMSIL II's large-scale border and air patrols provided security and prevented neighboring conflicts from spreading over to Sierra Leone. In order to provide long-term security and law enforcement, UNAMSIL II trained and restructured the national police forces which gradually took over UNAMSIL II's tasks. Sierra Leone also participated in the meetings of the head of states in West Africa as a means to establish security in the region. Additionally, UNAMSIL II was mandated to conduct several peacebuilding measures which contributed to long-term stability in Sierra Leone. In sum, the UN promotion of UNAMSIL II can be regarded as a "success story" (UN 2015b).

7. Conclusion

This paper answers the question what explains the different outcomes of PKOs in Sierra Leone and Liberia over time. It conducted two within-case analyses and additionally a cross-case comparison and tested the explanatory variables situational factors and international commitment. As the situational factors remained constant over time and across the cases they could not sufficiently explain the different peacekeeping outcomes. The paper therefore

supports the established hypothesis that the international commitment determines whether PKOs succeed or fail. International commitment includes the strength of the mandate and the number of troops deployed. The early missions UNOMSIL, and UNAMSIL I in Sierra Leone and UNOMIL in Liberia failed because they were authorized under weak monitoring and observing mandates and counted only small numbers of troops. Those kinds of mandates were inappropriate for the hostile conflict theatres of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The small numbers of peacekeepers, were not only unable to implement peace, they were also unable to provide for their own safety. That became evident when the ill-equipped peacekeepers were kidnapped in Sierra Leone and withdrawn from Liberia. In both cases, a military unilateral military intervention was needed in order to turn the conflict situation around. The small number of those well-equipped and well-trained soldiers restored the security situation in short-term. Therefore, they paved the way for new PKOs. The UN's second attempts to implement peace, UNAMSIL II and UNMIL, turned out to be more successful. Backed with a robust, enforcement mandate and record troop sizes those missions succeeded in peacekeeping.

This paper offers yet another proof for the existing argument that UN PKO bears great potential for peacekeeping if they are conducted in a prepared environment and if they are backed by extensive international commitment. Especially the focus on West Africa offers an interesting angle, as the region is still afflicted by civil wars and immense political instability, which could easily to relapse in a conflict. The reinforcing dynamics of the Sierra Leonean civil war and Liberia's civil war make the two cases compelling for a comparison in the first place. It would now be interesting to analyze the impact and dynamics of other conflicts in the region, for instance Guinea, in order to further proof the findings. A comparison with later conflict in the Ivory Coast would be compelling in order to see if the UN really has learned its lessons from Sierra Leone and Liberia or if it was just aiming to prevent Liberia and Sierra Leone being added onto the long list of peacekeeping failures in the early and mid-1990s.

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