The Promise of a Better Future:
ECOSOCC in theoretical perspective



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Master Thesis Political Science, Leiden Universtity

The Promise of a Better Future:

ECOSOCC in Theoretical Perspective

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Submitted on Monday, June 8th 2015

Word count (excluding appendix and literature): 17.901

Abstract

The research question central in this thesis is 'which theoretical perspective best explains the creation of the Economic, Cultural and Social Council in the African Union?'. In order to answer the question, three different perspectives, each originating from a different theoretical school of thought, are used in a case study design. Each of the theories employ different assumptions in order to describe why certain thing happen and others don't. Neorealism is based on assumptions of an anarchic world in which self-interested states compete for power, and that their position in the international structure is what defines the behavior of states. In contrast, the social constructivist view assumes that it is not the need for power, but norms and the logic of appropriateness that shape state behavior. Finally, sociological institutionalism assumes that global cultures shape how states present themselves, but that decoupling between rhetoric and practice is a necessary consequence because national and global cultures do not fit correctly. The observations drawn from the case study show little support for the social constructivist perspective but much support for the other two theories as explanations for the creation of ECOSOCC. However, the theories need not be regarded as contradictory but rather as complementary perspectives which employ different levels of analysis. Together, neorealism and sociological institutionalism seem to best explain the creation of ECOSOCC in the African Union.

Acknowlegdments

I would first like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor Dr. Theresa Reinold for introducing me to the topic of this thesis. Prior to starting this research, my interest in African institutions was very limited and my focus was more directed towards singular events such as conflicts. However, during the research and writing process of this thesis I developed a deeper appreciation for the importance of institutions and their activities. Additionally, I discovered once again how much perspective matters in our understanding how the world works.

Also, I would like to thank my mother Odile van Ditzhuijzen who has thought me what perseverance is and has shown me that any hardship can be overcome as long as you keep believing and find the strength to carry on.

Inhoud

1. Introduction

The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) was met with great enthusiasm from politicians, civil society and some scholars alike. The AU was to evolve far further than just being a successor of the OAU. Indeed, it included far-reaching objectives and principles showing great promise for the integration, development and democratization of the African continent. One of the new principles described in the AU Constitutive Act was the intent of becoming a people-driven organization. One of the institutions created to fulfill this aim was the Economic, Cultural and Social Council (ECOSOCC), established in Article 22 of the AU Constitutive Act.

But ECOSOCC has received much criticism in the past few years, and many have conveyed that the institution is ineffective. Concerns have even been expressed that the institution might never fulfill its intended role as a representative for the African People in the AU (Gyimah-Baodi 1996, 117-8; Moyo 2008, 275-8). These observations give rise to questions concerning the motives behind the creation of ECOSOCC. An approach to identify and perhaps even understand the underlying motives for the creation of ECOSOCC, is the application of International Relations Theory frameworks. Applying this method in order to gain insight into ECOSOCC will form the focus of this thesis. More specifically, the research question for this thesis is as follows:

Which theoretical perspective best explains the creation of the Economic, Cultural and Social Council in the African Union?

In order to answer the research question, the theoretical frameworks of neorealism, social constructivism and sociological institutionalism will be used to develop six different hypothesis to be subsequently tested in a case study of ECOSOCC.

First, chapter 2 will offer a case description and describe how the African Union evolved in Africa and in what context ECOSOCC was created. Chapter 3 offers a theoretical framework and contemplates the three theories of neorealism, social constructivism and sociological institutionalism, provides their assumptions and introduces the hypothesis derived from the theory. The methodology, including an overview of the methods of analysis and the operationalization of the variables will be presented in Chapter 4.

Chapter 5 applies the theoretical frameworks to the case and tests the assumptions of the subsequent theories in order to determine whether the presented hypothesis are supported by the findings, before discussing these findings and answering the research question in chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 presents a summary of the findings.

The analysis will show that there is little support for understanding the creation of ECOSOCC through the social constructivist perspective. However, both neorealism and sociological institutionalism seem to be appropriate models for explaining the motives driving the establishment of ECOSOCC. Instead of presenting contradictory perspectives, these two frameworks offer the possibility of complementary use, as both focus on different levels of analysis. The paper concludes with the assertion that the creation of ECOSOCC can best be explained by a combination of neorealism and sociological institutionalism.

2. Case description

In order to provide the context for this research, this chapter will offer the background information on the Economic, Social and Cultural Council required for the research in this paper. To this end, not only ECOSOCC itself is considered, but also the events and institutions leading up to the creation of it, such as pan-Africanism, the Organization of African Unity and the African Union. Additionally, this chapter will discuss the concerns surrounding ECOSOCC and the criticism it received.

2.1 From pan-Africanism to the Organization of African Unity

The African road towards integration finds it roots in the movement of pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism first developed in the Caribbean at the end of the 19th century where slave trade and discrimination had created a strong incentive for unity and solidarity amongst members of the African diaspora and glorification of Africa as its motherland. Starting of as a predominantly racial and cultural movement, pan-Africanism slowly gained a political dimension in Africa from the middle of the 1950s. And so it became a political movement committed to end colonialism and stimulating socio-economic development. While definitions of pan-Africanism can vary, from being denoted as an ideology to a political doctrine, the overarching principle of unity amongst the African people, both inside and outside of the continent, has been the persistent key element across the definitions (Bedjaoui 2012, 10-1).

Another very influential event, which strengthened the pan-African movement, was decolonization. Large parts of Africa had been colonized by Western European powers in the late 19th century. Following the Second World War, US president Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill released a declaration stating the war aims of their respective countries. This declaration was titled the Atlantic Charter and contained a provision on the autonomy of imperial colonies. Even though the document was not an official treaty and therefor never ratified, it became one of the most influential documents of its time (Karski 2014, 330). Through pressure from both the US and African Colonies, decolonization started.

Inspired by the pan-African ideology and motivated by the newly acquired self-determination, African leaders fought for the liberation of Africa as well as for the unification of the continent. Kwame Nkruhma, who became the first president of Ghana after the country claimed its independence in 1957, is one of the leaders in defining the foundation of African Unity

following the pan-African ideology. African states increasingly started to openly condemn imperialism and colonialism and the support for independence movements grew (Bedjaoui 2012, 12-3). In the 1960s, decolonization moved at a fast pace and most African states were winning their independence (Badejo 2008, 16).

Both pan-Africanism and decolonization can be seen as the catalysts for founding the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963. The kind of organization that the AOU was to become was discussed during a pan-African conference held in Liberia in May 1961. Therein was decided that a loose form of organization was preferred, wherein cooperation on economic, cultural, scientific and technical topics amongst states would be promoted while the sovereign integrity of all independent states was kept intact (Elias 1965, 243). The aim of the organization was thus to bring African nations together and strengthen independence from colonial nations, while at the same time respecting sovereignty (Badejo 2008, 12).

In its early years, the OAU spent much of its time assisting the liberation of African states from colonialism and liberation movements (Murray 2004, 3). The greatest successes of the OAU are its role in the decolonization of Africa, as well as its actions against the Apartheid regime in Southern Africa and the creation of a common socioeconomic agenda. However, it has been severely critiqued for its "dismal record in respect of its other declared objectives" (Maluwa 2012, 29).

Global events also pushed African leaders to reconsider the OAU. Especially the end of the Cold war reinforced the view that the organization, in its present form, was no longer fit to respond to new challenges.

Other influential events recognized in literature are the rising influence of neo-liberal economic ideologies and liberal democratic principles; the increasing demands for the respect of human rights and the inclusion of civil society organizations; and the personal rivalries among some African political leaders (Makinda & Okumu 2008, 31; Welz 2013, 3). Additionally, the 1990s introduced new pan-African theories and proposals which no longer were in line with the OAU, such as the Arusha Charter calling for the need of integrated civil society. The wish to change the organization to adapt it to the globalizing world, as well as to regain a position on the world stage, was born. A compromise on what this organization would look like was reached during the extraordinary summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, in September

1999. This compromise took the form of the Sirte Declaration, which established the African Union (Maluwa 2012, 30-4; Bedjaouni 2012, 19).

2.2 The African Union

The African Union Treaty was adopted and immediately signed by 27 African countries in July 2000 in Lomé, Togo. This treaty discussed the dissolution of the OAU within a year and its replacement by the new organization, the African Union and its Constitutive Act (Bedjaouni 2012, 19-20). While the Constitutive Act of the African Union was already adopted in July 2000 and the establishment of AU officially declared by the Assembly of the OAU in March 2001, it took until May 2001 before the Act entered into force, after two-thirds of the OAU members had ratified it. From that moment onwards, the Constitutive Act superseded the OAU. However, the OAU was given a year of transitional period before being completely replaced by the AU. The inaugural session of the AU took place in July 2002, a day after the OAU's final summit (Maluwa 2012, 31).

Vision, motives and principle

The African Union has not only replaced its predecessor in name, but has included great changes to its constitution. In its Constitutive Act, consisting of 33 disposable articles, the African Union envisions "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena" (www.au.int[1], retrieved on 04/06/2015). Among the 14 objectives stipulated by the Constitutive Act of the AU, we can find the objectives to

- "promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
- promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;
- promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
- promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human instruments;
- establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations; and

- COORDINATE AND HARMONIZE THE POLICIES BETWEEN THE EXISTING AND FUTURE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES" (AU Constitutive Act, 5-6; see appendix A for a complete list of the objectives).

While the OAU objectives was relatively narrow in scope, the Constitutive Act of the AU includes a far more profound emphasis on economic and political integration, but especially a new commitment to the advancement of ideals such as peace and security, human rights, rule of law, good governance and democracy. The key mission of the organization is to create greater unity and cooperation in order to improve living conditions in Africa. For this reason, literature speaks of a "complete break with its predecessor organization" (Badejo 2008, 12; Yusuf & Ouguergouz 2012, 1).

Another surprising changes to the AU in contrast to the OAU, is the incorporation of very expended principles which can have far-reaching implications (Maluwa 2012, 44). Amongst these are the principles of "participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union"; "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity"; "respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance"; and "condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments" (AU Constitutive Act, 6-7; see appendix B for a complete list of the principles).

Structure

The African Union represents all 54 nations of the African continent, with the exception of Morocco. The admission to membership depends solely on the acceptance of the founding treaty of the organization. Membership can constitutionally be refused if governments have come to power through unconstitutional means such as military coups or corrupt elections. The AU can also suspend members whose government is deemed to have changed through unconstitutional means (Badejo 2008, 13).

The Constitutive Act of the AU established 17 key institutions. The supreme institution of the AU is the Assembly, comprised of the Heads of State or their accredited representatives. The Assembly determines the common policies of the Union and monitors their implementation within Member States. The Executive Council is composed of Ministers or other Authorities designated by Member States. The Council coordinates and takes decisions on policies of

common interest as articulated by the Assembly, and is thus mainly responsible for the implementation of policy decisions made by the Assembly. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was established in accordance with the expressed vision of a people-driven African Union. The aim of PAP is to become an institution with full legislative powers, composed of members elected by the people of Africa. PAP's ultimate function is to facilitate the implementation of policies and objectives of the African Union. However since it does not have legislative power, it cannot yet fulfill this task. The institution responsible for the executive tasks is the Commission. Furthermore, the AU consists of several specialized organs and the Court on Human and People's Rights (www.au.int[1], retrieved on 04/06/2015).

Challenges constituted by these institutions are manifold. According to a report by the Center for Conflict Resolution, some of these institutions have overlapping mandates, while others have competing ones. Furthermore, some institutions, such as the aspiration to create a Court of Justice, seem to represent wishes and ideas rather than presently existing needs. Also, some institutions, such as PAP which still lacks legitimacy, and ECOSOCC, which seems to have failed in its function to mobilize CSOs, are relatively powerless (CCR Report 2013, 23).

2.3 The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)

ECOSOCC, together with PAP, was specifically designed to increase the voice of the African people in the AU's decision making procedures, in accordance to the AU objectives stated in the Constitutive Act (Kane et al. 2007, 9). The institution is, more specifically, invoked in article 22 of the AU Constitutive Act (www.au.int[2], retrieved on 04/06/2015). Because there is no protocol to the article establishing ECOSOCC, the status of the organ is based on the statutes which have been adopted by the Assembly, meaning that amending the statutes of ECOSOCC is relatively easy (Kane et al. 2007, 33).

Within the OAU, the task to facilitate civil society contribution rested upon the Conference for Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), established at the OAU summit in Lomé in 2000 and reinforced by a Memorandum of Understanding which was adopted two years later at the Durban summit. The CSSDCA was transferred into the AU and tasked with the establishment of ECOSOCC. Under its auspices, the first civil society conference took place in June 2001. At the second conference, organized in 2002, the proposed statutes of ECOSOCC were reviewed. The statutes had been prepared by a working group nominated by the, at the time interim, chairperson of the AU. Review of the prepared

statutes happened by another working group comprised of both AU and Civil Society Organization (CSO) members. The revised draft of ECOSOCC was subsequently presented to the fourth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of Ministers in Maputo in July 2003 which proposed further amendments. The statutes were finally accepted by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government in Addis Ababa in July 2004 (Kane et al. 2007, 33). In late 2005, the CSSDCA was given a new name, after which it has been referred to as the African Citizen's Directorate (CIDO).

Structure

ECOSOCC is a purely advisory organ of the AU. It can give recommendations on existing policies and programs, as well as propose programs fitting to the principles of the AU. In a more abstract manner, the AU states ECOSOCC's function as the connecting organ between CSOs and the organization, and through that a contributor to the promotion of human rights, gender equality, child rights, rule of law, good governance and democratic principles (www.au.int[3], retrieved on 05/06/2015).

In accordance to article 22 of the Constitutive Act (Appendix C), ECOSOCC is composed of different social and professional groups of the AU Member States (www.au.int[4], retrieved on 06/06/2015). These include, but are not limited to, social groups, professional groups, NGOs, CBOs and Cultural Organizations. The composition also includes CSOs from the African diaspora (ECOSOCC statutes, 4).

ECOSOCC includes a General Assembly, a Standing Committee, Sectoral Clusters Committees and a Credentials Committee. The General Assembly is the highest body of ECOSOCC and is composed of 150 CSOs: two from each Member State, ten regional, eight continental, twenty from the African diaspora and six in ex-officio capacity. Furthermore, the General assembly must meet the requirement of a 50% gender equality as well as be composed by a minimum of 50% youth representatives between the age of 18 to 35 years (ECOSOCC statutes, 5). The General Assembly meets once every two years and is responsible for electing the members of the Standing Committee, prepare and submit advisory opinions and reports; make proposition on the budget and activities of ECOSOCC; review and adapt the code of ethics an conduct for CSOs working with or affiliated to the AU and review ECOSOCC's activities. Also, the General Assembly elects the five members of the Bureau and its Presiding Officer (ECOSOCC statutes, 8-9).

The Standing Committee is the executive branch of ECOSOCC and is responsible for the coordination of ECOSOCC's work. Furthermore, the Standing Committee is responsible for preparing the General Assembly meetings as well as preparing and submitting annual reports to the Assembly of the AU. The Standing committee, in consultation with the Commission, is also responsible for determining the conditions for observer status admission to ECOSOCC. The Standing Committee is composed of 18 members: the six members of the Bureau, the chairpersons of ten Sectoral Cluster Committees and two representatives of the Commission (ECOSOCC Statutes, 9).

The Sectoral Clusters Committees function as the operational mechanisms of ECOSOCC and aims at formulating opinions and providing advice and inputs on ten specific topics of the AU. These topics are: peace and security; political affairs; infrastructure and energy; social affairs and health; human resources, science and technology; trade and industry; rural economy and agriculture; economic affairs; women and gender and cross-cutting programs. The Sectoral Clusters Committees prepare and submit reports to ECOSOCC on their specific subjects (ECOSOCC statutes, 10-11).

The Credentials Committee is responsible for inspecting the credentials of ECOSOCC members and their representatives. This committee is composed of five regional representatives, one representative of the diaspora, one representative of special interest groups and two representatives of the Commission (ECOSOCC statutes, 11).

The secretariat activities of ECOSOCC are assumed by CIDO, which has the additional responsibility of being the liaison between the AU and civil society on the African continent and the African diaspora (Kane et al. 2007, 30).

Membership

The ECOSOCC statutes state ten different requirements to be fulfilled by CSOs in order to become eligible for ECOSOCC. Amongst these requirements, are the requirements that CSOs need to have similar objectives and principles to those of the AU; the requirement that at least 50 percent of the resources of the CSO is derived from membership to the CSO; and the requirement that CSOs need to be registered in a Member State of the Union or either meet the General conditions of eligibility for the granting of Observer Status or be a proven or

registered diaspora CSO for at least three years (ECOSOCC statutes, 6-7; see appendix D for the complete list of eligibility requirements).

The funding criteria, which states that at least 50% of the CSO funding must originate from within Africa, excludes over 80 percent of the NGOs that have been working on the AU. This caused a lot of criticism from the civil society (Kane et al. 2007, 54). The effectiveness of the institution is further restricted by the requirement that CSOs must be registered in one of the AU Member States. Because African CSOs are often not well organized, this is likely to be responsible for the exclusion of another great number of CSOs. Finally, the requirement of CSOs having 'similar objectives' as the African Union might mean the exclusion of critical CSOs, while at the same time coercing CSOs in ECOSOCC to think like the AU. As Moyo points out, this leads to an ineffective and uncritical ECOSOCC wherein civil society is not realistically represented (Moyo 2008, 275-8).

Election troubles

The very first meeting of ECOSOCC took place in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 2005. As not all the national and regional structures of ECOSOCC had yet been fully constructed, the first mandate for the interim ECOSOCC extended for a period of two years, from March 2005 to March 2007 (Akokpari et al. 2008, 298-300).

During the 21st Ordinary Session of the Council, a decision was adopted directing the Commission to make arrangements for the election of the ECOSOCC General Assembly and the ECOSOCC Statutes. Subsequently, the Commission developed an election framework based on four components: a call for application; the process of receiving and sorting out the applications; procedure for verification and appraisal of eligibility and election management.

The actual election was expected to take place in the second half of 2012. However, the application deadline was extended twice because of unsuccessful appraisal processes, which produced very little eligible candidates. In total, 219 candidates were reviewed, but only 52 of those applications were able to meet the eligibility requirements specified in ECOSOCC statutes. As a consequence, it was decided to postpone the elections, allowing applications until 30 June 2014 (Executive Council 2014, 2-3; www.au.int[5], retrieved on 05/06/2015). The Second General Assembly was elected shortly after, but 15 March 2015, ECOSOCC issued a statement calling for candidates to apply for by-elections into the General Assembly in order

to increase the body's representativeness. The application, according to the statement, will be accepted until 31 December 2015 (www.au.int[7], retrieved on 07/06/2015).

The elections finally took place in December 2014. The composition of ECOSOCC includes CSOs from 33 out of the 54 Member States of the AU, with only few Member States providing two representatives, accounting for a total of 50 CSOs originating from Members States. Additionally, six regional representatives were elected and 8 continental representatives. This summed up to a General Assembly of only 64 members from the envisaged 150 (www.au.int[6], retrieved on 05/06/2015). Until now, ECOSOCC has been primarily focused on shaping its own structure, and has not yet been able to fulfill its function as an advisory organ to the AU.

Further concerns

ECOSOCC has encountered several problems since its official establishment in 2005. According to Kane et al. (2007), there is a great variety in the knowledge and development of the ECOSOCC model across the Member States. In this regard, Kenya seems to be the most advanced, while other Member States seem to have no ECOSOCC presence of any kind. In yet other Member States, national chapters of ECOSOCC have been established but show a low level of CSO participation and representativeness (2007, 35). Also, little publicity about the organ, functions and elections result in a relatively small amount of participation (Kane et al. 2007, 54). Furthermore, the process of election of representatives of both national chapters and continental chapters, are unclear and flawed (Kane et al. 2007, 6).

Another concern voiced at the Addis Ababa meeting in 2007 was the role played by CIDO, which acts as a secretariat to ECOSOCC as well as being the focal point for CSOs within the AU (Kane et al. 2007, 54). Because ECOSOCC remains extremely reliant on CIDO for funding, advice and administrative support, the effectiveness and representativeness of the directorate influences the capabilities of ECOSOCC (Kane et al. 2007, 6). For example, the selection criteria employed by CIDO in selecting participants to fora and interim structures of ECOSOCC have been unclear (Akokpari et al. 2008, 298; Kane et al. 2007, 31-5).

Finally, ECOSOCC's legal framework severely limits its position and effectiveness by limiting its capabilities to a mere advisory function. Because of these concerns, it is voiced that ECOSOCC cannot be seen as a credible voice of independent CSOs and is therefore not able to play its intended role within the AU (Kane et al. 2007, 6-7). This is further endorsed by reports stating

that the quality and substance of debates in ECOSOCC have been very poor, raising the concern that fora were used more in order to endorse passed decisions than to influence future ones (Kane et al. 2007, 31).

A more general problem of the AU also affects the functioning of ECOSOCC. Problems with Member States' lack of commitment lead to dysfunctional participation in the institutions of the AU undermining the legitimacy of these institutions (Welz 2013, 5). Furthermore, a great lack of both financial and human resources severely restricts the capabilities of all the AU's institutions. To illustrate the situation, the AU Commission employed 669 people in 2012, compared to the 33.000 employees of the European Union. While many Member States still do not pay their membership fees, around 55 percent of the AU's core budget in 2013 was provided by external actors (CCR report 2012, 13-4 & 30; Welz 2013, 5). As Kingah and Langenhove rightly state, "regional organizations which lack resources cannot be expected to perform optimally", hence the lack of resources creates a serious problem for inter alia ECOSOCC (2012, 212).

3. Theoretical framework

In order to understand upon which ideals the decisions leading up to the establishment of ECOSOCC within the AU were based, we turn to International Relations (IR) theories. IR theories provide different views which attempt to explain world politics and globalization according to a variety of assumptions. Of these theories, realism has been the most influential theory used to explain foreign policy and intra-state relations. Over the years, realism developed many different strains within its own theory, such as neorealism, defensive structural realism and neoclassical realism, as a reaction to critique uttered against classical realism from other IR theories. At the present, neorealism is the most dominant strain of realism within mainstream North American IR studies (Baylis et al. 2011, 83)..

Next to the development of theories in the field of IR, other fields of research such as sociology and organization theory became of increasing interest to political scientists (Hall & Taylor 1996, 946). While there is a large variety of IR theories applied to make sense of world politics, the extend of this paper does not allow for a deliberation of each of the existing theories. Hence, a restricted selection must be made of theories to be tested.

Seeing that neorealism at the present is the prominent theory in IR, this theory claims enough relevance to be discussed in this paper. Furthermore, two other theories with a special focus on how organizations develop shall be the topic of this research: social constructivism and sociological institutionalism. These three theories offer a wide range of assumptions which can, in their turn, be translated into different hypothesis to be tested against the casus at hand.

This chapter shall offer an overview of the theories and outlay their underlying assumptions.

3.1 Neorealism

The development of realism as we know today happened in the late 1930s and early 1940s with the works of Carr and Morgenthau. Their theories contrasted sharply against the interwar period idealistic theory of international relations. The idealistic theory claimed that there was harmony of interests among states and that international conflict could be resolved through international law and democratization (Griffiths et al. 2014, 292). In contrast, realism presented assumptions which gave a much more grim perspective for international relations. Morgenthau, one of the first scholars employing the term ‘realism’, offered three core

assumptions: (1) the most important actors are nation-states or their decision makers because of the anarchic structure of the global system; (2) international policy does not reflect domestic politics as states are motivated by their survival instinct and (3) the struggle for power is what defines international relations (Vasquez 1998, 37; Griffiths et al. 2014, 292). Furthermore, Morgenthau places much importance on the influence of the flawed human nature and failures of individuals as defining elements in state behavior (Elmar & Jensen 2014, 3).

The realism theory has dominated the field of IR since 1939, when the start of World War Two made it quite apparent that the ideologist theory failed to explain the events (Dunne & Schmidt 2011, 86). However, regardless of its huge success, realism was also subject to much criticism. One of the critique was that realism failed to explain sufficiently the increase of interdependence amongst states. Also, the assumption of the flawed human nature could not properly account for periods of peace and cooperation which periodically happened. This is when neorealism made its entrance into IR (Griffiths et al. 2014, 293).

Neorealism argues, in contrast to classical realism, that international politics are defined by the structure of the global system, and dismisses the assumption that human nature and its flaws is responsible for states' foreign policy decision (Waltz 1979, 77-99; Lamy 2011, 116).

The theory of neorealism aims at explaining foreign policy at three different levels. Firstly, it provides an understanding of foreign policy actions specifically. Secondly, the theory provides an explanation for overarching themes in foreign policy and thirdly, it offers an explanation for the general relationships in international affairs (Palmer & Morgan 2006, 14-5). Waltz, as one of the founders of neorealism, claims that the most important and defining concept in international relations is structure. According to Waltz, structure, and not its units, is responsible for shaping the way international relations works. If a structure is appropriately defined, its effects could be transferable to another similar structure (Waltz 1986, 330). Therefore, it is not human nature which influences the way states approach their foreign policy, but necessity. Waltz explains political structure according to three characteristics: its ordering, the similarity of the units and the distribution of capabilities (Waltz 1979, 77-101).

More thoroughly explained, this means that states function in an anarchic world where there is no higher power to rule or protect them. Because of this fact, states, who are mostly

concerned with their own survival, compete with each other in terms of the amount of power they have. States' main goal is survival, which they try to attain by balancing their own power to that of others. According to neorealism, the material capabilities controlled by a state are the basis of its power, which encompasses not only military power, but also socio-economic power needed for the growth of military power, such as wealth, population size and political power (Mearsheimer 2007, 83).

Another important element of neorealism is the belief that the internal structure of states does not influence its behavior, as the state behaves according to its position in the hierarchic order of the system. For this reason, it does not matter what the internal structure of a state is, e.g. whether it is democratic or not, as all states who find themselves in a similar position in the hierarchy will function in a similar manner. Differing paths in policy decision are a result of Waltz' third characteristic: the amount of accumulated capabilities (Lamy 2011, 119).

In summary, this produces five assumptions:

1. States are the main actors in international relations and they operate in an anarchic system;
2. All states possess some capabilities and can therefore inflict harm on others;
3. States can never be certain of the intentions of others;
4. A states' main goal is survival;
5. States make rational decisions in order to maximize their gains (Mearsheimer 2007, 73-4).

Putting these assumptions together creates a system wherein states need to compete with other states they do not trust in order to survive. This competition means shifting the balance of power in their favor by acquiring more capabilities. This creates the security dilemma, which entails that the increase of a state's security means a decrease in another state's security. Therefore, every shift in the balance of power generates an incentive for another shift (Mearsheimer 2007, 75).

With regard to the development of intergovernmental cooperation, neorealism at first seems to present a problem: why would states which do not trust each other and compete with each other cooperate and form intergovernmental organizations? (Caporaso 1992, 605). This question is answered by the claim that states, concerned with relative gains, will enter into

cooperation if they believe they can increase their relative gain through such a cooperation (Shimko 1992, 298; Snidal 1985, 593-5). The incentive for cooperation is thus self-help. According to neorealists, the internal hierarchy in cooperative initiatives are a reflection of the hierarchy in the global system. Furthermore, they believe that institutions do not affect the realm of international politics (Mearsheimer 1994, 7).

Derived from this vision on institutions, the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) was developed as the counterpart of Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which states that democratic states do not engage in intergovernmental conflicts with each other. According to HST, states can occasionally operate through institutions, but it is the most powerful actors in the system who shapes the institution in accordance to its own preferences. Cooperation is achieved through reward and/or coercion by the hegemon within the institution, which enables the most powerful actors to influence other actors within their sphere of influence. (Bayar & Kotelis 2014, 243). The ultimate goal of the cooperation, according to HST, is the creation of stability resolving around the preferences of the hegemon (Clark 2011, 15-7).

Based on the neorealist theory, international cooperation is motivated by self-interest states aiming at maximizing their gains, which can be of a military and/or socio-economic nature, in order to survive. This means that the establishment of ECOSOCC should, if it were in line with neorealism, provide a material incentive for the Member States who were mostly responsible for its establishment. Following this logic, one would thus expect that the most influential actor(s) at the establishment and shaping of the African Union recognized a possible benefit in the creation of ECOSOCC. This leads to the first hypothesis:

> *H1: If neorealism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the creation of the organ follows an assessment of opportunity-increase of the political influence for the main actors responsible for shaping the AU.*

According to the Hegemonic Stability Theory, an international organization is shaped in accordance to the preferences of the most powerful actor(s) within the organization. Through this actor's influence, stability is created amongst members. Following this theory, we would expect the structure and activities of ECOSOCC to reflect those of the most powerful actors within the African Union. The hypothesis derived from this theory would therefore be:

H2: If neorealism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the ECOSOCC model should support the preferences of the most powerful actor(s) within the African Union.

3.2 Social Constructivism

In contrary to neorealism, social constructivism – also called constructivism – is a relatively young theory in IR. Regardless, in under three decades, the theory managed to climb the ladder of influence and become one of the leading theories in the field. Constructivism as a theory arose from the challenges presented by neorealism and neoliberalism. As opposed to the focus on structure offered by these theories, constructivism is more interested in the process of how interaction and learning can change both behavior and identities. With this, constructivism has reframed the study of international relations to explain how identities and interests are formed (Wendt 1992, 291-2). The ideas of individualism and materialism have been contested by constructivists since the end of the 1980s, and its rise was especially enabled by the end of the Cold War and the resulting changes in the global system (Barnett 2011, 56-7).

The concepts of idealism and holism represent the core ideas of the theory. Idealism refers to the social constructability of ideas through knowledge, experience and interpretation. For example, the concepts of power politics and self-help are institutions that do not exist as such, but are ideas debated and given shape by states, as is for example the concept of anarchy. Holism refers to the concept that because of social constructability, the world does not have a fixed structure or unchangeable states, as these are dependent on their underlying norms (Wendt 1992, 394; Barnett 2011, 158).

A third important concept in constructivism is interaction and the relationship between agents and structures. Through the exchange of norms and practices, actors are able to grow an understanding of others and develop a relationship. Constitutive norms are responsible for creating the image by which actors judge others. In constructivism, it is very important to understand that actor's identities are what define their preferences, and their preferences are responsible for shaping their behavior in accordance to other actors (Hopf 1998, 173-5).

The understanding of power in constructivism is also very different from the realist understanding of the concept, even though it is a central theoretical element in both schools

of thought. According to constructivism, power is not only material but also discursive, which means it includes knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology and language. Discursive power enables actors to understand their world, and produces order through predictability which in turn enables trust amongst states (Hopf 1998, 177-9).

In his article "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", Wendt offers a summary of constructivism's three core claims:

1. States are the units of analysis;
2. Key structures in the state systems are holistic and socially constructed rather than material;
3. State identities shape state interests and are to a significant extend constructed by social structures (Wendt 1994, 385).

Cooperation, according to constructivism, can be accounted for through the distribution of identities in interests of relevant states (Hopf 1998, 189). Futhermore, international cooperation enables Member States to take on new identities and interests according to the International Socialization Theory (IST) of social constructivism. According to IST, institutions have the greatest effect not on the external level, but rather on the internal level through the shaping of state interests and behavior (Bearce & Bondella 2007, 703-4). Socialization is defined by Checkel as "a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community" (2005, 804). The process of socialization implies that actors switch from reasoning from a logic of consequences to reasoning through a logic of appropriateness. A distinction can also be made between two types of adherence to the logic of appropriateness: type I and type II socialization. Type I refers to a superficial socialization where the actor changes its behavior in order to fit socially expected norms, without truly agreeing with or liking the behavior in itself. Type II refers to a profound socialization, where actors accept the new norm as the true and acceptable norm. While in type I socialization, the actors only copy the norms, type II socialization shows a change in the actual identity of the actor (Checkel 2005, 804). The proposition of profound, or type II, socialization, represents the key components of constructivism where interests are shaped through identity.

According to constructivist theory, international cooperation is based on the presence of shared identities amongst actors, enabling cooperation. Following this assumption, one would

expect that the establishment of ECOSOCC within the African Union would reflect the identities of the Union's Member States. Following the logic of appropriateness, as the identities of actors and their beliefs of right and wrong are responsible for shaping their interests, one would expect the norm of a positive attitude towards civil society to be pre-existing in the African states who shaped ECOSOCC. This leads to the first hypothesis supporting constructivism:

> *H3: If social constructivism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the norm of an active and included civil society is a reflection of the same norm pre-existing in the Member States of the African Union.*

Besides looking at the motivations behind the establishment of ECOSOCC in its present shape, the constructivist theory can also be tested by looking at the subsequent effect of the organization on the norm representing a positive attitude towards civil society. According to constructivism, cooperation through institutions can shape interests of states over time to make these more similar to the norms represented by the organization. In this light, it would be expected that the norm representing a positive attitude towards civil society experiences a growth in the Member States that did not fully adhere to that norm prior to the establishment of ECOSOCC. This leads to a second hypothesis to test the constructivist perspective:

> *H4: If social constructivism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the organ has enabled a normative change in the practice of Member States in regards to civil society.*

3.3 Sociological Institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism is known under a variety of labels: world polity theory, world society theory or more simply institutional theory. The theory attempts to explain the shapes of structures, identities and behavior of individuals, and nation-states and organization through the influence of global institutions and culture. This theory developed, in the same manner as social constructivism, as a reaction to theories recognizing actor- and power centered elements as the driving forces behind state behavior found for example in neorealism. John W. Meyer is recognized as one of the primal developers of the theory, which evolved in the 1970s and 1980s. (Meyer 2010, 2-3; Schofer et al. 2012, 57-8).

As Meyer puts it, “actors are constructed entities, playing parts as in the theaters. So in realist models, the relation of actor and action is causal, with society and its structure as a product. In phenomenological models, the actor on the social stage is a scripted identity and enacts scripted action” (2010, 4). This position, therefore, does not deny the existence of states as actors, but rather shifts the focus of study towards the institutions responsible for influencing them (Schofer et al. 2012, 58).

According to institutionalism, conventional ideas can be seen as cultural models, also called ‘myths’, which set an example for what nation-states should look like. The global diffusion of ideas and policy models, as explained by Strang and Meyer (1993), is one of the consequences of cultural models (p. 491). Often, cultural models are copied despite the large differences between the context of the original and copying country (Schofer et al. 2012, 58-9).

Institutionalism views global cultural models as products of history, in contrary to being a product of the evolution of values. However, this does not mean that cultural models are ideologies brought forth by hegemonic powers by force. Rather, it is an autonomously driven evolvement of agreed-upon principles (Schofer et al. 2012, 59).

While neorealism and constructivism view states and/or organizations as unitary and coherent actors, sociological institutionalism views them rather as loose and incoherent structures. Because of a lack of clear identity, states make decisions which might not be coherent or logical, but which are inspired by the institutional environment. This often results in policies being incoherent and also often not reflected in policy implementation. This phenomenon is also called ‘decoupling’ (Meyer & Rowan 1977, 357; Meyer 2010, 13; Schofer et al. 2012, 60-1). As an example, Cole presents the case of human rights were many states, including states known for their repressive regimes, have ratified human rights treaties, but showing no actual improvement in the de facto human rights situation (Cole 2005, 477). In short, decoupling is the gap between what states claim they will do on paper, or via rhetoric, and what they are actually doing in reality.

Decoupling can happen for several reasons. Firstly, organizations may want to hide technical anomalies by masking them with the assumption that the structures are working. Secondly, an organization can avoid internal conflict and disputes because integration is avoided. Thirdly, an organization can find more support from external constituents because the claim

of adhering to a policy can grant legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1977, 357). However, decoupling does not necessarily mean that change is entirely absent, as institutional forces can over time affect change even if the organization is loosely coupled. Another important finding is that loose coupling seems to be especially ubiquitous in developing countries, as Drori et al. (2003) show in their paper on the decoupling of science policies in developing countries which rarely result in an actual increase of the scientific labor force (Schofer et al. 2012, 61).

Although Sociological institutionalism and constructivism look similar in many ways, the assumptions of both theories are quite different. Firstly, the state is no longer the unit of analysis within institutionalism as it is in constructivism. Instead, the focus is redirected towards institutions and how these shape state behavior. Secondly, while constructivism emphasizes the logic of appropriateness, stating that states aim to 'do the right thing', institutionalism argues that states rather follow a logic of confidence and good faith wherein the appearance of norm conformity is what grants legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1977, 357-8). Finally, while in constructivism changes are induced from the inside-out, institutionalism rather sees an outside-in influence, where not the existing norms within states influence behavior, but the existence of preferred global models. Together with this assumption goes that not military or economic power, but rather authority is of influence in cultural expectancies (Schofer et al. 2012, 62).

By examining core assumptions of sociological institutionalism, it can be predicted that the establishment of ECOSOCC is largely the result of the logic of confidence and good faith, where the establishing Member States attempted to follow a cultural or global model, or 'blueprint', of how an international organization is expected to function. Thus, the motives for creating ECOCOCC would be to conform to a global model wherein civil society engagement is deemed as necessary. In this light, ECOSOCC would be a copy of a pre-existing model. Following this logic, the first hypothesis in support of sociological institutionalism that shall be tested is as follows:

> *H5: If sociological institutionalism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the organ has been created in accordance to a global cultural model favoring a positive attitude towards civil society, while not necessarily reflecting the attitudes of the Member States.*

Furthermore, the assumption of decoupling can help predict the expected further behavior of ECOSOCC according to sociological institutionalism. Namely, the theory of decoupling predicts that while ECOSOCC on paper fulfills the requirements expected according to cultural models, the loose structure within the organization causes a gap between rhetoric and implementation. Therefore, while ECOSOCC presents a positive motivation of attitude towards civil society inclusion and its role in ECOSOCC in a rhetorical sense, the implementation of the model does not show a similar attitude. This leads to the second hypothesis for testing the sociological institutionalis perspective:

> *H6: If sociological institutionalism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the rhetorical setup of the organ does not correspond to the subsequent practice of the policies included therein.*

3.4 Levels of analysis and observation

The different theories presented in this chapter and the subsequent hypothesis offer different perspectives on how international organizations are shaped. By both looking at the shaping process of ECOSOCC and its subsequent activities should provide the information required for testing the six hypothesis developed in this chapter.

It is important however to also realize that the levels of analysis as well as the levels of observation differ for the three theories which will be tested. The neoliberalist school of thought focusses on the macro- or systemic level, as its focus lies with how the anarchic structure of the global system shapes state behaviour and interaction. Furthermore, the theory follows as state-centric approach. Hence, the level of observation for neorealism is the state.

In contrast, the level of analysis for social constructivism includes both the macro- or systemic and the meso- or domestic levels of analysis. According to the theory, structures in organizations matter to defining how states interact but are shaped at the domestic level. Since social constructivism follows the same state-centric assumptions as realism, the unit of observation for this theory is also the state – its behaviour and its identity.

Finally, the sociological institutionalism school of thought focusses solely on the macro-level, and assumes that state behaviour is entirely defined by cultural models at the institutional level. Because social institutionalism has its roots deeply in sociology, the macro-level here is

less related to the structure of the system, as is referred to in constructivism and neorealism, but rather to large-scale patterns and trends, such as institutions. As opposed to the two preceding theories, the level of observation in sociological institutionalism is not the state but the institution.

4. Methodology

This chapter will discuss the methods of research employed in this thesis. After elaborating on the research design, the key variables for each theory shall be discussed and operationalized. Finally, the case selection will be discussed.

4.1 Research design

This research employs a qualitative research design using a single case study and in-depth analysis. The paper employs a theoretical lens to look at the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union, and employs the method of process tracing to test hypotheses deduced from the theories of neorealism, social constructivism and sociological institutionalism. The process-tracing method attempts to identify causal processes between dependent and independent variables, by identifying processes leading to the occurrence, or absence, of variables (George & Bennett 2004, 206). To this aim, a variety of sources will be used including amongst other things scholarly literature, media sources, reports and survey data. Both content, discourse will be analyzed.

4.2 Operationalization

In order to enable the testing of the hypotheses presented in chapter 3, it is important to first determine and operationalize the independent variables for each theoretical framework. To this end, a list of indicators must be identified and a means of measurement for each indicator needs to be created.

Realism

According to neorealism, the behavior of a state is ultimately defined by its power. Power, therefore, is this theory's dependent variable. The amount of power a state has, is further defined by its capabilities, both material and social-economical. For the purpose of this research, the analysis uses the indicator of political capabilities to measure the change in the dependent variable. Political capabilities can be defined as the political influence of a state, which refers to the ability of a state to influence others. Defined as such, the theory indicates that in order to be willing to create an institution such as ECOSOCC, the institution must create an opportunity to increase the political influence of the state(s) enabling its creation.

In the first hypothesis, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is tested by analyzing whether ECOSOCC created power-increasing opportunity for within the

organizational structure. To test the hypotheses, it must thus be explored whether such opportunities are created by ECOSOCC.

The hegemonic stability theory implies that political influence can also be measured by the way hegemonic powers impose their personal interests upon actors within their sphere of influence using cooperative institutions. The independent variable for the second hypothesis is therefore imposition of interests translated into policies. In order to test the second hypothesis of neorealism, it must be established whether any similarities exist between in policies regarding civil society of the hegemonic power(s) and those of ECOSOCC.

Social constructivism

The main independent variable of the constructivist perspective that shall be used in this paper appropriateness. According to the theory, appropriateness defines how states behave. Appropriateness is not just expressed in an actor's view, but should also be recognizable in its behavior since a norm implies that the actor employing it beliefs it is a 'good thing to do'. What is deemed appropriate or inappropriate is in turn, influenced by the existing norms. Defined as such, the theory indicates that in order to be willing to create an institution such as ECOSOCC, norm for institutionalized civil society needs to exist amongst the actors responsible for its creation.

In the first hypothesis, the relationship between appropriateness and norm is analyzed by measuring the presence or absence of the civil society normative framework amongst the AU member states prior to and during the establishment of ECOSOCC.

Secondly, the logic of appropriateness explains that norms which are prominent in cooperative initiatives, should lead to a strengthening of these norms amongst the members of that initiative. Therefore, because ECOSOCC supports the norm of civil society engagement, this should result in an increased engagement of civil society in Member States, e.g. a change in what is deemed appropriate behavior. The relationship of these variables is that if the independent variable is present, the norm implementation should increase at a state level.

Sociological institutionalism

Finally, the independent variable for the sociological institutionalism framework which is derived from its assumptions and will be used for this paper is the logic of confidence and good faith. According to this logic, states follow existing global models and replicate them onto

their own institutions, without actually adopting the content of the models. The logic of confidence and good faith can be operationalized through two indicators. The first indicator is the existence, or non-existence, of an accepted global model. In causal terms, this means that a global model concerning the engagement of civil society should exist in order for ECOSOCC to find its place in the African Union. Such a culture must be compared against the national culture in order to verify whether the system follows an accepted and institutionalized norm or a global cultural norm which they do not necessarily agree with but implement in order to gain 'good faith'.

A second indicator is deduced from the decoupling theory of institutionalism. In order to keep good faith, states copy existing models but because those are in discourse with their individual context, the models are not implemented, creating a gap between rhetoric and implementation. This means that even though the content might show a certain preference, disjunction of subsequent action will occur. Hence, if the logic of confidence and good faith can be operationalized in this context by looking at the indicator of disconnection between written and implemented action.

4.3 Case selection

There are several reasons why the existence of ECOSOCC has been selected as the case study in this research. The establishment of ECOSOCC first received a lot of praise, but much criticism followed. While an integrated organ for civil society might appears very promising, many critics have pointed towards its ineffectiveness. Many skeptics also pointed to the unlikeliness of a union including many states denoted as non-democratic to truly involve civil society. The peculiarity of the situation, together with the criticism on ECOSOCC, together with the youth of ECOSOCC, and the connected relatively small amount of research done on the topic, forms a sufficient basis to raise the interest upon the question of why the organ was created, which this paper attempts to answer.

Furthermore, since one of the apparent results of globalization is the increase of intergovernmental organizations, testing diverging theories on their motivations might shed light unto greater questions, such as their actual influence in the global society. To this end, researching the root motivations behind the establishment of ECOSOCC can add to existing literature on the subject.

5. ECOSOCC in theoretical perspective

This chapter will draw on the research methods and apply the indicators as discussed in chapter 2 to the establishment and development of ECOSOCC in the African Union. Based on the presence or absence of these indicators, evidence is provided to test the six hypothesis presented in the theoretical framework of this paper. The theories will be tested in the same order as presented in chapter 3, starting will neorealism and continuing with social constructivism. Finally, the theory of sociological institutionalism will be verified. The discussion on which theoretical framework can best be applied on the case of ECOSOCC will subsequently be proposed in chapter 6.

5.1 The neorealist perspective

The two hypothesis that have been constructed using the assumptions proposed by neorealism are as follows:

> *H1: If neorealism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the creation of the organ follows an assessment of opportunity-increase of the political influence for the main actors responsible for shaping the AU.*
>
> *H2: If neorealism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the ECOSOCC model should support the preferences of the most powerful actor(s) within the African Union.*

According to the neorealist theory, the global system is shaped by anarchy and states are driven by motives of self-interest as a result of their instinct to survive within that system. This survival instinct is expressed through the power-seeking behavior of these states. In the theoretical framework, power was defined as a state's capabilities, measured in terms of military, economic and political power. To the end of this research, the focus will be solely on the latest element: political power. Political power is defined as the ability of a state to influence the behavior of others. The proposition outlaid in the first hypothesis is that the establishment of ECOSOCC was motivated by the incentive of states to increase their political influence. To verify the first hypothesis I will therefore attempt to establish whether any such beneficial incentives existed.

To test the second hypothesis, we follow the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) and its assumption that powerful states use cooperative initiatives in order to influence the behavior of others within their sphere of influence. In order to test the hypotheses, I will look at the similarities between the interests of the most powerful Member State(s) of the AU and the way the institution has been shaped.

H1

ECOSOCC was invoked in the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 (Bedjaouni 2012, 19-20). The wording of Article 22.1 defines that the institution was to have advisory power only, thereby restricting in a great manner the amount political influence which could be gained from the institution. Influence-increasing incentives, therefore, must not be sought in ECOSOCC's establishment but rather in the way the institution was shaped. This lengthy process took place between 2000 and 2004 and ended when the Statutes of ECOSOCC were adopted by the Assembly (Kane et al. 2007, 33).

The statutes were prepared by a working group appointed by the Interim President of the AU, and reviewed by State representatives rather than CSOs. When the final statutes were adopted, they included some very peculiar clauses severely restricting eligibility of CSOs to ECOSOCC. For example, CSOs were required to be registered in one of the AU Member States, which, regarding the great lack of formalization in Civil Society in some of the Member States excluded many right away. Additionally, a requirement for funding, which stated that at least 50 percent of a CSOs resources must originate from its own members locked out many CSOs which only existed thanks to foreign funding. During the election procedure of the Second General Assembly of ECOSOCC, these restrictions became very apparent: only 52 of the 219 reviewed applications passed the requirements (Executive Council 2014, 2-3).

Besides the elective nature of the ECOSOCC statutes, the institution has also been criticized for its lack of autonomy from government influence. When the Interim ECOSOCC General Assembly was established in 2005, the institution was headed by the Bureau. This created problems as the Bureau's president at the time, Nobel Laureate Prof. Wangari Maathai, had been nominated into this position by the Executive Council rather than being chosen by CSOs. Moreover, Maathai was at the time serving as a minister in the Kenyan Government. According to civil society leaders, this showed a great disrespect for the institution which had

been meant as an independent CSO forum, lacking governmental influence. In reaction to the nomination of Maathai, Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem commented:

> "[…] THE AU BUREAUCRATS WANTED HIGH VISIBILITY, SOMEBODY THAT WAS MORE AMENABLE TO THEIR OWN CONTROL AND AGENDA AND ACCEPTABLE AND RECOGNIZABLE TO THE HEADS OF STATES […] THE WHOLE PROCESS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE ECOSOCC WAS ENGINEERED, CONTROLLED AND MANAGED AT EVERY STAGE – EVEN THE ELABORATE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS" (QUOTED ON PAMBAZUKA.NET, RETRIEVED ON 05/06/2015)

The suggestion that states attempt to control the CSOs who qualify for ECOSOCC is confirmed in literature (Muchie et al. 2006, 19). The situation in regards to CSO eligibility creates an opportunity for member states to select the CSO representatives and ultimately also the policy advice produced by ECOSOCC. In addition, Gary (1996) claims that Africa shows strong signs of a civil society 'hijacked' by self-interested elites and that the idea that civil society in Africa is independent is a misplaced image. Rather, independent CSOs in Africa are a rare commodity and many CSOs in Africa are closely connected to governments (1996, 163). 'Hijacked' civil society could provide the perfect vehicle for governments to further their interests through the ECOSOCC channel.

CIDO's unclear selection procedure in regards to participants for CSO fora and summits adds to the concerns regarding ECOSOCC member's autonomy. According to reports, there have been instances where CSOs willing to participate in a forum were denied participation on inexplicable terms, while the majority of CSOs present at the forum were mostly CSOs which were known for entertaining close relationships with governments (Kane et al. 2007, 31).

The ability to influence CSO representatives creates a possible benefit for the Member States, who can use ECOSOCC as an additional channel to push for their interests in the African Union. Seeing that there is a possible power-increasing incentive in the creation of ECOSOCC, it can be viewed as a motive for establishing and shaping ECOSOCC according to the neorealist theory.

H2

To test the second hypothesis, it must be determine which Member State of the African Union can be labeled as being the 'most powerful'. The hierarchical ranking according to neorealism

happens in accordance with state's power, which encompasses the military, political and social-economic capabilities.

The National Power Index (NPI) is a methodology which calculates index values for economic capabilities, military capabilities, population capabilities, technological capabilities, energy security and foreign affairs capabilities, and combines them in a formula to create a relatively reliable index for National power (Kumar et al. 2012, 3-5; see appendix E for the NPI formula).

Using this index, we can establish which of the African countries is the most 'powerful', as this will indicate what country has, according to the Hegemonic Stability Theory, been the most influential in shaping the AU. However, data availability forms a problem in this context, and no NPI data is available for the preferred range of 2000-2014, the years during which ECOSOCC was established, its statutes were designed and the institution was given shape. Calculating the NPI for each Member State of the African Union in each of these years is not realistic taking into account the complexity with which the data is created and the amount of data required to calculate the NPI for each Member State of the African Union. Constrained by this fact, the hypothesis can only be tested for one specific year for which there is data available, namely 2012.

In 2012, the Foundation for National Security produced a report calculating the NPI for 27 countries. The selection of countries to be included in the report was made according to selection criteria such as a minimum GDP, a minimum expenditure on defense and the population size. The researchers found 41 countries meeting the basic selection criteria, and subsequently excluded from the list the countries which were of little geopolitical consequence (Kumar et al. 2012, 3). The only two African countries remaining in their list were Egypt and Nigeria.

In regards to Egypt, it is important to note that the country did not remain untouched by the Arab Spring. Uprisings in Egypt started in 2011 and led to the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2012. However, the NPI uses factual data for calculating indexes of military investments and GDP, which are reliable even in periods of political unrest. Additionally, neorealist theory assumes that the behavior of states is influenced by their hierarchical position in the global structure and that power is defined as the capabilities of the states, including the criteria

upheld in the NPI calculations resulting in a. For these two reasons, Egypt is still regarded as one of the main players in Africa, regardless of the Arab Spring.

Because of the restriction in data availability, literature is additionally consulted. Luckily, Egypt and Nigeria are, also in literature, recognized as being two of the main actors responsible for shaping and driving the AU. Additionally, literature recognizes South Africa as a key player in the establishment the African Union (Kingah & Langenhove 2012, 207). Hence, the comparison in the following section will focus on Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa.

The HST assumes that powerful states use cooperative initiatives such as the African Union to influence the behavior of other states to create a stable environment in accordance with their own preferences. To determine whether Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa have attempted to mirror their personal interests upon the African Union, we must look at both their national policies in regard to civil society and the actual situation of civil society in their retrospective countries as an indicator of practical application of these interests. Hence, the indicator for similarity can be found at two levels: policy and situation.

The data required for measuring the indicators can be obtained from USAID. USAID is an U.S. Government agency which aims to end global poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies (USAID.gov, retrieved on 06/06/2015). In this capacity, the agency produces yearly reports evaluating different facets of democratic values in countries around the globe. One of these facets is civil society representation, which is evaluated in CSO sustainability reports. The studies rely on qualitative studies and investigate the conditions for sustainability according to seven dimensions of civil society: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, infrastructure, public image, advocacy and service provision. Each of these dimensions are rated as being either sustainability enhanced, sustainability evolving or sustainability impeded (Fox 2012, 4-6). The reports published in 2012, covering both present and past information on CSO activity, will form the core of analysis outlaid in the following part.

In its 2012 report, USAID categorized Egypt's CSO sustainability as impeded in five out of the seven dimensions, consequently presenting a very grim image of Egypt's civil society. According to the report, CSOs mostly suffered from extensive legal restrictions as well as government harassment and a negative publicity campaign against CSOs (USAID[1] 2012, 6).

After the fall of the Mubarak regime during the Arab Spring in 2012, a new constitution was adopted. In contrary to its predecessor, the new constitution provides significant guarantees for the freedom of association. However, evidence shows that the constitutional change did not result in subsequent policy changes. Rather, the restrictive policies against CSOs which had been in place prior to the new constitution were maintained. The Ministry of Social Solidarity's database includes 37.500 CSOs, but it remains unclear how many of these are active (USAID[1] 2012, 5).

One of the impediments for CSOs in Egypt is the legal framework allowing the Ministry of Social Solidarity great discretion in terms of accepting, or refusing, CSOs. Moreover, the Ministry has the ability to dissolve CSOs and restrict their operations based on vague grounds (USAID[1] 2012, 6). This policy seems to present a similarity with Article 6.3a of the ECOSOCC statutes, which states that only CSOs registered with a Member State can be eligible into ECOSOCC. Hence, the power of civil society is heavily restricted by the preferences of the Member States, or in this case of Egypt.

Another striking coincidence between ECOSOCC and Egypt policy concerning civil society is the focus on a maximum for the percentage of external funding an eligible CSO can receive. Article 6.6 of the ECOSOCC statutes requires CSOs to be funded by at least 50 percent from within Africa. In comparison, Egypt has lead a strong campaign against externally funded CSOs in the past year, increasingly denying permission to CSOs to receive foreign funding. This campaign has been further intensified in 2012 (USAID[1] 2012, 8).

Concerning Egypt, there is strong support for the second hypothesis. Especially the external funding criteria bear a striking resemblance to ECOSOCC regulations. Additionally, both ECOSOCC and Egypt seem to provide structural opportunities for influencing CSO activity: ECOSOCC through the eligibility requirements and Egypt through its vague legal framework allowing the dissolve CSOs.

In comparison to Egypt, Nigeria presents a much more positive situation for CSOs, categorizing the country as being sustainability evolving in the civil society sector. With 57.000 recorded CSOs, Nigeria is the Sub-Saharan country with the largest number of registered CSOs. Besides the large amount of CSOs, USAID also states that CSOs operate without significant government interferences (USAID[2] 2012, 2-5).

Since democratization happened in 1999, political space for CSOs opened up and the sector flourished. CSOs seem to have gained an integrated role in society, as the government shows a generally cordial attitudes and often consults with CSOs on many issues.

CSO registration is regulated by the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990. This act involves transparent registration guidelines, enabling easy and quick registration of CSOs. In contrast to Egypt, there are no known instances of CSOs being denied registration for arbitrary or political reasons. Dissolution of CSOs can only happen through court decisions (USAID^2 2012, 109).

Studying the policies and behavior in regards to civil society, the case of Nigeria does not produce any similarities between its individual policy goals and the ECOSOCC mandate. Therefore it does not seem likely that Nigeria is attempting to enforce its individual preferences unto the modeling of ECOSOCC.

South Africa has the best overall score in terms of CS sustainability according to USAID (USAID^2 2012, 1). Even though CSOs faced financial difficulties as a result of decreased foreign funding, the CS is varied and effective. State interference is very small, although the manifold of Acts regulating CSOs makes the process of registration transparent but also very lengthy and difficult. However, South Africa is one of the few Sub-Saharan countries to have lawyers specialized in civil society related law, and the government provides funding for CSO organizations (USAID^2 2012, 135-6).

Similarly to the Nigerian case, South Africa presents very little resemblance to ECOSOCC in regards to policy and practice. This case does thus not present any support for the second hypothesis.

The second hypothesis has been investigated for three different countries, as the data availability constrained the opportunity for presenting a strong enough case in support of one AU Member State as being the most powerful one. The NPI for 2012 defined Egypt as Africa's most powerful country in terms of military, socio-economic and political terms, as requested by the neorealist school of thought. In contrast, literature suggested a great influence of Nigeria and South Africa in the primal years of the AU. For this reason, all three cases were studied.

If the NPI for 2012 can be regarded as a good indicator for the power structure of the AU in the period between 2000 and 2014, data suggests that Egypt is to be the subject of *H2*. In this case, observations on the policy and practice of ECOSOCC and Egypt show strong similarities, hence supporting the hypothesis.

5.2 The Social Constructivist Perspective

The assumptions provided by social constructivism were used to deduct two hypothesis to be tested in regards of ECOSOCC:

> *H3: If social constructivism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the norm of an active and included civil society is a reflection of the same norm pre-existing in the Member States of the African Union.*
>
> *H4: If social constructivism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the organ has enabled a normative change in the practice of Member States in regards to civil society.*

An important assumption in the constructivist theory is that norms, which adhere to a logic of appropriateness, are responsible for shaping behavior. Additionally, social constructivism assumes that frequent intercourse in cooperative initiatives can lead to norm changes in actors. Investigating whether the logic of appropriateness has been a motive behind the establishment of ECOSOCC can be done in two ways, each corresponding to one of the hypothesis. To answer *H1*, we must start by establishing whether or not the norm for civil society participation was regarded as the appropriate norm within the AU Member States, consequently resulting in the norm flowing into ECOSOCC. *H2*, in contrast, follows the assumption that cooperation within an organization supporting a certain norm can enhance norm change amongst actors in favor of the organization's norm.

Thus, in order to verify the hypothesis, we must look at which norms existed when ECOSOCC was called into life, as well as how norms have changed since its establishment. Moreover, seeing as constructivism is a state-centric theory, the units of research in this section must be states. Establishing whether or not the norms were present in the Member States shall be done using data from Freedom House.

Freedom House is an independent organization which aims at increasing freedom around the world. It functions as a supervisory body and an advocate for citizen empowerment. Amongst scholars, the organization is probably most famous for its extensive databases on topics of democracy, freedom and society (freedomhouse.org[1], retrieved on 06/06/2015).

Since 1972, the organization publishes its anual flagship report 'Freedom in the World', which offers a comparative assessment of civil and political rights in over 195 countries around the globe. Using a detailed assessment, Freedom House scores each country for Political Freedom and Civil Liberty. The publication is made available to everyone on their website. However, not all data used for their publication is available for all years since the first publication. For example, the sub-scores for each surveyed category have only been made available for the last ten years.

Freedom House uses a scale of 0 to 7 to assess each country's Political Freedom and Civil Liberty. The scale of political freedom is based on 40 indicators, while the civil society scale employs 60 different indicators. The indicators are grouped together to form subcategories each drawn from the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and representing a fundamental freedom. These categories are: free and legitimate elections; free participation in the electoral process; accountability of representatives; freedom of expression and belief; freedom of assembly and association; presence of a rule of law and individual rights and freedoms (freedomhouse.org[2], retrieved on 06/06/2015).

The scoring of civil liberties is established by awarding a score for each of the 15 civil liberty indicators. The indicators are questions grouped into four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief; associational and organizational rights; rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights (see appendix F for a complete list of questions). The total of these indicator corresponds to a certain value indicating a country's civil liberties, also called the Freedom Rating. The rating in turn, establishes the status of each country as follows: 1.0 to 2.5 for 'Free', 3.0 to 5.0 for 'Partly Free' and 5.5 to 7.0 for 'Not Free'.

A rating of '1' in Civil Liberty means that a country enjoys a wide range of civil liberties including the freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education and religion. There is an established an just legal system to ensure rule of law and other freedoms such as equality of opportunity. A rating of '2' means that there exist some impediments to civil liberties such

as limits on media independence, restrictions on trade unions and problems with minority rights and/or women. Countries with a rating between '3' and '5' are either moderate protectors of civil liberties or have strong preferences for certain civil liberties while disregarding others. Countries with a rating of '6' have restricted civil liberties, such as limited rights of expression and association and limited religious and social freedoms. Countries with the highest score of '7' are countries with none or only very few civil liberties. Freedom of expression and association is approximately non-existent and states control or dominate most of the economic activities (Freedomhouse.org[3], retrieved on 06/06/2015).

H3

If behavior of states follow norms, and norms follow the logic of appropriateness as assumed by social constructivism, than policy alone is not an indicator for the presence or absence of a norm. Rather, a norms need to be embedded in society and thus be reflected in a state's general practices. If states believe in the 'appropriateness' of a certain behavior, or in other words that it is the 'right thing to do', policy without integration is not possible. For this reason, the Freedom Rating should be a good indicator of the presence, or absence, of the norm of civil society representation in the AU Member States.

Amongst the data available on the Freedom House website, we can find a list of aggregated scores of civil liberty, as determined by the method outlaid above, for each individual state in the period 1972 to 2013. From the available dataset, I have selected all the African Union Member States except for the Democratic Arab Republic of Saharawi, also known as Western Sahara, which does not appear in the dataset. Data for South Sudan is available from 2012 onwards, after the state was officially recognized as an independent entity. From the selected data, a new set was created showing the average score for the AU Member States for each consecutive year. This data is shown in graph 5.1.

The data used for creating graph 5.1 can be found in appendix G. The complete dataset including the Freedom Ratings per country can be found in appendix H.



[Graph 5.1: Average of aggregated Civil Liberty Score of AU Member

A few observations can be made from graph 5.1. Firstly, the data shows that in average, civil liberties in Africa over the entire period is ranked as partly free at best as it never reaches below 4. Secondly, the graph shows a small but positive change in favor of civil liberty throughout the years. From 1986 onwards the average civil liberty score for African Union members dropped from a 5.7 in 1986 to a 4.5 in 1991 . After shortly rising again to 4.9 1994, the average civil liberty score declined again until 2004 to 4.1, after which a gradual rise is seen until 2014, where the average reaches a score of 4.4.

According to Akokpari et al. (2008), the Heads of States and Governments, to a large extent, agreed with the necessity of a people-centered AU when they agreed to establish ECOSOCC in the Constitutive Act of the AU in 2000. Additionally, they claim that the need for a CS in the development of Africa was generally recognized (2008, 291-2). This attitude corresponds with the Freedom House data, as the CS liberties had slowly been declining prior to 2000, which indicates a change in the norm favoring Civil Society.

The increase in civil liberties between 1986 and 1990 also corresponds to the establishment of the Arusha Charter, implying the positive change in the data corresponds to a positive change in attitude, or norm, in favor of civil society in AU Member States. The Arusha Charter is a document established by the OAU which claims the importance of civil society for the development a Africa. The document states:

> "We furthermore observe that given the current world political and economic situation, Africa is becoming further marginalized in world affairs, both geo-politically and economically. African countries must realize that, more than ever before, their greatest resource is their people and that it is through their active participation that Africa can surmount the difficulties that lie ahead." (Arusha Charter 1990, 5).

The process of establishing the ECOSOCC statutes, which in due course defined the institution's mandate, began in 2000 and ended in 2005 when the statutes were accepted by the Assembly. During this period, the average civil liberty score improved marginally from 4.5 in 2000 to 4.1 in 2005. It was previously discussed how the statutes severely limit the ability of ECOSOCC to function properly, especially because of the restrictions to CSO autonomy. In this regard, a change in average attitude towards civil society in Africa does not correspond to the drafting of restrictive statutes for the institution.

It must be recognized, however, that even though the data shows a positive change in attitude regarding civil liberties in AU members states, the change is rather limited and therefor it could alternatively be argued that the amount of change is not sufficient to constitute a norm change, but rather a mere improvement or slow move in the direction of a new norm.

If positive norm change was to be defined as the transition from one categorization to another, e.g. from 'Not Free' to 'Partly Free' or from 'Partly Free' to 'Free', only six out of 52 countries (excluding South Sudan) would satisfy the definition in the period between 2000 and 2014. Four other countries in this period experienced a decrease unto a lower category and the remaining 42 countries remain in the same category (see table in appendix H). Thus, in these terms the hypothesis can not be supported.

Observations of trends in attitude towards civil society in African Union Member States does not support the third hypothesis. While a change in norms according to the Freedom House data corresponds to the drafting of the Arusha Charter in 1990, the subsequent trends do not match the events surrounding ECOSOCC. Firstly, the establishment of ECOSOCC in the AU charter in 2000 followed a period wherein the general attitude towards civil liberties in Africa decrease, which presents a first. Secondly, the drafting of restrictive statutes for ECOSOCC between 2000 and 2005 was simultaneously accompanied by a small increase in civil liberties, again not falling in line with expectations raised by the hypothesis.

While the descripted trends in data seem to be only marginal, the definition of norm change not as a process but defined as a change in a country's liberty status according to Freedom House reinforces the observation. Therefore, *H3* cannot be accepted.

H4

The second hypothesis drawn from the constructivist perspective follows the assumption that through frequent cooperation, actors will take over the norms prominent within he cooperative initiative. In this respect, it would mean that the norm which promotes a positive attitude towards civil society, as exerted in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and expressed through the establishment of ECOSOCC, should be reflected on the Member States of the organization.

To research whether states have been influenced by the norm promoting a positive attitude towards civil society in the AU, I have created a dataset compiled of country-specific data from Freedom House. Every year between 2006 and 2015, Freedom House published detailed data including the scores awarded for the sub-categories of each rating. One of the subcategories used by Freedom House to rate civil liberty is the sub-category Associational and Organizational Rights. This sub-category is defined according to indicators in the form of questions regarding (1) the freedom of assembly, demonstration and public discussion, (2) the freedom of NGOs and (3) the existence of trade unions, peasant, professional and private organizations or equivalents and the possibility of collective bargaining (Freedomhouse.org[3], retrieved on 06/06/2015; see appendix F for the complete list of questions as provided by Freedom House). Summarized, this sub-category scores the opportunities for civil society to develop and exist within a country.

From the data, I have distilled all the sub-scores for Associational and Organizational Rights of every AU Member State, except for the Democratic Arab Republic of Saharawi, and calculated the average for all the AU Member States (the table including this dataset can be found in appendix I). Finally, the data was used to create graph 5.2. Contrary to the Freedom Score, this data employs a positive scale 0 to 12. This means that a higher score on the scale means a better position for civil society in the Member State(s).

The decreasing trend in graph 5.2 is very obvious. Except for two short periods during which the average civil society opportunities increased between 2006-2007 and 2011-2012, it

generally paints a grim picture of the prospects of civil society opportunities in Africa. It should be noted, however, that the scoring for this sub-category happens on a scale of 1 to 12 and the graph only displays the range 5.4-6.6, meaning the effect is optically magnified on the vertical scale. For this reason, the graph paints appears more negative than when the entire scale was to be displayed. To illustrate, the total difference between the averages in 2006 and 2015 are 0,6 point, which only accounts for a decrease of 10 percent over ten years.



[Graph 5.2: Average scoring on Associational and Organizational Rights of AU Member

If we look at the numbers of each individual country, the negative outlook perseveres. From the 53 states in the dataset, only 8 show an increase in the Associational and Organizational Rights indicator in contrast to 26 countries showing a deterioration. The remaining 19 countries received the same score in 2015 as in 2006.

From the data, an increase in the positive attitude towards civil society cannot be observed as the data shows an overall decrease of civil society opportunities in AU Member States. Even though we have to take into account the relatively young age of ECOSOCC, from a constructivist perspective we would assume to see an improvement in civil society opportunities in the AU Member States, or in a scenario were the short time-span would be of influence, at least a generally stable trend in this regard. However, both the average numbers as well as the amount of states which have had a decreasing score for the

Associational and Organizational Rights indicator point out that this is not the case. Therefore, there is no support for *H4* and the hypotheses cannot be accepted.

5.3 The Sociological institutionalist perspective

The assumptions brought forth by institutionalism have steered the development of two hypothesis aiming at testing this theoretical perspective:

> *H5: If sociological institutionalism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the organ has been created in accordance with a global cultural model favoring a positive attitude towards civil society, while not necessarily reflecting the attitudes of the Member States.*
>
> *H6: If sociological institutionalism is the correct approach to understanding the establishment of ECOSOCC, the rhetorical setup of the organ does not correspond to the subsequent practice of the policies included therein.*

In order to verify the theoretical perspective, we must first establish whether an improved role for civil society is viewed as a global culture. According to institutionalism's logic of good faith and confidence, states adopt acclaimed models and replicate them, without necessarily agreeing with their content. In this regards, three circumstances are expected to occur: (1) the normative civil society framework is regarded as a global culture, (2) the global culture is not a feature of AU Member States's national cultures and (3) the model belonging to this global culture has been mirrored in the AU model. This will form the basis for the evaluation of the first hypothesis.

The second hypothesis for institutionalism follows the theory of decoupling. Decoupling is a result of states adopting models without having the intention of bringing the model into practice, or not being able to as the context onto which the model is copied is not appropriate. To test the hypothesis, it must therefore be established whether there is a discrepancy between ECOSOCC in rhetorical terms and ECOSOCC in practice.

H5

Civil society is defined in literature as 'the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by legal order or set of shared rules' (Diamond 1994, 5). Civil society functions as a channel for people to

influence policy, by channeling general concerns and demands from interest groups, such as minority groups, thereby adding a normative component to debates (Kamstra 2004, 21). In the strong words enounced by Secretary General Kofi Anan, NGOs function as “the conscience of humanity” (quoted in Malone 2004, 374).

The two main functions of civil society are its task as a watchdog for democracy, scrutinizing abuse of state power and its mission to encourage broader participation of society in public matters. As a result of these functions, civil society is seen as a necessary element to ensure governmental accountability and transparency as well as to increase a state’s capacity for good governance and rule of law (Mercer 2002, 7; Diamond 1994, 5; Leyachi 1995, 186). The presence of good governance and rule of law, in turn, legitimizes the authority of states (Diamond 1994, 7). These assertions in regard to the importance of civil society as a requirement for state legitimacy flourished in the liberal democratic ideology which was flourishing in the post-Cold War era (Makinda & Okumu 2008, 31). As a result, an increasing number of regional organizations started incorporating these ideals into their constitutions (Maluwa 2012, 38). The inclusion of civil society had become a ‘global culture’.

In Africa, this global culture was already recognized in Africawith the adoption of the Arusha Charter by the OAU in 1990. The charter, more specifically, claimed civil society was required to regain a place in world affairs – notably geo-politically and economically (Arusha Charter 1990, 5).

In order to assess the national culture of AU Member States, data from Freedom House can be used. In chapter 5.2, it was established that civil liberties in the AU Member States are in average quite poor. In 2000, the year the AU was formally established, the average civil liberty score of the Member States of the African Union was a mere 4.5 on a scale of 0 – 7 wherein a ‘0’ indicates great liberty and ‘7’ no liberty. A 4.5 officially ranks as ‘Partly Free’ in the Freedom Score, but is way above the minimum score (2) required for gaining a categorization as ‘Free’. Furthermore, if we look at the scoring on the civil liberty scale per country, we can observe that from the 53 countries available in the data, only 5 are defined as ‘Free’, while 33 fit the category ‘Partly Free’ and 15 are categorized as ‘Not Free’ (data available in appendix H).

Thus, these observations do not support the presence of a positive national culture towards civil society. They do however, support the assumption of the presence of a global culture regarding civil society.

According to sociological institutionalism and the logic of confidence and good faith, global cultures are copied by actors in order to gain legitimacy because the global culture is 'generally accepted'. Moreover, states who want to be accepted into the system are required to employ these cultures in order to be regarded as legitimate entities permitted to participate in the system. According to sociological institutionalism, this expectancy results in the adoption of the matching models but are not implemented as they often don't fit with the context or national culture of the state adopting it.

Literature supports the claim that the AU was modeled after the flagship of integrated liberal democratic ideologies: the European Union. Imitation of the EU was encouraged by globalism and resulted in aspirations from African leaders to establish a continental body which mirrored the European Union and its features (Makinda & Okumu 2008, 35; Maluwa 2012, 38).

On paper, the AU shows striking similarities to the EU, especially in its architecture. The AU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government is comparable to the EU's European Council, the AU's Executive Council is very similar to the EU's General Affairs Council, the AU's Committee of Permanent Representatives is akin to the EU's Permanent Representatives Committee and the AU's ECOSOCC is the EU's Economic and Social Committee. Furthermore, the two organizations have the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament in common (Babarinde 2007, 8-9).

The influence of the European model on the shaping of the AU has not been hidden by those involved in its establishment. For example, President Gaddafi admitted that the inspiration for the AU had been drawn from the EU. Similarly, references were made at the Lusaka summit in 2001 to the AU 'being loosely based on the European model (au2002.gov, retrieved on 07/06/2015; Babarinde 2007, 8).

In observing the different indicators for *H5*, it can be recognized that there is strong support for the fifth hypotheses. Firstly, it was established that civil society participation for governmental legitimacy, especially with the rise of the liberal democratic ideologies, constitutes a global culture. From Freedom House data, it was furthermore established that

the lack of civil liberties in most of the AU member states points out that the attitude towards civil society does not match this global culture, and finally that the AU model was designed in accordance with liberal democracy's flagship intergovernmental organization: the EU. From these observations, *H5* can easily be accepted.

H6

Using the example of AU reluctance to invoke its right of intervention in Darfur and Sudan, Maluwa (2012) points out that the AU does not inspire confidence in its willingness to fulfill the promises in regards to human rights, democracy and good governance as enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act. Maluwa continues with asking the very poignant questions, which are at the heart of this paper's sixth hypothesis:

> "DOES THE AU TRULY REPRESENT A QUALITATIVE CHANGE AND TRANSITION FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW? IS THE AU INDEED READY TO GO BEYOND LIP SERVICE AND APPLY THE NEW NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY THE CONSTITUTIVE ACT AND OTHER RELATED LEGAL INSTRUMENTS TO FACE THE CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES FACING THE CONTITENT?" (MALUWA 2012, 46).

A report published by the Center for Conflict Studies in 2005, expresses similar concerns when it implies that the AU needs to improve and better implement its structures if it truly desires to work together with civil society. According to their survey of the AU, the objectives which motivated the establishment of ECOSOCC are severely impaired by the lack of respect for the institution amongst African leaders (Murithi & Ndinga-Muvumba 2005, 11).

Also civil society actors have expressed a growing concern, stating that the original enthusiasm with which the establishment of ECOSOCC was met had given way for a more pessimistic view:

> "[..] MANY STAFF SEEMED TO RETAIN THEIR OLD HABITS AND ATTITUDES. THERE ARE STILL CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN OTAINING ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT POLICIES AND DOCUMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION BY AU ORGANS, PREVENTING EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION BY AFRICA'S CITIZENS IN CONTINENTAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES" (KANE ET AL. 2007, 1).

Additionally, Kane et al. (2007) warn that the legal framework and institutional arrangements of ECOSOCC need to be simplified and improved in order to increase the effectiveness of the organ (2007, 2). These concerns and questions point in the direction of a gap between

ECOSOCC's stated motives, which was to become a people-driven organization through the establishment of ECOSOCC and PAP, and the current practice of the organization.

To define whether ECOSOCC fulfills its promise to involved civil society through ECOSOCC, the intentions given for creating the institution must be established an compared to the practical implementation.

One of the objectives stated in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act is to "promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples" (AU Constitutive Act, 5). The principles outlaid in the following Article further denotes that the Au shall function in accordance with the principle of "participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union" (AU Constitutive Act, 6). These ideals were given shape in the establishment of PAP and ECOSOCC, which were to have the function of becoming the representatives for participation of the African peoples. This aim is in accordance with the global culture of an involved civil society which came hand in hand with the flourishing ideals of liberal democracy.

In practice however, the interests of the people and their ability to participate is not as idealistic as the goals from Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act. ECOSOCC, as was noted before, was originally invoked in Article 22 the Constitutive Act of the AU. The specific article contains only two clauses:

> "1. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union.
>
> 2. The functions, powers, composition and organization of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be determined by the Assembly." (AU Constitutive Act, 15).

While not being a very elaborate Article, one important observation is that Article 22.1 establishes ECOSOCC solely as an advisory organ. In accordance, while Article 22.2 mentions that the powers of ECOSOCC shall be determined by the Assembly, the practical power of the institution is already set in Article 22.1 and the Assembly cannot change this. While the statutes of ECOSOCC can easily be amended and do not require long and difficult procedures due to set protocols (Kane et al. 2007, 33), the possibility for ECOSOCC to become more than a mere advisory body of the AU does not fall under this same reasoning as it requires a constitutional amendment: a process much harder to fulfill.

This information is in line with the critique the AU has received for ECOSOCC. Muchie et al. (2006) for example conclude that the institutionalization of civil society is not sufficient to be of any real influence within the AU (2006: 20). Similarly, Makinda and Okumu place big question marks behind the amount of power that states are willing to give to the people through institutions such as ECOSOCC (2008: 35).

When looking at the further mandate of ECOSOCC as defined by its statutes, we can observe more discrepancy between rhetoric and practice. As discussed before, the ECOSOCC statutes include several clauses that are severely restrictive to CSO eligibility, i.e. the requirement of a minimum funding originating from its own members, and the requirement that CSOs are registered with one of the Member States. These clauses are constraints on the autonomy of ECOSOCC members as they enable governmental influence over CSOs in the institution. As the autonomy of CSOs is a requirement for an effective civil society (Kamstra 2014, 26; Mercer 2002, 7), these restriction are very derogating for ECOSOCC's ability to function properly, as CSOs might no longer be the 'voice of the people', but rather the 'puppets of governments'.

The problem regarding the autonomy of participating CSOs is further aggravated by ECOSOCC's dependence on CIDO and the vague selection criteria they uphold (Akokpari et al. 2008, 298-301; Kane et al. 2007, 6). This is very well illustrated by the reports reciting how civil society leaders could not participate in CSO summits because they were denied the required visa to enter the into the host country, as a result of host government's desire to exclude CSOs from participation.

Practice at the national level does not show large support for the implementation of a normative civil society framework either. Little evidence was found that steps had been taken by Member States to create the institutions needed for the functioning of ECOSOCC. Furthermore, a significant absence of efforts by the Member States to engage civil society in decision making is persevering (Kane et al. 2007, 2).

While the statutes of ECOSOCC were adopted already in 2005, knowledge about the organ among civil society in Africa is generally low. Kane et al. point out this problem already in a report published in 2007 (p. 6), but the problem is further illustrated by the need for the Bureau to extend the election deadline for ECOSOCC members twice in 2013 and 2014. Consequently, the end result of the elections are not very hopeful: ECOSOCC is at the present

comprised of only 64 out of the possible 150 members (CCR 2012, 26; Akokpari et al. 2008, 303).

The ECOSOCC General Assembly was only elected in December 2014, and did not have much time to prove what ECOSOCC is worth in practice. The Interim General Assembly which steered the institution prior to these elections has been mostly busy with preparing the elections of the General Assembly and sensitization missions in order to raise the amount of applications to the elections. Additionally, the institution is still working on creating its foundation. The problem of the small representation in the General Assembly is also very problematic: roughly two thirds of the available seats remain empty.As a result, ECOSOCC has called for new elections and is currently taking applications until 31 December 2015 (www.au.int[7], retrieved on 07/06/2015).

The observations show a strong support for the presence of decoupling the case of ECOSOCC. There is much critique toward ECOSOCC for not fulfilling its envisioned promise as an institution. The Article responsible for the establishment of the institution restricts its power to a mere advisory role, and the statutes and structure of the institution allow opportunities for member states to influence which CSOs are represented, creating an impediment for the ideal of autonomous CSOs. Moreover, the little amount of knowledge of ECOSOCC among civil society, together with the lack of publicity and structural arrangements by the member states has resulted in a relatively small amount of applications and even smaller amount of eligible members for the ECOSOCC General Assembly, which is currently comprised of only 52 CSO representatives instead of the intended 150. Member states have shown no imperatives to contribute to the strengthening of the organization and even seem to lack respect for it. So far, the institution has not been able to achieve much of its intended goals. For these reasons, *H6* can be accepted.

The overall findings of this analysis will be discussed in chapter 6.

6. Discussion

The results from the application of the three theories on ECOSOCC in the previous chapter show the most support for the theoretical perspectives of neorealism and sociological institutionalism. In contrast, neither of the two hypothesis deduced from social constructivism were supported by observations from the case study. Both prior to and after the establishment of ECOSOCC the lack of norm improvement in regards to CSOs shows very little backing for the social constructivist assumption that norms enhance behavioral change and vice versa. Consequently, both constructivist hypothesis were rejected and the perspective was ruled out.

Realism shows strong support for both its hypothesis. ECOSOCC is structured in such a way that member states have opportunities enabling selectivity and manipulating the CSOs in ECOSOCC, hence gaining an extra voice in the institution. Additionally, the observations showed great similarities between policies and practices of ECOSOCC and Egypt, the AU's most powerful state according to neorealist standards. Both these hypothesis show that strong power-increasing incentives existed to motivate the establishment of ECOSOCC and influence the way it has been structured.

The two hypothesis for testing the appropriateness of sociological institutionalism in explaining why ECOSOCC could both be accepted. Evidence was provided showing how civil society erupted as a global culture part of the neo-liberal democracy ideals which flourished in the post-Cold War era. The normative civil society framework is seen as a necessity for legitimizing authority of governments, and can therefore be categorized as a global culture. The sharp contrast between the AU as an institution supporting global culture and the national culture of AU member states which does not support global culture further supports the nationalist assumptionsAdditionally, there is strong evidence to show that the AU model is copied from the EU, which is often seen as the flagship of liberal democracy, which further supports these assumptions. The second hypothesis used to test the theory considered the gap between rhetoric and practice, also called decoupling. The case study showed much support for this hypothesis as well.

Neorealism and sociological institutionalism show some parallels as well. Decoupling, for example, is also visible in the case study of Egypt of which the observations support the

neorealist theory. Additionally, the acquisition of legitimacy through the adoption of global cultures can form an incentive for states according to the neorealist theory, as the legitimacy of authority gained through the rhetorical adoption of the model could raise the influence for the organization and its units on the international stage. As these theoretical perspectives address different levels of analysis, they show a complementary, rather than a competing, nature. It seems, therefore, that the establishment of ECOSOCC can best be explained by a combination of neorealism and sociological institutionalism.

7. Conclusion

The research question 'which theoretical perspective best explains the creation of the Economic, Cultural and Social Council in the African Union?' is the foundation of this research. In order to answer this question three different perspectives, each originating from a different theoretical schools of thought, were used to study the establishment and practice of ECOSOCC. Each of the theories employ different assumptions in order to describe why certain thing happen and others don't. Neorealism is based on assumptions of an anarchic world in which self-interested states compete for power, and that their position in the international structure is what defines the behavior of states. In contrast, the social constructivist view assumes that it is not the need for power, but norms and the logic of appropriateness that shape state behavior. Finally, sociological institutionalism assumes that global cultures shape how states present themselves, but that decoupling between rhetoric and practice is a necessary consequence because national and global cultures do not fit correctly.

In order to test the neorealist perspective on the case of ECOSOCC, we looked for the presence of possible power-related incentives in the creation of the institution. Secondly, the national practices in regards to civil societies of the most powerful/influential AU member states were compared with the policies of ECOSOCC. This helped determine whether these states are using ECOSOCC in order to influence the behavior of those in their sphere of influence, as expected by the neorealist hegemonic stability theory. In regards to the first hypothesis, observations supported the presence of power-increasing incentives as a possible incentive for states to create ECOSOCC and shape its structures as they currently are. The second hypothesis was also strongly supported by the case study as Egypt, which meets the definition of most powerful Member State of the AU, has very similar policies and practices in regards to civil society as the AU.

The social constructivism theory was tested following its norm-based assumptions. According to this theory, state behavior is influenced by norms and the logic of appropriateness at the national level. Additionally, frequent intercourse between actors in a cooperative initiative propagating a certain norm should result in a positively change of this norm at the national level. Hence, this perspective was applied by testing the indicators determining the adoption of the global culture as a contradiction to national culture and according to decoupling. In contrast to neorealism this case study showed no support for either one of its hypotheses, as

the indicators for norm changes did not correspond between the Member States and ECOSOCC.

Sociological institutionalism was tested according to its logic of good faith and confidence and decoupling theory. The logic of good faith and confidence assumes that states copy international models which adhere to global cultures in order to gain legitimacy in the international system, while the systems don't necessarily fit the national context or culture. Additionally, decoupling assumes that as a result of the previous assumption, a gap between rhetoric and practice of policy evolves within these copied systems. Both hypothesis for this perspective were strongly supported by the case analysis. The normative civil society framework can be regarded as a global norm and the AU has been, at least in parts, copied from the European Union while at the same time being in sharp contrast with the AU Member States national cultures and contexts. Accordingly, the adoption of this global structure shows great discrepancy with the application of the civil society norm which was rhetorically adopted in the AU constitutive Act, thereby further supporting the sociological institutionalist perspective.

While both neorealism and sociological institutionalism present a strong case for explaining the establishment of ECOSOCC, the theories need not be regarded as contradictory but rather as complementary perspectives using two different levels of analysis. Together, neorealism and sociological institutionalism seem to best explain the creation of ECOSOCC in the African Union.

Appendix

Appendix A: Objectives of the African Union, as stipulated in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act

Article 3

Objectives

The objectives of the Union shall be to:

(a) achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;

(b) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;

(c) accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;

(d) promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;

(e) encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(f) promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;

(g) promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;

(h) promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;

(i) establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;

(j) promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;

(k) promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;

(l) coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;

(m) advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology;

(n) work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

(AU Constitutive Act, 5-6)

Appendix B: Principles of the African Union, as stipulated in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act

Article 4

Principles

The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles:

(a) sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union;

(b) respect of borders existing on achievement of independence;

(c) participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union;

(d) establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent;

(e) peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly;

(f) prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union;

(g) non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;

(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;

(i) peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security;

(j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security;

(k) promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union;

(l) promotion of gender equality;

(m) respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;

(n) promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development;

(o) respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;

(p) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.

(AU Constitutive Act, 6-7)

Appendix C: Article 22 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union

Article 22

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council

1. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union.

2. The functions, powers, composition and organization of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be determined by the Assembly.

(AU Constitutive Act, 15)

Appendix D: Eligibility requirements for membership to ECOSOCC, as stipulated in Article 6 of the Statutes of ECOSOCC

Article 6

Eligibility Requirements for Membership

The requirements to be fulfilled by CSOs seeking membership are as follows:

1. Be national, regional, continental or African Diaspora CSO, without restriction to undertake regional or international activities.
2. Have objectives and principles that are consistent with the principles and objectives of the Union as set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act.
3. Registration and status:
    a. Be registered in a Member State of the Union and/or;
    b. Meet the general conditions of eligibility for the granting of Observer Status to non-governmental organizations;
    c. Show a minimum of three (3) years proof of registration as either an African or an African Diaspora CSO prior to the date of submission of application, including proof of operations for those years.
4. Provide annual audit statements by an independent auditing company.
5. Show proof that the ownership and management of the CSO is made up of not less than fifty (50%) of Africans or of African Diaspora.
6. The basic resources of such an Organisation shall substantially, at least fifty percent (50%), be derived from contributions of the members of the Organization. Where external voluntary contributions have been received, their amounts and donors shall be faithfully revealed in the application for membership. Any financial or other support or contribution, direct or indirect, from a government to the Organization shall be declared and fully recorded in the financial records of the Organization.
7. Provide information on funding sources in the preceding three (3) years.
8. For regional and continental CSOs, show proof of activities that engage or are operative in at least three (3) Member States of the Union.
9. CSOs that discriminate on the basis of religion, gender, tribe, ethnic, racial or political basis shall be barred from representation to ECOSOCC;
10. Adherence to a Code of Ethics and Conduct for civil society organizations affiliated to or working with the Union.

(ECOSOCC statutes, 6-7)

Appendix E: National Power Index calculation method

The formula for calculating the value of the sub-indexes of the NPI on a positive scale (higher value means greater strength) from 0 to 100, is as follows:

$$Index = \frac{(Country\ Value - Minimum\ Value)}{(Maximum\ Value - Minimum\ Value)} \times 100$$

(Retrieved from Kumar et al. 2012, page

Within each sub-index, the different indicators used are in the following weightage:

1. Economic Capability (25%)

Parameters		*Weightage*
(i)	GDP	60%
(ii)	Foreign Trade	35%
(iii)	Growth Rate (5 years)	5%

2. Military Capability (25%)

Parameters		*Weightage*
(i)	Armed Forces and Equipment	40%
(ii)	Defence Expenditure	30%
(iii)	Doctrinal Issues	30%

3. Population Capability (15%)

Parameters		*Weightage*
(i)	Size of the country's population (15–64 years)	60%
(ii)	Labour Force (Educated Secondary level and above)	20%
(iii)	HDI	20%

4. Technological Capability (15%)

Parameters		*Weightage*
(i)	R&D (as % of GDP)	30%
(ii)	Control over Critical Technology	30%
(iii)	No. of Scientific and Technical Articles Published	10%
(iv)	Researchers in R&D (per million residents)	10%
(v)	High Technology Exports	10%
(vi)	Total Patents Granted (per million residents)	10%

5. Energy Security (10%)

Parameters		*Weightage*
(i)	Per capita Energy Production	50%
(ii)	Net Energy Imports	50%

6. Foreign Affairs Capability (10%)

Parameters		*Weightage*
(i)	Self-reliance in Defence	30%
(ii)	Membership of Multi-lateral Groupings	30%
(iii)	Role in Global Rule-formulation and Decision-making	30%
(iv)	Soft Power	10%

(Retrieved from Kumar et al. 2012, pages 4 &

Appendix F: Indicator questions for Freedom House scoring of Civil Liberties

Civil Liberties

Freedom of Expression and Belief

1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: In cases where the media are state controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)
1. 2.Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and private?
2. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?
3. 4.Is there open and free private discussion?

Associational and Organizational Rights

1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? (Note: This includes civic organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.)
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

Rule of Law

1. Is there an independent judiciary?
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?
4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?

Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

1. Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education?
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime?
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?

(Freedomhouse.org[3], retrieved on 06/06/2015)

Appendix G: Average aggregated Civil Liberty Freedom Rating of AU member states 1972-2013 - table

Year	Average
1972	5,33333
1973	5,32558
1974	5,20455
1975	5,27083
1976	5,28571
1977	5,3
1978	5,5
1979	5,46
1980	5,44
1981	5,58
1982	5,54
1983	5,7
1984	5,76
1985	5,7
1986	5,74
1987	5,74
1988	5,2549
1989	5,07843
1990	4,66667
1991	4,52941
1992	4,75
1993	4,92308
1994	4,69231
1995	4,63462
1996	4,63462
1997	4,40385
1998	4,51923
1999	4,48077
2000	4,53846
2001	4,40385
2002	4,23077
2003	4,15385
2004	4,09615
2005	4,11538
2006	4,15385
2007	4,17308
2008	4,28846
2009	4,28846
2010	4,26415
2011	4,35849
2012	4,32075
2013	4,37736

(Freedomhouse.org[2], retrieved on 06/06/2015)

Appendix H: Aggregated Civil Liberty Freedom Rating of AU member states 1972-2013 per country breakdown - table

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Algeria	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	4	4	6	6	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Angola	.	.	.	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	4	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Benin	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Botswana	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Burkina F	4	4	4	4	5	4	3	3	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Burundi	7	7	7	6	6	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Cameroon	4	4	4	4	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Cape Verde	.	.	.	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	6	6	6	5	5	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.
C.A.R.	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	7
Chad	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6

Comoros	. .	. .	. .	2	3	4	4	5	5	5	4	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	3	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Congo (...	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Congo (...	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Cote d'Ivoire	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	6	5	6	6	6	5	5	5	6	6	5	4	4	4	4	4	4
Djibouti	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	4	4	4	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Egypt	6	6	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Equatorial G...	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Eritrea	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Ethiopia	6	6	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Gabon	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Gambia, The	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Ghana	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	3	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	6	5	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Guinea	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	5	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	5	5	5	5
Guinea-	..	..	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Kenya	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	4	4
Lesotho	4	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Liberia	6	5	3	4	4	4	5	5	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Libya	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	5	5	6
Madagascar	3	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4
Malawi	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	7	5	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Mali	6	6	6	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	3	3	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	5	4	4
Mauritania	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Mauritius	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Mozambique	..	..	..	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

Namibia	5	5	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Niger	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Nigeria	4	4	4	5	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	6	7	6	6	4	3	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Rwanda	6	6	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	6
Sao Tome &	..	..	..	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Senegal	6	6	5	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2
Seychelles	..	..	..	..	2	3	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Sierra Leone	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	6	5	5	5	5	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Somalia	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
S. Africa	6	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
South Sudan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	5	6	6
Sudan	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	5	5	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

Swaziland	2	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Tanzania	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	6	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Togo	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4
Tunisia	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	3	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	3	3
Uganda	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	4	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	4	5	6	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5
Zambia	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4
Zimbabwe	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	5	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6

Scoring is on a negative scale from 0 to 7:

RED: Not Free (6-7)

YELLOW: Partly Free (3-5)

GREEN: Free (1-2)

(WHITE: missing data)

(Freedomhouse.org[2], retrieved on 06/06/2015)

Appendix I: Freedom house scoring of the indicator for Associational and Organizational rights per AU member state

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Difference
Algeria	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	-2
Angola	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	4	4	4	-2
Benin	11	12	12	12	12	12	11	12	11	12	-1
Botswana	10	10	8	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	0
Burkina Faso	9	9	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	-1
Burundi	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	3	-2
Cameroon	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	0
Cape Verde	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	0
Central African Republic	9	9	6	6	5	5	5	4	1	1	-8
Chad	6	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	-2
Comoros	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	0
Congo	8	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	-2
Cote d'Ivoire	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	7	7	4
DRC	5	5	5	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	-2
Djibouti	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	-2
Egypt	3	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	4	4	1
Euatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eritrea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia	3	3	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	-3
Gabon	6	6	6	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	-2
Gambia	6	6	6	6	5	4	4	4	3	3	-3
Ghana	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	0
Guinea	5	5	5	5	2	6	5	6	6	6	1
Guinea-Bissau	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	5	5	5	-3
Kenya	9	9	9	9	8	8	8	8	7	7	-2
Lesotho	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	-1
Liberia	7	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	0
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6	5	3	3
Madagascar	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	8	0
Melawi	8	8	8	8	8	7	6	7	7	7	-1
Mali	9	9	9	9	10	10	10	4	6	6	-3
Maurithania	6	8	8	5	5	5	4	4	7	4	-2
Mauritius	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	0
Mozambique	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	0
Namibia	12	12	12	11	12	12	12	12	12	12	1
Niger	7	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	1
Nigeria	7	9	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	0
Rwanda	3	3	3	3	4	3	2	2	2	2	-1
Sao Tome and Principe	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	0
Senegal	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	0
Seychelles	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	0
Sierra Leone	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	-1
Somalia	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1
South Africa	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	11	12	12	0
South Sudan							6	4	3	3	-3
Sudan	1	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	0
Swaziland	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	-1
Tanzania	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	0
Togo	3	5	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	6	3
Tunisia	2	2	2	2	2	2	8	7	9	10	8
Uganda	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	4	4	-2
Zambia	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	-1
Zimbabwe	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	3	0
Average	6,3653846	6,5	6,3653846	6,25	6,115385	6,038462	6,075472	5,886792	5,886792	5,773585	-0,60377

Freedom House scoring for Associational and Organizational rights happens on a positive scale of 0 (rights are completely respected) to 12 (rights are completely disrespected).

(Freedomhouse.org[2], retrieved on 06/06/2015)

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